Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 78813-14 November 8, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FARHAD HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, accused-appellant.

QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City,
convicting appellant in Criminal Cases No. Q-11867 and No. Q-11868.
The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Farhad
Hatani y Abolhassan, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal practice of
medicine in violation of R.A. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of
1959 (Secs. 8, 10) penalized by Section 28 thereof with "a fine of not less
than one thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, or by imprisonment of not less than one
year nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court; and considering the circumstances of the case and
the ignominy caused by him to his two teen-aged, female, then unmarried
victims, this Court exercising its discretion granted under said Section 28 of
the law, hereby SENTENCES said accused FARHAD HATANI Y ABOLHASSAN to
pay a fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency AND to suffer imprisonment of five (5) years; and to pay
the costs.
This Court further recommends that after service of his sentence the accused
be deported as undesirable alien (Rollo, p. 35).
The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. Q-11868 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, FARHAD
HATANI y ABOLHASSAN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
SENTENCES said accused to suffer life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua;
and to indemnify the complainant, Precila Borja, in the sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay costs (Rollo, p. 41).
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11867 charged appellant with illegal practice of
medicine, in violation of R.A. No. 2382, otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines the
above named accused, knowing fully well that he has not satisfactorily
passed the corresponding Board Examination, neither is he a holder of a
valid Certificate of Registration duly issued by the Board of Medical
Examiners, as in fact he does not even appear to have taken or completed
the course leading to a medical degree, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously for compensation, fee and salary, paid to him

directly, physically examined Priscila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja Y
Loquero, diagnosed, treated and administer injections on the persons of
Prescila (sic) Borja Y Loquero and Wilma Borja Y Loquero, in Violation of
Section 10, in relation to Section 28, Republic Act No. 2382 (Records, Vol. I, p.
1).
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-11868, charged appellant with Rape, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of July, 1979, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, and while she was deprived of
reason or unconscious after having been drugged or administered medicine,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the undersigned PRECILA BORJA Y LOQUERO without her
consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as
may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code (Records, Vol. II, p. 1).
It appears that in the morning of July 6, 1979, Agustina Borja visited her comadre, Maura
Fontreras, and requested malunggay leaves as medication for her 16-year old daughter,
Precila, who had high fever and loose bowel movement. Upon learning that Precila was
sick, Marita, Maura's daughter, introduced Agustina to her husband, appellant herein,
whom she said was a medical doctor. Marita suggested that her husband treat Precila
and Agustina agreed.
Appellant and Marita went to the Borja residence, where he examined Precila. He gave
her tablets to take and administered two injections (to her), one in the morning and the
second at noon. After each injection, Precila would feel dizzy and fall asleep.
It was appellant's diagnosis that Precila was a drug addict and required further
observation and treatment. Appellant offered to attend to Precila at his house and again,
Agustina agreed in the belief that her daughter was a drug addict.
In the evening of the same day, Precila was fetched by appellant and Marita and was
brought to appellant's house. Again, Precila was given an injection which caused her to
sleep. When she awoke, she realized that she was naked and her entire body was in
pain. Appellant was seated on the bed and was fondling her private parts. Shocked,
Precila called for her mother and tried to get up. Appellant, however, punched her on the
chest and forced her to lie down. He pressed a pillow on her face and injected her again,
causing her to fall asleep.
When Precila awoke the second time, she found appellant in bed with her. He was naked
and fondling her private parts. The pain all over her body lingered. When Precila touched
her private parts, she saw blood stains on her hand. She tried to stand up but she was
too weak. Appellant gave her another injection rendering her unconscious.
The following morning, Agustina went to fetch Precila. Upon reaching the Fontreras'
residence, she went straight to the bedroom, where, to her great dismay, she found
Precila and appellant both asleep and naked. She hurriedly dressed up Precila and
brought her home.
When Precila woke up, she noticed she was already home and her mother was crying.
Precila remained dizzy, with throbbing pains all over her body. When talked to, she was
incoherent.
That evening, Precila's oldest sister, Josefina, a nurse by profession, came home and saw
Precila looking very weak. Her mother, who was crying narrated what she had witnessed
that morning. She also told Josefina that appellant was in the other bedroom, treating
another sister, Wilma whom he also diagnosed as a drug addict. Josefina immediately
proceeded to the bedroom and saw appellant about to inject Wilma.

Josefina saw the open bag of appellant, which contained empty capsules of dalmane and
empty vials of valium. She inquired on the need of the injection and appellant replied
that a second shot of plain distilled water was required to cure Wilma of her drug
addiction. Josefina told appellant to stop but he persisted. Only upon threat that she
would call the police did appellant stop. Appellant and his wife then left the Borja
residence.
The following day, Agustina and Josefina brought Precila and Wilma to the Philippine
Constabulary Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where Josefina and Wilma
gave their statements (Exhs. "D" and "F"). Precila was physically examined by a doctor,
whose medical report stated that Precila's hymen and "deep, healing lacerations" and
that "subject is in non-virgin state physically" (Exh. A). Several needle puncture marks
were also found on Precila's arms and buttocks.
A physical examination was likewise done on Wilma, which showed that she too had a
needle puncture, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report (Exh. "L").
Acting on the complaint filed before the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), a
surveillance of appellant's residence was conducted. Subsequently, a search warrant was
secured from Judge Jose P. Castro of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Armed
with the warrant, CANU agents raided appellant's residence on July 15, 1979.
Assorted drugs, such as dalmane, valium and mogadon, as well as prescription pads in
the name of Dr. Jesus Yap (Exhs. "H" "H-4") and other medical instruments, such as a
"thermometer, a "hygomonometer (sic), stethoscope, syringes and needles, were seized.
The Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") on the prescription slips showed that
these were written by the appellant himself. The report on the chemistry examination of
the seized tablets and capsules (Exhs. "J" "J-1") confirmed the presence of mogadon,
dalmane and valium.
After the preliminary investigation, separate informations for rape and violation of R.A.
No. 2382 were filed. Appellant pleaded not guilty to both crimes.
The defense's version is that in the evening of July 6, 1976, Agustina and Precila Borja
visited the mother-in-law of the appellant, Maura Fontreras. In the course of the
conversation, Agustina asked Marita if she could help Precila. Marita obliged and agreed
to take care of Precila for the night and allow her to sleep in her bedroom.
Precila and Marita chatted the whole night. Accordingly, Precila confessed that she was
not really sick. She merely related her personal problems, involving her parents. She also
admitted her vice, such as drinking, smoking and taking drugs.
Their talk lasted until the wee hours of the morning and during their conversation,
appellant would occasionally enter the room but he never joined their discussion.
Precila and Marita shared the same bed. Appellant; who was wearing only his pajama
pants, slept on the floor at the opposite end of the room.
The following morning Agustina arrived and Marita related some of Precila's problems.
Nothing untoward happened that day and Agustina headed for home while Precila and
Marita followed later.
At past midnight of July 15, 1979, a raid was conducted by CANU agents in the house of
the appellant under the supervision of C1C Agustin Timbol, Jr. The raid was made upon
Josefina's complaint for illegal possession of drugs.
Appellant and his wife were driven out of their bedroom, while three-men remained.
Later, appellant was called to join them in the bedroom and he was shocked to see
assorted drugs scattered around. Appellant denied owning them. Photographs were

taken of him with the drugs. A barangay official was called to attest to the list of the
confiscated drugs. Appellant, however, refused to sign the said list.
C1C Timbol offered to fur the case in exchange of money. Instead of acceding, appellant
demanded to see the search warrant. C1C Timbol failed to show a warrant on the pretext
that they were military men without need of any identification or search warrant.
Appellant, his wife and brother-in-law were forced to join C1C Timbol for questioning in
Camp Crame. Upon boarding the van, appellant saw Josefina aboard kissing C1C Timbol
and both exchanged victory signs.
The trial court rendered two separate decisions and convicted the appellant of both
crimes. In finding appellant guilty of illegal purchase of medicine, considerable weight
was given to the prosecution's exhibits.
The Professional Regulation Commission certified that appellant is not among the list of
registered physicians nor among those with special permit to practice medicine in a
limited scope (Exh. "K").
Appellant failed to refute the Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. "I") released by the
PC Crime Laboratory showing that the signature of Dr. Jesus D. Yap (Exhs. "H" "H-4")
prescribing medicine belonged to him. The pictures also taken during the raid (Exhs. "G"
- "G-8'" undeniably reveal several medical equipment used by practicing physicians.
Notwithstanding the trial court's finding that there was no direct evidence of rape, it
concluded that circumstantial evidence indicate that rape was consummated by
appellant considering the following:
1. The medico-legal examination of victim Precila, taken on July 8, 1979 at
10:25 in the morning or less than 48 hours from the evening of July 6, 1979
found "hymen with deep, healing lacerations at 4, 6 and 9 o'clock position";
thus indicating that the lacerations were recent as they are in the process of
healing; (Exh. "A-1")
2. The above undeniable findings of the expert confirms the statement of the
victim, a young girl of 16 or 17 years of age, that when she held private parts
which were painful then, she noticed blood. (tsn. Alma, Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 45).
The fresh laceration of the hymen further confirms the carnal assault. (People vs.
Ocampo, L-47335, Aug. 13, 1986)
3. In the two short waking moments of the victim she noticed she was naked
and beside her on the same bed was the accused, also naked. (tsn. Alma,
Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 3-5)
4. The accused, then 21 years of age was in the prime of youth, and the
unconscious girl beside him was just 16 or 17 years of age, thus in the full
bloom of womanhood. The sexual excitement on the part of the accused was
therefore exceedingly great.
5. When the mother, Agustina, came into the room of the accused that early
morning of July 7, 1979 she saw her daughter and the accused on the same
bed and both naked. (tsn., Rogato, Jan. 27, 1981, p. 9)
6. The medico-legal found several needle puncture marks on the arms and
buttocks of Precila (Exh. "A"); thus confirming Precila's testimony that she
had been injected by the accused, rendering her unconscious (tsn. Alma,
Feb. 9, 1984, pp. 4-5; tsn., Nenita, May 21, 1984, pp. 3-6; also pp. 29-30).
7. The medico-legal found the victim "in non-virgin state physically." (Exh; "Ai")

8. At the time of the medico-legal examination, i.e. morning of July 8, 1979,

the victim was found to be "incoherent." (Exh. A) after effect of the
injections or drugs.
9. At the time of the incident (July 6, 1979) the Borjas and Frontreras (sic)
were "comadres" and neighbors. There is no enmity between and among
them.
10. Between accused and Marita on one hand, and the victim, her mother,
and sisters, on the other hand, there was no misunderstanding before the
incident. There is absolutely absence of any ulterior motive for the teen-aged
victim or her family to file the serious charge of rape which would expose her
to embarrassment of examination of her private parts and public trial (Rollo,
pp. 38-39).
In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.
Appellant faults complainant for recounting her ordeal only after four years when she
took the witness stand. This argument is misleading. The record shows that the day after
the rape, Josefina and Wilma Borja, accompanied by their mother, Agustina, issued their
statements at Camp Crame. Agustina gave her statement twice on separate days. Precila
did not give any statement due to her weak condition but it cannot be denied that she
was instead physically examined. Suffice it to say, the Medico Legal Report (Exh. "A")
indicates swellings and lacerations and concludes that Precila was no longer a virgin.
Although the records fail to show any sworn statement by Precila, such is not fatal where
the sworn affidavits of her mother, her two sisters and the medico-legal report are
sufficient to show probable cause of rape (People v. Yambao, 193 SGRA 571 [1991]).
Precila was either dizzy or unconscious at the time she was sexually abused. We find her
testimony consistent and credible. While her testimony is limited to the times when she
would gain her consciousness, it is not unlikely that such traumatic incidents would still
be engraved on her mind even four years after.
Appellant's assertion that Precila failed to inform her family of his misdeeds is
explainable. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Precila was still dizzy and
incoherent as a consequence of the injections administered by appellant. In fact, when
Precila was physically examined by the doctor the day after, she was still sleepy and
groggy (TSN, March 31, 1980, pp. 7-8).
Appellant also finds it strange that considering the acts allegedly committed by him
against Precila, the medico-legal report fails to specify any injuries on the body of Precila.
Appellant need not inflict heavy blows on Precila for the simple reason that she was
under sedation. The absence of the injuries does not negate the commission of rape
(People v. Torrevillas, 203 SCRA 576 [1991]; People v. Arenas, 198 172 [1991]) for rape
may be committed after rendering a woman unconscious (Art. 335, Revised Penal Code;
People v. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 [1991]).
Appellant alleges that Precila was no longer a virgin on that fateful day and that her
bleeding was actually the start of her menstrual cycle. It is settled jurisprudence that
virginity is not an essential element of rape (People v. Corro, 197 SCRA 121 [1991];
People v. Banayo, 195 SCRA 543 [1991]). To claim that Precila's menstrual cycle began
on that day is highly speculative.
Appellant claims that the sworn statements of the Borjas (Exhs. "D", "E" and "F") were
antedated and were prepared after the illegal search was conducted in his residence. He
also cites some inconsistencies in said statements. We find the claim to be devoid of
merit. It is only now on appeal that appellant disputes the execution of these affidavits.
When they were presented and offered as evidence, appellant failed to raise such
objections and to refute them.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses merely refer to
minor details, which cannot destroy their credibility (People v. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632
[1991]). This is also true where statements made while on the witness stand are claimed
to be inconsistent with the affidavit, which are generally incomplete (People v. Lagota,
194 SCRA 92 [1991]; People v. Avanzado, 158 SCRA 427 [1988]).
With regard to the second assignment of error, appellant insists that his conviction arose
from insufficient evidence and his failure to prove his innocence.
Indeed, the circumstantial evidence established at the trial are more than sufficient to
prove the guilt of appellant. The Medico-Legal Report on Precila, taken within 48 hours
from the commission of rape confirmed that her hymen had "deep, healing lacerations at
4, 6 and 9 o'clock position" and Precila was "in non-virgin state physically" (Exh. "A").
Furthermore, the report confirms that Precila had at least six needle puncture marks and
swellings, which confirm that appellant had injected her several times.
On the two occasions that Precila woke up, she positively stated that appellant was with
her on the bed and that they were both naked. She also tried to free herself on both
attempts from accused, but, he made her unconscious through injections (TSN, February
9, 1984, pp. 3-5). This is corroborated by the testimony of Agustina, who saw her
daughter and accused together naked on bed (TSN, January 27, 1981, p. 9). These
unbroken chain of events leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused
actually raped Precila.
As held in People v. Yambao, supra, credence is given to the findings of the trial court
where the rape victim's testimony is buttressed by the corroborative testimony of the
mother and the medico-legal report, as well as the report of the police investigator.
It must also be borne in mind that at the time of the commission of the crime, Precila
was just sixteen years old. No young lady at the prime of her youth would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her intimate parts and later bare herself to
the disgrace brought to her honor in a public trial unless she was motivated solely by a
desire to have the culprit apprehended and brought to justice (People v. Patilan, 197
SCRA 354 [1991]; People v. Yambao, 193 SCRA 571 [1991]).
Appellant claims that his right to be presumed innocent was violated. He cites the trial
court's decision holding that it.
. . . finds that with these circumstantial evidences (sic) pieced together the
prosecution has proved the crime of rape, and the burden shifted on the
defense to show the contrary (Rollo, p. 40).
Appellant was afforded a fair trial and in fact he availed of surrebuttal evidence. The
statement of the trial court, as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, implies that the
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction unless the defense
is able to provide evidence to the contrary.
With respect to his conviction of illegal practice of medicine, appellant presented
inconsistent claims. On one hand, he claims that the drugs and other paraphernalia were
planted by the raiding team; while on the other hand, he claims that these were seized
without any warrant.
If indeed the evidence were all planted, how can appellant explain his handwriting on the
prescription pads in the name of Dr. Jesus Yap? A perusal of the photographs showing
accused during the raid, fails to indicate any protestation by him. In fact, the other
photographs (Exhs. "G-l", "G-2", "G-4" "G-8") do not bear any sign of disorder, in
contrast to appellant's testimony that his room was made into a mess during the raid.
The records fail to disclose a copy of a search warrant. However, the prosecution was
able to present its return (Exh. "ZZ") and we are satisfied that indeed a lawful search
warrant was obtained. Besides, the judge who granted the search warrant was the same

judge who initially heard both criminal cases. It can therefore be presumed, that the
search was made with a search warrant and absent of any showing that it was procured
maliciously, the items seized are admissible in evidence (People v. Umali, 193 SCRA 493
[1991]).
The evidence is overwhelming that appellant actually treated and diagnosed Precila and
Wilma Borja. The positive testimony of Agustina, Precila, Wilma and Josefina Borja; the
medico-legal reports (Exhs. "A", "A-7", "C", "L" and "L-1") which attest to the needle
marks; the Handwriting Identification Report (Exh. I); the photographs (Exhs. "G-l "G8") showing assorted drugs and medical equipment in appellant's room; and the
chemistry reports (Exhs. "J" "J-1") prove that appellant was engaged in the practice of
medicine. And as to his allegation that there was no proof of payment, the law
specifically punishes said act whether or not done for a fee.
Appellant claims that Precila admitted in her cross-examination that she was in school
the whole day of July 6, 1979 and it was therefore impossible for him to have treated and
diagnosed her on that date. An accurate reading of the transcript, however, will show
that Precila's testimony was in response to a question regarding her school schedule for
that day.
Finally, appellant claims that the ponente of both decisions was not the trial judge, ergo
said judge was thus deprived of the opportunity to assess the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.
Admittedly, the ponente's participation was limited to the resolution of the cases. The
fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment,
and for that reason the latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case, does not
render the judgment erroneous (People v. Ramos, Jr., 203 SCRA 237 [1991]; People v.
Villamayor, 199 SCRA 472 [1991]), especially where the evidence on record is sufficient
to support its conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the judgments appealed from are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186387

August 31, 2011

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JUAN MENDOZA y VICENTE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal assailing the June 5, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. HC-No. 02734 which affirmed with modification the February 6, 2007 Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 61 (RTC). The RTC found accused Juan
Mendoza y Vicente guilty of having violated Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Version of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution shows that Senior Police Officer 4 Edelfonso Sison
(SPO4 Sison) received information from a long-serving unidentified informant of the
Baguio City Police Offices (BCPO) Drug Enforcement Section (DES) that the accused
contacted him and offered to sell shabu worth P1,000.00 to any interested buyer. The
accused then suggested that they meet at the stairs of the Cresencia Barangay Hall
along Bokawkan Road.
After interviewing the informant, Police Senior Inspector Myles Pascual (PSI Pascual)
decided to conduct a buy-bust operation to entrap the accused. PSI Pascual made
arrangements for the informant, the accused, and the poseur buyer officer to meet on
April 14, 2005 around 2:30 oclock in the afternoon at the stairs below the Cresencia
Barangay Hall along Bokawkan Road. He planned for an entrapment operation and put
together a team, with SPO4 Sison, as team leader; Police Officer 3 Ricky Calamiong (PO3
Calamiong) and PO3 Roy Mateo (PO3 Mateo), as back-up officers; and Police Officer 2
Edgar Antolin (PO2 Antolin), as the poseur buyer.
In coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the entrapment
team proceeded to the area at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, half an hour before the
scheduled time. The team parked their vehicle 20 to 30 meters away from the
designated transaction area. PO2 Antolin and the informant alighted and proceeded to
the stairway to wait for the accused.
Twenty minutes later, the accused arrived and approached the informant. The latter
introduced PO2 Antolin as the buyer. After the accused asked if the buyer had the
money, PO2 Antolin handed over P1,000.00. The accused then gave him two (2) sachets
containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Antolin raised his right hand, the prearranged signal, signifying to the other team members that the transaction had been
consummated. The team rushed to assist PO2 Antolin, who arrested the accused and
recovered the buy-bust-money. PO2 Antolin frisked the accused and recovered five (5)
more small transparent sachets with white crystalline substance from the pants pocket of
the accused. He turned over the same to the team leader, SPO4 Sison.
SPO4 Sison informed the accused in Tagalog the reason why he was being arrested and
apprised him of his constitutional rights. The accused merely nodded but otherwise kept
silent.3 The buy-bust team then took the accused to the BCPO, where PO2 Antolin
identified him as Juan Mendoza, alias "Ampi."
In a preliminary test, the white crystalline substance recovered from the accused tested
positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous
drug.4 The case records state that after the conduct of such preliminary test, the items
confiscated from the accused were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further
analysis and disposition.5
A confirmatory test conducted on the same day by Police Inspector and Forensic
Chemical Officer Cecile Akiangan Bullong yielded the same result. 6
Version of the Accused
The accused alleges that in the afternoon of April 14, 2005, he was walking down Sepic
Road, Baguio City, on his way home from his brothers house in Guisad, where he had
just finished washing diapers and clothes. A vehicle stopped beside him and SPO4 Sison
alighted. The accused knew SPO4 Sison because the latter arrested him for a drug
offense way back in 1997, for which he was convicted and incarcerated in Camp
Sampaguita for five years.
SPO4 Sison showed him a photograph and demanded information about the person in
the photo. When he insisted that he did not know who it was, SPO4 Sison invited him to
the BCPO-DES. As he could not decline, he went along with him.

At the DES, the police again asked him if he knew the person in the photo and a certain
Gary Chua, but he replied in the negative. He was also questioned whether he knew
someone who was selling drugs, and he again replied in the negative. He told the police
that since his release from prison, he no longer dabbled in the drug trade, as he already
had a family. When he told SPO4 Sison that he did not know anyone who was selling
drugs, SPO4 Sison got angry.
After an hour, he was informed that he would be subjected to a drug test. Again, unable
to refuse, he was subjected to a drug test at the BCPO Station 7 laboratory, in front of
the DES. He was then brought to the Baguio General Hospital (BGH) for a medical
examination, and later back to the police station.
During the interrogation at the police office, he did not have a counsel present. 7 SPO4
Sison did not inform him that he was being arrested for the possession of the 5 heatsealed plastic sachets containing shabu.8
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision dated February 6, 2007, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in both Criminal Case No. 24384-R and Criminal Case No. 24385-R. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 24384-R, judgment is rendered finding the accused
GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt and he is hereby sentenced to suffer Life
Imprisonment and to pay a fine of 500,000.00 and in Criminal Case No. 24385-R,
judgment is rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of Twelve (12) Years and One (1)
Day to Fourteen (14) Years, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision10 dated June 5, 2008, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated 06 February 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61
finding the accused-appellant JUAN MENDOZA Y VICENTE guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in Criminal Case
Nos. 24384-R and 24385-R and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of 500,00[0].00, and the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, respectively, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
in that said accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay a fine of 300,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. 24385-R.
SO ORDERED.11
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
In his Supplemental Brief for the Accused-Appellant,12 the accused submits that the court
a quo erred:
In not finding that the procedures for the custody and disposition of
confiscated dangerous drugs in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied
with, rendering the evidence compromised.
In convicting the accused-appellant notwithstanding the fact that his guilt was
not established beyond reasonable doubt.13
Ruling of the Court

The Court finds the arguments of the accused bereft of merit.

In crimes involving the sale of illegal drugs, two essential elements must be satisfied: (1)
identities of the buyer, the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment for it.14
In the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, it must
be shown that: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 15 In this case, all these elements
were satisfactorily proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through
testimonial, documentary and object evidence presented during the trial. PO2 Antolin,
the designated poseur-buyer, testified as to the circumstances surrounding the
apprehension of the accused, and the seizure and marking of the illegal drugs recovered
from the accused. 16 Then, SPO4 Sison corroborated PO2 Antolins testimony and
confirmed that all the confiscated items recovered from the accused were turned over to
him as team leader.17
The accused also argues that the procedure in the custody and disposition of the
dangerous drugs was not observed. The Court finds, however, that the compliance with
the chain of custody rule was sufficiently established in this case.
In the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, the following links must be established:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
from the forensic chemist to the court.18
Regarding the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination, the parties admitted the following facts during pretrial:
1. The fact that the forensic chemist examined the drugs and prepared
the report thereon but qualified that it did not come from the accused;
2. Medico-legal Report;
3. The witnesses to the inventory witnessed the inventory taking, signed
the inventory but they have no knowledge that the drugs came from the
accused.
4. Order of detention, booking sheet and preliminary test;
5. Existence of the pre-operation report and the request for drug test. 19 [Emphases
supplied]
The prosecution also presented several documents that traced how the evidence
changed hands.
The Inventory in the Presence of Witnesses20 (Exhibit "D") listed six small transparent
heat-sealed plastic sachets, each weighing approximately 0.3g and containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu,
previously marked as "ECA" 04/14/0521 , and showed the corresponding photos taken
during the inventory (Exhibit "N").22
The Certificate of Preliminary Test23 (Exhibit "F") prepared under the signature of Marites
Vizcara Tamio of the BCPO DES and addressed to the Baguio City Prosecutor, certified
that on April 14, 2005, at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, she conducted a preliminary test
on the same marked items24 by using Simons reagent on the white crystalline substance

contained in the individually heat-sealed plastic sachets. All the items yielded a "dark
blue color," indicating the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug. The same certificate stated that the alleged confiscated pieces of evidence were
turned over the to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for chemistry analysis and disposition.
Finally, Chemistry Report No. D-044-200525 (Exhibit "G")26 issued by the PNP Regional
Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Bado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet stated that
following a qualitative examination conducted on the same marked items, 27 it was found
that the specimens produced a positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The illegal drugs subject of the buy-bust transaction and those recovered from the
person of the accused were positively identified by PO2 Antolin, marked and presented
as evidence during trial:
Q x x x I am showing you two sachets marked as Exhibit "A" ECA. 04/14/05 BB and a
signature. Now tell us the relation of these sachets which the accused gave to you in
exchange of the 1,000.00?
WITNESS:
A These are the buy bust item, sir.
PROS. CATRAL:
Q Now what does ECA stands (sic) for again?
A Edgar Cortes Antolin, sir.
Q And that will be you
A Yes, sir.
Q And 04/14/05 would be the date of the transaction?
A Yes, sir.
Q And BB. What would those letters mean?
A buy bust, sir.
Q How about this signature, whose signature would that be?
A My signature, sir.
xxx
Q I am presenting to you five sachets which your office marked as Exhibit CDEF and G
with the marking ECA, 04/14/05 signature and a letter R. Are these the same items which
you referred a while back?
A Yes, sir.
Q And for the record, what does ECA stands (sic) for?
WITNESS:
A Edgar Cortes Antolin, sir.
PROS. CATRAL:

Q And what does 04/14/05 means (sic)?

A The date, sir.
Q The date of what?
A The date of the transaction, sir.
Q And what does "R" in the five sachets represents (sic)?
A Recovered, sir.
PROS. CATRAL:
For purposes of identification, may we have the two sachets marked as BB be marked as
Exhibit M-1 and M-2 which are the subject for sale and the other five other sachets with
marking R be marked as M-3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to constitute the charge for possession.
COURT:
Mark it.

28

From the foregoing circumstances, it is unmistakable that there is no break in the chain
of custody of the seized dangerous drugs from the time that it came to the possession of
PO2 Antolin to the point when such items were presented and identified during trial.
Clearly, there is no doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
dangerous drug were properly preserved, in compliance with what the law requires.
WHEREFORE, the June 5, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-No. 02734
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 194721

August 15, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA a.k.a. JAO MAPA, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR.*
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Once again, on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, we uphold the state's
compliance with the chain of custody rule and sustain the conviction 1 of accusedappellant of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu.
The Facts
Accused-appellant identified himself as "John Brian Amarillo, 25 years old, a resident of
Laperal Compound, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, single, a washing boy." 2 The records do
not indicate when, how and upon whose liking the a.k.a. "Jao Mapa" came to be
associated with the accused.
"Jao Mapa," the "washing boy" who was acquitted for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2044-45,3 in 2004, and whose name
appeared in the drugs Watchlist of Barangay Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City,4 was again
charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu this time allegedly committed in
2006.
The accusatory portions of the separate Informations both dated 10 April 2006 filed and
raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati read:
[Criminal Case No. 06-750
That on or about the 8th day of April 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA alias "Jao
Mapa/Jao"], without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver zero point zero
three (0.03) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
[Criminal Case No. 06-751
That on or about the 8th day of April 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA alias "Jao
Mapa/Jao"], not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession direct custody and control the following items with
markings, to wit:
"JAO 1" - 0.03 gram
"JAO 2" - 0.02 gram
"JAO 3" - 0.02 gram
"JAO 4" - 0.02 gram
"JAO 5" - 0.02 gram

"JAO 6" - 0.02 gram

"JAO 7" - 0.02 gram
"JAO 8" - 0.01 gram
"JAO 9" - 0.02 gram
"JAO 10" - 0.03 gram
"JAO 11" - 0.02 gram
"JAO 12" - 0.02 gram
"JAO 13" - 0.03 gram
"JAO 14" - 0.02 gram
with a total weight of zero point three three (0.33) gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu) which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
On 8 May 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During pretrial, the forensic
chemist and PO2 Rafael Castillo, the police investigator assigned to the case, appeared
in court. The parties stipulated on the following: "qualification of the forensic chemist as
an expert witness; existence of the documents relative to the examination conducted by
the forensic chemist; substance, subject matter of [the] case; existence of the Final
Investigation [R]eport; and Acknowledgement Receipt," 7 after which, the court ordered
that the testimony of the forensic chemist and the police investigator be dispensed with. 8
On trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO1 Percival Mendoza 9 (PO1
Mendoza) and PO3 Julius Lique10 (PO3 Lique), both of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs
Special Operations Task Force of the Makati Central Police Station; and Barangay Captain
Angelito Gatchalian11 (Barangay Captain Gatchalian) of Barangay Guadalupe Viejo. The
defense, on the other hand, presented the accused as its lone witness.12
The Court of Appeals summarized the version of the prosecution in the following manner:
xxxx
On April 8, 2006, PO1 Mendoza x x x received a telephone call from an informant that a
certain Jao Mapa (later identified as the Accused- Appellant) was selling prohibited
narcotics at Laperal Compound, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City. Immediately, a briefing for
a buy-bust operation was conducted. The buy-bust team prepared Three Hundred Pesos
(PhP 300.00) worth of marked money and designated PO1 Mendoza as the poseur-buyer.
The other members of the team were PO2 Lique, PO1 Randy Santos, and PO1 Voltaire
Esquerra. The team coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency before
proceeding to the target area.
At around 9:15 oclock in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded to the
basketball court inside Laperal Compound where the Accused-Appellant was sighted.
Once inside, PO1 Mendoza and the informant, with the help of sufficient lights coming
from the nearby shanties and sari-sari stores, saw a man wearing a camouflage short
pants and a dark t-shirt casually standing beside one of the basketball courts post while
talking to two (2) men. The informant called the attention of the Accused-Appellant and
introduced PO1 Mendoza to the latter as a buyer intending to purchase Three Hundred
Pesos (PhP 300.00) worth of shabu. PO1 Mendoza then handed the marked money to the
Accused-Appellant who, in turn, took from his right pocket a small plastic sachet
allegedly containing shabu and gave it to the former. Upon receipt, PO1 Mendoza

examined the contents thereof and asked the Accused-Appellant, "Panalo to ha?" The
Accused-Appellant replied with "Ako pa! Amin ang pinakamagandang bato dito."
When PO1 Mendoza was certain that the plastic sachet contained shabu, he lit a
cigarette, a pre-arranged signal, and motioned to his team members to arrest the
Accused-Appellant. PO1 Mendoza subsequently introduced himself as a police officer and
arrested the latter. A few seconds later, his other team members arrived. A procedural
body search was conducted resulting in the discovery of a small Mercury Drug plastic
bag containing seventeen (17) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with
suspected shabu, the marked money, and several Peso bills of different denominations.
The confiscated items were immediately marked, photographed, and inventoried at the
place of arrest and in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Gatchalian. The photographs of the
seized items were taken by PO3 Lique. Thereafter, the Accused-Appellant was brought to
the Makati Police Station for further investigation. Subsequently, the seized plastic
sachets were brought to the Crime Laboratory to determine the presence of shabu. The
results thereof showed that the substances therein were positive for
Methylamphetamine,Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.13
The version of the defense, on the other hand, consisted of the sole testimony of the
accused, to wit:
The Accused-Appellant testified that, on April 8, 2006, at around 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon, he was watching a game at the basketball court in Laperal Compound,
Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City, when several men arrived and asked him if he knew the
whereabouts of a certain Alvin. When he could not give any information, they brought
him to the Makati Police Station. It was only after he was detained that he learned that
charges were being filed against him for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs. 14
After trial, the court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both
crimes.15 The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 28 July 2008 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 06-750, finding the accused JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the charge for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165
and sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of five
hundred thousand pesos (P 500,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 06-751, finding the same accused JOHN BRIAN AMARILLO y MAPA,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A.
No. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) days as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and to pay a fine of
three hundred thousand pesos (P 300,000.00).16
On appeal, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED17 the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
automatic review of the accused conviction.
Our Ruling
We sustain the conviction of appellant.
To prove illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be present: "(a) the identities
of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing.18 And, to secure conviction, it is
material to establish that the transaction or sale actually took place, and to bring to the
court the corpus delicti as evidence.19
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant, not being authorized by law, sold a sachet of shabu to PO1 Mendoza in a buybust operation. PO1 Mendoza testified that, during the buy-bust operation, the informant
introduced him to accusedappellant; that informant asked accused-appellant if he could

help PO1 Mendoza buy shabu; that accused-appellant agreed to sell him Three Hundred
Peso-worth of shabu; that PO1 Mendoza, counted the pre-marked bills in front of
accused-appellant and gave them to him; and that accused-appellant, in turn, handed
him a small transparent plastic sachet, which he took from the pocket of his short pants,
and which tested for shabu based on the result of the laboratory examination. PO1 Lique
corroborated the testimony of PO1 Mendoza by stating that he saw accused-appellant
hand something to the poseur-buyer. Further, the seized items, together with the result
of the laboratory examination and the marked money were all presented in court.
As to the crime of illegal possession of shabu, the prosecution clearly proved the
presence of the following essential elements of the crime: "(a) the accused [was] in
possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug;
(b) such possession [was] not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the drug."20 After the arrest of the accused-appellant, seventeen
(17) heat-sealed sachets of white substance were found in his possession. The chemistry
report showed that the white substance in the plastic sachets tested for shabu. And,
there was no showing that such possession was authorized by law.
We find no merit in the arguments of the defense that the arresting officers did not
testify that the marking of the seized items were done in the presence of the persons
mentioned by the law and its implementing rules; and that testimonies on how the
confiscated items were turned over to the investigator for examination were lacking.
The Joint Affidavit of Arrest21 executed by PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Randy C. Santos, the
allegations of which PO1 Mendoza affirmed and confirmed during his direct testimony, is
clear on two points: (1) that the seized items were marked and inventoried at the place
where accused-appellant was arrested; and (2) that the integrity of the seized items was
preserved. Thus:
4. That immediately thereafter, together with the confiscated pieces of evidence marked
and inventoried at the place of suspects apprehension, the confiscated pieces of
evidence, together with suspect AMARILLO, were immediately brought at SAID SOTF
office, for formal dispositions and proper investigations.
5. That, before the SAID SOTF office, the investigator on case acknowledge the
complaint, and in preparation for the formal filing of formal charges against herein
suspects, same was subjected to the procedural Drug Test at SOCO/SPD and mandatory
MEDICO LEGAL examinations at OSMAK Malugay as assisted by the same arresting
officers, xxx. The confiscated pieces of evidence, only in so far with the suspected illegal
drugs and the small white plastic Mercury Drug were referred at SOCO SPD for laboratory
examinations and safe keeping.22
The Joint Affidavit of Arrest is consistent with the following testimony of PO1 Mendoza on
direct examination:
Q: Mr. Witness, after the inventory what did you do next, if theres any?
A: We proceeded to our office, SAID SOFT office, sir.
Q: And what did you do when you reached your office?
A: We made the necessary documents for filing the case, sir.
Q: What did you do with the items you recovered from the accused?
A: We turned it over to the investigator together with the subject person
to SOCO crime laboratory for drug test examination and for laboratory
examination, sir.23 (Emphasis supplied.)
The testimony, in turn, is well-supported by a copy of the Request for Laboratory
Examination (Exhibit "A") showing that it was PO1 Mendoza himself who brought the

request to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Stamped on the face of the receiving copy of the
request were the following:
PNP CRIME LABORATORY
SOUTHERN POLICE DISTRICT OFFICE
F. ZOBEL, MAKATI CITY
CONTROL NO. 1204-06
T/D RECEIVED: 11:55 PM 8 APRIL 06
RECEIVED BY: NVP DE RANIA
DELIVERED BY: PO1 PERCIVAL MENDOZA
CASE NO. D-284-0624 (Emphasis supplied)
As to the required "presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official," Section 21, Article
II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165 specifically provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. x x x:
1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This has been substantially complied with after the prosecution was able to show that
the accused, the arresting officers and a public official were all present during the
inventory of the seized items as evidenced by the testimonies of the witnesses, the
photographs, and the Acknowledgement Receipt of the items seized.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that all of these were defective for one reason
or another, the defense failed to consider the following well-settled principle:
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required
physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said
guidelines, is not fatal and does not automatically render accused-appellants arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. xxx25
The Court has long settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure
to faithfully observe the requirements provided under Sec. 21 of RA 9165, for as long as
the chain of custody remains unbroken.26

As to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, we hold, as we have done
time and again, that "the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses,
when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great
respect, if not conclusive effect"27 and that "findings of the trial courts which are factual
in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross
misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be
gathered from such findings."28
Also, after a thorough examination of the records, we find the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution credible. For instance, after the cross examination of
Barangay Captain Gatchalian, the presiding judge asked him a number of clarificatory
questions, which he readily answered in a straightforward manner. Thus:
Q: May we know xxx if you knew all along before the buy bust operation where to be
conducted by the said anti-narcotics team?
A: Yes, sir, because I am the Cluster head, every time we have an operation beforehand
they tell me the operation.
Q: So you knew all along that you will be called to act as the witness when the inventory
would be prepared?
A: Yes, [Y]our Honor.
Q: When you reached the place where the incident happened, was the inventory sheet
already accomplished wherein the items allegedly seized from the accused were listed?
A: Not yet, when I arrived, thats the time they prepared the inventory sheet, so, when I
arrived, then they started to write the items.29 (Emphasis supplied)
PO3 Lique corroborated material facts in the testimony of PO1 Mendoza, to the effect
that the sale of shabu between accused-appellant and PO1 Mendoza was consummated,
and that Barangay Captain Gatchalian was present during the inventory of the seized
items.
The doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is likewise
applicable in the instant case there being no showing of any ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers to falsely accuse accused-appellant of the crimes charged. In fact, he
himself testified that "he did not know any of the persons who arrested him and that he
did not also have any misunderstanding with any one of them."30 The Court elucidated:
xxx. And in the absence of proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to
falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, . . ., must prevail over the self-serving and
uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been framed.31
Finally, we find the penalties imposed by the trial court in order.
Under Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, a person found guilty of unauthorized sale of
shabu shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).32
On the other hand, under Section 11, Article II of the same Act, the crime of illegal
possession of shabu weighing less than five (5) grams is punishable by imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and a fine ranging from Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000.00).33
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the determination of the appropriate
penalty,34 the trial court correctly imposed the following penalties: (1) in Criminal Case
No. 06-750 for the crime of illegal sale of shabu, life imprisonment and a fine of Five

Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500.000.00) considering that these arc within the period and
range of the fine prescribed by law35 and (2) in Criminal Case No. 06-751 for the crime of
illegal possession of 0.33 gram of shabu, imprisonment for an indeterminate term of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum, and
a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), which is within the range of the
amount imposable therefor. 36
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 31 May 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 03579 is AFFIRMED, and, thereby the 28 July 20C'8 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court in Criminal Case Nos. 06-750-751 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132135

May 21, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DOMINGO SABARDAN, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal,
Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. 1590-B convicting appellant Domingo Sabardan of
serious illegal detention with rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering the appellant to indemnify the private complainant, Richelle
Banluta, the sum of P50,000.00.
The Information2 against the appellant reads:
That about and during the period beginning the 15th day of September 1991, to
the 30th day of September 1991, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and by force and
intimidation, detain and keep lock one Richelle Banluta, a girl twelve (12) years of
age in his rented apartment at No. 5 Linaluz St., SCH-Subdivision-Tayuman,
Binangonan, Rizal, from September 15 to September 30, 1991, or a period of
fifteen (15) days, under restraint and against the will of said Richelle Banluta, and
said accused during said period of detention did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have a carnal knowledge of the complainant Richelle Banluta while
she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious by reason of a drug which he
administered to her, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on June 9, 1992, the appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter
ensued.
The Case for the Prosecution
Richelle Banluta was born on August 10, 1979. When she was about four (4) years old,
Nimfa Banluta, a beach resort owner, allowed Richelle to stay in their house and
considered her as a natural daughter. Nimfa had Richelle enrolled in the elementary
school using her surname, "Banluta."
Sometime in 1990, the Banluta family transferred their residence to No. 5, Linaluz Street,
San Carlos Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. Opposite their house was that of
Elizabeth de Luna. Another neighbor of the Banluta family was the appellant, then fiftyyear-old Domingo Sabardan, a cathecist who resided in a two-storey apartment about
fifteen meters away from the Banluta residence. The appellant came to meet Richelle as

he frequented the Banluta house and befriended Rico Banluta, Nimfas twenty- one-yearold son.
At about 10:00 p.m. on September 15, 1991, Nimfa berated Richelle for playing with the
diaper of her niece. Richelle, who was then a little more than twelve years old, placed
some underwear, shorts, long pants, and four shirts in her school bag and surreptitiously
left the house. She passed by the appellants apartment while the latter was on his way
out to throw garbage. The appellant inquired where she was going, and Richelle replied
that she was earlier berated by her mother and was leaving the house. The appellant
invited Richelle to his apartment, and to spend the night therein. Richelle agreed. She
felt happy, thinking that she was in good hands.3 Besides, she had nowhere to go.4
The appellant led Richelle to a room on the second floor of the apartment, where she
slept without removing her pants and underwear. The following morning, the appellant
served breakfast to Richelle in her room. He told Richelle that Ella, who stayed in the
house, had left earlier at 5:00 a.m. The room where Richelle slept had three padlocked
windows with jalousies.5
Later that day, the appellant served lunch and dinner to Richelle in her room. That night,
the appellant entered the room completely naked. Surprised, Richelle asked what he was
doing in the room, but the appellant did not respond. Richelle kicked him and pulled his
hair, and told him to get out. The appellant left the room.
The next morning, Richelle told the appellant that she wanted to go home already. The
appellant dissuaded her from leaving and told Richelle that her mother might get angry
if she found out that she had slept in his apartment.
The appellant later left the house. When Richelle tried to open the door, she found out
that it was locked from the outside.6
In the evening of the fourth day of her detention, or on September 18, 1991, Richelle
was seated on a coach in the sala on the ground floor of the apartment.7 The appellant
forced her to drink a glass of ice cold beer. When she refused, the appellant threatened
to kill her. Afraid for her life, she drank the beer from a glass. The appellant then
embraced her, kissed her and touched her breasts. Richelle resisted. Momentarily, she
felt dizzy and fell unconscious.
Early the next morning, Richelle woke up and found herself lying in bed completely
naked. She felt severe pains in her vagina. She saw the appellant beside her, also
completely naked.8 She noticed that her vagina was bleeding profusely. She asked
Sabardan what he did to her and he told her nothing.9 Richelle washed her vagina with
water.10
In the evening of the fifth day of her detention, or on September 19, 1991, while Richelle
was sitting on the sofa on the ground floor, the appellant again forced her to drink beer.
She resisted but the appellant threatened to kill her anew. She drank the beer, but
consumed only about one-half of the contents of the glass. She felt dizzy and lost
consciousness. When she woke up in the morning, she again felt severe pains in her
vagina and saw blood in it.11
The appellant forced Richelle to drink either beer or juice on four other occasions.
Richelle felt dizzy afterwards, and would wake up completely naked, feeling pains in her
vagina.
On September 30, 1991, the appellant left the house, but closed the door outside with
three padlocks. At about 5:00 a.m. on that same day, Elizabeth de Luna, a housewife
who lived about thirty meters away from the appellant, heard someone hysterically
shouting, "Mang Domeng!"12 Elizabeth sensed that the voice was that of Richelles. She
looked out of the window of her house and saw the appellant in the upper floor of his
apartment, walking to and fro.13

Elizabeth waited for daybreak, and at 6:00 a.m. reported the incident to Val Banluta,
Richelles brother. Elizabeth and Val went to the appellants house and knocked on the
door. No one responded. The two left and kept the incident to themselves.14 At about
11:00 a.m., Elizabeth sensed that someone in the appellants house was watching
television. She related the incident to Richelles other brother, Rico Banluta, who climbed
the wall of the appellants house which abutted a vacant lot, and through the window
saw Richelle inside the apartment. Rico informed Val of his discovery. They proceeded to
the police station where they reported the incident. Three policemen arrived, and along
with Rico and Val, they proceeded to the appellants apartment. They saw that it was
locked from the outside with three padlocks. Instead of destroying the padlocks, the
policemen asked Rico and the latters friends to climb over the wall. Toto and Binoy, who
were friends of Rico, climbed the wall, and managed to extricate Richelle from the
second floor of the apartment through the window, after removing the jalousies.15 The
appellant was not in the house at that time.
Richelle was, thereafter, brought to the police station for investigation. There, she
executed a written sworn statement dated October 2, 1991. She also signed a criminal
complaint charging the appellant of serious illegal detention with rape.16
Dr. Jesusa O. Nieves, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service,
conducted a physical and medical examination on the private complainant on October 3,
1991. She prepared a Medico-Legal Report,17 with the following findings:

General and Extragenital:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are
hemi-spherical with light brown areola and nipples from which no secretions
could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
Genital:
There is lanugo-type growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and
slightly gaping with the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between.
On separating, the same is disclosed an elastic, fleshly-type hymen with
deep, healed laceration at 7 oclock. External vaginal orifice offers moderate
resistance to the introduction of examining index finger and the virgin-sized
vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix
is normal in size, color and consistency.

CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of violence.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci
and for spermatozoa.
The Defense of the Appellant
The appellant denied having raped Richelle. He testified that he was single, 56 years of
age, and was residing at No. 11 Luz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman,
Binangonan, Rizal.18 He alleged that he taught catechism in front of the Central School of
Angono and the school in Barangay Pag-asa.19 He was a person of good moral character
and could not have perpetrated the crime charged.

According to the appellant, he never saw Richelle during the period of September 15,
1991 to September 30, 1991, nor did he invite her to stay in his apartment.20 He further
asserted that he had nothing to do with the offense charged and that Richelle was
merely trying to exact money from him.21
Prosperidad Sabardan Soriano, the appellants sister, testified that she customarily paid
a visit to her brothers apartment. During the period of September 15, 1991 up to
September 30, 1991, she visited her brother on four different occasions. The first was on
September 17, 1991, which was the appellants birthday; the second was on September
25, 1991, the witness natal day. The third was on September 29, 1991; and finally, on
September 30, 1991. She never saw Richelle in her brothers apartment. 22
After due trial, the court rendered judgment on October 25, 1997, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Serious Illegal Detention with Rape, and therefore sentence (sic) him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the private
complainant the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.23
The appellant now appeals the decision, contending that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED SINCE THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED DID NOT CONFORM TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD
SUFFERED DETENTION OR THAT SHE HAD BEEN RAPED.
III. THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE AWARD OF DAMAGES. 24
The Courts Ruling
Anent the first and second assigned errors, the appellant contends that he was deprived
of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
because he was charged of detaining and raping the private complainant in his
apartment at No. 5 Linaluz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan,
Rizal. However, the prosecutions evidence shows that she was detained and raped at
No. 11-C Luz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal.
Furthermore, the appellant asserts that under the allegations of the Information, the
private complainant was raped when she was "deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious by reason of a drug" which the appellant supposedly administered to her.
The prosecution, however, failed to adduce evidence that he administered any drug to
the private complainant before she was raped.25 If this were true, Richelle could not have
known that she was raped by the appellant since she testified that she felt dizzy and lost
consciousness after drinking beer and juice.
The appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that Richelle was illegally
detained by the appellant in his apartment, and that he forced her to have sexual
intercourse with him. The evidence on record, the appellant insists, shows that Richelle
agreed to stay with him in his apartment after leaving their house and consented to
having sexual intercourse with him. From the time Richelle arrived at his apartment in
the evening of September 15, 1991 up to September 30, 1991, she never tried to
escape, nor shouted for help, despite the proximity of the appellants apartment to their
house and that of Elizabeth de Luna.
The contention of the appellant does not persuade.
The verisimilitude and probative weight of the testimony of Richelle, that the appellant
detained her against her will and raped her in his apartment, were not debilitated by her

mistake in declaring that the apartment of the appellant was at No. 5-C Linaluz Street,
when, in fact, it was at No. 11-C Luz Street, San Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman,
Binangonan, Rizal. It must be stressed that the situs criminis is not an essential element
in rape. The gravamen of the felony is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the
private complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. Richelles mistake was only minor and collateral to the
gravamen of the crime charged. She consistently testified that the appellant detained
and raped her in his apartment, only about thirty meters away from their house in San
Carlos Heights Subdivision, Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal. The appellant admitted that he
resided in the said apartment, and that Richelle and her family were his neighbors. In
People vs. Monieva,26 we stressed that where the inconsistency is not an essential
element of the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on
the essential fact testified to. It has been held that inconsistencies and discrepancies in
the testimony, referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime, do
not diminish the witnesses credibility.
The case for the prosecution was not enfeebled by its failure to adduce in evidence the
substance or drug which the appellant forced Richelle to drink and which made her dizzy
and unconscious, or its failure to present an expert witness to testify on the presence of
any sedative in the beer and juice which Richelle was made to drink.
First. The drug or substance in question is only corroborative to Richelles testimony that
she became dizzy and unconscious when the appellant forced her to drink beer and
juice. There can be no other conclusion than that the appellant mixed a sedative in the
beverage which he forced Richelle to drink. It must be stressed that Richelle was then
barely twelve years old. The alcoholic content of the beer must have caused her to feel
dizzy and lose consciousness. She was rendered to such stupor, weakness of body and
mind as to prevent effectual resistance and preclude the possibility of consent.
Second. In People vs. Del Rosario,27 we held that a test to determine the presence of any
sedative or drug in the drinks given to a victim is not an indispensable element in the
prosecution for rape:
True, there was no test conducted to determine the presence of any sedative or drug in
the drinks given to the victims which caused them to lose momentary control of their
faculties. But this is of little consequence as the same is not an indispensable element in
the prosecution for rape. Under the circumstances, it suffices that the victim was found
to have been unconscious at the time the offender had carnal knowledge of her. 28
Richelle testified that during the fourth and fifth days of her captivity, before she was
rescued on September 30, 1991, the appellant forced her to drink beer or juice,
threatening to kill her if she refused. Despite her resistance, the appellant succeeded in
forcing her to drink the beverage. Richelle felt dizzy and unconscious as a consequence,
and when she came to, found herself completely naked with the appellant beside her
who was also completely nude.29
Richelle testified, thus:
Q Question No. 22, Madam Witness, Bukod sa ginawa niyang paghahalik at
paghimas niya sa iyong dede na una mong binanggit, mayroon pa ba siyang
ginawa sa iyo?
Sagot: Noon pong ikatlong araw, meaning on the 17th, sa bahay ni Mang Domeng
pagdating niya galing sa pagtuturo ng religion ay pilit niya akong pinainom ng
beer at matapos kong mainom ang halos kalahati ng isang boteng beer sa kapipilit
niya ay nawalan na ako ng malay at nang magising ako ng madaling araw ay
naramdaman ko na masakit ang aking katawan pati na ang aking kike at katabi ko
na si Mang Domeng na hubot hubad kung kaya tinanong ko siya kung ano ang
nangyari at bakit ko siya katabi at sinabi sa akin na wala at umalis na siya sa aking
kwarto, at halos hindi na siya umaalis ng bahay at kung umalis man ay sandali
lang at bumabalik agad ito at kung ilang gabi niya akong pilit na pinaiinom ng beer

o kaya ay juice at tuwing nakakainom ako ng mga ito ay nawawalan ako ng malay
tao at tuwing magigising ako ay katabi ko na si Mang Domeng na palaging hubot
hubad at wala ang aking panty. Do you confirm this?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times did the accused ask you to drink juice?
A Seven (7) times, sir.
Q The equal number of times you were asked to drink beer, is it not?
A Yes, sir. Sometimes beer, sometimes juice, but I was asked to drink for seven (7)
times.
COURT:
Q So that, it is a fact that you were made to drink beer for seven (7) times?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How about juice, how many times did he made (sic) you [to] drink juice?
A Sometimes he asked me to drink juice and sometimes beer for seven (7) times,
Your Honor.
Q So that, what you want to tell us on those seven (7) occasions that you were
made to drink it was either beer or juice?
A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Q Do you recall how many times you were asked to drink beer?
A I dont know, sir. I just know juice and beer.
Q Do you recall how many times you were asked to drink juice?
A No, sir.
Q Was there any instance that the accused asked you to drink beer and juice at the
same time?
A None, sir.
Q When you were asked by the accused to drink juice, is it not a fact that you were
asked to drink juice while you were in the sofa or downstairs?
A Sometimes in the sofa, sometimes in the room, sir. 30
Understandably, Richelle could not have seen the appellant insert his penis into her
vagina since she lost consciousness after drinking the beer and juice. However, in rape
cases, carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proven not only by direct
evidence but also by circumstantial evidence, provided that there is more than one
circumstance; the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.31
In the case at bar, the evidence on record shows that, on the fourth and fifth day of
Richelles captivity, and while seated on the sofa in the sala of the ground floor of the

appellants apartment, the appellant forced her to drink beer. She felt dizzy and lost
consciousness, and when she came to, found herself in the room on the second floor of
the apartment, completely naked, with the appellant beside her. Richelle felt severe
pains in her vagina and was petrified when she saw plenty of blood on it. She washed her
bloodied vagina with water. To quote the testimony of Richelle:
Q Madam witness, lets go back to the 4th day that you were inside the room and
that the following day you wake (sic) up early in the morning nude where the
accused was nowhere in that place, when you wake (sic) up in that morning, what
did you feel in your body?
A My vagina is (sic) painful, sir.
Q That is (sic) all that you felt, your vagina is (sic) painful, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, there was no blood in your vagina, is it not?
A There was, sir.
Q Small quantity or big quantity?
A Big quantity, sir.
Q What did you do with your vagina with full of blood as you testified?
A I was afraid, sir.32

Q On the 5th day when you wake (sic) up in the sofa was your vagina bleeding?
A Yes, sir.
Q On the 4th, on the 5th day that your vagina was bleeding, Madame witness, is it
not a fact that you washed your vagina?
A I washed it, sir.
Q What did you use in washing your vagina?
A Water, sir.
Q With a soap?
A No, sir.33
The testimony of Richelle, that the appellant succeeded in raping her, is corroborated by
Dr. Jesusa Nieves medical findings that Richelle was no longer in a virgin state physically
and that her hymen had a deep laceration at seven oclock when she was examined on
October 3, 1991.
Q Can you please tell us your findings with regard to the genital of the victim?
A Upon the examination of the genie layer, the sex organ of the victim, the only
pertinent findings Ive got was the laceration, a deep healed laceration at the
hymen, sir.
Q What does that signifies (sic)?

A That a hard blunt object was forcefully inserted to the genie layer of the victim,
sir.
Q I notice in this findings (sic) of yours there is a laceration at 7:00 oclock, can you
please clarify this?
A The laceration at the 7 oclock only means that since the hymen is circular in
appearance, it is being correlated to the face of the watch so when we say that the
laceration is located at 7 oclock then it only means the same that the laceration or
the tear is located in the same position as the number 7 of the clock, sir.
Q Now, you claimed that upon your examination, one of your findings that [there]is
a laceration of (sic) 7 oclock, what could have cause (sic) the laceration of (sic) 7
oclock?
Atty. Mendoza:
Already answered, Your Honor, the forceful insertion by blunt instrument.
Fiscal Tacla:
Q Would you consider the penis or a male organ as the blunt instrument which to
have put (sic) into her organ?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the state of the virginity of the lady when you conducted an
examination upon her person?
A She is no longer a virgin, sir.
Q What made you conclude that thing?
A That is based on my findings at the hymen, sir.34
We reject the appellants submission that he could not have raped Richelle during the
period of September 17, 1991 to September 30, 1991 because when she was examined
by Dr. Nieves on October 3, 1991, the lacerations in her hymen had already healed. The
appellants reliance on the testimony of Dr. Nieves, that the healing period of the
lacerations on the hymen was seven (7) days from the infliction of such lacerations, is
misplaced. The doctor did not testify that the laceration in the hymen of Richelle could
not have been healed in less than seven days. Indeed, the healing of wounds is
dependent on several factors: (a) vascularity; (b) age of the person; (c) degree of rest or
immobilization; and (d) nature of injury.35
In fine, although the lacerations were already healed by the time Richelle was examined
by Dr. Nieves on October 3, 1991, it is not impossible that Richelle was raped by the
appellant for the first time on the fourth day of her captivity. It is well settled that healed
lacerations do not necessarily negate rape.36
The appellant asserted that Richelle consented to having sex with him, because she
shouted, "Mang Domeng, tama na, ayaw ko na!," when he kissed and embraced her, and
mashed her breasts. The appellant asserts that, in saying, "ayaw ko na," twelve-year-old
Richelle was consenting to his prior sexual assaults. Richelles testimony reads:
Q Throughout these days that the accused embraced you, kissed you and got hold
of your breast, you did not shout?
A I shouted everyday, sir.
Q Will you tell this Court what words you used when you shouted?

A I shouted, "Mang Domeng, tama na, ayaw ko na."

Q Why, Madame witness, when you said "ayaw ko na," was there any instance that
you agreed to Mang Domeng?
FISCAL TACLA:
What is that agreement all about, Your Honor?
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Well, "ayaw ko na" Your Honor, she presumed that ayaw na niya iyong nagaganap
sa kanya. My question is on what was happening to her that she is now testifying,
was there any occasion that she agreed.
COURT:
Answer.
Witness:
A Ayaw ko na po iyong ginagawa niya sa akin. Gusto ko nang umuwi sa amin.
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Q In all that occasions you did not box nor kick the accused, is it not?
A I tried to fight back and I even pulled his hair, sir. 37
The appellants contention deserves scant consideration. As gleaned from Richelles
testimony, she had been shouting and pleading to the appellant everyday to stop the
lascivious acts and the sexual advances on her. She resolutely fought back and even
pulled the appellants hair. In fine, when the appellant subjected Richelle to his bestial
desires, Richelle resisted, to no avail. If, as claimed by the appellant, Richelle had
consented to having sexual intercourse with him from September 16, 1991 to September
30, 1991, there would no longer have been a need for him to force her to drink beer and
juice to render her dizzy and unconscious.
The testimony of Richelle should not be considered in its truncated parts but in its
entirety. The meaning of the words in a portion of the testimony of a witness should be
considered, taking into account the entirety of the latters testimony. Besides, bearing in
mind the chastity and bashfulness of a typical Filipina, especially one in her tender years,
it is highly inconceivable for Richelle, a young girl, to consent to sexual acts with the
appellant. Richelle was barely in her teens when the harrowing experience took place.
We find it deviant for a twelve-year-old nave and unsophisticated grade school student
to be consenting to sexual intercourse with the appellant. Richelles unwaivering
sincerity and candor while testifying in court convinces us that she was constrained by
her desire to seek justice for the bestial act committed upon her person.38 In fact,
Richelle cried while recalling the sexual assaults on her.
The appellant harped on his being a catechist of good moral character to escape
conviction. This hardly justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged.
Indeed, religiosity is not always a badge of good conduct and faith is no guarantee
against any sexual perversion. In the case of People vs. Diopita,39 this Court pronounced
that an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because he is of good moral
character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be
resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is
more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of the appellants good moral character
cannot prevail.

The appellant contends that Richelle consented to stay in his apartment; hence, he
cannot be convicted of serious illegal detention. We agree with the appellants assertion
that he is not guilty of serious illegal detention, but we do not agree that Richelle
consented to stay in his apartment from September 17, 1991 until she was rescued on
September 30, 1991. Understandably, Richelle did not leave the appellants apartment
on September 30, 1991. She had just surreptitiously left their house in a rebellious mood
and had nowhere to go. She believed, at that time, that she was safe with the appellant,
who was their neighbor and her brothers friend. However, when the appellant sat on her
bed in the evening of the same day, completely naked, Richelle decided to leave the
next day. She balked at leaving only when the appellant warned her that her mother,
Nimfa, would berate her for sleeping at his apartment. Obviously, in warning Richelle of
what to expect from her mother, the appellant wanted to instill fear in her mind to force
her to remain in his apartment. Richelle should have left the apartment and returned
home that day, and contend with her mothers anger for leaving their house and
sleeping in the appellants apartment. However, Richelle, then barely twelve years old
and a mere grade six pupil, cannot be expected to react and decide like an adult would.
She could not have foreseen the appellants evil intent of raping her. Moreover, even if
she wanted to leave the appellants apartment, she could not do so because the
appellant did not allow her to leave. Frustrated in his first attempt, the appellant was
determined to deflower Richelle. And the appellant succeeded, because on the fourth
day of Richelles stay in the appellants apartment, the appellant forced her to drink beer
which caused her to feel dizzy and rendered her unconscious. The appellant forthwith
raped her.
In light of the evidence on record, the original and primordial intention of the appellant in
keeping Richelle in his apartment was to rape her and not to deprive her of her liberty.
Hence, the appellant is guilty only of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code, and not of the complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape under
Article 267, in relation to Articles 335 and 48 of the Code.40 Hence, the trial court
correctly sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua.
Richelle could not have escaped from the appellants apartment during her stay therein
from September 17, 1991 until September 30, 1991, because the appellant locked the
door from the outside whenever he would go out. Richelle could move around the house,
but the windows on the ground and second floors had grills with smoked glass.41 Richelle
tried to open the windows, but she could not.
We, likewise, find it incredible for Richelle to contrive a story of rape which would expose
herself to a lifetime of shame, allow an examination of her private parts and face public
trial.42 A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness. The bare denial of the
appellant cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Richelle. Well-settled is the rule
that testimonies of young victims of rape deserve full credence and should not be so
easily dismissed as a mere fabrication. 43 In the case at bar, the trial court found the
testimony of the victim to be trustworthy and convincing. It has been held in a long line
of cases that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are afforded great respect, since it is the trial judge who observes and
monitors the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses.
Finally, the assertion of the appellant that the charge against him was motivated by
Richelles desire to extort money from him is preposterous. The appellants testimony to
prove his claim is hearsay because he was merely told by his counsel of Richelles desire
for money. The appellant failed to present his counsel to prove his claim. Besides, the
appellant was merely a catechist and had no apparent sustainable means of livelihood,
and only survived through the support given to him by his siblings. We agree with the
findings of the trial court, viz:
The accused tried to insinuate ulterior or improper motive on the part of the
complainant by alleging that complainant Richelle charge[d] him with this offense
because they are asking money as told [to] him by Atty. Mendoza.

This allegation is patently unmeritorious and cannot be given any value by the
court, as it was hearsay, and Atty. Mendoza was not presented to pursue or give
light on this allegation. At any rate, the mother of the offended party, Nimfa
Banluta, testified that she got the insinuation that the sister of the accused was
willing to settle the case through her friend living near the street of the accused.44
It is rudimentary that where there is no showing that the private complainant was
impelled by any improper motive in making the accusation against the appellant, her
complaint is entitled to full faith and credit. Hence, when the appellant could not present
any sensible justification as to why the private complainant had accused him, such fact
logically proves that no improper motive propelled the latter to charge the former of such
a serious offense as rape.45
The trial court correctly awarded Richelle civil indemnity of P50,000. This is in the nature
of actual and compensatory damages, and is obligatory upon conviction for rape.46 In
addition, she is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000. Moral damages are
automatically awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof, for it is assumed
that she suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. Such award is separate and
distinct from civil indemnity.47
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. 1590-B, finding the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious illegal detention with rape is
MODIFIED. Appellant DOMINGO SABARDAN is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the victim, Richelle
Banluta, P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 205227

April 7, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MARCO P. ALEJANDRO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated November 11, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 03483 which affirmed the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 convicting appellant of illegal sale of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). In its Resolution3 dated March 14, 2012,
the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by appellant.

The Facts
Marco P. Alejandro (appellant), along with Imelda G. Solema and Jenny V. del Rosario,
were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9 l 65 under the following
Information:
That on or about the 12th day of July, 2006, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, not being
authorized by law did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade
deliver and give away to another, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug
weighing 98.51 grams contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, in
violation of the above-cited law.
Contrary to law.4
When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not guilty. Upon demurrer to evidence filed by
accused Jenny del Rosario, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting her of the crime
charged considering that her mere presence in the car used by appellant is not indicative
of conspiracy in the sale of illegal drugs.5
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following:
1. The identity of the accused as the persons charged;
2. The jurisdiction of this Court over the persons of the accused;
3. Police Inspector Ruben Mamaril Apostol Jr. is a member of a PNP Crime
Laboratory Office as of July 12, 2006 and he is an expert in Forensic Chemistry;
4. That a request for laboratory examination was made for the specimens allegedly
confiscated from the accused;
5. The existence and authenticity of the request for examination of the seized
items and Request for a drug test on the persons of the accused;
6. That pursuant to the requests for the drug test and examination of the
specimens, the corresponding Regional Crime Laboratory Office, Calabarzon issued
two (2) chemistry reports, D-267-06 and CRIM[D]T-286-06 that subject specimens
submitted are positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride; and
7. That only a representative sample of the specimens submitted were examined
by the Forensic Chemist which consist of one (1) transparent sachet containing
white crystalline substance in black and red markings.6
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the following factual milieu based on the testimonies of SPO1
Jaime A. Cariaso (poseur-buyer), SPO1 Norman Jesus P. Platon and Police Inspector Ruben
M. Apostol, Jr. (Forensic Chemical Officer):
In the morning of July 11, 2006, a Confidential Informant (CI) went to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office 4-A (CALABARZON) at Camp Vicente Lim in
Calamba City, Laguna. The CI informed Regional Director P/Supt. Raul L. Bargamento
that he was able to set up a deal with a certain "Aida" who directed him to look for a
buyer of 100 grams of shabu for the price of P360,000.00.7
Immediately, P/Supt. Bargamento instructed Police Chief Inspector Julius Ceasar V.
Ablang to form a team who will conduct a buy-bust operation. PCI Ablang organized the
team composed of eleven police officers and made the proper coordination with PDEA.
Since the target area is situated in Barangay Bayanan, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila,

the team likewise obtained the requisite "Authority to Operate Outside AOR".8 During
the briefing, SPO1 Cariaso was designated as poseur-buyer while SPO1 Platon will be his
back-up arresting officer. Four pieces of five hundred peso (P500) bills were then
prepared and marked by SPO1 Cariaso. The said bills stacked on the boodle money were
placed inside SPO1 Cariasos belt bag. On the same day, SPO1 Cariaso and SPO1 Platon,
along with the CI, conducted a surveillance of the house of "Aida" and vicinity. Prior to
these preparations, the CI had contacted "Aida" through her cellphone and arranged the
2:00 p.m. meeting/sale transaction the following day.9
The next day, July 12, 2006, at around 12:00 noon, the team accompanied by the CI
boarded two service vehicles and proceeded to the target area. They arrived at Barangay
Bayanan at 1:45 p.m. SPO1 Cariaso and the CI parked the Toyota Revo infront of the
house of "Aida" while SPO1 Platon and the rest of the team, who rode on another vehicle
(Isuzu Crosswind), waited at a distance. As agreed during the briefing, SPO1 Platon
positioned himself in a spot where he could see SPO1 Cariaso. The other police officers
posted themselves where they could see SPO1 Platon as the latter will wait for a "missed
call" from SPO1 Cariaso.10
SPO1 Cariaso and the CI alighted from the Revo and went to the gate of the house of
"Aida". They called the attention of a woman whom the CI identified as "Aida". The
woman came out of the house and the CI introduced SPO1 Cariaso to her as the buyer of
shabu. After the introduction, the CI left. The woman asked SPO1 Cariaso where the
money is and he opened his belt bag to show her the money. SPO1 Cariaso in turn asked
her where the shabu is and she replied that he should wait for Marco (appellant). SPO1
Cariaso and the woman then went inside the Revo and waited for appellant. After about
five minutes, a Toyota Vios arrived and parked infront of the Revo. The woman told SPO1
Cariaso that the driver of the Vios was appellant.11
Appellant alighted from the Vios and went inside the Revo. The woman introduced
appellant to SPO1 Cariaso as the buyer. After appellant ascertained that SPO1 Cariaso
had the money with him, he went down and got something from the Vios. When
appellant returned, he was carrying an item wrapped in newspaper. Inside the Revo,
appellant uncovered the item and SPO1 Cariaso saw a transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance which appellant handed to him. Appellant then
demanded for the money. SPO1 Cariaso gave appellant the belt bag containing the
marked bills and boodle money and quickly pressed the call key of his cellphone, the prearranged signal for the team that the sale had been consummated.12
Within fifteen seconds, SPO1 Platon rushed towards the Revo and the rest of the team
followed. The team introduced themselves as PDEA agents. SPO1 Cariaso arrested
appellant and the woman ("Aida") who was later identified as Imelda G. Solema.
Meanwhile, SPO1 Platon arrested the woman passenger in the Vios who was later
identified as Jenny del Rosario.
The seized plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was marked by SPO1
Cariaso with his initials "EXH. A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" and signed it at the bottom. SPO1
Cariaso also recovered the marked P500 bills and boodle money from appellant. The
three accused and the confiscated items were brought to the PDEA Regional Office in
Camp Vicente Lim.13
At the PDEA regional office, appellant and his co-accused were booked and the
confiscated items were inventoried by the investigator in the presence of SPO1 Cariaso,
a media representative and a barangay councilor. A request for laboratory examination
of the seized transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, weighing
98.51 grams, was prepared and signed by P/Supt. Bargamento. There were also requests
made for the physical examination and drug test of the arrested persons. The request for
laboratory examination and the specimen marked "EXH. A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" were
brought by SPO1 Cariaso to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime
Laboratory Office 4A. Result of the chemical analysis performed by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr.
showed that the said specimen is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Appellant and his co-accused likewise were found positive for methamphetamine based
on screening and confirmatory test done on their urine samples.14
The prosecution presented and offered the following evidence: (1) Pre-Operation Report
dated July 12, 2006 submitted by PCI Ablang (Team Leader) and noted by P/Supt.
Bargamento; (2) Authority to Operate Outside AOR dated July 12, 2006 granted by PDEA
Police Chief Inspector Emmanuel Salvador L. Enriquez; (3) Certificate of Coordination
dated July 12, 2006 from PDEA; (4) Request for Laboratory Examination dated July 12,
2006 of specimen marked "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" with signature of poseur-buyer; (5)
Request for Drug Test of arrested persons dated July 12, 2006 signed by P/Supt.
Bargamento; (6) Request for Physical/Medical Examination of arrested persons signed by
P/Supt. Bargamento; (7) Chemistry Report No. D-267-06 dated July 13, 2006 submitted
by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. showing positive findings on specimen marked "EXH A J.A.C. July
12, 2006"; (8) Chemistry Report No. CRIMDT-268-06 to 270-06 submitted by Pol. Insp.
Apostol, Jr. showing positive findings on the urine samples taken from appellant and his
co-accused; (9) Certification dated July 12, 2006 issued by Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Roy
A. Camarillo of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory 4A stating that "there are no external
signs of recent application of any form of trauma noted during the time of examination"
on the persons of appellant and his co-accused; (10) Certificate of Inventory prepared by
PCI Ablang and signed/witnessed by a media representative (Lyka Manalo) and Barangay
Councilor (Jerusalem Jordan); (11) One transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance with markings "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006" and signed by poseurbuyer SPO1 Cariaso; (12) Affidavit of Poseur-Buyer dated July 13, 2006 executed by SPO1
Cariaso; (13) Affidavit of Back-Up/Arresting Officer dated July 13, 2006 executed by SPO1
Platon; (14) Booking Sheet and Arrest Reports of appellant and his co-accused containing
their fingerprints, but which only Imelda Solema signed while appellant and Jenny del
Rosario refused to sign; and (15) four pieces P500 bills marked money with serial
numbers CM180235, YA867249, ZS853938 and ZW337843.15
Version of the Defense
Appellants defense is anchored on the claim that no buy-bust took place. He testified
that on July 12, 2006, at around 1:30 p.m., he went to the house of his co-accused
Imelda Solema whom he knows is called "Im". The purpose of his visit to Im was to rent
her apartment because his girlfriend is arriving from Japan. Along the way, he saw Jenny
del Rosario with her baby and let them rode on his car (Vios) as they were going the
same way. Upon reaching Ims house at 1:45 p.m., he parked his vehicle infront of said
house but a barangay tanod told him not to park there as it was a towing area. And so he
parked his Vios inside the garage of Ims house which has a steel gate and knocked at its
door. Meanwhile, Jenny del Rosario was left inside the Vios.16
Upon entering the house of Im, appellant claimed he was immediately grabbed by a man
who made him lie down. He would later learn at PDEA that the mans name is "Toto" and
his female companion is Maam Carla. These PDEA agents took his belt bag containing
cash (P48,000) and his jewelry. He was also handcuffed and brought inside his car where
Toto, Ablang and a driver also boarded. He saw SPO1 Cariaso for the first time at the
PDEA office. He likewise does not know SPO1 Platon. At the PDEA office, appellant and
his co-accused were photographed after they were made to change clothes. Appellant
further claimed that PCI Ablang demanded money (P1 million) from him in exchange for
his release. When he was unable to give such amount, they just detained him and his coaccused. Their urine samples were taken and submitted for drug testing.17
As to the shabu allegedly seized from him in a buy-bust operation, appellant vehemently
denied having such drug in his possession at the time. They have already been detained
for two days when they were photographed with the said item. The taking of
photographs was done in the presence of PDEA personnel, barangay officials from
Canlubang and the media.18
On cross-examination, appellant explained that he had talked to his lawyer regarding the
filing of a case against the PDEA officers who tried to extort money from him but his

lawyer suggested they should first do something about this case. He added that he does
not know of any reason why SPO1 Cariaso is accusing him of selling an illegal drug.19
Imelda G. Solema testified that on July 12, 2006 between 1:00 to 2:00 in the afternoon,
she was inside her house watching TV together with her seven-year-old son when some
persons carrying long firearms arrived asking if she is "Aida". She shouted to them that
she is not "Aida" but "Im." These armed persons searched her house for shabu and when
she shouted she was pushed into a chair. After ten minutes of searching, nothing was
found in her house. When somebody knocked on the door, one of the armed men opened
it and they saw appellant. They pulled appellant inside, poked a gun at him, made him lie
down and handcuffed him. She and appellant were brought outside the house and
boarded into the Revo. They waited for the other car for the armed men to board
appellant there. Thereafter, they were brought to the PDEA office in Canlubang where
they were detained.20
On cross-examination, Imelda Solema admitted that appellant was her friend even prior
to their arrest because he was the "kumpare" of her sister. Appellant went to her house
at the time as they had an agreement that he will rent one of the units of her
apartment.21
The defense presented another witness, Rowena S. Gutierrez, a siomai/sago vendor who
allegedly saw what transpired at the house of Imelda Solema from a distance of 6-8
meters. She testified that on July 12, 2006 at past 2:00 p.m., a red car immediately
parked infront of the house of Imelda Solema, whom they call "Im." A man and a woman
(whom she later learned were police officers) alighted from said car and entered the
house of Im. Not too long after, a silver car also arrived which was supposed to park in
the area but there were barangay tanods and so it parked instead in the garage of the
mother of Im. She later learned that the driver of the silver car was appellant. Appellant
went out of his car and proceeded to Ims house. When appellant was already inside Ims
house, two vehicles (Revo and Crosswind) suddenly arrived and there were armed men
who alighted from said vehicles and entered Ims house. Thereafter, she heard Im crying
as she was being held by a woman and a man. The armed men forced Im and appellant
into the Revo. The persons left were a female and a child who eventually drove the silver
car.22
On cross-examination, the witness admitted that the relatives of her friend Im asked her
to testify because the others who also saw the incident were afraid to do so.23
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC found that the police officers complied with all the requirements in conducting a
buy-bust operation, and that their testimonies were spontaneous, straightforward and
consistent on all material points. On the other hand, the RTC observed that the
testimonies of defense witnesses do not jibe or are inconsistent with each other. It held
that appellants denial of the crime charged is a negative self-serving evidence and
cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution who, being police officers, are presumed to have performed their duties in
accordance with law, and who have no reason to fabricate the charges against the
accused.
Convinced that appellant and his co-accused Imelda Solema had conspired in selling
shabu, the RTC noted that it was the latter who called up the former about the offer of
the poseur-buyer SPO1 Cariaso to buy shabu. Appellant thus brought the pack of shabu
to be sold to SPO1 Cariaso, unaware of the entrapment plan of the police officers. As to
their warrantless arrest, the RTC held that such arrest was legal since the accused were
caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, a dangerous drug, to a poseur-buyer who
turned out to be a police officer, in a legitimate buy-bust operation.
Accordingly, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused MARCO ALEJANDRO y PINEDA
and IMELDA SOLEMA y GUTIERREZ GUILTY of violating Sec. 5 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 beyond reasonable doubt, they are sentenced to LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to suffer all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay a
fine of ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00) each with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
The Acting Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit the subject "shabu" contained in
a transparent plastic sachet which was marked as Exhibit "J" to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.
Accused MARCO ALEJANDRO y PINEDA is ordered committed to the National Bilibid
Prisons and accused IMELDA SOLEMA y GUTIERREZ is ordered committed to the
Philippine Correctional for Women until further orders.
The preventive imprisonment undergone by the accused shall be credited in their favor.
SO ORDERED.24
Ruling of the CA
By Decision dated November 11, 2011, the CA affirmed appellants conviction. The CA
rejected appellants argument that there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that a sale
transaction of illegal drugs took place as there appeared to be no prior meeting or
conversation between him and appellant, and hence they could not have agreed on a
price certain for a specified weight of drugs to be sold. It stressed that from the
prosecutions narration of facts, the basis of the meeting between the poseur-buyer and
"Aida" was the arrangement made by the CI for the sale of shabu; hence there was
already an agreement for the sale of 100 grams of shabu for the amount of P360,000.00.
The CA was likewise convinced that the corpus delicti of the crime has been established.
It held that the failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized
from him inadmissible.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Firmly established in our jurisprudence is the rule that in the prosecution for illegal sale
of dangerous drugs, the following essential elements must be proven: (1) that the
transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. Implicit in all these is the
need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or regulated drug as evidence.25
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation
is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.26
The above elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution. Poseur-buyer
SPO1 Cariaso identified appellant as the seller of shabu. While the police officers were
initially unaware of the identity of appellant, as their CI had only informed them about
appellants co-accused, "Aida" (Imelda Solema) with whom the CI had set up a drug deal
for 100 grams of shabu for the price of P360,000.00, appellants presence at the buybust scene, and his act of delivering the shabu directly to SPO1 Cariaso clearly identified
him as the seller who himself demanded and received the payment from SPO1 Cariaso
after giving the shabu to the latter.

Appellants arrival at the house of Imelda Solema at the appointed time of the sale
transaction arranged the previous day by the CI, and with Imelda Solema informing SPO1
Cariaso that they should wait for appellant after SPO1 Cariaso asked for the shabu, were
clear indications that they acted in coordination and conspiracy to effect the sale of
shabu to a buyer brought by the CI and who turned out to be a police officer detailed
with the PDEA. SPO1 Cariaso placed his initials and date of buy-bust on the plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance sold to him by appellant. After Forensic Chemical
Officer Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. conducted a chemical analysis of the said specimen, the
result yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
The same specimen was presented in court as evidence after it was properly identified
by SPO1 Cariaso and Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. to be the same substance handed by appellant
to SPO1 Cariaso and examined by Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr.
SPO1 Platon corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Cariaso that they conducted a buy-bust
operation as he positioned himself across the street 15 meters from the house of Imelda
Solema. From his vantage, SPO1 Platon saw the following transpired: SPOI Cariaso
accompanied by the CI in front of the house of Imelda Solema; SPO1 Cariaso conversing
with Imelda Solema; the subsequent arrival of appellant on board the Vios; appellant
going inside the Revo where SPO1 Cariaso and Imelda Solema waited for him; appellant
getting something from the Vios and returning to the Revo carrying the said item. Upon
hearing the call from SPO1 Cariasos cellphone, SPO1 Platon immediately proceeded to
the scene and arrested Jenny del Rosario who was still inside the Vios. At that moment,
SPO1 Cariaso had already arrested appellant and Imelda Solema, confiscated the
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and recovered the
marked money from appellant.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime were established by both the oral and object
evidence presented in court. It is settled that in cases involving violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers
for they enjoy the presumption of having performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless, of course, there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on their part or
deviation from the regular performance of their duties.27 Since no proof of such illmotive on the part of the PDEA buy-bust team was adduced by appellant, the RTC and
CA did not err in giving full faith and credence to the prosecutions account of the buybust operation. This Court has repeatedly stressed that a buy-bust operation (which is a
form of entrapment) is a valid means of arresting violators of R.A. No. 9165.28
Appellant assails the CA in not correctly interpreting the requirements set forth in Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations. He harps on the
failure to immediately mark the seized shabu at the scene of the incident and
photograph the same, and the inventory of the confiscated items which was not shown
to have been done in the presence of the accused. As to the absence of testimony by the
investigator and the receiving employee of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory, appellant
argues this is fatal to the case of the prosecution. He thus contends that the chain of
custody was broken in this case.
We sustain the CAs ruling on the chain of custody issue.
Under Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which
implements R.A. No. 9165, "chain of custody" is defined as the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 laid down the procedure for the custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs.

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall
be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be
done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within
twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when
the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification
shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same
within the next twenty-four (24) hours;
xxxx
On the other hand, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A.
No. 9165 reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, while SPO1 Cariaso testified that he immediately marked the transparent
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance sold to him by appellant, there was
no statement as to whether such marking was made at the place of arrest. From the
records it is clear that such marking was done upon reaching the PDEA office before its
turnover to the investigator on duty. What is important is that the seized specimen never
left the custody of SPO1 Cariaso as he was present throughout the physical inventory
being conducted by the said investigator.

This Court has already ruled in several cases that the failure of the prosecution to show
that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated pursuant to the guidelines, is not fatal. It does not automatically
render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt of the accused.29
Records reveal that only the marked money was photographed at the PDEA office. The
Certificate of Inventory, though not signed by the accused, was duly signed by team
leader PCI Ablang, a representative from the media and a barangay councilor. We thus
find substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and IRR.
Time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that substantial compliance with
the procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized
drug items inadmissible.30 In the instant case, although the police officers did not
strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, their
noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from appellant
as the chain of custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroken under the
circumstances of the case.
In the case of People v. Kamad,31 the Court enumerated the links that the prosecution
must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.32
The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the transparent plastic
sachet containing shabu during the buy-bust operation. Records show that from the time
appellant handed to SPO1 Cariaso the said item, only SPO1 Cariaso was in possession of
the same until it was brought to the PDEA office. SPO1 Cariaso himself marked the said
sachet of shabu with his initials and date of buy-bust: "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006." While
the marking was not immediately made at the crime scene, it does not automatically
impair the integrity of the chain of custody as long as the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items have been preserved.33
The second link is the turnover of the shabu at the PDEA office. SPO1 Cariaso testified
that he turned over the seized plastic sachet containing shabu with his markings "EXH A
J.A.C. July 12, 2006" to the investigator who proceeded with the inventory thereof, along
with the marked money also confiscated from appellant. He was present next to the
investigator while the latter was conducting the inventory.
The third link constitutes the delivery of the request for laboratory examination and the
specimen to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory. It was likewise SPO1 Cariaso who
brought the said request and the specimen to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory on the
same day. He personally turned over the specimen marked "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006"
to the receiving clerk as evidenced by the stamp receipt on the said request bearing the
time and date received as "10:25 PM July 12, 2006."34
The fourth link seeks to establish that the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination is the one presented in court. Forensic Chemical Officer Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr.
testified that the transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which
was marked "EXH A J.A.C. July 12, 2006", was given to him by the receiving clerk. Within
twenty-four hours, he conducted the chemical analysis by taking a representative
sample from the specimen, even explaining in detail the process of testing the specimen
for shabu. He identified the specimen with markings "EXH. A J.A.C. July 12, 2006"
presented as evidence in court (Exhibit "J") as the same specimen he examined and
which he found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.1wphi1

The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as the investigator and the
receiving clerk of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory is not a crucial point against the
prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the
court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it
has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.35 Further, there is
nothing in R.A. No. 9165 or in its implementing rules, which requires each and every one
who came into contact with the seized drugs to testify in court. "As long as the chain of
custody of the seized drug was clearly established to have not been broken and the
prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that
each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness
stand."36
With the unbroken chain of custody duly established by the prosecution evidence, the CA
did not err in giving the same full credence in contrast to the denial by appellant who
failed to substantiate his allegation of frame-up and extortion. Frame-up, like alibi, is
generally viewed with caution by the Court because it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove. It is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.37 To substantiate such defense, the evidence must be clear and
convincing and should show that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by
any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty. Otherwise, the police
officers' testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.38 No such evidence
was presented by appellant in this case. The CA even quoted in part the decision of the
RTC which highlighted the irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of defense
witnesses on what transpired during the buy-bust operation.
Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and
fine, ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved. Hence, the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P1,000,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated November 11, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 03483 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202709

July 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE,

vs.
ROMEO ONIZA Y ONG AND MERCY ONIZA Y CABARLE, APPELLANTS.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the need to absolve the accused of the charges against them because
of the police officers outright failure without any justification to abide by the law
governing the conduct of seizure operations involving dangerous drugs.
The Facts and the Case
On June 21, 2004 the Public Prosecutors Office of Rizal filed separate charges of
possession of dangerous drugs1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rizal, Branch 2,
against the accused spouses Romeo in Criminal Case 7598 and Mercy Oniza in Criminal
Case 7599. The prosecution further charged the spouses with selling dangerous drugs in
Criminal Case 7600, all allegedly in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The prosecutions version is that at about 9:30 p.m. on June 16, 2004, PO1 Reynaldo M.
Albarico, PO1 Fortunato P. Jiro III, and PO1 Jose Gordon Antonio of the Rodriguez Police
Station in Rizal received information from a police asset that accused Mercy Oniza was
selling dangerous drugs at Phase 1-D Kasiglahan Village, Barangay San Jose.2 They
immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. After coordinating its action
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the police team proceeded to Kasiglahan
Village on board an owner-type jeep. They brought with them two pieces of pre-marked
P100 bills.3
On arrival at the place, the team members positioned themselves at about 15 to 20
meters from where they spotted Mercy Oniza and a male companion, later identified as
her accused husband Romeo Oniza. The police informant approached Mercy and initiated
the purchase. 4 He handed the two marked P100 bills to her which she in turn gave to
Romeo.5 After pocketing the money, the latter took out a plastic sachet of white
crystalline substance from his pocket and gave it to the informant. The latter then
scratched his head as a signal for the police officers to make an arrest.6
The police officers came out of concealment to arrest Mercy and Romeo. 7 On seeing the
police officers, however, the two quickly ran into their house, joined by Valentino Cabarle
(separately charged) who had earlier stood nearby, and locked the door behind them.
The officers rammed the door open to get in. They apprehended Mercy, Romeo, and
Valentino.8 Officer Jiro recovered four heat-sealed plastic sachets believed to contain

shabu from Mercy. Officer Albarico retrieved two marked P100 bills and a similar plastic
sachet from Romeo. Officer Antonio seized an identical sachet from Valentino. 9
The police officers brought their three captives to the police station for investigation and
booking. Officer Jiro marked all the items the police seized and had these brought to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. 10 After forensic
chemical analysis, the contents of the sachets proved to be shabu.11
The prosecution and the defense stipulated that the specimens that PO1 Annalee R.
Forro, a PNP forensic chemical officer, examined were methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu). They further stipulated, however, that Officer Forro "could not testify on the
source and origin of the subject specimens that she had examined."12 As a result, PO1
Forro did not testify and only her report was adduced by the prosecution as evidence.
The evidence for the accused shows, on the other hand, that at around 9:30 p.m. on June
16, 2004, the spouses Mercy and Romeo were asleep at their home when Mercy was
suddenly awakened by the voice of Belen Morales calling on her from outside the house.
As Mercy peeped through the window, Belen told her that the police had arrested and
mauled Mercys brother, Valentino. Mercy hurriedly ran out of the house to find out what
had happened to her brother.13
When Mercy got to where Valentino was, she saw some police officers forcibly getting
him into an owner-type jeep while Zenaida Cabarle, Mercy and Valentinos mother, kept
pulling him out of the owner-type jeep. When Mercy approached Valentino, the police
officers told her to accompany him to the police station. This prompted her to shout for
her husbands help.14
Meanwhile, when Romeo had awakened, he came out of the house, and saw two police
officers in black jackets, Albarico and Antonio, who approached him. They seized and
shoved him into the owner-type jeep to join Mercy and Valentino. Romeo noticed that
Valentino was grimacing in pain, having been beaten up by the police.15
At the police station, the police officers asked their three captives to produce P30,000.00
in exchange for their release.16 Officer Antonio took out something from his pocket,
showed it to them, and told them that he would use it to press charges against them.
Afterwards, PO1 Antonio took Mercy to the kitchen room and hit her head with two pieces
of pot covers ("pinompyang").17
Nearly after five years of trial or on April 2, 2009 the RTC rendered a decision 18 that
found Romeo and Mercy guilty of possession of dangerous drugs in Criminal Cases 7598
and 7599, respectively, and imposed on them both the penalty of imprisonment of 12
years and 1 day to 20 years and a fine of P300,000.00. Further, the trial court found
them guilty of selling dangerous drugs in Criminal Case 7600 and imposed on them both
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00. The trial court, however,
acquitted Valentino of the separate charge of possession of dangerous drugs filed
against him in Criminal Case 7597.
On appeal in CA-G.R. CR-HC 04301, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgments of
conviction against Romeo and Mercy, hence, the present appeal to this Court.
Issue Presented
The issue presented in this case is whether or not the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Romeo and Mercy were in possession of and were selling
dangerous drugs when the team of police officers arrested them on June 16, 2004.
Ruling of the Court
The law prescribes certain procedures in keeping custody and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs like the shabu that the police supposedly confiscated from Romeo and
Mercy on June 16, 2004. Section 21 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 reads:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
Compliance with the above, especially the required physical inventory and photograph of
the seized drugs in the presence of the accused, the media, and responsible government
functionaries, would be clear evidence that the police had carried out a legitimate buybust operation. Here, the prosecution was unable to adduce such evidence, indicating
that the police officers did not at all comply with prescribed procedures. Worse, they
offered no excuse or explanation at the hearing of the case for their blatant omission of
what the law required of them.
Apart from the above, the prosecution carried the burden of establishing the chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs that the police allegedly seized from the accused on the
night of June 16, 2004. It should establish the following links in that chain of custody of
the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.19
Still, jurisprudence has established a rare exception with respect to the first required link
immediate seizure and marking of the seized items in the presence of the accused and
others20namely, that (a) there must be justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the
procedures; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.
Here, the prosecutions own evidence as recited by the CA and the RTC is that the police
officers did not make a physical inventory of the seized drugs nor did they take a picture
of the same in the presence of the accused, someone in the media, a Department of
Justice (DOJ) representative, and any elected public official.
All that Officer Albarico could say is that his companion, Officer Jiro, marked the plastic
sachets with the initials of the accused already at the police station and then turned over
the same to the desk officer who prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination. 21
Thus:
Pros. Gonzales : And after that, what, if any, did you do next?
PO1 Albarico : After arresting them, we brought them to our police station, sir.
Pros. Gonzales : And at the station, Mr. Witness, what happened to the items that you
said was [sic] recovered from the possession of accused Romeo?
PO1 Albarico : We have the pieces of evidence blottered, sir.
Pros. Gonzales : And thereafter, what happened to the evidence gathered, Mr. Witness?

PO1 Albarico : PO1 Jiro marked the evidence, sir.

xxxx
Pros. Gonzales : Mr. Witness, those substance[s] that were marked by PO1 Jiro, what
happened to them after the markings?
PO1 Albarico : After marking the pieces of evidence, he turned them over to the Desk
Officer and prepared a request for examination and those were brought to Camp Crame
for examination, sir.
xxxx
Pros. Gonzales : If you know, what was the result of the request for examination?
PO1 Albarico : As far as we know, it is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.
Yet, the police officers did not bother to offer any sort of reason or justification for their
failure to make an inventory and take pictures of the drugs immediately after their
seizure in the presence of the accused and the other persons designated by the law.
Both the RTC and the CA misapprehended the significance of such omission. It is
imperative for the prosecution to establish a justifiable cause for non-compliance with
the procedural requirements set by law.22 The procedures outlined in Section 21 of R.A.
9165 are not merely empty formalitiesthese are safeguards against abuse,23 the most
notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion.24
And what is the prosecutions evidence that the substances, which the police chemist
examined and found to be shabu, were the same substances that the police officers
allegedly seized from Romeo and Mercy? No such evidence exists. As pointed out above,
the prosecution stipulated with the accused that the police chemist "could not testify on
the source and origin of the subject specimens that she had examined." No police officer
testified out of personal knowledge that the substances given to the police chemist and
examined by her were the very same substances seized from the accused.1wphi1
In regard to the required presence of representatives from the DOJ and the media and an
elective official, the prosecution also did not bother to offer any justification, even a
hollow one, for failing to comply with such requirement. What is more, the police officers
could have easily coordinated with any elected barangay official in the conduct of the
police operation in the locality.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the February 23, 2012 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 04301, which affirmed the April 2, 2009 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Cases 7598, 7599, and 7600 and, accordingly,
ACQUITS the accused-appellants Romeo Oniza y Ong and Mercy Oniza y Cabarle of the
charges against them in those cases on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The National Police Commission is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE PO1 Reynaldo M. Albarico,
PO1 Fortunato P. Jiro III and PO1 Jose Gordon Antonio for the possible filing of appropriate
charges, if warranted.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE both the
above accused-appellants from custody unless they are detained for some other lawful
cause.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Vs. Peralta, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECONO DIVISION
G.R. No. 195528

July 24, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOSE CLARA y BUHAIN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal filed by herein accused Joel Clara y Buhain (Joel) from the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of conviction rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. 2
The factual rendition of the prosecution follows:
Prosecution witness P03 Leonardo R. Ramos (P03 Ramos) narrated that he acted as a
poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation conducted by their office, the District Anti-Illegal
Drug Special Task Group (DAID-SOTG) of Quezon City on 12 September 2005. 3 He
recalled that on or about 4:00 oclock in afternoon of the said date, a male informant
came to their office with the information that a person named "Ningning" was selling
drugs at 22-C Salvador Drive, Balonbato, Quezon City. 4 Police team leader SPO2 Dante D.
Nagera (SPO2 Nagera) endorsed the matter to their Chief of Office Col. Gerardo B.
Ratuita (Col. Ratuita) for the conduct of a buy-bust operation.5 A buy-bust group was
created consisting of SPO2 Nagera, PO1 Peggy Lynne V. Vargas (PO1 Vargas), PO1
Teresita B. Reyes (PO1 Reyes), PO1 Alexander A. Jimenez (PO1 Jimenez) and PO3 Ramos
who was designated as the poseur-buyer.6 During the briefing, it was agreed upon that
P200.00-worth of shabu would be bought from "Ningning" by PO3 Ramos. Before leaving
for their target, PO1 Reyes prepared a Pre-Operation Report and forwarded it to the
Tactical Operation Communication of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
coordination.7 At 8:00 oclock in the evening, the team proceeded to the area on board
three vehicles: Nissan Sentra, Toyota Corolla and owner-type jeep. 8 Upon their arrival at
9:35 oclock in the evening, PO3 Ramos and the informant knocked on the door of the
house while the rest of the team positioned themselves ten meters away.9 The informant
identified "Gigi" as the accused Joel, Ningnings uncle.10 Initiating a conversation, the

informant introduced to Joel PO3 Ramos as a buyer of P200.00-peso worth of illegal drug.
When PO3 Ramos asked for Ningning, Joel answered that she was upstairs. Joel asked for
payment and PO3 Ramos handed the P200 marked money.11 Joel went upstairs and
called Ningning. Ningning opened the door and handed Joel a small plastic sachet of
shabu which in turn was handed to PO3 Ramos.12
Thereafter, PO3 Ramos touched his head as a pre-arranged signal to prompt the back-up
police officers of the consummation of the illegal sale. Immediately, the rest of the team
rushed to the place to arrest Joel.13 Joel tried to close the door to prevent the police
officers from entering the house but PO3 Ramos was able to grab him. SPO2 Nagera
quickly went upstairs to arrest Ningning but the latter was able to escape
apprehension.14 PO3 Ramos immediately frisked Joel inside the house but failed to
recover anything from him; the marked money was given to Ningning when Joel went
upstairs to get the plastic sachet.15
Joel was brought to the police station and was informed by PO1 Jimenez of his
constitutional rights as a consequence of his arrest.16 Afterwards, the small plastic sachet
recovered was marked by PO1 Jimenez inside the station and an inventory receipt was
prepared.17 PO3 Ramos clarified that the plastic sachet was in the possession of PO1
Jimenez from the place of arrest until arrival at the police station. PO3 Ramos added that
PO1 Jimenez was present at the time of arrest which explained his possession of the
plastic sachet containing shabu.18
Inside the courtroom, PO3 Ramos identified Joel as the one involved in the illegal
transaction.19 He also identified the small plastic sachet of shabu as the subject of the
illegal transaction through the marking "LRR" he placed on it.20 He testified that he
brought the plastic sachet containing the specimen to the crime laboratory for
examination21 where it was tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, as
certified by the examining Forensic Chemist Engr. Leonard M. Jabonillo (Forensic Chemist
Jabonillo) of Central Police District Crime Laboratory in his Chemistry Report. 22
SPO2 Nagera was also called to the witness stand to present his version of the events.
However, some inconsistencies surfaced during his examination at the witness stand.
When asked about the gender of the informant who came to their office, he answered
that the informant was a female, contradicting the statement of PO3 Ramos.23 He also
differed from the statement of PO3 Ramos when he testified that only two modes of
transportation, instead of three, were used by the buy-bust team in proceeding to the
target area, one Nissan Maxima and one owner-type jeep.24 He also had difficulty in
identifying the accused inside the court room when he was asked upon by the prosecutor
to do so.25
Further contradiction was made when SPO2 Nagera narrated that PO3 Ramos was the
one holding the plastic sachet before it was turned over to PO1 Jimenez for
investigation.26 He also admitted in his cross examination that he never saw Ningning
during the entire buy-bust operation.27 Finally, when asked about on who placed the
initial "LRR" on the plastic sachet, he positively identified that it was the investigator who
put the same.28
PO1 Jimenez was also presented in court as a prosecution witness to give details of the
buy-bust operation. His version, however, also differed from the versions presented by
PO3 Ramos and SPO2 Nagera. He testified that the plastic sachet confiscated was
already marked by the apprehending officers when it was turned over to him for
investigation, a contradiction of the statements of both PO3 Ramos and SPO2 Nagera
that it was him who marked the plastic sachet with the initial "LRR." 29 He positively
identified that he saw the item being marked by the apprehending officers in their
office.30
The defense interposed denial.

Accused Joel denied any involvement in the buy-bust operation. He recalled that he was
inside his house sleeping between 9:00 to 10:00 oclock in the evening of 12 September
2005 when five uniformed police officers entered his house.31 They got hold of his arm
and frisked him but failed to recover anything.32 The police officers did not inform him of
the reason for his arrest; neither did they recite his constitutional rights. Afterwards, he
was made to ride an owner type vehicle and was taken to the police station where he
was only asked for his name.33 He denied having sold drugs and having seen the marked
money and plastic sachet containing shabu.34
On cross examination, Joel was also inconsistent in portions of his testimony. He testified
that all of his siblings were in the province and his only companions in the house at the
time of the arrest were his nephew and niece.35 However, when asked why the door was
still open at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, he replied that he was waiting for his
sister.36 He also contradicted his earlier statement that he was sleeping with his nephew
and niece downstairs when in his cross examination he said that his niece was staying on
the second floor of the house at the time of the arrival of the police officers. 37
Joel was eventually charged with Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs punishable under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 before the Prosecutors Office of Quezon City. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads:
Criminal Case No. 05-136719
That on or about the 12th day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute
any dangerous drug, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver,
transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, ZERO POINT ZERO SEVEN
(0.07) gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. 38
When arraigned, Joel pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 39
During pre-trial, it was agreed upon by both parties that Forensic Chemist Jabonillo had
no personal knowledge as to how the plastic sachet containing specimen positive for
illegal drug came to of police officers possession. The forensic chemist merely examined
the specimen and found it to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. As a
consequence of these stipulations, his testimony was dispensed with by the court. 40
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court on 21 March 2007 found the accused guilty of the offense charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision41 reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered finding the accused JOEL CLARA Y BUHAIN GUILTY
beyond reasonable of the crime in violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165 as charged (for drug
pushing) and he is sentenced to suffer the prescribed jail term of Life Imprisonment and
pay a fine of P500,000.00.
The shabu weighing 0.07 gram involved in this case is ordered transmitted to the PDEA
thru DDB for disposal in accordance with R.A. 9165.42
The trial court ruled that Joel directly dealt with the poseur buyer and participated in all
the stages of the illegal sale. It found conspiracy between Joel and Ningning. It pointed
out that Ningning was able to escape the police dragnet while Joel was being arrested
because of her familiarity as a drug operator with police operations.
The police operation and its coordination with the operatives of the PDEA would be
recognized by the appellate court as legally performed. 43 On the contrary the
prosecutions scenario that the police officers entered Joels residence and hauled him
out with no reason at all was found to be improbable. 44
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the appellate court ruled that all the elements of
an illegal sale of dangerous drugs were present.45 First, Joel, as the seller of illegal drug,
was positively identified by the poseur buyer and the police officers; Second, the
confiscated white crystalline substance which was found by the PNP crime laboratory as
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug was presented
during trial; and Lastly, the illegal sale was for a consideration of P200.00 given by PO3
Ramos as poseur buyer. The appellate court further held that the non-presentation of the
marked money was not fatal since the prosecution witnesses were able to establish that
the P200.00 bill used to purchase the illegal drug was in the possession of Ningning who
was able to evade arrest.46
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the evidence, we resolve to reverse the ruling of conviction and
render a judgment of acquittal in favor of the accused.
In his Brief, the accused-appellant contested his conviction due to the inconsistencies in
the prosecutions presentation of a supposed buy-bust operation, coupled with its failure
to establish with certainty the chain of custody of evidence. He also argued against the
presumption of regularity of performance of duties. Finally, to substantiate his innocence,
he pointed out that he was not even the target person in the PDEA Coordination Report
and denied any conspiracy and involvement with such target person named "Ningning." 47
Inspite of the imperfect narration of events by the accused Joel, we are constrained to
render a judgment of acquittal due to the lapses of the prosecution that led to its failure
to discharge the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed
the crime.
In order to successfully prosecute an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like
shabu, the following elements must first be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.
It is basic in criminal prosecutions that an accused is presumed innocent of the charge
laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the
burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of
evidence required.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 48 It must rest on its
own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to
meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present
evidence on its own behalf, in which case, the presumption prevails and the accused
should necessarily be acquitted.49
In this case, the prosecution failed to overcome such presumption when it presented
inconsistent versions of an illegal sale.
PO3 Ramos identified Joel as the seller who sold to him a small plastic sachet containing
shabu in exchange of two hundred pesos. We quote the relevant portions:
FISCAL (to witness)
Q: What happened there?
A: When we reached the house sir, we knocked at the door and alias Gigi open (sic) it.
xxxx
Q: What was the conversation with you during that time?

A: The informant first introduced me to Gigi that I will be the one to buy shabu.
Q: What was the answer of Gigi at that time?
A: He asked how much.
Q: What was your answer?
A: I said dos.
Q: After informing him that you intend to buy dos of illegal drug, what happened?
A: I first asked where is Ningning.
Q: What was the answer of Gigi?
A: He said that she was upstairs.
Q: What happened after that?
A: He asked for my money, sir.
Q: Did you give the P200.00.
A: Yes sir, I gave the money.
Q: After giving that money to Gigi, what happened after that?
A: He called Ningning from up stair (sic).
Q: Did Ningning go to the place where you were talking with Gigi at that time?
A: No sir, she just open (sic) the door and handed the sachet of shabu.
xxxx
Q: When he received that from Ningning at that time, what did you do?
A: After Gigi got it he gave it to me, sir.
Q: Can you describe that item you received from Gigi that came from Ningning at that
time?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Can you describe?
A: Yes sir, just a small plastic sachet.50
PO3 Ramos initially testified that he placed his marking on the small plastic sachet he
was able to buy from Joel:
Q: If that small plastic sachet is shown to you can you indentify the specimen?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because I placed my marking.
Q: What marking did you place?

A: LRR.
Q: Showing to you this transparent plastic sachet containing illegal drug, what can you
say about that, what is the relation of that transparent plastic sachet to the plastic
sachet you have just mentioned?
A: That is the sachet I was able to buy, sir.
Q: Where is the marking?
A: It was on top of the plastic sachet.51 (Emphasis supplied)
However, he would later present a new version on who marked the plastic sachet:
Q: Now, going [back] to the police station, other than searching, what other matters were
taken during the arrest?
A: The evidence that I was able to get from Ningning and it was the investigator who
marked it.
Q: Other than putting the initial on the transparent plastic sachet immediately after the
arrest Mr. Witness, what was the SOP in a buy-bust operation, after taking or receiving
the item from the accused during the arrest?
A: We made the inventory receipt, sir.52 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Q: x x x. You said that it was the investigator who made the marking in the transparent
plastic sachet, where were you when the marking was placed on it?
A: I was in front of the investigator.
Q: What was the marking placed?
A: LRR.53 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Q: You said that the investigator placed the marking in the transparent plastic sachet and
likewise he was the one who made the inventory receipt. In what particular place that he
prepared this particular document?
A: At the area, sir.
Q: What do you mean by area?
A: In front of the house of the accused, sir.
Q: What is the name of that investigator again?
A: Alexander Jimenez, sir.54 (Emphasis supplied)
The testimony of PO3 Ramos, which apparently was given as proof of all the elements
that constitute an illegal sale of drug is however, inconsistent on material points from the
recollection of events of PO3 Ramos, SPO2 Nagera and PO1 Jimenez regarding the
marking, handling and turnover of the plastic sachet containing the dangerous drug of
shabu.
SPO2 Nagera narrated that it was PO1 Jimenez who marked the plastic sachet after it
was handed by PO3 Ramos:

Q: What did the investigator do to shabu, Mr. Witness?

A: They placed their initial and prepared request for examination address to the Crime
Laboratory sir.55 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Q: Where was PO3 Ramos when that plastic sachet, when the police investigator put the
initial, Mr. Witness?
A: We were there sir.56 (Emphasis supplied)
However, PO1 Jimenez later testified that it was PO3 Ramos who marked the plastic
sachet in their office.
Q: Being the investigator you saw the item confiscated?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was it already marked when it was received by you?
A: It was already marked by the apprehending officers.
Q: Did you see it marked by the apprehending officer?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: In our office.57 (Emphasis supplied)
Contradictory statements were further made as to who between PO3 Ramos and PO1
Jimenez held the shabu from the time of the arrest until arrival at the police station. PO3
Ramos pointed to PO1 Jimenez in his direct examination:
Q: You said immediately after arresting and searching the accused in this case you said
that you brought the accused to the police station, who was in possession of the
transparent plastic sachet from where you received that transparent plastic sachet in
exchange to P200.00 going to the police station Mr. Witness?
A: The investigator, sir.
Q: You mean to say that investigator was present when the accused was arrested in this
case?
A: Yes sir, he was with us.58 (Emphasis supplied)
However, SPO2 Nagera pointed to PO3 Ramos as the one in possession:
Q: What about the shabu, who was holding it in going to the police station, Mr. Witness?
A: Ramos, sir.
Q: What happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: It was turn (sic) over to the police investigator, sir.59 (Emphasis supplied)
The clear inconsistency in the presentation of facts is fatal. It creates doubts whether the
transaction really occurred or not. Though Joels denial as a defense is weak, such cannot
relieve the prosecution the burden of presenting proof beyond reasonable doubt that an
illegal transaction actually took place.60

Inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses referring to the events that transpired in the
buy-bust operation can overturn the judgment of conviction. As held in Zaragga v.
People,61 material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the
shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable
doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. Prosecutions failure to indubitably show the
identity of the shabu led to the acquittal of the accused in that case.62
Inconsistencies and discrepancies referring to minor details and not upon the basic
aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses credibility. If the cited inconsistency
has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, it does not stand as a ground to reverse
a conviction.63 However, in this case, the material inconsistencies are furthered by
inconsistencies of the police officers on minor details. Referring back to the narration of
circumstances of the buy-bust operation, SPO2 Nagera was asked about the gender of
the informant who went to their office to report about the illegal activities committed by
Ningning.1wphi1 He readily answered that the informant was a female.64 PO3 Ramos in
turn, when asked to describe what happened in the afternoon before the buy-bust
operation, testified that a male informant came to their office to report about a person
selling illegal drugs.65
These conflicting statements of the prosecution effectively broke the chain of custody of
evidence of the sale of dangerous drug.
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 provides
for the procedure to be observed in preserving the integrity of chain of custody:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for disposition in the following
manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given copy thereof. Provided, that the
physical inventory and the photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at least the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending team/officer, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.
"Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court and finally for destruction. Such record
of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition.66
To establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, the prosecution must establish
the following links, namely: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of

the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.67.
The "objective test" in determining the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the
conduct of buy-bust operation provides that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a
complete picture detailing the buy-bust operationfrom the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of
sale.68 The manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug,
the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully
induced to commit an offense.69
In view of these guiding principles, we rule that the prosecution failed to present a clear
picture on how the police officers seized and marked the illegal drug recovered by the
apprehending officer and how the specimen was turned over by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer.
As to the first link of marking, the three police officers failed to agree on who among
them marked the plastic sachet, which is highly improbable if they really had a clear
grasp on what really transpired on the day of operation.
PO3 Ramos testified that he placed his marking on the small plastic sachet but recanted
his previous statement at the latter part of the examination and pointed out that it was
the investigator PO1 Jimenez who put the marking in front of him at the area of arrest. 70
SPO2 Nagera in his testimony confirmed that it was PO1 Jimenez who put marking on the
plastic sachet.71 However, PO1 Jimenez in his testimony clarified that the item
confiscated were already marked by the apprehending officers when it was turned over
to him in their office.72
Likewise, they cannot seem to agree on the second link on who among them held the
item confiscated from the time of arrest and confiscation until it was turned over to the
investigator and the place where it was turned over.
PO3 Ramos positively pointed that it was PO1 Jimenez who took possession of the item
from the time of the arrest until arrival at the police station.73 However, when SPO2
Nagera was asked, he pointed out that it was PO3 Ramos who held the item from the
time of the arrest until they reached the police where it was turned over to Jimenez for
investigation.74
In Malillin v. People,75 it was explained that the chain of custody rule includes testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was
offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.76
The inconsistent statements of the police officers generated doubt on whether the
identity of the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to
marking and inventory then given to the Jimenez for investigation and eventually
submitted by PO3 Ramos for examination by the forensic chemist.
The prosecution cannot rely on the saving clause provided under Section 21(a) of the IRR
that non-compliance with the legal requirements shall not render void and invalid
seizures of and custody over said items. This saving clause is applicable only if
prosecution was able to prove the twin conditions of (a) existence of justifiable grounds
and (b) preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the items.77 The
procedural lapses in this case put to doubt the integrity of the items presented in court.

The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is adamant in its argument that
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by police officers
conducting buy-bust operation.
We agree but with qualification.
In numerous cases, we were inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty of public officers. 78 However, this is not a hard-and-fast rule. It does
not mean that we straight away and without a blink of the eye rule on the regularity of
their performance of duties. We at all times harmonize the interest of the accused
alongside the interest of the State.
Inconsistencies committed by the police officers amounting to procedural lapses in
observing the chain of custody of evidence requirement effectively negated this
presumption. Their inaccurate recall of events amounted to irregularities that affected
the presumption and tilted the evidence in favor of the accused. The absence of
improper motive tends to sustain inexistence but does not absolutely rule out false
charges.
In case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police officers and the
presumption of innocence of the accused, we rule that the latter must prevail as the law
imposes upon the prosecution the highest degree of proof of evidence to sustain
conviction.79
Due to foregoing flagrant inconsistencies in the testimonies of police officers which
directly constitute the recollection of events of buy-bust together and failure of
observance of chain of custody of evidence which effectively broke the links to sustain
conviction, we rule for the acquittal of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 4 August 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02714 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 21
March 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 103 of Quezon City is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant JOSE CLARA y BUHAIN is hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered immediately released from detention unless his continued confinement is
warranted for some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice