20151016-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To Senate Standing Committees On Community Affairs-SUBMISSION - NO JAB, NO PAY-Supplement 1

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Committee Secretary
Senate Standing Committees on Community Affairs
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16-10-2015(Supplement 1)
PO Box 6100, Parliament House, Canberra ACT 2600

Phone: +61 2 6277 3515, Fax: +61 2 6277 5829
community.affairs.sen@aph.gov.au
Re: 20151016-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Senate Standing Committees on Community AffairsSUBMISSION- NO JAB NO PAY-Supplement 1
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Sir/Madam,
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Having provided my submission earlier today I now came across the Statement of
Minister Scott Morrison and will quote it and explain why it is unconstitutional.
Because the religious/secular issue was extensively canvassed by me during the 19 July 2006
litigation involving the Commonwealth of Australia and Mr Robert Hulls Attorney-General for
the State of Victoria made known to abide by the Courts decision then I view Mr Scott Morrison
cannot act in violation to the courts ruling by excluding religious or other conscious grounds.
Because my submissions were all pre-filed in writing in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT it is
a valid and accurate record what was submitted to the court by me. And as none of the AttorneyGeneral challenged any part or all of my submissions than it was and remains to be unchallenged
and binding the Commonwealth and the states.
My 4-6-2006 correspondence to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions which
was also part of my written submissions makes it very clear that that secular views are at the
same level as a religiousview!
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HANSARD 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-I understood the honorable member to put himself on the very highest pedestal, and by
contrast to put me on the very lowest. At all events, I feel that if this were carried, an unpopular individual, to
obtain his rights and liberties, would have to go cap in hand to and be at the mercy of the Government of the
day. I was thinking of the pig-tail case which occurred in California, and which I alluded to some time
ago, where an abominably unjust law was passed against Chinamen. It was passed to persecute them in
regard to their pig-tails, which they [start page 1689] regard with exceptional reverence. That law was
declared to be unconstitutional as a law passed by a state.
END QUOTE
The transcript of this Hansard is in greater detail set out further down below.
.
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QUOTE
Mr. SOLOMON.- We shall not only look to the Federal Judiciary for the protection of our interests,
but also for the just interpretation of the Constitution:
END QUOTE
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QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-I did not say that it took place under this clause, and the honorable member is quite right in
saying that it took place under the next clause; but I am trying to point out that laws would be valid if
they had one motive, while they would be invalid if they had another motive.
END QUOTE
.
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16-10-2015 (Supplement 1)
Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
INSPECTOR-RIKATI about the BLACK HOLE in the CONSTITUTION-DVD
A 1st edition limited special numbered book on Data DVD ISBN 978-0-9803712-6-0
PLEASE NOTE: E-mail admin@inspector-rikati.com at blog Http://www.scribd.com/InspectorRikati

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- The position with regard to this Constitution is that it has no legislative power, except
that which is actually given to it in express terms or which is necessary or incidental to a power given.
END QUOTE
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I did the litigation about s116 and again my submissions remained unchallenged and as such I am
entitled to the benefits of the Court having upheld both appeals. Hence, where this matter was
extensively litigated by me then I view it is beyond the powers of the Commonwealth to now use
a backdoor manner to achieve something it cannot do so to say through the front door.
Hence, the intention of the legislation clearly violates the provisions of s116 as it seeks to deny
religious/secular beliefs.
Because it was a constitutional issue before the court and none of the other parties sought to
challenge any of my submissions and neither appealed the judgment, then I view it may
constitute CONTEMPT OF COURT by the Minister to deny not just myself but also anyone
else the benefits of the courts decision. After all neither the constitution or any legislation was
specifically put in place for my person only, and as such it applies to me so shall it apply to any
other person in the Commonwealth of Australia.
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F842ee7d
9-89d4-4e4f-bc93-045b018bbeb2%2F0023%22
QUOTE
Wednesday, 16 September 2015
Page: 10329
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Mr MORRISON (CookMinister for Social Services) (09:25): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.
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This bill will introduce the government's No Jab, No Pay announcement from the 2015 budget. This is an
important initiative aimed at boosting childhood immunisation rates.
From 1 January 2016, the bill will ensure children fully meet immunisation requirements before their
families can access the childcare benefit, childcare rebate or the family tax benefit part A supplement.
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Immunisation requirements will also be extended to include children of all ages. At present, a child's
vaccination status is only checked at ages one, two and five for the family tax benefit part A supplement, and
up to age seven for the childcare payments.
Crucially, the government is ending the conscientious objection exemption to children's vaccinations
for access to these family assistance payments.
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Parents who vaccinate their children should have confidence that they can take their children to child care
in particular, without the fear that their children will be at risk of contracting a serious or potentially lifethreatening illness because of the conscientious objections of others.
Exceptions to the policy will apply only for valid medical reasonsfor example, not for religious
reasonssuch as when a general practitioner has certified that vaccinating the child would be medically
contraindicated, or that vaccination is unnecessary because the child has natural immunity from having
contracted the disease in question.
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Families with children participating in an approved vaccine study will be taken to meet the immunisation
requirements for the duration of the study, and similar rules will apply where a vaccine is temporarily
unavailable.
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The requirements will also be met if a recognised immunisation provider certifies that the child has an
equivalent level of immunisation through an overseas vaccination program.
Lastly, the secretary of my department will be able to determine that a child meets the immunisation
requirements after considering any decision-making principles set out in a legislative instrument made by the
minister.
The choice made by some families not to vaccinate their children is not supported by public policy or
medical research and advice to the government, nor should such action be supported by taxpayers in the form
of family payments.
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Australia now has childhood vaccination rates over 90 per cent, from one to five years of age. Under the
present arrangements, the vast majority of families receiving family paymentsaround 97 per centalready
meet the current immunisation requirement at the relevant age points.
However, more needs to be done to ensure we protect our children and our community from preventable
diseases. That includes those who, for genuine medical reasons, find themselves in a position where they are
not able to be vaccinated and rely on the herd vaccination to protect their health.
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The new policy will tighten up the rules and reinforce the importance of vaccination in protecting public
health, especially for children. I commend this bill to the House.
Ms King: On indulgence, as the shadow health minister, I commend the minister for the measure.
Debate adjourned.
END QUOTE
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On 19 July 2006 I then had the issue of religious issues before the County Court of Victoria
(exercising federal jurisdiction) where those using a religious exemption were allowed not to
vote.
ADDRESS TO THE COURT
County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
QUOTE
Firstly, I do wish to quote Section 117 and then 116 of the Constitution, both being relevant;
117 Rights of residents in States
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A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject

in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would
not be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen
resident in such other State.
Despite this, the Defendant continues to find that he is excluded from accessing High Court of
Australia, Federal Court of Australia and other AuslII.edu files. This despite ongoing complaints
filed via the Victorian Government, High Court of Australia, Federal Court of Australia, etc.
It appears to the Defendant that this denial of access to judgments has been to try to limit the
Defendant to have relevant Authorities for litigation on foot.
After having filed a complaint via the Victorian Government then for about 2 weeks access was
enabled, only to be excluded again, as such, it is a deliberate conduct to prevent me to research
judgments on record so as to frustrate me in legal proceedings.
I view that this is in breach of Section 117 of the Constitution.
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Because of this deliberate blockage to access Australian Authorities I am forced to rely often
upon US Authorities. In view that in the USA there is also a prohibition to legislate in regard of
religion then the equivalent Authority can be relied upon.
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116 Commonwealth not to legislate in respect of religion
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The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test
shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust
under the Commonwealth.
As shown below in greater extend the question of the Defendants religion itself would be an
invasion as to his rights. Further, there is no requirement to state any particular religion as the
matter in U.S. Supreme Court.
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116 Commonwealth not to legislate in respect of religion
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test
shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust
under the Commonwealth.
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WELSH v. UNITED STATES, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), 398 U.S. 333, WELSH v. UNITED
STATES, CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT, No. 76., Argued January 20, 1970, Decided June 15, 1970
1. The language of 6 (j) cannot be construed (as it was in United States v. Seeger, supra,
and as it is in the prevailing opinion) to exempt from military service all individuals who
in good faith oppose all war, it being clear from both the legislative history and textual
analysis of that provision that Congress used the words "by reason of religious training
and belief" to limit religion to its theistic sense and to confine it to formal, organized
worship or shared beliefs by a recognizable and cohesive group. Pp. 348-354.
2. The question of the constitutionality of 6 (j) cannot be avoided by a construction of that
provision that is contrary to its intended meaning. Pp. 354-356.
3. Section 6 (j) contravenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by
exempting those whose conscientious objection claims are founded on a theistic belief
while not exempting those whose claims are based on a secular belief. To comport with
that clause an exemption must be "neutral" and include those whose belief emanates from
a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. Pp. 356-361.
4. In view of the broad discretion conferred by the Act's severability clause and the
longstanding policy of exempting religious conscientious objectors, the Court, rather than
nullifying the exemption entirely, should extend its coverage to those like petitioner who
have been unconstitutionally excluded from its coverage. Pp. 361-367.
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And;
http://www.vaccineinfo.net/exemptions/relexemptlet.shtml
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Hints for Religious Exemptions to Immunization

Please read the text below before you download, print, or use the sample religious
exemption letter and support materials provided in the following link:
Sample Religious Exemption Letter and Supporting Documentation
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Refer to the statutes. The laws require that immunization must conflict with the tenets and
practices of a recognized or organized religion of which you are an adherent or member.
However, the law does not require you to name a religion at all. In fact, disclosing
your religion could cause your religious exemption to be challenged.
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And
Some schools and daycares attempt to require you to give far more information than
required by law. You are not required by law to fill out any form letters from a school or
daycare. The law allows you to submit your own letter and the letter only needs to meet
the bare requirements of the law. Keep it simple; do not feel you need to describe your
religious beliefs here as that also is not required by law.
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And
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Many times, when a school or day care questions your exemption, they are merely
unfamiliar with the law or trying to coerce you to go against your beliefs by
deliberately misrepresenting the law. They are betting on the fact that you don't know
your rights.
What appears to be clear is that a religious objection is not qualified to a specific religion and
neither can be as this would in fact offend Section 116 of the Constitution. Neither can it be
associated with any particular religion as this would also interfere with Section 116 of the
Constitution. Likewise, any person objecting under the religious objection Subsection 245(14)
of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 neither can be required to be a religious person as this
would also offend Section 116 of the Constitution, as the equivalent in WELSH v. UNITED
STATES, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), 398 U.S. 333 made clear that it (the religious objection applies
as much to non religious persons as religious persons. Therefore, anyone objection for his/her
personal reasons to vote clearly is entitled to do so regardless of having any specific religion
mentioned.
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Again, because I have been prevented from researching judgments of the High Court of Australia
and other judgments in general which are under control of AusLii.edu I am unable to research
that avenue as to locate simular judgments within Australia judgments.
Still, for purpose of this case, I should not be denied the benefits of my research, where I am
wrongly excluded from my constitutional rights to access Australian judgments.
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END QUOTE
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It should be made clear that I had filed and served an S78b NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
MATTERS and as such where neither the Commonwealth and/or the State Attorney-General
disputed my submissions then where the court upheld both appeals then clearly the
commonwealth nor any State can act now in defiance of the court judgment to uphold both
appeals upon my unchallenged submissions.
ADDRESS TO THE COURT
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QUOTE
I take the position that Subsection 245(14) of the Constitution is not and cannot be regarded to
limit the right of a objection to be only a (theistic belief ) religious objection but includes also
any secular belief objection.
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If Subsection 245(14) was limited to being theistic belief then it would be unconstitutional.
QUOTE 4-6-2006 CORRESPONDENCE FAXED 10.36 pm 4-6-2006
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
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Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
4-6-2006
C/o Judy McGillivray, lawyer
Melbourne Office, 22nd Floor, 2000 Queen Street, Melbourne VIC 3000
GPO Box 21 A, Melbourne Vic 3001
Tel 03 9605 4333, Fax 03 9670 4295
ref; 02101199, etc
T01567737 & Q01897630
AND WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
Re; religious objection (Subsection 245(14) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918)
offend Section 116 if the Constitution if it excludes secular belief based objections.
Madam,
As you are aware I continue to refer to my religious objection albeit do wish to indicate
that while using the religious objection referred to in subsection 245(14) of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 I do not consider that this subsection 14 limits an objection
only to an theistic belief based religious objection but in fact it also includes any secular
belief based religious objection, as it must be neutral to whatever a person uses as grounds for
an objection. This, as Section 116 of the Constitution prohibit the Commonwealth of
Australia to limit the scope of subsection 245(14) to only theistic belief based religious
objections. Therefore, any person having a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source of
religious objection have a valid objection.
Neither do I accept that a person making an religious objection requires to state his/her
religion, and neither which part of his/her religion provides for a religious objection as the
mere claim itself is sufficient to constitute what is referred to in subsection 245(14) as being a
religious objection. Therefore, the wording religious objection is to be taken as objection
without the word religion having any special meaning in that regard.
If you do not accept this as such, then there is clearly another constitutional issue on foot!
I request you to respond as soon as possible and set out your position in this regard.
Awaiting your response, G. H. SCHOREL-HLAVKA
END QUOTE 4-6-2006 CORRESPONDENCE FAXED 10.36 pm 4-6-2006
END QUOTE
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Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. WISE.-If the Federal Parliament chose to legislate upon, say, the education question-and the
Constitution gives it no power to legislate in regard to that question-the Ministers for the time being in each
state might say-"We are favorable to this law, because we shall get 100,000 a year, or so much a year, from
the Federal Government as a subsidy for our schools," and thus they might wink at a violation of the
Constitution, while no one could complain. If this is to be allowed, why should we have these elaborate
provisions for the amendment of the Constitution? Why should we not say that the Constitution may
be amended in any way that the Ministries of the several colonies may unanimously agree? Why have
this provision for a referendum? Why consult the people at all? Why not leave this matter to the
Ministers of the day? But the proposal has a more serious aspect, and for that reason only I will ask
permission to occupy a few minutes in discussing it. Not that I believe that it will be carried, but I think it
is an echo of a widespread misapprehension which prevails outside as to the duties and functions of the
Supreme Court. It very often seems hard to a layman that that which has been enacted by Parliament should
be declared to be illegal by a Supreme Court when the statute is called into question during litigation between
two citizens. It is hard, but like everything else in politics, it is a choice of evils. The question is: Whether it
would not be of much greater disadvantage to the whole community to bring in the Supreme Court as an
interpreter of the Constitution before any precise case was taken before it, than it is to leave the individual to
suffer the hardship of finding that the Act upon which he relied was really invalid? I will not use my own
language in explaining the position, but, to have it put upon record, I should like to quote a passage which
occurs on pages 154 and 155 of Dicey's Law of the Constitution. After pointing out that the American
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Supreme Court exists to interpret the Constitution, and to see that effect is given to its provisions, the writer
goes on to say that-
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The power, moreover, of the courts, which maintains the Articles of the Constitution as the law of the
land, and thereby keeps each authority within its proper sphere, is exerted with an ease and a
regularity which has astonished and perplexed continental critics. The explanation is that the Judges of
the United States control the action of the Constitution, but they perform merely judicial functions,
since they never decide anything but the cases before them. It is natural to say that the Supreme Court
pronounces Acts of Congress invalid, but in fact this is not so. The court never directly pronounces any
opinion whatever upon an Act of Congress.
[start page 1687]
What the court does do is simply to determine A. is or is not entitled to recover judgment against X.;
but in determining that case the court may decide that any Act of Congress is not to be taken into
account, since it is an Act beyond the constitutional powers of Congress.
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If any one thinks this is a distinction without a difference he shows some ignorance of politics, and does not
understand how much the authority of a court is increased by confining its action to purely judicial business.
In a book prepared by you, sir, entitled A Manual of Reference for the use of Members of the National
Australasian Convention, to which frequent reference has been made, the matter is further dealt with. You
say, at page 126, in words that I would like to adopt as part of my argument:-
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No doubt the power given is very great, but it is exercised in a manner and by a body which affords
the least possible chance of friction and quarrels between the central and the provincial governments.
A veto by the central authority has to be exercised at a time when the public attention of the provincial
electors is directed to the matter; at a time when, perhaps, party spirit runs high, when angry passions
pervade both factions, and when the subject-matter is invested with an importance which is not
intrinsic, whereas a declaration by a court that the statute is invalid is withdrawn from the sphere of
politics. Each individual and each state looks upon it that such declaration is given only in pursuance of
the Constitution. Public attention is probably directed to other matters, and the question has, in many
cases, shrunk into its native insignificance; and "it is to the interest of every man who wishes the
Federal Constitution to be observed that the judgments of the federal tribunals should be respected,
and they take it that the courts are the protectors of the federal compact, and that the federal compact
is, in the long run, the guarantee of the rights of the separate state."
If the proposal of the honorable member (Mr. Gordon) was carried into effect-though of that, I think, there is
not the slightest chance-it would follow that any person who was aggrieved by an unconstitutional enactment
would have to persuade the Attorney-General of the state or of the Commonwealth, as the case might be, to in
some way set the law in motion to ascertain the legality of the enactment, If the enactment was one which
affected a matter exciting strong party feeling, the result would be that the abstract question of its
validity would have to be argued before the court at a time when public feeling was excited, although it
would be of the utmost importance that the decision of the court should be entirely free from all
suspicion of political bias. Then, too, the enactment might be valid in parts and invalid in other parts,
or it might be impossible to interpret it in the abstract. It is impossible to foresee the bearing of a
statute upon all possible cases, and it is only when a case comes for determination before a court that
the court is able to say that in that particular case the statute does or does not afford protection to the
citizen who has relied upon it. The honorable member's proposal would remove at once the greatest of all
safeguards to the impartiality and usefulness of the Federal Court, by taking away from it its right to deal
with matters which are brought, as lawyers term it, to a distinct issue, and with precise and definite points, in
regard to which the full bearing of every word of the judgment could be appreciated? Instead of the court
being able to determine the legality of an enactment in its bearing upon any particular case, there
would be considerations introduced which were utterly foreign to the atmosphere of the tribunal, and
that would seriously impair the public confidence in a court which, with us, as in America, will, I
believe, prove to be the ultimate protector of the liberties of the people. Then, too, the amendment is in its
form so complicated that its practical working will be impossible. The honorable member said truly that the
Attorney-General constantly intervenes now. But he intervenes at the expense of the individual. The
individual presents his case, and gives a guarantee for costs. Under this proposal all that would happen would
be that the individual who wanted to assert [start page 1688] his right would have a barrier placed between
him and the obtaining of justice. He would have to satisfy the Attorney-General for the time being that he
would be able to pay the costs of any action, and he would have to bring sufficient political pressure to bear
upon that officer to get him to move in the case, and finally he would be left to contest the matter in his own
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interests and in his own name. The result would be that the rights and liberties of every citizen in the
community would be placed at the mercy of a chance parliamentary majority.
Mr. GORDON.-That is the position now-the rights and liberties of every individual are at the mercy of a
parliamentary majority.
Mr. WISE.-The honorable member is now speaking of rights in respect to legislation. If the Parliament of
South Australia were to pass a law contravening the Merchant Shipping Act
Mr. GORDON.-I am not speaking of Imperial legislation.
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Mr. WISE.-Suppose the Parliament of South Australia wanted to get rid of the Plimsoll Mark Act-even
though there were a majority it would be invalid, but according to the honorable member, when, we have here
a case exactly analogous, if the Constitution limits the power of the state, and enacts that certain powers shall
belong exclusively to the Commonwealth Parliament, and that if the state deals with them it invades the
authority of the Commonwealth Parliament, the individual is to have no rights unless he can persuade the
Government of the day to take up his case. It is in the interests of the poorer and uninfluential classes of
the community, it is. in the interests of the minority, that this amendment should be rejected, because it
places an obstacle in the way of obtaining that justice which ought to be free to every individual in the
community.
Mr. HIGGINS (Victoria).-I should like to add my protest against this new clause. I am bound to say
something, because the honorable member (Mr. Gordon) says it is only the conservative and timid lawyers
who would venture to oppose this proposal.
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Mr. GORDON.-I did not say that. I said as a rule the legal profession is, according to Herbert Spencer, a
timid and conservative class.
Mr. HIGGINS.-That may be so, and if the honorable member says he did not make that statement it is all
right. Anyhow, I thought he said that only conservative and timid lawyers would oppose this clause. There is
no doubt the intention of the honorable member is excellent. He wants to diminish litigation. If he can show
that this will diminish litigation to any material extent, and, at the same time, will not involve us in a great
many dangers to our liberties, I will go with him, but he has not shown anything of the sort. As Mr. Wise has
shown, it will throw an unpopular minority into the power of a chance Ministry of the day. We must see today that the rights of individuals, even unpopular individuals, are preserved in the Constitution. I think
Sir John Forrest said that I personally had not got sufficient respect for the rights of individuals.
Sir JOHN FORREST.-No.
Mr. HIGGINS.-Do I understand him to refer merely to private property?
Sir JOHN FORREST.-Not the same respect as I have.
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Mr. HIGGINS.-I understood the honorable member to put himself on the very highest pedestal, and by
contrast to put me on the very lowest. At all events, I feel that if this were carried, an unpopular individual, to
obtain his rights and liberties, would have to go cap in hand to and be at the mercy of the Government of the
day. I was thinking of the pig-tail case which occurred in California, and which I alluded to some time
ago, where an abominably unjust law was passed against Chinamen. It was passed to persecute them in
regard to their pig-tails, which they [start page 1689] regard with exceptional reverence. That law was
declared to be unconstitutional as a law passed by a state. I ask honorable members to consider the great
difficulty there would be in getting the Federal Congress or Federal Executive to interfere in the case of
Chinamen, so as to enforce their rights in such a case. There was an exceptional law which should never have
been passed. It was distinctly a persecuting law. Any practical politician would see the great difficulty there
would be in appealing to a Federal Executive, especially if there was an election approaching, to enforce the
just rights of Chinamen in such a case. The same thing might happen supposing a federal law were
passed which was outside the Constitution. Supposing that a majority of the state concerned happened
to regard the man as unpopular supposing a law were passed that no one bearing the name of Jones
should be admitted into the state of Virginia, the law might be directed against a certain person named
Jones, and it would be unconstitutional, and Jones could not enforce his rights to go into that state. I
ask, is he to be compelled to go cap in hand to the Attorney-General of the state of Virginia to enforce his
rights? I feel that, with the very best intentions my honorable friend is making the gravest of mistakes. So far
as regards the main purport of the amendment, it would mean this: That you could only get a point of this sort
decided by having a state or Commonwealth intervening as a party. You would turn judicial questions into
political questions. You would proclaim-"Here is a question between the state and the Commonwealth;
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here is a political question"; and you would make the Judges partisans. It is one of the great
advantages of private persons being able to raise these points, and not the states or the Commonwealth,
that you keep the judicial bench free from the taint of political partisanship. I feel that the more you look
at this thing all round, the more inconsistent it is with the very first principles of justice. It may be said-Even
supposing the law does go beyond the Constitution in some degree, surely it ought not to be left to a private
person to upset it." I say it ought to be upset at once and at the very earliest point. As soon as ever you
find it has gone beyond the bounds you ought to say-"This thing is illegal." Otherwise you will leave to
the Ministry of the day these powers of which you are so careful, giving them to a majority of the states
and to a majority of the people. You would allow the Ministry of the day to exercise a suspending
power as to whether it would enforce a law or not, which is most dangerous. It is one thing to induce a
Government or Parliament to pass an unjust law, and it is quite another thing to induce a Government for one
excuse or another to hold its hand from acting. What I fear is that you would often induce the Government to
withhold its hand from acting, for fear it would incur opprobrium or unpopularity. I sincerely hope the
amendment will not be carried.
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Mr. GORDON (South Australia).-Of course the objections raised are those I expected, only I think they
might have been put with even greater force. And there is a great deal more to be said in favour of my motion
than I have been able to say. I agree at once with the interpretation of Mr. Wise that this measure is a simple
method of amending the Constitution by acquiescence. I intended it to be so, and that is not a demerit-it is a
merit-of the proposal. As for the argument that you might as well have no Constitution at all if you allow
amendment by acquiescence, that seems rather wide of the mark. People going into a partnership lay down
the general terms of that partnership, but they may be qualified by consent. But you must have in your
partnership general rules laid down. There are the general lines laid down in the Constitution, which within
certain limits may [start page 1690] be modified as agreed, so that the honorable and learned gentleman's
argument in that view, I think, fell to the ground. Mr. Higgins enforced the argument as to the rights of the
individual. Now, I have already said that I think those individual rights should be subordinated to the general
rights of the community, and to their interests as expressed in the law for the time being. I object altogether to
the objection that party faction would govern. What would govern it would be the sense of the community for
the time being. However, as there appears to be no hope of carrying the proposal, I must content myself by
submitting it to the committee.
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Mr. Gordon's proposed new clause was negatived.

END QUOTE
ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 3

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QUOTE
Re- RELIGIOUS OBJECTION
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As stated above, the definition religious objection is as such unconstitutional (Section 116 of
the Constitution) unless it includes secular objections.
http://www.vaccineinfo.net/exemptions/relexemptlet.shtml
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Hints for Religious Exemptions to Immunization

Please read the text below before you download, print, or use the sample religious
exemption letter and support materials provided in the following link:
Sample Religious Exemption Letter and Supporting Documentation
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Refer to the statutes. The laws require that immunization must conflict with the tenets and
practices of a recognized or organized religion of which you are an adherent or member.
However, the law does not require you to name a religion at all. In fact, disclosing
your religion could cause your religious exemption to be challenged.
And
p9
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Some schools and daycares attempt to require you to give far more information than
required by law. You are not required by law to fill out any form letters from a school or
daycare. The law allows you to submit your own letter and the letter only needs to meet
the bare requirements of the law. Keep it simple; do not feel you need to describe your
religious beliefs here as that also is not required by law.
5
And
10
Many times, when a school or day care questions your exemption, they are merely
unfamiliar with the law or trying to coerce you to go against your beliefs by
deliberately misrepresenting the law. They are betting on the fact that you don't know
your rights.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=398&invol=333
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U.S. Supreme Court

WELSH v. UNITED STATES, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)
398 U.S. 333
WELSH v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
No. 76.
Argued January 20, 1970
Decided June 15, 1970
Petitioner was convicted of refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces despite his
claim for conscientious objector status under 6 (j) of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act. That provision exempts from military service persons who by reason of "religious training
and belief" are conscientiously opposed to war in any form, that term being defined in the Act as
"belief in a relation to a supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation" but not including "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal code." In his exemption application petitioner stated that he could not affirm or
deny belief in a "Supreme Being" and struck the words "my religious training and" from the
form. He affirmed that he held deep conscientious scruples against participating in wars where
people were killed. The Court of Appeals, while noting that petitioner's "beliefs are held with the
strength of more traditional religious convictions," concluded that those beliefs were not
sufficiently "religious" to meet the terms of 6 (j), and affirmed the conviction. Petitioner
contends that the Act violates the First Amendment prohibition of establishment of religion and
that his conviction should be set aside on the basis of United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 ,
which held that the test of religious belief under 6 (j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful
belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualified for the exemption. Held: The judgment is reversed. Pp. 335-367.
404 F.2d 1078, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, joined by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concluded that:
This case is controlled by United States v. Seeger, supra, to which it is factually similar.
Under Seeger, 6 (j) is not limited to those whose opposition to war is prompted by
orthodox or parochial religious beliefs. A registrant's conscientious objection to all war is
"religious" within the meaning of 6 (j) if this [398 U.S. 333, 334] opposition stems from
the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and these
beliefs are held with the strength of traditional religious convictions. In view of the broad
scope of the word "religious," a registrant's characterization of his beliefs as
"nonreligious" is not a reliable guide to those administering the exemption. Pp. 335-344.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concluded that:
p10
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1. The language of 6 (j) cannot be construed (as it was in United States v. Seeger, supra,
and as it is in the prevailing opinion) to exempt from military service all individuals who
in good faith oppose all war, it being clear from both the legislative history and textual
analysis of that provision that Congress used the words "by reason of religious training
and belief" to limit religion to its theistic sense and to confine it to formal, organized
worship or shared beliefs by a recognizable and cohesive group. Pp. 348-354.
2. The question of the constitutionality of 6 (j) cannot be avoided by a construction of that
provision that is contrary to its intended meaning. Pp. 354-356.
3. Section 6 (j) contravenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by
exempting those whose conscientious objection claims are founded on a theistic belief
while not exempting those whose claims are based on a secular belief. To comport with
that clause an exemption must be "neutral" and include those whose belief emanates from
a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. Pp. 356-361.
Again
http://members.macconnect.com/users/k/knelson/co/co.html
"By Reason of Religious Training and Belief..."
A History of Conscientious Objection and Religion during the Vietnam War
By Karl D. Nelson
30
The Development of Conscientious Objection Through World War I

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Since the Protestant Reformation, most conscientious objectors have come from the pacifist
strain of Christianity, which was embodied in the "historic peace churches." These churches,
emulating the early Christian church's pacifism, brought conscientious objection to America in
the colonial period. American military and political authorities have frequently granted
exemptions to these objectors, although before the Civil War such policy was made at the local
level. Through World War I, only members of the historic peace churches qualified for
conscientious objector status.
Early Pacifism
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50
From its inception, the notion of conscientious objection has been tied to religion. The early
Christian church, following Jesus' teachings against killing, appears to have been mostly
pacifist.1
The church was even censured for its position. A Roman chastised the Christians in 173 AD:"If
all men were to do as you, there would be nothing to prevent the emperor from being left in utter
solitude and desertion and the forces of the empire would fall into the hands of the most lawless
barbarians."2
p11
12
The pacifist stance was not entirely unanimous in the church, for tombstones of Christian
soldiers dating to the late second century have been uncovered.3
As time went by, the number of Christians in military service increased, especially after the
Roman emperor Constantine embraced Christianity in 313 AD.
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The church, however, still maintained its pacifist character, urging its members not to join the
army and telling military converts not to kill.4
Church leaders excluded those who had killed in battle from the sacrament of Holy Communion
for three years.5 conscription, faced a difficult choice. Some, undoubtedly, entered the military.
Others, like St. Maximilian, refused, saying, "I will not be a soldier of this world, for I am a
soldier of Christ."He was beheaded.6
The division in the early Christian church on military matters slowly solidified into three basic
positions. One wing remained true to the early church's pacifist convictions. Another group
embraced the "just war" tradition. The third tradition, best viewed in the medieval churchsanctioned Crusades, embraced war.
As a result of the Protestant Reformation, the pacifist wing of Christendom evolved into what
became known as the "historic peace churches."The most dominant of these churches were the
Anabaptists, the Brethren, and the Quakers. These sects rejected the institutional Roman church
in favor of the model seen in the early Christian church.
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The Anabaptists, a collection of Protestant groups spawned by the Reformation, maintained the
pacifist tradition of first century Christians. Mennonite, Amish, and Hutterite sects rejected those
beliefs and practices of Catholicism and Protestantism that they believed were not biblically
grounded. Specifically, they rejected infant baptism in favor of adult baptism.
These Anabaptists withdrew from affairs of the state, preferring to live in closed communities
apart from the secular world. They were considered quite unorthodox, and Anabaptist groups
have often been persecuted by Catholics and Protestants alike.7
Another group that is included with the historic peace churches is the Church of the Brethren.
The Brethren share many of the same principles with the Anabaptists. This sect originated much
later, in the early-eighteenth century.8
30
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The Society of Friends, commonly called the Quakers, was founded by George Fox in midseventeenth century England. The Quakers emerged from left-wing Puritanism. They minimized
liturgy and emphasized the role of Christ and the grace of God.9 withdraw from society, the
Quakers were politically active.10
Where the Mennonites tended to Mennonites, Brethren and Quakers, although originating in
Europe, represented the majority of pacifists in the United States well into the twentieth century.
The historic peace churches were traditionally small, unorthodox groups, articulating a consistent
position against war. The pacifist position was never in the majority.
Mainstream religious groups rejected the pacifism of the early church and the peace church
fringe. Mainstream churches instead took two different positions, one accepting war and the
other accepting only "just war."
The "just war" idea can be traced back to the first century B.C. Roman pagan Cicero.
45
Cicero laid out several rules that one could apply in a situation to decide if a given conflict was
just or unjust. His arguments were taken up by Christian philosophers, namely Tertullian,
Origen, Aquinas, Augustine, and later Vitoria, Bellarmine and Suarez. As the theory took shape
in the sixteenth century, it had four elements:the war must be declared by those in authority; the
cause must be just; the warring states should seek to further good or destroy evil; and, the war
p12
13
must "be fought by proper means."Other clauses were often added, such as the protection of
innocents, and that war is to be used a last resort.11
10
15
The more militant group of mainstream Christians accepted, and even encouraged, the use of
force for religious reasons. John Ferguson cites an ancient German poem that exalts Simon Peter
for using his sword to defend Jesus on the night he was betrayed.12
This tradition is exemplified in the Crusades. The Crusades, which dominated European and
Mid-East political and religious life from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, was a series of
wars with the purpose of re-capturing Palestine (a "holy land" for Christians, Jews, and
Moslems) from the Moslems. Not only were these wars blessed by the Catholic Church
hierarchy, but a number of military monastic orders sprang up with the expressed purpose of
fighting for Christ.
There is another element in the religious debate on war and peace that runs throughout all three
positions: nationalism. At times, nationalistic issues do more to dictate an individual's response
to a war than religious belief. Ferguson writes, "[t]he historic association of the Christian faith
with nations of commercial enterprise, imperialistic expansion and technological advancement
has meant that Christian peoples, although their faith is one of the most pacifistic in its origins,
have a record of military activity second to none."13
The flag has historically occupied an important position in the church, and churchmen have
frequently endorsed and approved of warfare.
20
Conscientious Objection In Early America

Many early immigrants to America sought religious freedom. Among these were some members
of the historic peace churches.14
A few Quakers immigrated from England in 1656, with more to follow.15
25
30
Anabaptist immigration came in a number of waves. Dutch and German Mennonites arrived as
early as 1683. Settling in Pennsylvania, Mennonite immigration continued
until 1760. Included in this group were the Amish, a more conservative group within the
Mennonite tradition. Later, large numbers of Russian Mennonites immigrated to America in the
1870s. These Mennonites, many of whom had originally moved to Russia to avoid military
service in Germany, now fled an increasingly unfriendly Czar.16
All of these groups, hoping to avoid the persecution of their beliefs in Europe, were drawn to
America by promises of religious freedom.
35
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45
1See the "Sermon on the Mount," Matthew, chapters 5-7. Examples of Jesus' teachings that promote the pacifist idea are:"But I say
unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray
for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you"(Matthew 5:44) and "Blessed are the
peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God."(Matthew 5:9).
2James H. Forest, Catholics and Conscientious Objection(New York: Catholic Peace Fellowship, pamphlet, 1981).
3Ibid.
4John Ferguson, War and Peace in the World's Religions(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 103-4.
5Forest, Catholics and Conscientious Objection.
6Ibid.
7For more information on Anabaptists, see Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity(New York:Harper and Brothers, 1953),
chapter XXXIV.
8Ibid., 786.
9Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People(New Haven:Yale University Press, 1972), 177.
p13
10
15
20
14
10Ferguson, War and Peace,113.
11Ibid., 103-104, 110-111.
12Ibid.,106.
13Ibid.,122.
14Moskos and Chambers, New Conscientious Objection,25.
15Lillian Schlissel, comp., Conscience in America: a Documentary History of Conscientious Objection in America, 1757- 1967(New
York : Dutton, 1968), 17.
16Ahlstrom, Religious History, 232-234, 753.
The following is from the Victorian Hansard in regard of parliamentarian debates relating to
religious objections, etc.
http://tex2.parliament.vic.gov.au/bin/texhtmlt?form=VicHansard.dumpall&db=hansard91&dodra
ft=0&house=ASSEMBLY&speech=4604&activity=Second+Reading&title=JURIES+BILL&dat
e1=15&date2=March&date3=2000&query=true%0a%09and+%28+data+contains+'RELIGIOUS
'%0a%09and+data+contains+'OBJECTION'+%29%0a
Title
JURIES BILL
House
ASSEMBLY
Activity
Second Reading
Members
NARDELLA
Date
15 March 2000
Page
364
Mr NARDELLA (Melton) --
25
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35
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The other exemption is religious dispensation. Again it is important. Some of my

constituents who were brethren based in Melton came to see me about the bill. They
wanted to maintain the dispensation for people like themselves who have a firm religious
belief about not serving on juries. Again I believe that is appropriate and I am happy to see
that provision remain.
ft=0&house=ASSEMBLY&speech=23768&activity=Second+Reading&title=EDUCATION+%
28AMENDMENT%29+BILL&date1=21&date2=October&date3=1998&query=true%0a%09an
d+%28+data+contains+'RELIGIOUS'%0a%09and+data+contains+'OBJECTION'+%29%0a
Title
House
Activity
Members
Date
Page
EDUCATION (AMENDMENT) BILL

ASSEMBLY
Second Reading
MILDENHALL
21 October 1998
608
Mr MILDENHALL (Footscray) --
45
The Age editorial of 24 February probably got the balance right. The latter part of it
says:
A pluralist society such as ours demands more than freedom of religion and freedom
from state-imposed religion. It requires respect for diversity, opportunity to exercise
choice and tolerance of different faiths.
p14
10
15
It would be wrong, for example, for schoolchildren to be compelled to take part in
religious observances against their parents' wishes. The law makes it clear that such
participation must be voluntary. On the other hand, Australia's Christian heritage
cannot be erased or unduly confined. And such festivals as Christmas and Easter
have in reality become events of popular culture as much as religious celebrations.
The notion that state schoolchildren whose parents and teachers so wish should not
be allowed to take part in an inoffensive Easter or Christmas pageant in a church
hall because a few parents object is an affront to commonsense and reasonable
tolerance. If the law is indeed so restrictive as to make such a free choice and
popular event illegal, then the law is an ass. The government's instincts are right: the
regulations -- or, if necessary, the law -- should be amended to give individual
schools and communities more flexibility in such cases.
That editorial probably has the balance and the arguments right.
15
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ft=0&house=ASSEMBLY&speech=5105&activity=Second+Reading&title=HISTORIC+BUIL
DINGS+%28FURTHER+AMENDMENT%29+BILL&date1=28&date2=May&date3=1991&qu
ery=true%0a%09and+%28+data+contains+'RELIGIOUS'%0a%09and+data+contains+'OBJECT
ION'+%29%0a
Title
House
Activity
Members
Date
Page
HISTORIC BUILDINGS (FURTHER AMENDMENT) BILL

ASSEMBLY
Second Reading
SPEAKER
28 May 1991
2583
It is inappropriate for governments to interfere in religious observance. It is not for a

former Methodist minister, with great respect to the Minister, to be telling His Grace
the Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne whether he can have his high altar in the
middle of the transept, in the northern end of the transept or anywhere else in the
transept.
Page 2587
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Let religious belief and religious forms and observance be appropriate to the
particular denomination. It is not for us to be telling the great Synagogue of
Melbourne that it cannot do this or it cannot do that. It is not for us to tell a Muslim
community how it will set up its mosque.
As a Parliament we must learn to respect other people's religious beliefs and the
form of religious service they follow. If that means making changes to buildings
which are their buildings and which they have looked after for generations and
brought down the generations for us as part of our heritage, that respect is all
important. That is fundamental in our community and will be fundamental in the
coalition's approach to historic buildings legislation.
p15
16
ft=0&house=COUNCIL&speech=13022&activity=Second+Reading&title=RACIAL+AND+RE
LIGIOUS+TOLERANCE+BILL&date1=14&date2=June&date3=2001&query=true%0a%09and
+%28+data+contains+'RELIGIOUS'%0a%09and+data+contains+'OBJECTION'+%29%0a
5
10
Title
House
Activity
Members
Date
Page
RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE BILL

Second Reading
COUNCIL
NGUYEN
14 June 2001
1484
It is in this context of the diverse Victorian community that I believe the Victorian
people will support the promotion of legislation that seeks to enhance a tolerant
society.
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The bill is about promoting a tolerant society. I see this bill as being about creating
rights and not taking away rights. There has been a lot said during the debate about
the freedom of speech. Australia does not currently have a bill of rights, although I
believe we should have one. We do not currently have unqualified rights to freedom
of speech -- for example, we do not have the right to defame people, to harass or to
intervene. There are already laws in place, as the Honourable Carlo Furletti
indicated in his contribution, that deal with such
Page 1490
25
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instances. However, I agree with him that such laws do not cover many situations of
verbal abuse.
Although we are not signatories to a bill of rights, we are signatories to a number of
international treaties, including the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. These documents not only endorse freedom of speech but also
acknowledge that this right is tempered by the rights of others.
Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.
35
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.
p16
17
Australia is a founding member of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and
is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 29
conveniently sets out the need for a balance between rights in our society, and I see
this bill as not tempering any of our existing rights.
We do not have an unlimited right to free speech in this country. Given that we live
in a community we should have regard to the rights of others, which is what the bill
seeks to do. It is important to refer specifically to paragraph 3 of the preamble of the
bill, which says, in part:
However, some Victorians are vilified on the ground of their race or their religious
belief or activity. Vilifying conduct is contrary to democratic values because of its
effect on people of diverse ethnic, indigenous and religious backgrounds. It
diminishes the dignity, sense of self-worth and belonging to the community. It also
reduces their ability to contribute to, or fully participate in, all social, political,
economic and cultural aspects of society as equals, thus reducing the benefit that
diversity brings to the community.
10
15
And
20
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The state is in danger of taking onto itself the power of deciding religious issues
through state servants. I remind honourable members of section 116 of the federal
constitution. I will read it because people with professional backgrounds have
advised me that this bill may be subject to challenge -- it could be challenged as
being invalid on the basis of section 116 of the Australian constitution. That section
states:
The commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for
imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any
religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or
public trust under the commonwealth.
The notes that go with this publication on the constitution state:
The section prohibits the commonwealth from doing four separate things: it may
not:
30
make a law for establishing a religion;
make a law for imposing a religious observance;
make a law for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion ...
p17
18
Therefore I have real reservations about the validity and conformity of the bill as it
relates to the constitution, which takes precedence over state legislation. It may
indeed be subject to a finding of invalidity at a subsequent hearing.
10
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20
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30
35
ft=0&speech=2644&activity=Questions+without+Notice&title=Organ+donor+program&date1=
3&date2=June&date3=1999&query=true%0a%09and+%28+data+contains+'RELIGIOUS'%0a%
09and+data+contains+'OBJECTION'+%29%0a
Title
Organ donor program
House
COUNCIL
Activity
Questions without Notice
Members
VARTY; KNOWLES
Date
3 June 1999
Page
1126
It is a fundamental issue for many in the community because organ donations can allow
others to enjoy an increased life expectancy and provide an opportunity for those who do
not have a cultural or religious objection to contribute to the community.
ft=0&house=COUNCIL&speech=18716&activity=Second+Reading&title=TERTIARY+EDUC
ATION+%28AMENDMENT%29+BILL&date1=1&date2=June&date3=1994&query=true%0a
%09and+%28+data+contains+'RELIGIOUS'%0a%09and+data+contains+'OBJECTION'+%29%
0a
Title
House
Activity
Members
Date
Page
TERTIARY EDUCATION (AMENDMENT) BILL

COUNCIL
Second Reading
HOGG
1 June 1994
1151
Hon. C. J. HOGG -- It is a problem when ministers are quoted as saying something they
have not said when they have not read the document, and I shall refer to that later. I also
double-checked the opting-out clause or the conscientious objection clause. In his student
days the honourable member for Dandenong in another place was the general secretary of
the student union at Monash University. I asked him what happened to the conscientious
objection clause, and he informed me that every year 20 to 30 applications for exemption
were approved and almost all of those applications were brought on religious grounds.
40
ft=0&house=COUNCIL&speech=5190&activity=Second+Reading&title=JURIES+BILL&date1
=5&date2=April&date3=2000&query=true%0a%09and+%28+data+contains+'RELIGIOUS'%0a
%09and+data+contains+'grounds'+%29%0a
45
50
Title
House
Activity
Members
Date
Page
JURIES BILL
COUNCIL
Second Reading
FURLETTI
5 April 2000
564
p18
19
However, if a person's religious beliefs are incompatible with the concept of jury service,
that person can apply for excusal on those grounds as good reason. There is the catch-all
provision in the bill which refers to any other matters of special urgency or importance
which can be cited as a ground for excusal.
10
Some past correspondences reproduced;
QUOTE 25-10-2001 EMAIL
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Subj:
Date:
From:
To:
File:
close of nominations
25/10/01 4:10:24 PM AUS Eastern Standard Time
shawn.o'brien@aec.gov.au
GHSchorelHlavka@aol.com
gals4497.doc (23040 bytes) DL Time (46666 bps): < 1 minute
(See attached file: gals4497.doc)

< I>
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Subject: close of nominations
To: GHSchorelHlavka@aol.com
Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2001 16:06:19 +1000
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END QUOTE 25-10-2001 EMAIL
QUOTE 25-10-2001 CORRESPONDENCE
File:
50
2001/1154/gals4497
Contact:
Shawn OBrien
Telephone:
02 6271 4678
West Block Offices

Parkes ACT 2600
PO Box E201
p19
20
Facsimile:
02 6271 4457
E-mail:
shawn.obrien@aec.gov.au
Kingston ACT 2604
Mr G Schorel-Hlavka
107 Graham Road
ROSANNA EAST VIC 3084
GHSchorelHlavka@aol.com
Dear Mr Schorel-Hlavka
10
15
20
25
30
Thank you for your enquiry about the period between the issue of the writs for the 2001 Federal
Election and the close of nominations.
As you are aware, the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (the Electoral Act) provides as follows:
a writ shall be deemed to be issued at the hour of 6 oclock in the afternoon of the day on
which the writ was issued (s.152(2));
the date fixed for the nomination of the candidates shall not be less than 10 days after
the date of the writ (s.156(1));
the hour of nomination shall be 12 oclock noon on the day of nomination (s.175(1)).
The Australian Electoral Commission (the AEC) understands that the writs issued by the
Governor-General and State Governors for the 2001 Federal Elections meet these requirements.
The AEC does not believe the Electoral Act requires a 10 day period from the deemed time of
the issue of the writs to the hour of nomination, as you have suggested. The writs for the 2001
Federal Election reflect the same timetable as writs for the many previous elections that have not
been challenged on this basis.
Should you wish to challenge the conduct of an election, you could seek your own legal advice
with regard to;
applying for an injunction in the Federal Court of Australia to prevent the election being
held; or
petitioning the High Court of Australia, sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns, to set the
election aside. Such petitions need to be lodged in the period of 40 days following the return
of the writ.
Yours sincerely
authorised for electronic transmission by
35
Kathy Mitchell
Director
Government and Legal Section
25 October 2001
END QUOTE 25-10-2001 CORRESPONDENCE
Again;
40
applying for an injunction in the Federal Court of Australia to prevent the election being held; or
QUOTE 27-10-2001 CORRESPONDENCE
45
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
p20
21
Australian Electoral Commission
C/o Shawn OBrien.
Katy Mitchell, Director, Government and Legal Section
27-10-2001
5
Fax; 02 6271 4457
Ph; 02 6271 4678
10
Ref: 2001/1154/gals4497
* URGENT * URGENT * URGENT * URGENT

*
In regard of your letter dated 25 October 2001 I wish to indicate that your reference:
15
The writs for the 2001 Federal election reflect the same timetable as
writs for the many previous elections that have not been challenged on
this basis.
I refer to the following:
20
25
30
Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and 278
The oath of a justice of this court is ' to do right to all manner of people according to law' Our sworn duty
is to the law itself and to the organic nature of the constitution first of all. If, then, we find the law to be
plainly in conflict with what we or any of our predecessors erroneously thought it to be, we have, as I
conceive no right to choose between giving effect to the law, and maintaining an incorrect interpretation, It
is not, in my opinion, better that the court should be persistently wrong than that it should be ultimately
right..
Whatever else may be said with respect to previous decisions - and it is necessary here to consider the
principals upon which a court should act in particular cases - so much at least emerges as is undoubtedly
beyond challenge, that where a former decision is clearly wrong, and there are no circumstances
countervailing the primary duty of giving effect to the law as the court finds it, the real opinion of the court
should be expressed.
"In my opinion, where the prior decision is manifestly wrong, then, irrespective of the consequences, it is
the paramount and sworn duty of this court to declare the law truly...."
35
As such I am not the least concerned as to if in the past elections were held incorrectly, what I
am concerned about is if this election is being held correctly.
40
45
The Act in s156 (1) clearly requires the date fixed for the nomination of the candidates shall not
be less than 10 days .. after the dater of the writs meaning that the nomination date must be on
the 11th day AFTER the date of the writs.
It is my view that it isnt my responsibility to take matters to Court on the first place but that it is
the responsibility of the Australian Electoral Commission to ensure that matters are conducted
in a proper legal manner.
As per my e-mail:
156 Date of nomination
50
(1)
Subject to subsection (2), the date fixed for the nomination of the
candidates shall not be less than 10 days nor more than 27 days after the date of
the writ.
p21
22
157 Date of polling
The date fixed for the polling shall not be less than 23 days nor more than 31
days after the date of nomination.
158 Polling to be on a Saturday
10
15
The day fixed for the polling shall be a Saturday.

Whereas the writs shall be deemed to be issued at the hour of 6 oclock in the afternoon of the
day on which the writ was issued (S152(2)) Then clearly the closing of the nominations shall
not be less than 10 days nor more than 27 days after the date of the writ (s.156(1))
Considering that the Writs were issued on Monday 8 October 2001 then the counting of the days
must commence after the date of the writ is that 9 October 2001 is the first day of the
minimum 10 days. It cant be held that the nominations close on the 10th day, as then there are
only 9 days from the Writs being issued.
Again, I maintain that closing of nominations were to occur on Friday the 19 th of October 2001
and the election to be held no earlier but Saturday the 17th day of November 2001.
The fixing of the polling shall not be less than 23 days nor more than 31 days after the date of
nomination.
(s157) Clearly, this means that the first date after the closing of nominations, even if argued that
20
25
the 18th day of October 2001 was the nomination date (I dispute) then the polling date being
shall not be less than 23 days.. after the date of nomination. Must be counted that the first day is
the day AFTER closing of the polling dates. In this case, it would be on an 18th October 2001
date being Sunday 11 November 2001 and on a 19 October 2001 nomination date it would be
Monday 12 November 2001 before an election could be held. However as
158 Polling to be on a Saturday
The day fixed for the polling shall be a Saturday.
Then clearly in any event Saturday 17 November 2001 is the appropriate polling date.
30
As to the hour of nomination shall be 12 oclock noon on the day of nomination (s175(1)) that
in itself doesnt mean that the closure of the nominations had to occur on Thursday 18 October
2001 but merely indicates that AFTER the minimum 10 days had expired then at any
subsequent date but within the maximum of 27 days the closure of the nominations can be held.
35
ISSUE:
COURT
PROCEDURE
AND
LEGISLATIVE
PROVISIONS MANDATORY OR DIRECTORY.
40
In S.S. Constructions Pty. Ltd. V. Ventura Motors Pty. Ltd. [1964 V.R. 229 Gillard J took
considerable notation of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statues (12th ed.) at pp. 314-315 as to
the
Compliance to legal requirements.
45
It must be clear that the Act uses the wording shall and not may and as such it is directory
that not less then 10 days after the date of the writ and as such 9 and a bit days is in breach
of the legal provisions.
50
I invite you to point out to me where in the legislation it is shown that s175(1) overrides the legal
requirements of a minimum of 10 days as referred to in s156(1)? I do not find it to be imprecise,
ambiguous, duplex, incomprehensible or otherwise bad in law or that it appears to indicate that
minimum of 10 days is to be less then 10 days by some other kind of application. I calculate
p22
10
15
23
minimum 10 days to be 10 days of 24 hours and not less then 10 multiplied by 24 hours being
240 hours.
If a person is sentence for 1 day in imprisonment then this generally means overnight
imprisonment and not that a person send to prison at 5 PM by a Court then by midnight can
claim his 1 day of imprisonment is over. Unless the contrary of the act is shown one must accept
that 1 day means 24 hours and that where the Act refers to minimum 10 days then the
legislators had every intention to ensure it was NOT LESS THEN 10 DAYS!
Because the legislators included the word minimum it is clear that the legislators had concern
that not to use the wording minimum would or might be likely result to an abuse of the 10
days being made part of a day.
It is idiotic that you expect me to be liable for tens of thousands of dollars of Court cost to
commence legal proceedings merely because the Australian Electoral commission is refusing to
do his job.
It is my position that the Australian electoral commission is obligated to avoid millions of dollars
on taxpayers monies to be wasted on an election that is incorrectly dated.
20
Obviously the question is also that if the nomination date was closed on the wrong date then
those persons who were seeking to lodge a nomination form but did so within the 24 hours after
the alleged closing of the nomination date of 18 October 2001 may also be entitled to have their
nomination still accepted and then the Australian electoral commission must amend the draw of
nominated candidates, if and when applicable.
25
It also means that the Australian Electoral Commission held the draws of listing on the ballot
papers incorrectly as instead of being held on Friday 12 noon (or there about) 19 October 2000 it
ought to have been held on the earliest on Saturday 12 noon.
30
35
40
45
It is my view that the Writ being deemed to be issued at 6 PM of the day and the 10 days must be
counted AFTER the day of the writ then the closing of the nominations could be held no earlier
but on the 11th day AFTER the writs were issued being on the Friday the 19th day of October
2001.
As the Polling day must be held no less then 23 days after the closing of nominations then the
polling day, considering it to be held on a Saturday, must be held no earlier but on Saturday the
17th day of November 2001.
It is my position that the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 Section 7 Functions and Powers of
Commission does NOT disclose any powers for the Australian Electoral Commission to Act
contrary to the legal provisions of the Act and as such where I as a candidate have given
appropriate notice PRIOR TO the election being held that it appears that the Australian electoral
commission has no legal powers to conduct an election on Saturday 10 November 2001 as it
would breach the legal provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 then I request you
from refraining to conduct any polling on Saturday the 10 November 2001 and to ensure that the
issue of the Writs are addressed as to have the writs amended or otherwise superseded as to
ensure it complies with the legal requirements of the said Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918.
Again, I invite the Australian electoral Commission to provide me with an appropriate set out as
how the Commission within the framework of the legal provisions holds the relevant dates to be
applicable.
50
As such, how does the Commission calculate its dates and does it consider that minimum 10
days in effect is LESS THEN 10 DAYS?
p23
24
How also does it consider the nomination date and polling date are calculated?
I do wish to point out that it would be grossly unfair to the Australian public as to proceed with a
polling day in breach of the legal provisions and then have them to do another vote on a
subsequent election on an appropriate polling day.
The cost of another election also would be horrendous and surely, this could be avoided if
perhaps appropriate steps is undertaken as to resolve the issues.
10
15
20
25
30
Perhaps, some kind of agreement can be reached to enable amending the Writs issued between
my self and the leaders of the parties that would overcome the problem.
As I have given notice as a candidate and a elector disputing the appropriateness of the
Australian electoral commission to conduct a polling day on 10 November 2001 as set out above
then I view the obligation rest with the Australian electoral commission to ensure that it Acts
within the legal framework of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 Act to conduct the polling
day as it intends to do.
I view that the obligation of the Australian electoral commission must not be ignored as to Act
within the legal framework and to fulfil its duties according to law.
Whatever legal avenues might be open to me isnt any excuse for the Australian electoral
commission to ignore its legal obligation to act within the precise legislated provision of the Act.
Again, I am not concerned if the Australian Electoral Commission in past elections may have
disregarded its legal duties nor consider this to be any excuse to ignore on this occasion its legal
obligations, as simply ignorance is no excuse.
Because of the URGENCY of this matter I request you to forthwith attend to this matter and
respond in the most urgent way, such as forwarding a copy of any mail response also by
facsimile to my facsimile number shown in my letterhead.
I intend to release a copy of this letter to the media and to the leaders of the parties, for so far I
have their e-mail addressed or otherwise their facsimile numbers) as to ensure they are all aware
of the dispute about the election date.
35
Awaiting your response and cooperation,
40
G. H. SCHOREL
(Mr. G. H. SCHOREL-HLAVKA)
END QUOTE 27-10-2001 CORRESPONDENCE

END QUOTE
This document is not intended and neither must be perceived to refer to all details/issues.
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

Our name is our motto!)
(
45
Awaiting your response,
G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O. W. B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
p24

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PO Box 6100, Parliament House, Canberra ACT 2600

HANSARD 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

HANSARD 31-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

HANSARD 8-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

HANSARD 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr MORRISON (CookMinister for Social Services) (09:25): I move:

A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject

116 Commonwealth not to legislate in respect of religion

Hints for Religious Exemptions to Immunization

Mr. Gordon's proposed new clause was negatived.

ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 3

Re- RELIGIOUS OBJECTION

Hints for Religious Exemptions to Immunization

U.S. Supreme Court

The Development of Conscientious Objection Through World War I

Conscientious Objection In Early America

The other exemption is religious dispensation. Again it is important. Some of my

EDUCATION (AMENDMENT) BILL

HISTORIC BUILDINGS (FURTHER AMENDMENT) BILL

It is inappropriate for governments to interfere in religious observance. It is not for a

RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE BILL

Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:

The notes that go with this publication on the constitution state:

make a law for establishing a religion;

make a law for imposing a religious observance;

TERTIARY EDUCATION (AMENDMENT) BILL

(See attached file: gals4497.doc)

----------------------- Headers -------------------------------Return-Path: <shawn.o'brien@aec.gov.au>

West Block Offices

Kingston ACT 2604

QUOTE 27-10-2001 CORRESPONDENCE

* URGENT * URGENT * URGENT * URGENT

The day fixed for the polling shall be a Saturday.

The day fixed for the polling shall be a Saturday.

END QUOTE 27-10-2001 CORRESPONDENCE

MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

Awaiting your response,

G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O. W. B. (Friends call me Gerrit)

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