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Requirements for a Lease.

Isaac v Hotel de Paris - Issac v. Hotel de Paris Ltd. where the P.C. used the
intention of the parties test to reach their decision. In that case, the
respondent company was the lessee of part of a building in Port of Spain
which was used as a hotel. In December 1955, the company let the appellant
into possession of the first floor of the building under an arrangement that
the appellant would operate a night bar for the company. In February 1956,
after a dispute between the parties, it was agreed that the appellant would
pay $250 month as rent (the amount payable by the company as head
rent) and all expenses incurred in the running of the bar, and in return that
the appellant could retain all the profits for himself. In May 1956, the
company gave the appellant seven days notice to quit the premises. It was
held by the PC that the circumstances in which the appellant was allowed to
occupy the premises showed that the company never intended to accept him
as tenant and that he was fully aware of that fact. A licence had been
created, and notice was sufficient to terminate it. Lord Denning said, It was
submitted by Counsel for the appellant that there were all the indicia of a
monthly tenancy. There was not only exclusive possession but there was also
the payment and acceptance of rent. (Furthermore, the appellant paid the
disbursements, and so forth.) Counsel admitted that these would not be
decisive to establish a tenancy in the case of premises within the Rent
Restriction Acts such as Marcroft.
Street v Mountford - In 1985, the House of Lords in Street v. Mountford
rejected the intention test and held that where there is (1) exclusive
possession (2) a fixed or periodic term and (3) rent, there will be a tenancy,
unless there are exceptional circumstances which point to a licence. Facts:
by an agreement, S granted M the right to occupy two rooms for $37 per
week, subject to termination by 14 days notice. Other conditions were set
out in a document entitled licence agreement. It contained a declaration by
M that she understood that there was no tenancy giving her protection under
the Rent Acts. M and her husband moved into the rooms, having excusive
possession. A declaration was sought as to whether a licence or a tenancy
existed. The HL held that a tenancy had been created.
There Lord
Templeman stated that the true test is whether the occupier has been
granted exclusive possession for a fixed or periodic term at a stated rent. If
these requirements have been satisfied a tenancy arises unless there are
some special circumstances which negative a presumption of a tenancy.
Then it may be necessary to consider the intention of the parties. The usual
special circumstances that will arise are:
Prudential Assurance v London Residuary Body Here the LCC
purchased a strip of land for future road widening and purported to lease it to

the Ps predecessor in title at rent of 30 pounds per anum under an


agreement that provided that the tenancy would continue until the road was
widened. The agreement authorized the construction of temporary buildings
by the T until the road was widened, and the agreement could be terminated
by 2 months notice. The LCC sold the land to the Ds none of whom were
highway authorities with road widening powers. Prior to the sale the T was
given 6 months notice. P sought to have the notice declared null & void on
the grounds that the contract could only be determined if the land was
required 4 road widening purposes. HL: A grant for an uncertain amount of
time did not create a lease, so no estate was granted in the land. However,
as the T had entered into possession of the land and paid yearly rent he had
become a T from year to year and that tenancy was for a certain term
because each party had the power to determine it with 6 months notice.
Since the LL had served such notice, the tenancy had been validly
terminated.
Lace v Chandler - The plaintiff was tenant of a dwelling-house which she
sub-let to the defendant. The agreement for the sub-letting was partly oral
and partly by conditions contained in the rent-book, one of those conditions
being expressed by the words "furnished for duration." The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had removed certain articles which were her property,
contrary to the conditions of the agreement; and she gave him notice to quit.
As the defendant did not comply with the notice, the plaintiff brought an
action for possession in the county court. The county court judge found that
the defendant had broken a condition of the agreement by removing the
articles, and he made an order for possession in one month. The defendant
appealed. Among the grounds of defence to the action in the county court
was the following: "The said dwelling-house was let to the defendant for the
duration of the war. " The question of the validity of a letting "for the duration
of the war" was not argued in the county court, but it was raised at the
hearing of the appeal:- Held, that a tenancy "for the duration of the war"
does not create a good leasehold interest, the term, when the agreement
takes effect, being uncertain, and, also, that it was impossible to construe
this tenancy as a lease for a long period, e.g., ninety-nine years,
determinable on the cessation of the war.
Term granted must be less than term held by the lessor/landlord or sublessor:
Lewis v Baker - Baker, (D) acquired the 2 yr remainder of a 40 yr lease. The
reversioner agreed to grant him a 73 yr lease of the same property at the end
of his current 2 yr lease. D then let Haddon the premises for 21 years.
Haddon subletted the property to P. D distrained on Ps goods as a tenant of
haddon when Haddon did not pay rent. The court found that D could not
distrain on Ps good he did not have a reversionary interest in the property. D

had assigned his interest to Haddon by granting a lease longer than his own.
The lease for 73 years was an expectant lease, it was not an estate but an
interessi termini until entry on or after the date as from which he was entitled
to enter into possession under it. Held: If a lessee with an original lease and a
reversionary lease or an agreement therefor under-lets the premises for a
term exceeding the original lease, he cannot distrain for rent during the
original lease under the common law for want of a reversion.
Implied agreement
Dougadeen v Ramsamooj - The appellant, D, was a monthly tenant of the
first respondent, X, of a house where she lived with her family and ran a
parlour business. Without Xs consent D concluded a verbal agreement with
the second respondent, Y, whereby Y was to occupy the premises for a few
months in place of D, and pay the rent to X in Ds name. The agreement was
duly put into effect but when, after some months, D verbally requested the
premises back, Y refused. D took no special steps to recover possession and Y
remained in possession, continuing to pay the rent to X in Ds name, until
after some 2 years had elapsed, when he purported to sell the parlour
business and transfer the premises to the third respondent, Z, who thereupon
went into occupation. Shortly afterwards D visited the premises which Z had
left locked and, with a view to resuming possession of them, placed her own
padlock on the door. Later that same day X, Y and Z together broke off Ds
lock. D sued X, Y and Z claiming damages for trespass, or in the alternative,
for dispossession. Her claim was dismissed. Held: (i) The arrangement
concluded between D and Y was not a mere licence but a tenancy
agreement. As such it could only have been determined by proper notice or
by lawful re-entry and resumption of possession. (ii) There had been no
notice, and the mere placing of a lock upon the premises did not constitute a
resumption of possession. Consequently at the time appellants lock was
broken she was not in possession of the premises and could not therefore
maintain an action for trespass or dispossession in respect of them
How is the relationship created?
Estoppel

Meredith v Gary
E.H. Lewis & Sons Ltd v Morelli
Mackley v Nutting
Harrison v Wells