SPE 63112

Application of a Completion Equipment Reliability Database in Decision Making

Einar Molnes, ExproSoft and Geir-Ove Strand, SINTEF Petroleum Research

Copyright 2000, Society of Petroleum Engineers Inc.

This paper was prepared for presentation at the 2000 SPE Annual Technical Conference and
Exhibition held in Dallas, Texas, 14 October 2000.
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Abstract
A study (JIP) on reliability of well completion equipment
(Wellmaster Phase III) was completed by SINTEF in
November 1999. This has resulted in a comprehensive
database on well completion equipment, with a total of 8000
well-years of completion experience represented and more
than 1000 downhole failures included, given as input from the
16 funding oil companies of this JIP. The database represents
all categories of downhole equipment, from tubing hanger
level down. The paper points towards the major contributors to
well interventions and downtime, indicating industry average
and benchmark failure rates of the most vital completion
components. A historical evolution in reliability of Subsurface
safety valves (SCSSV) is demonstrated, and the industry wide
effect of reliability improvements is shown through specific
examples. In the North Sea, reliability data has gained
widespread acceptance for use in decision making. The paper
lists several cases where reliability data of downhole
equipment has been used with a major impact on field
development and subsequent operational expenditures.

1. Introduction
Reliability data has gained widespread use in the offshore
business due to industry studies like OREDA, Wellmaster and
others. The introduction of statutory codes and regulations in a
number of oil producing countries has also strongly
accelerated this development. During the last decade, offshore
industry managers have become increasingly aware of the

potential benefits which can be drawn from such databases.

Some industry cases are now established which have
demonstrated the cost saving potential of such databases.
Examples of applications of reliability data are:

Risk and reliability studies

LCC/LCP analysis
Tender evaluations and purchasing decisions
Rig contracting strategies
Incentive based contract definitions
Downhole barrier acceptance criteria definitions

Cautiously defined and consistent reliability data collection

requirements is a prerequisite for successful reliability
databases. The new ISO 142241 standard constitutes a
valuable reference in this context.
The Wellmaster Phase III project objective has been to
contribute to improvement in completion equipment reliability
through systematic collection, analysis and feedback of
reliability data to participating oil companies and equipment
manufacturers.
The main deliverable from the project has been the new
Wellmaster data collection software for completions with an
integrated analysis tool, an updated database on completion
equipment and reliability statistics and a summary report2 on
main findings.
Data analysis has focused on in-service equipment failures,
defined as failures occurring from 6 days after landing the
tubing hanger on the wellhead. Failures occurring prior to that
are defined as installation failures, and a fair amount of these
failures have also been reported. All failure reported are also
listed in a web-application where the Wellmaster JIP member
companies have access.

EINAR MOLNES AND GEIR-OVE STRAND

SPE 63112

Work process description

By means of the Wellmaster software, a completion schematic
is built to represent the completion configuration and give
details on the equipment in the well. Failure data are captured
directly via this schematic by pointing at the failed item and
entering detailed data. Failure modes unique to each item are
predefined and can be selected when entering information on
new failures. In this way, a comprehensive and consistent
database can be generated. An integrated processing package
is then used to prepare a range of different reliability reports
from the database (MTTF, failure mode distribution, MTTW,
run time distributions etc.). Upon reporting of failure data, an
e-mail connection can be established with the manufacturer
with the possibility for the manufacturer to feed back
information on the likely cause of equipment failure.

considerable proportion also exists for subsea completed wells

(11.4 %). The remaining data are from TLP wells (6.1 %) and
onshore wells (2.9 %).

Well and equipment performance data is normally collected by

the operating company itself, or through assistance from a
contractor. The data is then checked for consistency and
quality in accordance with the agreed data collection
requirement. Upon data quality compliance, the data are
merged into a master database, which in turn is fed back to the
contributing member companies on CD-ROMs. A subset of
the data (equipment failure data) can be viewed by the JIP
member companies in a dedicated Internet browser,
WellWatch. The different steps of the data collection, QA and
data feedback cycle is shown in Figure 1.

In 1992, the NPD issued the new risk analysis regulations3.

These regulations state that a risk analysis should be
performed for all major potential risks associated with
offshore field development and operation. The results from
the analysis shall be measured against risk acceptance criteria
which have to be pre-defined by the operating oil company. If
the risk level as demonstrated by the risk analysis is below the
pre-defined acceptance criteria, the results from the risk
analysis may in some cases override the requirements given in
more detailed regulations concerning certain safety systems.

Database contents
The Wellmaster database is currently the most comprehensive
completion equipment database worldwide, with participation
from 16 major oil companies in Phase III. Key figures on the
database scope are as follows:

More than 71000 completion string items represented in

equipment database
A total of 1002 equipment failures included for a total of
5 different completion equipment categories
A total of 1613 wells with 1921 completions are included,
representing a total of some 8000 completion-years of
experience

The majority of data in the Wellmaster database is from the

North Sea. Figure 2 illustrates the data distribution by region.
In Phase III, a fair amount of data from the Gulf of Mexico has
also been added, whereas earlier project phases have included
almost exclusively North Sea data.
The database is dominated by data from oil producers, but a
significant amount of data from water injectors and
gas/condensate producers are also included. A breakdown of
well type vs. well service time is shown in Figure 3.
With respect to completion type, the data are dominated by
data from fixed offshore platforms (79.6 %), but a

2. Case histories (benefits)

Heidrun TLP
The first TLP (Tension Leg Platform) on the Norwegian
continental shelf was installed in Saga Petroleum's Snorre
field. The production risers for the Snorre TLP are fitted with
passive fire protection. The decision to use passive fire
protection on the risers was based on detailed regulations
issued by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and a
series of risk analyses performed by Saga Petroleum.

The Statoil Heidrun platform is the 2nd TLP installation on

the Norwegian Continental shelf. For this development,
several risk analyses were performed which addressed the
need for passive fire protection of the risers.
SINTEF was requested to do a 3rd party verification of these
studies, in order to produce input to the final decision
concerning the issue of fire protection of the Heidrun risers.
The main decision point in these risk analyses was the
blowout escalation risk, i.e the risk that a blowout on one of
the oil production wells would escalate to additional wells thus jeopardizing the entire Heidrun TLP. The blowout
escalation risk is directly related to the rate of critical failures
of the downhole safety valve (DHSV/SCSSV).
In the 3rd party verification study, a review and update of the
studies with the latest reliability data for SCSSVs was
performed. This clearly indicated that the blowout escalation
risk for the Heidrun TLP was within the pre-defined
acceptable level. This led to an approval from the NPD to
develop the Heidrun field without passive fire protection of
the TLP production risers.
This led to a cost saving of minimum NOK 720 million (ca
USD 81 million) for the Heidrun TLP when compared to the
Snorre TLP. Without the availability of updated and
recognized, independent SCSSV reliability data this cost
saving would not have been achieved.

SPE 63112

APPLICATION OF A COMPLETION EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY DATABASE IN DECISION MAKING

Alternative SCSSV leakage acceptance criteria

A paper4 presented earlier this year summarized the findings
from a study which has looked at alternative leakage
acceptance criteria for SCSSVs. The basis for the widely used
API RP 14B was reviewed and compared with an alternative
method to define acceptance criteria (leak rate levels). This
alternative method utilizes principles from risk and reliability
analysis to suggest a systems oriented approach for primary
and secondary barriers (the x-mas tree master valve and the
SCSSV) in combination - rather than looking at these items on
an isolated basis.
Rather than applying the API RP 14B criteria for all well
types, the paper suggests the use of a matrix with
recommendations on well type specific risk levels and
corresponding acceptance criteria. Compared to todays
practice, this implies a certain relaxation of acceptance criteria
without compromising the overall safety level. This is
achieved through increasing the test frequency whenever a
situation arises in which one of the main barriers
(PMV/SCSSV) has failed according to the existing API RP 14
B criteria.
The direct implication of this is that considerable cost savings
can be achieved during the wells lifetime. The cost saving
potential is greatest for subsea producers, due to the high cost
of interventions.
The results from the work described in this paper are now
carried forward and implemented into a new NORSOK
standard (D-009) for risk based acceptance criteria for
SCSSVs. This standard will be applicable for the Norwegian
Continental Shelf, but can also be applied internationally. The
standard is expected to be ready by the end of 2000.

SCSSV removal from subsea completions?

A hot issue over the last 1-2 years involving extensive use of
completion and subsea equipment reliability data in risk
analysis is the issue of SCSSV removal from subsea
completions. Studies have been performed on this issue in
Brazil, Gulf of Mexico (through) and in the U.K., with a study
underway in Australia as this paper is written. In the authors
opininon, there is no general answer to this question. This
issue has to be addressed on the basis of local/regional
regulations concerning requirements on external protection of
subsea wellheads and x-mas trees and the risk picture
(dropped object risk, trawlboard impact risk and other
potential external damage factors).
Studies have also been performed where non-conventional
completion configurations have been studied, typically on
removal of annulus safety systems from gas lifted wells.

2. Results
The Wellmaster Phase III project extended previous historical
data provided by SINTEF. The Ekofisk Bravo blowout in
Norway in April 1977 paved the way for a collective effort on
improvement of safety levels for Norwegian offshore
installations and was the basis for SINTEFs initial reliability
study on SCSSVs which was published in 1983. Since then, an
unbroken chain of historical data on performance of both
SCSSVs and other completion equipment data has followed.
Figure 4 illustrates the historical evolution in SCSSV
reliability. A significant improvement in SCSSV performance
has resulted, from an initial Mean Time to Failure (MTTF) of
14.2 years (1983) to the most recent result of 36.7 years
(1999). This represents a tremendous boost in well production
availability and availability of the SCSSV as a safety barrier.
Morever, downhole reliability data has become an important
instrument in communication with interpretation of auhorities
rules and regulations in many offshore regions around the
world. The challenge for many operators is the time lag from
demonstration of performance improvement to revisions of
governmental regulations.
A distinct trend in well completions is the increased
preference towards the use of single rod piston, flapper type
tubing retrievable safety valves without equalizing feature.
This trend towards design standardization is paying off
when looking at this purely from a SCSSV reliability and well
intervention standpoint. However, as a result of the reduction
in piston area, the control pressure needs to be increased. This
has some negative effects for subsea completions, with high
control umbilical pressures, increased probability of hydraulic
leaks in control pods, subsea hydraulic connections and other.
High completion equipment reliability is particularly
important for subsea completed wells, particularly in deep
waters. This is illustrated by some examples from the North
Sea, which were reported in the Wellmaster Phase III project:
Well A experienced a failure (leakage in closed position) of
the TR-SCSSV in June 1995. Upon failure diagnosis of the
well, a tubing to annulus communication due to a leaking
GLV was noted. The well was shut down and a subsea
workover followed. Due to problems with rig availability and
production allocation restraints, the well was off production
until October 1996. During the workover, the failed GLV was
replaced and an insert valve was run inside the failed TRSCSSV. Total well downtime was 476 days.
Well B also involved a failure of the SCSSV. A critical failure
(leakage in closed position) occurred on the TR-SCSSV
during initial completion, in August 1997. The failure was
caused by a coiled tubing bottom hole assembly hanging up
while pulling out of hole at TR-SCSSV depth, indicated
through flapper and hinge pin damage during the subsequent

EINAR MOLNES AND GEIR-OVE STRAND

workover. Workover 1 took place during January/February

1998. The tubing hanger was found to be stuck in the wellhead
and failed to release. Dolomite particles from a kill pill was
found to be jamming the tubing hanger lock/unlock
mechanism. The workover was aborted, and preparations were
made to re-enter the well through Workover 2, where the
tubing hanger was to be milled out. Workover 2 was
performed during April/May 1999, when the tubing hanger
was successfully milled, the tubing pulled and a new
completion string run. The well was brought back on
production in May 1999 after a shut-in period of 482 days.
In both cases, the shut-in period was extended due to
limitations in rig availability. Both wells are prolific
producers, causing significant loss of revenues in this period.

SPE 63112

NOMENCLATURE
GLV
MTTF
MTTW
NORSOK
OREDA
SCSSV
TR
WR

Gas lift valve

Mean time to failure
Mean time to workover
The competitive standing of the Norwegian
Continental Shelf
Offshore Reliability Data
Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve
Tubing retrievable
Wireline retrievable

REFERENCES
3. Conclusions
/1/

ISO 14224: Petroleum and natural gas industries

Collection of reliability and maintenance data for
equipment. Issued by ISO/TC 67/WG 4 N5, July
1999.

/2/

Molnes, E. and Strand, G.-O.: Reliability of Well

Completion Equipment Phase III Main Report.
SINTEF
Petroleum
Research
Report
32.0898.00/04/99
(Confidential).
Trondheim,
November 1999.

/3/

The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate: Regulations

concerning implementation and use of risk analysis in
the petroleum activities. First issued 1994.

/4/

Molnes, E. and Strand, G.-O.: Towards risk based

acceptance criteria for downhole safety valves.
Paper presented to Petrobras VI Technical Meeting
Reliability Engineering, Rio de Janeiro, 28-30 March
2000.

Reliability databases have been present in the offshore

industry for some two decades, with the number of
applications of reliability data in decision making continually
growing.
The key to successful reliability databases in the offshore
sector lies in populating the databases with data in sufficient
quality and quantity. In the current low cost era of the
industry, it is difficult to convey the benefits of these
databases to management.
A wider acceptance of the benefits of the results now seems to
be emerging, with current focus on stronger implementation of
the data collection software throughout the organizations and
more frequent updating of the historical data now high on the
agenda of the participating oil companies.
Collection, analysis and feedback of reliability data is an
effective means of communicating performance of equipment
and operations across organizations boundaries. The fact that
reliability data is now being utilized for definition of new
standards and governmental regulations, is another indication
of the need for continuous collection and analysis of reliability
data by independent third parties.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors wish to thank the participants of the Wellmaster
Phase III project for permission to publish this paper. The
participants were A/S Norske Shell,
Amerada Hess Norge A/S, BHP Petroleum Pty. Ltd.,
BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd., BG PLC, Enterprise
Oil plc, Mobil Exploration Norway Inc., Norsk Agip A/S,
Norsk Hydro ASA, Norske Conoco AS,TOTAL Norge A.S,
Saga Petroleum ASA, Statoil, Chevron Petroleum Technology
Company, Exxon Production Research Company and Texaco
Group Inc.

SPE 63112

APPLICATION OF A COMPLETION EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY DATABASE IN DECISION MAKING

B u ffe r D a ta b a se
M a n u fa ctu re r

F a ilu re re p o rt d u p lica te

W e llm a ste r
C lie n t
ve rsio n 2 .5

M o d e ra to r/
QA

F a ilu re ca u se co m m e n t

W e llm a ste r
W in d o w s N T A ge n t

E -M a il

O n lin e W e llW a tch

D a ta b a se

Com pany
D a ta b a se

G e n e ra te a u to m a tic
re p ly a n d co n firm a tio n

W e llW a tch
HTML
W e b B ro w se r

Users - O il com panies

Users - M anufacturers

Figure 1 Wellmaster/WellWatch information flow chart.

Distribution Wells by Region

Adriatic
0.1 %

Africa
2.7 %

S.E. Asia/Australia
2.5 %

GoM
8.1 %
Other
0.1 %

North Sea
86.5 %

North Sea

Other

E xp ro S o ft
W e llm a ste r
S e rve r

GoM

Adriatic

Africa

S.E. Asia/Australia

Figure 2 Distribution of wells by region.

EINAR MOLNES AND GEIR-OVE STRAND

SPE 63112

S e rv ic e T im e (y e a rs )

C o m p le tio n T y p e v s . S e rv ic e T im e
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
F ixe d p la tfo r m
we ll

Subsea
T L P c o m p le te d
O n sh o re
c o m p le te d we ll
we ll
c o m p le te d we ll

C o m p le tio n T y p e

MTTF (years)

Figure 3 Distribution of well service time by welltype.

50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

36.69

20.2
14.2

SCSSV I
(1983)

16.4

19.55

12.7

SCSSV II
(1986)

SCSSV III
(1989)

SCSSV IV
(1992)

Wellmaster II Wellmaster III

(1996)
(1999)

Figure 4 Historical development of TR-SCSSV (flapper valve type) reliability during the period 1983-1999.