[G.R. No. 141284.

August 15, 2000]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B.

ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and
GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
DECISION
Facts:
In view of the increase in the violent crimes in Metro Manila like
robberies, kidnapping and carnapping, the President through a verbal
directive ordered the PNP and Marines to conduct a joint visibility patrols
for crime prevention and suppression. The said directive was confirmed
through a memorandum addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP(CSAFP) and
PNP Chief (CPNP) where he expressed his desire to improve the peace and
order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program
including increased police patrols. The said memorandum was treated as a letter of
instruction which included therein the purpose, situation and mission of the joint
operations. He invoked his powers as Commander in Chief in making the said LOI
which authorized the joint operation. He stated that the deployment of the services
of the Marines and would be ceased until such time the situation have improved.
The LOI included the areas of deployment which are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa
(SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial
Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airpor
Subsequently, the IBP filed the IBP) filed the instant petition to annul LOI
02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void
arguing that the said LOI is violative of the constitution since there is no emergency
situation that would justify the tapping of the military in helping in the crime
prevention. In its defense, the Solicitor General argued that that petitioner has no
legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for
judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization
and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police
officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy
clause in the Constitution. Hence this petition.
Issues: 1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;
(2) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and,
(3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutionalprovisions on civilian supremacy over the military
and the civilian character of the PNP.

outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens

the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional question. The IBP asserted that their duty to preserve the rule of law
and nothing more. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. Despite the said non compliance with the requirements of
locus standi, the Court can still take cognizance of the case. As settled in
jurisprudence, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance
to the people.[17] Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the
public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In the case at bar,
reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and
lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the
Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost
certainly will not go away
2. The Court held that it can exercise judicial review over the factual
determination of the President. Under the 1987 constitution, the Judiciary
was given an expanded power of judicial review to determine on whether
there was grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order. Thus the court
cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its
own but it may examine on whether such power was exercised within the
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President
full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it
is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally
bereft of factual basis.
However the said burden was not fully discharged as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed
forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse
was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to
violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the
performance of this Courts duty of purposeful hesitation [32] before declaring an act of
another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to
sustain. Furthermore, the framers of the constitution intended that the calling out
power be fully discretionary to the President because there is no power to revoke on
the part of Congress unlike in the declaration of Martial law and suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus cases.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers
highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest
discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and
thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.

Ruling:
1. The Court held that the petitioners had not fully satisfied the requirements of
locus standi. Locus standing isis whether a party alleges such personal stake in the

However in the case at bar, since the petitioners had failed to discharge the
assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot
undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity

of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively
established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of
textual standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary
to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts

7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;[48]

8. Enforcement of customs laws;[49]
9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities; [50]
10. Conduct of licensure examinations;[51]

The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for
calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted
that, [V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and
carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila... [35] We do not doubt the
veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the
light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent
bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public
utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of
deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold
that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law
enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;
[52]

12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;[53]

13. Sanitary inspections;[54]
14. Conduct of census work;[55]
15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;[56]
16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices; [57]
17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units. [58]

3. The Court held that the deployment of the Marines does not violate the
civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the
police force. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of
the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of
the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines
authority.

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than
assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no insidious
incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution.

It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various

forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is
not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and
execution of certain traditionally civil functions. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been
rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military
together in a relationship of cooperation, are:
1. Elections;[42]
2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;[43]
3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters; [44]
4. Amateur sports promotion and development; [45]
5. Development of the culture and the arts;[46]
6. Conservation of natural resources;[47]

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the
armed forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus
place in peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are
unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is just that - calling out the
armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the
deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the fundamental
law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people,
this Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents determination of the
factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.

The action was made in lieu of the fact that the elections are coming up and the
legislators who are members are seeking to be elected in the upcoming elections.
However, the justice secretary along with the other members of the JBC had already
taken action despite the position of the Chief Justice.
Later, the CJ received a letter from the President stating his position that the
prohibition does not cover the appointments to the jusdiciary. He notified the CJ of
the appointment and that they might assume their posts. The CJ treated the said
appointments as administrative matter and hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the appointments are covered by the prohibition
Ruling:

A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998

In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62,
Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabananatuan City, respectively.
Facts:
The appointment papers of Hon Mateo Valenzuela and Placido Vallarta as judges
were forwarded from the Office of the President after being signed by the President.
The papers were signed on March 30,1998 and was received by the CJ on June 12.
The Constitutionality of the said appointments were questioned in light of the
forthcoming presidential election which prohibits the appointments 2 months prior to
the said election. The constitutional provisions that were given attention are Sec 15,
Art VIII and Sec 4 of Art VIII. The said provisions are as follows:
Sec. 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his, term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Sec. 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. ** **. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
Also pertinent is section 9 of Art VIII which states that for lower courts, the President
shall issue the appointments from a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by the
council for every vacancy within 90 days from the submission of the list. One of the
expressed views was that the election ban had no applications on the appointments
to the court .
Subsequently, the Chief Justice received a communication for the appointment of 8
CA Associate Justice all appointment papers have been duly signed by the president
as of Mar 11, 1998. The CJ, resolved to defer the considerations of the nominations
in the vacancy in the Suprememe Court due to the retirement of one of the Justices.

Considering the respectives reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the
courts and the restriction on the President's power of appointments, it is this Court's
view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the
latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for
avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases.
Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as
earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those
occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited
appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier
pointed out, their making is considered an election offense.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made
for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to
those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election
and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus
Election Code. The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII
consist of the so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, 9 it was held
that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President,
President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no
more than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the transfer of
authority to the incoming President."
The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford
some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But
the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost
all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some
reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps
taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective
of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to
important positions which have to be made even after the proclamations of a new
President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford
some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the

appointment and the appointee's qualifications," 10 can be made by the outgoing

President
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998
(transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 998) were unquestionably
made during the period of the ban. Consequently, they come within the operation of
the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the
purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in
the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of
any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period
of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public policy
for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the
appointments signed by His Excellency the President under date of March 30, 1998
of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively
and to order them, forthwith on being served with notice of this decision, to
forthwith CEASE AND DESIST from discharging the office of Judge of the Courts to
which they were respectively appointed on March 30, 1998. This without prejudice to
their being considered anew by the Judicial and Bar Council for re-nomination to the
same positons.