CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1153b Now, that pain is indeed bad is agreed to/

3
so too that it is something to
be avoided: one kind of pain is bad unqualifiedly, another is bad by dint
of its being in some way an impediment. And the contrary of something
to be avoided, insofar as it is to be avoided and bad, is good. It is necessary,
then, that pleasure be something good. For as Speusippus
54
attempted to
resolve the perplexity-that pleasure is just like the greater in its opposi52 Or, "base" (phaulos), rather than kakos, here and in what follows.
53
Consider II48a22 and following.
54 Speusippus (ca. 407-339) was an Athenian philosopher, related to Plato, who to
ok
over leadership of the Academy from 34 7 to 339 Only fragments of his many writin
gs
remain. BOOK 7, CHAPTER 13 [ 159
tion to both the lesser and the equal-no resolution actually follows, for
he would not assert that pleasure is in itself something bad.
And nothing prevents a certain pleasure from being the best thing,
even if some pleasures are bad/
5
just as there is nothing to prevent a certain science from being the best thing, though some sciences may be bad.
If in fact there are unimpeded activities of each characteristic-whether
happiness is constituted by the activity (provided it is unimpeded) of
all these characteristics or by the unimpeded activity of a certain one of 10
them-perhaps it is even necessary that this activity be most choiceworthy.
But this is pleasure. As a result, a certain pleasure would be the best thing,
even though many pleasures may be, as it happens, unqualifiedly base.
For this reason, all people suppose the happy life to be pleasant, and
they weave pleasure into happiness-reasonably so. For no activity is 15
complete when it is impeded, but happiness is among the things that are
complete. Hence the happy person needs in addition the goods residing
in the body as well as external goods and chance, so that he not be impeded in these respects. And those people who claim that somebody be- 20
ing tortured on the wheel or meeting with great misfortune is happy-if
he is good-make no sense, either voluntarily or involuntarily. It is because one needs chance in addition that good fortune is held by some to
be the same thing as happiness, though it is not; since even good fortune,
when in excess, acts as an impediment-and perhaps it is not just to call
this "good fortune" any longer, for its definition 5
6
is relative to happiness. 25
And that all things-both brute animals and human beings-pursue
pleasure is a sort of sign that it is somehow the best thing:
There is no talk that dies down entirely, which many peoples ...
57
But since neither the same nature nor the same characteristic is or is held
to be the best [for all], all do not pursue the same pleasure, though all do 30
pursue pleasure. Yet perhaps they pursue not the pleasure they suppose
or would assert they pursue, but in fact the same pleasure, for all things
by nature possess something divine. But the bodily pleasures have appropriated as theirs alone the name "pleasure:' because, most often, people
55 Here again and in the next line, the term is phaulos, which can also mean"
base:'
56 Horos: see defining boundary in the glossary.

57 Hesiod, Works and Days 763. The poem continues: "spread about. She [i.e., "
talk"
or "rumor"] too is a certain goddess:' As the context makes clear, Hesiod is wa
rning
against acting in such a way as to permit "talk" to spread about and so to exact
its penalties. 160) BOOK 7, CHAPTER 14
35 steer toward them and all share in them. Because these pleasures alone
are known to them, then, people suppose that only these pleasures exist.
1154a But it is manifest also that if pleasure and activity are not good, the
happy person will not live pleasantly: for the sake of what would he need
pleasure, ifin fact it is not good? Rather, it is possible for him even to live
his life in pain; for pain would be neither bad nor good, if in fact pleasure
were not either. As a result, on what account would he avoid pain? And
so the life of the serious person would be no more pleasant [than anyone
else's] either, if his activities were not more pleasant as well.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
But what concerns the bodily pleasures must be examined by those who
say that some pleasures, at least, are highly choiceworthy-for example,
the noble ones-but that the bodily pleasures are not, that is, those pleasures with which the licentious person is concerned. But why is it, then,
10 that the pains contrary to the bodily pleasures are bad [or corruptions]?
For good is contrary to bad. Or are the necessary pleasures good only in
the way that what is not bad is good? Or are they good only up to a certain
point? For in the case of all those characteristics and motions that do not
admit of an excess of what is good, there would not be an excess of pleasure either; but for all those characteristics and motions that do admit of
15 such an excess, there would be an excess also of pleasure. Now, there is an
excess ofbodily goods; and a person is base because he pursues that excess,
but not because he pursues the necessary pleasures-for all in some way
enjoy refined foods, wines, and sex, but not all do so as they ought. But
the contrary holds in the case of pain: one does not avoid just excessive
20 pain, but rather pain in general; for pain is not the contrary of excessive
pleasure, except for someone who pursues that excess.
Now, one ought to state not only the truth but also the cause of the
falsehood, for this contributes to the truse
8
one has. For whenever a reasonable explanation comes to sight as to why a thing appears to be but is
25 not true, this makes for greater trust in the truth. One must, as a result,
say
why it is that the bodily pleasures appear more choiceworthy than other
pleasures. First, then, they expel pain. Because of excessive pain, people
seek out excessive pleasure, and bodily pleasure in general, as though it
30 were a cure. And such cures become intense-the reason people do in
58 Or, "conviction" (pistis): seen. 14. BOOK 7, CHAPTER 14 [ 161
fact pursue them-because they come to sight in contrast with their opposite. Pleasure is also held not to be of serious worth for these two reasons, as has been said: some pleasures are actions belonging to a base nature-either base from birth, as in the case of a brute animal, or through
habit, as in the example of the pleasures of base human beings; and some
pleasures act as cures for a deficient nature, and it is better to be complete,
rather than to be in the process ofbecoming so. These pleasures, because 1154b
they arise only for those still in the process of becoming complete, are of
serious worth only incidentally.
Further, bodily pleasures are pursued on account of their intensity by
those who are incapable of enjoying other pleasures. At any rate, people
foster in themselves certain thirsts; and when these are harmless, this is
not reproachable, but when they are harmful, it is base. For such people s
do not have other things from which they derive enjoyment, and that

which is neither painful nor pleasant is painful to many, given their nature. For a living animal is always toiling-just as those who study nature
also bear witness: as they assert, seeing and hearing are painful, though
by now we are accustomed to them. And similarly, during youth, because 10
of the process of growth that then occurs, people are in a condition like
that of those who are drunk, and youth is as a result pleasant. But those
who are melancholy
59
in nature, on the other hand, are always in need of
a cure; for their body is continually being stung because of the blending
[of the humors within it], and they are always in the grip of an intense
longing. And pleasure drives out pain, both the pleasure contrary to the
relevant pain and any chance pleasure, provided it is intense. It is for these
15
reasons too that people become licentious and base.
But the pleasures unaccompanied by pains do not have an excess,
and these fall among the things pleasant by nature and not incidentally.
I mean by "things pleasant incidentally;' those that serve as cures: because it happens that people are cured when that which remains healthy
in them acts, these cures seem to be pleasant. But things pleasant by nature are those that prompt an action belonging to a healthy nature. 20
Yet the same thing is not always pleasant on account of our nature's not
being simple. Rather, something else is present in us as well (hence we are
subject to destruction)
60
such that when the one part acts, this is contrary
59 Seen. 37 above.
Following the reading of Bywater (phthartoi), itself based on the commentary
60
of
Aspasius. The reading of the MSS (phtharta) would give: "But something else is p
resent
in us as well (hence [or: insofar as] these things are subject to destruction):'
to nature with respect to the other nature; and when both are equally balanced, the action performed seems to be neither painful nor pleasant. For
25 if someone's nature were simple, the same actions would always be most
pleasant. Hence the god always enjoys a pleasure that is one and simple,
for there is an activity not only of motion but also of motionlessness, and
pleasure resides more in rest than in motion. But "change in all things is
sweet:' as the poet has it,
61
on account of a certain defective condition.
62
30 For just as the defective person is a human being who readily undergoes
change, so also the nature in need of change is defective, for it is neither
simple nor decent.
What concerns self-restraint and lack of self-restraint, then, and what
concerns pleasure and pain, has been stated-both what each is and how
it is that some of them are good, others bad. But in what remains, we will
speak also about friendship.