NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

- versus -

G. R. No. 189127
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

SPOUSES BERNARDO AND Promulgated:

MINDALUZ SALUDARES,
April 25, 2012
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition questions the 21 July 2009 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA), [ 1 ] which affi rmed the 10 September 2002 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), [ 2 ] Branch 31, Tagum City. The RTC had ruled
that respondent spouses are entitled to 4,920,750 as just compensation for
the exercise of the power of eminent domain by petitioner National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR).
Sometime in the 1970s, NAPOCOR constructed high-tension transmission
lines to implement the Davao-Manat 138 KV Transmission Line Project.
[3]
These transmission lines traversed a 12,060-square meter portion of a
parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certifi cate of Title (TCT) No.
T-15343 and owned by Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano Pereyras, Laureano
Pereyras and Mindaluz Pereyras.
In 1981, NAPOCOR commenced expropriation proceedings covering TCT No.
T-15343 in National Power Corporation v. Esperanza Pereyras, Marciano
Pereyras, Laureano Pereyras and Mindaluz Pereyras . [ 4 ] These proceedings
culminated in a fi nal Decision ordering it to pay the amount of 300,000 as
just compensation for the aff ected property. [ 5 ]
The trial court issued an Order [ 6 ] subrogating Tahanan Realty Development
Corporation to the rights of the defendants in National Power Corporation
v. Pereyras.Pursuant to this Order, NAPOCOR paid the corporation the
judgment award of 300,000 [ 7 ] and Tahanan Realty Development
Corporation executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the former. [ 8 ] This
Deed covered Lot 481-B, Psd-11012718, which was a portion of Lot 481, Cad.
276 of Barrio Magugpo, Municipality of Tagum, Davao. [ 9 ]

Respondent Spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz Pereyras-Saludares are

registered owners of a 6,561-square-meter parcel of land covered by TCT No.
T-109865, [ 1 0 ] more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 15, Pcs-11-000704, Amd.), being a portion of Lots 481D, Psd-11-012718; 480-B, Psd-51550; H-148559 & 463-A-2 (LRC) Psd150796, situated in the Barrio of Magugpo, Mun. of Tagum, Province of
Davao, Island of Mindanao. x x x [ 1 1 ]
On 19 August 1999, respondents fi led the instant Complaint against
NAPOCOR and demanded the payment of just compensation. They alleged
that it had entered and occupied their property by erecting high-tension
transmission lines therein and failed to reasonably compensate them for the
intrusion. [ 1 2 ]
Petitioner averred that it already paid just compensation for the
establishment of the transmission lines by virtue of its compliance with the
fi nal and executory Decision in National Power Corporation v.
Pereyras. Furthermore, assuming that respondent spouses had not yet
received adequate compensation for the intrusion upon their property,
NAPOCOR argued that a claim for just compensation and damages may only
be fi led within fi ve years from the date of installation of the transmission
lines pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6395. [ 1 3 ]
Pretrial terminated without the parties having entered into a compromise
agreement. [ 1 4 ] Thereafter, the court appointed Lydia Gonzales and Wilfredo
Silawan as Commissioners for the purpose of determining the valuation of
the subject land. [ 1 5 ] NAPOCOR recommended Loreto Monteposo as the third
Commissioner, [ 1 6 ] but later clarifi ed that its conformity to the appointment
of commissioners was only for the purpose of determining the exact portion
of the subject land, and that it was not admitting its liability to pay just
compensation. [ 1 7 ]
After the proceedings, the Commissioners recommended the amount of 750
per square meter as the current and fair market value of the subject
property based on the Schedule of Market Values of Real Properties within
the City of Tagum eff ective in the year 2000. [ 1 8 ]
Trial on the merits ensued. On 10 September 2002, the Court rendered
judgment in favor of respondent spouses, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the plaintiff s, and against the defendant-National Power Corporation,
ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff s the Just Compensation as herein
fi xed which they claimed for the use, occupation and utilization of their land
from which it benefi ted and profi ted since January 1982 , as follows:
First : To pay plaintiff Spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz Saludares as just
compensation of their 6,561 square meters, more or less, titled land covered
by TCT No. T-109865 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Norte hereby
fi xed in the amount of FOUR MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENT Y
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY (4,920,750.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum reckoned from
January 01, 1982, until said amount is fully paid, or deposited in Court;
Second : To pay plaintiff s-spouses Bernardo and Mindaluz Saludares
attorneys fees of Fifty Thousand ( 50,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency,
plus appearance fee of 2,000.00 per appearance and litigation expenses
which shall be supported in a Bill of Costs to be submitted for the Courts
approval;
Third. To pay the costs of the suit.
Fourth. For utter lack of merit, the counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED. [ 1 9 ]
NAPOCOR appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. [ 2 0 ] After a review of
the respective parties Briefs, the appellate court rendered the assailed
Decision on 21 July 2009, denying NAPOCORs appeal and affi rming the
trial courts Decision, but reducing the rate of interest to 6% per annum. [ 2 1 ]
Aggrieved, petitioner then fi led the instant Rule 45 Petition before this
Court.
The Issues
The pivotal issues as distilled from the pleadings are as follows:
1.
Whether NAPOCOR has previously compensated the spouses for
establishing high-tension transmission lines over their property;
2.
Whether the demand for payment of just compensation has already
prescribed;
3.
Whether petitioner is liable for only ten percent of the fair market
value of the property or for the full value thereof; and

4.
Whether the trial court properly awarded the amount of 4,920,750 as
just compensation, based on the Approved Schedule of Market Values for
Real Property in Tagum City for the Year 2000.
The Courts Ruling
We uphold the Decisions of the CA and the RTC.
I
NAPOCOR failed to prove that it had adequately compensated
respondents for the establishment of high tension transmission lines over
their property
NAPOCOR argues that the parcel of land involved in the instant Petition
had already been expropriated in National Power Corporation v. Pereyras .
[22]
In support of this argument, it alleges that one of the sources of the
spouses TCT No. T-109865 is TCT No. 39660; and that TCT No. 39660 is a
transfer from TCT No. T-15343, the subject land in National Power
Corporation v. Pereyras. [ 2 3 ] Thus, having paid just compensation to Tahanan
Realty Development Corporation, the successor-in-interest of defendants
Pereyras in the aforementioned case, petitioner submits that it should no
longer be made to pay just compensation in the present case.
We disagree.
While it is true that respondent spouses TCT No. T-109865 was indeed
indirectly sourced from TCT No. T-15343, the CA correctly ruled that
NAPOCOR failed to prove that the lands involved in National Power
Corporation v. Pereyras and in the instant Petition are identical. One cannot
infer that the subject lands in both cases are the same, based on the fact
that one of the source titles of TCT No. T-109865 happens to be TCT No. T38660, and that TCT No. T-38660 itself was derived from T-15343.
Furthermore, the evidence before us supports respondent spouses
contention that the lands involved in both cases are diff erent. National
Power Corporation v. Pereyras involved Lot 481-B, Psd-11012718, which was
a portion of Lot 481, Cad. 276 of Barrio Magugpo, Municipality of Tagum,
Davao. [ 2 4 ] On the other hand, the instant Petition involves Lot 15, Pcs-11000704, Amd., which is a portion of Lots 481-D, Psd-11-012718; 480-B, Psd51550; H-148559 and 463-A-2 (LRC), Psd-150796, in Barrio Magugpo,
Municipality of Tagum, Davao. Clearly, these lots refer to diff erent parcels
of land. [ 2 5 ]

We rule, therefore, that NAPOCOR failed to prove its previous payment of

just compensation for its expropriation of the land in question.
II
The demand for payment of just compensation
has not prescribed
Petitioner maintains that, in the event respondent spouses have not been
adequately compensated for the entry into their property, their claim for
just compensation would have already prescribed, [ 2 6 ] pursuant to Section 3
(i) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 380, 395, 758,
938, 1360 and 1443. This provision empowers the NAPOCOR to do as
follows:
x x x [E]nter upon private property in the lawful performance or prosecution
of its business or purposes, including the construction of the transmission
lines thereon; Provided, that the owner of such private property shall be
paid the just compensation therefor in accordance with the provisions
hereinafter provided; Provided, further, that any action by any person
claiming compensation and/or damages shall be fi led within fi ve (5) years
after the right-of-way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other
facilities shall have been established; Provided, fi nally, that after the said
period no suit shall be brought to question the said right-of-way,
transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities nor the amounts of
compensation and/or damages involved. (Emphasis supplied.)
NAPOCORs reliance on this provision is misplaced.
The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill
of Rights, which states in clear and categorical language that [p]rivate
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. [ 2 7 ] This
constitutional mandate cannot be defeated by statutory prescription.
[28]
Thus, we have ruled that the prescriptive period under Section 3 (i) of
R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to an action to recover just compensation.
[29]
It would be a confi scatory act on the part of the government to take the
property of respondent spouses for a public purpose and deprive them of
their right to just compensation, solely because they failed to institute
inverse condemnation proceedings within fi ve years from the time the
transmission lines were constructed. To begin with, it was not the duty of
respondent spouses to demand for just compensation. Rather, it was the
duty of NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings before
occupying their property. In the normal course of events, before the
expropriating power enters a private property, it must fi rst fi le an action for

eminent domain [ 3 0 ] and deposit with the authorized government depositary

an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. [ 3 1 ] Due to its
omission, however, respondents were constrained to fi le inverse
condemnation proceedings to demand the payment of just compensation
before the trial court. We therefore rule that NAPOCOR cannot invoke the
statutory prescriptive period to defeat respondent spouses constitutional
right to just compensation.
III
NAPOCOR is liable to pay the full market value
of the aff ected property
NAPOCOR submits that it should pay for only ten percent (10%) of the fair
market value of the landowners property because, under its Charter, [ 3 2 ] it is
only authorized to acquire easements of right-of-way over agricultural
lands. [ 3 3 ]
Petitioners arguments fail to convince.
We have ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct
transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper
determination by the courts. [ 3 4 ]
In National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez , [ 3 5 ] the petitioner likewise
argued that it should only be made to pay easement fees instead of the full
market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines. In striking
down its argument and ruling that the property owners were entitled to the
full market value of the land in question, we ruled:
x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it
nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as
manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below
said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed.
Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said
transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath
said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only
pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the
taxes due on said aff ected portion of their property. [ 3 6 ]
Similarly, in this case, while respondent spouses could still utilize the area
beneath NAPOCORs transmission lines provided that the plants to be
introduced underneath would not exceed three meters, [ 3 7 ] danger is posed to
the lives and limbs of respondents farm workers, such that the property is

no longer suitable for agricultural production. [ 3 8 ] Considering the nature and

eff ect of the Davao-Manat 138 KV transmission lines, the limitation
imposed by NAPOCOR perpetually deprives respondents of the ordinary use
of their land.
Moreover, we have ruled that Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is
not binding upon this Court. [ 3 9 ] [T]he determination of just compensation in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function and . . . any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may
not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. [ 4 0 ]
We therefore rule that NAPOCOR is liable to pay respondents the full
market value of the aff ected property as determined by the court a quo.
IV
The trial court did not err in awarding just compensation based on the
Approved Schedule of Market Values for
Real Property for the Year 2000
As its fi nal argument, petitioner contends that the amount of just
compensation fi xed by the trial court is unjust, unlawful and contrary to
existing jurisprudence, because just compensation in expropriation cases
must be determined from the time of the fi ling of the complaint or the time
of taking of the subject property, whichever came fi rst. [ 4 1 ] It therefore posits
that since the taking of the property happened in the 1970s, the trial court
erred in fi xing the amount of just compensation with reference to real
property market values in the year 2000. [ 4 2 ]
Petitioners contention holds no water.
We have ruled in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit
Sangkay [ 4 3 ] that the reckoning value of just compensation is that prevailing
at the time of the fi ling of the inverse condemnation proceedings for the
following reason:
[c]ompensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time
either when NPC entered x x x would not be just, for it would compound the
gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC's entering without
the intention of formally expropriating the land x x x. NPC's entry denied
elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners
commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more

concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profi ting from
its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure
of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just
compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse
condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.

Indeed, respondent spouses would be deprived of their right to just

compensation if the value of the property is pegged back to its value in the
1970s. To reiterate, NAPOCOR should have instituted eminent domain
proceedings before it occupied respondent spouses property. Because it
failed to comply with this duty, respondent spouses were constrained to fi le
the instant Complaint for just compensation before the trial court. From the
1970s until the present, they were deprived of just compensation, while
NAPOCOR continuously burdened their property with its transmission
lines. This Court cannot allow petitioner to profi t from its failure to comply
with the mandate of the law. We therefore rule that, to adequately
compensate respondent spouses from the decades of burden on their
property, NAPOCOR should be made to pay the value of the property at the
time of the fi ling of the instant Complaint when respondent spouses made a
judicial demand for just compensation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review
is DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
81098 dated 21 July 2009 isAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

NATIONAL POWER

G.R. No. 193023

Petitioner,

Present:

CORPORATION,

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE
- versus -

CASTRO, *
BRION,

PEREZ, and

SERENO, JJ.

YUNITA TUAZON, ROSAURO

Promulgated:

TERESA TUAZON,

June 22, 2011

TUAZON and MARIA

Respondents.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N BRION, J.:
This is a petition for review fi led under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the decision [ 1 ] (dated March 15, 2010) of the Court of
Appeals (CA) [ 2 ] in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480, which set aside the order [ 3 ] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarangnan, Samar, Branch 40, and remanded
the case back to the RTC for determination of just compensation. The RTC
had dismissed the complaint of respondents Yunita Tuazon, Rosauro Tuazon
and Maria Teresa Tuazon against the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) for payment of just compensation and damages.
ANTECEDENTS
The antecedent facts are not in dispute.
The respondents are co-owners of a 136,736-square-meter coconut land [ 4 ] in
Barangay Sta. Cruz, Tarangnan, Samar. The land has been declared for tax
purposes in the name of the respondents predecessor-in-interest, the late
Mr. Pascual Tuazon. Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR [ 5 ] installed transmission
lines on a portion of the land for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power TL
Project. In the process, several improvements on the land were destroyed.
Instead of initiating expropriation proceedings, however, NAPOCOR entered
into a mere right-of-way agreement [ 6 ] with Mr. Tuazon for the total amount
of TWENT Y SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT and
21/100 PESOS (P 26,978.21). The amount represents payments for damaged
improvements (P 23,970.00), easement and tower occupancy fees ( P 1,808.21),
and additional damaged improvements ( P 1,200.00).
In 2002, the respondents fi led a complaint against NAPOCOR for just
compensation and damages, claiming that no expropriation proceedings
were made and that they only allowed NAPOCOR entry into the land after
being told that the fair market value would be paid. They also stated that
lots similarly located in Catbalogan, Samar, likewise utilized by NAPOCOR
for the similar projects, were paid just compensation in sums ranging
from P 2,000.00 to P 2,200.00 per square meter, pursuant to the
determination made by diff erent branches of the RTC in Samar.

Instead of fi ling an answer, NAPOCOR fi led a motion to dismiss based on

the full satisfaction of the respondents claims. The RTC granted the motion
in this wise:
ORDER
Acting on the Motion to Dismiss and the Opposition thereto and after a very
careful study of the arguments raised by the Parties, the court resolves in
favor of the Defendant.
Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of this case without
costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Tarangnan, Samar, Philippines, February 3, 2004.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO A. NAVIDAD
Acting Presiding Judge [ 7 ]
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
The respondents filed an ordinary appeal with the CA. In its Appellees
Brief, NAPOCOR denied that expropriation had occurred. Instead, it claimed
to have lawfully established a right-of-way easement on the land per its
agreement with Mr. Tuazon, which agreement is in accord with its charter, Republic
Act No. (R.A.) 6395. NAPOCOR maintained that Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395
gave it the right to acquire a right-of-way easement upon payment of just
compensation equivalent to not more than 10% of the market value of a
private lot traversed by transmission lines. [ 8 ]
The CA disagreed with the RTC. Citing National Power Corporation v. Hon.
Sylvia G. Aguirre-Paderanga, etc., et al. [ 9 ] and National Power Corporation
v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, [ 1 0 ] the CA pointed out
that the demolition of the improvements on the land, as well as the
installation of transmission lines thereon, constituted taking under the
power of eminent domain, considering that transmission lines are hazardous
and restrictive of the lands use for an indefi nite period of time. Hence, the
CA held that the respondents were entitled, not just to an easement fee, but
to just compensation based on the full market value of the respondents
land. Citing Export Processing Zone Authority v. Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay,
etc., et al., [11] the CA maintained that NAPOCOR cannot hide behind the
mantle of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 as an excuse of dismissing the claim of
appellants since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. No

statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination
shall prevail over the courts findings,[12] the CA added. The dispositive of the
assailed decision reads:
In sum, after establishing that NAPOCORs acquisition of the right-of-way
easement over the portion of the appellants land was a defi nite taking
under the power of eminent domain, NAPOCOR is liable to pay appellants
[referring to the respondents herein] just compensation and not only
easement fee.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Order dated February 3, 2004 of
the RTC, Br. 40, Tarangnan, Samar is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The instant case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC, Br. 40 of
Tarangnan, Samar for the proper determination of just compensation. [ 1 3 ]
The Petition
The present petition reiterates that by installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR did not
expropriate the respondents land, but merely established a right-of-way easement
over it. The petition relies heavily on the lack of transfer of the lands title
or ownership. NAPOCOR maintains that since the respondents claim
involved an easement, its charter a special law should govern in accordance with
Article 635 of the Civil Code. [ 1 4 ] NAPOCOR insists that its agreement with the
respondents predecessor-in-interest and the easement fee that was paid pursuant
thereto were authorized by its charter and are, thus, valid and binding. Finally, the
petitioner alleges that establishing right-of-way easements over lands traversed
by its transmission lines was the only mode by which it could acquire the properties
needed in its power generation and distribution function. It claims that R.A.
8974,[15] specifically its implementing rules, supports this position.
THE COURT RULING
We fi nd the petition devoid of merit and AFFIRM the remand of the
case to the RTC for the determination of just compensation.
The petitioner pleads nothing new. It essentially posits that its liability is
limited to the payment of an easement fee for the land traversed by its
transmission lines. It relies heavily on Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 to
support this position.
This position has been evaluated and found wanting by this Court in a plethora of
cases, including Manubay[ 1 6 ] which was correctly cited by the CA in the assailed
decision.
In Manubay, [ 1 7 ] NAPOCOR sought the reversal of a CA decision that
affi rmed the payment, as ordered by the RTC in Naga City, of the full
value of a property traversed by NAPOCORs transmission lines for its 350
KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. Through then Associate

Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the Court echoing the 1991 case of National
Power Corporation v. Misericordia Gutierrez, et al. [ 1 8 ] formulated the
doctrinal issue in Manubay, [ 1 9 ] as follows:
How much just compensation should be paid for an easement of a right of
way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by high-powered
transmission lines? Should such compensation be a simple easement fee or
the full value of the property? This is the question to be answered in this
case. [ 2 0 ]
In holding that just compensation should be equivalent to the full value of
the land traversed by the transmission lines, we said:
Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondents
property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain
its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of
the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview
of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion fi nds support in similar
cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation
for private property condemned for public use. Republic v. PLDT held thus:
x x x. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated
property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property
may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.
True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the
easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The
acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly
observed by the CA, considering the nature and the eff ect of the installation
power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefi nite period
would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the
latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither
more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.
Just compensation is defi ned as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers
gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of
the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to
be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample.
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to
which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market

value. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would
agree on as a price to be given and received therefore. [ 2 1 ] (Emphasis ours;
citations omitted.)
We fi nd it signifi cant that NAPOCOR does not assail the applicability
of Manubay [ 2 2 ] in the present case. Instead, NAPOCOR criticizes the
application of Gutierrez [ 2 3 ] which the CA had cited as authority for the
doctrine that eminent domain may also be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. [ 2 4 ] NAPOCOR assails Gutierrez [ 2 5 ] as irrelevant on the ground
that the expropriation proceedings were instituted in January 1965, when
the NAPOCOR Charter had not been amended with the insertion of Section
3-A(b) in 1976. [ 2 6 ] To NAPOCOR, Section 3-A(b) provides for a fi xed formula
in the computation of just compensation in cases of acquisition of easements
of right-of-way. Heavily relying on Section 3-A(b), therefore, NAPOCOR
argues:
Absent any pronouncement regarding the eff ect of Section 3-A (b) of R.A.
6395, as amended, on the computation of just compensation to be paid to
landowners aff ected by the erection of transmission lines, NPC v. Gutierrez,
supra, should not be deemed controlling in the case at bar. [ 2 7 ]
We do not fi nd NAPOCORs position persuasive.
The application of Gutierrez [ 2 8 ] to the present case is well taken. The facts
and issue of both cases are comparable. [ 2 9 ] The right-of-way easement in the
case similarly involved transmission lines traversing privately owned land.
It likewise held that the transmission lines not only endangered life and limb, but
restricted as well the owners use of the land traversed. Our pronouncement
in Gutierrez [ 3 0 ] that the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily
includes the imposition of right-of-way easements upon condemned property without
loss of title or possession [ 3 1 ] therefore remains doctrinal and should be
applied. [ 3 2 ]
NAPOCORs protest against the relevancy of Gutierrez, heavily relying as it
does on the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 on just
compensation due for properties traversed by transmission lines, has no
merit. We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive
upon the courts. [ 3 3 ] In National Power Corporation v. Maria Bagui, et al.,
[34]
we categorically held:
Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the
Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just
compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any

valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as
a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation
but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount
should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.)
The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function
addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any
other branch or offi cial of the government. [ 3 5 ] This judicial function has
constitutional raison dtre; Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates
that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of
just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Santa Loro Vda. de
Capin, et al., [ 3 6 ] we noted with approval the disquisition of the CA in this
matter:
The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b)
of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value
declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in
the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever
is lower. To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a
judicial function but would also render as useless the protection guaranteed
by our Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our Constitution that no
private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just
compensation.
The same principle further resolves NAPOCORs contention that R.A. 8974,
specifi cally its implementing rules, supports NAPOCORs claim that it is
liable to the respondents for an easement fee, not for the full market value
of their land. We amply addressed this same contention
in Purefoods [ 3 7 ] where we held that:
While Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule
of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state that only 10% of the market value of the
property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of rightof-way, said rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that
the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a
judicial function. In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay , the Court
held that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may
serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation,
no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's fi ndings. Much less can the

courts be precluded from looking into the "justness" of the decreed

compensation. (Citations omitted.)
That the respondents predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation
of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. In the present petition,
NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose the instillation
now estops the respondents from their present claim. [ 3 8 ] This
insinuation has no legal basis. Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose cannot have
the eff ect of thwarting the respondents right to just compensation.
In Rafael C. de Ynchausti v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., et al.,
[39]
we ruled:
The owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a public
railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is completed, or large
expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent
acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In
such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation.
(Goodin v. Cin. And Whitewater Canal Co., 18 Ohio St., 169.)
One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and
construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot
afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be
imposed upon it. His acquiescence in the company's taking possession and
constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance,
if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But
while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the
company, he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the
land, or for injuries done him by the construction or operation of the road.
(St. Julien v. Morgan etc., Railroad Co., 35 La. Ann., 924.)
In sum, we categorically hold that private land taken for the
installation of transmission lines is to be paid the full market value of the
land as just compensation. We so ruled in National Power Corporation v.
Benjamin Ong Co, [ 4 0 ] and we reiterate this ruling today :
As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended,
substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by
transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just
compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10 percent of
the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when
petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable
to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts.
(Citations omitted.)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for

review and AFFIRM the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on March 15, 2010, in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155065. July 28, 2005]

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. SYLVA G.

AGUIRRE PADERANGA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Danao City, Branch 25, PETRONA O. DILAO, FEDIL T. OSMEA,

ISABEL T. OSMEA , CELESTINO O. GALON, POTENCIA O. BATUCAN,

TRINIDAD T. OSMEA , LULIA T. OSMEA , LOURDES O. DAFFON,

VICTORIA O. BARRIGA and JUAN T. OSMEA, JR., and ESTEFANIA

ENRIQUEZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision [ 1 ] dated June 6, 2002, as well as its
Resolution [ 2 ] dated August 30, 2002, affi rming the decision [ 3 ] of the Regional
Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25 which granted the complaint for
expropriation fi led by herein petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC)
against herein respondents Petrona Dilao et al. are being assailed in the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
To implement its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, the NPC fi led on
March 19, 1996 before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City a complaint
for expropriation [ 4 ] of parcels of land situated at Baring and Cantumog,
Carmen, Cebu [ 5 ] against the following defendants:
NAMES ADDRESS
1. Petrona O. [ 6 ] Dilao Poblacion, Carmen, Cebu
2. Fidel T. Osmea -do3. Isabel T. Osmea -do4. Celestina O. Galon -do5. Potenciana O. Batucan -do6. Trinidad T. Osmea -do7. Lulia T.Osmea -do8. Lourdes O. Daff on -do9. Victoria O. Barriga -do10. Juan T. Osmea, Jr. -do11. Estefania Enriquez Marijoy Realty Corp.
Natalio Bacalso Ave.
Mambaling, Cebu City [ 7 ]

(Underscoring supplied)
The complaint covers (a) 7,281 square meters of the 25,758 square meters of
land co-owned by herein respondents Petrona O. Dilao (Dilao) and the
above-listed defendant Nos. 2-10 who are her siblings, and (b) 7,879 square
meters of the 17,019 square meters of land owned by Estefania Enriquez
(Enriquez). [ 8 ]
A day after the complaint was fi led or on March 20, 1996, NPC fi led an
urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the lands.
Dilao fi led her Answer with Counterclaim on April 19, 1996 . [ 9 ] Enriquez did
not. [ 1 0 ]
On May 9, 1996, Branch 25 of the RTC Danao, issued an Order [ 1 1 ] granting
NPCs motion for the issuance of writ of possession. It then appointed a
Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation. [ 1 2 ]
The commissioners submitted on April 15, 1999 their report [ 1 3 ] to the trial
court containing, among other things, their recommended appraisal of
the parcel of land co-owned by defendants Dilao and her siblings at P 516.66
per square meter.
To the Commissioners Report, the NPC fi led its
Comment/Opposition [ 1 4 ] assailing the correctness of the appraisal for failing
to take into account Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6395 ( AN ACTREVISING
THE CHARTER OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION), as amended,
specifi cally Section 3A [ 1 5 ] thereof which provides that the just compensation
for right-of-way easement (for which that portion of the Dilao property is
being expropriated) shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the market
value of the property. The traversed land, NPC asserted, could still be used
for agricultural purposes by the defendants, subject only to its easement. It
added that the lots were of no use to its operations except for its
transmission lines. [ 1 6 ]
By Decision of November 10, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision on the
complaint, adopting the commissioners recommended appraisal of the land
co-owned by Dilao and her siblings . The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered condemning the property of
Petrona Dilao et al. which has been aff ected by 7,281 square meters in favor
of plaintiff ; declaring in favor of defendants for plaintiff to pay the fair
market value of said area aff ected at P 516.66 per square or a total
of P 3,761,801.40 plus P 250,000.00 for the value of the improvements
aff ected by herein expropriation.
SO ORDERED. [ 1 7 ] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Copy of the decision was received by NPC on November 18, 1999. [ 1 8 ]
NPC fi led a Notice of Appeal [ 1 9 ] but the trial court, by Order of January 17,
2000, denied the same for NPCs failure to fi le and perfect it within the
reglementary period, it having failed to fi le a record on appeal. [ 2 0 ] To the

Order, NPC fi led a motion for reconsideration, [ 2 1 ] contending that a record

on appeal was not required as the trial court rendered judgment against all
the defendants including Enriquez as shown, so it claimed, by the
dispositive portion of the decision referring to Petrona Dilao et al.
By Resolution [ 2 2 ] of March 7, 2000, the trial court denied NPCs motion for
reconsideration, clarifying that the reference to Petrona Dilao et al. in the
dispositive portion of its decision was meant to cover only Dilao and her coowner-siblings. [ 2 3 ]
NPC subsequently fi led before the trial court a petition for relief from the
denial of its appeal on the ground that its failure to fi le a record on appeal
was due to honest mistake and excusable neglect, it having believed that a
record on appeal was not required in light of the failure of the other
defendant, Enriquez, to fi le an answer to the complaint. [ 2 4 ]
The trial court denied NPCs petition for relief for lack of factual and legal
basis. [ 2 5 ]
On August 17, 2001, the trial court granted Dilao et al.s motion for
execution of judgment. [ 2 6 ] NPC thereupon fi led a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals with prayer for temporary restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction [ 2 7 ] assailing the trial courts order denying its
appeal and other orders related thereto, as well as the order granting Dilao
et al.s motion for execution. The appellate court, however, denied NPCs
petition, [ 2 8 ] it holding that under Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the fi ling of a record on appeal is required in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals, as in an action
for expropriation in which the order determining the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate and the subsequent adjudication on the issue of just
compensation may be the subject of separate appeals. [ 2 9 ]
Aggrieved, NPC challenged the appellate courts decision via the present
petition, [ 3 0 ] it contending that the trial courts questioned orders eff ectively
deprived it of its constitutional right to due process.
NPC argues that a complaint for expropriation is a Special Civil Action
under Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, not a special proceeding as
contemplated under Rule 41, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; that
there is no law or rules specifi cally requiring that a record on appeal shall
be fi led in expropriation cases; and of the two sets of defendants in the
present case, the Dilaos and Enriquez, the fi rst, while they fi led an answer,
did not appeal the trial courts decision, while with respect to the second,
there is no showing that summons was served upon her, hence, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over her and, therefore, no appeal could
arise whatsoever with respect to the complaint against her. Ergo, petitioner
concludes, no possibility of multiple appeals arose from the case.
The petition fails.

Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, clearly
provides:
SEC. 2. Modes of Appeals.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be
taken by fi ling a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or fi nal order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law
or these Rules so require. In such cases , the record on appeal shall be fi led
and served in like manner.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
While admittedly a complaint for expropriation is not a special proceeding,
the above-quoted rule requires the fi ling of a record on appeal in other cases
of multiple or separate appeal.
Jurisprudential law, no doubt, recognizes the existence of multiple appeals
in a complaint for expropriation. [ 3 1 ] The case of Municipality of Bian v.
Garcia [ 3 2 ] vividly expounds on the matter, viz:
1. There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The fi rst is
concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the fi ling of the complaint."
An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a fi nal one, of course,
since it fi nally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by
the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a fi nal
one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before
the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation
(or the propriety thereof) shall be fi led or heard.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. The order fi xing the just compensation
on the basis of the evidence before, and fi ndings of, the commissioners
would be fi nal, too. It would fi nally dispose of the second stage of the suit,
and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be
erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or fi ndings of fact or otherwise.
Obviously, too, such a dissatisfi ed party may seek reversal of the order by
taking an appeal therefrom . (Underscoring supplied).

Thus, in Municipality of Bian, this Court held that in actions for eminent
domain, since no less than two appeals are allowed by law, the period for
appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty days counted from notice
thereof and not the ordinary period of fi fteen days prescribed for actions in
general. [ 3 3 ] As such, the complaint falls under the classifi cation of other
cases of multiple or separate appeal where the law or these rules so require
in above-quoted Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in
which a record on appeal is required to be fi led and served.
Respecting NPCs claim that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the other defendant, Enriquez, there being no evidence that summons was
served on her and, therefore, no appeal with respect to the case against her
arose, the trial courts Order [ 3 4 ] of May 9, 1996 belies said claim:
x x x
In the letter-appeal by defendant Estefania V. Enriquez addressed to the
Court, defendant did manifest no opposition to the right of plaintiff to the
use of her land but only wich (sic) that payment be based on the actual
market value of the property sought to be expropriated . In comment to said
letter-appeal, plaintiff stressed that the amount deposited was purely to
secure a writ of possession as provided under PD 42. It agreed with
defendant that the fair market value or actual market value shall be the
basis for the just compensation of the property.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That the defendant Enriquez did not fi le an answer to the complaint did not
foreclose the possibility of an appeal arising therefrom. For Section 3 of
Rule 67 provides:
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. If a defendant has no objection or defense to
the action or the taking of his property, he may fi le and serve a notice of
appearance and a manifestation to that eff ect, specifi cally designating or
identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within the time
stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all
proceedings aff ecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the fi ling of or the allegations in the
complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall
serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall
specifi cally designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an
interest, state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all
his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the
answer or any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court,
in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made
not later than ten (10) days from the fi ling thereof. However, at the trial of
the issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously

appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the

compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the
distribution of the award . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In other words, once the compensation for Enriquez property is placed in
issue at the trial, she could, following the third paragraph of the
immediately-quoted Section 3 of Rule 67, participate therein and if she is
not in conformity with the trial courts determination of the compensation,
she can appeal therefrom.
Multiple or separate appeals being existent in the present expropriation
case, NPC should have fi led a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt
of the trial courts decision. The trial courts dismissal of its appeal, which
was affi rmed by the appellate court, was thus in order.
En passant, glossing over NPCs failure to fi le record on appeal, its appeal
would still not prosper on substantive grounds.
NPC anchored its appeal [ 3 5 ] on the alleged overvalued appraisal by the
commissioners of the compensation to be awarded to Dilao et al., the
commissioners having allegedly lost sight of the already mentioned 10%
limit provided under Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395.
In National Power Corporation v. Chiong , [ 3 6 ] petitioner similarly argued
therein that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in upholding the RTC order
requiring it to pay the full market value of the expropriated properties,
despite the fact that it was only acquiring an easement of right-of-way for
its transmission lines. It pointed out, as it does in the present case, that
under Section 3A of RA No. 6395, as amended, where only an easement of
right-of-way shall be acquired, with the principal purpose for which the
land is actually devoted is unimpaired, the compensation should not exceed
ten percent (10%) of the market value of the property. Upholding the trial
court and the Court of Appealss approval of the commissioners
recommendation in that case, this Court declared:
In fi xing the valuation at P 500.00 per square meter, the Court of Appeals
noted that the trial court had considered the reports of the commissioners
and the proofs submitted by the parties. This includes the fair market value
of P 1,100.00 per square meter proff ered by the respondents. This valuation
by owners of the property may not be binding upon the petitioner or the
court, although it should at least set a ceiling price for the compensation to
be awarded. The trial court found that the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated are agricultural land, with minimal improvements. It is the
nature and character of the land at the time of its taking that is the
principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner . Hence,
the trial court accepted not the owners valuation of P 1,100 per square meter
but only P 500 as recommended in the majority report of the commissioners.
x x x

In fi nding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the
evidence and the reports placed before it nor did it misapply the rules
governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority reports
valuation of P500 per square meter to be fair. Said factual fi nding of the
Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or
otherwise unjustifi ed, is binding on the parties as well as this Court.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with
a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement
resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land
traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the
ambit of the term expropriation. As explained in National Power
Corporation v. Gutierrez, [ 3 7 ] viz:
The trial courts observation shared by the appellate court show that x x x
While it is true that plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it
nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as
manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below
said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed.
Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said
transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath
said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only
pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the
taxes due on said aff ected portion of their property.
The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right-of-way easement
falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain . Such conclusion
fi nds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-way where the
Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private
property condemned for public use (See National Power Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 102
SCRA 597, 1981). The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs.
PLDT, thus held that:
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but
no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose
only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title
and possession . It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is defi nitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and eff ect of the
installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines,the limitation
imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefi nite period deprives
private respondents of its ordinary use. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).

From the Commissioners Report [ 3 8 ] chronicling the following fi ndings:

x x x
1. The parcel of land owned by the defendant PETRONA O. DILAO, et al. is
very fertile, plain, suited for any crops production, portion of which planted
with coco trees and mango trees, portion planted with corn, sometimes
planted with sugar cane, the said land has a distance of about 1 kilometer
from the trading center, about 100 meters from an industrial land
(Shemberg Biotech Corp.) adjacent to a Poultry Farm and lies along the
Provincial Road.
x x x
IMPROVEMENTS AFFECTED
Per ocular inspection made on lot own by PETRONA O. DILAO, et al.
traversed by a transmission line of NPC and with my verifi cation as to the
number of improvements, the following trees had been damaged.
1. 55 coco trees productive
2. 10 mango trees productive 3. 30 cacao trees
productive
4. 110 bananas
5. 400 ipil-ipil trees
x x x, [ 3 9 ]
it cannot be gainsaid that NPCs complaint merely involves a simple case of
mere passage of transmission lines over Dilao et al.s property. Aside from
the actual damage done to the property traversed by the transmission lines,
the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire
property is unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered as the
environment is made dangerous to the occupants life and limb.
The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings being
a judicial function, [ 4 0 ] this Court fi nds the commissioners recommendation
of P 516.66 per square meter, which was approved by the trial court, to be
just and reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and
her siblings.
In fi ne, the appeal sought by NPC does not stand on both procedural and
substantive grounds.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.