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SCHMIDT V. DRISCOLL HOTEL, INC, 249 Minn. 376 (Minn.

1957)

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

SCHMIDT V. DRISCOLL HOTEL, INC


249 Minn. 376 (Minn. 1957)
HERBERT G. SCHMIDT, A MINOR, BY
HIS
MOTHER
AND
NATURAL
GUARDIAN, MATIE T. SCHMIDT, v.
DRISCOLL HOTEL, INC., d.b.a. THE
HOOK-EM-COW BAR AND CAFE.
No. 36,973.

ordinarily determines the rights


responsibilities of the parties involved.

and

Same action under Civil Damage Act


applicable law illegal sale in
Minnesota causing injuries in Wisconsin.
3. If these sections be held applicable here, the
trial court was correct in granting defendant's
motion for judgment on the pleadings, for, *377

Supreme Court of Minnesota.


April 12, 1957.
Civil Damage Act application sale of intoxicants to person obviously intoxicated.

1. M.S.A. 340.95, commonly known as the


Civil Damage Act, provides that "Every * * *
person who is injured in person or property,
* * * by any intoxicated person, or by the
intoxication of any person, has a right of
action, in his own name, * * *" against any
person who illegally sold or gave the
intoxicating liquor, and so caused the
intoxication of such person, for all damages
sustained. Sale of liquor in violation of 340.14,
subd. 1, which forbids selling of intoxicants to a
person obviously intoxicated, would constitute
such an illegal sale as to give rise to an action
under 340.95.

Conflict of laws tort actions


applicable law place of wrong.
2. Under Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 377,
the place of wrong in multistate tort actions
is the state where the last event necessary to
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes
place, and under 378, the law of such place

while defendant illegally sold intoxicants in


Minnesota to the person causing plaintiff's
injuries, such injuries to plaintiff were
sustained in the State of Wisconsin which
therefore was the place of wrong.

Same same same same.


4. To thus apply Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
377 and 378, in multistate fact situations like
the present would deprive an injured party of
his remedy under the Civil Damage Act both
in the state where the statutory violations
occurred, as well as in the state where the last
event took place giving rise to plaintiff's
damages.

Same same same same.


5. Application of Restatement, Conflict of
Laws, 377 and 378, to multistate fact
situations relating to civil damage acts is not
required by virtue of any common-law
principles. Here, where all parties involved
were residents of Minnesota; where defendant
was licensed in this state; and where its
wrongful acts in violation of the Minnesota
statutes for which it became liable under
M.S.A. 340.95 took place and were completed
here, held plaintiff's right to compensation

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SCHMIDT V. DRISCOLL HOTEL, INC, 249 Minn. 376 (Minn. 1957)


therefor under 340.95 was established in
Minnesota even though his ultimate harm
occurred outside the state.

Same same same same.


6. For cases in support of conclusions similar
to that reached here, see Gordon v. Parker (D.
Mass.) 83 F. Supp. 40; Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive
Auto Renting Co. Inc. 108 Conn. 333, 143 A.
163, 61 A.L.R. 846; Moore v. Pywell, 29 App.
D.C. 312, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1078; Gratz v.
Claughton (2 Cir.) 187 F.2d 46; Caldwell v.
Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387.

Same same same same.


7. Decisions in Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber,
Inc. 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512, 22 A.L.R.
2d 1123, and Goodwin v. Young, 34 Hun 252,
construing civil damage acts of those states, are
at variance with determination here.

Action in the Dakota County District Court on behalf


of Herbert G. Schmidt, a minor, by his mother and
natural guardian, Matie T. Schmidt, for personal injuries sustained by said minor when he was a passenger
in an automobile which turned over while it was *378
being driven by one John Sorrenson who was allegedly intoxicated as the result of illegal sale of intoxicants
by defendant. The court, W. A. Schultz, Judge, granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings,
and plaintiff appealed from the judgment entered. Reversed.
Daniel T. Cody, J. M. Daly, Lipschultz, Altman, Geraghty
Mulally, and H. E. Cochrane, for appellant.
Hoffmann, Donahue Graff and T. Eugene Thompson, for
respondent.

THOMAS GALLAGHER, JUSTICE.


Plaintiff, Herbert G. Schmidt, a minor, instituted this
action by his mother and natural guardian, Matie T.

Schmidt, against the Driscoll Hotel, Inc., doing business as The Hook-Em-Cow Bar and Cafe in South St.
Paul, for damages alleged to have resulted from defendant's illegal sale of intoxicants to one John Sorrenson.
The complaint alleged that defendant illegally sold intoxicating liquors to Sorrenson to the extent of causing him to become intoxicated in defendant's establishment in South St. Paul so that shortly thereafter, as
a proximate result thereof, plaintiff sustained injuries
when an automobile driven by Sorrenson, in which
plaintiff was a passenger, was caused to turn over near
Prescott, Wisconsin.
Defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged that it failed to state a claim against
it. Subsequently, it moved to dismiss the action on the
ground that the pleadings failed to state a claim against
the defendant and that the court lacked jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1956, the trial court made its order granting defendant's motion. In the order granting the
same, the trial court determined that "No penalty by
way of collecting damages arose under M.S.A. 340.95
[Civil Damage Act], unless the injury was inflicted in
the state. No civil action to collect the penalty arose
unless the illegal sale in the state was followed by an
injury in the state. * * * M.S.A. 340.95 does not provide for extraterritorial effect, * * *."
This is an appeal from the judgment entered pursuant
to the foregoing order. *379
1. M.S.A. 340.14, subd. 1, provides: "No intoxicating
liquor shall be sold * * * to any person obviously intoxicated * * *." M.S.A. 340.95, commonly known as
the Civil Damage Act, provides that: "Every * * * person who is injured in person or property, * * * by any
intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action, in his own name, against any
person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages, sustained; * * *." We have recently held this provision to be essentially remedial in na-

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SCHMIDT V. DRISCOLL HOTEL, INC, 249 Minn. 376 (Minn. 1957)


ture although penal in its characteristics. Adamson v.
Dougherty, 248 Minn. 535,81 N.W.2d 110.
2. It is defendant's position that the action is governed
by the law of torts and that, since the last act in the series of events for which plaintiff instituted his action
occurred in Wisconsin, which has no Civil Damage
1
Act similar to 340.95, the latter can have no application in determining plaintiff's rights or defendant's
liability. In support thereof defendant cites Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 377, which states:
1. Cf. Wis. Stat. 1955, 176.35.

"The place of wrong is in the state where the last event


necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort
takes place."
And 378, which states:
"The law of the place of wrong determines whether a
person has sustained a legal injury."
3. The allegations of the complaint by which we are
bound for the purposes of this appeal make clear that
plaintiff's damages are the result of two distinct
wrongs one committed by defendant in Minnesota
when it sold Sorrenson intoxicating liquors in violation of M.S.A. 340.14, subd. 1; and one committed by
Sorrenson in Wisconsin when his negligence caused
the car in which plaintiff was riding to turn over. It
cannot be disputed that, had plaintiff's action been
against Sorrenson for his negligence, his rights would
be governed by the law of Wisconsin applicable in tort
actions of this kind. Sohm v. Sohm, 212 Minn. 316, 3
N.W.2d 496; Hardgrove v. Bade, *380190 Minn. 523,
252 N.W. 334. But, even if at the time of the accident
there had been in effect in Wisconsin a statute similar
to 340.95, it is doubtful if it could be applied to ascertain plaintiff's rights against defendant since there
is nothing here to support a claim that defendant ever
consented to be bound by Wisconsin law. See, Scheer
v. Rockne Motors Corp. (2 Cir.) 68 F.2d 942; Young
v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253,53 S.Ct. 599, 77 L. ed. 1158.

4. From the foregoing, it would follow that, if the


principles expressed in Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
377 and 378, are held applicable to multistate fact
situations like the present, then neither the laws of
the state where the last event necessary to create tort
liability took place nor the laws of the state where
the liquor dealer's violations of the liquor statutes occurred would afford an injured party any remedy
against the offending liquor dealer for the injuries
which resulted from his statutory violations. The result would be that here both the interest of Wisconsin
in affording whatever remedies it deems proper for
those injured there as the result of foreign violations
of liquor laws (Watson v. Employers Lia. Assur. Corp.
348 U.S. 66, 75 S.Ct. 166,99 L.ed. 74), and the interest
of Minnesota in admonishing a liquor dealer whose
violation of its statutes was the cause of such injuries;
and in providing for the injured party a remedy therefor under the Civil Damage Act would become ineffective. See, Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting
Co. Inc.108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163, 61 A.L.R. 846;
Gordon v. Parker (D. Mass.)83 F. Supp. 40.
5. We feel that the principles in Restatement, Conflict
of Laws, 377 and 378, should not be held applicable
to fact situations such as the present to bring about
the result described and that a determination to the
opposite effect would be more in conformity with
principles of equity and justice. Here all parties involved were residents of Minnesota. Defendant was
licensed under its laws and required to operate its establishment in compliance therewith. Its violation of
the Minnesota statutes occurred here, and its wrongful conduct was complete within Minnesota when,
as a result thereof, Sorrenson became intoxicated before leaving its establishment. The *381 consequential
harm to plaintiff, a Minnesota citizen, accordingly
should be compensated for under M.S.A. 340.95
which furnishes him a remedy against defendant for
its wrongful acts. By this construction, no greater burden is placed upon defendant than was intended by
340.95.

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SCHMIDT V. DRISCOLL HOTEL, INC, 249 Minn. 376 (Minn. 1957)


6. In arriving at this conclusion, we have in mind decisions of a number of jurisdictions which have reached
similar results in situations, which, though not involving civil damage acts, presented factual circumstances comparable to those here. Gordon v. Parker
(D. Mass.) 83 F. Supp. 40; Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive
Auto Renting Co. Inc. 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163,61
A.L.R. 846; Moore v. Pywell, 29 App. D.C. 312,9
L.R.A. (N.S.) 1078; Gratz v. Claughton (2 Cir.) 187
F.2d 46; Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387;
see, Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36
Minn. L.Rev. 1; Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A
Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 Tulane L.Rev. 4; Id.

7. We recognize that the courts of Illinois (Eldridge v.


Don Beachcomber, Inc. 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E. [2d]
512,22 A.L.R. [2d] 1123) and New York (Goodwin
v. Young, 34 Hun 252) have reached opposite conclusions in construing civil damage acts similar to
340.95. However, we feel that the situations presented in such cases, as well as that presented here, do not
compel application of Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
377 and 378, and that our determination that other
principles apply will better afford Minnesota citizens
the protection which the Civil Damage Act intended
for them.
Reversed.

165.
In Gordon v. Parker, supra, an action for alienation
of affections was instituted in Massachusetts by plaintiff, who, with his wife, was domiciled in Pennsylvania. Therein it appeared that defendant's wrongful
acts had taken place in Massachusetts, and accordingly
plaintiff sought the application of a Massachusetts
statute relating to alienation of affections. Defendant
contended that, since the matrimonial domicile of the
parties was in Pennsylvania, which accordingly was
the place where the ultimate wrong was done to plaintiff, only Pennsylvania law could be applied. In denying this contention and applying the Massachusetts
statute, the court stated (83 F. Supp. 42):
"This is not a situation in which the interests of Pennsylvania plainly outweigh those of Massachusetts. The
social order of each is implicated. As the place of matrimonial domicil, Pennsylvania has an interest in
whether conduct in any part of the world is held to
affect adversely the marriage relationship between its
domiciliaries. But, as the place where the alleged * *
* wrongdoer lives, Massachusetts also has an interest.
She is concerned with conduct *382 within her borders
which in her view lowers the standards of the community where they occur. She also is concerned when her
citizens intermeddle with other people's marriages."

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