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10/15/2015 12:14 AM

Copyright 2015 by Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal and Vision Research Institute. All rights reserved.
Authors permission is needed for re-producing and/or quoting any portion (except the quotes from other
authors). For referring, the following content should be included: Vimal, R. L. P. (2015). Biological Naturalism
in Extended Dual-Aspect Monism and Conscious Robots. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and
Consciousness Research [Available: http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2015-Vimal-eDAM-BNLVCR-7-3.pdf ], 7(3), 1-23. Added to Academia and Research Gate: Added: 2015-10-15 T 04:13:43 UTC. DOI:
10.13140/RG.2.1.2326.6008. [Recent update: Thursday, October 15, 2015, 12:14 AM]. This article started in
2014. Comments and suggestions are most welcome and should be emailed to rlpvimal@yahoo.co.in .

Title page
Title of manuscript: Biological Naturalism in Extended Dual-Aspect Monism

and Conscious Robots

Author: Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal
Work Affiliations and address:
Vision Research Institute, 25 Rita Street, Lowell, MA 01854 USA.
Email Address: rlpvimal@yahoo.co.in
Financial Disclosure/Funding Information: The work was, to some extent, supported
by VP-Research Foundation Trust and Vision Research Institute research Fund. The
funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
Acknowledgments
The work was supported by VP-Research Foundation Trust and Vision Research
Institute research Fund. Author would like to thank two anonymous colleagues (some of
the phrases/sentences are adapted/paraphrased/quoted from their reviews in Sections
1, 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 3), John R. Searle for the email discussion on Biological
Naturalism and traditional views, Arnold Trehub for the email discussion on his Retinoid
framework, Alfredo Pereira Jr., Max Velmans, and Pankhuri Singhal for critical
comments, discussion, and suggestions. Author is also affiliated with Dristi
Anusandhana Sansthana, A-60 Umed Park, Sola Road, Ahmedabad-61, Gujrat, India;
Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, c/o NiceTech Computer Education Institute, Pendra,
Bilaspur, C.G. 495119, India; and Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, Sai Niwas, East of
Hanuman
Mandir,
Betiahata,
Gorakhpur,
U.P.
273001
India.
URL:
http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home. Email: rlpvimal@yahoo.co.in.
Postal address of submitting author (single author manuscript):
Vision Research Institute
25 Rita Street, Lowell, MA 01854 USA.

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Biological Naturalism in Extended Dual-Aspect Monism and Conscious Robots

Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal
Vision Research Institute, 25 Rita Street, Lowell, MA 01854 USA
Email: rlpvimal@yahoo.co.in

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Abstract
Previously, an extended version of dual-aspect monism (eDAM) framework for
consciousness was proposed: It (a) has the least number of problems, (b) addressed the
hard problem of consciousness (how to explain subjective experiences), and (c) can be
tested scientifically. Here, the term consciousness is defined as the mental aspect of a state
of brain-system or that of a state of brain-process from the first person perspective;
consciousness has two sub-aspects: conscious experience and conscious function. The terms
mental and physical are used in the sense of the eDAM framework (not dualism). The
eDAM framework has five components: dual-aspect monism, dual-mode, varying degrees of
manifestation of aspects depending on the levels of entities and contexts, necessary
conditions of consciousness, and the segregation and integration of dual-aspect
information. In Searles Biological Naturalism (BN), conscious states are real and
irreducible, caused by lower level brain processes, realized as higher-level or system
features, and function causally. Here, the eDAM framework attempts to: (a) interpret BN
and address the objections raised in BN by traditional views (dualism and materialism), (b)
investigate if conscious robots can be supported, and (c) investigate if the eDAM is
parsimonious and more efficient compared to other frameworks.

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1. Introduction
This article consists of three main sections: (1) the first elaborates the two concepts of
matter and defines the term consciousness before using it and elaborates the articles
preferred view in the mind-brain debate: the eDAM (extended dual aspect monism)
framework. (2) The second section (i) interprets Searles Biological Naturalism (BN) in terms
of the eDAM framework where both are consistent with each other to some extent because
both are non-traditional views, and addresses the objections raised in BN by traditional
views (dualism and materialism); (ii) examines the possibility of a conscious robot (Strong
AI), and theorizes that it is possible in the eDAM framework; and (iii) argues that the eDAM
view should be chosen as preferred view because of (a) the parsimony due to the Occams
razor principle and the model selection criterion derived from the Akaike information
statistics and (b) its explanatory and predictive powers. (3) The third section critically
investigates if the eDAM framework is more efficient and better than other frameworks,

Keywords: Easy and hard problems of consciousness; functional and experiential aspects
of consciousness; dual-aspect monism; Biological Naturalism; materialism; idealism;
interactive substance dualism; segregation and integration (or binding) of information;
emergence; supervenience; functional integration; access and phenomenal consciousness;
necessary conditions of consciousness.

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such as BN, materialism (including materialistic emergence), idealism, interactive

substance dualism, triple-aspect monism, and reflexive monism, and retinoid system.

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1.1. Concepts of matter and definition of consciousness

Concepts of matter: There are two concepts of matter: (i) first, the YjavalkyaBdaryaa-Aristotles concept of matter, where matter has rpa/form and has the
potentiality for experiences (Pereira Jr., 2013; Radhakrishnan, 1960; Swami Krishnananda,
1983); it is used in our frameworks (Pereira Jr., 2013; Pereira Jr., Vimal, & Pregnolato,
2015; Vimal, 2013). (ii) Second, the Kada-Democritus concept of matter (who identifies
matter with atoms/particles), which implies that matter is non-experiential (Vimal, 2015a);
it is used in science (such as physics, chemistry, and biology). The second concept misleads
materialistic biologists who make grave mistake of following non-experiential materialism
that has serious unsolvable problems and hence cannot address the hard problem of
consciousness. Biologists who follow Yjavalkya-Bdaryaa-Aristotles concept of matter
should not have such problems.
Definition of consciousness: There are about forty meanings attributed to the term
consciousness, which were identified and categorized according to whether they were
principally about function or about experience (Vimal, 2009b). One could argue (Cottam &
Ranson, 2013) that functions are related to easy problems and experiences are related to
the hard problems of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). An immediate advantage of this
categorization is that it makes clear what materialism can do and what it cannot do.
Materialism may explain functions but cannot explain experiences. In other words, this
categorization sets the clear-cut limit for materialism. Furthermore, the optimal definition
(that has the least number of problems) of consciousness, using Yjavalkya-BdaryaaAristotles concept of matter, is: consciousness (a) is the mental aspect of a state of the brainmind system or that of a state of a brain-process in the first person perspective (1pp), and (b)
has two sub-aspects: conscious experience and conscious function (Vimal, 2010b). This
definition is used in the five-component-eDAM framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010a, 2013,
2015a, 2015b), which is concisely summarized below.

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1.2. An extended version of Dual-Aspect Monism (eDAM) framework

The extended dual-aspect monism framework (eDAM) is a monist framework and is
different from interactive substance dualism and quantum interactive dualism. This
framework is an alternative to a materialism based framework for consciousness (Crick &
Koch, 2003). The materialistic framework does not address the hard problem because the
explanatory gap problem (Levine, 1983) still remains. As per Crick and Koch, the hard
problem of consciousness is the most difficult problem. It is fruitless to approach this
problem head-on; instead, it will be useful first to find the neural correlate(s) of
consciousness (NCC) and then try to explain it in causal terms. This will hopefully tell us
how to address the hard problem (quotes are from (Crick & Koch, 2003)). This strategy
might have lead Koch towards a version of dual-aspect monism in (Koch, 2012), but it
certainly led me to the eDAM framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010a, 2013, 2015a, 2015b) that
tries to solve the hard problem as elaborated in (Vimal, 2015a).
The eDAM framework is consistent with psychophysical, biological, and physical laws
and the principle of dependent co-origination1. The eDAM attempts to address the hard
problem of consciousness (how to explain subjective experiences) as elaborated in (Vimal,
2015a). In addition, this framework can be tested scientifically. For example, if the doctrine
of inseparability between the 1pp-mental (for living systems) and physical aspects of a
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conscious brain-mind state from the third person perspective (3pp) is somehow rejected
then the eDAM framework needs major modification; this is elaborated in (Vimal, 2015a).
The eDAM framework has five components that are summarized in (Vimal, 2015a) and
very concisely given below in the interest of space:
(I) Dual-Aspect Monism: This is elaborated in (Vimal, 2008b). Briefly, the
qualitative/mental and the physical aspects of a state of any entity (elementary particle to
neural-network to whole universe) are inseparable in dual-aspect monism; this can be
called the doctrine of inseparability. The qualitative/mental aspect of an entity-state
comprises of: (a) the qualitative aspect of the entity-state which consists of superposed
potential basis-states related to forms, patterns of distribution of matter/energy in space
and time, and/or patterns of vibrations for both living and non-living systems. And (b) the
mental aspect of the entity-state which consists of superposed potential basis-states
(Section 1.2 of (Vimal, 2015a)) related to the potential primary irreducible subjective
experiences (SEs) representing the pre-existence of the potentiality of experiences for livingsystem and/or conscious artifacts. The degree of manifestation of 1pp-mental aspect and
that of the 3pp-physical aspect dependently co-arise1; this entails the inseparability
between both aspects.
The concept of superposition is borrowed from physics (especially quantum physics)
and is elaborated in (Vimal, 2010a) and Section 2.3 of (Vimal, 2015a). As per (Vimal,
2015a), the basis-states related to potential primary irreducible subjective experiences
(SEs) are superposed in the mental aspect of a state of neural-network. The superposed
basis-states collapse/reduce to a specific basis-state related to a specific primary SE (such
as redness) for its realization (actualization) through the matching and selection processes
(selected by the self, not by any homunculus) in the related neural-network complex with
integrated information () (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) higher
than its critical threshold value for consciousness. The integrated information () is
elaborated later in (V).
(II) Dual-mode and matching and selection mechanisms: This is discussed in (Vimal,
2010a). Briefly, the two modes are stimulus-dependent-feed-forward-signals-related-mode
and cognitive-feedback-signals-related-mode. They interact for conjugate matching and
then the selection of a specific subjective experience occurs and experienced by the self
(Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007), which is further elaborated later in Section 2.1.
For experiencing a specific SE, there are three major interacting signals: (i) stimulusdependent feed forward (FF) signals, (ii) stimuli-related-memory-dependent cognitive
feedback (FB) signals, and (iii) self-related signal that is a part of reentrant FB signals. The
self (a) is the SE of subject (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007), (b) consists of proto-self, core-self, and
autobiographical-self (Damasio, 2010), and (c) is the 1pp-mental aspect of a state of selfrelated neural network (such as cortical midline structures: (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004))
and its activities.
The matching/interaction is between FF and FB signals; then the self-related signals
interact with the resultant signal representing the matching between stimulus-related FF
signal and cognitive FB signals; thus, there are interactions between the three major
signals; this interactive process can be called as the specific SE is selected and experienced
by the self.
(III) Variation of the degree of manifestation of aspects: This is detailed in (Vimal,
2013) and summarized in (Vimal, 2015a) as follows: The concept of the varying degrees of
the manifestation (appearance/strength) of aspects means that the degree of the
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appearance and/or strength of aspects varies depending on the levels of entities. At each
level, the manifestation of aspects is through dependent co-origination (Ngrjuna &
Garfield, 1995; Vimal, 2009a)1, i.e., through co-evolution, adaptation, natural selection,
co-development and sensorimotor tuning. For example, the degree of manifestation of
mental aspect in an inert non-conscious entity is zero and high in an awake-conscious
entity.
The third component is varying degrees of manifestation (appearance/strength) of
physical aspect and qualitative/mental aspect depending on the levels of entities and
contexts, where contexts include entity-state, environment, background, surround, and so on.
In inert (nonliving) entities at classical level, such as a molecule, the physical aspect of
its state is from the objective third person perspective (3pp) and the degree of its
manifestation is high. []
The mental aspect of a state of a living-system is from the subjective 1pp and the
physical aspect is from the objective 3pp. This implies that (a) the qualitative aspect, such
as forms and patterns, can be perceived or implicitly inferred from 3pp, but (b) the mental
aspect of a state of a non-living system is latent to us from 3pp.
This does not mean that nonliving systems have consciousness like us that is hidden;
rather, the qualitative/mental aspect of a state of a nonliving entity carries potential protoexperiences in superposed form as a Natures mechanism for the pre-existence of potential
SEs. We perceive the form, pattern of distribution of matter/energy in space and time,
and/or pattern of vibration related to an inert entity, which indicates the existence of its
qualitative aspect. Therefore, it is better to use the term qualitative aspect in place of
mental aspect for non-living systems to address some biologists skepticism; for the same
reason, we use 1pp-mental aspect for conscious states and mental aspect for nonconscious states.
(IV) Necessary conditions of consciousness: This is elaborated in (Vimal, 2015b).
Briefly, the necessary conditions of access (reportable) consciousness are the formation of
neural-networks, wakefulness, reentrant interactions among neural populations, frontoparietal and thalamic-reticular-nucleus attentional signals that modulate consciousness,
integrated information in complex of neural-network such as thalamocortical complexes
with critical spatiotemporal grain-size, working memory, stimulus contrast at or above
threshold level, and neural-network proto-experiences that are potential subjective
experiences. Attention and the ability to report are not necessary for non-reportable
phenomenal consciousness. The criterion for the selection of necessary conditions of
consciousness is that if any of these conditions is missing, we will not have consciousness.
(V) Segregation, differentiation, and integration of information: This is discussed
in (Vimal, 2015a). Briefly, there are two steps: (i) the segregation of information for the
analysis of specific stimulus attribute and then (ii) the integration of information for the
synthesis of all attributes (related to dimension such as redness, sub-mode such as color,
and mode such as vision), which results unified consciousness. In other words, the first
stage of processing is the segregation of information (such as the information related to
physical and conceptual attributes), which are analyzed and processed for preciseness and
specificity in different specialized neurons of related brain areas. Then, the second stage of
processing is the integration of information (or binding of attributes) (related to different
functions, concepts, experiences and so on) in various neural-network-complexes, which
results unified consciousness. The term differentiation signifies that there are a large
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number of possible functions and potential experiences; this leads to higher effective
information (Tononi, 2004).
The integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009;
Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) is based on the materialistic identity theory (consciousness is
integrated information) or to some extent panpsychism (Tononi & Koch, 2014). However,
both materialism and panpsychism have serious problems (Vimal, 2010b, 2013). Therefore,
IIT is interpreted in terms of more efficient metaphysics, such as the eDAM framework in
(Vimal, 2015a), which has the least number of problems; here, information is a dual-aspect
entity.
In the eDAM framework, consciousness is the 1pp-mental aspect of a state of related
neural network that has high amount of integrated mental-information mental.
Consciousness has two sub-aspects: (a) the experiential aspect such as SEs including
feelings, emotion- and thought-related experiences and (b) the functional aspect such as
related functions. The 3pp-physical aspect of this state is the correlated neural-network
(such as thalamocortical main complex) and its activity as its neural substrate that has
high amount of integrated physical-information physical, which is close to the term
integrated information used in (Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) and (Balduzzi & Tononi,
2009). Since 1pp-mental and 3pp-physical aspects are inseparable, mental and physical
information related to the same brain-mind state are also inseparable.

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1.3. Specific aims

There are four specific aims of this article: First, in Section 2.1, the article interprets
Searles Biological Naturalism (BN) in terms of the eDAM framework, and address the
objections raised in BN by traditional views (dualism and materialism). Second, in Section
2.2, it investigates if conscious robots can be supported. Third, in Section 2.3, it
investigates if the eDAM is parsimonious. Fourth, in Sections 2.3 and 3, it investigates if
the eDAM framework is more efficient compared to other frameworks, such as BN,
materialism (including materialistic emergence), idealism, interactive substance dualism,
triple-aspect monism, reflexive monism, and retinoid framework.

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2. Models and Results

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2.1. The Biological Naturalism in the eDAM framework

Searle renamed the mind-body problem of traditional views (dualism and materialism)
as Biological Naturalism (BN), where consciousness has four empirical essential features
(Searle, 2007): qualitative feel (what-it-feels-like), subjective ontology, single unified
conscious field, and intentionality (see the Table).
In BN, conscious states are real and irreducible, caused by lower level brain processes,
realized as higher-level or system features, and function causally. The BN is certainly a new
way of thinking and rejects traditional views, and seems somewhat consistent with the nontraditional eDAM framework (Section 1.2).
However, BN (Searle, 2007) still confuses researchers because sometimes it appears to
lean towards materialism, sometimes interactive substance dualism, or sometimes dualaspect monism. An example related to materialism is: brain processes cause
consciousness (Searle, 2007), which seems to imply that physical entity brain-processes
cause mental entity consciousness. An example related to interactive substance dualism is:
Conscious states ... cannot be eliminated or reduced to something else (Searle, 2007), which
seems to imply that consciousness is a mental entity and is different and independent from
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the physical entity brain and its processes. An example related to dual-aspect monism is:
conscious states are realized simultaneously with the neuron firings (Searle, 2007), where
the term simultaneously has effects similar to the inseparability of mental and physical
aspects.
However, materialism and substance dualism have serious problems as elaborated in
(Vimal, 2010b, 2013).
Therefore, it is justified to interpret BN in terms of the least problematic eDAM
framework to unpack some of the concepts of the BN that have objections from traditional
views and address those objections; both are accomplished as follows:
[I] The brain processes of the BN can be interpreted as the matching and selection processes
in the eDAM framework: As per Searle, Conscious states ... cannot be eliminated or reduced
to something else. All conscious states are caused by lower level brain processes. brain
processes cause consciousness (Searle, 2007). This hypothesis needs unpacking in the
eDAM framework as follows:
(a) Irreducible primary experiences (mental entities) are not created by material brain or
its processes (physical/material entities).
(b) Consciousness related brain processes (or neural networks) are (a) correlated with
experiences as NCC (see Table), or (b) the neural basis of consciousness.
(c) There are many brain processes, such as lower-level neural (brain) processing related
to stimulus-dependent feed forward (FF) signals, higher-level neural processing related to
feedback (FB) signals, and neural processing related to the matching/interaction between
FF and FB signals and the selection of specific subjective experience (SE).
(d) FF and FB signals and their interactions entail dual-aspect conscious states of brainmind system. The term cause in BNs brain processes cause consciousness is misleading;
instead, the eDAM framework uses the degree of manifestation of 1pp-mental aspect and
that of the 3pp-physical aspect dependently co-arise1 entailing the inseparability of aspects.
(e) Primary irreducible experiences, however, potentially pre-exist in Nature and the
basis-states related to potential primary irreducible experiences are superposed in the
mental aspect of an entity-state.
(f) A specific subjective experience is realized through the brain processes such as the
matching and selection processes as briefly elaborated in (Section 1.2) and detailed in
(Vimal, 2010a), which entails the irreducibility of experiences.
Please insert Table somewhere around here; Table is located after References and before
Endnotes
[II] Experiences influence brain processes through inseparability of aspects: The hypothesis
that conscious states function causally (Searle, 2007), i.e., experiences influence brain
processes can be unpacked by using the doctrine of inseparability of the eDAM framework
without making category mistake2 as follows. First, the mental information (such as in
intention) in the 1pp-mental aspect of a state of an entity) is immediately, faithfully, and
automatically translated into the physical information in the 3pp-physical aspect of the
entity (such as the related neural network and its activities because both aspects are
inseparable1) and information is conserved. This implies that conscious states are realized
simultaneously with the neuron firings (Searle, 2007). Then, the physical signal related to
this entity influences/causes the correlated brain process (physical signal) without making
category mistake.
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[III] Unpacking BNs consciousness is irreducible ontologically, but reducible causally: As per
Searle, In the case of consciousness the causal reduction does not lead to an ontological
reduction (Searle, 2007). The brain processes, as unpacked above in the interpretation [I]
of the BN, are the matching and selection mechanisms, which entails that consciousness is
irreducible ontologically, but the brain processes and related experiences entail dual-aspect
conscious states through the doctrine of inseparability and dependent co-origination1 using
FF signal, FB signal, and/or their interactions (matching process).
[IV] Simultaneity between consciousness and its NCC: As per Searle, conscious states are
realized simultaneously with the neuron firings (Searle, 2007). This is consistent with the
eDAM because inseparability implies simultaneity between the mental and the physical
aspects of a conscious state as in the interpretation [II] of the BN.
[V] Dualism and materialism can be rejected but the dual-aspect monism is maintained: As
per Searle, One way to see Biological Naturalism is as an attempt to preserve what is true
in each [dualism and materialism] while discarding what is false. In order to do that we
have to overthrow a set of powerful philosophical presuppositions (Searle, 2007). The BN
has selected the true features of dualism and that of materialism but ends up with
criticisms from both metaphysics. However, if the BN is interpreted in terms of the eDAM
framework (as in interpretations [I]-[IV]), then we do not have to overthrow powerful
philosophical presuppositions entrenched in the five components of eDAM framework
(Section 1.2).
[VI] In general, the mental aspect of a state of a brain-mind system includes information
related to consciousness (functional and experiential aspects), conscious and nonconscious thoughts, and other conscious and non-conscious cognition (such as attention
and memory). Therefore, all entities can be categorized in two groups: conscious and nonconscious entities. In this article, the terms mental and physical are used in the sense of
the non-traditional (or semi-traditional) eDAM framework; these terms are not used in the
sense of Cartesian substance dualism.
As per LaRock, the BN is based on weak form of emergence: consciousness emerges only if
there are sufficiently organized neurons present to allow for suitable causal relations
(LaRock, 2013). This fails to provide a satisfactory account of objectual unity and subject
unity (LaRock, 2013). Both strong and weak emergence are mysterious and needs
unpacking; to the some extent, this is accomplished in (Vimal, 2013).
Searle proposes that brain processes (physical entity: traditional notion) cause
consciousness (mental entity) as if physical entity causes mental entity (Searle, 2007); this
is confusing because it seems to make category mistake2 in the traditional notion of the
physical and the mental (Feigl, 1967). However, there is no category mistake in Biological
Naturalism because it is assumed that brain processes are capable of creating irreducible
primary subjective experiences as a brute fact (that is the way it is!). This is because, as per
Searle, brain processes cause consciousness (Searle, 2007). Searle also proposes, All
conscious states are caused by lower level brain processes (Searle, 2007).
Thus, there seems to be apparent confusion: Do brain processes cause conscious states
or consciousness? Answer is both as per Searle, but how? In the eDAM framework, this
confusion can be addressed as follows: the lower level brain processes entail dual-aspect
conscious states, i.e., the degree of manifestation of 1pp-mental and that of 3pp-physical
aspects of conscious brain-states dependently co-arise1. In other words, each conscious
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state has inseparable 3pp-physical and 1pp-mental aspects, which implies that if 3ppphysical aspect is objectively known then 1pp-mental aspect is automatically, rigorously,
and immediately subjectively known through subjective experience (SE) because of the
doctrine of inseparability and vice-versa. In both aspects, it is the same information related
to the same reality and we are just describing it in two different perspectives (see also
(Trehub, 2013)).
Furthermore, brain processes such as the matching and selection mechanisms can
select a specific SE (experiential aspect of consciousness) through the matching of feed
forward with feedback signals and experienced by the self (see below). It should be noted
that physical entities (such as the firing of a neuron) interact with other physical entities
(such as the firing of other neurons), but mental entities (such as subjective experience
painfulness) do not interact with (or cause) physical entities (such as firing of pain related
neurons). Thus, the category mistake2 is not made in the eDAM framework.
One could ask: is the eDAM framework property dualism? Answer is NO. As per property
dualism, the world consists of just one kind of substance (physical kind) that has physical
properties and mental properties, i.e., mental properties inhere in physical substances such
as brains; and consciousness is ontologically (and causally) irreducible. Thus, property
dualism is based on materialism. The eDAM framework is not the property dualism because
it is based on dual-aspect monism (not materialism), where a state of an entity has
inseparable 3pp-physical and 1pp-mental aspects (not of the entity but of its state because
an entity can have multiple states). They are just from different perspectives, namely, the
physical aspect is from 3pp, and the mental aspect is from 1pp. It is the same information
but different ways of viewing either from 3pp or 1pp. Physical aspect does not cause
mental aspect and vice versa; rather, they are inseparable, they have the same information
in different perspectives, and the degree of manifestation of 1pp-mental and that of 3ppphysical aspects of conscious brain-states dependently co-arise1 in the eDAM framework.
In other words, any change in one aspect/perspective is automatically, immediately, and
faithfully translated into the language of other aspect/perspective because information is
conserved. In the BN, since consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes
(although it is ontologically irreducible), it does not appear to be property dualism (Searle,
2002). Perhaps, emergent materialism, non-reductive physicalism/functionalism,
anomalous monism, and epiphenomenalism fall under property dualism, which need
unpacking in terms of the eDAM framework to address the hard problem.
In addition, the eDAM framework is neither proto-panpsychism or nor panpsychism3
and hence does not inherit their problems.
Furthermore, Searle (Searle, 2014) (a) extends the BN elaborated in (Searle, 2007), and
(b) rejects substance dualism, property dualism/epiphenomenalism (because mental
properties such as thirst, hunger, or an intention to raise arm have causal effects on
physical properties such as drinking, eating or raising arm), materialist reductionism,
behaviorism, and computationalism. (c) Searle proposes three stages to enhance
consciousness research (Searle, 2014): (i) find NCC, (ii) test if NCC is a causal correlation
(silencing the NCC must stop experiences and resuming the NCC restarts consciousness),
and (iii) build a theory that explains why these phenomena have these effects. The eDAM
framework, as a theory, does a good job in addressing the mind-brain debate; for example,
silencing the NCC also silences the related experiences and resuming the NCC also
resumes those experiences because of the inseparability of 1pp-mwntal and 3pp-physical
aspects. The BN implicitly seems to imply that the Nature has potentiality for experiences,
which is consistent with the eDAM framework.
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2.2. Conscious Artifacts (Strong AI)

Can we build conscious artifacts/robots/strong artificial intelligence (AI)? This is a
provocative but an essential and an interesting question because conscious artifacts can
obviously bring a new revolution in the advancement of science and technology. Its answer
seems to be first based on metaphysics, biological laws, and physical laws, and second on
the availability of appropriate technology.
Searle's Biological Naturalism supports conscious artifacts because brain processes
cause consciousness does not imply that only brains can be conscious. The brain is a
biological machine, and we might build an artificial machine that was conscious (Searle,
2007).(p.328). Tononis IIT (Tononi, 2008) also implies that it is possible to construct
highly conscious artifacts by endowing them with a complex of high (Koch & Tononi,
2008).
As per IIT (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012), integrated information
is consciousness, which is an identity theory based on materialism that has serious
problem. Since Kada-Democritus definition of matter used in science is non-experiential
and does not even have potential for experiences (consciousness) (the fundamental
assumption of materialism) as discussed in (Vimal, 2015a), generating consciousness from
such non-conscious matter is impossible; otherwise, there will be gross violation of its own
fundamental assumption.
If we assume that matter has potential for consciousness (as Yjavalkya-BdaryaaAristotles definition of matter implies) then it is no more materialism, it will be then dualaspect monism metaphysics. Implicitly, Koch and Tononi (Koch, 2012; Koch & Tononi,
2008; Tononi, 2008) seem to imply dual-aspect monism, but Tononi calls it the central
identity that is an experience is a maximally integrated conceptual (information) structure
(Tononi, 2012).(p.306). As discussed above, Tononis IIT seems to be based on materialism,
but now Tononi and his colleagues seem to confess that their IIT, to some extent, is based
on panpsychism (Tononi & Koch, 2014). However, both materialism and panpsychism have
serious problems (Vimal, 2010b, 2013). Therefore their proposal has some confusion and
serious problems, which are addressed clearly in (Vimal, 2015a) by interpreting IIT in terms
of the eDAM framework.
Since, in materialism, non-experiential matter (that does not even have potential for
experiences) cannot generate consciousness, eliminativism holds that consciousness
(subjective experience) does not exist (Dennett, 1978), i.e., our and robotic consciousness
are illusion. However, how can we eliminate our daily obvious and robust subjective
experiences (that are the entities we are sure of!)? This implies that the materialism is false.
If the functional integration framework based on materialism is proposed, it is unclear how
the qualitative feature of the experiential aspect of consciousness (what-it-feels-like: (Searle,
2007)) can be derived from the integration of function, and hence related explanatory gap
problem remains.
However, if the functional integration framework is interpreted in terms of dual-aspect
monism based frameworks, such as the eDAM framework where the mental aspect includes
functional and experiential sub-aspects, one could argue that conscious artifacts are
possible.
In other words, the eDAM framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010a, 2013, 2015a, 2015b), which
includes the necessary conditions of consciousness (Vimal, 2015b) and integrated
information (Vimal, 2015a), supports conscious robots (without violating biological laws
that are one of the necessary conditions of consciousness). Such conscious robots can have
robotic subjective experiences (perhaps different from human subjective experiences). This
is because each entity including silicon system has inseparable qualitative/mental and
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physical aspects; and the qualitative/mental aspect of each entity has potential for
subjective experiences, i.e., experiences potentially pre-exist in the qualitative/mental
aspect of a state of each entity as superposed-basis-states in latent form. The degree of
manifestation (appearance/strength) of aspects varies depending on the levels of entities
and contexts (Vimal, 2013), and the degrees of manifestation of mental and that of
physical aspects dependently co-arise1. For example, both aspects are fully and equally
manifested in active awake conscious human beings. In non-living matter, the mental
aspect of a state of an inert entity is latent (i.e., only its qualitative/form aspect can be
perceived in 3pp or implicitly inferred) but its physical aspect is fully manifested.
As per many frameworks of the mind-brain debate (such as materialism, panpsychism,
functionalism, eDAM and so on), strong AI is a conceptual possibility. One of the colleagues
stated that the possibility of conscious artifacts might be correct; however, one needs to
show that the eDAM framework provides an important advancement on the current state of
the debate on the possibility of conscious robots. To this end, this article argues that the
eDAM framework provides the important advancement on this debate via its fourth and
fifth components (Sections 1.2.(IV) and 1.2.(V)), namely, the necessary conditions of
consciousness (Vimal, 2015b) and the segregation, differentiation, and integration of
information (Vimal, 2015a). In other words, artifacts/robots (strong AI) must be designed
and implemented in available technology in such a way (a) that the necessary conditions of
consciousness (Section 1.2.(IV)) are satisfied and (b) that their integrated physical
information (physical) is above critical threshold for having robotic consciousness.

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2.3. Framework selection: parsimony because of (a) the Occams razor principle and
(b) the model selection criterion (MSC) from Akaike information statistics
The functions and related experiences are embodied (their basis-states are superposed
in respective brain-mind states) and embedded in related structures. In the eDAM
framework, an event creates a dual-aspect brain-mind state that has two inseparable
aspects. (i) First is a qualitative/mental aspect, where the 1pp-mental component of this
aspect that has inseparable experiential and functional sub-aspects of consciousness and
the qualitative component of this aspect has forms and patterns. (ii) The second is its 3ppphysical aspect, which is composed of correlated structures and their activities (NCF
(neural correlate(s) of function) and NCC). The inseparability between aspects must always
be maintained; they cannot be segregated or separated. The rationale is as follows.
When evolution, natural selection, and adaptation based ecosystem ecology changes a
structure, a new function arises. If it is useful, then it is embodied and embedded in
neural-network (NN)-structure. If a certain function is not any more useful to the organism,
related structure is modified or selected out. This modification or selecting out can occur
when organism is inactive for example; but it takes long time (years and generations in
some species). In this manner, ecosystem ecology and adaptation can add new structure,
function, and experience, delete unused structure, function, and experience, or modify
structure, function, and experience. However, in all cases, the inseparability between
structure, function, and experience is maintained whenever it is needed, i.e., they are
considered as just one variable for Occams razor: if one of them is selected out, others are
selected out as well. Since function and experience are in 1pp-mental aspect, they are
grouped together as sub-aspects of consciousness. Since structure is 3pp-physical, it is
another inseparable aspect. Thus, they all are inseparable, i.e., they are tightly linked
together, and move together as if they are just one single entity-state and just one single
variable for Occams razor to avoid slicing of aspects. If we try to segregate or separate these
aspects, Occams razor will slice off the gap because of the separation (or weak link) due to
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the segregation; and then the segregation or the separation will be selected out and will be
brought back to inseparability. The underlying principle behind inseparability is that the
degree of manifestation of qualitative/mental aspect and that of the physical aspect
dependently co-arise1, co-evolve, co-develop, and co-tuned for sensorimotor tuning
appropriately depending on the levels of entities and contexts. Ecosystem ecology and
adaptation do not need segregation between aspects during conscious experience and
function. This is because ecosystem ecology and evolutionary changes are very slow process
(can take years and/or generations) compared to the duration of consciousness for a
specific event (that takes seconds to a few minutes at the most: we usually cannot maintain
the same brain-mind state after a few seconds). The updates in structure, function, and
experience can be done without segregation during inactive-state. Therefore, the Occams
razor objective credibility (essential in scientific research) for the eDAM framework is 100%
of the materialism.
In the triple-aspect monism (TAM), the gap because of the separation of aspects or weak
links due to the segregation are between 1 and 2 (i.e., 1-2), 1 and 3 (i.e., 1-3), and 2 and 3
(i.e., 2-3), where 1 is aspect-1, 2 is aspect-2, and 3 is aspect-3 in three-aspect frameworks.
This is because the first aspect of the TAM framework can occur without the other two (i.e.,
1-2 and 1-3) and the second can occur without third (i.e., 2-3), but the second cannot
occur without the first (i.e., 2-1), and the third cannot occur without the first (i.e., 3-1) and
the second (i.e., 2-3). This gives 3 degrees of freedom for the slicing of Occams razors
slicing. Therefore, the Occams razor objective credibility of TAM is about 33% of the eDAM
framework or materialism.
In other words, ecosystem ecology, adaptation, and Occams razor will select out threeaspect frameworks because some of the aspects are segregable and will use the eDAM
framework instead to solve the serious problem of association among structure, function,
and experience. This is because otherwise there are very large number of possible
associations of a large number of micro-, meso-, and macro-structures, functions, and
experiences in innumerable species. This is a huge combinatorial association problem,
which ecosystem ecology, adaptation, and Occams razor need to solve. This is one of
rationale for using the eDAM framework instead of triple-aspect or three-world type
frameworks.
Furthermore, we need methods to find the degree of scientific credibility, viability, or
reliability of our frameworks. There may be many methods such as the model selection
criterion (MSC) from the Akaike information statistics (see Section 4.A, Appendix B.2 of
(Vimal, 1998)). Occams razor is another method. Parmenides single metaphysics (1 free
parameter) and materialism (1 free parameter) have highest objective creditability (100%) as
per Occams razor. This is one of the reasons why science uses materialism. However, both
these metaphysics have serious problems such as explanatory gap problem. Occams razor
has no objection on the eDAM framework because there is one single free parameter as
both aspects are inseparable and the eDAM does not have other problems as other
metaphysics have. However, Occams razor has serious objection on triple aspect
frameworks that have separable/segregable aspects. How do we evaluate our models if we
do not use these methods? Just philosophical arguments for their pragmatic usefulness are
not enough; scientists/skeptics may not accept them. Furthermore, since the Reflexive
Monism (RM) (Velmans, 2008) is a version of dual-aspect monism framework that
presumably has inseparable aspects (personal communication with Velmans), the number
of parameter is 1 as in the eDAM framework; the RMs scope is limited to conscious beings,
whereas the eDAMs scope is unlimited. Therefore, we elaborate the above two methods for
the framework-selection as follows:
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The MSC (model selection criterion) is derived from the Akaike information statistics
(Vimal, 1998); higher MSC indicates better model. The MSC is defined as:
MSC = ln(A/B) - (2Np/Nd)

(1)

where ln is natural logarithm; A is the sum of the weighted squared deviation of the data
from the weighted mean of the data; and B is the sum of the weighted squared deviation of
the data from the model. Np is the number of parameters and Nd is the number of
experimental data points. Since currently we do not have experimental data points and
quantitative mechanisms of model related to various frameworks for model-prediction, let
us assume that all frameworks yield the same model predictions implying the same ln(A/B).
The number of free parameters (Np) for various frameworks is as follows. (a) Np is 1 for
materialism, idealism, eDAM, and RM. (b) Np is 2 for dualism (independent physical and
mental entities) because the segregation is between 1 and 2, 2 and 1. (c) Np is 3 for TAM
(physical, non-conscious mental, and conscious mental aspects) (Pereira Jr., 2013) because
the segregation is between 1 and 2, 1 and 3, or 2 and 3. (d) Np is 6 for Freuds framework
(physical brain, unconscious, and conscious aspects) because the segregation is
presumably between 1 and 2, 2 and 1, 1 and 3, 3 and 1, 2 and 3, or 3 and 2. (e) Np is 6 for
Poppers three worlds framework because the segregation is assumed similar to that for
Freuds model. The comparisons between eDAM, dualism, and triple aspect frameworks
from Eq. (1) are given below:
MSCeDAM MSCDualism = [2(Np=2)/Nd]TAM [2(Np=1)/Nd]eDAM = (4-2)/Nd = 2/Nd > 0
(eDAM vs. Dualism) (2)
MSCeDAM MSCTAM = [2(Np=3)/Nd]TAM [2(Np=1)/Nd]eDAM = (6-2)/Nd = 4/Nd > 0
(eDAM vs. TAM)

(3)

MSCeDAM MSCFreud = [2(Np=6)/Nd]Freud - [2(Np=1)/Nd]eDAM

= (12-2)/Nd = 10/Nd > 0

(eDAM vs. Freud)

(4)

MSCeDAM MSCPopper = [2(Np=6)/Nd]Popper - [2(Np=1)/Nd]eDAM

= (12-2)/Nd = 10/Nd > 0

(eDAM vs. Popper)

(5)

This implies that the eDAM framework is better than dualism that is better than TAM,
which is better than Freuds framework that is equal to Poppers framework as per MSC
derived from the Akaike information criterion. This is the same conclusion as from Occams
razor. To sum up, the comparative degree of scientific credibility, viability, or reliability of
frameworks (assuming Nd same for all frameworks) are as follows:
Occams_razor(materialism, idealism, eDAM, RM, Dualism, TAM, Freud, Popper)
:: (1, 1, 1, 1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/6, 1/6) based on (1/Np)

(6)

MSC_AIC(materialism, idealism, eDAM, RM, Dualism, TAM, Freud, Popper)

:: (1, 1, 1, 1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/6, 1/6) based on (1/Np) using Eqs. (2)-(5)

(7)

One could argue for under-determination of theory by data, i.e., empirical data test only a
part of theory because of the limitations of data collections. However, this fact should not
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affect the above comparative conclusion if we assume that all frameworks can explain the
same collected data.
In other words, as one of the colleagues stated, this section argues that the eDAM is the
preferred framework because of the parsimony due to the Occams razor principle and the
model selection criterion derived from the Akaike information statistics. In addition, as per
this colleague, this section correctly recognizes that such considerations are only relevant
once it has been determined that competing views are equally virtuous in other respects
(their explanatory power, predictive power and so on), and so they make it a working
assumption that eDAM and its competitors (materialism, dualism and so on) meet this
criterion.
Therefore, other factors (such as greater explanatory etc. power, the serious problems
of frameworks, limitation in scope) must also be considered for selecting the preferred
framework in the contemporary debate concerning the ontology of mind and body.
[Quotes are adapted from this colleagues review.]
Thus, materialism, interactive substance dualism, and idealism have serious problems
as elaborated in (Vimal, 2010b, 2013); views related to dualism, TAM, Freud, and Popper
are less parsimonious; BN is confusing and controversial; and RM is limited to conscious
beings. On the other hand, the eDAM (a) is parsimonious, (b) has unlimited scope, (c) has
equal or greater explanatory and predictive powers (somewhat elaborated in (Vimal, 2015a))
compared to competitors, (d) is the least problematic framework, and (e) can address the
hard problem of consciousness. Therefore, the eDAM should be considered as the preferred
view.

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3. Discussion
We would like to investigate if the eDAM framework is more efficient compared to other
frameworks, such as BN, materialism, materialistic emergence, idealism, interactive
substance dualism, triple-aspect monism, reflexive monism, and retinoid framework, which
are very briefly discussed as follows in the interest of space:
Biological Naturalism: As elaborated in Sections 2.1 and 2.3, BN is confusing and
controversial and has been attacked by both traditional views namely materialism and
interactive substance dualism. However, if BN is interpreted in terms of eDAM, then the
related problems can be addressed.
Materialism: Here, non-experiential matter is the fundamental reality and experiential
aspect of consciousness emerges from matter such as brain or identical with brain-states.
The major problem is the explanatory gap problem (Levine, 1983): how can experiences
arise from non-experiential matter? The problems of materialism are elaborated in (Vimal,
2010b, 2013).
As per materialistic emergence framework (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Neves, 2010;
LaRock, 2013), the experiential aspect of consciousness is an emergent phenomenon, closer
to neuroscience, which is the result of dynamic interactions between widely distributed
neuronal groups in thalamocortical neural-networks (Edelman, 2003). One could also
argue that consciousness is simply neural activity or integrated information (identity theory
framework), so mysterious emergent phenomenon is not needed. However, both these
materialistic frameworks have the problem of explanatory gap (Levine, 1983): how can a
subjective experience (a) emerge from a non-experiential matter such as a brain and its
activities, processing, and integrated information in it or (b) identical with its state?
Furthermore, in materialistic emergentism (Fingelkurts et al., 2010; LaRock, 2013), the
hypothesis is that SEs somehow emerge in neural-networks (Vimal, 2008a); but, precisely
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how SEs emerge is not clear. We have tried to unpack emergence in the eDAM framework
in (Vimal, 2013), which hypothesizes that a specific SE does not really emerge from nonexperiential matter such as brain. Rather, it is selected from the potential SEs that
potentially pre-exist in Nature and embedded in a specific neural-network (as memory
traces formed during neural Darwinism) by the self during the interaction between feedforward and feedback signals in the neural-network by the matching process (Vimal,
2010a) and experienced by the self (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007) as concisely elaborated in
Section 2.1. This is extended in terms of information integration (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009;
Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) in a complex of neural-network, where the measure or degree of
integration () is higher than critical threshold for consciousness as further elaborated in
(Vimal, 2015a).
Idealism: It is just opposite to materialism, i.e., non-material consciousness is the
fundamental reality, and the appearance of matter-in-itself emerges from consciousness
(i.e., from the structure of sets of conscious subjective experiences and potential
experiences). However, there is a serious problem explanatory gap problem of idealism,
which is just opposite to that of materialism: how can matter-in-itself (i.e., Kants ding an
sich or noumenon; not its appearances, i.e., not Kants phenomenon: (Kant, 1787/1996))
emerge from the non-material consciousness? The problems of idealism are elaborated in
(Vimal, 2010b, 2013).
Interactive Substance Dualism (or simply dualism): Here, mind (consciousness is a
mental entity) and matter can independently exist but can interact in conscious entities.
This has many problems (Vimal, 2010b, 2013) such as the association problem:
consciousness (such as redness) can take significant amount of time to associate to specific
neurons (such as redness-related neurons) in searching their locations over billions of
neurons whereas it takes just few msec to experience when we open our eyes. Moreover, a
mental entity (such as consciousness) cannot interact with matter because otherwise
category mistake2 is made?
Triple aspect monism (TAM): It has three aspects: physical aspect (aspect-1), nonconscious mental aspect (aspect-2), and conscious mental aspect (aspect-3): At the lower
level [aspect-1], the system can be described as an ordinary physical-chemical-biological
one, ruled by causal relations that ultimately reduce to the four fundamental physical
forces. At the middle level [aspect-2], the system can be described as an informationprocessing system obeying the rules of information theory. At the higher level [aspect-3],
the system can be phenomenologically described in terms of conscious experiences or
presentations, which can be symbolically represented (Pereira Jr., 2013).(p.321-2). Triple
aspect monism is less parsimonious than the eDAM framework as elaborated in Section
2.3.
Reflexive monism: It is a version of dual-aspect monism, where experiences are
anywhere, they are roughly where they seem to be representations in the mind/brain
have two [inseparable] (mental and physical) aspects, whose apparent form is dependent on
the perspective from which they are viewed (Velmans, 2008). It is limited to conscious
beings, whereas the eDAM framework does not have such limitation.
Retinoid framework: It is based on three principles: (i) In (Trehub, 2013)s dual-aspect
monism,1pp-private descriptions and 3pp-public descriptions are separate accounts of a
common underlying reality. This seems equivalent to the private 1pp-mental aspect and
the inseparable public 3pp-physical aspect of the same state of the mind-brain system in
the eDAM framework. (ii) As per (Trehub, 2013), The bridging principle For any instance
of conscious content, there is corresponding analog in the biophysical state of brain. As per
Trehub (email communication on 12-and-13-May-2015), 1pp conscious content and its
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corresponding 3pp biophysical state of brain are inseparable during the execution of related
function and experience. Therefore, this bridging principle is consistent with the eDAMs
inseparability of 1pp-mental aspect and 3pp-physical aspect of a state of brain-mind
system in the eDAM framework. In addition, both the eDAM and the retinoid frameworks
hypothesize that (a) primary irreducible experiences potentially pre-exist in Nature because
we have no firm grounds to rule out anything as a potential property of nature, and (b)
both aspects co-evolve leading to inseparability between them. (iii) As per (Trehub, 2013),
Consciousness is a transparent brain representation of the world from a privileged egocentric
perspective. Here, the brain representation is a 3pp physical aspect, an aspect of the
brain that can, in principle, be experienced in the public domain by N independent
observers (1pp). This is the scientific aspect. But the brain representation of the scientific
object of study in the public domain is transparent within the personal brain of each
scientist. [] retinoid mechanisms are limited to living systems (email communication with
Trehub on 12-May-2015). In the eDAM framework, the experiential aspect of consciousness
is the 1pp-mental aspect of a state of the brain-mind system or that of a state of a brainprocess, and the related brain-representation (a neural-network and its activities) is the
inseparable 3pp-physical aspect. The retinoid framework seems to be limited to living
systems and perhaps conscious artifacts.
Furthermore, one could argue that materialism is more parsimonious than dualism as
per Occams razor because it has just one parameter (matter is the only fundamental
reality), whereas dualism has two parameters (mind and matter). Some materialists (such
as (Papineau, 2006b)) can argue that the explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) is simply an
artifact of an intuitive conviction that dualism is true, i.e., dualism has us all in its
intuitive grip (Papineau, 2006a). To justify the eDAM framework, one has to reject all
materialism based frameworks, such as: materialistic emergence, non-reductive
physicalism/functionalism, supervenience, identity theory that includes materialisticidentity-theory based IIT, phenomenal concept strategy (Carruthers & Veillet, 2007; Levin,
2006; Papineau, 2006b), Rosens modeling relation in complex system (Rosen, 1998),
reductive materialism, eliminativism, and so on. In addition, one has to reject idealism and
interactive substance dualism (or simply dualism).
In our view, materialism, idealism, and the dual-aspect monism (different from
interactive substance dualism) metaphysics are monistic frameworks; therefore, they are
more parsimonious compared to interactive substance dualism from Occams razors point
of view. Moreover, dualism itself has serious problems (Vimal, 2010b, 2013), which can
certainly free us from its strong intuitive grip.
The major objection to materialism is its fundamental assumption: matter is the
fundamental reality and it is inherently and fundamentally non-experiential and does not
even have potential for generating experiences. Then we try to create experiences out of
such non-experiential matter. This is the gross violation of its own fundamental
assumption. The explanatory gap problem (Levine, 1983) is: how can subjective experiences
be created from non-experiential matter that does not even have potential for experiences?
This is just a side effect of this gross violation. An analogy may help: if we assume that
seeds of orange cannot create apple and then trying to create apple out of orange seeds will
obviously be impossible task. The same goes for idealism, which is just opposite to
materialism and has serious problem to explaining how to create matter-in-itself (not its
appearance) out of consciousness as elaborate above.
If we assume that matter has potential for having subjective experiences (SEs) then it is
no more materialism, it would then be dual-aspect monism with matter (such as brain and
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its activities) as the physical aspect and a potential experience (such as a SE) as the
inseparable mental aspect of a state of an entity (such as the brain-mind system).
If we look at closely, one can argue that some frameworks that assume materialism but
accept the existence of experiences have an implicit trace of dual-aspect monism (brains
neural-networks and neural activities as the 3pp-physical aspect and experiences as the
1pp-mental aspect of brain-mind states). For example, in emergentism, we assume that
experiences somehow emerge from brain. In supervenience, we assume that experiences
supervene on the physical or functional integration. In identity theory, we assume that the
state related to an experience is identical with the state related to the corresponding brain
processes. In phenomenal concepts strategy (Carruthers & Veillet, 2007; Levin, 2006;
Papineau, 2006b) (Type-B materialism), subjective experiences are recognitional concepts
that apply to physical properties, and we pick out demonstratively physical properties in
our subjective experiences, which must potentially pre-exist. This means that Type-B
materialists accept the existence of subjective experiences. In all these frameworks, the
existence of experiences is acceptable, which seems brains neural networks and activities
can be considered as the 3pp-physical aspect and experiences as 1pp-mental aspect of
brain-mind states.
Let us take another example, as per Libet et al., The onset of cerebral activity clearly
preceded by at least several hundred milliseconds [minimum 150 ms; average 350 ms] the
reported time of conscious intention to act (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). One
could argue that it is possible to initiate subjective intention (subjective experience of
wanting or intending to act) in 1pp as a cause for an objective action (endogenous motor
act) in 3pp. This appears as if mind causes brain-activity (close to idealism or interactive
substance dualism). However, it makes category mistake2 because mind and matter are two
different categories in the traditional notion of the physical and the mental entities (Feigl,
1967) and hence one cannot cause other. Therefore, materialism, idealism, and interactive
substance dualism must be rejected. Instead of these metaphysics, we need to consider the
eDAM framework, where both (mental and physical) are inseparable aspects of the same
brain-mind state1.
Furthermore, as per Libet et al., cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely voluntary
act can begin unconsciously, that is, before there is any (at least recallable) subjective
awareness that a decision to act has already been initiated cerebrally (Libet et al., 1983).
This seems to imply that unconscious process is from 3pp because it is latent to 1ppconsciousness to a certain degree (0<<1, where is the degree of manifestation of 1ppmental aspect). However, they cannot imply that brain-activities cause mental entities
(such as intention); otherwise, category mistake2 will be made.
In the eDAM framework, 1pp and 3pp are inseparable aspects of the same brain-mind
state; sometimes 1pp is easier to access (as in intention) and sometimes 3pp (as in
unconscious processing, motor action etc.) is easier to understand. In any case, if 1pp
entity (such as intention) is known, then 3pp (the neural-correlate of 1pp-intention) can be
understood simultaneously and vice-versa. This is because of the doctrine of inseparability
of mental and physics aspects. That is, 1pp-intention is automatically, faithfully, and
immediately translated into its 3pp-neural correlates because 1pp-mental aspect and 3ppphysical aspect are inseparable as the degree of manifestation of 1pp-mental and that of
3pp-physical aspects of conscious brain-states dependently co-arise, co-evolve, co-develop
and co-tune1. Furthermore, same-can-cause-same: a 3pp-physical entity can cause another
3pp-physical entity without making category mistake2; for example, the neural-correlates of
intention (related brain-activities) can cause a physical motor action (related motoractivities); but, 1pp-mental entity such as intention cannot cause 3pp-motor action;
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otherwise, category mistake will be made. Similarly, a mental entity can cause another
mental entity, without making category mistake.
Moreover, recent studies (King, 2014; Pockett, 2006; Schlegel et al., 2013; Schurger,
Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012; Trevena & Miller, 2010) are not consistent with (Libet et al., 1983)
and hence their claims are controversial (King, 2014; Libet, 2006; Pockett, 2006; Schlegel
et al., 2013; Schurger et al., 2012; Trevena & Miller, 2010). The eDAM framework can
address this controversy; for example, the readiness potential may be the 3pp-physical
aspect of the mind-brain-state, and its 1pp-mental aspect indicates that the subject is
merely paying attention (King, 2014; Trevena & Miller, 2010).
The eDAM framework is consistent, to a certain extent, with other dual-aspect views
such as (a) reflexive monism (Velmans, 2008), (b) triple-aspect monism (physical, nonconscious mental, and conscious mental aspects) (Pereira Jr., 2013) and (c) retinoid
framework (Trehub, 2013), but each have its own problems as elaborated above and in
Section 2.3.
To sum up, the eDAM framework is better than materialism, idealism, interactive
substance dualism, and other versions of dual-aspect monism.

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4. Conclusions
(1) Consciousness is defined as the mental aspect of a state of brain-system or that of a
state of brain-process from the first person perspective; consciousness has two sub-aspects:
conscious experience and conscious function.
(2) A materialism based framework for consciousness (Crick & Koch, 2003) does not
solve the hard problem, but makes the problem clearer.
(3) An alternative to materialism is an extended version of dual-aspect monism (eDAM)
framework for conscious experience. The eDAM framework has five components: (i) dualaspect monism, (ii) dual-mode and matching and selection mechanisms, (iii) the variation of
the degree of manifestation of aspects, (iv) the necessary conditions of consciousness, and
(v) the segregation, differentiation, and integration of information.
(4) The eDAM framework is parsimonious; it has the least number of problems
compared to all other frameworks; it is consistent with psychophysical, biological, and
physical laws; it attempts to address the hard problem of consciousness (how to explain
subjective experiences) and it can be scientifically tested as elaborated in (Vimal, 2015a).
(5) The eDAM framework can interpret and unpack Biological Naturalisms claims (such
as brain processes cause irreducible experiences, and consciousness can influence brain
processes) using (a) the matching and selection mechanisms, (b) the doctrine of
inseparability of 1pp-mental and 3pp-physical aspects, and (c) the principle of codependent origination1. The eDAM can address the objections raised in Biological
Naturalism by traditional views (dualism and materialism) without making category
mistake2.
(6) The eDAM framework supports conscious robots and is parsimonious.

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Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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Table: The features of the 3pp-physical aspect of an entity-state, the 1pp-mental aspect of
a conscious brain-mind state, and the mental aspect of a non-conscious brain-mind
state are compared. An entity-state means a state of any entity including conscious
and non-conscious brain-mind system and inert system. We use the term
qualitative/mental aspect, where the qualitative aspect is for all systems, and the
mental aspect is for living systems. The content of Table is adapted with some
modification from (Searle, 2007) and its chart with respect to the eDAM framework as
elaborated in Section 2.1: The features 1-8 of 3pp-physical aspect is the same as that
of Physical in the (Searle, 2007)s chart. The features 1-4 of 1pp-mental aspect of
conscious brain-mind state is the same as that of Mental in the Searles chart, and
its features 5-6 is the same as that of Physical in the Searles chart. The rest of
features of columns 2 and 3 are from (Searle, 2007), but modified for the eDAM
framework. The features of the mental aspect of non-conscious entity-state in
Column 4 are speculative and based on the eDAM framework. The features of Table
are not based on traditional views (dualism and materialism); rather, they are based
on the eDAM framework.

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Features

3pp-physical aspect
of entity-state
Objective

1pp-mental aspect of conscious brainmind state

Subjective, the degree of manifestation
of 1pp-mental aspect is 1 (Vimal, 2013).

Third person
ontology

First person ontology

Quantitative

Qualitative (What-it-feels-like)

Non-intentional

Most conscious states are intentional,

(such as in states related to visual
perception, hunger, thirst), but not all
(such as undirected feeling of anxiety or
well-being)

5
6

Spatially located
Spatially extended

Causally explainable
by microphysical
processes

Acts causally, and a

system is causally
closed

May or may not be

integrated

Spatially located in brain

Spatially extended, and it is related to
integration of information associated
with the distributed processing in
multiple locations in brain; see also
(Lachaux et al., 1997)
Explainable by the 1-1 relationship
through the doctrine of inseparability
between
1pp-mental-aspect
(consciousness) and 3pp-physical aspect
(NCC: micro-brain processes)
1pp-mental-aspect does not cause 3ppphysical aspect and vice-versa, but has
1-1 relationship through the doctrine of
inseparability
and
the
degree
of
manifestation of 1pp-mental and that of
3pp-physical aspects of conscious brainstates dependently co-arise1; for example
how to explain a conscious decision
(intention-in-action) to act is elaborated
in Section 3.1 and feature 11 below
Single unified conscious field

10

Real and reducible

11

Micro
level
3ppphysical
processes
can cause the 3ppphysical aspect of
macro states

12

Realized
in
the
physical system

Real; conscious states cannot be

eliminated or reduced to something else;
e.g. irreducible to (a) its inseparable 3ppphysical aspect, (b) its 1pp-components,
or (c) brain processes ontologically
Lower level brain processes (such as
stimulus dependent feed forward signals)
can entail conscious states (such as from
thirst related states to mystical ecstasy
related states), each of which has
inseparable 3pp-physcial and 1ppmental aspects with ~ 1
All conscious states are realized in the
brain as higher level or system features

13

Mechanisms
Physical processes

Consciousness related brain processes

are matching & selection mechanisms

22

Mental aspect of non-conscious

entity-state
Subjective,
but
the
degree
of
manifestation of mental aspect varies
with the levels of entity-states; 0<1
Ontology is related to a non-conscious
state
Degree of being qualitative depends on
related to a non-conscious state
Intentional
or
non-intentional
depending
on
the
degree
of
manifestation of mental aspect ( is
different in autopilot state in driving,
dream state, deep-sleep state, states of
heart, pancreas, etc. and inert entities)
because of non-conscious states
Spatially located in the system
Spatially
extended
(distributed
processing in brain) for non-conscious
states; see also (Meisenzahl et al.,
2008)
Explainable by the 1-1 relationship
through the doctrine of inseparability
between the mental-aspect and the
3pp-physical aspect of non-conscious
state
Mental-aspect does not cause 3ppphysical aspect and vice-versa, but has
1-1 relationship through the doctrine of
inseparability; and the degree of
manifestation of 1pp-mental and that
of 3pp-physical aspects of conscious
brain-states dependently co-arise1.

May or may not be unified field: it

seems unified to some extent in states
such as autopilot state in driving,
dream state, and similar states of a
brain-mind system, but may not be
unified (rather localized within a
system) in non-conscious states of
other systems
Real; it may be irreducible to its
inseparable 3pp-physical aspect; but it
may be reducible to its components
related to mental aspect for some nonconscious states
Lower level processes can cause/entail
non-conscious states, each of which has
inseparable 3pp-physcial and mental
aspects with 0<1

All non-conscious states are realized in

the related system as higher level or
system features
Non-conscious processes may involve
matching & selection mechanisms,
such as in an autopilot state during
driving

Endnotes
1

Ngrjuna rejects inherent existence or essence in favor of co-dependent origination,

and that is also why he rejects causality; the entities that lack inherent existence
dependently co-arise (Ngrjuna & Garfield, 1995; Vimal, 2009a).
In the eDAM framework, since the degree of manifestation of qualitative/mental aspect
of a state of a brain-mind system and that of the inseparable physical aspect of the same
state of the same brain-mind system vary with the levels of entities and contexts, it lacks
inherent existence. Although both aspects inherently exist in each state of each entity at all
levels.
In other words, the degree of manifestation of qualitative/mental aspect and that of the
physical aspect dependently co-arise, co-evolve, co-develop, and co-tuned for sensorimotor
system appropriately depending on the levels of entities and contexts, which entail the
inseparability of both aspects. In this sense, the symmetry between physical and mental
aspects of a state of brain-mind system in the eDAM framework is maintained, where the
3pp-physical aspect does not cause the 1pp-mental aspect in living systems or vice-versa.
2

Since mind and matter are two different categories in the traditional notion of the physical
and the mental entities (Feigl, 1967), and hence one cannot cause (or interact with) other;
otherwise category mistake is made.
3

The criticism against this statement (the eDAM framework is neither proto-panpsychism
or nor panpsychism) is that the doctrine of inseparability of dual-aspect monism seems to
be a statement of the dual-aspect panpsychism. This confusion is addressed (in detail) in
Section 3.4 of (Vimal, 2010a). Briefly, in dual-aspect monism, there are three competing
hypotheses (Vimal, 2010c), where each of them follows the doctrine of inseparability:
(i) Superposition based hypothesis (H1), where the basis-states related to potential
primary irreducible experiences (subjective experiences (SEs) and/or proto-experiences
(PEs)) are superposed in the mental aspect of each entity-state; when a specific stimulus is
presented to the neural-network, the associated specific SE is selected by the matching and
selection process and experienced by the self as elaborated in (Vimal, 2010a). This
superposition based hypothesis (H1) is used the eDAM framework, which is neither protopanpsychism or nor dual-aspect panpsychism and does not have the problems of
panpsychism, proto-panpsychism, and other metaphysics.
(ii) Superposition-then-integration based hypothesis (H2), where only PEs are
superposed, which are integrated (co-developed) mysteriously by neural-Darwinism leading
to specific SEs.
And (iii) Integration based hypothesis (H3), where each entity has its own PE, which
keeps on transforming appropriately as physical aspect and qualitative/mental aspect
somehow (mysteriously) co-evolves, co-develops, and co-tunes for sensorimotor from
elementary particles to neural-networks to whole universe using the concept of dependent
co-origination (Ngrjuna & Garfield, 1995; Vimal, 2009a). This is the dual-aspect
panpsychism and has many problems as elaborated in (Vimal, 2010b).

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