17. CEQUENA V.

BOLANTE
G.R. No. 137944
April 6, 2000
by Kristel Descallar
FACTS:
Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza are brothers. Petitioners were the daughters of
Margarito Mendoza. Prior to 1954, a land in Binangonan, Rizal, was originally declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of respondent Honorata Mendoza Bolante and
married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930.
On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso of the contested lot was
cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza, but respondent Honorata is the
present occupant of the land. In October 1975, Honorata and Miguel Mendoza, son of Margarito, during
the cadastral survey had a dispute on the ownership of the land. A case ensued between the parties,
wherein the trial court declared the petitioners (heirs of Margarito) as owners of the land.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by
Honorata since 1985 gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code, and that the probative
value of the tax receipts and declarations of the heirs of Margarito diminished in comparison to
Honoratas adverse possession of the land. Furthermore, the CA also ruled that the genuineness and the
due execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by the Honorata and her mother had not been sufficiently
established; it was insufficient to overcome the denial of Honorata and her mother, Eduarda Apiado.
Honorata testified that her mother, never having attended school, could neither read nor write. Also,
Honorata said she had never been called "Leonor," which was how she was referred to in the affidavit.
Hence, the heirs of Margarito appealed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Honorata enjoys presumption of a preferred possessor by virtue of her
actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985.
2. Whether or not respondent Honoratas actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession of the land
since 1985 proves her ownership over the land.
HELD:
1. YES.
The Court concedes that although the petitioners dispossessed the land in 1985, they did not
lose legal possession, because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. To all intents
and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor. Indeed,
anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover such possession.
However, possession by the heirs of Margarito does not prevail over that of the Honorata.
Possession heirs of Margarito before 1985 was not exclusive, as Honorata also acquired it before 1985.
Petitioners father and brother, as well as Honorata and her mother were simultaneously in adverse
possession of the land. Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the Sinforoso
(Honoratas father), as evidenced by a tax declaration. When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took
possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel, while Honorata and her mother continued
residing on the lot.
Upon coming of age, Honorata paid realty taxes from 1932-1948, while Margarito declared the
lot for taxation in his name in 1953 and paid taxes since 1952. When Margarito died, Miguel continued
cultivating the land despite Honorata and her mother were also living there. In 1985, Honorata ousted
Miguel on the land.

Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the Honorata is the preferred possessor because,
benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession
thereof for a longer period, whereas petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
2. NO.
Honorata argues that she was legally presumed to possess the subject land with a just title since
she possessed it in the concept of owner, and pursuant to Article 541 of the Code, she is not obliged to
show or prove such title. But the Court ruled that the presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is
merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. One who is disturbed in one's possession
shall, under this provision, be restored thereto by the means established by law.
Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and possession is different from
ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in one of the ways provided by law. To
settle the issue of ownership, there is a need to determine who has proven acquisitive prescription.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years.
Being the sole heir of her father, Honorata showed through his tax receipt that she had been in
possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932, even after her father died. When she got
married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood. Her
possession was not disturbed until 1953 when Margarito claimed the land. Her possession, which was in
the concept of owner public, peaceful, and uninterrupted had already ripened into ownership.
Furthermore Honorata declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the
property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire
ownership. Ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with the element of
hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by
prescription or adverse possession.
Also, although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary
prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), this supposed
ownership cannot extend to the whole lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
Petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land was established before the trial
court through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza is
untenable. Such tax declarations and receipts prove that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's
adverse claim against the state and other interested parties.
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most,
they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have
been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
purposes does not prove ownership. Petitioners' claim of ownership of the land has no legal basis.