1.[G.R. Nos. 116196-97.

June 23, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLO ADOVISO,

defendant-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Pablo Adoviso appeals from the Joint Judgment[1] of the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Sur[2] declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of
Murder.
Appellant, allegedly a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU), was originally charged with four unidentified persons who have, however,
remained at large. The information[3] charging appellant with the Murder of Rufino
Agunos under Criminal Case No. P-2079 alleges:
That on or about the 18th day of February 1990 at about 8:00 oclock [sic] in the
evening at Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Casugad, Municipality of Bula, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, while armed with assorted long firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot one Rufino Agunos several times with said firearms hitting the
latter on the different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause
of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Rufino Agunos.
That the crime complained of against the accused is not service connected.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Except for the name of the victim, the information in Criminal Case No. P-2080 with
respect to the killing of Emeterio Vasquez, contains the same allegations.[4]
Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. At the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos.
P-2079 and P-2080, the prosecution presented their version of the events that
transpired on the evening of February18, 1990, as follows:
The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had two adjacent houses in Sitio Tanagan, Barangay Casugad, Bula, Camarines Sur. One of the houses was actually a
camalig where they stored harvested rice. The spouses preferred to live there
because it was cooler. The living area of the camalig had walls of bamboo called
salsag. This area was elevated from the ground. Three steps led down to an awning
(suyab) walled with bamboo slats. These slats were placed horizontally
approximately four to six inches apart. A portion of the awning was used as a
kitchen but another portion had a papag where the Vasquez grandson, Rufino
Agunos, son of their daughter Virginia, would sleep whenever he tended the

irrigation pump. The spouses son Bonifacio occupied the other house eight (8)
meters from the camalig with his own son Elmer.
At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez was
preparing coffee as his wife was about to retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino
had already gone to sleep in the papag. Anastacia had just finished spreading the
sleeping mat when she heard three or four gunshots. Emeterio then uttered that he
had been shot. Seeing Emeterio, Anastacia exclaimed, Why should you not be hit
when in fact there are guns in front of you. Anastacia saw the protruding edge of
the gun on the wall near the stairs where Emeterio went down. A lamp near the
stairs where Emeterio drank coffee illuminated the camalig but Anastacia failed to
recognize the persons who fired their guns at her husband.
The Vasquez son Bonifacio was in the bigger house when he heard the gunshots.
Earlier that evening, Bonifacio was talking to Rufino regarding the engine of the
irrigation pump. Bonifacio was still talking when he noticed that Rufino had fallen
asleep, the latters back against the bamboo wall. Bonifacio left Rufino snoring in the
papag and went to the other house. Only a minute had passed after he had gone up
when Bonifacio heard the gunshots. He and his 16-year-old son Elmer immediately
went down the front yard to investigate.
Bonifacio hid himself in the dark portion of the yard, behind a coconut tree. From a
distance of eight (8) meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was inside the camalig,
being shot by several persons from the outside. Looking through the bamboo slats
of the camalig wall, Bonifacio recognized one of the assailants, with a large built
and long hair, as appellant Pablo Adoviso because of the gas lamp that was lighted
inside the camalig. Of Rufinos assailants, only appellant was not wearing a mask.
Appellant was holding a long firearm wrapped inside a sack with its muzzle
protruding and directed where Rufino was sleeping. Appellant then fired hitting
Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio heard his father Emeterio shout Pino, (referring to
his grandson Rufino) and saw his father go down the stairs carrying a gas lamp.
Appellant fired again, hitting Emeterio at the stomach.
For his part, Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig with his father Bonifacio, saw
five (5) persons aiming their firearms at the camalig. Except for appellant, each of
these persons had a cover over their faces. Three (3) of them were positioned in a
ditch near the camalig while two (2) others were near its door. Elmer saw these five
(5) persons shoot his cousin Rufino who was lying down on the papag. Although his
back was hit, Rufino was able to crawl under the papag. Elmers grandfather was
also hit on the stomach but he managed to go up the camalig. When appellant and
his companion by the camalig door saw Elmer, they fired at him then, with the three
others at the ditch, escaped to the banana plantation. Elmer, on the other hand,
fled towards the coconut plantation.
Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer saw his father carrying his grandfather
Emeterio. He also found Rufino at the foot of a coconut tree near the river, lying on
his side with his body curled. Rufino told Elmer that he had been hit and, when
Elmer failed to locate his wound, Rufino took Elmers hand and put it on his back.

Elmer then moved Rufino sidewise. Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer carried his
grandfather and bandaged his stomach with diapers.
In the meantime, Bonifacio went to the municipal building of Bula to fetch the
police. Inspector Antonio Lopez and Senior Police Officer 1 Claro Ballevar returned to
the scene of the crime with him. The police brought Emeterio and Rufino to the
municipal hall of Bula and then to the Bicol Regional Hospital. Both Emeterio and
Rufino died early the next morning.
The certification[5] dated March 7, 1990 and signed by Dr. Janice Nanette Estrada,
resident physician of the Bicol Regional Hospital in Naga City, states that 35-yearold Rufino Agunos died of four (4) gunshot wounds: at the inguinal area, the sacral
area, the thigh and the abdomen. The wounds at the inguinal area and the thigh
bore contusion collars. The same physician certified that Emeterio Vasquez, 88
years of age, sustained seven (7) gunshot wounds at the paraumbilical area, lumbar
area, hypogastrium, anterior aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial aspect of the
right forearm, anteromedial aspect left arm and anterolateral aspect of the left arm.
Four (4) of these gunshot wounds had contusion collars at the paraumbilical area,
the hypogastrium, the right forearm and the left arm.[6]
Appellant Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense.
Appellant claimed that he was a member of the CAFGU whose headquarters was
located in Barangay Palsong, Bula, Camarines Sur. At around 7:00 in the evening of
February 18, 1990, he was in Sitio Burabod, Palsong, about a kilometer away from
the CAFGU headquarters. He, together with Francisco Bislombre, Benjamin Alina, Jr.
and PFC Antero Esteron, had some drinks in the store of Honoria Tragante until
around 11:00 p.m.
Honoria Tragante and Francisco Bislombre corroborated appellants alibi. Antero
Esteron likewise testified that from 7:00 until past 11:00 that night of February 18,
1990, he and appellant had a drinking spree at the Tragante store. He distinctly
remembered that date because it was the fiesta of Balatan.
To support his denial, appellant presented Lt. Antonio Lopez, the deputy chief of
police and SPO2 Claro Ballebar of the PNP Bula Police Station. Lopez identified a
police certification[7] prepared by Pfc. Ramon N. Canabe to the effect that the
shooting incident was perpetrated by unidentified armed men. Lopez said that he
(Lopez) was one of those who brought the victims to the hospital who were then still
conscious. The victims told him that they did not know who shot them or why they
were shot.
SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that in the follow-up investigation he
conducted several days after the incident, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed to him that
he (Bonifacio) vividly saw the incident and recognized appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crime and that the killings had some something to do with land
dispute between Bonifacios parents and the Galicia family.
The defense also offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph
Examiner II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, who conducted a
3

polygraph test on appellant. In Polygraph Report No. 900175,[8] Lucena opined that
appellants polygrams revealed that there were no specific reactions indicative of
deception to pertinent questions relevant to the investigation of the crimes.
In rebuttal, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed that when he reported the incident to the
police, he did not identify appellant as one of the culprits because he was afraid of
appellant who was a member of the CAFGU. Nevertheless, Bonifacio did mention to
the police that he recognized appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime
although he told them that he did not recognize appellants four (4) companions. He
did not mention to Lopez and Canabe appellants identity because he was confused
about what had happened in their house.
On March 25, 1994, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of murder and disposing of Criminal
Case Nos. P-2079 and P-2080 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, joint judgment is hereby rendered:

In Criminal Case No. P-2079, finding the accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of Rufino Agunos, consisting of the
widow, Evelyn T. Agunos and their four (4) children the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency;
In Criminal Case No. P-2080, likewise finding said accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him another
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of the late EMETERIO
VASQUEZ, consisting of Anastacia Vasquez and Bonifacio Vasquez, another sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency with all the accessory
penalties provided therefore in both cases and to pay the costs in both instances.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Appellant hinges his bid for exoneration on whether he was properly identified by
the two (2) eyewitnesses as one of the killers of the victims. He contends that
eyewitnesses Bonifacio and Elmer Vasquez presented an incredible story because it
is highly improbable that they could have distinctly and positively recognized
accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes."[10] According to
appellant, Bonifacio, who was in the dark portion of the yard hiding behind a
coconut tree, could not have identified appellant by the light emanating from gas
lamp inside the camalig where Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos were staying at
the time of the incident. Neither could Elmer Vasquez, who declared that he saw his
grandfather shot by appellant, could have identified appellant because of the poor
lighting coming from the gas lamp being carried by his grandfather. Appellant
claims that the gas lamp carried by Elmer's grandfather was a small can about two
(2) inches tall and the wick is smaller than a cigarette and the lamp inside the
camalig was placed inside a bigger can so that the direction of the light emanating
therefrom was upwards and not sidewise.[11]
4

Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an

eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled
that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to
be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted.[12] Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to
allow identification of persons.[13] Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or
starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the
attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious.[14]
In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps illuminated the place the one placed
inside the camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after
the first volley of gunfire. Appellants contention therefore that one particular gas
lamp could not have lighted the place because it was placed inside a can is puerile.
Besides, Elmer was not describing either of the gas lamps during the incident. The
defense counsel at the trial and appellants counsel misunderstood the testimonies
of Elmer and his grandmother on that matter. Thus, Elmer testified:
ATTY. CORTES:
Q Is it not that the lamp you said placed along the door, which is already marked as
lamp, is that not this lamp was placed inside a kerosene can as testified to by your
grandmother so that the cat could not cause it to fall?

A It was placed just on the floor not inside the can.[15] (Underlining supplied.)
For her part, Anastacia testified as follows:
ATTY. CORTES:
xxx.
Q Because you were already about to retire, the doors and windows were already
closed, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q That you also shut down or closed the light, is that correct?
A No, sir, we even placed the kerosene lamp inside a can.
Q You said, you placed the lamp inside a can so that the light is going up, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, the light was not illuminating sidewise because it was inside a can?
A When we left, I got the kerosene lamp and brought it with me.
ATTY. CORTES:I think, the witness did not get the question right, Your Honor.
COURT: Repeat the question.
5

ATTY. CORTES:
Q My question Madam Witness is, when you were about to retire?
A The lamp was placed on the floor where my husband was drinking coffee.
COURT:
Q Who are the persons you are referring to as having left when you placed the light
inside the can?
A My son, Bonifacio, and the policemen, Your Honor, when the(y) brought Emeterio
and Rufino to the hospital.[16] (underlining supplied).
Clearly then, the lamp inside the camalig was placed on the floor and a can was
placed over it only after the incident when Anastacia left with her son and the police
to bring the victims to the hospital.
The bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed the
eyewitnesses' view of appellant, considering that the slats were built four (4) meters
apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of relatives of victims to strive to observe
the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities, and the
manner in which the crime is committed.[17] A relative will naturally be interested
in identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction to obtain justice for the death
of his relative(s).[18] It must remembered that appellant was not a complete
stranger to the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten (10) years[19] while
Elmer had been acquainted with him for four (4) years. Elmer recalled that appellant
used to join the rabuz at the barracks.[20] Familiarity with appellants face and
appearance minimized if not erased the possibility that they could have been
mistaken as to his identity.

Appellants allegation that it was improbable for him to have committed the crimes
without a mask, unlike the other participants, deserves scant consideration. It is not
contrary to human experience for a person to commit a crime before the very eyes
of people who are familiar to them. Indeed, some may even take pride in their
identification as the perpetrator of a criminal act.
Appellant also considers as a positive sign, Bonifacios failure to immediately identify
him as the perpetrator of the crime to the police.[21] The delay in reporting his
participation to the police was however sufficiently explained by Bonifacio. Bonifacio
was afraid of appellant since the latter was a member of the CAFGU and, as such,
was provided with a gun. He was also hesitant in identifying appellant immediately
lest he got wind of his impending arrest and posthaste escaped the clutches of the
law. The failure of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as one of
the perpetrators of the crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility as a
witness.[22] The general or common rule is that witnesses react to a crime in
different ways.[23] There is no standard form of human behavioral response to a
strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which
witnesses to a crime must react.[24]
6

There is no merit in appellants contention that Bonifacio had a motive in implicating

him. According to appellant, Bonifacio suspected that he was hired by the Galicia
family to kill Bonifacio's father who had earlier won in a land dispute with the
Galicias. It is irrelevant here to talk of motive on the part of Bonifacio inasmuch as
to credible witnesses had positively identified appellant as one of the participants in
the killing of Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos.
Appellants alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive identification as one of the
perpetrators of the crimes.[25] For an alibi to prosper, moreover, there must be
proof that the defendant was not only somewhere else when the crime was
committed but that he could not be physically present at the place of the crime or
its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[26]26 Appellant did not prove
the physical impossibility of his being in Sitio Tan-agan which is not exactly remote
from Sitio Palsong where he claimed to be when the incident happened. Both places
are within the Municipality of Bula. Appellant admitted that the distance between
the two sitios could be negotiated in three hours even without any means of
transportation.[27] On the other hand, his alleged companion in Sitio Palsong,
Antero Esteron, testified that the distance could be traveled in thirty-five (35)
minutes by trimobile or private vehicle.[28]
Apart from the fact that appellant's alibi was inherently weak, he was not even sure
where he was and who were his companions at the time the crimes were
committed. We quote the observation of the trial court on this point:
On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction on the basis
of mere conjectures and speculations,[29] appellant argues that the negative result
of the polygraph test should be given weight to tilt the scales of justice in his favor.
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and
records certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be
involuntarily caused by an examinees conscious attempt to deceive the questioner.
[30] The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person who lies
deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing,
which will be recorded on the graph.[31] However, American courts almost
uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the
purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether
the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph
has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception.[32] The rule is no different in this jurisdiction. Thus,
in People v. Daniel,[33] stating that much faith and credit should not be vested upon
a lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced
any reason why this rule should not apply to him.
Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of Murder. Treachery
qualified the killings to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[34] In
other words, there is treachery when the attack on an unarmed victim who has not
7

given the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and without warning.[35] The
victims in this case were totally unaware of an impending assault Rufino was
sleeping and Emeterio was going down the stairs when they were shot.
WHEREFORE, the Joint Judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
2. FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127803. August 28, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO ABELLA,
DIOSDADO GRANADA, BENJAMIN DE GUZMAN, and EDGARDO VALENCIA,
accused-appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
It all started with an altercation during a basketball game. Three days later, or on 10
March 1992, the bodies of MARLON[1] Ronquillo; JOSEPH Ronquillo; ERWIN Lojero;
ANDRES Lojero, Jr.; and FELIX Tamayo were fished out of the murky waters of the
Pasig River, filthy, bloated, putrid, and decomposing. Postmortem examinations on
the cadavers showed signs of foul play.
MARLONs hands were tied at the back with a black electric cord. He had lacerated
wounds, contusions, ligature marks and hematoma. He died from a gunshot wound
on the head.[2]
ANDRES hands were bound at the back with a plastic flat rope with four loops. His
genitals were cut off; and he had ligature marks, contusions, and hematoma. The
cause of his death was asphyxia by strangulation; hemorrhage, intracranial,
traumatic.[3]
JOSEPHs hands were hog-tied at the back using a basketball T-shirt. He also had
ligature marks, contusions, lacerated wounds and fracture. He died of asphyxia by
strangulation; hemorrhage, intracranial, traumatic with skull fracture.[4]
ERWINs body showed abrasions and burns. There were cord impressions on his
wrists and depressed fracture on his head and at the base of his skull. He died of
asphyxia by drowning with blunt head injury.[5]

FELIX had abrasions on the left cheek and tie impressions on the wrists. The cause
of his death was asphyxia by drowning.[6]
On 18 March 1992, five informations for murder were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (hereafter the trial court) against Juanito ABELLA, Diosdado
GRANADA, Benjamin DE GUZMAN, Edgardo VALENCIA, Renato Dante, and Virgilio de
Guzman. The cases were raffled to Branch 52 presided over by the late Judge David
Nitafan. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-104529 to -33, the informations[7]
identically read as follows:
That on or about March 8, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together with others whose true names, real identities
8

and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and
evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon
Ronquillo y Alepda [(Criminal Case No. 92-104529), one Felix Tamayo y Pascual
(Criminal Case No. 92-104530), one Andres Lojero, Jr. y Pascual (Criminal Case No.
92-104531), one Joseph Ronquillo y Alepda [(Criminal Case No. 92-104532), one
Erwin Lojero y Pascual (Criminal Case No. 92-104533)] by then and there hitting his
head with guns, kicking him, tying his hands, [neck and private organ (additional
allegation in Criminal Case No. 92-104531)] and thereafter throwing his body into
the river thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.

Contrary to law. [Enclosures supplied].

On 25 March 1992, the informations were amended to include three other accused,
namely, Joselito Crespo, Bienvenido Dugay and Danilo Abarete.[8] Upon
arraignment all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. On 26
August 1992, Joselito Crespo, Renato Dante, Bienvenido Dugay, Danilo Abarete and
Virgilio de Guzman were dropped from the information.[9]
The prosecutions version of the events is as follows: In the morning of 7 March
1992, MARLON, JOSEPH, and an unidentified companion played three rounds of
basketball against the team of JOEY de los Santos at the vicinity of Dalisay and
Lakas Streets, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The Ronquillos won the first two rounds;
but the third round ended in a brawl, which the neighbors quickly pacified. JOEY
later went back to Dalisay Street carrying two pillboxes. A certain Donald Ancheta
saw him, took the pillboxes and turned them over to a policeman.[10]
On 8 March 1992, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., JOEY and his brother GENER threw
stones at the Ronquillos house, attracting the attention of neighbors, who forthwith
ran after the brothers. JOEY and GENER were overtaken and mauled before they
were released.[11]
Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. of the same day, WILFREDO Lojero, a certain Daniel,
and the victims were in front of the Ronquillos house in Lakas Street, trading stories
while awaiting a certain Aling Flor.[12] JOSEPHINE del Rosario was then at the corner
of Lakas Street on her way to a friends house when the victims called her and asked
her about her mother, who was a barangay kagawad at Bacood. They told her that
they were waiting for Aling Flor to report to her that JOEY and GENER threw stones
at the Ronquillos house.[13] Later, EVELYN de la Cruz joined the group in the
conversation.[14] The area was then illuminated by a streetlight at the corner of
Damayan and Dalisay Streets about ten arms-length away.

Suddenly, a dirty white Ford Fiera without a plate number stopped in front of the
group. There were about ten to thirteen people on board. Among them were JOEY
and GENER, who looked out of the van and pointed at the victims. All the
passengers except for JOEY and GENER alighted. Their faces were covered with
black handkerchiefs, and they were armed. Someone shouted, Pulis ito! Another
exclaimed, Walang tatakbo! FELIX ran but stopped when shots were fired; he was hit
9

with a gun then dragged into the van. WILFREDO Lojero, however, managed to
sneak into the Ronquillos house and was able to see everything. The other victims
were boxed, kicked, and also hit with a gun and dragged into the van. Before the
van sped away, one of the abductors warned JOSEPHINE, Ikaw huwag kang
maingay, wala kang nakita, wala kang narinig.[15]
Meanwhile, at about 6:00 p.m. inside the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), Sta. Ana compound
in Bacood, ELENA Bernardo was waiting for Pastor Cesar Almedina to seek his
advice regarding her son-in-laws problem. Pastor Almedina asked her to wait, and
she did so. She waited until 10:00 p.m. Suddenly the guard switched off the lights
inside the compound. With only the MERALCO light illuminating the compound from
outside, she saw a dirty white Ford Fiera loaded with passengers enter and park in
front of the pastoral house near the path leading to the basement. JOEY, GENER, all
the accused and the victims were inside the van. Four of the victims were made to
alight from the van, while the fifth one lay on the floor of the vehicle as though
dead. The victims were brought to the basement, which was at the back of the
chapel and beneath the choir office. ELENA followed. Inside the basement the
victims were continually mauled, whipped with a gun, and beaten with steel tubes,
lead pipes and other blunt instruments. One of the victims was tied with wire.
Filemon Garcia arrived with a blowtorch and also entered the basement. ELENA
heard the victims beg for mercy. Unable to endure the sight she sat in front of the
chapel and stayed for 30 minutes. Pastor Almedina arrived and told her that they
would talk about her problem at another time. Afterwards the victims were herded
back to the Fiera. They seemed almost dead.[16]
On 10 March 1992, at 8:45 a.m., the lifeless body of FELIX was found floating on the
Pasig River near Beata-Tawiran in Pandacan. At 12:25 p.m., ERWINs body was
retrieved from the same river at the back of the Sta. Ana market. At about the same
time, the decomposing bodies of ANDRES, MARLON and JOSEPH were also fished out
of the Pasig River near Lambingan Bridge.[17]
SPO3 Myrna Ricasa prepared the crime report and was part of the group that
conducted the police line-up on 13 March 1992. Witnesses to the abduction
identified the accused from among five line-ups. JOSEPHINE identified ABELLA as
among the passengers of the Ford Fiera. EVELYN pointed to GRANADA; Roy Ronquillo
and Noel Estorel, who were not presented as witnesses, identified DE GUZMAN and
VALENCIA, respectively.[18]
Appellants advanced alibi as their defense. They all claim to have attended the
panata at the Punta Sta. Ana chapel on 8 March 1992 from 8:00 to 10:00 p.m., save
for ABELLA whose attendance was excused. The panata is a religious practice of the
INC held for seven consecutive days as preparation for the santa cena or holy
supper. In 1992, the panata was held from 8 to 14 March 1992 and the santa cena,
on 15 March 1992.[19] VALENCIA testified that after the panata on 8 March 1992, he
went home to San Juan, Metro Manila; it was then about 11:00 p.m.[20] For his part,
GRANADA claimed that after attending the panata, he left the Iglesia compound
with Filemon and Marilou Garcia. The three arrived at the Garcia residence in
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, at 11:00 p.m. Filemon and GRANADA had snacks and watched
two movies on the video player. It was already past midnight when GRANADA went
home.[21] GRANADAs testimony was corroborated by both Filemon and Marilou.[22]

10

ABELLA was a member of the PNP highway patrol group assigned to Mobile Unit No.
13 in March of 1992. His tour of duty was from 2:00 to 10:00 p.m. He was previously
granted exemption from attending the panata. Together with PO3 Ferdinand
Parolina, he patrolled Roxas Boulevard from the corner of T.M. Kalaw St. to the
corner of Vito Cruz St. on 8 March 1992. ABELLA and Parolina parted ways at 10:15
p.m.[23] PO3 Parolina, who drove the mobile car, corroborated ABELLAs testimony.
[24]
According to former accused Bienvenido Tugay, on 11 March 1992 at 11:00 p.m.,
Major Joe Pring arrived at the Iglesia compound in Punta, Sta. Ana, with police
officers, demanding entrance inside the premises. Since there was no order from his
superior allowing outsiders to enter the compound, Tugay refused. Enraged, Pring
asked for the names of Tugays companions. Tugay enumerated the names of
appellants.[25]
The following day, appellants read their names in newspapers as among the
perpetrators of the crime. Alarmed, they consulted the INC Central Office on what
steps to take. Accompanied by Atty. Restituto Lazaro of the Iglesias legal
department, appellants proceeded to see Gen. Diokno at the Western Police District
Headquarters on 13 March 1992 to clear their names. Major Pring brought them to
his office and hurriedly organized a police line-up. During the line-up Major Pring
allegedly tapped all the accused on the shoulder as a signal to the prosecution
witnesses for identifying them. Accordingly, appellants were identified.[26]
On 7 February 1995, after several instances where defense counsel questioned his
orders and doubted his partiality, Judge Nitafan inhibited himself from further
hearing the cases. The cases were re-raffled to Branch 35 presided over by Judge
Ramon P. Makasiar, who penned the decision on 15 November 1996 convicting the
accused.[27] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing the four accused in these cases:
JUANITO ABELLA y GARCIA, DIOSDADO GRANADA y SALCEDO, BENJAMIN DE
GUZMAN y LABASAN, and EDGARDO VALENCIA y VILLANUEVA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER on five (5) counts, and sentencing each of them to the
penalties of five (5) reclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs in proportionate
shares.
The said four accused are further ordered, jointly and severally, to pay:
A. To Erlinda Ronquillo and Betty Ronquillo

1. P91,607.70 for actual damages,

2. P500,000.00 to each of them for moral damages,

3. P500,000.00 to each of them for exemplary damages;

11

B. To Domingo Tamayo

1. P33,125.50 for actual damages,

2. P500,000 for moral damages,

3. P500,000 for exemplary damages;

C. To Andres Lojero, Sr.

1. P60,716.00 for actual damages,

2. P1,000,000.00 for moral damages,

3. P1,000,000.00 for exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[28]
This decision was amended to include an award of P50,000 as indemnity for the
death of each of the victims.[29]
Appellants are now before us contending that the trial court erred:

IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE AND CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF THE

ACCUSED IN THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION OF THE VICTIMS;

II

IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ALLEGED EYEWITNESS ELENA

BERNARDO;

III
12

IN HOLDING THAT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION IS

SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION;

IV

IN FINDING ACCUSEDS DEFENSE OF ALIBI WEAK;

IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY WAS PRESENT TO QUALIFY THE CRIME TO MURDER;

and

VI

IN RULING THAT THE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF THE ACCUSED DOES NOT

CONSTITUTE A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.[30]
As to the first assignment of error, appellants contend that reliance on the
testimonies of JOSEPHINE and EVELYN is misguided. In JOSEPHINEs testimony she
expressly named the abductors as GRANADA and a good-looking guy, referring to
ABELLA, who could be easily remembered; but in her sworn statement she only
mentioned GRANADA. Such omission of an important detail casts doubt on the
veracity of her identification of ABELLA. Neither did EVELYN identify ABELLA, De
Guzman and Valencia during the police line-up and in her sworn statement of 11
March 1992, although she pointed to all appellants when she testified in court. That
GRANADA was recognized both by JOSEPHINE and EVELYN in a dimly lit place at
night because of his gray hair is likewise unworthy of belief.
Appellants claim in their second assignment of error that ELENAs testimony was a
mere concoction with loopholes that were revealed during cross-examination. Her
insistence that all the victims were stabbed was disproved by medico-legal findings.
Her testimony was uncorroborated by either testimonial or physical evidence and
was even contradicted by the ocular inspection as observed by the presiding judge
himself. Admittedly holding a grudge against GRANADA, she is a biased witness
motivated by vindictiveness.
In their third assignment of error, appellants allege that the circumstances relied
upon by the trial court were not established with certainty. The only circumstances
proven were the basketball altercation, the stoning of the Ronquillos house, FELIXs
attempt to flee and the fact that the victims were fished out of the Pasig River.
Testimonies on the abduction are patently inconsistent with each other. Nothing

13

connects the appellants to the basketball altercation or the stoning of the Ronquillos
house. The link between appellants and the De los Santos brothers is tenuous.
Appellants next assert that their defense of alibi gained strength because they were
not positively identified. They further maintain that the use of superior force as a
qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the information and could not therefore
serve to elevate the killing to murder. Neither could treachery be considered, as
there were no witnesses to the actual killing. Lastly, appellants equate their move to
clear their names to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

We affirm the conviction of appellants. After a careful scrutiny of the witnesses

testimonies, we find that all the appellants were positively identified as the ones
who abducted and killed the victims.
I
JOSEPHINE readily recognized GRANADA from among the abductors who alighted
from the Fiera, as he was her neighbor and she has known him since she was a
child. In spite of the black handkerchief covering GRANADAs face, JOSEPHINE was
familiar with his physique and physical features, particularly his prematurely
graying hair. She was in front of the victims when they were abducted.[31] When
part of the face of the accused is not visible, positive identification is difficult.
Nevertheless when despite such artifice the witness is familiar with the accused,
[32] or his identity is not sufficiently hidden due to his physical appearance,[33] or
there are extraneous factors,[34] recognition is facilitated. Identification becomes
quite an easy task even from a considerable distance, once a person has gained
familiarity with another.[35]
With regard to ABELLA, JOSEPHINE was able to recognize him as one of the
abductors because he had no cover on his face and he was a good-looking guy who
could easily be remembered. The alleged inconsistency between her sworn
statement where she failed to mention ABELLA and her testimony in court is
imaginary. JOSEPHINEs testimony was merely an amplification of her sworn
statement in which she admitted:
21. T: Maliban kina BOBOT, JOEY at GENER, mayroon ka pa bang nakilala?
S: Mayroon pa po akong namukhaan ngunit hindi ko alam ang kanilang mga
pangalan.[36]
It is probable that she found out ABELLAs name only after the sworn statement was
executed. There is no inconsistency when what the witness stated in open court are
but details or additional facts not mentioned in the affidavit.[37]
EVELYN testified that she recognized the appellants as among the abductors of the
victims and then proceeded to name them in court.[38] She particularly recognized
GRANADA, as she had seen him on several occasions. Her assertion that GRANADAs
face was not covered, contrary to JOSEPHINEs testimony, does not detract from the
fact that GRANADA was indeed one of the abductors. The handkerchief covering
GRANADAs face could have fallen off in the course of the commotion. Besides, it is
not to be expected that all witnesses viewed the abduction at the same stages.

14

WILFREDO was part of the victims group when the abduction took place, but he ran
for safety after one of the abductors fired warning shots. He allegedly recognized
GRANADA despite the handkerchief on the latters face. GRANADAs white hair and
pointed nose became rooted in WILFREDOs consciousness as GRANADA got off the
van, introduced himself as a policeman, and fired two warning shots. Most often the
face and body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be
easily erased from memory.[39]
Not only was WILFREDO physically present and an eyewitness when the abduction
took place, but more importantly two of the victims were his brothers. Blood
relatives have a definite stake at seeing the guilty person brought before the courts
so that justice may be served. It would be unnatural for a relative who is interested
in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.[40]

II

ELENAs testimony is sufficient to convict appellants. She positively identified all the
appellants as among the passengers of the Fiera and whom she saw torturing the
victims. She could not have been mistaken in identifying them because she knew
them very well, they being deacons of the INC.[41] She was only four meters away
when the Fiera passed by her. [42]Her identification must have been confirmed
when appellants alighted from the Fiera and proceeded to the so-called basement.
Out of curiosity, she followed and stayed near the door of the basement[43] where
she saw appellants and their cohorts maul and torture the victims. Although the
electric lights inside the compound were switched off she could see the culprits and
the mauling of the victims, since the place was illuminated by two streetlights
outside.[44]
The appellants attack, for being contrary to physical evidence, ELENAs testimony
that she saw some of their cohorts, particularly Boy Valencia and Virgilio de
Guzman, stab the victims. Indeed, the post -mortem examination on the bodies of
the victims yielded no finding of stab wounds. This physical evidence is a mute and
an eloquent manifestation of truth; it rates high in the hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence.[45] Thus, where the physical evidence runs counter to the testimony of
the prosecution witness, as in this case, the former should prevail.[46] At any rate,
when asked on cross-examination whether the victims suffered stab wounds, ELENA
answered, Siguro po, hindi ko po alam.[47]
ELENA must have been mistaken in her observation of the events or in her
recollection. But this is understandable, as several persons were actively engaged in
the mauling of the victims. It would have been highly unlikely for her to remember
accurately their movements. Lapse of time blurs recollections. Human memory can
be treacherous. It is a very common thing for honest witnesses to confuse their
recollection of what they actually observed with what they have persuaded
themselves to have happened or with impressions and conclusions not really drawn
from their actual knowledge.[48]
While ELENAs testimony on the stabbing does not ring true in the face of the
physical evidence, this does not mean that her entire testimony is false or had been
15

contrived. It is significant to note that her identification of the appellants as

malefactors was corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses, who pointed to
them as the victims abductors. Moreover, her testimony that they and their cohorts
had beaten the victims by using lead pipes and blunt instruments was corroborated
by the autopsy report, which revealed that most of the victims sustained lacerated
wounds, contusions and hematoma.
There is a general principle of law that where a witness has testified falsely to some
material matter in a case, his testimony in other respects maybe disregarded unless
it is corroborated by other proof. This rule of law is expressed in the maxim Falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus. This rule, however, has its own limitations, for when the
mistaken statement is consistent with good faith and is not conclusively indicative
of a deliberate perversion, the believable portion of the testimony should be
admitted. Although a person may err in memory or in observation in one or more
respects, he may have told the truth as to other respects.[49] Elsewise stated, the
maxim deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of universal
application and should not be applied to portions of the testimony corroborated by
other evidence, particularly where the false portions could be innocent mistakes.
[50]
Notwithstanding the false or mistaken statements, the trial judge, Judge Makasiar,
found ELENAs version impressive, as the manner of her narration was
straightforward, sincere, candid, frank and terse.[51] Like the other prosecution
witnesses, she had been subjected to searching, grueling and consuming crossexamination by a determined, brilliant, veteran and astute defense counsel, no less
than retired Supreme Court Justice Serafin Cuevas, such that any falsehood and
fabrication in [her] narration and identification of the four accused could have been
easily detected and exposed. But she passed the test.

Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect. This is so because
the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different
indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted
assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a reluctant
answer, or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant sneering tone, the heat,
the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.[52]
Admittedly, ELENAs testimony has some discrepancies. However, the trial court
emphasized:
[I]t is to be expected that some discrepancies, and even self-contradictions, will
appear on cross-examination, especially where the witness is of inferior mental
capacity and without any experience in court proceedings, like Elena Bernardo.[53]
The trial court correctly likened Elenas testimony against appellants, all of whom
were ranking members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a declaration against interest. This
was so because her act of testifying against them put her in danger of being
expelled from the said sect. In fact, as admitted by Pastor Cesar Almedina, he and
many other local officials of the Church recommended her expulsion allegedly on
16

grounds of non-attendance at church services and violation of the teachings,

doctrines, laws and tenets of the Iglesia, which were not, however, specified by him.
But the recommendation was disapproved by the Central Office because of these
cases.[54]
While ELENA admitted to having a grudge against GRANADA for arresting his son-inlaw sometime in 1991, her identification of him as one of the perpetrators of the
crime charged cannot be disregarded because it was strongly corroborated by the
three other prosecution witnesses, who categorically pointed to him as one of the
abductors. Her honesty in admitting her dislike against GRANADA should be
considered in her favor.[55] The existence of such grudge does not automatically
render her testimony false and unreliable.[56] It must be noted that she had no
known quarrel with the other appellants to be considered as sufficient motive in
implicating them. Where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that a witness
for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that she
was not so actuated.
As to her long silence or reluctance to give her statement or to testify, ELENA
explained that she was initially barred by then Judge Nitafan from testifying.
Besides, there was a threat on her life by one of the suspects in the killing of herein
five victims.[57] Nevertheless, she had already reported the incident to a certain
Brother Cerilo del Rosario, who replaced Pastor Almedina after the latter was
transferred to another chapel, and that sometime in 1993 she went to the Central
Office of the INC and related the whole event to Brother Eduardo Manalo.[58]
At any rate, the failure of a witness to report to the police authorities the crime that
she had witnessed is not a matter affecting her credibility. The natural reticence of
most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice.[59]

III

Concededly, there were no eyewitnesses to the actual killing of the victims. But the
following of circumstances leave no shred of doubt that the appellants were the
perpetrators of the crime:

1. On the morning of 7 March 1992, the victims MARLON and JOSEPH had a
basketball altercation with JOEY and his two companions;

2. Later that day, JOEY was caught bringing two pillboxes to Dalisay Street, where
the victims reside;

3. Between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. of 8 March 1992, JOEY and GENER, both members of
the INC, threw stones at the Ronquillos house, attracting the attention of neighbors
who in turn mauled them;

17

4. Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. of that same date, after the De los Santos brothers
pointed at the victims, the appellants and their cohorts picked up and herded the
victims into a Ford Fiera, which then sped away;

5. At about 10:00 p.m. the victims, except the one lying in the vehicle who seemed
either unconscious or dead, were brought to a so-called basement in the Iglesia
compound in Punta, Sta. Ana. There, they were mauled, tortured and beaten by
appellants, who were deacons of the INC, as well as by their cohorts, using steel
tubes, lead pipes, guns and other blunt instruments. Thereafter, they were loaded
into the van, which forthwith sped out of the compound; and

6. Three days later, or on 10 March 1992, the victims bodies were found floating on
the Pasig River, showing signs of foul play.

These circumstances are sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. They constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellants, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty persons.[60]

IV
As for appellants defense of alibi, we have consistently held this to be the weakest
of all the defenses. Appellants were unable to show that it was physically impossible
for them to have been present at the scene of the crime. GRANADA, DE GUZMAN
and VALENCIA claimed to have been attending the Panata rites on 8 March 1992,
the date of the abduction and mauling of the five victims. However, considering that
there were at least 200 members of the INC who attended the panata, it was
possible for them to have sneaked out unnoticed into the Ford Fiera to Lakas Street,
picked up the five victims and waited in the evening for the grounds to be deserted
before bringing them inside the INC compound. Neither was ABELLA able to show by
clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to go from
his alleged post at the corner of T.M. Kalaw St. and Roxas Boulevard to Lakas Street,
Bacood, Sta. Mesa. Thus, appellants defense of alibi must fail. Besides, such
defense is worthless in view of the positive identification of appellants as the
culprits.
We agree with the trial court that the killing was characterized by treachery. It is
true that treachery should normally attend at the inception of the aggression.
However, when the victim was first seized and bound and then slain, treachery is
present.[61] In this case, it is enough to point out that the victims hands were tied
at the back when their bodies were found floating in Pasig River. This fact clearly
shows that the victims were rendered defenseless and helpless, thereby allowing
the appellants to commit the crime without risk at all to their persons.

18

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed in treachery and

cannot be considered as an independent aggravating circumstance. It need not be
alleged in the information, as treachery was adequate to elevate the killing to
murder.

VI

We cannot equate appellants move to clear their names as voluntary surrender. For
a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the intent of
the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because (1)
he acknowledges his guilt or (2) he wishes to save the government the trouble and
expense necessarily included for his search and capture.[62] In an analogous case,
we have held that when the accused goes to a police station merely to clear his
name and not to give himself up, voluntary surrender may not be appreciated.[63]
Lastly, we affirm the awards made by the trial court except as to the awards of
moral and exemplary damages, which are, however, reduced from P500,000 to
P50,000 each.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court of

Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-104529 to -33 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the awards of moral and exemplary damages are hereby reduced
from P500,000 to P50,000 each.
3.G.R. No. 117472. June 25, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y
PILO, accused-appellant.
Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty
is indeed a deterrent as far as the commission of heinous crimes is concerned and
while the attendant details pertaining to the execution of a death sentence remain
as yet another burning issue, we are tasked with providing a clear-cut resolution of
whether or not the herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human
society for the infliction of the primitive and bestial act of incestuous lust on his own
blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7,
1994, for the crime of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as charged in the complaint,
aggravated by the fact that the same was committed by the accused who is the
father/stepfather of the complainant, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, as provided for under RA. No. 7659; to pay the complainant Rodessa
Echegaray the sum of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties
provided by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs."[1]
19

We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:

"C O M P L A I N T

The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE, committed
as follows:

That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant
his daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all against her will and without her consent,
to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his
counsel de oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in
his brief:
"This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.
Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born on
September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five siblings. She has three brothers
aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively, and a 3-month old baby sister. Her parents are
Rosalie and Leo Echegaray, the latter being the accused-appellant himself. The
victim lives with her family in a small house located at No. 199 Fernandez St.,
Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994,
TSN).
Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three
brothers in their house as her mother attended a gambling session in another place,
she heard her father, the accused-appellant in this case, order her brothers to go
out of the house (pp. 10-11, ibid.). As soon as her brothers left, accused-appellant
Leo Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the room (p.
12, ibid). Before she could question the appellant, the latter immediately removed
her panty and made her lie on the floor (p. 13, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant likewise
removed his underwear and immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa.
Subsequently, appellant forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ causing
her to suffer intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid.). While appellant was pumping on her, he
even uttered: 'Masarap ba, masarap ba?' and to which Rodessa answered: 'Tama na
Papa, masakit' (p. 16, ibid.). Rodessa's plea proved futile as appellant continued
with his act. After satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant threatened to kill her
mother if she would divulge what had happened. Scared that her mother would be
20

killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she suffered. She was very
afraid of appellant because the latter, most of the time, was high on drugs (pp. 1718, ibid.). The same sexual assault happened up to the fifth time and this usually
took place when her mother was out of the house (p. 19, ibid.). However, after the
fifth time, Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who in turn
told Rosalie, Rodessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the Barangay
Captain where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she suffered. Thereafter,
Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.).
From there, she was accompanied to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
for medical examination (p. 22, ibid.).

Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time when
her mother was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first, her mother was on her side.
However, when appellant was detained, her mother kept on telling her: 'Kawawa
naman ang Tatay mo, nakakulong' (pp. 39-40, ibid.).
When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of Dra. Ma.
Cristina B. Preyna,[3] the complainant was described as physically on a non-virgin
state, as evidenced by the presence of laceration of the hymen of said complainant
(TSN., Aug. 22,1995, pp. 8-9)."[4]
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:
"x x x the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted that
the RAPE charge against the accused was only the figment of her mother's dirty
mind. That her daughter's complaint was forced upon her by her grandma and the
answers in the sworn statement of Rodessa were coached. That the accusation of
RAPE was motivated by Rodessa's grandmother's greed over the lot situated at the
Madrigal Estate-NHA Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, which her grandmother's paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to the
accused in order to persuade the latter to admit that Rodessa executed an affidavit
of desistance after it turned out that her complaint of attempted homicide was
substituted with the crime of RAPE at the instance of her mother. That when her
mother came to know about the affidavit of desistance, she placed her
granddaughter under the custody of the Barangay Captain. That her mother was
never a real mother to her.
She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted homicide as her
husband poured alcohol on her body and attempted to burn her. She identified the
certification issued by the NHA and Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the Certification
based on the Masterlist (Exh. 3) indicates that the property is co-owned by accused
and Conrado Alfonso. That Rodessa is her daughter sired by Conrado Alfonso, the
latter being the paramour of her mother. That Conrado Alfonso waived his right and
participation over the lot in favor of the accused in consideration of the latter's
accepting the fact that he is the father of Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and
to conceal the nauseating sex orgies from Conrado Alfonso's real Wife.
Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the complainant
has a very strong motive in implicating him to the crime of RAPE since she was
interested to become the sole owner of a property awarded to her live-in partner by
the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project. That he could not have committed the imputed
21

crime because he considers Rodessa as his own daughter. That he is a paintercontractor and on the date of the alleged commission of the crime, he was painting
the house of one Divina Ang of Barangay Vitalis, Paraaque, Metro Manila (Exh 4).
The travel time between his work place to his residence is three (3) hours
considering the condition of traffic. That the painting contract is evidenced by a
document denominated 'Contract of Services' duly accomplished (see submarkings
of Exh. 4). He asserted that he has a big sexual organ which when used to a girl 11
years old like Rodessa, the said female organ will be 'mawawarak.' That it is
abnormal to report the imputed commission of the crime to the grandmother of the
victim.
Accused further stated that her(sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of drug
pushing earlier and he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of using drugs. The
decretal portion of the judgment of conviction ordering the accused to be confined
at the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center irked the grandmother of Rodessa because it
was her wish that accused should be meted the death penalty.

Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive of

Rodessa's grandmother in implicating him in this heinous crime because of her
greed to become the sole owner of that piece of property at the National Housing
Authority-Madrigal Project, situated at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City,
notwithstanding rigid cross-examination. He asserted that the imputed offense is far
from his mind considering that he treated Rodessa as his own daughter. He
categorically testified that he was in his painting job site on the date and time of the
alleged commission of the crime.
Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she is the
laundry woman and part time baby sitter of the family of accused. That at one time,
she saw Rodessa reading sex books and the Bulgar newspaper. That while hanging
washed clothes on the vacant lot she saw Rodessa masturbating by tinkering her
private parts. The masturbation took sometime.
This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the fourth
and last witness for the defense. She stated that she tried hard to correct the flirting
tendency of Rodessa and that she scolded her when she saw Rodessa viewing an Xrated tape. Rodessa according to her was fond of going with friends of ill-repute.
That (sic) she corroborated the testimony of Mrs Punzalan by stating that she
herself saw Rodessa masturbating inside the room of her house."[5]
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, the lower court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence to the
straightforward testimony of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill motive to testify
falsely against accused-appellant can be attributed. The lower court likewise
regarded as inconsequential the defense of the accused-appellant that the
extraordinary size of his penis could not have insinuated itself into the victim's
vagina and that the accused is not the real father of the said victim.
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal
of the lower court's verdict through the following assignment of errors:

22

1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER MOTIVE OF PRIVATE

COMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER THAT PRECIPITATED THE FILING OF THE CHARGE
OF RAPE, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY AS CHARGED.
2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE HEALED LACERATIONS AT
3 AND 7 O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF
ACCUSED TO THE VAGINA OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT
DENIAL.
3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT
ACCUSED WAS IN PARAAQUE ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED CRIME
HENCE, IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR."[6]
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty,
requires a thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances relating
thereto, this Court remains guided by the following principles in evaluating evidence
in cases of this nature: (a) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused though innocent to disprove; (b)
In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand and fall on its own
merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense."[7]

Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to
tilt the scales of justice in favor of the accused-appellant notwithstanding that he
cries foul insisting that the rape charge was merely concocted and strongly
motivated by greed over a certain lot situated at the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing
Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The accusedappellant theorizes that prosecution witness Asuncion Rivera, the maternal
grandmother of the victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape so that, in the
event that the accused-appellant shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the
lot will be consolidated in her favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned by the
accused-appellant and Conrado Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera,
according to the records of the National Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accusedappellant would want us to believe that the rape charge was fabricated by Asuncion
Rivera in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the
live-in partners would have the property for their own.[8]
We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as
to instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father
simply on account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot.[9]
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is
credible where she has no motive to testify against the accused.[10]
We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old
Rodessa which the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by the

23

defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in detail of
her father's monstrous acts had made her cry.[11] Once again, we rule that:
"x x x The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the rape
as to the circumstances of the rape must be given weight for testimony of young
and immature rape victims are credible (People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]). No
woman especially one of tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself
to a public trial, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished (People v. Guibao, supra)."[12]
The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape accusation
against him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the
accused-appellant was already naked when he dragged her inside the room is
inconsistent with her subsequent testimony that the said accused-appellant was still
wearing short pants when she was dragged inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's
sworn statement before the police investigator which indicated that, while the
accused was executing pumping acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ
from her testimony in court wherein she related that when the accused took out his
penis from her vagina, the accused said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's
grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her sworn statement that it was the
accused who went to see her to apprise her of the rape committed on her
granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court, Asuncion Rivera claimed that
she was the one who invited the accused-appellant to see her in her house so as to
tell her a secret.[13] These alleged discrepancies merely pertain to minor details
which in no way pose serious doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. Whether or not the accused was naked when he dragged Rodessa inside
the room where he sexually assaulted her bears no significant effect on Rodessa's
testimony that she was actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover, a
conflicting account of whatever words were uttered by the accused-appellant after
he forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's private organ against her will cannot
impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A determination of which version
earmarks the truth as to how the victim's grandmother learned about the rape is
inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.

As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin:[14]

"This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of
a witness do not detract from its essential credibility as long as it is on the whole
coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the
witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed as it is not to be expected
that he will be able to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or
total recall."
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the absence
of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft
of clear and concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his
24

penis and that if that be the fact, it could not have merely caused shallow healed
lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock.[15] In his testimony, the accused- appellant
stated that he could not have raped Rodessa because of the size of his penis which
could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done so.[16] This Court gives no
probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving statement in the light of our
ruling in the case of People v. Melivo, supra,[17] that:
"The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable of varying
degrees of distensibility. The degree of distensibility of the female reproductive
organ is normally limited only by the character and size of the pelvic inlet, other
factors being minor. The female reproductive canal being capable of allowing
passage of a regular fetus, there ought to be no difficulty allowing the entry of
objects of much lesser size, including the male reproductive organ, which even in its
largest dimensions, would still be considerably smaller than the full-term fetus.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of the
vaginal wall, though not as extensive as appellant might have expected them to be,
indicate traumatic injury to the area within the period when the incidents were
supposed to have occurred." (At pp. 13-14, Italics supplied)
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof.[18] A mere
knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis suffices
to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required
to sustain a conviction.[19] In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal examiner,
categorically testified that the healed lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were
consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as narrated by the victim to
have taken place in April, 1994.[20]
Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant
erroneously argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as evidence in
support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated
because there is no law expressly requiring so.[21] In view of our finding that the
prosecution witnesses have no motive to falsely testify against the accusedappellant, the defense of alibi, in this case, uncorroborated by other witnesses,
should be completely disregarded.[22] More importantly, the defense of alibi which
is inherently weak becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the
accused-appellant as perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim, Rodessa.[23]

The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do

some painting Job at the house of one Divina Ang in Paranaque, Metro Manila, within
25 days from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of the accused-appellant
at the time of the commission of the offense.
The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of
the complaint, dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as stated in
paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a
25

woman below twelve years old.[24] Rodessa positively identified his father accusedappellant, succeeded in consummating his grievous and odious sexual assault on
her is free from any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly inconceivable that it is
rehearsed and fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal grandmother
Asuncion Rivera as asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, more than two decades ago, are
relevant and worth reiterating, thus:
"x x x it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended parties are
young and immature girls like the victim in this case, (Cited cases omitted) there is
marked receptivity on its part to lend credence to their version of what transpired. It
is not to be wondered at. The state, as parens patria, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost
protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate
victim alone. The consternation it causes her family must also be taken into
account. It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the
fundamental law for such institution. There is all the more reason then for the
rigorous application of the penal law with its severe penalty for this offense,
whenever warranted. It has been aptly remarked that with the advance in
civilization, the disruption in public peace and order it represents defies explanation,
much more so in view of what currently appears to be a tendency for sexual
permissiveness. Where the prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly
minimal, self-restraint should even be more marked."[25]
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty
Law, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:
"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxx xxx xxx

(Italics supplied)
Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty
imposed by the trial court by declaring that he is neither a father, stepfather or
grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother.[26]
On direct examination, he admitted that before the charge of rape was filed against
him, he had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and had provided for her food,
clothing, shelter and education.[27] The Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname
of the accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her
grandmother's live-in partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the crossexamination that she, the accused-appellant and her five children, including
Rodessa, had been residing in one house only.[28] At any rate, even if he were not
the father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him
26

from the abyss where perpetrators of heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by
law. Considering that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's
mother,[29] he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty
Law under the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."
The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa"
is reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or
stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused
on his young victim has become all the more repulsive and perverse. The victim's
tender age and the accused-appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her
are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial
craving. The law has made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that
the accused-appellant face the supreme penalty of death.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104.
4. G.R. No. 136257 February 14, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Vs. OSCAR YBAEZ, accused-appellant
DECISION

MELO, J.:
In order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the special qualifying
circumstance of the victims minority and her relationship to the offender should be
both alleged in the Information and proved during the trial. This is the principle
which finds application in the case at bar.1wphi1.nt
Before us on automatic review is the decision dated September 25, 1997 of Branch
71 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region stationed in Antipolo,
Rizal, in its Criminal Case No. 94-11878, finding accused-appellant Oscar Ybaez
guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The instant case was initiated by a complaint against accused-appellant Oscar
Ybaez y Dagulpo filed by the victim Erika Dialogo, which charged:
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1995, in the Municipality of Taytay, Province
of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one Erika Dialogo y Dialogo, a minor, ten (10) years of age, without
her consent and against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(p. 5, Rollo.)
27

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and stood trial, resulting in a
judgment of conviction, accordingly disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Oscar Ybaez y Daguplo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the private complainant in the
amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
(p. 16, Rollo.)
The prosecutions version of the events is based principally on the testimony of
victim Erika Dialogo, Celestino Dialogo, uncle of the victim, and Dr. Jesusa Vergara
of the PNP Crime Laboratory Services.
Erika testified that on January 1, 1995, at around 3 oclock in the afternoon, she was
requested by accused-appellant, her mothers common-law husband, to gather
firewood. As she was about to do so, accused-appellant told her not to go and
instead she was brought by him to the forest near their house. At that point, he
forced her to lay down on a wooden bed, and despite her strong resistance and lack
of acquiescence, accused-appellant took her panties off. Nevertheless, Erika seized
a chance to get up and attempted to ran, but accused-appellant was quick in
grabbing her back. As a preliminary to his intended beastful act, Erika tearfully
narrated, accused-appellant inserted his finger into her vagina, and naked as he
was, he laid on top of her and indoctrinated her into eroticism and libidinal
gratifications. Thereafter, accused-appellant left her. Erika, on the other hand, left
home and went to a certain Ate Rosal where she dozed off. When she woke up, she
went home and found therein accused-appellant and her crying baby sister.
Erika continued her silence about her ordeal even as she brought her sister that
same day to a certain Ate Tilde. Therefrom, she proceeded to her Ate Dolly, residing
nearby. No longer able to keep to herself what she had just gone through, Erika told
her Ate Dolly that she was raped by Oscar Ybaez. Consequently, she was brought
by her other relatives, including prosecution witness Celestino, to Camp Crame.
Prosecution witness Dr. Jesusa Vergara, the medico-legal officer who conducted a
physical examination of Erika confirmed the claim of the victim that she was raped.
Dr. Vergara testified that Erikas external vagina orifice admits the tip of the
examiners smallest finger with shallow healed lacerations at 3 and 6 oclock; and
that Erika physically was in a non-virgin state.
The defense is based on the testimony of its sole witness, accused-appellant. He
denied the charge and testified that on January 1, 1995, he was on his way home
when he met Erika along the road. He gave her a fatherly kiss on the cheek,
considering that he treated her as his own child from the time he started cohabiting
with the victims mother in 1987. Nothing more happened after that, so he claimed.
He alleged that the crime imputed to him was a way of getting back at him, as
initiated by prosecution witness Celestino. According to accused-appellant,
Celestino used to live with them but was ordered to move out, hence, Celestinos
motive to implicate accused-appellant in this case.
The trial court did not accord credence to the testimony of accused-appellant,
pointing out that the defense of denial cannot prevail against the affirmative
28

testimony of Erika who was only 10 years old when subjected to accusedappellants sexual perversity. Further, Erika showed no ill motive to falsely testify
against accused-appellant, and that her testimony was straightforward and
impeccable.
Accused-appellant is now before us insisting on his innocence and pleading for
acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt. He imputes to the trial court the error
of finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged notwithstanding
the victims admission that she was not threatened by accused-appellant. He would
also make much capital of the circumstance that the victim failed to divulge the
rape committed against her to the first person she met after the incident.

Accused-appellants assertions must certainly come to naught.

The workings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently and there
is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident
(People vs. Ranido, 288 SCRA 369 [1998]). More so, if one is a victim of a misfortune
which in the victims young mind is beyond comprehension.
In the instant case, threatened or otherwise, Erika opted to keep to herself and to
endure the misery and pain she suffered from the hands of accused-appellant, at
least for a while, so that she just dozed off upon reaching the house of her Ate
Rosal. Only later did she realize that she had been violated. So, even before the day
ended, she intimated her horrible experience to her Ate Dolly.
Erikas failure to immediately report the rape is not an indication of a fabricated
charge (People vs. Batoon, 317 SCRA 545 [1999]), and does not by itself undermine
the charge. Procrastination seldom works to acquit from liability a person accused of
rape (People vs. Pacistol, 284 SCRA 520 [1998]). In rape cases, the gravamen of the
offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent
(People vs. Igat, 291 SCRA 100 [1998]). Erika, in tears, narrated that she resisted
and protested accused-appellants sexual advances. In fact, she was even able to
stand up and attempted to escape, but accused-appellant grabbed and snatched
her back, following which, accused-appellants bestiality unfolded. Erika was 10
years old then. In light of this fact, statutory rape has been committed; force,
intimidation or threat need not then be proved (People vs. Pacistol, 284 SCRA 520
[1998]). When the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical
findings, sufficient basis exists to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisite of
carnal knowledge has thereby been established (People vs. Tabion, 317 SCRA 126
[1999]). The mass of physical and testimonial evidence in this case clearly
establishes accused-appellants guilt of the crime of rape. Verily, the trial court was
correct in its findings.
While we agree with the trial court that accused-appellant is guilty of rape, we
cannot, however, subscribe to the penalty of death imposed. Both the defense and
the Office of the Solicitor General are in concurrence. Article 335, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the rape
victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is the common-law spouse or
the parent of the victim. Clearly believing that the instant case fell within the abovementioned circumstance, the trial court sentenced accused-appellant to death. A
reading of the complaint filed against accused-appellant would, however, reveal
29

that he was charged only with simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, with the additional allegation that the victim was only 10 years of age at the
time of the incident.
Although the rape of a person under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of
the victims mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on
accused-appellant because this relationship was not alleged in the complaint. The
elements of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur.
The penalty of death cannot be automatically imposed on accused-appellant merely
because of the trial courts appreciation of both minority and relationship, no matter
how clearly established. Jurisprudence is to the effect that these twin facts be
alleged in the information or complaint before the death penalty can properly be
imposed (People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559 [1998]; People vs. Leopoldo Ilao, 296
SCRA 658 [1998]).
Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of accused-appellant to be informed of the
charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged
with simple rape but thereafter convicted of its qualified form punishable with
death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and calling for
the capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned
(People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997]). Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that the complaint or information shall
state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstance.
To be sure, accused-appellant can only be meted out the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on account of the complaints failure to specifically allege the relationship
between accused-appellant and the victim, the daughter of accused-appellants
common-law spouse, who was erroneously referred as being instead, the stepdaughter of accused-appellant.
Finally, modification of the damages awarded by the trial court is in order. In
addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00, Erika is entitled to the award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 without need for proof of the basis thereof.
Lastly, accused-appellant is liable to pay the victim the sum of P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb
socially deleterious actions (Del Rosario vs. CA, 267 SCRA 158 [1997]).
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED with modifications.
Accused-appellant Oscar Ybaez is hereby found guilty of simple rape and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In addition to the award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the victim
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter
other sex perverts from sexually molesting hapless women. No special
pronouncement is made as to costs.1wphi1.nt
5. G.R. No. 80116

June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
30

HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign
absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against
the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what
hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before
the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal
Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil
Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner
in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April,
1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on
January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show
that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on
and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair
with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints
for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were
eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as
Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil

31

and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge
Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking
that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against
her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State
Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal
to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned
and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the
entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment
and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo
Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand,
respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 8752435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the
cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then
pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also
directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William
Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be
arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as
direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered
detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent
entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment
of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide
the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de
officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from
further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23,
1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for
review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as
four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and
32

not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of
the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a
sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint
which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage
the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and
nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery
and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party.
The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant
that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or
incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such
amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words,
only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action
therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does
not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply.
Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are
generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action,
or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might
prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public
trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of
the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since
the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
33

initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be
determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time
when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the
specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended
spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and
with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in
the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in
pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the
innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings
have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when
the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for
this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in
our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are
convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the
person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is
meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was
granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her
American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her
business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render
34

an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...Thus, pursuant
to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer
the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before
the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance
or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding,
he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a
danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the
reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by
private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the
same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although
the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her
marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have
her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a
formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity
because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating
that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for
adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand
on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed
before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab
initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of
the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.Private
35

respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27

must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals
that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for
adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved
in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the
one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET
ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 8752435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on
October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German

absolute divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the
instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no
longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly
authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would
be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the
woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered
the absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid
and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are
governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of
the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say
an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities
would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and
precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as
valid insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino
wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where
a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the
opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the
correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will
be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one
of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury
to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the
absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial
36

to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it
would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took
effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect
to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite
the fact that the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said
case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER
put in issue.

6. G.R. No. 89685

November 8, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO GALANZA y VALDEZ @ Ed, NICANOR BAUTISTA @ Nick, HUBERTO
ALIMAN y BISNA @ Bert, REGINO BALANGUIT y CEBRON @ Budoy and LEO
ROBIEGO y DULAY @ Leo, accused, LEO ROBIEGO y DULAY @ Leo and
REGINO BALANGUIT y CEBRON @ Budoy , accused-appellant

QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor,
Cavite in Criminal Case No. B-85-178, finding Regino Balanguit y Cebron and Leo
Robiego y Dulay guilty of Robbery in Band with Homicide under Article 294(1) of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing them, in the absence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, "to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, jointly and severally (1) in the amount of P30,000.00 for the
death of Dominador Limbo; (2) P10,500.00 for the money taken from the victim; (3)
moral damages of P5,000.00; and (4) exemplary damages of P5,000.00 and to pay
the proportionate cost" (Rollo, p. 49).
Lourdes de los Santos would not have met face to face with the killers of her
common-law-husband, Dominador Limbo, were it not for the information relayed to
her by Capt. Marcos Gotico, Chief of the Investigation Section of the Marikina Police,
that suspects in two robbery cases in Marikina could be the same culprits who killed
Limbo in Bacoor, Cavite.
Capt. Gotico provided such information after Lamberto Bonahan had confided to
him that, the group who had been apprehended in Marikina for robbery was also
involved in the robbery with homicide in Bacoor. Since the informant did not know
the name of the victim in Bacoor, Capt. Gotico wrote a letter addressed to "Sa mga
kinauukulan" in Bacoor.
Consequently, on January 28, 1985, Lourdes de los Santos went to the office of
Capt. Gotico. Lourdes was able to identify Regino Balanguit, in a police line-up as
one of the killers of Limbo (TSN, April, 10, 1986, p. 10; TSN, April 22, 1986, p. 13)

37

On January 31, 1985, Sgt. Monico T. Dulloog, the PC investigator-in-charge, filed a

complaint for Robbery in band with Homicide against, Eduardo Galanza, Nicanor
Bautista, Huberto Aliman, Regino Balanguit and Leo Robiego. In due course, the
following information for Robbery in band with Homicide was filed against them:
That on or about the 16th day of December 1984, in the Municipality of Bacoor,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused Regino Balanguit and Leo Robiego together with Eduardo
Galanza, Nicanor Bautista and Huberto Aliman who are still at-large, then all armed
with short firearms conspiring, confederating together and mutually assisting and
helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of violence against or
intimidation on the person of one Dominador Limbo, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob, take and carry away cash money in the total amount
of TEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P10,500.00), Philippine Currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforestated amount and by reason of or
on occasion of the aforesaid act, the above named accused Regino Balanguit and
Leo Robiego together with Eddie Galanza, Nicanor Bautista and Huberto Aliman who
are all still at-large, then all armed with short firearms, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping and assisting one another, with intent to kill and without
justifiable cause, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot at one Dominador Limbo hitting the latter on his chest which
wound caused the direct and proximate death of said Dominador Limbo, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs (Rollo, p. 17).
Regino Balanguit and Lea Robiego were brought to trial, while Eduardo Galanza,
Nicanor Bautista and Huberto Aliman remain at-large.
The case for the prosecution was established mainly through the testimony of
Lourdes de los Santos.
According to Lourdes, Limbo woke up between 3:00 and 4:00 A.M. of December 16,
1984, as he was preparing to go to Batangas on business. Their house in Barangay
Habay, Bacoor, Cavite, had a canteen. The door was lighted by a fluorescent bulb,
its interior by a 40-watt bulb and its balcony by a 20-watt bulb. There was an
electric lamp on a post near the house.
When someone knocked at the door, Limbo asked who it was and someone replied,
"Pagbili ng sigarilyo." Limbo then asked what brand of cigarette the man wanted to
buy. When he heard no response, he opened the door. Balanguit and Robiego,
armed with guns, entered the canteen saying, "Hold up ito. Huwag kayong kikilos ng
masama." Galanza, in the meantime, stayed outside. Limbo told the two, "Wala
kaming pera." He was then shot on the chest at short range. He fell on the floor,
screaming and writhing in pain. Robiego pointed a gun at him and told him to keep
quiet.
Robiego then hurriedly tied the hands and feet of Limbo with a nylon cord while
Balanguit, with his gun pointed at Lourdes, ordered her to get their money.
Frightened, Lourdes got the P10,500.00 wrapped in a plastic bag, which was kept in
a tool box placed underneath the door. She gave the money to Robiego but as the
latter grabbed the plastic bag from her, he accidentally tore it. The peso bills were
scattered on the floor. After picking up the money, Robiego and Balanguit fled.

38

Limbo died on the spot. His body was brought to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for autopsy.
Dr. Ricardo G. Ibarrola, the NBI Medico-Legal officer who conducted the autopsy and
prepared the autopsy report, (Exh. "F"), said that Limbo could not have survived the
single gunshot wound because three big blood vessels near the heart were
damaged.
The ballistics report, (Exh,. "G"), states that the bullet marked "DL", which was
recovered from Limbo's body, is a caliber .38 bullet "fired through the barrel of
caliber .38 firearm having six (6) lands and six (6) grooves, twisting to the left."
The defense was anchored on alibis and denials.
Robiego testified that in the early morning of December16, 1984, he was in his
house in Sampaloc, Manila and therefore it was impossible for him to have
perpetrated the crime. He admitted having executed a statement owning
commission of the crime while detained at Imus, Cavite. However, he alleged that
he "as only forced to sign it as he could no longer endure the torture inflicted on
him by the PC soldiers.
For his part, Balanguit testified that when the crime was committed, he was in his
hometown at Laoang, Samar. He also claimed that during his detention at the
provincial jail in Trece Martires City, he was forced to sign a document written in
Tagalog, a dialect he was not fully conversant with.
On March 28, 1986, the trial court promulgated its decision finding both Robiego
and Balanguit guilty of the crime as charged.
Robiego and Balanguit interposed the instant appeal.
Balanguit specifically assails the trial court's ruling that appellants were guilty of
Robbery in band with Homicide when only three persons allegedly participated in its
commission. He also criticizes the trial court for giving credence to the lone
prosecution witness, a mere elementary school graduate, who "succumbed to the
suggestion given by the letter of Capt. Marcos Gotico that the persons who robbed
their canteen and shot her husband were those apprehended by the Marikina Police
in a similar robbery-hold-up" (Brief for Balanguit, p. 12; Rollo, p. 88).
The resolution of this case depends upon the credibility of the sole witness. Since
this Court did not have the opportunity to see such witness testify and therefore
gauge her credibility while on the stand, the general rule that the findings of the
trial court on credibility should be given much weight must be applied (People v.
Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 [1991]; People v. Lardizabal, 204 SCRA 320 [1991]).
While there are exceptions to the general rule, none exists in this case. Moreover,
there is no evidence to indicate that the lone prosecution eyewitness, Lourdes de
los Santos, had any motive to falsely testify against appellants (People v. Belibet,
199 SCRA 587 [1991]).
Lourdes had a good look at the two appellants as she was only about half a meter
away from them when they entered her house. There was sufficient light for her to
see their faces clearly. As this Court has time and again held, where conditions of
visibility are favorable and the witness did not appear to be biased against the
39

accused, her assertions as to the identity of the malefactors should normally be

accepted. This is more so when the victim is the witness herself because a victim
usually strives to remember the faces of the malefactors (People v. Lacao, Sr., 201
SCRA 317 [1991]).
Balanguit points out that while on the witness stand, Lourdes categorically pointed
at him as the one who shot Limbo, but in her sworn statement of January 29, 1985,
she failed to identify the person who actually fired the shot. This alleged
inconsistency, however, is more apparent than real. While at the stand she
categorically pointed at Balanguit as the one who shot Limbo, but in her sworn
statement she said that she was not looking when all of a sudden someone shot her
husband ("Noong nakalingat ako bigla na lang may bumaril sa asawa ko"). However
in the same sworn statement, Lourdes said that she was sure Robiego and Balanguit
were the ones who entered the canteen ("ang natitiyak ko lang pa ay itong
dalawang iyan ang siyang pumasok sa loob"). Under this circumstance, anyone of
the two could have been the killer. The conclusion that Balanguit, not Robiego, was
the one who fired his gun may be deduced from their positions vis-a-vis the victim
and their actions immediately after the shooting. Besides, minor inconsistencies do
not reflect on a witness' credibility as long as the testimony manifests a ring of truth
(People v. Arbolante, 203 SCRA 85 [1991]).
What should concern the Court in this case is whether or not Lourdes had positively
identified the accused. There is no doubt that she did. She remained unflinching
even on cross-examination in pointing at appellants as the intruders who killed her
common-law-husband. In the face of her positive identification of the appellants as
the culprits, their respective alibis dwindle into nothingness (People v. Arroyo, 201
SCRA 616 [1991]). This defense suffers from an inherent infirmity because it is easy
to fabricate (People v. Bugho, 202 SCRA 164 [1991]).
Another aspect which erodes appellants' attack on Lourdes' testimony as to who
killed Limbo is the fact that conspiracy had been proven beyond reasonable doubt
in this case. This is shown by the evidence that both appellants were armed with,
handguns when they entered the house at an ungodly hour and announced the hold
up, while the third member of the group acted as a look-out. They helped each
other pick up the scattered money bills and they fled the scene of the crime
together. Even assuming that Lourdes mistook Balanguit as the one who fired the
fatal shot at Limbo, Balanguit cannot escape culpability. In conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all and therefore, a showing as to who actually killed the victim is
not required (People v.Alvarez, 169 SCRA 730 [1989]).
Appellants' denials that they perpetrated the crime were correctly disregarded by
the trial court. Being unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, not to
mention that, they are negative in character, such denials are self-serving which
deserve no evidentiary weight unlike the testimony of the sole eyewitness who
testified on affirmative matters (People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991]).
The trial court, however, incorrectly characterized the crime as Robbery in band
with Homicide. It has not been indubitably shown by the prosecution that more than
three persons perpetrated the crime. Under Article 14(6) of theRevised Penal Code,
a crime is deemed committed by a band ("cuadrilla") when more than three armed
malefactors acted together in the commission of the offense. In this case, Lourdes
only mentioned three culprits, namely: Galanza, Robiego and Balanguit. The crime
40

committed is therefore the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide under
Art. 294(l) of theRevised Penal Code. All the elements of the crime of robbery,
namely, intent to gain, unlawful taking of personal property belonging to another
and violence against or intimidation of a person (Art. 293, Revised Penal Code) have
been duly proven in this case. There is no doubt that the appellants' intention was
to rob Limbo as they even informed him that it was a hold up. In the course of the
robbery, however, they shot and killed him. As there was a direct relation and
intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, the special complex crime
of Robbery with Homicide was committed (People v. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627
[1991]).
Robbery with Homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua
294(l) of the Revised Penal Code. Inasmuch as there
aggravating circumstances proven in the commission of the
correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua
Penal Code).

to death under Article

are no mitigating or
crime, the lower court
(Article 63(2) Revised

In line with recent jurisprudence (People v. Callao, 206 SCRA 420 [1992]), the
indemnity imposed by the trial court for the death of Dominador Limbo in the
amount of P30,000.00 should be increased to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED, with the modifications that:
(1) the crime committed be designated as Robbery with homicide under Article
294(l) of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) the indemnity to the heirs of the victim be
increased to P50,000.00. Costs de oficio.
7. G.R. No. 150873
Sazon vs Sandiganbayan
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to nullify the Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan, dated July 26, 2001,
in Criminal Case No. 18257, finding the petitioner Zenaida V. Sazon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Robbery Extortion.[2] Likewise assailed is the Sandiganbayans
Resolution[3] dated November 16, 2001 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The facts, as established by the evidence presented, are as follows:
Petitioner was a Senior Forest Management Specialist of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), National Capital Region (NCR).[4] On
September 24, 1992, the DENR-NCR issued Travel Order No. 09-92-409 directing the
petitioner and a certain Carlos Gubat I (Gubat) to proceed to Karuhatan and
Navotas, both in Metro Manila, to perform the following:

1.
To investigate [an] intelligence report on the alleged arrival of illegal
shipment of poles and piles to Navotas, Metro Manila; and

41

2.
[To] verify illegal resaw operation of Honway Lumber, Karuhatan, Metro
Manila.[5]
On September 25, 1992, petitioner and her team, composed of Gubat and Forester
Nemesio Ricohermoso, conducted a surveillance in Karuhatan and Navotas. While
looking for the office of Vifel Shipyard, subject of the travel order, the team chanced
upon the R&R Shipyard (R&R) and asked from the lady guard for Mr. Rodrigo Opena
(Mr. Opena), the Operations Manager.[6] As the petitioner knew Mr. Opena, the
former wanted to inquire from the latter where Vifel Shipyard was.[7] In the course
of their conversation with the lady guard, the team spotted squared logs, which
they claimed to be dungon logs piled at the R&R compound. Upon a closer look, the
team noticed that the squared logs were mill-sawn and bore hatchet marks with a
number indicating inspection by the DENR. Since dungon logs were banned species,
the team asked for the pertinent documents relative thereto. However, the same
could not be produced at that time; hence, they decided to return on October 1.[8]
On October 1, 1992, petitioner and her team returned to R&R to check the
necessary documents they were looking for. Yet again, Mr. Opena could not produce
the documents as they were then allegedly in the possession of the auditing section
of their main office. Petitioner insisted that the subject logs were banned species
and, thus, threatened Mr. Opena that he could be arrested and that the logs could
be confiscated. Mr. Opena, however, claimed that the logs that were seen by the
petitioner were yakal and tangile and not dungon.[9]
On October 7, 1992, Atty. Teresita Agbi, the lawyer of R&R, met with the petitioner
to talk about the subject logs. Petitioner instructed Atty. Agbi to proceed to the
bakeshop at the ground floor of the formers office.[10] There, Atty. Agbi informed
the petitioner that she had in her possession the receipts covering the subject logs;
but the latter averred that the receipts were not sufficient as there were additional
requirements[11] to be submitted. Believing that Atty. Agbi could not produce the
required documents, petitioner initially demanded the payment of P300,000.00 if no
papers would be submitted; P200,000.00 if incomplete; and P100,000.00 if the
papers were complete.[12]
On October 13, 1992, petitioner made a final demand of P100,000.00 in exchange
for the favor of fixing the papers of the alleged hot logs. She even offered Atty. Agbi
P25,000.00 as her share in the amount.[13] Atty. Agbi reported the matter to the
police. Consequently, an entrapment operation against the petitioner was planned
wherein Atty. Agbi would agree to pay P100,000.00 to settle the issue with the
petitioner.[14]
On October 14, 1992, the day of the scheduled entrapment operation, Atty. Agbi,
together with Senior Police Officer 1 Edwin Anaviso (SPO1 Anaviso), SPO1 Pablo
Temena (SPO1 Temena) and SPO2 Renato Dizon (SPO2 Dizon) went to the Maxs
Restaurant in EDSA, Caloocan City, where they would meet the petitioner.[15] Upon
seeing Atty. Agbi, petitioner instructed the former to drop the envelope containing
the money in the taxicab parked outside. Atty. Agbi, however, could not comply
since her P25,000.00 commission had not yet been segregated from the
P100,000.00. Petitioner thus offered to segregate it at the ladies room.[16] As soon
as Atty. Agbi handed over the envelope containing the money, petitioner placed her
wallet and handkerchief inside the envelope;[17] then SPO2 Dizon immediately

42

accosted and handcuffed the petitioner while SPO1 Temena took pictures of the
incident.[18]
Petitioner, for her part, denied the above accusation. She averred that it was in fact
Atty. Agbi who proposed the settlement which she, however, rejected. When offered
a brown envelope containing money, petitioner allegedly stood up and prepared to
leave, but a man came from nowhere and immediately handcuffed her while
another man took pictures.[19]
At about 11 oclock in the evening, petitioner was brought to the assistant
prosecutor for inquest.[20] Thereafter, an Information for Robbery Extortion was
filed against the petitioner, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about October 14, 1992, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer,
being then the supervisor of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(D[E]NR), taking advantage of her public position and which offensed (sic) was
committed in relation to her office, by means of intimidation and with intent to gain,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand, take and extort from
the IRMA FISHING & TRADING COMPANY as represented herein by ATTY. TERESITA A.
AGBI, the amount of P100,000.00 to prevent the confiscation of more or less thirty
(30) pcs. of logs, which are found in the compound of RNR Marine Inc., purportedly
for unauthorize[d] possession of the said logs, and belonging to the said Irma
Fishing & Trading Company, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforementioned amount of P100,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[21]
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of Not Guilty.[22]
After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision[23] convicting the
petitioner of the crime of robbery extortion. The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision is quoted hereunder:
WHEREFORE, the accused, ZENAIDA SAZON y VENTURA, is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY EXTORTION, defined under
Article 293, and penalized under paragraph 5, Article 294 (as amended by Section
9, Republic Act No. 7659) both of the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime,
she is hereby sentenced, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of from Two (2) Years and Three (3) Months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to Seven (7) Years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[24]
The court found that the elements of robbery with intimidation were established by
the prosecution.[25] It was pointed out that if the interest of petitioner was merely
the submission by R&R of the required documents, she should have required that
they meet at her office and not at a restaurant.[26] Her liability, said the court, was
not negated by the eventual admission of Irma Fishing and Trading Co. that the
required documents could not be produced.[27]
Hence, the instant petition on the following grounds:
43

I. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING

THAT THE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION TENDS TO SHOW THAT ALL THE
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH INTIMIDATION ARE PRESENT.

II. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[28]
Apart from the instant criminal case, the DENR filed an administrative complaint
against the petitioner for grave misconduct in the performance of official duty, but
the same was dismissed for lack of interest on the part of the complainant. Another
administrative case was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, but the same
was likewise dismissed.[29]
Petitioners insistence on her acquittal of the crime of robbery with intimidation
hinges on the alleged absence of the elements of the crime. She specifically
questions the Sandiganbayans conclusion that she employed intimidation in order
to extort P100,000.00 from R&R. Petitioner strongly doubts that the threat of
confiscation of the subject logs created fear in the mind of R&R or its employees.
Absent such element, says the petitioner, her exoneration is clearly indicated.[30]
We do not agree with the petitioner.
In appeals to this Court from the Sandiganbayan, only questions of law may be
raised, not issues of fact. The factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are binding
upon this Court.[31] The Supreme Court should not be burdened with the task of reexamining the evidence presented during the trial of the case. This rule, however,
admits of exceptions, to wit: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmise or conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; 3) there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court or
agency; 4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
and 6) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on an absence of
evidence on record.[32] However, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings
of the Sandiganbayan, as none of these exceptions is present in this case.
Petitioner was charged with robbery defined and penalized under Articles 293[33]
and 294(5)[34] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), otherwise known as simple
robbery. Simple robbery is committed by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons.[35] The elements of robbery as defined in Article 293 of the RPC are the
following: a) that there is personal property belonging to another; b) that there is
unlawful taking of that property; c) that the taking is with intent to gain; and d) that
there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.[36]
Indeed, the prosecution adequately established the above elements.
As to what was taken, it is undisputed that petitioner demanded and eventually
received from R&R P100,000.00, a personal property belonging to the latter. The
amount was placed inside a brown envelope and was given to petitioner while
inside Maxs Restaurant in EDSA, Caloocan City.
As to how the money was taken, it was proven that P100,000.00 was unlawfully
taken by the petitioner from R&R, with intent to gain and through intimidation. In
44

robbery, there must be an unlawful taking or apoderamiento, which is defined as

the taking of items without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.[37] Taking is
considered complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. In the instant case, it was
adequately proven that petitioner received and took possession of the brown
envelope containing the money; she even placed her wallet and handkerchief inside
the envelope. At that point, there was already taking.

As a public officer employed with the DENR, petitioner was tasked to implement
forestry laws, rules and regulations. Specifically, she had the power to make reports
on forestry violations which could result in the eventual confiscation of logs if the
possession thereof could not be justified by the required documents; and the
prosecution of violators thereof. Undoubtedly, petitioner could not demand and
eventually receive any amount from private persons as a consideration for the
formers non-performance of her lawful task. More so, in the instant case where the
petitioner threatened the complainants with possible confiscation of the logs and
prosecution if they would not accede to her demand for P100,000.00. Under such
circumstances, the eventual receipt of the said amount by the petitioner makes the
taking unlawful.
To constitute robbery, the taking should be accompanied by intent to gain. Intent to
gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of robbery, is an internal act;
hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things.[38] Actual gain is irrelevant as
the important consideration is the intent to gain.[39] Having established that the
amount of P100,000.00 was unlawfully taken by the petitioner from R&R for her
personal benefit, intent to gain was likewise proven.
Lastly, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner employed intimidation in
order to obtain the amount of P100,000.00 from R&R.
Intimidation is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary as unlawful coercion; extortion;
duress; putting in fear.[40] In robbery with intimidation of persons, the intimidation
consists in causing or creating fear in the mind of a person or in bringing in a sense
of mental distress in view of a risk or evil that may be impending, real or imagined.
Such fear of injury to person or property must continue to operate in the mind of the
victim at the time of the delivery of the money.[41]
Applying this principle to the pertinent facts of the instant case, it is noteworthy
that: On September 25, 1992, petitioner discovered the questioned logs and asked
that the supporting documents be shown; on October 1, she formally demanded the
submission of the required documents; on October 7, she demanded payment of a
particular sum of money while offering to fix the problem; on October 13, she made
the final demand; and on October 14, the representatives of R&R parted with their
P100,000.00. While it appears that initially, petitioner only demanded the
submission of the supporting documents to show that R&Rs possession of the
subject logs was legal, she agreed to talk about the matter outside her office. This
circumstance alone makes her intentions highly suspect. The same was confirmed
when petitioner eventually demanded from R&R the payment of a particular sum of
money, accompanied by threats of prosecution and confiscation of the logs.
45

From the foregoing, and in light of the concept of intimidation as defined in various
jurisprudence, we find and so hold that the P100,000.00 grease money was taken
by the petitioner from R&Rs representatives through intimidation. By using her
position as Senior Management Specialist of the DENR, petitioner succeeded in
coercing the complainants to choose between two alternatives: to part with their
money, or suffer the burden and humiliation of prosecution and confiscation of the
logs.
Indeed, this Court had, in a number of cases involving substantially the same
factual milieu as in the present case, convicted the accused of the crime of robbery
with intimidation. These include the early cases of People v. Francisco[42] and
United States v. Sanchez,[43] and the more recent cases of Fortuna v. People[44]
and Pablo v. People.[45]
In People v. Francisco, the accused, who was then a sanitary inspector in the
Philippine Health Service, discovered during an inspection of the merchandise in Sy
Hams store that the lard was unfit for consumption. He then demanded from Sy
Ham the payment of P2.00 with threats of prosecution and arrest. For fear of being
arrested, prosecuted, and convicted, Sy Ham immediately paid the amount
demanded.
In United States v. Sanchez, two police officers demanded from a Chinese, who
allegedly violated the Opium Law, P500.00, accompanied by threats to take him
before the proper authorities and have him prosecuted. For fear of being sent to
prison for a long term, the Chinese paid a negotiated amount of P150.00
In Fortuna v. People and Pablo v. People, three policemen frisked Diosdada and
Mario Montecillo, and accused the latter of illegal possession of a deadly weapon.
The policemen threatened Mario that he would be brought to the police station
where he would be interrogated by the police, mauled by other prisoners and
heckled by the press. The apprehending policemen took from Mario P1,000.00. They
likewise rummaged Diosdadas bag where they found and eventually pocketed
P5,000.00. They further demanded from Diosdada any piece of jewelry that could
be pawned. Thereafter, the two were released by the policemen.
In all of the above cases, the Court was convinced that there was sufficient
intimidation applied by the accused on the offended parties inasmuch as the acts of
the accused engendered fear in the minds of their victims and hindered the free
exercise of their will.
As in the aforesaid cases, petitioner herein was a public officer who, in the
performance of her official task, discovered the subject logs which she claimed to be
banned species. By reason of said discovery, she had the power to bring the
offenders to the proper authorities. As such public officer, she abused her authority
and demanded from the offenders the payment of a particular sum of money,
accompanied by an assurance that the latter would no longer be prosecuted.
Eventually, money was given to the petitioner. We, therefore, find no reason to
depart from the above conclusion.
We would like to stress that the Constitution guarantees that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
This means proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Reasonable
doubt is present when, after the comparison and consideration of all the evidence
46

adduced, the minds of the judges are left in a condition that they cannot say they
feel an abiding conviction, a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge, a certainty
that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and
judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.[46] To be sure,
proof beyond reasonable doubt does not demand absolute certainty and the
exclusion of all possibility of error.[47]
We find, however, that the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of public position.[48] The fact that petitioner was Senior
Forest Management Specialist of the DENR situated her in a position to perpetrate
the offense. It was on account of petitioners authority that the complainants
believed that they could be prosecuted and the subject logs confiscated unless they
gave her what she wanted. Consequently, we find that a modification of the penalty
imposed by the Sandiganbayan is in order.
Article 294(5) of the RPC fixes the penalty for simple robbery at prision correccional
in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, the range of which is
from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Considering
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position, the penalty should be
imposed in its maximum period; and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
same should likewise be the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty. The
minimum term, on the other hand, shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree which is arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium in any of
its periods, the range of which is four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months.[49]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan, dated July 26, 2001, and its Resolution dated November 16, 2001 in
Criminal Case No. 18257, are AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that petitioner
Zenaida V. Sazon is sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of Two (2) Years, Ten
(10) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight
(8) Years and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
8. G.R. No. L-27352

October 31, 1969

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. RUBEN ABLAZA, defendant-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Crim. Case
No. 13526) convicting therein accused Ruben Ablaza for kidnapping and serious
illegal detention and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death with all the
accessory penalties set by law.
In an information filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Ruben Ablaza, John Doe
and Peter Doe were accused of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention, said to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of March 1963, in the municipality of Makati,
province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
47

above-named accused being then private individuals, conspiring, and confederating

together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, take and carry away and detain one Annabelle
Huggins a female, 20 years of age, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law, with the aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle.
The prosecution, through its lone witness, complainant Annabelle Huggins, tried to
establish that in November, 1962 accused Ruben Ablaza forcibly took her from her
aunt's place in Caloocan City and brought her to a house in a barrio in Hagonoy,
Bulacan, where she was criminally abused by her abductor. After her rescue by the
Philippine Constabulary men, a criminal case for forcible abduction with rape was
filed against Ablaza in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
On 22 March 1963, and while that case in Bulacan was still pending, Annabelle
Huggins, who was sweeping the front of her aunt's house in Makati, Rizal, was again
grabbed by two men and forcibly taken to a taxicab where a third man, who turned
out to be Ablaza, was waiting. Then the vehicle sped away before anybody could
come to the aid of the struggling girl. Inside the cab, Annabelle was seated at the
rear between Ablaza and a companion; her head was pressed down to the floor of
the taxi, with Ablaza covering her mouth with his hand to prevent her from crying
out for help. She was first brought to the house of Ablaza's compadre in Caloocan,
but then, informed that the police were already in their pursuit, she was moved to
the house of another compadre, where she was kept for a week. Later, at the
instance of Ablaza, Annabelle was taken to Bulacan to ask for the complaint against
him be dropped. This did not materialize, because when they were inside the
Malolos municipal building Annabelle's uncle, in company of Constabulary men,
came and took her. She also testified that for the duration of her detention the
accused and his compadres were always guarding her to prevent her escape.1

For the defense, only accused Ruben Ablaza took the witness stand, and gave an
entirely different version of the incident. According to this accused, in 1962, he and
complainant Annabelle Huggins were sweethearts; that as Annabelle was
complaining of being maltreated by her aunt, they decided to elope, which they did
in November, 1962. He and Annabelle stayed in the house of his uncle in Hagonoy,
Bulacan, where they were later found by the police authorities. Thereafter, he was
charged for abduction with rape before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
Sometime in March, 1963, he received a letter from Annabelle asking him to get her
from her aunt's residence in Makati, Rizal (Exhibit "1"). The accused took a taxicab
and went to the place indicated in the letter, and there he saw Annabelle; that, at
his call, she came near and entered the cab with him; that they agreed to get
married, but upon complainant's suggestion, they first went to Malolos so she could
drop the case against him; that when they were in the municipal building, however,
the Philippine Constabulary men and the aunt arrived and Annabelle changed her
mind. With the above testimonies, both parties rested their cases.
On 7 March 1967, the court rendered its decision finding the accused guilty of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, attended by the aggravating circumstance
of use of motor vehicle, and sentenced him to death. In reaching this verdict, the
lower court said:
48

In deciding and resolving the question of guilt or innocence of the accused, Ruben
Ablaza, this Court more than ever realizes its grave responsibility of ascertaining the
truth and finding the real facts as the accused is charged with a capital offense. The
task of fact-finding in this particular case is delicate and difficult because all that the
Court has before it are the directly conflicting testimonies of the complaining
witness, Annabelle Huggins, and the accused, Ruben Ablaza, and our Decision will
essentially be predicated on testimonial credibility.
Simply stated, the question is: who of the two, Annabelle or Ruben Ablaza, is telling
the truth?
Several factors or circumstances lead us to believe and find that Annabelle Huggins
is the one who told the truth.
The decision then went on to state that it was the complainant's sincerity and
frankness while she was on the witness stand, coupled by her timidity and modesty,
that convinced the court that the events as narrated by her were the true facts.
As correctly designated by the accused himself, the issue in this review of the
aforesaid judgment of the court below revolves around the credibility of witnesses,
i.e., whether or not the trial court was correct in giving more weight to the
testimony of the complainant and in finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged and sentencing him to death.
The rule in this jurisdiction on the matter of credibility of witnesses is by now
settled. Unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case, the appellate court will not disturb the factual
findings of the lower court.2 For, having had the opportunity of observing the
demeanor and behavior of the witness while testifying, the trial court more than the
reviewing tribunal, is in a better position to gauge their credibility, and properly
appreciate the relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for both parties.3
In the present case, there is no reason for us to overrule the judgment of the trial
judge giving credence to the declarations of the complainant. The records of the
case are convincing that the complainant's testimony on the facts of her kidnapping
on 22 March 1963, and of her detention for a week, rang of truth. Not only was her
narration of the events coherent and plausible, and remained unshattered by the
cross examination by the defense counsel, but also no motive has been adduced by
this witness, who, since the first incident in 1962, had got married and, therefore,
would have wanted least public exposure of her harrowing experiences, would come
out and undergo another legal scrutiny of her unfortunate encounters with the
accused, other than the desire to tell the truth. Her reluctance after her marriage to
publicize her harrowing experiences with the accused is attested by the warrant for
her arrest, issued by the trial court on 16 January 1967 (Record, Court of First
Instance, pages 90-91), that left her no alternative but to take the witness stand on
18 January.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1.

If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days;
49

xxx
4.
xxx

xxx

xxx

If the person kidnapped or detained shall be minor, female, or a public officer.

xxx

xxx

The accused, however, assails the decision finding him guilty of kidnapping defined
and penalized by the above-quoted provision. It is being claimed that considering
the testimony of complainant that she was raped by the accused while in the house
of the latter's compadre in Caloocan, and again while in the house of his uncle in
Bulacan, he (the accused) should have been adjudged guilty of abduction with rape
instead.
There is no merit in the allegation. The accused stood trial for kidnapping with
serious illegal detention, and the deprivation of complainant's liberty, which is the
essential element of the offense,4 was duly proved. That there may have been
other crimes committed in the course of the victim's confinement is immaterial to
this case. The kidnapping became consummated when the victim was actually
restrained or deprived of her freedom, and that makes proper the prosecution of the
herein accused under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The surrounding
circumstances make it clear that the main purpose of Annabelle's detention was to
coerce her into withdrawing her previous charges against appellant Ablaza, thus
obstructing the administration of justice. The acts of rape were incidental and used
as a means to break the girl's spirit and induce her to dismiss the criminal charge.
While the accused presented a letter which he claimed to have been sent him by
the complainant asking him to take her away, the authorship of said missive was
not established. Appellant's personal belief that it came from her is not enough,
considering that he made no attempt to even show his familiarity with her
handwriting or her signature. Hence, the lower court was correct in giving no weight
to said document.
It is likewise contended that it was error for the lower court to consider the
aggravating circumstance of motor vehicle as attending the commission of the
crime, the prosecution allegedly having failed to substantiate this allegation of the
information. The contention is untenable. Contrary to the protestation of the
accused, the fact of use of motor vehicle, which facilitated the taking away of the
complainant and her consequent detention, was established not only by the latter's
declaration in court but also by the accused's own admission that he took away the
said complainant from her aunt's residence in Makati, Rizal, in a taxicab.5
Considering, therefore, the extant evidence on record, we fully agree with the trial
court that accused Ruben Ablaza has committed the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention of the person of complainant Annabelle Huggins. The
offense being attended by one aggravating circumstance, the use of motor vehicle,
with no mitigating circumstance to offset it, the penalty provided in Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code should be imposed in its maximum period. The Court is thus
left no alternative but to confirm the death penalty imposed by the court below.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
50

9. G.R. No. 137567

June 20, 2000

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON,

JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge
Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in
Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the
Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that
the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against
his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16,
1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.1
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,2
petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it
was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman
named Milagros Salting.4 Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage5 under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his
paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated
September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information6
against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.1awphi1
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of
Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the
foregoing motion in the Order7 dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated
December 9, 1998.In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the
concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9,
1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.8 In an Order9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order 10
dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
his petition.
51

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a
prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions
might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for
concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare the marriage as valid by
dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might
acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts'
ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be
suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's
marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of
the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never existed;
and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because
he was never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said
provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision read:
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well
invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the
custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
52

marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not
present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in
the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of
concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that
even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is
not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova 1 cited in Donato vs. Luna 14
where this Court held that:
. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by
petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he
who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court
therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
10. G.R. NO. 137049. November 29, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PFC. RENANTE
NACARIO y CAPALOS, defendant-appellant.
MELO, J:
In an Information dated May 21, 1998, accused-appellant Renante Nacario y
Capalos was charged with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about May 20, 1998, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then an
active member of the Philippine Army assigned with the 62nd Infantry Battalion,
stationed at Malagutay, this City, and as such armed with an M14 rifle, with grave
abuse of superior strength, by means of treachery and with intent to kill, did then
53

and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot with the use
of said weapon that he was then armed with, at the person of Cpl. DANILO ROSIL,
thereby inflicting multiple gunshot wounds on the fatal part of the latters body
which directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
victim.
(p. 6, Rollo.)
It is not disputed that the victim and the accused-appellant were members of the
Philippine Army and were both assigned to work in the mess hall of the 62nd
Infantry Battalion in Malagutay, Zamboanga City. At around 2 oclock in the
afternoon of May 20, 1998, accused-appellant and the victim were alone inside the
mess hall when accused-appellant thrice shot the victim at the back using an M14
rifle. Accused-appellant owned up the killing and immediately surrendered his M14
rifle and a bandolier of bullets to the officer on duty, Pfc. Reynaldo O. Germano, and
later to superior officers.
When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and invoked self-defense. He
contended that he and the victim had a heated argument on May 20, 1998; that he
pushed the victim as the latter was grabbing accused-appellants M14 rifle; that the
victim then pulled a .357 caliber revolver from his back forcing accused-appellant to
raise his M14 rifle and to shoot the victim as he turned his back. Accused-appellant
submits that the circumstance that the victim was shot three times was purely due
to impulse and was not deliberate.
The trial court did not believe the sole and uncorroborated testimony of accusedappellant. Instead, it upheld the testimony of the prosecution witnesses who
declared that they saw the accused-appellant shoot the victim two more times even
as the victim had his back to accused-appellant, and was about to fall on the ground
due to the first shot. The trial court also lent credence to the testimony of the
physician who conducted the autopsy which showed that all the three wounds
sustained by the victim were at his back. Thus, on November 13, 1998, the court a
quo rendered a decision convicting accused-appellant of Murder and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua and to pay damages (pp. 16-28, Rollo).
On appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following as the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court, to wit:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING APPELLANTS PLEA OF SELFDEFENSE OR THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELFDEFENSE.

II

54

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN

PROVEN BEYOND DOUBT, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING
TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE.

III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE COURT A

QUO ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER.

(pp. 53-54, Rollo.)

We find the appeal unmeritorious.

Self-defense is a timeworn excuse resorted to by assailants in criminal cases (People

vs. Maalat, 275 SCRA 206 [1997]). We have held in a host of cases that for selfdefense to prosper, the following requisites must be met: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself (People vs. Angeles, 275 SCRA 19 [1997]; People vs. Maalat, 275 SCRA 206
[1997]; People vs. Unarce, 270 SCRA 756 [1997]; People vs. Nalangan, 270 SCRA
234 [1997]; People vs. Tobias, 267 SCRA 229 [1997]; People vs. Cahindo, 266 SCRA
554 [1997]; People vs. Silvestre, 244 SCRA 548 [1995]). In the case at bar, accusedappellant has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the first element of
self-defense: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. His uncorroborated
testimony that he and the victim had a heated discussion is not the unlawful
aggression contemplated by law. Worse, this pretension is belied by the absence in
the crime scene of any firearm, more so the .357 cal. revolver allegedly drawn by
the victim and with which he was presumably going to shoot accused-appellant.

Rather, the evidence shows that accused-appellant was the aggressor. His use of a
deadly and high-powered M14 rifle in shooting the victim, not just once, but thrice
and at the back at that, all demonstrate a deliberate and determined effort to kill
the victim. His failure to assert self-defense before the person on duty, Pfc.
Hermano, to whom he surrendered the M14 rifle used in killing the victim and the
bandolier of bullets, casts serious doubt on the veracity of the theory of selfdefense. And it must be borne in mind in this regard that the absence of the
essential element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim likewise
invalidates and voids incomplete self-defense (People vs. Layam, 234 SCRA 424
[1994]).

55

Was the killing of the victim attended with treachery, thus qualifying the crime to
murder?

We answer in the affirmative. There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make (Art. 14, Par.
16, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Taedo, 266 SCRA 34 [1997]). In the case at bar,
accused-appellant shot the victim thrice from behind. The victim was unarmed.
Plainly, treachery attended the killing for there is alevosia when a person is
unexpectedly attacked from behind, depriving him of any opportunity to defend
himself (Ingles vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 122 [1997]). In People vs. Eubra (274
SCRA 180 [1997]), we likewise held that where the victim was totally unprepared for
the unexpected attack from behind and had no weapon to resist the aggression, the
shooting cannot but be considered as treacherous. Here, accused-appellants
treacherous attack on his co-soldier was narrated by accused-appellant himself, to
wit:
COURT:
Q You were able to hit him (the victim) also three (3) times?
A Yes.
Q All at the back?
A Yes.
Q Are you sure?
A Yes.
Q You were not able to hit him a single time at the front?
A No, your Honor, because his back is already facing me.
Q So, when you shot him his back was towards you?
A Yes.
Q He was not facing you?
A No, your Honor.
(tsn, p. 12, October 27, 1998)
Anent the third assigned error, the trial court, contrary to accused-appellants
submission, indeed considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
by imposing the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code punishes the crime of murder with reclusion perpetua to death. Because
accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered to the authorities immediately after the
shooting, the trial court considered said mitigating circumstance and correctly
imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on the accused. However,
reclusion perpetua being an indivisible penalty, accused-appellant cannot avail
himself of the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
56

With respect to the award of actual damages in the amount of P34,500.00, we find
that only the amount of P2,713.00 was duly supported by receipts (Exhs. G2-G9,
Original Records). The rest of the expenses which the victims widow allegedly
incurred were not substantiated by evidence other than her sole testimony. The
award of actual damages cannot rest on the bare allegation of the heirs of the
offended party (People vs. Aguilar, 292 SCRA 349 [1998]. Failure to substantiate
such claim negates the award for actual damages (People vs. Castro, G.R. No.
130785, September 29, 2000). As such, the victims widow is entitled to the award of
P2,713.00 only as actual damages.
We, however, increase the award of moral damages from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00
considering that the victims widow was pregnant with her and the victims first child
at the time of the incident. Moral damages, which include mental anguish, serious
anxiety, and wounded feelings, may be recovered in criminal offenses resulting in
the victims death (People vs. Dagami, G.R. No. 123111, September 13, 2000).
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
the actual damages awarded by the trial court are reduced to P2,713.00, and the
moral damages granted are increased to P50,000.00. In all other respects, the
appealed decision is affirmed. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
11. [G.R. No. 121178. January 22, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO CAHINDO,
accused-appellant
ELO, J.:
For the killing of one Militon Lagilles, Romeo Cahindo was charged with murder,
thusly:
That on or about the 23rd day of September, 1989, in the City of Tacloban,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack and wound MILITON
LAGILLES, with the use of a deadly weapon known as "sarad" which the accused
had provided himself for the purpose thereby inflicting upon him hack wounds on
his head and deltoid area near shoulder joint of his body which caused his
death.SPPED-CALR
Contrary to law.
(p. 5, Rollo.)
After trial, Cahindo was found guilty as charged in a decision dated September 20,
1993, and he was accordingly meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua, aside
from being ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency (p. 18, Rollo).

57

Dissatisfied, accused-appellant has interposed the instant appeal, claiming that the
trial court erred in giving more weight to the prosecution's evidence instead of
believing his protestations of self-defense.
The facts of the case, as found by the trial court and as borne out by the evidence,
are as follows:
The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimonies of Dr. Rogelio Daya,
Lucila Lagilles, Cristilyn Lagilles and Anatolio Bohol. The evidence for the people
seeks to establish that at about 7 o'clock in the evening of September 23, 1989 at
Baybay District, San Jose, Tacloban City, while the deceased victim Militon Lagilles
was urinating at the yard of his house the accused Romeo Cahindo approached the
victim from behind and with a scythe locally known as "sarad" held in his (accused)
right hand delivered hacking blows upon said victim hitting the latter at his right
shoulder and on top of the head, after which the deceased victim fell down on the
ground and died.
The post mortem examination (Exhibit-"B") issued by Dr. Rogelio Daya, Assistant
City Health Officer of Tacloban City shows that the deceased Militon Lagilles
sustained the following injuries which resulted in his death, to wit:
1) Hacking wound, (R) deltoid area, upper portion anterior aspect, near shoulder
joint, 22 cms. long, 5.5 cms. deep, 5 cms. wide;
2) Hacking wound, scalp, 16 cms. long, 3 cms. wide, skull deep, extending from
frontal area to occipital area.
Cause of Death:
Hemorrhage due to hacking wounds.
Prosecution witness Cristilyn Lagilles and Anatolio Bohol revealed that immediately
prior to the hacking incident, the accused challenged the deceased to a fight, which
the victim obviously did not mind. Nonetheless, the accused persisted in his
criminal designs and hacked the victim to death. Said prosecution witnesses further
testified that before the accused hacked the victim, the latter was heard uttering
the statement "I will not fight you, don't do it, don't do it". Said prosecution
witnesses could not have erred as they were barely two armslength from the scene
of the crime. After inflicting the fatal wounds on the victim, the accused
immediately ran away from the scene of the crime. This significant piece of
evidence was, surprisingly, not denied by the defense, hence admitted.
According to said witnesses, at the time accused challenged the deceased victim to
a fight, the former was drunk. While the hacking incident was taking place,
prosecution witnesses Cristilyn Lagilles and Anatolio Bohol were immobilized with
shock, although Lagilles was able to shout for help. Only after the victim had fallen
down to the ground and his assailant fled, that witness Anatolio Bohol regained his
composure and rushed and ran towards Costa Brava to fetch the husband of
Cristilyn Lagilles, Danilo Lagilles, who upon arrival immediately rushed the victim to
the hospital, but the victim was dead on arrival at the hospital.
(pp. 13-14, Rollo.)

58

Accused-appellant argues that he should have been exculpated on the ground of

self-defense. Having invoked such justifying circumstance, accused-appellant is
deemed to have necessarily admitted having killed the victim (People vs. Besana,
Jr., 64 SCRA 84 [1975]). The burden of proof is thereupon shifted to him to establish
and to prove the elements of self-defense (People vs. Nuestro, 240 SCRA 221
[1995]) by clear and convincing evidence (People vs. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653 [1993]).
For exculpation, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution (People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]).
The elements of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (People vs.
Camahalan, 241 SCRA 558 [1995]).
Accused-appellant maintains that he acted in self-defense when he inflicted the
fatal wounds with his scythe upon the victim because the victim stabbed him twice
when he (accused-appellant) refused to sell tuba to the victim. According to
accused-appellant, at around 7 o'clock on the evening of December 23, 1989, the
victim went to the house of accused-appellant to buy tuba but accused-appellant
refused because the victim was already drunk, and because of this refusal, the
deceased stabbed accused-appellant three times after which the latter retaliated by
hacking the deceased on the head with his scythe which he pulled from his waist.
Accused-appellant's version is unconvincing, flawed as it is by serious
inconsistencies. He testified that "there was a person who called wanting to buy
tuba". It would seem that when the deceased "called", he must have been at a
certain distance from accused-appellant, such that the latter could not have been
certain whether the buyer was drunk or not. In any event, human experience tells
us that one who sells alcoholic drinks does not usually refuse a buyer unless the
latter is obviously too intoxicated and is already creating trouble. There is not even
a suggestion that the buyer was acting unnaturally, or boisterously, or bellicosely at
the time he "called" accused-appellant to buy tuba. Further, it is too much of a
coincidence that the victim would arm himself with a bladed weapon while on his
way to buy tuba. And it goes against human nature to suggest that the accused
should be carrying a scythe at his waist even after he had reached his house and
was resting. Then too, not the slightest injury was sustained by accused-appellant
from the alleged attack by the victim.

Moreover, accused-appellant's version is adulterated with evident falsehoods. He

declared that he inflicted the fatal wounds on the deceased while he was down on
the ground grappling with the deceased. This declaration goes counter to his earlier
statement that he hacked the deceased while the latter was at the door of the
former's house.
Such manifest falsehood and discrepancy in accused-appellant's testimony seriously
impair its probative value and cast serious doubts on his credibility (People vs. Cruz,
231 SCRA 759 [1994]).
The factual findings and conclusions of the trial court are entitled to great weight
and respect and should not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA
314 [1995], unless the trial court had overlooked, disregarded, misunderstood, or
59

misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and significance which if considered

would have altered the result of the case (People vs. Gapasan, 243 SCRA 53
[1995]).We have scoured the record in search of such fact or circumstance and have
found none. Hence, the findings of the trial court must stand.
Another circumstance which glaringly points to the guilt of accused-appellant is his
flight from the scene of the killing. Flight of an accused from the scene of the crime
removes any remaining shred of doubt on his guilt (People vs. Deunida, 231 SCRA
520 [1994]).
As afore-mentioned, accused-appellant invokes self-defense, but he has utterly
failed to substantiate the same. The paramount element of self-defense is unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, the absence of which negates self-defense
(People vs. Ponayo, 235 SCRA 226 [1994]). As shown above, accused-appellant has
grossly failed to establish that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. No injury on accused-appellant was shown, or else any alleged wound must
have been inflicted long before he hacked the victim, and must have been the very
motive why he killed the victim. No witness has come forth to corroborate any
supposed unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
On the other hand, prosecution witnesses Anatolio Bohol and Cristilyn Lagilles
positively and categorically testified that the victim was urinating at the yard of his
house when accused-appellant appeared from behind and hacked the victim with a
scythe on the right shoulder and on the head causing his death. The location and
extent of the wounds sustained by the victim, clearly demonstrate the intent and
determination of accused-appellant to kill the victim, and in effect corroborate the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses that accused-appellant, suddenly and
without, warning, treacherously attacked the victim from behind while the latter was
totally oblivious of his impending doom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against accusedappellant.

12. G.R. No. 132633

October 4, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

vs. ARMANDO GEMOYA, and RONILO TIONKO, accused-appella
Before us on automatic review is a joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of the
Eleventh Judicial Region stationed in Davao City (Branch 15), finding accusedappellants guilty of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 35,459-96, and
sentencing each of them to a prison term of two years, four months, twenty-one
days to eight years and one day. The two accused appellants were also found guilty
of murder in Criminal Case No. 36,460-96, and were sentenced to suffer the death
penalty.

The relevant facts are summarized in the People's Brief as follows:

60

At about 9:00 in the evening of January 27, 1996, the neighborhood of Barrio
Malagamot, Panacan, Davao City was awakened by a commotion. Irene Lantapon
was among those who went out to check what was happening. She saw accused
Armando Gemoya and Candelario Aliazar running towards their house (TSN, June
11, 1996, p. 20, November 5, 1996, p.65).
After about half an hour, Gemoya and Aliazar came back with Ronilo and Rolly
Tionko, the former's uncles and the latter's in-laws. They were armed with pipe,
wood and an improvised bow and arrow locally called "indian pana." It was like a
sling shot with an arrow made of nail with feathers in the end. Addressing a group of
people who were huddled together, Ronilo Tionko stopped and demanded an
explanation for what happened to his brother-in-law. They replied that nothing
happened to him and advised them to go home. Accused ignored them and
proceeded to the house of the Alferezes, which was along the road in front of the
school, when they saw Wilfredo Alferez standing by the road waiting for a taxi (ibid,
June 11, 1996, p. 5, 16, 20-21; November 4, 1996, p. 57; November 5, 1996, pp. 6667; November 6, 1996, pp. 79-81).
The quartet rushed to him. Ronilo Tionko beat him with a cylindrical wood, Rolly
Tionko with a pipe of the same size while Aliazar held his arms behind him. Once
Gemoya had aimed his "indian pana," they stepped aside to ensure that they would
not be hit. Wilfredo Alferez was hit directly on his left chest. Slumped to the ground,
Edgardo Jimenez rushed to his aid. His daughter Rosalie, who had just come from
school, tried to pull him away. Irene Lantapon yelled at her to run as Gemoya was
about to shoot his "indian pana" again. Before she could do so, she was hit in her
left ear. Then the four scampered away (ibid., June 11, 1996, pp. 6-7, 21-24; June
13, 1996, pp. 34-36; November 4, 1996, pp. 57-58; November 1996, pp. 66-67;
November 6, 1996, pp. 79-81).
Rosalie Jimenez and Wilfredo Alferez were rushed to the hospital. After minor
treatment, she was declared out of danger. Wilfredo Alferez was not as lucky. He
was pronounced dead on arrival (ibid., June 11, 1996, pp. 8-9; June 13, 1996, pp. 36,
41; November 6, 1996, p. 81).
Two separate Informations were filed against four suspects, namely, the herein two
accused-appellants and two others who have remained at large, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 36,459-96
That on or about January 27, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, hit with the use of an "Indian Pana", one
Rosalie Jimenez. The accused performed all the acts of execution which could
produce the crime of Homicide, as a consequence but which did not produce it by
reason of a timely medical intervention, a cause which is independent of the will of
the perpetrators.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No.36,460-96
That on or about January 27, 1996 in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery and abuse of superior strength,
61

wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and hit with an "Indian Pana"
one Wilfredo Alferez which caused his subsequent death.
Contrary to law.
(pp. 7-8. Rollo.)
On May 28, 1996 and August 28, 1996, Armando Gemoya and Ronilo Tionko,
respectively, entered their pleas of "not guilty", and the two criminal cases were
thereafter jointly tried, following which, judgment was rendered disposing:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt in the two cases, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 36,459-96 the penalty of two years, four months, twenty-one
days to eight years and one day is imposed on accused Armando Gemoya and
Ronilo Tionko for frustrated homicide with respect to victim Rosalie Jimenez.
2. Criminal Case No. 36,460-96 the death penalty is imposed on accused
Armando Gemoya and Ronilo Tionko for the murder of Wilfredo Alferez.
(p. 27, Rollo.)
In their individual and separate briefs, the following errors are assigned:

Accused-appellant Ronilo Tionko:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT RONILO TIONKO
GUILTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 36,459-96 FOR FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, WITH
RESPECT TO VICTIM ROSALIE JIMENEZ AND, ALSO, IN FINDING HIM GUILTY IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 36,460-96 FOR THE MURDER OF WILFREDO ALFEREZ AS THE
SET OF FACTS OBTAINING IN THE CASE AT BAR IS CAPABLE OF TWO OR MORE
EXPLANATION.
Accused-appellant Armando Gemoya:

I.THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING GEMOYA OF THE CRIME OF

MURDER.

II.THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF GEMOYA.

III.THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING GEMOYA OF THE CRIME OF

FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE FOR THE WOUNDING OF ROSALIE JIMENEZ.
IV.THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY OF
GEMOYA.
After reviewing the evidence on record we find no compelling reason to depart from
the factual findings of the trial court that accused-appellants, in conspiracy with one
62

another, committed the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength. In

People vs. Patalin (G.R. No. 125539, July 27, 1999) we reiterated the ruling on this
matter, thus:
Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination. We generally uphold and respect this appraisal since as an appellate
court, we do not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a written
record.
(p. 15)
Accused-appellant Gemoya claims that the uniform narration of facts by prosecution
witnesses is not supported by the documentary and the expert's testimony of the
NBI Medico Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy examination on the victim
Wilfredo Alferez. Dr. Ricardo M. Rodaje affirmed that he found no other injury on
Wilfredo aside from the puncture wound on his chest which was the sole cause of
death (TSN, July 3 1996, p.46).
We are not persuaded by this argument.
It must be borne in mind that accused-appellant Gemoya has not denied having
executed the fatal act, which caused the death of Wilfredo Alferez. He admittedly
discharged the weapon ("indian pana") which hit a vital organ of the victim, causing
his instantaneous death. His only lame excuse is that, to defend himself, he used
the sling shot ("indian pana"), which he grabbed from "somebody", against the
victim in the course of a tumultuous affray allegedly instigated by the victim
himself.
When an accused admits having killed the victim, the burden of proving his
innocence is shifted to him. We ruled in People vs. Manlulu (231 SCRA 701 [1994])
that "by invoking self-defense, the accused admit killing Alfaro. The burden of proof
is thus shifted to them. Their duty now is to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the lawful justification for the killing." Accused-appellant Gemoya can no
longer invoke the constitutional right of being presumed innocent of the crime
charged. As far as he is concerned, the crime of murder in the case at bar is
established once the prosecution, establishes any of the qualifying circumstances
with proof beyond reasonable doubt. This is because the fact of death and the cause
thereof are already established by the admission. The intent to kill is likewise
presumed from the fact of death, unless the accused proves by convincing evidence
that any of the justifying circumstances in Article 11 or any of the exempting
circumstances in Article 12, both of the Revised Penal Code, is present.
As we have earlier observed, however, we find no cogent reason to disregard the
trial court's factual findings on this score. We find nothing upon review of the record,
which would convince us that accused-appellant Gemoya and his cohorts were not
the assailants in this case. The theory of self-defense has not been duly established.
The fact that accused-appellant shot the victims with an "indian pana" cannot be
negated by supposed inconsistencies between the testimony of the eyewitnesses
and the findings of the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy
63

examination. It matters not if Wilfredo suffered no injury other than the fatal
puncture wound. His death was caused by that puncture wound, and the fact that
there were four assailants who ganged upon the said victim is incontestable. These
established realities make accused-appellants criminally liable for murder, qualified
by abuse of superior strength.
Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of
in the commission of the crime (People vs. Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233 [1994]). When
four armed assailants, two of whom are accused-appellants in this case, gang up on
one unarmed victim, it can only be said that excessive force was purposely sought
and employed.
Although only accused-appellant Gemoya may have inflicted the fatal wound upon
the victim in this case, accused-appellant Tionko is also liable for the crime of
murder since evidently, the concerted acts of the two accused appellants, and their
two other companions, to obtain a common criminal objective signify conspiracy
among them. Ronilo Tionko beat Wilfredo with a cylindrical wooden cane or
"batuta", and Rolly Tionko with a pipe, while Gemoya, after his companions had step
aside to give him a clear shot, released his dart-missile at Wilfredo. A conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it (People vs. Taguba, 229 SCRA 188, 1994).
Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit
the crime. It may he deduced either from the mode and manner in which the
offense was committed or from the accused themselves pointing to a community of
interest or concerted action (People vs. Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]). Herein
accused-appellants and their companions ganging up upon a single common victim
until one of them is able to inflict the fatal wound is clearly indicative of a common
design to assail and disable their victim-. Conspiracy can be inferred and proved by
the totality of the acts of the accused when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design (People vs. Bayrante, 235 SCRA 19 [1994]).
With or without himself inflicting injuries upon victim Wilfredo, accused appellant
Ronilo Tionko is equally liable for the crime of murder in the case at bar as accused
appellant Gemoya. He cannot escape criminal liability under the circumstances
even though the autopsy report indicated no other injuries except the punctured
wound on the victim's chest. A conspirator, no matter how minimal his participation
in the crime, is as guilty as the principal perpetrator of the crime (People vs. Alas
274 SCRA 310 [1977]). Holding the victim to render him immobile to enable his
companions to consummate their dastardly act (People vs. Dinglasan, 267 SCRA 29
[1997]) or standing guard or lending moral support to the actual perpetrator is
criminally responsible to the same extent as the one who inflicted the fatal blow
(People vs. Diaz, 271 SCRA 504 [1997]).
As regards their second victim, Rosalie Jimenez, however, we agree with accusedappellants that the trial court erred in convicting them of frustrated homicide. As
correctly pointed out in the People's brief, the testimony of Jerry Lantapon and Irene
Lantapon concurred to the effect that the hitting of Rosalie was accidental as the
second "indian pana" was intended for Wilfredo. The intent to kill Rosalie which is

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essential if accused appellants were to be held liable for frustrated homicide is

therefore, absent.
The two accused-appellants herein are liable for the crime resulting from Gemoya's
act of releasing the second "indian pana", which accidentally hit Rosalie. Although
Rosalie may not have been their intended victim, accused-appellants, acting in
conspiracy with one another as we have earlier discussed, are liable for the
consequences of their felonious act (see: Paragraph 1, Article 4, Revised Penal
Code). Mistake in the identity of the victim, which may either be (a) "error in
personae" (mistake of the person), or (b) "aberratio ictus" (mistake in the blow), is
neither exempting nor mitigating (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil. 605 [1930]). Accusedappellants, therefore, cannot escape the criminal liability resulting from the injury
suffered by Rosalie.
As for the penalty, even though it appears on record that Rosalie received medical
treatment immediately after her injury, there is no evidence regarding the extent of
incapacity said injury caused her. Accordingly, accused-appellants may only be held
liable for the crime of slight physical injury under Paragraph 2 of Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 266.
Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attention during the same period.
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from
engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance;
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos when
the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing injury.
Since there is no showing that victim Rosalie Jimenez was incapacitated from
carrying out her habitual work after the injury, both accused-appellants in this case
are sentenced to the penalty of arresto menor or a fine of P200.00 and censure for
the crime of slight physical injury.
As to the imposition of the death penalty upon both accused-appellants in this case,
we agree with the Solicitor General and accused-appellant Gemoya that the trial
court seriously erred in not considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in favor of accused-appellant Gemoya. The trial court likewise erred in
imposing the maximum in the range of penalty for murder.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punished by
reclusion perpetua to death. Where there are no aggravating and no mitigating
circumstances attendant in the commission of the crime the medium penalty shall
be imposed. For the crime of murder, the medium as well as the minimum penalty
are the same because the lower range penalty, reclusion perpetua is an indivisible
penalty.
Applying the rule to the case at bar where there is the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and the absence of any aggravating circumstances other than
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those already absorbed in the circumstances which qualified the killing to murder
(People vs. Cheng, 279 SCRA 129 [1997l), the minimum penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed.
Finally, as correctly pointed out in the People's brief. when death occurs as a result
of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the amount of as P50,000.00
indemnity for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof of
damage (People vs. Galladan, G.R. No. 126932, November 19, 1999; People vs.
Espaola, 271 SCRA 689 [1997]). Thus, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00
for the death of Wilfredo Alferez will have to be awarded in favor of his heirs.
Accused-appellants being convicted as co-principals for the crime of murder, the
two shall be held solidarily liable for the civil indemnity.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of: (a)
slight physical injury in Criminal Case No. 35,459-96 and each sentenced to a
determinate prison term of thirty (30) days of arresto menor; and (b) murder in
Criminal Case No. 36,460-96 and accordingly each sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
and ordered to solidarily pay civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) to the heirs of Wilfredo Alferez for the latter's death, the two prison
terms to be served concurrently with one another. No special pronouncement is
made as to costs.

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