Educ Psychol Rev (2009) 21:181192

DOI 10.1007/s10648-009-9099-6
REFLECTIONS ON THE FIELD

Situated Learning: What Ever Happened

To Educational Psychology?
Philip Langer

Published online: 9 May 2009

# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract This paper attempts to explore the diminishing contributions of psychology in

teacher preparation programs. Using situated learning as a basis for discussion, I have
argued that a student may take a course in educational psychology and then subsequently
discover that subsequent preparation may ignore those psychological caveats regarding the
efficacy of proposed instructional methodology such as situated learning. These include
cognition, group processes, and transfer of training. However, the presence of such concerns
is not confined to situated learning specifically. It may be time for educators to reconsider
psychological findings as necessary contributions to the efficacy of their proposals.
Keywords Educational psychology . Situated learning
The purpose of this paper is to reflect on what I believe to be a diminishing
acknowledgement by educators regarding possible psychological contributions to classroom practices. I shall paint my remarks in rather broad strokes, recognizing that there are
exceptions. My intent is to raise questions rather than provide answers. I intend to provoke
because I believe there are academic issues, which have been festering for some time.

The Role of Educational Psychology

In many teacher preparation programs, the educational psychology course all too often
becomes the statistical equivalent of an outlier. Indeed, students may subsequently learn
about methods and practices relevant to instruction, without much possibility of exposure to
the underlying psychological rationale. A course in educational psychology may then seem
to be an academic hurdle to be overcome and forgotten, on the way to becoming a
classroom teacher. A student might legitimately ask the question: So what? For that
matter, when questions arise in such matters as methodology and policy, I wonder how
P. Langer (*)
School of Education, University of Colorado, 249 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309, USA
e-mail: Philip.Langer@Colorado.edu

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often educational psychologists get the feeling that they may be seen, but not necessarily
heard.
Rothkopf (2008) alluded to this, when discussing the contributions of psychology to
instructional research (or lack thereof). He pointed out that the practical demands of
classroom instruction do not align themselves necessarily with basic research, which is
focused on more fundamental problems. Specifically, studies assessing the effectiveness of
a given curriculum are more concerned with overall achievement rather than the day-to-day
operations. Referring to the latter as being at the tactical level, he goes on to argue that
such studies are not necessarily welcomed or even considered necessary.

Questions about the Relevance of Psychology

Part of the problem is that there is not much consensus about how to define educational
psychology, particularly about what psychology is relevant. For the purposes of this paper, I
shall assume that the psychology in educational psychology refers to concepts relevant to
classroom instruction. Moreover, I believe that psychological research does provide some
explanations for classroom successes and failures, and for that matter, on policy issues. Of
course, the significance of the contributions of any psychological research is a function of
the questions asked and the methodological rigor of the study.
Current texts do carry a generally shared set of psychological concepts, at times outdated
and simplistic. In an attempt to attract a diverse audience, depth is frequently sacrificed for
breadth, apparently to attract purchasers ranging from community and junior colleges to
universities. If AERA journals as well as the annual program proceedings can be taken as
examples of my arguments, the presumed contributions of psychology to classroom
instruction, as espoused by curriculum developers, policymakers, and practitioners in
general, have begun to diminish. In the call for 2009 papers, I was surprised to find that
while situated learning was included among the keywords provided, there was no keyword
provision for transfer of training, group processes, etc. And yet, even proponents of situated
learning recognize that such concerns are part of any discussion.
I believe this represents a drift toward an orientation favoring cultural anthropology, with
holistic rather than analytical arguments regarding the efficacy of instructional strategies,
not to mention human behavior. The theoretical perspectives differ. This is not meant to
question the validity of each perspective but to argue that a psychological perspective is
necessary to the needs of education. Following Rothkopfs observations, necessary
questions of why seem to have given way to questions of simply how. As I noted
earlier, this situation has very serious implications.

Educational and Academic Psychology

Part of the problem is that there is something called educational psychology, but at the same
time, there is something called academic psychology. Initially, the fields were not separated,
as witnessed by Thorndike and others. However, the divergence between academic and
educational psychology began early in the twentieth century. Some years ago, with
reference to another problem, I surveyed a number of colleges and universities in the Rocky
Mountain area with regard to their own schools about this matter. Earlier research
notwithstanding, without exception, respondents agreed that what led to the formation of an
independent department of psychology in each institution was based on one overriding

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belief: Psychologists interested in education were seen as not enthusiastically receptive to

the emergence of experimental psychology as integral part of the discipline. It appeared that
such studies were not relevant to human behavior, at least as observed in the classroom. The
result was educational and academic psychology began to go their separate paths.
Psychologists interested in classroom behavior began to emphasize large-n, classroombased research, replacing laboratory or small-n studies. I have personally encountered
colleagues who equate any laboratory study as being the equivalent of the infamous rat
laboratory. That is, such experimental efforts should be confined to infrahuman subjects.
Historically, findings from large-n studies became derivatives of increasingly more complex
statistical analyses. A nationally noted colleague of mine, not in educational psychology,
thought the statistics were an attempt to gain respect.
Unfortunately, regardless of the elegance of the statistical tools, the methodological rigor
of these studies came under increasing criticism, particularly by those in academic
psychology. One has to wonder, if critics do not view variants of meta-analysis as an
attempt to cover up methodological weaknesses in the original studies. The presence of
such negative attitudes has not helped communication, even in those institutions where
educational psychology is still part of the psychology department course offerings.
Ironically, I have begun to wonder if the divergence between academic and educational
psychology has found a parallel in the lack of communication and interest between
educational psychology and educators outside the field, that Rothkopf observed.

Situated Learning as an Exemplar

In the discussion that follows, I plan to use situated learning as a means of examining this
issue of the relevance of psychology (or lack thereof) to classroom instruction. My choice
of situated learning is completely arbitrary, and is being used to highlight much larger
issues. While I will point to a number of conceptual areas in situated learning which
illustrate a lack of communication between the contributions of psychology and classroom
practices, it is not my intent to discuss the specific fields of research cited in much detail.
Again, the research findings given are used primarily to illustrate my concerns. There are
limitations to the classroom application of the situated learning construct, and for that
matter, any instructional strategy. In fact, I wonder how often the educators concerned with
methodology are knowledgeable about the psychological rationale underlying such
problems.
At the very outset, I should add I have taught academic psychology courses as well as
educational psychology, within settings which have included academic psychology
departments, as well as departments and schools of education. Additionally, I have also
conducted experimental studies ranging from large-n to single or small-n.

Situated Learning
It can be assumed from the outset as a truism that classroom activities are indeed executed
within some sort of social context. Unfortunately, this social context has come to be reified
by proponents of situated learning, acquiring a life of its own. Indeed, in some circles, it has
become more of a philosophical position not necessarily to be challenged by psychological
evidence. From my perspective, coteries of True Believers are a detriment to its
development.

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Lack of agreement as to definition

Situated learning itself has been defined and interpreted in a number of ways, not all of
them wholly compatible. Still, the MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science recognized
situated learning as an established construct (Seifert 1999). In the literature, the term
situated cognition has been used interchangeably. More recently, the term situativity
has been added (Greeno 1998). It should be noted that the term situated can specify both
physical as well as social settings.
It is interesting to note that in general educational psychology texts, situated learning is
given somewhat limited attention. Woolfolk (2007) defined situated learning as located in a
particular community of practice. Learning in the real world has no parallel counterpart in
school. The learner begins as an apprentice moving toward mastery, within the community
of practice. This seemed to assert that learning outcomes and their associated values were a
group phenomenon. However, she also points out that learning does transfer, thereby
emphasizing a problem inherent in more radical interpretations of the concept.
Slavin (2009) simply defined situated learning as taking place in real life, authentic
tasks. The concept is given a strong emphasis on group processes. Santrock (2008) goes
further, defining cognition as embedded within the group, and not the individual. It is worth
noting, that all the definitions cited are subsumed under the more general concept of
constructivism. These texts do provide some directions for organizing and facilitating group
interaction. Slavin provides the most elaborate discussion of the texts cited, although the
assistance provided is couched in a non-technical, prescriptive language.
Situated learning as a classroom strategy
The proposed contributions of this construct to the classroom had its initial impetus in the
work of Ann Brown (1994). In this paper, she presented essentially a semi-historical review
of changes in her thinking about the role of established psychological models, particularly
with regard to childrens learning. Brown basically rejected much of the relevance of
behaviorism to school learning, although she did acknowledge some contributions such as
token economies, fading, etc. However, she made it clear that very often, much of
psychology, especially behaviorism, lacked relevance to childrens learning. This led her to
focus on the concept of a community of learners, dealing with real-life problems,
emphasizing the contributions of group collaboration and less formal settings. Her previous
work in special education may have been a contributing factor.
Browns views formed the basis for the development of number of classroom strategies
generally categorized as reciprocal teaching (Brown 1994; Slavin 2009). The caveats,
though, came early. Gentile (1996) argued that Brown was overly broad in her criticism,
especially with regard to her condemnation of behaviorism, resulting in conclusions not
necessarily borne by the evidence. He also pointed out that the strategy of reciprocal
teaching had produced a mixed bag of results. Moreover, besides Gentiles observations,
situated learning has been criticized on other accounts (Anderson et al. 1996, 1997).
Unfortunately, as Gentile (1996) pointed out, the movement had any number of
adherents wholeheartedly embracing the concept, long before the constructs parameters
were properly evaluated. This is not an uncommon problem in education (Schimmel and
Langer 2001). In fact, I have personally found a disturbingly common occurrence that even
in classroom situations where small group strategies might not be efficient, education
faculty dogmatically characterize the absence of such activities as examples of poor
teaching. I do find it hard to believe you can use the same road map to go everywhere in the

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world. Nevertheless, reciprocal teaching and its derivatives have remained an accepted and
widely used teaching strategy (Woolfolk 2007), retaining as its primary operational practice
some form of collaborative processes.
This distinction between classroom and community has also remained an integral part of
the definition (Gersten et al. 2001). Learning, at least when it is considered to be an
example of a real-world problem, is considered a legitimate derivative of social activity,
rather than necessarily the products of more formal or logical ratiocination (Brown et al.
1989). For that matter, Greeno (1998) has argued that the skills acquired in the collaborative
process contribute directly toward cognitive gains in the learning process. More precisely,
he has defined the collaborative processes as the treatment variable in the learning process,
which other researchers have not done. Learning is a consequence of group interaction, and
its significance or value is group defined.
Major existing concerns
Any review, however, of the concept reveals that proponents have been engaged from its
inception, with the task of reconciling the interaction between two major themes or
dimensions, with a third hovering over like some dark cloud. This third theme, or
dimension, deals with transfer of training. Again, in discussing these critical issues, there is
no intent to probe the literature in great detail. Rather, the arguments that I make emphasize
the relevance to any consideration of situated learning, especially with reference to school
learning. Or, to recall a point I made earlier, a why is needed to justify a how.

Cognition as an Individual or Socially Defined Phenomenon

To whom does learning belong?
The first critical issue, as I see it, deals with whether cognitive achievement is properly
defined in terms of the individual or whether it is seen as somehow a shared phenomenon.
Proponents of a more radical view of situated learning at times emphasize cognition as the
shared product of a specific group collaborative process, rather than an individually derived
outcome. That is, the value of the learning achieved is measured by the individuals
contribution to a specific learning environment, which is heavily if not completely socially
defined. In all fairness, emphasis has been placed on the emergence of critical or higherorder cognitive outcomes (Gokhale 1995; Palincsar and Brown 1984).
Still, the use of terms like apprentice and mastery suggest that the value of a
participants achievement is located within some group standard. This is tied in many ways
to establishing the significance of a given context to any learning situation. There can be no
quarrel with the rather simplistic observation that any learning, formal or informal, is
located within some ecology (e.g., Roediger III 2008). The question is whether we can
consistently predict under what circumstances learning will be indeed context specific or
can be linked to future learning.
All the educational psychology text definitions previously cited attempt, in some
measure, to encapsulate the early origins of this concept. In a foreword to Lave and Wenger
(1991), Hanks, for example, argued not only that learning takes place in a social context,
which is usually true, but also that the learning achieved is a product of the interactive
processes within the group, and not the individual. Learning is distributed among the
participants, and this distribution defines the cultural value of the learning. It could be

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argued that the more extreme positions begin to toy with Durkheims idea of the existence
of a group mind (Allport 1954).
On the other hand, in all fairness to Hanks, Lave and Wenger (1991) left him little
choice. In their view, general knowledge is limited only to special circumstances. Learning,
as they define it, results from participation in a community of practices, where as noted, the
individual emerges from some apprentice level to that of mastery, which are clearly social
terms. What seems extraordinary is almost the complete absence of any recognition of
information processing models, which emphasize by their very nature, that cognition is
derived from complex processes within the individual (Healy and McNamara 1996;
Kellogg 2007). For a fact, assessment in school settings is traditionally reflected by
individual performance. The unit of measurement is the student, not the classroom.
Learning can be situation-specific
These arguments are not meant to negate the existence of some learning that is very clearly
situation specific. For example, we can eventually learn the location of buildings on our
own campus and move about with complete confidence as to where we are heading.
However, if we are placed on another campus, the location of the library may not be
immediately evident. We usually believe that on any college campus, there is some building
designated as the library. But it is equally true that on the new campus, we do possess
transferrable skills, such as language, reading and interpreting maps, etc. We have no doubt
that those we encounter on the new campus will readily understand our requests for
information. The result is that locating the library will not be a lengthy procedure
characterized by walking all over the campus. For a more mundane example of restricted
learning, we may be able to start our lawn mower quite easily, but there is no guarantee
regarding another model or make.

Cognition and Group Processes

The second issue, dealing with estimating achievement within a collaborative phenomenon,
requires a realistic appreciation of group processes. Predictability regarding the contributions of social processing to learning is much debated and strikes at the heart of some very
basic assumptions regarding the nature of cognition and schooling.
Group processes are complex
Group processes were initially often represented in rather simplistic terms (Brown 1994;
Lave and Wenger 1991). Some of the more committed proponents of the collaborative
processes seemed to suggest the existence of a generic set of egalitarian group processes,
operating in an almost universal and predictable manner. Still, the literature does reveal that
some researchers early on were aware of difficulties and the necessity for training in
collaborative processes (Smith and MacGregor 1992; Gokhale 1995). In subsequent papers,
for example, Greeno (1997, 1998) has acknowledged the complexities embedded within
group processes, so critical to the collaborative activities, which are an integral part of
situated learning (Greeno 2006). As I noted earlier, Greeno (1998) argues that learning is
directly attributable to the collaborative processes.
The area of group dynamics has a very rich history, and it is very clear that not only is
there a myriad of group influences but also that those operative in one group situation may

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not be found in another. Furthermore, the existence of diverse influences operating within a
given situation makes it rather difficult to argue that the contributions of and effects on each
of the participants are necessarily equivalent (Cialdinin and Goldstein 2004; Kassin et al.
2008; Vroom 1969). The prescriptive suggestions given in educational psychology texts
leave teachers with very little basis for analyzing the needs of their particular classroom.
The how is there, but the why, which I think the student also needs, is not.
Individual student outcomes
Given the complexities of the social process, predicting the effects of collaboration on
the individual can be a risky venture. In fact, research suggests that group decisions
are simply not the additive contributions of each participant. What emerges from
collaborative efforts may not necessarily reflect the decision of the single individual
(Kerr and Tindale 2004). It must be emphasized that merely demonstrating that every
individual within the group has achieved some common learning outcome can be very
misleading. For example, if the learning task involves solving a problem with one correct
answer, the fact that one individual was initially capable of achieving the solution means
that every other individual could have benefited, without much effort (Kerr and Tindale
2004). Indeed, the systematic acquisition of knowledge within a group setting is often
very difficult, given the fact that individual contributions and accomplishments may differ
markedly not only because of status and influence, but prior knowledge (Kassin et al.
2008). No one should confuse a commitment to the democratic process with the realities
of the classroom.

Assumptions of Transfer
I have come to the conclusion that the concept of situated learning can be difficult to
analyze because it is treated as both a cause and effect. The cause dimension is selfapparent: learning can be considered situated because it always occurs within some context.
As an effect, it becomes a question of arguing that because learning is situation specific, a
failure to demonstrate transfer is not critical. In fact, the question may be considered
irrelevant (Brown et al. 1989). It is interesting to note that Greeno, a long-time proponent of
situated learning, recognizes that transfer is an important issue (Greeno 1998, 2006). In his
theoretical development of a model for what he calls situativity, he believes that transfer
is a phenomenon demonstrated across related situations. I shall treat his concept of transfer
in a somewhat different manner.
Transfer must be an assumed result in school learning
One can infer, I believe as do others, that transfer of training is the sine qua non of any
educational program (McDaniel 1988). From my perspective, a failure to demonstrate
transfer of learning should be the starting point for further research. The educational
psychology texts previously cited, with the exception of Woolfolk (2007), do not even
consider transfer as a problem for situated learning. Some proponents of situated learning
have at least recognized the necessity, at least, of acknowledging existence of the problem.
In one view, transfer is not necessarily considered a problem to be immediately resolved, if
at all (Lave and Wenger 1991). In fact, Perkins and Salomon (1989) considered transfer to
be the result of a limited and difficult deliberative process.

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It should be noted that sometimes arguments between situated learning and more formal
classroom instructional models revolve around a purported distinction between concrete
and abstract learning (Anderson et al. 1997; Greeno 1997; Perkins and Salomon 1989). In
some instances, it appears that by relegating situated learning or cognition to real-life
experiences, criticality of transfer becomes more a concern for formal classroom, activity,
but not necessarily for community situated learning, where achievement is measured by
supposedly more authentic assessments. Interestingly, Palinscar (1989) treats transfer in a
somewhat tangential way, suggesting that the purpose of situated cognition is not only to
provide the learner with understanding but also a means of controlling the world.
Measuring transfer
Whether one is dealing with situated or transfer paradigms, there is one common element:
to demonstrate the absence or presence of either transfer position involves measurement
procedures based on retrieving prior learning from long-term memory. Unfortunately, as
Roediger III (2008) pointed out, the so-called laws regarding long-term memory do not
hold up under all circumstances. The why question then becomes whether the learning
was ever encoded in long-term memory or perhaps represents a failure to retrieve
previously encoded information. What makes any evaluation of curricula a difficult process is
that the instruments used are undoubtedly heavily influenced by what the curriculum
developers presumed would be the underlying cognitive outcomes derived from the curriculum
strategies to which the students are exposed. So how do we examine the transfer issue?
One widely used approach is the TAP mode. This is an acronym for text-appropriate
processing (Morris et al. 1977). To determine whether transfer can be inferred, the cognitive
processing to be measured must have been critical to the processing operative during the
instructional phase. Healy (2007), on the other hand, argues that the failure to optimally
measure transfer lies in the failure to duplicate cues and operations. Nevertheless, both
views reflect not only the problems inherent in retrieving long-term memories, but also
basic assumptions regarding the nature of the transfer process. At times, it seems almost
incredible that within the typical classroom structure, transfer does occur.
As Roediger III (2008) pointed out, any speculations underlying the nature of the
operative cognitive processes, as well as the efficacy and completeness of the experimental
controls used to insure the presumed learning, may be overly simplistic. Roediger III used
the tetrahedral model of Jenkins (1979) to stress the difficulties in determining the critical
elements in any given learning situation. Jenkins model postulated four categories of
variables contributing to any learning situation: students, events, encoding, and retrieval.
In his discussion of the model, Roediger III attempted to update the categories. He pointed out
that this seemingly inclusive model may not be all encompassing since the introduction of
another unaccounted-for variable may reverse experimental findings. He further argued that
context is critical since the variables cited do not exhibit a constant influence across experimental
settings. While this may appear to support the concept of situated learning, especially regarding
context, he used contextual specificity as the starting point for further research. This supports my
previously held assertion that within an educational setting, any example of nontransferable
learning should not, indeed cannot, be accepted as the final conclusion.
Dual transfer dimensions
My argument is that any educational program, which specifies learning outcomes, must
either account for transfer, or explain why it is not possible and/or important. Definitions of

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transfer generally include statements concerning the application of prior learning or

experiences by the individual to a similar or new situation (Mayer 2004; McDaniel 1988).
For the purposes of this paper, I should like to use the term lateral transfer, where the
results of intended instruction are assessed across similar situations (Greenos argument)
and vertical transfer, where the outcomes of prior instruction are assessed with reference to
subsequent instruction. It is understood, of course, that these terms represent a continuum.
The number and significance of the critical stimulus and response elements would
undoubtedly make categorization difficult in some instances.
While the possibilities for transfer in situated learning can be treated as research or
philosophical questions, educational systems cannot afford that luxury. In my opinion,
given the expansion of high-stakes testing, a school district, teacher, or student cannot
afford the luxury of constrained or limited learning. As I shall point out, the failure to
demonstrate transfer on either dimension can mean that either transfer was not a possibility
or that invalid assessment instruments were used. The arguments for situation-bound
learning, I believe, can be better examined in terms of this dual dimension of transfer. In
fact, these dimensions may help in assessing the outcomes on matters of proposed
curriculum changes. A critical educational activity in most school districts does involve the
introduction of new curricula either as part some of some existing program or as a total
replacement.
Lateral transfer
The successful introduction of a new curriculum across the social realities of separate
classrooms is generally a function of the equivalency of outcomes across multiple
situations. Under these circumstances, I argue this reflects an example of lateral transfer.
Failure should be considered not as an example of situated learning but a failure of lateral
transfer. Following Sidman (1960), the fact that transfer did occur meant that the new
curriculum treatments were powerful enough to override individual classroom differences.
Failure could mean that critical elements in the program were missing or masked by
specific classroom influences. This then creates the necessity for further effort on the part of
the curriculum developer, which involves why questions.
However, the argument could be made that the learning was indeed influenced within
the context of each specific classroom but that the students used different strategies to
achieve success on some common assessment measures. This could show up when the issue
of vertical transfer is being considered. The cognitive changes presumed to result within a
curriculum generally reflect a priori assumptions, and evidence about such speculations is
usually inferred from student successes and failures. Given current assumptions regarding
information processing models (Kellogg 2007), any such assumptions may be hard to
prove, given the complex interaction between working and long-term memories. One
example of this complex interaction is the observation that individuals themselves may
have a great deal of difficulty monitoring their own thinking processes (Nisbett and Wilson
1977).
Vertical transfer
Attempts to introduce a new curriculum vary considerably in preparation. A legitimate
proposal should include not only a complete description of the program objectives but also
some evidence of prior research support, adequate instructional resources, extensive teacher
preparation, and monitoring of classroom activities (e.g., Clements and Sarama 2008).

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Although the authors in this study talk about trajectories, there is still the problem of how
far up the educational ladder their program outcomes will be implemented or, more
importantly, what happens to student achievement subsequent to their participation in the
particular program.
Basically, this is the concern of vertical transfer. It can be very misleading to argue that
because the new program objectives parallel or even augment previous curriculum
objectives, then transfer is very likely. After all, both programs are focusing on the same
or similar objectives. Unfortunately, most of the large-n evaluation studies do not
demonstrate much in the way of experimental control or, as Rothkopf (2008) put it, at
the tactical level. And there is always the possibility of the Hawthorne Effect
(Rothlisberger and Dickson 1950), reflecting a general reaction to a newer approach to
instruction. In fact, I cannot recall the last time any acknowledgement was made of the
Hawthorne phenomenon.
In all fairness to developers seeking to validate their curricula, the complexities of
research in a classroom setting are indeed staggering, as compared to a typical laboratory
study involving transfer (e.g., Roediger III 2008). In the laboratory, the assumption is that
the transfer elements can be tightly controlled, and the assessment process can be indexed
carefully and precisely to the outcomes sought. However, as Jenkins (1979) argued, such
laboratory assumptions might not always be the case, much less for classroom research
settings. It would be minimally incumbent then upon any curriculum developer to not only
demonstrate lateral transfer by assessing outcomes common to all the classrooms involved
in the project but also to assess the potential for vertical transfer.

Conclusions
Using situated learning as a vehicle for my arguments, I have argued that the contributions
of psychology can be and have been ignored for the sake of educational strategies, policies,
etc., which may receive substantive support from others similarly inclined to cling to firmly
established belief systems. I have also argued that after a course in educational psychology,
students in a teacher preparation program may find that practice takes precedence over the
need for providing much of the accompanying psychological rationale. Readers may take
exception to this argument, but I am willing to bet, for example, that while the contributions
of behaviorism may find a place in the special education curriculum, it is not usually
considered a viable strategy source in the regular classroom.
Again, if situated learning is delineated as an example of learning taking place within a
specific context, there can be no quarrel with the construct. However, when it becomes an
article of faith, then the implications are serious. If situated morphs into a particular kind of
learning in which the issue of transfer is either not significant or a non-outcome, then it clearly
has little or no value for schooling. I have argued that lateral and vertical transfer represent at
least two dimensions of a process critical to the requirements for school improvement. The
failure to demonstrate either or both should be the starting point for further effort. Educators at
the college level or at the public school level have what I consider moral and ethical choices.
The No-Child-Left-Behind Act was as much a political document as a demand for
educational improvement. Unfortunately, it conflated both political as well as educational
objectives. Given the propensity of state legislators to improve student achievement
primarily through testing, learning efficiency as Rothkopf (2008) described it, may
overcome the need for basic psychological analyses. Political success as defined by test
results may trump broader educational objectives.

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