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ON DENOTING FOR ARITHMETIC (PEANO’S) AND IDENTIFYING A 5th NATURAL

DIMENSION IN MATHEMATICS1

I. M. R. Pinheiro2

Abstract:

In this one more paper, we destroy one more idol in Logic: Arithmetic is actually complete,

suffices defining it correctly, as with what it refers to. As a side result, we also present a new set

1 According to [P. Schwarz 2008] , we hold three spatial dimensions, to which Einstein has added time, so that they

became four dimensions for reference of objects, what simply makes sense with our assertions in this paper. With

Superstring theory, however, they got to imagine 11 dimensions, and others, apparently. Here, we go up to Einstein

only, once Superstring theory is not yet fully understood by us. From superficial understanding, it does look like

they do not address our main issue, far simpler than what they deal with, yet a more primary issue than theirs:

simply dealing with the already existing Cartesian coordinates, but attaching always a fixed point in time, `t`, to

them, that is, we are not really creating another variable, for it is always going to be a constant, in each Cartesian

time dealt with, and Mathematics will always deal with one at a time, but we are creating mathematical ways of

refining language to the level already demanded by any mathematical problem in two dimensions, even though

neglected so far, in a way to generate confusional talk and writing for some, what goes against the ethos of Science

and, therefore, needs fixing and updating. We seem to be working a single step away from what is not tangible, what

we talk about supposed to be the own connection, if any exists, between what may be seen by a rigid Science,

Mathematics, and what may be experienced by a human being, from a physical/chemical point of view. Thus, the 5th

dimension might be, or might be not, the missing coordinate to precisely refer to the physical/chemical world.

Basically, people had skipped this coordinate and gone from Einstein’s time to Superstring coordinates. We then

have managed to interpolate a coordinate to complete the theory, or make it more complete.

2 Postal Address: Po Box 12396, A’Beckett st, Melbourne, Victoria, 8006. E-mail: mrpprofessional@yahoo.com
I. M. R. Pinheiro 1
of axioms for Arithmetic, and it is going to be an infinite set instead of a set with only 8

elements...We seem to bring actual progress to at least six major issues in Mathematics via the

present paper (Russell’s Paradox, Gödel’s most famous assertions, Peano’s axioms, inclusion

relation basics, coordinate system of reference, parallel’s problem).

Key-words:

Peano, Arithmetic, completeness, consistency, complete, consistent, natural, proposition,

premise, parallels, inclusion, set, statement, denotation, Gödel.

Introduction:

Gödel has apparently written that Arithmetic could never be contained in any axiomatic system

which were not either incomplete, or inconsistent, but never both, according to a few sources.

That is a very strong statement…

Basically, axiom is all which cannot be proven, all we assume to be true, the fundamental stone

for any theory.

However, lots of confusion seem to be living inside of everyone dealing with the words

regarding logical systems so far…

First of all, the difference between proposition and statement does not seem to be as clear as it

should be.

Basically, a statement which does not hold logical value is simply a statement, whilst those with

logical value will be called propositions.

For instance, uttering `uh’…`uh’ is a statement, a declaration, but never a proposition, for

I. M. R. Pinheiro 2
nothing may be inferred logically from that.

However, `the chair is blue’ is an assignment to chair of a match in the color spectrum and,

therefore, a proposition, or almost, once everything in language is context-dependent (to be a

scientific statement, that is, a proposition, we would actually need to specify this shade of blue

technically, let‘s say shade 55 in the color spectrum of factory X).

Another interesting point is: if we have `the chair is blue’, `the table is red’, `my sister is too old’

and `I am then going to invite only Sue’, the first two are statements, for they hold no logical

value for the conclusion, which seems to be deriving solely from the fact that the sister is,

indeed, too old. Notice, however, that if we increase the context size, that situation may change,

for logical situations are almost as dynamic as real life: `the chair is blue’, `the table is red’, `my

sister is too old’, `therefore I am going to invite only Sue’, `because red and blue are color for

kids’. Now, the addition of another sentence made it all logically necessary for the conclusion, so

that they are now all propositions. Interesting enough that it was premature judging the three first

sentences in our case: It is all very interesting with language…

Statement, involving Arithmetic, would be, for instance, `adding two numbers is merging the sets

corresponding to the number of units of counting of one number with the other, and then

providing the merging referent as response’. This is a statement of definition, and therefore a

clear proposition (logical value, foundational) for the operation of summing.

However, another statement is that assigning a number to a certain set of units of counting, and,

therefore, proposition (foundational definition). Thus, only with the natural numbers, there is an

infinite number of them, and they are essential for Arithmetic to be sound, the elements to be

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added…This way, Peano was also a good joker when coming up with only 8 axioms…someone

obviously forgot to state that, apart from the designations for units of counting, we hold 8 axioms

in Arithmetic…(see [Alozano 2004], for instance).

In what follows, we will write first about Gödel and his statements on Arithmetic, criticizing and

explaining all in detail, to then write our Conclusion, based on the moves which come before its

writing.

Arithmetic and Gödel

The proof of how impossible it is to `count’ the binary infinite sequences apparently generates

Gödel’s (1906-1978, see [E. Weissten 1996], for instance) proof for incompleteness. Cantor,

between 1873 and 1891, devised very particular proofs for this fact (see [George Cantor 1890]).

We have devised a far simpler way of proving that it is impossible to count binary sequences,

which are infinite (any sequence is supposed to be such, that is, infinite, according to a few

authors, everything else deserving status of set, rather than sequence), however. Suffices

pretending to be writing the natural numbers as binary sequences the following way: we assign a

sequence with the number one replacing the nth digit of the previously solely zero sequence

(every digit being zero) for each natural number n. Once this will cover every natural number,

and each one of the sequences attained this way, this far, may generate an infinite number of new

sequences, which may be generated by simply swapping one zero with a one, we reach the easy

conclusion that the number of binary sequences is incredibly higher than the number of natural

numbers: At least one infinity higher (picking anyone of the sequences representing anyone of

the natural numbers, and swapping one digit at a time to one, we reach an infinite number of new

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sequences…)!

So, it is all about comparing sizes of things…

Gödel has also claimed that any well-built formula (built according to the well-posedness theory

for formulae in Arithmetic) in Arithmetic would have a Gödel number, that is, a string of

numbers, corresponding to it.

Gödel apparently assigned each mathematical symbol to a number and wrote each symbol of the

formulae that way to find a corresponding `image’ to the formulae via his assignment, so that

formula x from Arithmetic would have G(x) as Gödel’s representation (see [Henry 2003]).

After mimicking the work performed by Cantor, Gödel ends up with a new formula, allowed by

the system for containing its allowed symbols, what proves that the number of formulae

available is higher than the ability of counting them via natural numbers, which would go one by

one. Gödel then (apparently, according to a few) claims this proves that there will always be a

well-formed formula, in Arithmetic, which is not passive of deduction from the formulae already

existing, so that it is unprovable inside of any system with a finite number of axioms.

This assertion seems unreasonable.

The symbols used in a mathematical formula are not, necessarily, in direct correspondence with

the meaning of the formula: one may get several different formulae, in Mathematics, which

represent the same information, for instance, or the same English statement.

So, this is one argument clearly against his claimed-to-be conclusion.

The second is that the deduction of a formula does not have to do with the symbols of the

previous formulae, but with the information content.

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For instance:

`5+2=7’ is the same as `7-2=5’ and etc.

`For all tables of color shade 57, there are table cloths of color shade 45’ is the same as `there is

no table of color shade 57 to which there is no table cloth of color shade 45’.

So, we have, in both cases, different symbols for each variation of the same information content,

yet there is only one of them which should be listed in our enumeration, for that is already the

information intended…

Basic mistakes when, once more, trying to fit English language inside of Mathematics in

bijection, that is, blatantly stupid move.

One of the arguments used by Gödel has to do with a sentence which goes like this `P does not

have a proof in axiomatic system T’, and call this sentence P as well (see [Kleene et al. 1986] , p.

6). It is claimed that if a statement claims itself not to be provable then we have a sentence which

cannot be proved false, or true, inside of the system under consideration. If we write that as: `this

statement does not have a proof in T’, and we consider the possible truth values over it,

according to Classical Logic, we end up with `if the statement is true then it does not have a

proof in T’, and `if the statement is false then it does have a proof in T, but its claim is that itself

does not have a prove in T and, therefore, there is contradiction’. The confusion that Gödel

suffers from is not different from that suffered by people taking the Sorites seriously, as we have

also explained before. Basically, the English words may be applied to more than one object, in

the same sentence, with no mistake, but the mathematical words cannot.

It is not because the writing `this statement does not have a proof in T’ is also labeled `statement’

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in English, that is, we may apply the word for both cases (that of `this statement does not have a

proof in T’ and the own original statement the problem refers to, which is not mentioned in detail

in the sentence), that the word points to same reference in both cases: there is a `time’ issue going

on here, which is being disregarded. If one states the word `statement’, that is like `x’ (for

Mathematics), when repeated on a single mathematical sentence: Rigid and inhuman, to make it

short. However, it is also beautiful and perfect, just like God, perfectly inaccessible to anything

which is human, unless via transcendence.

Basically, `this’, in English, fits any possible thing seen by the speaker by time he/she utters the

sentence with that word. Of course, the same dynamics contained in Statistics, a human Science,

is present in real life: everything is updated and considers continuous modifications in the world

of reference. However, for Mathematics, one only develops reasoning if `freezing’ things at

precise time X, that is, if making use of Einstein’s coordinate system with a fixed time `t’

implied, but not stated clearly each time the process occurs.

Another primordial point to be made is that regarding well-posedness theory for Philosophy and,

therefore, Mathematics. Well-posedness is mandatory for a problem being passive of scientific

analysis, and a problem cannot, ever, be well-posed, if not totally defined, and understood in full,

by those reading it. The word `this’ besets any analysis in Mathematics because we do not know

what it is referring to as the sentence appears on its own…One thing will always be true: if it is

vague in language (may refer to more than one reference as presented), it is definitely unsuitable

for Mathematics the way it is. First, one must master the language, be able to write expressions,

and sentences, which will make everyone who reads them see what they see, to then be able to

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translate, univocally, as the well-posedness principle for Philosophy demands, that into good and

sound Mathematics.

Ambiguity, or vagueness, besets any possible mathematical analysis, that is, classical logic one.

Therefore, such a sentence is not `ready’ for mathematical analysis, and could not, possibly, be

included as logical proposition of the system under consideration.

Now, suppose we specify `this’ to mean what is being written by time we write: interesting that

the only way to do that is writing `X cannot be proven in system T’.

Now, calling this sentence X makes the statement mathematically incorrect, for one cannot use

the same place holder/variable to refer to different objects of reference in the same mathematical

statement. If the sentence is true, then X cannot, indeed, be proven in T. If it is false, `X can be

proven in system T’ and, therefore, the statement bears no logical confusion whatsoever. Notice,

as well, that Einstein’s world (according to our sources here listed) of reference is also implied

here (whatever is taken to be x will also hold a time coordinate as mathematical locator, that is,

the `thing’ x points to definitely encompasses at least four coordinates, if not more (eye of

beholder? - depends, of course, on what is being analyzed/dealt with mathematically, or intended

to be dealt with, anyway)). There should be a way of making it possible for Mathematics, instead

of only Physics and Statistics, to include a human factor in its analysis…However, the human

entity is too complex, as well as loosely determined, always with some vagueness, to be passive

of inclusion in the `world of Mathematics’. For instance, some text books are annoying and seem

to demand that the student `draws’ an expected scene (expected by the person writing the

problem only), with which to work for the problem. However, the `imagination’ of the writer of

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the problem cannot, ever, be a mathematical being. Recalling the most basic rule of well-

posedness (solve inside of the smallest context which fits the whole problem and its expression),

that of context, this sort of problem would be located, as minimum placement, either in Statistics

or in Physics, only for requiring `imagination’ derived from `personal interpretation’ of the words

given by the `maker’ of the problem…One can see that even with severely limited constraints on

all variables involved, not only mathematical errors in formulation are found in unacceptable

number, in already refereed work, but possible unwanted interpretation of intended problem (not

deviation from expected solution, but understanding of it) is likely to happen, imagine with

loosest scope of all (that involving not only the imagination of the reader, but the imagination of

the own problem maker…). Insane are us, in thinking such cannot ever be marked with a final

`right’ or `wrong’, not passive of discussion,…obviously! Look, the day mathematicians and

logicians understand that whatever they do reaches only 20% of human life, at most, and never

the actual life, only an imagined life, where everything is perfect and logical, they will definitely

put far more work in order to refine whatever they write and say to others…As a simple

example, a Mathematics teacher stated, as final exam question, an exam which was supposed to

tell who was `able’ to chase Mathematics studies and who was not: A man is observing a painting

from a distance of 1m. His eye reaches the top of the painting at an angle of 20 degrees. The line

between his eye and the bottom of the painting is a straight line. How long is the painting?

Sad enough, the student who was told to be `able’ had imagined a right triangle. However, the

student who was marked as `impossible to ever be able to learn Mathematics’ had chosen his

triangle to form more than ninety degrees with the wall…and actually wrote: I am sorry, but your

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problem is not good enough for me to have a single answer. However, I will provide you with a

few alternatives: it is possible that the eye of the observer forms ninety degrees, if a line is drawn

from the bottom of it and the line is parallel to the `equalizer’ line of the surface of the floor. I

then have 20+90+70, what makes sense. In this case, I will get an easy answer, for there is one

meter of distance involved (one side), and all angles. However, if I make him sit, supposing he

were standing in the previous situation, the angle will be larger than 90 degrees, still possible, for

20+100+60 is also 180. In this case, I do not know how much larger… I then cannot infer

anything else.

The teacher said `unable to study Mathematics because I gave him several exercises, all same

way, I taught nothing else in class, so he is supposed to assume it was ninety degrees and make

the calculations, but he never made the calculations, only wrote remarks!’

Oh, well, so Logic does not matter more than Mathematics? We all had this thought as premise,

however: that everything from Mathematics could actually be made by means of words only, that

is, without single symbol, but not vice-versa…

Of course the teacher is wrong, and problems in Mathematics cannot be based in their own

heads, or teachings, they must be solely based on what is written, for that is what any person

assesses as valid: whatever is written, if anything written was given. Imagination, or habit, are

obviously not mathematical entities. If there are more interpretations allowed, there is no single

possible right answer, and if there is more than one, we have allowance for anything to happen,

including the student not doing anything. She asked the dimension of the painting, but one could

easily reply, using Logic, that such does not exist because there can only be one, however we get

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more than one using different reasoning trends, what creates inconsistency, what blocks any

reasoning in Classical Logic, and stops the flow of the solution, or what entitles any response (in

conflict, everything implies, explosion law).

Unfortunately, Mathematics may only encompass the abstract world. If ever referring to humans,

the problem must contain a drawing of reference for that fact, so that the human part of the

problem is fully fit inside of the world of Mathematics. One cannot simply add a more complex

entity to a Mathematics problem and believe it will be passive of solution there. If the own entity

extrapolates the boundaries of Mathematics, it cannot be solved there, as we explained in [M. R.

Pinheiro 2007], with the well-posedness theory for Philosophy. It really does not matter how

many coordinates we create, in terms of reference, the complexity of a human being cannot, ever,

be reduced to Mathematics, as we have proved in [M. R. Pinheiro 2007], not even the verbal

expression of a human being there fits…

Basically, as we express in the second article of ours on the Sorites solution, it is important, in

Science, more than anywhere else, the `why’ we do things. If we overlook this step, everything

else implies, that is, logical classical rules rule and, therefore, there is no real progress, just

illusionary, or delusional, progress.

For instance, in another absurd trial, but more refined than the case with P, we find some people

referring to Russell as if Russell (see [A. D. Irvine 2003], for instance) thought a special set R,

supposed to contain normal sets, and those normal sets are defined as sets which do not contain

themselves (which, per se, is already absurd thought), to pose a problem for Mathematics, and

not solely for language, and those who are experts in it, once more.

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Basically, they claim that if R is normal, then it does not contain itself, but if it is normal, it

should also be inside of itself.

This is all ridiculous, and even primary students who are good in the English language are able to

see the fallacy involved: there is a temporal problem there, very clear. Mathematics is the static

picture of everything done in Statistics, for a good reason: Time does matter!

Basically, whilst R is not built, there is no R to be analyzed. Therefore, R cannot, ever, possibly,

contain itself whilst is still being defined. On the other hand, once defined, it cannot be changed,

because it has become an axiom of the system involved, for it is a definition, for God’s sake!

What that means is that we cannot actually, formally, mention a name to that set: it is an

`unnamable’ sort of set. If mentioned, only via elements, and its definition. Why? Because giving

it a name will create same sort of inconsistency, present in the case of the variable X, from our

earlier writing here…It is true that the set of natural numbers contains itself? No! Never.

Basically, when it is being formed, we give it a name (or assign it to a pointer), which is `natural

numbers`. It cannot contain itself…a set has to be more than its elements, it is a pair (name;

elements). Getting rid of the confusion is essential work…Interesting how Mathematics teachers

have been teaching wrong for ages: a set is equal to another if it is contained in the other and the

other is contained in itself (or some of them, anyway…). The truth of all is found at [H. Langston

2008]: they are equal if and only if they are equal…This way, a set could never, possibly, contain

itself, for itself is an axiom of assignment (name; elements), and not only a letter, an empty place

holder…A set containing itself is humanly impossible, and Mathematics was created by human

beings…whatever they cannot see, Mathematics will not either. Write a set by time `t’. This is an

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operation which is never completed if you are still writing it, you only know who is in the set by

last element. Case you then add whole set as element, to be coherent and claim that the set then

contains itself, for instance, you need now to add everything as last element of it (`last’ not being

relevant here), what will create an infinite loop and, as Mathematics loves, it may only be true in

its limit of inclusion, that is, in this case, it will never, realistically, be true, but we get tired and

say it is possible where we cannot see, just like the parallels meeting at infinity…

Basically, set B given, B contained in B is only achieved when n is infinity for the progressive

set of inclusions of the previous set development in current updated set. See:

Bo={a1,…,aN}

B1={a1,…,aN,{a1,…,aN}}

B2={a1,…,aN,{a1,…,aN},{a1,…,aN,{a1,…,aN}}}

Bn=BN,

that is: lim Bn = BN, when n goes to infinity (this is also confusional statement, it is just better

than stating that a set may contain itself…what is absurd. This is confusional because it mixes

Physics with Mathematics, that is, human perception with rigid Science, what is not scientifically

sound for Mathematics: what we are able to cope with, our speed in writing, and the actual

truth…just like the parallels case, what we are able to see at a time, in a single picture, with no

further thinking, and the actual truth: basically, infinity fits a slice of any size of a ruler, as small

as we wish for (or as small as our eyes need)…then take parallels there, they will reach infinity

in the reals, and yet they will never meet, proving the own thought of this to be as absurd as a set

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containing itself…not even the empty set could, possibly, contain itself, for a name has been

given, that means a pair, same case as before).

A set is not what it refers to, Mathematics defined a set as being a pair of elements, instead. And,

as seen, if (R; elements) is our result, and we say that R={(R; elements); R}, then it is wrong

mathematically, because that R would have to point to two different entities in Mathematics, not

the same…one is a set and its name, the other is just the name, and if R is element of itself, there

is no R which does for Mathematics to be sound,… this fact has to place R, as minimum

obligation, in the 5th dimension (the one of the infinity case3). The axiom of formation brings the

3 We are then suggesting, or actually defining, infinity to belong to another world, the same way each time constant

will create another world for a Cartesian plane to inhabit…Infinity cannot ever be accessible via the Cartesian plane,

for nobody can reach it, and no thing can do it either: everything and everyone may, at most, BECOME infinity

(divide something by infinity…if you divided something that there is, the thing cannot, possibly, simply disappear,

for it was physical before, it has to become something else…once it is habit to name what we cannot deal with

infinity, it actually became own infinity…and that is a case in which the MÖbius band applies again: zero married

with infinity, that is, what Priest would like: Ontological Paraconsistency time reached, once more…in Mathematics

we say it has become zero, but, in the Physical world, it can only have become own infinity, for now we hold the

same physical object split into infinitely many units of whatever it has become…Basically, that world is not

accessible yet not even via Physics, as far as we know,…therefore, it has to be another world…we mathematically

force it to be `zero’, an entity from Mathematics, even because Mathematics cannot change the nature of the

material, only Physics may account for that. The world of reference for Mathematics is pre-fixed, from start of

analysis, and, in it, one thing may not become another, for it does not have enough tools in its system to account for

that. Once what we see from the world of Mathematics is nothing left, only because we are also stupid enough to

attach things to our observation, when it is Mathematics, it then is told to be zero…zero what? Zero units of

whatever was there before…that is, it is also implied the nature of the matter of the object under consideration has
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pair. Once the pair is axiomatized, then one may use only the name as reference for the pair

formed…things made accurate, that is, scientific, things solved. Now, is R normal in the correct

case? No, R is abnormal, and no doubts about it!

(it is only possible in the 5th dimension, so that R is quite normal, rather than abnormal…)

Another interesting thing is that writing things this way: R={(R; elements); R}, is actually still

been fixed in time and will be kept until end of analysis in any mathematical setup…Oh, well, the world of infinity

can fit Mathematics, as in the ruler, even several times. However, its nature is different from that of the Cartesian

plane…it has to be in a fifth dimension of some sort…it is the world which is not represented precisely in language

either, yet. If it is only graphical, it is incomplete, once Mathematics must be able to define each one of its elements

with precision, primary in language, and, if possible, in pictures, not the opposite…Mathematics is obviously about

symbols and calculations, inferences, etc, we still do not hold infinity fully dealt with in the axiomatic world…if we

try, we will go human, what ruins all: infinity is the figure we cannot reach ever…(a person might not be able to

reach a figure in a ruler for physical impairment, so that is not good enough as universal definition). Perhaps we can

do better: infinity is what goes beyond any mathematical figure (spirit also does…). One can see it is not a

`mathematical being’. At the same time, it is, for we even deal with it and understand its occurrence…so it must be a

metamathematical being, similar to metaphysics, which deals with whatever goes beyond Physics, by definition…it

is not `ethical’, then, to include infinity, or mix it, with pure mathematical elements…one would then, perhaps, state:

do we have to change the Cartesian plane, then? Infinity seems to be reached infinitely many times in a single unit

step from a single axis there…No…because we are not `talking’ about it there, and we never will, for it is not

something we can talk about…as soon as we state something like `as x goes to infinity then the function goes to

zero’, we must read that as `as x goes somewhere else, where we cannot see, the function will be, in that world,

zero’. Where is infinity? Not on the graph! If it were on the graph, we would have a precise number for it, or close,

and, therefore, it would be the limit of the function when x goes to that particular number (we see) from the graph…

not infinity. We believe it is trivial to understand that if you are able to locate a particular point in a graph, you are
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incorrect, for the name would have to be another, or we are using Maple, where such is possible:

we cannot, in Mathematics, have this occurring at the same time, once after the new set,

containing axiom and previous R, is being formed, we cannot give it the same name of an

already existing set, it has to be another. It cannot, ever, happen, at the same time. Only Maple

may account for that with the `:=’ symbol. That means: forget previous definition of R, it is now

able to draw a vertical line, forming right angle with the x axis, to determine precisely where the point is located on

x, with very little mistake, so that it will never be infinity, no matter how much we try (the universe of the rulers

cannot reach infinity, of course, why? Because it is our own eyes and hands which built the ruler and our hands,

eyes, and instruments cannot go beyond certain thickness, what will beset any trial of going places we are unable to

locate precisely, or almost, in the ruler…infinity is where the finger and the ruler cannot point and, therefore, no

computer program either, for the grid for the computer screen is also built based on what we can deal with, for we

are those building the machines, with our Logic…). All that means is that infinity might be there, but will not make

of the Cartesian graph something inconsistent. However, claiming it is there will make our mathematical discourse

inconsistent, so it is better, for our own sake, to always state that the world of infinity does not fit the world of the

Cartesian graphs, and is not accessible by us physically (yet?), but it is accessible by our abstract entities, for the

numbers must definitely know who infinity is, same way the souls will always know the way to God…So, we would

have a coordinate system with five elements (3 from the 3D Cartesian, 1 from time, and 1 from infinity), where the

infinity coordinate would accuse 0 if it does not appear, or 1 if present in the system of reference. However, it may

appear in any of the original reference system coordinates, so that the coordinate for infinity should at least bear 3

place holders, instead of one, so that we know to which axis it refers. Even though infinity is reached several times

between a single real number and another, we are unable, at this point in time, to come up with a single practical

example in which mathematical reasoning would lead us to refer to any of those infinities there, in between. For this

reason, the system last suggested for reference seems to be complete to account for the Mathematics world so far.

Interesting enough, it is one more dimension if not activated, but it becomes 3 as soon as activated, that is, as soon
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such…R stops existing as before, and starts existing as now defined, otherwise inconsistency…

(which is not allowed in Mathematics, ever). Another way of seeing that is that we would have to

give it another name and that would create eternal, or infinite number of steps, with new names

all the way through and new set always containing previous axiom and previous set (as shown

earlier on here)…so, if mathematicians and logicians can spell and speak, write and read, then

they cannot get updated or see the time issue (so far)…conclusion: we are all problematic, but

mathematicians and logicians, so far, are realistically lunatic, unable to perceive time change!

Basically, a set which is still being defined cannot be a member of itself because even the own

set under analysis does not know who he/she is, for God’s sake, can you all not see it?

Only after a set is defined, and the axiom of definition is created, what means we have generated

a clear association, and if it is supposed to last, has to become a pair, containing the name and the

elements, we know who it is…how can it be included in itself before we know who they are?

Interesting that if that were ever true, a person would also be contained in themselves, just like

the set of Russian dolls (see [Dale Group 2001], for instance)…Is it not obvious that such is not

possible at all? A person is, at most, equal to themselves, trivially! If adding a finite, but large,

as the progression of the figures `calls’ for it, establishing the needed connection, not existing that far…that is why

we state infinity would be the closest the mathematical world could possibly get to the human world,

transcendence…it is definitely not inside of Mathematics (perhaps yet), yet there is a primary trial of `boxing’ it

there…now, there is a difference between this fact and the assertion that the world of Mathematics is then

incomplete, or inconsistent, because of such a fact…it is, perhaps, missing quite a few axioms for the element

infinity, what may mean simply going from the reference system suggested here onwards, what we shall soon

endeavor to do ourselves.
I. M. R. Pinheiro 17
number of Russian interpolating dolls, the difference between last insertion and that before the

last may make our (faulty, always) perception `see’ as if the Russian doll may, indeed, contain

itself (remember that the properties of the being do include its size, on top of everything else…).

Why? Human perception fails, always, what means that not even there the assertion will ever be

true…mixing things, however (human universe with Mathematics4), as it is usual for statements

involving infinity (not in the case of Calculus, for limits, once, there, it is obvious that the limit

will be reached when the infinity step on the real numbers is finished), we may utter that…

However, logicians, so far, would be realistically lunatic if accepting that as being `any set is

contained in itself’… Now, once we know who they are, who is included in R is the elements,

once more, not the pair…why? Because the English name was given to the elements, and R is

replacing that, only, that is the only purpose of R…in that point of time, on what was seen

there…perhaps, to make it all precise, we should then complete the English words which gave

birth to our R (set of sets which do not contain themselves at this point in time, 3pm of the 30 th),

for Mathematics may look like `Casa da mãe Joana’, but it is certainly a very well defined place,

and we doubt any mathematician of respect would like their own houses loose like that…then,

the right name for the updated R is set of sets which do not contain themselves at this point in

time, 3 pm and one second, of the 30th, soon after we have just written what the set R is. If, with

Maple (inside of the machine world), we may then simply re-define R, update and keep the

name, but if with (inside of the world of) Mathematics, we are now obliged to come up with a
4 Our special assertion on the 5th dimension: It is actually true that if Mathematics holds anything close to human,

that connection has to be made via the concept infinity, which will be the closest to the idea of transcendence, yet

part of the world of Mathematics as an entity…


I. M. R. Pinheiro 18
new name, so that the set from 3pm will be called R, for instance, but the set of 3pm and one

second has to be at least R’, and so on, so forth…now, either it is Mathematics, and everything in

scientifically defined, or it is language and we discuss it there, as explained in [M. R. Pinheiro

2007]. Understand that Philosophy is the mother of Mathematics and, apparently, we have

fathered the well-posedness theory for it in 2007, so that we have recently fixed the gap, what

made this all possible theoretically. It was obviously not gap in language, for language never had

problems, or issues, of that sort, but absence of understanding of the fundamentals of language

by those doing Logic and Mathematics, what just corroborates our statements in `Translation

avec Samba’: make people learn more subjects well and they will not create problems which will

only waste humanity’s time…

OK, so just to make it shorter: even wondering about the possibility of a set containing itself is

insane…if it ever did, it would be there as element, what means already defined by time of

`pointing’, which was never the case…a name is a complex entity and, as soon as we associate it

with a complex entity, we understand that time of baptism is extremely relevant (like a nuclear

bomb at our door!). A person is born little, they then grow, they get to keep their name only

because it is in the English language, but mathematically, and scientifically, they are a different

being each and every even thousandth part of second…(the complexity of a being cannot, ever,

be described scientifically, never in real time…it will never be possible…by time the machine

produces reading it is already something else…obviously and trivially…by time of the human

eye observing the fetus, the image arriving to mind, the actual being, is already another being5…

5 Interesting enough that this is like an example for parallel worlds: a world is that which is mathematically
I. M. R. Pinheiro 19
the time a human sees is also different from the machine…) the same chain of mistake error we

find between baby in tummy, machine, and finally doctor, we find with the translation, as we

pointed out before, just in smaller scale because the doctor is also a dynamic entity, not written

somewhere, not abstract, like the text. If we understand all this, and accept it all as what gives

relevance to life, what makes it interesting, we will also understand how trivial Mathematics is in

this so complex universe, or how trivial IT SHOULD BE, anyway…it is all about static pictures

of things that will change all the time, so that it is always wrong for real life and will never be

good enough for those who are really nasty about correctness. However, it is perfect for the

abstract world, if laws of definition, which sustain its perfection, are finally respected.

Otherwise, even there it will fail and produce inconsistencies.

On same realm of things (see [A. D. Irvine 2003], for instance), we find another gem…`From P

we may infer logically P ∨ Q, but from ∼ P and P ∨ Q, we will infer Q’…they mention this as a

big deal. Sincerely, at the same point in time, either you have P or its negation, how is it possible,

IN MATHEMATICS (!), not in human beings’ stuff, having both? What are the mathematical

entities which would be there and not be, at the same time, as Ontological Paraconsistency would

like to state, and we have never seen more repulsive thing than this in proposals for Science…

whatever is not is obviously something else than whatever is…for God’s sake! If they do not

occur at the same point in time, how can that generate any problem in any deduction
happening, which is never going to be accessed by the being reading it, and another is what they read from their own

limited perception of the actual world…of course there is the `Matrix’ effect (reference to last movie of the series),

an actual high chance that the world is yet another thing, which is not the actual world, time wise, or the world

perceived by vast majority of people…


I. M. R. Pinheiro 20
whatsoever? Logic is, once more, just like well-written, well-posed, mathematical problems, or

even logical, attached to a context, a context which is human, and that is all own humans may

deal with: it does include, obviously, minimum human environmental conditions (time, location,

participants of relevance, probably others we are currently unable to mention)…Some things,

mathematical entities, may exist per se, of course, and so will, most of the time, such as triangles

we create from our own imagination, or circles, or functions…whatever is abstraction over

abstraction, already axiomatized in full, will be passive of creation by us with no context

whatsoever. In this case, however, we must keep in our minds the `trigger rule’: if the human

matters are included by time of assertions, then it is not abstraction over abstraction…who is P?

P must be an assignment of some sort, must mean a previous axiom, even if temporary, that is,

for that specific problem…show us then a P which is a mathematical entity that `may be’ and

`may be not’, at same point in time, as well as same conditions, and we will believe this is a

problem for scientists to worry about…by the time it is not true anymore, cannot be the same P,

that is trivial! P must bear the four point reference, always, even if such is not spelled out in the

statements!

Apparently, Russell has created a complex theory to explain all this, and called it `theory of

types’: That is absurd. Once more, shows incompetence in understanding life and language in

depth. No! Things are simple, Science aims simplicity, most basic principle of it, as we keep on

stating…

Now, once we know, we are back to what we state before, the mathematical prohibition of

naming two things the same way and, therefore, even though the English words are the same, we

I. M. R. Pinheiro 21
must either write them all, or use a different name in Mathematics, for they are not even close to

be the same in Mathematics…the confusion is always generated by same superficial

understanding of the English language. In English, we can, not with variables (and the name of a

set happens to be one variable)!

It is interesting to see that, nowadays, some scientific journals oversee this sort of incorrectness,

or absence of perfection, in mathematical proofs, and even accept the writing of the computer

program Maple, which allows the same variable to become itself plus one, for instance.

That is OK for computation purposes, but one must remember the origins of the variables and the

fact that they can only hold one assignment at a time, not two in the same logical proposition, for

God’s sake! And, even in Maple, by the time x becomes x+1, x disappears and will never be

recovered from the system…So, Maple is not against mathematical principles (thanks all), only

those using it, mistakenly, or its symbols…

With this, the argumentation used by Gödel to prove incompleteness is knocked down.

To be able to utter that X cannot be proven in T, we obviously would have to exhibit the value of

X, which we are not able to do so far…

In fact, First Order Arithmetic has already been proved to be complete (see [D Jabcquette 1991],

for instance).

If multiplication is defined as it is, based on the sum, then it is proven that Arithmetic is complete

for first order as well.

They then claim that the Second Order Arithmetic, that involving quantifiers, is not complete,

providing a reason for Gödel to be correct.

I. M. R. Pinheiro 22
Second Order Arithmetic is obviously not complete because to create a `for all’ statement, one

does not need to check each element of the first order, the statement is born on second order and

is not deductible from whatever existed in first order because it is impossible to enumerate all

natural numbers, for instance, in the clearest case. If we tie the application of quantifiers to what

we can count, however, then quantifiers may be included in Arithmetic and we do then have

completeness…For instance, take A={a, b, c, d}. If we claim that `a belongs to the set of natural

numbers, and so do b, c, and d’, we then have a valid logical inference: `for all x, x inside of A, it

is true that x is also inside of the set of natural numbers’. And there is no doubt about who is

included in A and who is not, so that any assertion about A is easily told to be true, or false, in

those regards.

This way, there is at least one sentence which is not provable from the first order propositions, or

even the second one ones: `For all’ may only be inferred from another `for all’ or from `there is

not a single element which does not…’.

If one defines Arithmetic to only be that of first order, then it is complete, and that may only

make sense, for Arithmetic is about summing, not about generalizations. We may also include

quantifiers which inhabit the Arithmetic logical universe (has to then be passive of deduction

there). Apparently, the problem held by many researchers in the area, in what regards

completeness, is the acceptance of the induction process as formal sets of foundations to support

conclusions. The other issue some had was the Russell issue, on sets of sets…

Oh, well, bad on them, who did not read the Bible of Mathematics with the Bible of the English

language, at the same time, so that it is all compatible.

I. M. R. Pinheiro 23
Induction is a better reason than Russell’s paradox (again, is there a real paradox? We start

thinking they are all like Parallax mistake, only an equivocated observation, superficial, of

things), in terms of Science. However, it is pretty clear that induction does generate righteous

conclusions and one may easily go from conclusion to theorem if told there was induction and

vice-versa, so that there is both soundness and completeness going on there. One cannot simply

state Arithmetic is incomplete, or inconsistent, or any system containing it: a proof is necessary.

However, we had proof of the opposite and all examples in the sense they would like to see were

proven wrong here.

Right names given, Arithmetic is, finally, complete and consistent. If the deduction of a sentence

with a quantifier cannot be attained via axioms from Arithmetic, it is because the sentence does

not belong there…easy as that. The other point is that if a true sentence, that is, a proposition,

sound in Mathematics (well-posedness) is ever found to exist, but it is not passive of deduction

via the system rules, then one of these things has to be true: the person uttering that proposition

has incurred in a fallacy, or the system is incomplete in the sense that it should have included that

proposition as axiom of foundation, what simply means `include that proposition in the set of

axioms of the system and re-build it’.

Logical systems do hold their symbols, which are mandatory to exist in higher number than the

symbols from the system formed by them, for they may generate more than one system, different

ones.

In the literature, they mention the self-referential statements. However, P (1), for instance, as

mentioned before here (2), in this very paper (3) (and notice how many referents (3 in total),

I. M. R. Pinheiro 24
in the English language, we feel obliged to use to point precisely to the P we wish for, by now,…

it cannot be easy to have something scientific being passed onwards via written language…), is

not a person and, therefore, cannot refer to itself. Who is making it look as if this is the case there

is the person writing it, who happens to be a nonsensical writer. It is impossible to write such a

thing in Logic, for the rules of assignment are context dependent and include only one actual

world reference to a name in each complete problem, or statement.

It is simply ridiculous even bothering…

Once more, however, it is there, so we must bother!

Another interesting point is that if we ever find out that certain statement does not have proof in

a logical system T, we are not going to use this information in any deduction, rather the opposite,

we will never mention that statement, for it is not a valid proposition in the own system

considered and, therefore, it cannot, possibly, be called proposition, only statement, English

statement.

All this confusion is always the same we write about since the Sorites paradox solution: logicians

and mathematicians seem not to study the basic items forming their own communication (see

[M. R. Pinheiro 2007]). Of course there is a difference between the English language and what is

logical in it. Only what is logical may be used in deductions…(of scientific nature, only ones we

are able to refer to in Science, aiming conversation of scientific level)

This is a fundamental stone for one to claim to be doing Science, that it is all logical…

They call axiom from Arithmetic, for instance, the fact that any number summed to zero is the

own number, that is: x+0=x (see [Storrs McCall 2008] , as possible source).

I. M. R. Pinheiro 25
Interesting that this is part of the statement defining the operation of summing: It is trivially

included there.

So, if we take the statement of definition as axiom, we then have that automatically!

x=y -> Sx=Sy is another axiom of Arithmetic (see [Storrs McCall 2008], for instance).

Easy to see how the last axiom is also a direct consequence of the statement of definition the way

we wrote it.

Basically, there is also a mistake when dealing with Arithmetic: the own definitions have to be

axioms of the system, but they usually do not include it there. Included, however, as we propose,

perhaps we get no inconsistency, or incompleteness, thoughts going on whatsoever…

Inconsistency means we may infer two conclusions, fully contradictory, from same set of

premises/propositions (a premise is like an English statement for us, as before explained. It may,

or may not be, a proposition, which is something context-dependent, as also explained before in

this very paper. One may wonder why we state a premise is like an English statement. The reason

behind that is that the word premise is used by several people outside of Science to mean

whatever they hold as paradigm…Good scientific terms must hold maximum uniqueness as

pointers, so that `premise` could not be a good one for that end).

That would be a very weird assertion to be made about Arithmetic. As far as we know, such

contradictory set of conclusions was never mentioned in the literature…

And, in fact, Gentzen, 1936, has proven the consistency of Arithmetic (see [E F Robertson 2005],

for instance).

With this, what remains to Gödel to wish for is that Arithmetic were incomplete.

I. M. R. Pinheiro 26
Incompleteness of a logical system means that not the whole set of possible logical statements

may be proved inside of own system, that is, there will always be a possible statement, from the

allowed set of propositions (well formed, according to rules of the system), which may not be

proven to be true, or false, using the postulates of the system.

With Arithmetic, such a statement does not exist.

Interesting that suffices renaming things to what they actually are, and there is no statement not

passive of being proven true, or false, in Arithmetic.

For instance, the initial assignment of names of the numbers to the actual sets containing the

units of counting is arbitrary and, therefore, could not be seen as anything different than `naming’

things. It is baptizing objects from our imagination, counting, with something we can refer to in

written, or spoken, language. Baptism can only be considered axiom, once it is arbitrary

assignment, there is no possible logical universal agreement on that baptism, it has to be imposed

so that we can talk, and write, about those things the name refers to…As it is necessary for the

theory to be referred to, must be included on the set of axioms for that system. Therefore, for

Arithmetic, it will be the whole set of the natural numbers, an infinite number of axioms added to

our previously found 8!

If the definition of summing, which is also a name, is an axiom, why would not the assignment

of names to quantities?

So, they are all axioms, all contained in Arithmetic…and Peano did a lazy job presenting only a

reduced number of axioms for Arithmetic, when there is actually an infinite number of them…

including all number assignments, it is an infinite number…

I. M. R. Pinheiro 27
Conclusion

Arithmetic is both complete and consistent, any claim opposing this must be accompanied of

other counter-examples, different from the ones so far, all proven to be equivocated, mostly for

same reason: shortage of understanding of human kind by those doing Mathematics, or Logic.

The work done by people like frege and Russell is the most important factor for any Science, the

right language of communication, for unless a scientist is eternally on Earth, how can Science

ever progress otherwise? The important is communicating things to the level Science demands,

that is, so that a person simply reading the paper of someone else will understand everything to

top detail, no matter who they are, as long as introduced to the rigors of Science. A paper can

only be good if the majority of people in Science, or Science literate, may assess it…Those

defending the opposite, that the good thing to do is `hiding’, is `making it mysterious’, are

obviously committing crimes against human kind, as repulsive as torture, brain-washing, slavery:

they cannot, ever, be considered scientists at all. Prizes to scientists must consider first rule:

simplicity and accessibility. Why? Because if even with a whole editorial board we get papers

like those we mention (see H-H inequality and S-convexity, or others of ours), imagine if we

intentionally limit the amount of people who are able to criticize/read them? Vast majority of

scientists do not have time to spare criticizing research of others, that is, contributing to another

person’s research (actually, also deserving remark: for free?), imagine making it all difficult? It is

obviously a huge favor if a paper of someone gets to be well criticized before acceptance, for

imagine finding out on your 500th published paper that the same logical scheme you took for

I. M. R. Pinheiro 28
granted as right is actually wrong and you have been using it in almost your every mathematical

proof? Better falling from the horse at the beginning of the race than almost at the final line, and

winning…What we want is that those who are top students find Science a comfortable place to

be at, not exam cheaters…do it right, and it will be a welcoming place for those who matter, for

whoever got degrees cheating will never love learning or teaching, and, therefore, will never be

ethical…make it bearable for the good students and everything is coherent with the chosen

democratically principles. Science is definitely not a place for everyone, or should not be,

starting with those who wish to make it inaccessible intentionally…

In short: let’s do the right thing, no matter how historically relevant (how do we actually measure

that is another issue: quantity of papers produced? Number of non-thinkers copying?) the author

is. If something is blatantly incoherent with all foundational theory that far, like the set

containing itself thing, we immediately yell it is, not seeing the king naked, and taking politeness

as excuse, telling others he was dressed with most modern fabric ever, from top designers…we

go one, or several, wrong steps back, but we re-do it right, so that when we progress, it is for

real, for it would not be Science otherwise, only schizoid delusion!!

Another point is that about the symbol `subset of’ in Mathematics. There is something which

needs to be fixed there, for long creating confusion everywhere…basically, we have been using

the same delimiters for parts of sets and sets, that is, artificial boundaries, which do not exist,

which we insert to write about pieces of sets, and actual boundaries, which exist due to our

definition of a new set, such as the natural numbers.

Basically, we should have a symbol for when the boundaries actually do not exist, but we are

I. M. R. Pinheiro 29
creating a subset from an existing set (so that it is not a new definition, or axiom, only new

presentation of the elements of a set), and another for when the set was created via axiom, so that

there is no possible confusion, or mistake, in the notation (remember that the English words

should match the Mathematics symbols, and different meanings should deserve different

mathematical symbols, for Mathematics has to be precise, and univocally interpreted, what is not

a condition for language).

The imaginary line could then be something like `!!’, why not?

This way, via axiom we create the set B, for instance B={a, b, c, d}, but to express the idea of a

subset, which is not there physically as a set inside of another, we write !!a, b!! C B, for instance.

The reason for this further fixing is obvious: if things remain as they are now, we will have to

agree that a set is contained in itself (no distinction between the physically existing line around a

set and the imaginary line around a subset, so that the elements of the set contained in the set is

equated to the whole axiom contained in the same set, what is absurd and create inconsistencies

in Mathematics, what is unacceptable).

References:

[Storrs McCall 2008] Storrs McCall . The Consistency of Arithmetic, found online at

http://www.mcgill.ca/files/philosophy/The_Consistency_of_Arithmetic.doc, as seen on the 27th

of April of 2008.

I. M. R. Pinheiro 30
[E F Robertson 2005] J J O'Connor, E F Robertson. The real numbers: Attempts to understand.

Found online at

http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/HistTopics/Real_numbers_3.html, visited on the 30th of

April of 2008.

[D Jabcquette 1991] Mojzesz Presburger, Dale Jabcquette. On the completeness of a certain

system of Arithmetic of whole numbers in which addition occurs as the only operation. History

and Philosophy of Logic, Volume 12, Issue 2 1991 , pages 225 - 233.

[George Cantor 1890] George Cantor. Uber ein elementare Frage der Mannigfaltigkeitslehre.

Journal of the German Mathematical Union (Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinigung) (Bd. I, S. 75-

78 (1890-1)).

[Henry 2003] Gödel numbering. Planetmath, accessible via

http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/GodelNumbering.html, seen on the 27th April 2008.

[Kleene et al. 1986] Eds: S. Feferman, J. D. W. Junior, S. C. Kleene, G. H. Moore, R. M.

Soloway, J. V. Heijenoort. Kurt Gödel Collected Works Volume I Publications 1929-1936.

Oxford University Press, 1986. ISBN-13: 978-0195039641.

I. M. R. Pinheiro 31
[M. R. Pinheiro 2006] M. R. Pinheiro; A Solution to the Sorites, Semiotica, 160 (1/4), 2006.

[M. R. Pinheiro 2007] M. R. Pinheiro. The inferential step in the Sorites paradox: logical or

human? Submitted, preprint located at www.geocities.com/mrpprofessional, as seen on the 30th

of April of 2008.

[Alozano 2004] Alozano. Peano Arithmetic. Planethmath as seen at

http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/PeanoArithmetic.html, on the 27th of April 2008.

[E. Weissten 1996] E. Weissten. Gödel, Kurt. Eric Weissten’s world of biography, accessible via

http://scienceworld.wolfram.com/biography/Goedel.html, as seen on the 27th April 2008. 1996.

[A. D. Irvine 2003] Irvine, A. D., "Russell's Paradox", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/russell-paradox/.

[P. Schwarz 2008] P. Schwarz. Looking for Extra Dimensions,

http://www.superstringtheory.com/experm/exper5.html, as seen on the 01st of May of 2008.

I. M. R. Pinheiro 32
[Dale Group 2001] Dale Group. Matryoshka Doll (How Products Are Made). Date: January 1, 2001.

Accessible online at http://www.encyclopedia.com/beta/doc/1G2-2897000064.html.

[H. Langston 2008] H. Langston. Discrete Mathematics, Lecture 2, Logic of Quantified

Statements, Methods of Proof, Set Theory, Number Theory, Introduction and General Good

Times, p. 35, found online at http://www.cs.nyu.edu/courses/summer06/G22.2340-

001/lect/lecture_02.pdf, seen on the 01st of May of 2008.

I. M. R. Pinheiro 33

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