The Soviet "iar Seara President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board February 15, 1990 fied by Multiple Sources PFIAB Control #_/-70 ‘Declassify OADR copy t DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E.0. 13526 010 — 0f26- MR HS wlK/6 WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “POP-GEGRED-UMBRA GAMKAZOP-GEGREP UMBRA GAMMA ‘WNINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades has the situation in the world been explosive and, hence, more difficult ai unfavorable as in the firet half of the Mikhail Gorbachev February 1986 WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOWExecutive Summary PART I: U.S. Handling of the "War Scare": The Estinative Proves: Barly Perceptions of the Soviet War Scare British Assessment U.S. Perceptions Entrenched An Alternative opinion Te Rebuttal Wew Information Perceptions Evolve. . . But Doubta Remain Me Last Word The Record muddied Conclusions: The Estinative Process And Unfinished Business. . . PART II: The Soviet "War Scare" Introduction origins of the Scare Vulnerability of Soviet Nuclear Forces to a US Surprise attack Soviet Analysis of the US-USSR Strategic Balance ‘The "War Scare" Tate 1970's: Changing Soviet Perceptions of Us Intentions 1980: Heightoned concern 1981: Reducing Vulnerabilities 1982: Strategic Preparations 1983: Wearing the Precipice Growing Peasinism, Additional Precautions Mounting Tensions WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON ‘BOR_SECREE-UMBRA GAMMA atble Archer 43 3983-1984: Winter of crisis Summer 1984: Preparations for War Autumn 1984: Reason Restored ‘The Legacy Implications for Today This document is classified 2P-GECRRE/UNERA/GAMMA/WNINTEL/ MOFORN/HOCOMTRACT/ORCOM in ite entirety. WHINEEL NOFORN HocoITACT oRCON ~BOD-GHGREP UNBRA GAMMA av“ToP-SEERET UMBRA GAMMA - \WOENTEL HOFORN WOCONTRACT. ORCON ‘Executive Summary From the late 1970's to the mid-1980'e, the military forces and intelligence services of the Soviet Union were redirected in waya that suggested that the Sovict leadership was seriously concerned about the possibility of a sudden strike launched by the United states and ite NATO allies. These changes were accompanied by leadership statements —- sone public, but many made in secret meetinga -- arguing that the US vas seeking strategic superiority in order to be able to launch a nuclear first strike. these actions and atatenents are often referred to aa the period of the “war scare." The changes in Soviet military and intelligence arrangenents included: improvements of Warsay Pact combat readiness (by recalling reservists, lengthening service tines, increasing draft ages, and abolishing many draft deferents), an unprecedented emphasis on civil defense exercises, an end of military support for gathering the harvest (last seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion), the forvard deployment of unusual mumbera of SPETSNAZ forces, increased readiness of Soviet ballistic missile submarines and forward deployed nuclear capable aircraft, massive military exercises that for the first time emphasized surviving and responding to a sudden eneny atrike, a nev agreement anong Waray Pact countries that gave Soviet leaders authority in the event of an attack to unilaterally comait Pact forces, creation vithin the Gnu of a new directorate to run networks of illegal agents abroad, an urgent KGB (and some satellite services") requirement that gave the highest priority the gathering of politico-nilitary indleatore of US/NATO preparations for a sudden nuclear attack, establishment of @ special warning condition to alert Soviet forces that a surprise enemy strike using weapons of mass destruction vas in Progress, and the creation of a special KGB unit to manage a WHINTEL HOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON ‘FOD-GRERB? UMERA GAMMA ¥‘Z0P-GEGRED UMBRA GAMMA - WHINTEL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON computer program (the VRYAN model) that would objectively measure ‘the correlation of forces and warn vhen Soviet relative strength ‘had declined to the point that a preemptive Soviet attack might be justitied. During the November 1983 NATO "Able Archer* nuclear release: ‘exercise, the Soviets implemented military and intelligence activities that previously were seen only during actual crises. ‘These included: placing Soviet air forces in Geraany and Poland ‘on heightened alert, aE ae The moaning of these events obviously vas of crucial Amportance to American and ATO policymakers. If they were aimply parts of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to intimidate the US, deter it from deploying improved veapons, and arouse US donestic opposition to foreign policy initiatives, then they would not be of crucial significance. rf they reflected an internal Soviet power struggle -- for example, a contest between conaerva~ tives and pragnatists, or an effort to avoid blane for soviet economic failures by pointing to (exaggerated) military threats -- then they could not be ignored, but they vould not imply a fundamental change in Soviet strategy. But if these events vore expressions of a genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that the US was planning a nuclear first strike, causing the soviet military to prepare for such an eventuality ~~ by, for example, readying itself for a preemptive strike of its ovn -- then the "var scare" was a cause for real concern. During the past year, the President's Foreign Intelligence NINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCOM “POR-GRORET UMBRA GAIA viWHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Advisory Board has carefully revieved the events of that period to earn what ve (the U.S. intelligence comunity) knew, vhen ve knew it, and how ve interpreted it. The Board has read hundreds of @ocuments, conducted more than 75 intervieva with American and British officials, and studied the series of National Intelligence Ratimates (NIR's) and other intelligence assessments that have attempted over the last six years to interpret the var scare data. aaaitionally, ve have offered our ovn interpretation of the var scare events. We believe that the Soviets perceived that the correlation of forces had tured against the USSR, that the US vas seeking military superiority, and that the chances of the US launching a muclear first strike -- perhaps under cover of a routine training exercise -- vere groving. We also believe that the US intelligence community aid not at the time, and for several years aftervards, attach sufficient veight to the possibility that the var scare vas real. As a result, the Preaident was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and actions that understated the risks to the United States. Moreover, these assessments did not lead us to reevaluate our ovn military and intelligence actions that might be perceived by the Soviets as signaling var preparations, In two separate special National Intelligence Estimates (snre's) in Yay and August of 1984, the intelligence community said: "We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United states." soviet statements to the contrary were Judged to be "propaganda." The Board believes that the evidence then did not, and certainly does not nov, support such categorie conclusions. Even without the benefit of subsequent reporting and looking at the 1984 analysis of then available information, the tone of the intelli- gence Judgnents vas not adequate to the needa of the President. WOTWTRL NOFORN NOCONFRACT ORCON ‘FOR-GRERET-UNBRA GAMMA vit7roPGECRET-UMBRA GAIOA WHINTEL WOPORN WOCONTRACT ORCON A strongly stated interpretation was defended by explaining avay facts inconsistent with it and by failing to subject that interpretation to a comparative risk asseament. tn tine, analysts! views changed. In an annex to a February 1986 NIB, analysts declared: "During the late 1970's and early 1980s there were increasing Soviet concerns about the drift in superpover relations, vhich sone in the Soviet leadership felt indicated an increased threat of var and increased ikelihood of the use of muclear weapons. ‘These concerna vara shaped in part by a Soviet perception that the correlation of forces vas shifting against the Soviet Union and that the United states vas taking ateps to achieve military superiority." The Sovieta' VRYAN program vas evaluated as part of an effort to collect data and aubject it to computer analysis in a way that vould varn the USSR when the US had achieved @ecisive niiitary superiority. Reporting from a variety of a Ancluding Oleg Gordiyevakiy (a senior XGB officer vho once served ‘as second in command in the London Residency and vho has since defected to Great Britain), taken as a whole, strongly indicates that there vas in fact a genuine belief among key members of the Soviet leadership that the United states had embarked on a program of achieving decisive military superiority that might prompt a sudden nuclear nissile attack on the USSR. Although some details of that belief became knova only recently, there was at the tine evidence -- from secret directives and speeches by Soviet authorities -- that a major change in Soviet Political and strategic thinking had probably occurred. For example, ve knew by 1984 at the latest that a Soviet general had Anterpreted President Carter's PD-59 as preparing US atrategic forces for a preemptive strike, that the Head of the KGB's First chief Directorate, General Kryuchkov had told key subordinates that the KGB must work to prevent the US from launching a surprise attack, that KGB and Czechoslovak intelligence Residencies had been YWHINTEL NOFOR HOCONTEACT ORCON “‘DOP-GRERER UMERA GAMMA vith\WHINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON ‘tasked to gather information on US preparations for war, and that missile submarines had been placed on shortened readiness tines. Many of these facts vere summarized in a memorandum from the Mational Intelligence officer for Warning (NIO/W) to DCI William Position of the intelligence community as expressed in the May 1984 SNIE and as reasserted, in almost identical language, in tha August 1984 SHIR. Analysts will alvays have legitimate disagreements over the meaning of inevitably incomplete and uncertain intelligence reports. Moreover, part of the confidence that PPIAB has in ita ‘evn asseaament of tha var scare derives from inforaation not knovn at the tine. Our purpose in presenting this report 1s not so much to eriticize the conclusions of the 1984 SNIR‘s as to raise questions about the vaya these estimates were made and aubsequently reassessed. In cases of great importance to the survival of our nation, and especially vhere there is important contradictory evidence, the Board believes that intelligence estinates mat be cast in teras of alternative scenarios that are subjected to comparative risk assessnents. This is the critical defect in the war scare episode. By "alternative scenarioa," ve mean a full statement of each major, Possible interpretation of a set of intelligence indicators. In this case, these scenarios might have included the folloving: 2. Soviet leaders had not changed their strategic thinking but vere attempting by means of propaganda and intelligence decep- tiona to slow the US military build-up, prevent the deployment of ‘WOINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACE ORCON “‘TOP-GECRED-UMERA GAMIA ae-foP-GEERET UNBRA GAMMA - \WINTEL NOPORN NOCONTRACT ORCON new weapons, and isolate the US from its allies. 2. Soviet leaders may or may not have changed their strategic: ‘thinking, but a pover struggle among Kremlin factions and the need to deflect blame for poor economic conditions made it useful to. exaggerate the military intentions and capabilities of the US. 3. Soviet leaders had changed their strategic thinking and, in fact, believed that the US vas attempting to gain decisive strategic superiority in order, possibly, to launch a nuclear firat strike. By "comparative risk asseasment," ve mean assigning tvo kinda of weights to each scenario: one that estimates the probability. that the scenario 1a correct and another that assesses the risk to. the United states if it wrongly rejects a scenario that is, in fact, correct. In 1984, one might reasonably have given the highest probabil- ity of being correct to the first or second scenario (even though, as we argue in this report, we believe that would have been an error). But having done this, it vould surely have been clear aven then that if the third scenario was in fact correct and ve acted Af it were wrong, the risks to the United states would have been very great ~~ grater than if ve had rejected a correct first or second scenario. As it happened, the military officers in charge of the able Archer exercise minimized this risk by doing nothing An the face of evidence that parte of the Soviet armed forces were moving to an unusual level of alert. But these officers acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance, for in the year Jeading up to Able Archer they had received no guidance ss to the Possible significance of apparent changes in Soviet military and political thinking. By urging that some major estinates be based on a comparative \WHINTEL MOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON ‘ROP-SEGREE UMERA GXIOA x‘TOP-SEERE? UNBRA CAOIA ~ WHINTEL NOPORN HOCONTRACT ORCOM assessment of fully developed alternative scenarios, we are not arguing for “competitive analyses" or greater use of dissenting opinions. An intelligence catimate is not the product of a governmental debating society in which institutional rivals try to outdo one another in their display of advocacy skills. We are arguing instead for adopting the view that since it is very hard to understand the present, much lesa predict the future, it is a mistake to act as if we can. On the most important issues, it is Aifticult if not imposaible to say with confidence that we know what is happening or will happen. We can, hovever, say that there are a anall number of possibilities, each of vhich has a (rough) probability and each of which presents to the policymaker likely risks and opportunities. When analysts attempt to arrive at a single strong conclusion, ‘they not only run the risk of being wrong, they run two additional and perhaps more worrisome risks. They are likely to underestimate ‘the possibility of change (the safest prediction is alvays that tomorrow vill be 1ike today) and they are 1ikely to rely on mirror- imaging (our adversaries think the vay ve do). In this era of unprecedented, breakneck change, the first error grows in Amportance. And since ve cannot knov what individuals vill next hold pover in the USSR or vhen, it 1s an especially grave error to assume that since ve knov the US is not going to start World War IIT, the next leaders of the Kremlin vill also believe that ~- and ‘act on that belief, In short, our criticien of the 1984 SWIE‘s, though in part substantive, is in larger part procedural. We do not think there is any simple organizational change that will correct that procedure. If atrategic intelligence estimates are to give policymakers a better sense of risks and opportunities, it will only happen if policymakera insist that that is what they want and refuse to accept anything less. ‘WIIDNTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCOW “POP-SRCRET UMGRA GAMMA wt-T0P-GHCRET: UMBRA GAIA WAINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCOK Thin review of the var scare period also suggest another lesson. Tt is quite clear to the Board that during the critical years vhen the Kremlin vas reassessing US intentions, the US intelligence community dia not react quickly to or think deeply about the early signs of that change. ‘the var scare indicators began appearing in the early 1980's; the first estimate to address: this was not written until 1984. At the tine it was written, the 1a knew very 11¢tle about Rreaiin deotatonaaking, authors wrote confidently about "Soviet leadership intentiows.* We recommend that the National security council oversee a reassessment of the intelligence commnity's understandiig of Soviet military and political decisionmaking, both in general terma and in light of the Judgments made in the 1984 estimates. oir on leadership needs far better intelligence reporting on and agsess~ nents of the mindset of the Soviet leadership -- its ideclogicaly Political instincts and perceptions. As part of this reassessnent, it should exploit the current opening in the Iron Curtain to interview past and present East Bloc and Soviet officials aboit the sources and consequences of the war scare in order to obtain a better understanding of the perceptions and inner conflicts of Soviet deciaionnakers. Finally, we suggest that the US review the way in vhith it manages military inca, its ovn intela: forts, Angure that these are carried out in a way that is ‘responsive to indications and warning for var. Zn 1983 we may have inadvertently placed our relations, with the Soviet Union on a hair trigger. ‘Though the current thay in US~ Soviet relations suggests that neither side is likely in the near YWHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACE ORCON ‘FOP-ORERET UMERA CARMA aldWWINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON term to reach for that trigger, events are moving so fast that it would be unvise to assume that Soviet leaders will not in the future act, from misunderstanding or malevolence, in ways that puts the peace in jeopardy. \WAIWTEL NOPORN MOCONTRACT ORCON ‘TOP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA sel‘TOPGBCREE UMBRA GRA — ‘WWINTEL HOFORN MOCORTRACT ORCON PART T US HANDLING OF THE "WAR SCARE": THE STIMATIVE PROCESS The Board has divided its presentation into two parts; the first (Part One) deals vith a reviev of what the US (arid the British) thought about the war scare both at the tisp and subsequently. It alo sumarizes sona of the key characteristics of the estimative process and offers our conclusions for Smprovenent. ‘The second half (Part Two) sumarizes the ev ‘that leads to the conclusion that the soviet leadership genitinely developed a war scare" in the early 1980's, We believe this to be a plausible version of events based upon nev inforantdon as Well as a reconsideration of evidence known then. Inevitably, there ia sone duplication between the two parts, but this is necessary in order to tell the story in an orderly way. Part One, then, is a summation of what we knev, vhen wp knew it, and how wa interpreted it. It is not a competitive estimate. Rather than catalog the actual events in detail, ve to summarize then and to focus instead on how the intelj} community reacted, as manifested in its analysis. Our conclusions mirror our profound dismay at what ve believe to bé the intelligence community's single largest failing -- the failure to Provide policymakers with an adequate understanding of the risks ‘and consequences associated with alternate scenarios snvohviog uncertain events of grave import. There were many other directions that ve, given unlimited me, vould have liked to embark. Intelligence issues| that Ampacted upon our review of the war scare are identified in the WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “POP-SEERET-UMERA GAMMA 2SP SBERE? UMBRA cama a ‘WONTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOM final section of Part one. We regret that these important issues received short shrift; ve encourage a complete review of tien so ‘that US indications and warning might be improved as ve enter into ‘the evermore complex, polycentric, and uncertain 1990's. ‘EARLY PERCEPTIONS OP THE SOVIET "WAR SCARR* Ag the Carter years wound to a close, America's bilateral relationship with the USSR was on the dovneving fron the earlier detente. Te Soviet Union's invasion of Afyhanistan biought bitter MAO condeanation, and SALT IZ languished unratitied. As ‘the new Republican Administration took up the reina, Preqident. Reagan announced in hia state of the Union speech « major Pencetine military buildup. By May 1901, the "ara of self-aéubt,* personified by the failed Iran hostage rescue attempt, had énded. United states foreign policy took on a nev assertivencant President Reagan declared that arms control treaties vefe no substitute for military preparedness and characterized the Union as an ‘evil force, the antithesis of the Us. goviet meddling in Afghantatan, Poland, Central America, and elbdvhere increasingly proved a constant irritant to the nev Administration, ‘and seened only to reinforce its "get tough” posture. Recriminations flew between Moscov and Washington, and relations continued to slide. As the Administration settled into ita first tera, an intense "war scare" thone began to in the Soviet media and in private fora, accompanied by ancmalods and often provocative USSR behavior. At first, such activity was easily dismissed as predictable Soviet responses to US efforts to deploy INF missiles in in order to counter Soviet 65-20's and to modernize ite atrategse and conventional forces. United states officials understandably, vere suspicious of Soviet motivations as Washington struggled to gain Public support in Western Burope and in the US for thesa force \WINTEL WOFORN HOCORTRACT ORCOM TOP-SRERET-UMERA GHIA 2-AGP-QRERET UNERA CAIHA é WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Amprovenents.2 In 1983, Soviet rhetoric had sharpened. Moscow had agcused President Reagan and his advisora of "madness," extremian|" and criminality" in the conduct of relations vith the USSR.) Te United states vas portrayed as a nation singularly recog a firet-steike muclear capability as a prelude to eradi communion. Westerners, including some vell-knovn experts gn the Soviet Union, reported alarming conversations with Soviet citizens and officials that indicated a large portion of the soviet Population believed nuclear war was dangerously close, A @iploatic relations ebbed to near a postwar lov, US andlyste attributed soviet ansieties and belligerence to a muber of factors: initiation of INF deployments; a strong US posture in ‘the START talks; US action in Grenada; deployment of Marisies in Tebanon; US ald to inauryencies against foviet client regines; the Reagan Adniniatration's perceived political “exploitatign" of the KAL shootdowny and the Adminiatration's perceived unvii1ing- ness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Soviet regime or to treat the Kremlin with the *superpover" deference it desired.” Moreover, US analyata concluded that certain developments could have heightened Moscov's uncertainties about its long-tera geostrategic position: © A possible adverse shift in the overall strategic balance, precipitated by resolute US moves to significantly boleter ite strategic posture as well as its conventional capsbilities. dus officials detected a vigorous Soviet "active neaduren* campaign intended to thvert US atratagic objectives. * Icrey Hodnett's memorandun of Dec. 22, 1983, entitled *doviet. ‘Thinking on the Possibility of Arsed confrontation with the United seaten,s Foreign Policy, Tames Branch, Policy Anaiysia Divfelon, Office’ of Soviet Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency.-26P-ONGRE? UMERA GANA ce \WOUINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON © the perceived lover priority accorded by the Reagan Adniniatration to arma control negotiations, as “evidenced* hy ite CrvilLingnese to accomodite Soviet intersta and {ee ajarent Intention to proceed with vespons programa Moscov may have thought vere on hold. © The end of the ‘Vietnam syndrome" and readineda of Washington to use force once again in the Third World, either by supporting insurgencies againat Soviet client regines, da in Nicaragua, or acting @irectly, as in tebanon and Grenada.? Although US analysts aptly identified signa of emotional and paranoid Soviet behavior and offered an analysia of the potential causes, they reasoned that Moscow was fundamentally concerne not about any hypothetical near-term US nuclear attack, but about possible shifts in the strategic balance five-to-ten years |hpnce. Tt was easy to distrust the USSR, they reasoned, because soviet Jeadera had many plausible motives for trying to cleverly manipulate Western perceptions: ' I © To foster the "peace movenent™ in Western Europe so ps to derail INF deployments and encourage neutrality within NATO.| i © To portray President Reagan as an incompetent varnonger so ‘as to deepen cleavages among nationa in the West. © To Increase public pressure in the United stated for providing a more conciliatory posture tovard the USER via lover defense spending, arma control concessions, and less “th ‘ventioniat™ poliotes. Analyste also oatinated that, for the foviete, the ihagan Adminiatration vas the "least loved of any US Administration pince Sipia. ‘WOIWTEL MOPORN NOCONTRACT ORCOH ‘ZOP-GRERET UMBRA GAIA ‘TOP-GRERET UMBRA GAIA WWINTEL NOPORN HOCORTRACT ORCON ‘that of President Truman." It vould be just like them to "undercut the President's reelection prospects.*4 abnormal, emotional Soviet behavior could be, and vas, essentially in political teras in minor analytical products, At the same tine, US analysts often tended to Soviet leadership decisionmaking as rational, leadership's strengths and veaknesses. United states nevertheless, described Soviet policy aa “driven by calculation of interests and dogged purauit of objectives, even in the face of great adversity, rather sudden svella of fear or anger." Furthermore, analysts conbluded, that, "However disturbed Soviet policymakers might be ly the Reagan Adninistration, they aleo have a sense of the! SER’ strengths and of [U8] vulnerabilities . . . the perception from the Kremlin ia by no means one of unrelieved gloom." Moscow ‘economic problems, while described as “taut,” vere judged not Likely to deter them from accelerating the pace of ailitary ‘spending to challenge the us.> Undeterred by what vas termed the "soviet campaign® and vary concerned about the threat posed by tha|large numbers of 88-20 deployments, America contimed to fira up her defenses by, for example, deploying cruise aiseiles and nga 4n Burope, adopting a forvard-based military strategy, eabirking on a path of force modernization and improved readinesa, and invigorating a atrong "continuity in governsent™ atratesy designed ‘to protect US leafership during a nuclear exchange. ‘mia. Smita. | WHINFEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON | “‘FOP-SECRET UMERA ANIA s-TOP-GHGRET UMERA GAMA cs j \WODETEL MOFORW MOCONTRACT ORCOM As the second Reagan/Bush campaign swung into high gear, US intelligence analysts began to compile solid evidence from vithin the Soviet bureaucracy of groving concern about nuclear var: © Ina briefing to soviet and Hast European officials! dn the fall of 1983, a Sovict diplomat warned that the world waa on the. brink of war. © Immediately following Brezhnev's death, KCB on Residencies in Soviet missions abroad received orders to adnitor US installations for indications of US military mobilisatié: © Shortly after the second inauguration, Hoscov enjoined Residencies vorldwide to work to detect any sign that the t States and its allies were about to unleash a firet strike USSR. Already in mid-1981, reporting on possible us to launch a first strike had been added to KGB col: requirements vorldvide, In early 1983, Mocov varned KaB Fesidencies that the United states vas positioning itealf thi war. © In early 1983, Soviet military intelligence, created a nev directorate to organize and manage "illegal networks vorldvide. ‘the uryency of this nove reportedly re: hhad taken on a sense of urgency not seen in the past. from Weadquarters constantly reminded field els Prepare for war. As a reault, all Residency were Sees eee eee eaeBy the fall of 1983, the beat of soviet “war scare” 4 ‘almost ost in the cacophony of the international thund ‘Masaive demonstrations erupted in Germany and other NATO ‘to protest the INF deployments. ‘The Soviets shot down ‘the Marine barracks in Beirut was bonbed; and the US Grenada. Against this backdrop, NATO held its annual co exercise to practice nuclear release procedures in early 1983. This recurring exercise, known as Able Archer, WTO forces from Turkey to England, Although past abl exercises were monitored by Soviet intelligence, the read Warsaw Pact military forces and intelligence services to wee unprecedented. Atr araies in East Gernany conducted eignificantly more reconnaissance flighta previous years, and sant special intelligence requi:-TOP-SRERBT UMERA GAIOA 7 WWINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON and GRU Residencies in vestern countries to report any 2 military activity that might signal an impending NATO ise attack. ‘hia abnormal Soviet behavior to the annual, Archer 83 exercise sounded no alarm bells in the US and Warning system. United states commanders on the scan not aware of any pronounced superpower tension, and the activities vere not seen in their totality until long exercise vas over. For example, vhile the Us d ‘veeks had passed after the completion of the exercise. tha 0 air force standéovn had been in effect for nearly a week before fully armed MiG-23 aircraft vere noted on air defense al ‘There vere plenty of reasons vhy the Soviet military to able Archer was missed; there was no context by which to| judge the behavior. First, Moscow's "war scare" activity was net yet the rocus of intelligence or policy attention. Additiohally, Soviet intelligence requirenents ageinst the exercise, Revolution holiday? about midway through the exeraise, [ji een detected if the Soviets were seriously concerned about h HATO-2OR-OREREP UMERA CAMA Pe WOINTEL NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON attack.® But beyond the puzzling Soviet reaction to the able exercise, US analysts, by spring of 1984, had also clear trend: Soviet forces, over the past decade, had effort to respond more rapidly to the threat of var and to ‘the capability to manage all aspects of a nuclear var.*7 Ip Soviet exercise activity in 1983 highlighted "the continued ing of concepts necessary for avoiding surprise attack . «|. . ‘Common to all these exercises vere the thenes of continued over force readiness and vulnerability to attack; ensuring] that @ispersal and launch orders vere complied with; and testing) what previously had been paper or small-scale vartime concepts actual operational conditions using larger numbers of 7 Analysts estimated that the attaingent of the above objectives could increase the Soviet military's capability to respond to an enemy surprise attack or launch an attack of their & By March, 1964, the iegue of the war scare broke into Allied "In fact, a potentially dangerous analytic assumption vad also rently at’ vork, Despite indications of increased readi with some units, other units upon vhich no positive intel! existed regarding readiness vere assumed to have not TonrE 11-10-84 “Implications of Recent military-Political Activities.” \WAIRTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON -SOP-GREREE UMERA GAMMADespite -- or perhaps because of ~- its disturbingsoPonener Umea cama | comentey SE (I saateionanny, something was amiss. The British Aubassador to the US visit to the state Department’ Aftaire, Lawrence Eagleburger, to Giscuss the issue. according to the responsible briefing official from state's of Intelligence and Research (INR), THR {and thus state's position) vas that the Soviets vere pursu} massive propaganda campaign. The INR officer zagleburyer a skeptical version of events, designed, in hin worda, to "discourage the British." he British case apparently was not helped by the Ambassador's presentation; he was not entirely clear about events, and his intelligence aide most familiar with the var scare vas out of country. ‘There vas even suspicion in| sone american quartera that the Foreign Office vas simply capitalizing fen a good political occasion to force President Reagan to tone ovn hia rhetoric and delay deployments of the INF missiles. ‘Thus, the Foreign Office ie eee ‘US_PERCEPTIONS ENTRENCHED In May 1984, US intelligence addressed for the first tine in national estimate the possibility that the soviets vere ‘the Able Archer NATO exercise. Despite the evidence of @irectives and speeches by Soviet authorities to prepare for-TOP-ORCRET UMERA COMA ~ WWINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON the iaaue vas not treated as an evolutionary process. In |fact, several intelligence officers told the Board that the vas undertaken essentially to explain a series of short-term events, rather than to examine the accumulated long-tern rej on the war scare. In the estinate's "Key Judgments, the underlying Soviet purpose." The “coincident” activities consisted oft © Large-scale military exercises -- including a major naval exercise in the Norvegian Sea, unprecedented $S-20 launch detiv- ity, and large-scale SsBN dispersal; | © Preparations for air operations against Afghanistan: © Attempts to change the air corridor regine in Berliny © Wow military measures described as responsive to or deployments; and | © shri11 propaganda attributing a heightened danger 4¢ var to us behavior. United States analysta categorically concluded: SMe believe preparation moves in the USER, and the absence of a tone 0: eaTOP-SECRET UMERA CAMA WWINTEL NOFORM KOCONTRACT ORCON (Underlining added.)® the estimate boldly declared that "! Soviet war scare propaganda . . . is aimed primarily at Alecrediting US policies and mobilizing ‘peace' pressures |anong ‘various audiences abroad." In a more piecemeal fashion, ft vas Judged that "Bach soviet action has its ovn military or political purpose sufficient to explain it." The accelerated of Soviet live exercise activity was explained simply as a reflection of “long-term Soviet military objectives Te Soviet reaction to able Archer 83 was dismissed|as a eounterexercise," but analysts acknoviedged that the “el were admonished "to look for any indication United States vas about to launch a first nuclear the West could very well have been vitnessing a careful, delih— erate Soviet defensive posturing designed to achieve readiness for attack, vhile not simultaneously escalating tensions.) Aa for leadership instability, again analyste rej. the hypothesis that veak central leadership could account for Spviet actions. While acknovledging that either a Soviet militaty or "Sa 414 note that [Si ume ae tnee ight ehiacted to expla thn seen © ¥force-v ‘alert since World War IZ. WWINTEL NOFORN KOCONTRACT ORCON “TOP-SECRET UMERA GAMMA a3-70P-SBGREE-UMBRA cAKOCA WHIWREL NOFORN NOCOWTRACT ORCOH hard-Line foreign policy faction could possibly exert | more influence on a weak Chernenko, the experts concluded that this was not, in fact, happening. it is unclear vhat evidence for this conclusion vas used, since the estinate admitted that thee vas Anadequate information on "the currant mind-set of the goviet Political leadership" and on "the ways in which military operations and foreign policy taction may be infl by Political differences and the policy process in the Kremlin,* Finally, analysts dismissed f jon the war scare, ‘tasking to its Residencies. "This var scare reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated Instead, analysts viewed the Soviet talk about increased 2 hood of nuclear war, as well as military actions, as des! speak “with a louder voice" and show "firmness through a| con~ trolled display of muscle." Such judgnenta vere made even the analysis was tempered "by some uncertainty as to Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about the Politburo decisionmaking processes, our inability at this point te conduct a detailed examinat how the soviets might have assessed recont US/HATO nil exercises and reconnaissance operations" -- vhich, of Ancluded the previous Able Archer exercise. In other analysts vere unsure of vhat the Kremlin leadership thought 4t made decisions, nor had they adequately assossed the reaction to able Archer 83. This notwithstanding, the eat concluded: ‘We are confident that, as of nov, the Soviets an imminent military clash but a costly and -- to some more perilous strategic and political struggle over the26p RESET UMBRA GAMMA ‘WNINFRL HOFORN WOCONTRACT ORCON ment, analysts conceded: "It is conceivable that the stridehcy of Soviet ‘var scare! propaganda reflects a genuine soviet| vorry about a near-future attack on thea. This concern could be inspired by Soviet views about the depth of anti-Soviet intentions 4n Washington combined with elements of their ovn military doctrine projected onto the United States, such as the virtues of surprise, striking first, and masking hostile initiatives in exercises. Some political and military leaders have stressed the danger of var more forcefully than others, sugyesting that| there may have been differences on this score -- or at least how tp talk about the issue ~~ over the past half year. ‘BM ALTERNATIVE OFINTON ona month later, Det casey sent tp the President a memorandum with a differing view of events. tain whether the Soviets were preparing for a crisis or merely trying to influence eventa in the United states, Casey attached "a father stunning array of indicators" of an "increasing aggressiventas in Soviet policy and activities." Prepared by the DcI's wational Warning Staff, the events atudied vere described as "longer|tera" ‘than those considered in the May NIB. In the Warning staff’ view, "the Soviets have concluded that the danger of war is greater and will grow vith additional INF emplacements and that the reduced warning tine inherent in Pershing IT has 1 Soviet confidence in their ability to warn of sudden attack. ‘These perceptions, perhaps driven by a building Us defense : nev initiatives in continental defense, improvenenta in |foroe readiness, and a potentially massive space defense progran say be Bropelling the USSR to take national readiness measures |at a deliberate pace." jhe indicators of abnormal soviet behavior ranged in |acope from domestic to international. They included: \WHINTEL, NOFORH NOCONTRACT ORCON “2OR-SRGRET UNBRA GAMMA 35-6F-SR0RE® UMBRA GAMHA WWINTEL NOFORH NOCOWFRACT ORCON © Preparing soviet citizens for var through civil activities and media broadcastay © Tightening of security procedures against Westerners, such ae increased travel restrictions and isolation from the| Bloc populace; © Conducting political harassment; © Improving military logistic systems; © shifting the economy more tovard a wartime footing,| as terminating military support to the harvest, converting farm tractor plants to tank production, and reducing aircraft production in favor of military transportay © Conducting out-of-the-ordinary military activities,| an delaying troop rotations, increasing deployments of forces, and expanding reservist call-ups, as vell as active duty tours; and © Promulgating extraordinary intelligence directives purpose of warning. Casey advised: "rt is important to distinguish in| this category those acts vhich are political blustering and those may be, but also carry large costs . . . The military behavi have observed involve high military costs in terns of - over, or enhanced readiness at the price of coneumer ais or enhanced readiness at the price of troop dissatisfaction. of these are trivial costs, adding thereby a dimension of - nesa to the Soviet expressions of concern that is reflected in intelligence ismuances." WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “OP GEORER UMERA GUOEAWWINTEL NOPORN MOCOWTRACT ORCON According to former National security Advisor Robert McFarlane, President Reagan expressed surprise upon reating the Casey memorandum and described the events as “really spary. However, MoParlana hinaalf Jess convinced. He quaationad Soviet motivations and wondered if their actions vere part| of an effort to drive 2 wedge in Europe to counter the Adainistration's: SDI objectives. He also found it difficult to believe that the Soviets could actually fear a nuclear strike from the US, since he knew how preposterous that vas. McFarlane vondered, if scare was real, vhy had the Soviets not raised it through Hiplo- matic channels in Washington? (vet, even the President/s own. Personal anissary dispatched to Moscow months earlier message for chernenko was frozen out of the Kremlin.) on the other hand, McFarlane vas "concerned" about @uring the early 1980's. Many of them told of extreme Paranoia over US intentions. In fact, one close friend visited Moscow said that the Soviets spoke of "going to quarters" during the 1983 to 1984 tine frane. MoFarlane UREN auring nis tenure at the Hational Security Council. (No President's Daily Brief during this mentioned it either.) Zn a mamorandum to Director Casey in June 1984, called for ® nev intelligence estinate that vould the context of ‘the utility to the sovieta of interfer: various geographic trouble spots." one month later, ‘memorandum of indicators was leaked to the ‘vas fully reported as "Russia at high level of battle WHINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOM ‘ZOR-GHERET UMBRA GAMMA | oa-OP-GReRE? UMBRA GAKIA WONTEL NOFORN HOCONIRACE ORCOM The following day, the Washington Times reported a controversial split of opinion within military and intel! circles over the significance of the Soviet behavior, saying CIA officials tended to downplay it. Some officials on the National Intelligence councii| vere upset over the Casey memorandum. after all, they just. addressed the war scare in May through a fully coordinated SNIE ‘that determined it was purely "propaganda." The Casey was not coordinated, refuted the SNIE, and yet had repoived Presidential attention. By August 1984, the estimate called for by MoFarlare vas completed, Entitled "Soviet Policy Tovard the United states in 1984," it vas far more comprehensive than he initially ted. A “central concern" of the estimate vas "the possibility of| major Soviet initiatives to influence the Noveaber election," since "the motivation for Soviet policy . . . lies in the perception that the + + + current [0S] Administration is a more consistently hostile ‘opponent of the USSR's interests and aspirations than it has| faced in many years." Thus, the Soviets could be expected to t and, if possible, deflect US policies, and create a more prate— sive environment in vhich Soviet relative military power and|vorld Anfluence can continue to grov." he var scare, characterized in the SHE as "hostile propaganda, which blanes the United states for an increased of war and for diplomatic rigidity . . . is used to put f= Administration on the defensive vhere possible and to pucite opposition to Washington's polictes.* In fact, much hosfility tovard the West was judged to serve Soviet leaders conventently for “exhorting greater dlacipline, sacrifice, and vigilance pn the Soviet hone front... .* Analyste were, again, ontegotic in WMINTEL NOFORN HOCONTRACE ORCON ‘20P-OHGRED. UMBRA GAMHA 28States, Also, ve do not believe that soviet var talk andlother actions ‘mask' soviet preparations for an imminent move to confrontation on the part of the USSR." (Underlining added|) While acknoviedging that "there may be debates anong soviet Jeaders about tactica tovard the United states," analyats asgerted that “current Soviet policy . . . is based on consensus in the Politburo." In fact, there was “indirect evidence of foviet leadership debate over future policy direction, largely in the form of varying Linea on the danger of var... admonished that such debates should not be taken to indicate|sharp controversy in the’ Politburo because “showdown situatione” vere avoided in orfer to protect the Kremlin's hold on pover. Gorbachey was lumped with Romanov, Ogarkov, and Ligachay at Aiffering "from their elders only in the belief that they can puroue traditional Soviet aims more skillfully and successfully at. home and abroad.* Analysts readily acknowledged that the previous aix had seen extraordinary, unprecedented soviet activities. |rarge scale military exercises, "anomalous behavior® during the |troop rotation, vithdrawn military support for the harvest (last seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion), nev, deployed veapons (termed "in response to INF deployments"), and heightened internal vigilance and security activities vere noted. These . hovevar, ware judged to be "in line with long-evolving plate and patterns, rather than with sharp acceleration of preparations for a major war. ‘The NIE authors profeased high confidence in the intelligence community's ability to detect widespread logistics, supply, and Gafense-econonic preparations obligated by Soviet war doctrine and \WODTEL NOFORN MOCONTRACT ORCOH ‘POP-GRERET UNERA GAMMA 29-oP-GRORET-UMBRA CAMA \WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON ‘operational requirenents. Such indicators, they insisted, vere notevorthy by thelr absence. In seeming contradiction, hovever, ‘the authors pointed out that Us strategic warning indicators and nethodologies are oriented tovard providing "warning of var vithin & short period of tines at most, one to two mnths." But, "pecause ve give less emphasia to defenae-econontc and other hoe front measures that night provide strategic varning . . . and because a pattern of such activities 1a inherently digeicult to detect in their early stages . . . ve have less confidence in longer range warning based on military and defense-related. activities alone." Wonetheless, the authors asserted that, even without the capability to datect such indicators, the developments An Soviet foreign and domestic affaira made it ‘very unlikely" that they vere preparing for a var. Both NBA and National Warning Staff officials confiraed to us recently that US technical systens in particular were not, in fact, tuned to long-range military, economic, and defense-related activities at the tine. ‘The estimate concluded vith a list of indicatora detected at. the time that strongly suggested unusual Pact military activity. early a11 of them vere dismissed as oxplainable for ordinary reasons. The Board did not conduct a retrospective of each indicator but we believe that such a review would prove useful to. the continued validation of the assessment. Me believe that some of the explanations given at the time will be found to be mistaken. For example, the estinate explained the appearance of high-level Warsaw Pact command poste in 1984 as part of a one-time exercise, The command posts remained in operation, hovever, long after the estimate vas published and the exercise vas completed, In reviewing both estimates, the Board vas struck by hov categorical and unqualified vere the judgnenta mate about the Afkelihood of the war scare, particularly given the extremely important consequences of those assessments, In fact, the HIO for Warning in 1984 made the sane point in his comentary on the draft WAINTEL NOPORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “POR-SUGRET UMERA GANIA 20‘August estimate. Although unable procedurally to comment in the estimate itself, he sent a menorandun to the NIE drafter arguing: ‘This episode highlights a latent conflict between sovict analysts and warning specialists. ost intelligence officers involved in the warning process are not necessarily trained Soviet experts; indeed, the staff tonds to come from a military pool for a two-year rotational assignment. within the intelligence community, an assignment to the Warning Staff has not alvays been ‘viewed as career-enhancing. Disputes with geographic or other substantive" analysts are often not resolved in favor of the warning officers. We have been told by senior intelligence officials that the problem of establishing credibility for varning experts, particularly in the Soviet affairs arena, is one that is ‘FOP-SECRET UMBRA GAMA aTOP-SHCRD? MERA CAMA : WINTEL WOFORN HOCONTRACT ORCON recognized but not solved easily.49 conversely, Sovietologists are not often likely to have a deep grounding in warning issues. ‘The Board found that after the 1984 assossments vere issued, the intelligence community did not again address the var scare until after the defection to Great Britain of KGB Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskly in July, 1985. Gordiyevekiy had achieved the rank of Acting Resident in the United Kingdom, but he fel1 under suspicion as a Western agent. Recalled to the soviet Union, he was placed under house arrest and intensely interrogated. Able to flee his watchers, Gordiyevakiy vas exfiltrated from Moscow by the British Secret Intelligence Service. During lengthy debriefing sessions that followed, Cordiyevakiy supplied a fuller report on the soviet var hysteria. This report, complete vith documentation from KCB Headquarters and entitled "KGB Response to Soviet Leadership Concern over US Muclear Attack," waa first disseminated in a restricted manner within the US intelligence community in October, 1985. Gordiyevakiy described the extraordinary KGB collection Plan, initiated in 1961, to look for signs that the US would conduct a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. He identified and reviewed the factors driving leadership fears. Based on the perception that the US vas achieving a strategic advantage, those in the Kremlin vere said to believe that the Us was likely to resort to nuclear veapons much earlier in a crisis than previously expected. They alao vere concerned that the Us might seek to exploit ite firat-strike capability outeide the 2¥q note that the National Warning staff does tend to view events with a long-range perspective. Clearly, ve believe this to be an asset in evaluating the Soviet war scare. \WHINTEL, NOFORN MOCONTRACT ORCON “FOP-GRCRED UMERA GAIA 22-TOP-SBOREP UNBRA GAMMA - WWINTEL NOFORN NOCONIRACT ORCON context of a crisis, probably during a military exercise. He described the leadership's vorries of a "decapitating" strike from the Pershing IT's, and its belief that the Us could mobilize for @ surprise attack in a mere seven to ten days. He explained hov the London Residency responded to the requirenents, and the effects that reporting had back at Moscow center in reinforcing Soviet fears. He described conversations he had held vith colleagues from center and from the GRU. The next month, President Reagan held his first sumit with mikhail Gorbachev and relations began to thaw. ‘PERCEEEIONE_ EVOLVE ‘Some in the intelligence community have argued that the var scare was a‘massive Soviet propaganda and deception campaign that not only included attempts to manipulate public opinione but Antelligence community perceptions as vell. central to this theory is that the Soviets intended for secret intelligence Airectives -- like the taskings sent from Moscow Center to London Residency -- to becoe known to the US. In July 1985, a National Intelligence Rstimate entitled "Denial and Deception in soviet Strategic Military Programs: Implications for US Security" (NIE 21-21-85), hovever, dashed cold vater on this assumption. Analysts judged: ‘We strongly doubt that the Soviets intended for official docments to reach intelligence sources." Further, Soviet reliance on verbal disclosures of secret communications was also judged unlikely: "The uncertainty of the potential for such isclosures . . . combined with the lack of control over tining and content probably would have led the Soviets to conclude that such a device represents an unreliable means of communicating with the West." The estimate concluded that, "the intelligence Atrectives probably represent efforts by the Soviet intelligence services to respond to concerns of Soviet leaers that since at least 1980 worsening relations with the United States increased the danger of var." WNINTEL HOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “‘ZOP-GREREP UMBRA GOA a3UMERA canOHA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCOH Although Gordiyevakly's reporting remained closely held, by June 1986, assosementa giving more credence to the logitimacy of ‘the var scare hogan to surface in intelligence products.!? py August, the washington Rost broke cordiyavakiy's story to the American public.!? the article quoted inforned sources as daying that many high-level officials with extensive experience in Ract~ West relationa vere still unavare of cordtyevakiy's inforadtion. Jt maintained that many Western specialists, sone with accdes to the Gordiyevakiy material, attributed soviet anxieties in the early 1980's to genuine apprehension about Reagan Adainistration policies and to a tactical decision to exploit that cdncemn through propaganda channels. the CIA then dovngraded ani re~ roleased the Gordiyevakly material. Despite the public disclosure and the broader circulation of Gordiyevakiy's material within government channels, the issue remained strangely doraant national intelligence topic. available in the spring of 1987. [NPONNI0 a xcB computer model called VRYAN (moaning Sudden Muclear Missile Attack), and how it vas used as a tool to predict US strategic intentions in the carly 1980's. At the sane tine, [iNT] the accompanying Pact-vide eaphasis on collecting strategic intelligence against the US, including efforts to enhance illegal agent operatians to detect Us plans for a surprise nuclear attack. [lil PSN the seemingly improbable, but apparently widespread, soviet Helief that the US leadership vould attack first to a deeply-aeated Soviet fear of foreign invasion. Uvarsay Pact ailitary Perceptions of NATO Muclear Initiation, IA intelligence Assessment. petector told of Soviet Alert, Aug 6, by Murrey Marder, \WOTFEL NOFORM MOCONTRACT ORCON “Pob-SECRED UMBRA GAMMA ery