Set 3 LTD - Part 2

G.R. No.
L-31271 April 29, 1974
ROMEO MARTINEZ and LEONOR SUAREZ, spouses, petitionersappellants, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY and
UNDERSECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS & COMMUNICATIONS,
Respondents-Appellees.
Flores Macapagal, Ocampo and Balbastro for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor

General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Concepcion T. Agapinan for
respondents-appellees.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals
dated November 17, 1969 in its CA-G.R. 27655-R which reverses the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in favor of
petitioners-appellants against the Secretary and Undersecretary of
Public Works & Communications in the case instituted to annul the
order of November 25, 1958 of respondent Secretary of Public Works &
Communications directing the removal by the petitioners of the dikes
they had constructed on Lot No. 15856 of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga, which order was issued pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2056. The dispositive portion of the judgment of
reversal of the Court of Appeals reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed

from is hereby reversed, and another entered: [1] upholding the
validity of the decision reached by the respondent officials in the
administrative case; [2] dissolving the injunction issued by the Court
below; and [3] cancelling the registration of Lot No. 2, the disputed
area, and ordering its reconveyance to the public domain. No costs in
this instance.
The background facts are stated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez, now petitionersappellees, are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land located
in Lubao, Pampanga, covered by transfer certificate of title No. 15856
of the Register of Deeds of the said province. Both parcels of land are
fishponds. The property involved in the instant case is the second
parcel mentioned in the above-named transfer certificate of
title.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino

Montemayor, who secured a "titulo real" over it way back in 1883. After
the death of Paulino Montemayor the said property passed to his
successors-in-interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata Montemayor,
who in turn, sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a certain Potenciano
Garcia. Because Potenciano Garcia was prevented by the then
municipal president of Lubao, Pedro Beltran, from restoring the dikes
constructed on the contested property, the former, on June 22, 1914,
filed Civil Case No. 1407 with the Court of First Instance against the
said Pedro Beltran to restrain the latter in his official capacity from
molesting him in the possession of said second parcel, and on even
date, applied for a writ of preliminary injunction, which was issued
against said municipal president. The Court, by decision promulgated
June 12, 1916, declared permanent the preliminary injunction, which,
decision, on appeal, was affirmed by the Supreme Court on August 21,
1918. From June 22, 1914, the dikes around the property in question
remained closed until a portion thereof was again opened just before
the outbreak of the Pacific War.
On April 17, 1925. Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of
both parcels of land in his name, and the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, sitting as land registration court, granted the registration
over and against the opposition of the Attorney-General and the
Director of Forestry. Pursuant to the Court's decision, original certificate
of title No. 14318, covering said parcels 1 and 2 was issued to the
spouses Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza Sioson.
These parcels of land were subsequently bought by Emilio Cruz de Dios
in whose name transfer certificate of title No. 1421 was first issued on
November 9, 1925.
Thereafter, the ownership of these properties changed hands until
eventually they were acquired by the herein appellee spouses who
hold them by virtue of transfer certificate of title No.
15856.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To avoid any untoward incident, the disputants agreed to refer the
matter to the Committee on Rivers and Streams, by then composed of
the Honorable Pedro Tuason, at that time Secretary of Justice, as
chairman, and the Honorable Salvador Araneta and Vicente Orosa,
Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources and Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, respectively, as members. This committee

thereafter appointed a Sub-Committee to investigate the case and to
conduct an ocular inspection of the contested property, and on March
11, 1954, said Sub-Committee submitted its report to the Committee
on Rivers and Streams to the effect that Parcel No. 2 of transfer
certificate of title No. 15856 was not a public river but a private
fishpond owned by the herein spouses.
On July 7, 1954, the Committee on Rivers and Streams rendered its

decision the dispositive part of which reads:
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the spouses Romeo Martinez

and Leonor Suarez should be restored to the exclusive possession, use
and enjoyment of the creek in question which forms part of their
registered property and the decision of the courts on the matter be
given full force and effect."
The municipal officials of Lubao, led by Acting Mayor Mariano Zagad,

apparently refused to recognize the above decision, because on
September 1, 1954, the spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez
instituted Civil Case No. 751 before the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga against said Mayor Zagad, praying that the latter be
enjoined from molesting them in their possession of their property and
in the construction of the dikes therein. The writ of preliminary
injunction applied for was issued against the respondent municipal
Mayor, who immediately elevated the injunction suit for review to the
Supreme Court, which dismissed Mayor Zagad's petition on September
7, 1953. With this dismissal order herein appellee spouses proceeded
to construct the dikes in the disputed parcel of land.
Some four (4) years later, and while Civil Case No. 751 was still
pending the Honorable Florencio Moreno, then Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, ordered another investigation of the said
parcel of land, directing the appellees herein to remove the dikes they
had constructed, on the strength of the authority vested in him by
Republic Act No. 2056, approved on June 13, 1958, entitled "An Act To
Prohibit, Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams. Dikes, Or
Any Other Walls In Public Navigable Waters, Or Waterways and In
Communal Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in Such Waters or
Waterways And In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To Provide Penalties
For Its Violation, And For Other Purposes. 1 The said order which gave
rise to the instant proceedings, embodied a threat that the dikes would
be demolished should the herein appellees fail to comply therewith

within thirty (30) days.
The spouses Martinez replied to the order by commencing on January
2, 1959 the present case, which was decided in their favor by the lower
Court in a decision dated August 10, 1959, the dispositive part of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court

hereby declares the decision, Exhibit S, rendered by the
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications null and void;
declares the preliminary injunction, hereto for issued, permanent, and
forever enjoining both respondents from molesting the spouses Romeo
Martinez and Leonor Suarez in their possession, use and enjoyment of
their property described in Plan Psu-9992 and referred to in their
petition."chanrobles virtual law library
"Without pronouncement as to costs."chanrobles virtual law library
"SO ORDERED."
As against this judgment respondent officials of the Department of

Public Works and Communications took the instant appeal, contending
that the lower Court erred:chanrobles virtual law library
1.
In holding that then Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, complainant in
the administrative case, is not an interested party and his lettercomplaint dated August 15, 1958 did not confer jurisdiction upon the
respondent Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to
investigate the said administrative case;chanrobles virtual law library
2.
In holding that the duty to investigate encroachments upon
public rivers conferred upon the respondent Secretary under Republic
Act No. 7056 cannot be lawfully delegated by him to his
subordinates;chanrobles virtual law library
3.
In holding that the investigation ordered by the respondent
Secretary in this case is illegal on the ground that the said respondent
Secretary has arrogated unto himself the power, which he does not
possess, of reversing, making nugatory, and setting aside the two
lawful decisions of the Court Exhibits K and I, and even annulling
thereby, the one rendered by the highest Tribunal of the
land;chanrobles virtual law library
4.
In not sustaining respondent's claim that petitioners have no
cause of action because the property in dispute is a public river and in
holding that the said claim has no basis in fact and in law;chanrobles
virtual law library
5.
In not passing upon and disposing of respondent's counterclaim;
chanrobles virtual law library
6.
In not sustaining respondent's claim that the petition should not
have been entertained on the ground that the petitioners have not
exhausted administrative remedies; andchanrobles virtual law library
7.
In holding that the decision of the respondents is illegal on the
ground that it violates the principles that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided and in holding that the said
Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional on the ground that
respondents' threat of prosecuting petitioners under Section 3 thereof
for acts done four years before its enactment renders the said law ex
post facto.
The Court of Appeals sustained the above-mentioned assignment of

errors committed by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and, as
previously stated, reversed the judgment of the latter court. From this
reversal this appeal by certiorari was taken, and before this Court,
petitioners-appellants assigned the following errors allegedly
committed by the Court of Appeals:
1.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING IN THE INSTANT
CASE THAT PARCEL NO. 2 OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO.
15856 IS A PUBLIC RIVER AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF ITS

REGISTRATION BECAUSE THIS CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON
A TORRENS TITLE IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW AND THE WELL-SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
2.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REOPENING AND RELITIGATING THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2 OF
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856 REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
PAMPANGA, IS A PUBLIC RIVER NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN LONG RESOLVED AND SETTLED BY THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURT OF PAMPANGA IN LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDING NO. 692 AND IS NOW RES
JUDICATA.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
3.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF THE REGISTRATION OF LOT NO. 2 OF TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 15856 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
THE TORRENS TITLE COVERING IT HAS BEEN VESTED IN THE
PETITIONERS WHO ARE THE SEVENTH OF THE SUCCESSIVE INNOCENT
PURCHASERS THEREOF AND WHO IN PURCHASING THE SAME RELIED
ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PERSONS DEALING WITH REGISTERED
LAND NEED NOT GO BEHIND THE REGISTER TO DETERMINE THE
CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY.
The 1st and 2nd assignment of errors, being closely related, will be
taken up together.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that Lot No. 2 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15856 of the petitioners-appellants is a public
stream and that said title should be cancelled and the river covered
reverted to public domain, is assailed by the petitioners-appellants as
being a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the torrens title
originally issued in 1925 in favor of the petitioners-appellants'
predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano Garcia, which is violative of the rule
of res judicata. It is argued that as the decree of registration issued by
the Land Registration Court was not re-opened through a petition for
review filed within one (1) year from the entry of the decree of title, the
certificate of title issued pursuant thereto in favor of the appellants for
the land covered thereby is no longer open to attack under Section 38

of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) and the jurisprudence on the
matter established by this Tribunal. Section 38 of the Land Registration
Act cited by appellants expressly makes a decree of registration, which
ordinarily makes the title absolute and indefeasible, subject to the
exemption stated in Section 39 of the said Act among which are: "liens,
claims or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the
United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statute of the
Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of record in the
registry."chanrobles virtual law library
At the time of the enactment of Section 496, one right recognized or

existing under the law is that provided for in Article 339 of the old Civil
Code which reads as follows:
Property of public ownership is:chanrobles virtual law library
1.
That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks
shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character. (Par. 1)
The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain

intended for public use, are outside the commerce of men and,
therefore, not subject to private appropriation. ( 3 Manresa, 6th ed.
101-104.)chanrobles virtual law library
In Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769, this Court held:
A simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system

does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the
property described therein. If a person obtains title under the Torrens
system which includes by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be
registered under the Torrens system, he does not by virtue of said
certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included.
In Mercado v. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592, it was also

said:
It is useless for the appellant now to allege that she has obtained
certificate of title No. 329 in her favor because the said certificate does
not confer upon her any right to the creek in question, inasmuch as the
said creek, being of the public domain, is included among the various
exceptions enumerated in Section 39 of Act 496 to which the said
certificate is subject by express provision of the law.
The same ruling was laid down in Director of Lands v. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Zamboanga, 61 Phil. 644, as regards public
plaza.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. L-20300-01 and G.R. No. L20355-56, April 30, 1965, 20 SCRA 704, it was held that the
incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of title
does not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable of
registration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is, therefore, clear that the authorities cited by the appellants as to

the conclusiveness and incontestability of a Torrens certificate of title
do not apply here. The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over
non-registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are
parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration
of title in favor of a private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of Certificate of
Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners-appellants may be attacked
at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not
bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of
Limitations (Article 1108, par. 4, new Civil Code). The right of reversion
or reconveyance to the State of the public properties fraudulently
registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or
private acquisition does not prescribe. (Republic v. Ramona Ruiz, et al.,
G.R. No. L-23712, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 348; Republic v. Ramos, G.R.
No.
L-15484, January 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 47.)chanrobles virtual law library
When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the

Secretary of Public Works & Communications under Republic Act 2056
to order the removal or obstruction to navigation along a public and
navigable creek or river included therein, has been definitely settled
and is no longer open to question (Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No L-17821,
November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Taleon v. Secretary of Public Works &
Communications G.R. No. L-24281, May 16, 1961, 20 SCRA 69,
74).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The evidence submitted before the trial court which was passed upon
by the respondent Court of Appeals shows that Lot No. 2 (Plan Psu 992)
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856, is a river of the public domain.
The technical description of both Lots Nos. 1 and 2 appearing in
Original Certificate of Title No. 14318 of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga, from which the present Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15856 was derived, confirms the fact that Lot No. 2 embraced in said
title is bounded practically on all sides by rivers. As held by the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil Case No. 1247 for injunction filed
by the petitioners' predecessors-in-interest against the Municipal
Mayor of Lubao and decided in 1916 (Exh. "L"), Lot No. 2 is a branch of
the main river that has been covered with water since time
immemorial and, therefore, part of the public domain. This finding
having been affirmed by the Supreme Court, there is no longer any
doubt that Lot No. 2 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15856 of
petitioners is a river which is not capable of private appropriation or
acquisition by prescription. (Palanca v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil.
449; Meneses v. Com. of the Philippines, 69 Phil. 647). Consequently,
appellants' title does not include said river.
II
As regards the 3rd assignment of error, there is no weight in the

appellants' argument that, being a purchaser for value and in good
faith of Lot No. 2, the nullification of its registration would be contrary
to the law and to the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court as it
would destroy the stability of the title which is the core of the system
of registration. Appellants cannot be deemed purchasers for value and
in good faith as in the deed of absolute conveyance executed in their
favor, the following appears:
6.
Que la segunda parcela arriba descrita y mencionada esta
actualmente abierta, sin malecones y excluida de la primera parcela en
virtud de la Orden Administrative No. 103, tal como fue enmendada,
del pasado regimen o Gobierno.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
7.
Que los citados compradores Romeo Martinez y Leonor Suarez se
encargan de gestionar de las autoridades correspondientes para que la
citada segunda parcela pueda ser convertida de nuevo en pesqueria,
corriendo a cuenta y cargo de los mismos todos los
gastos.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
8.
Que en el caso de que dichos compradores no pudiesen
conseguir sus propositos de convertir de nuevo en pesquera la citada
segunda parcela, los aqui vendedores no devolveran ninguna cantidad
de dinero a los referidos compradores; este es, no se disminuiriat el
precio de esta venta. (Exh. 13-a, p. 52, respondents record of exhibits)
These stipulations were accepted by the petitioners-appellants in the

same conveyance in the following terms:
Romeo Martinez y Leonor Suarez, mayores de edad, filipinos y

residentes en al Barrio de Julo Municipio de Malabon, Provincia de Rizal,
por la presente, declaran que estan enterados del contenido de este
documento y lo aceptan en los precisos terminos en que arriba uedan
consignados. (Exh. 13-a, ibid)
Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that the

appellants who were the vendees did not know exactly the condition of
the land that they were buying and the obstacles or restrictions
thereon that may be put up by the government in connection with their
project of converting Lot No. 2 in question into a fishpond.
Nevertheless, they willfully and voluntarily assumed the risks
attendant to the sale of said lot. One who buys something with
knowledge of defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he
acquired it in good faith (Leung Lee v. Strong Machinery Co., et al., 37
Phil. 664).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The ruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond

the record to make inquiries as to the legality of the title of the
registered owner, but may rely on the registry to determine if there is
no lien or encumbrances over the same, cannot be availed of as
against the law and the accepted principle that rivers are parts of the
public domain for public use and not capable of private appropriation
or acquisition by prescription.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals

appealed from is in accordance with law, and the same is hereby
affirmed with costs against the petitioners-appellants.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs.RAMON GARCIA, as head
of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as
Executive Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner, vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN
RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et
al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES
ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN JAPAN, respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin
respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding

with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land
at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled
on February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer for a temporary
restraining order effective February 20, 1990. One of the
petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayes for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to fully disclose to the
public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale
of the Roppongi property inspire of strong public opposition and
to explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the
participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding
process.
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et al.
were heard by the Court on March 13, 1990. After G.R. No. 92047,
Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al. was filed, the respondents
were required to file a comment by the Court's resolution dated
February 22, 1990. The two petitions were consolidated on
March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the parties in the Laurel
case were deliberated upon.
The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the
respondents filed a motion for an extension of thirty (30) days to
file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by a second motion for
an extension of another thirty (30) days which we granted on
May 8, 1990, a third motion for extension of time granted on May
24, 1990 and a fourth motion for extension of time which we
granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of the
respondents to the length of time the petitions have been
pending. After the comment was filed, the petitioner in G.R. No.
92047 asked for thirty (30) days to file a reply. We noted his
motion and resolved to decide the two (2) cases.
I
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties
in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956,
the other lots being:
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuyaku, Tokyo which has an area of approximately 2,489.96 square
meters, and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy
Chancery;
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with
an area of around 764.72 square meters and categorized as a
commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and parking lot
for the consulate staff; and
(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama-cho,
Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a residential lot which is now vacant.
The properties and the capital goods and services procured
from the Japanese government for national development
projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for
their losses in life and property and their suffering during World
War II.
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at
$550 million would be payable in twenty (20) years in
accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed
by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2,
Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations
Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and
utilization of reparations and development loans. The
procurements are divided into those for use by the government
sector and those for private parties in projects as the then
National Economic Council shall determine. Those intended for
the private sector shall be made available by sale to Filipino
citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned
entities in national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese
government under the Second Year Schedule and listed under
the heading "Government Sector", through Reparations
Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The Roppongi property
consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for Petitioner,
p. 503). As intended, it became the site of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July

22, 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due
to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the
Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by
former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to
make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a
Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation which shall construct two
(2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and
renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The
consideration of the construction would be the lease to the
foreign corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be constructed
in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other
building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine
Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three
leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine
government. No change of ownership or title shall occur. (See
Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The Philippine government
retains the title all throughout the lease period and thereafter.
However, the government has not acted favorably on this
proposal which is pending approval and ratification between the
parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine
government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through
Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders
Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296
entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations'
capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi
were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of
the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision
to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.
The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor
price of $225 million. The first bidding was a failure since only
one bidder qualified. The second one, after postponements, has
not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding on February 21,

1990 was restrained by his Court. Later, the rules on bidding
were changed such that the $225 million floor price became
merely a suggested floor price.
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct
issues. The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 objects to the alienation
of the Roppongi property to anyone while the petitioner in G.R.
No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the alleged unjustified
bias of the Philippine government in favor of selling the property
to non-Filipino citizens and entities. These petitions have been
consolidated and are resolved at the same time for the objective
is the same - to stop the sale of the Roppongi property.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be
alienated by the Philippine Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the
authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from
questioning the authority of the government to alienate the
Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 296 in making the property available for sale to nonFilipino citizens and entities. He also questions the bidding
procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of
Philippine Government Properties in Japan for being
discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned
entities by denying them the right to be informed about the
bidding requirements.
II
In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi
property and the related lots were acquired as part of the
reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and
consular use by the Philippine government. Vice-President
Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of
public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420
of the Civil Code (See infra).

The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under
"property intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the
above provision. He states that being one of public dominion, no
ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State. The
Roppongi and related properties were acquired for "sites for
chancery, diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and other
improvements" (Second Year Reparations Schedule). The
petitioner states that they continue to be intended for a
necessary service. They are held by the State in anticipation of
an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be
appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in
more simple terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject
matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30
Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property at
the moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains property
of public dominion so long as the government has not used it
for other purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a
removal of its original purpose or use.
The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention
by saying that the subject property is not governed by our Civil
Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located.
They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in determining
the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and
devolution of the title to a property. They also invoke Opinion
No. 21, Series of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of
Justice which used the lex situs in explaining the inapplicability
of Philippine law regarding a property situated in Japan.
The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of
argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi
property has ceased to become property of public dominion. It
has become patrimonial property because it has not been used
for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over thirteen
(13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and because the
intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to
convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts, such
as, among others: (1) the transfer of the Philippine Embassy to
Nampeidai (2) the issuance of administrative orders for the

possibility of alienating the four government properties in
Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; (4) the
enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which
contains a provision stating that funds may be taken from the
sale of Philippine properties in foreign countries; (5) the holding
of the public bidding of the Roppongi property but which failed;
(6) the deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the
bidding to a future date; thus an acknowledgment by the Senate
of the government's intention to remove the Roppongi property
from the public service purpose; and (7) the resolution of this
Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et
al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin the second bidding of
the Roppongi property scheduled on March 30, 1989.
III
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to
rule on the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. He had
earlier filed a petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court
dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now avers that the executive
order contravenes the constitutional mandate to conserve and
develop the national patrimony stated in the Preamble of the
1987 Constitution. It also allegedly violates:
(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable
lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens. (Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth
Act 141).
itc-asl
(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights,

privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution);
(3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair
competition and trade practices;
(4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all
matters of public concern (Section 7, Article III, Constitution);
(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or

entities not wholly owned by Filipino citizens of capital goods
received by the Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections
2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789); and
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of
all transactions involving public interest (Section 28, Article III,
Constitution).
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the
execution of an unconstitutional executive order is a
misapplication of public funds He states that since the details of
the bidding for the Roppongi property were never publicly
disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days before the
scheduled bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in
Tokyo, and the accomplishment of requirements and the
selection of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo,
interested Filipino citizens or entities owned by them did not
have the chance to comply with Purchase Offer Requirements
on the Roppongi. Worse, the Roppongi shall be sold for a
minimum price of $225 million from which price capital gains tax
under Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of the floor price would
still be deducted.
IV
The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute
the fact that the Roppongi site and the three related properties
were through reparations agreements, that these were assigned
to the government sector and that the Roppongi property itself
was specifically designated under the Reparations Agreement to
house the Philippine Embassy.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is
expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the
Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of
procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the
Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial.
This, the respondents have failed to do.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a
special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an
application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in
the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a
juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common
and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropration.
(Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries
on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private
ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks
shores roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2
of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the
State and intended for some public service.
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the
property been changed because the lot has been Idle for some
years? Has it become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long
time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert
it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if
the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and

Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by
concerned public officials insinuating a change of intention. We
emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to
use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be
definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's
own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial
support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino
Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be
a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976
is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original
purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the
building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated,
there simply was a shortage of government funds. The recent
Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and
conditions of government properties in Japan were merely
directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear
intention to dispose of the properties.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority
to sell", does not have a provision in its text expressly
authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan
for the government sector. The executive order does not declare
that the properties lost their public character. It merely intends
to make the properties available to foreigners and not to
Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition. It
merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789 that
reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino citizens and one
hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities. The text of
Executive Order No. 296 provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended,

and of other laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the abovementioned properties can be made available for sale, lease or
any other manner of disposition to non-Filipino citizens or to
entities owned by non-Filipino citizens.
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or
assumption that the Roppongi and the three other properties
were earlier converted into alienable real properties. As earlier
stated, Rep. Act No. 1789 differentiates the procurements for the
government sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12,
Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the private sector properties can be
sold to end-users who must be Filipinos or entities owned by
Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was amended by
Executive Order No. 296.
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which
provides as one of the sources of funds for its implementation,
the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the
Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi
property from being classified as one of public dominion when it
mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to
properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for
public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not
authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi
property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future
funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform
Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any
property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a
source of funds.
The respondents try to get around the public dominion character
of the Roppongi property by insisting that Japanese law and not
our Civil Code should apply.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all
people, should be the ones to insist that in the sale of extremely
valuable government property, Japanese law and not Philippine
law should prevail. The Japanese law - its coverage and effects,
when enacted, and exceptions to its provision is not
presented to the Court It is simply asserted that the lex loci rei
sitae or Japanese law should apply without stating what that law
provides. It is a ed on faith that Japanese law would allow the
sale.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when
no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation
arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or
ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the
essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation
and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga,
Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A
foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to
conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the
need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title.
There is no question that the property belongs to the
Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials
to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds
light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The
opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties
procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of
the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of
acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the
foreign law which should determine who can acquire the
properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of
lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities
wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in
belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should
we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no
showing that it can be sold?
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President

Aquino of the recommendation by the investigating committee
to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very
least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of
the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does not have
the force and effect of law since the President already lost her
legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for
more than a year.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi
property is no longer of public dominion, there is another
obstacle to its sale by the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
provides
Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the
Government is a party. In cases in which the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other
instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other
property the value of which is in excess of one hundred
thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall
prepare the necessary papers which, together with the proper
recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the
Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or
contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the
Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines
unless the Government of the Philippines unless the authority
therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer.
(Emphasis supplied)
The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.
Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law
to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in
behalf of the government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the

Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless the
authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but
titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate
agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency
or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance
must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for
the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does not
withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize
its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration
abandoning the public character of the Roppongi property. In
fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting
hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious
policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding investigation of
the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine
government properties in Japan.
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et
al., supra, did not pass upon the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents' assertion, we did not
uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi
property. The Court stated that the constitutionality of the
executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the
constitutional question was "neither necessary nor finally
determinative of the case." The Court noted that "[W]hat
petitioner ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the
disposition of the Roppongi property." In emphasizing that "the
decision of the Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to
finance the CARP ... cannot be questioned" in view of Section 63
(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact
that the property became alienable nor did it indicate that the
President was authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property.
The resolution should be read to mean that in case the

Roppongi property is re-classified to be patrimonial and
alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used
for national economic development projects including the CARP.
Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions
before us question the proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi
property. We are resolving the issues raised in these petitions,
not the issues raised in 1989.
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to
withdraw the Roppongi property from public domain to make it
alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale of
the property, we see no compelling reason to tackle the
constitutional issues raised by petitioner Ojeda.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional
questions unless these questions are properly raised in
appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the
determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of
on some other ground such as the application of a statute or
general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175,
[1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
[1941]).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the Roppongi
property should not be sold:
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It
was given to the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and
blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese
military occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans
who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes and other
properties lost by countless Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo
properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the
Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the monuments of
Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do not expect
economic or financial benefits from them. But who would think
of selling these monuments? Filipino honor and national dignity

dictate that we keep our properties in Japan as memorials to the
countless Filipinos who died and suffered. Even if we should
become paupers we should not think of selling them. For it
would be as if we sold the lives and blood and tears of our
countrymen. (Rollo- G.R. No. 92013, p.147)
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:
Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by the
Japanese government in atonement for its past belligerence for
the valiant sacrifice of life and limb and for deaths, physical
dislocation and economic devastation the whole Filipino people
endured in World War II.
It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never bring back
to life, that its significance today remains undimmed, inspire of
the lapse of 45 years since the war ended, inspire of the passage
of 32 years since the property passed on to the Philippine
government.
Roppongi is a reminder that cannot should not be
dissipated ... (Rollo-92047, p. 9)
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so
much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in
Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos
veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and
related properties will eventually be sold is a policy
determination where both the President and Congress must
concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the
laws on conversion and disposition of property of public
dominion must be faithfully followed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are
GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the
respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi
property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary
Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ.,

concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur completely with the excellent ponencia of Mr. Justice
Gutierrez and will add the following observations only for
emphasis.
It is clear that the respondents have failed to show the
President's legal authority to sell the Roppongi property. When
asked to do so at the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor
General was at best ambiguous, although I must add in fairness
that this was not his fault. The fact is that there is -no such
authority. Legal expertise alone cannot conjure that statutory
permission out of thin air.
Exec. Order No. 296, which reads like so much legislative,
double talk, does not contain such authority. Neither does Rep.
Act No. 6657, which simply allows the proceeds of the sale of
our properties abroad to be used for the comprehensive
agrarian reform program. Senate Res. No. 55 was a mere request
for the deferment of the scheduled sale of tile Roppongi
property, possibly to stop the transaction altogether; and ill any
case it is not a law. The sale of the said property may be
authorized only by Congress through a duly enacted statute,
and there is no such law.
Once again, we have affirmed the principle that ours is a
government of laws and not of men, where every public official,
from the lowest to the highest, can act only by virtue of a valid
authorization. I am happy to note that in the several cases where
this Court has ruled against her, the President of the Philippines
has submitted to this principle with becoming grace.
PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr., I
only wish to make a few observations which could help in
further clarifying the issues.
Under our tripartite system of government ordained by the
Constitution, it is Congress that lays down or determines
policies. The President executes such policies. The policies
determined by Congress are embodied in legislative enactments
that have to be approved by the President to become law. The
President, of course, recommends to Congress the approval of
policies but, in the final analysis, it is Congress that is the policy
- determining branch of government.
The judiciary interprets the laws and, in appropriate cases,
determines whether the laws enacted by Congress and
approved by the President, and presidential acts implementing
such laws, are in accordance with the Constitution.
The Roppongi property was acquired by the Philippine
government pursuant to the reparations agreement between the
Philippine and Japanese governments. Under such agreement,
this property was acquired by the Philippine government for a
specific purpose, namely, to serve as the site of the Philippine
Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently, Roppongi is a property
of public dominion and intended for public service, squarely
falling within that class of property under Art. 420 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion :
(1) ...
development of the national wealth. (339a)
Public dominion property intended for public service cannot be

alienated unless the property is first transformed into private
property of the state otherwise known as patrimonial property of
the state. 1 The transformation of public dominion property to state
patrimonial property involves, to my mind, a policy decision. It is a
policy decision because the treatment of the property varies
according to its classification. Consequently, it is Congress which
can decide and declare the conversion of Roppongi from a public
dominion property to a state patrimonial property. Congress has
made no such decision or declaration.
Moreover, the sale of public property (once converted from

public dominion to state patrimonial property) must be approved
by Congress, for this again is a matter of policy (i.e. to keep or
dispose of the property). Sec. 48, Book 1 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 provides:
But the record is bare of any congressional decision or approval
to sell Roppongi. The record is likewise bare of any
congressional authority extended to the President to sell
Roppongi thru public bidding or otherwise.
It is therefore, clear that the President cannot sell or order the
sale of Roppongi thru public bidding or otherwise without a
prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi from a
public dominion property to a state patrimonial property, and,
second, authorizing the President to sell the same.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to make

PERMANENT the temporary restraining order earlier issued by
this Court.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The central question, as I see it, is whether or not the so-called
"Roppongi property' has lost its nature as property of public
dominion, and hence, has become patrimonial property of the
State. I understand that the parties are agreed that it was
property intended for "public service" within the contemplation
of paragraph (2), of Article 430, of the Civil Code, and
accordingly, land of State dominion, and beyond human
commerce. The lone issue is, in the light of supervening
developments, that is non-user thereof by the National
Government (for diplomatic purposes) for the last thirteen years;
the issuance of Executive Order No. 296 making it available for
sale to any interested buyer; the promulgation of Republic Act
No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, making
available for the program's financing, State assets sold; the
approval by the President of the recommendation of the
investigating committee formed to study the property's
utilization; and the issuance of Resolution No. 55 of the
Philippine Senate requesting for the deferment of its disposition
it, "Roppongi", is still property of the public dominion, and if it is
not, how it lost that character.
When land of the public dominion ceases to be one, or when the
change takes place, is a question our courts have debated early.
In a 1906 decision, 1 it was held that property of the public dominion,
a public plaza in this instance, becomes patrimonial upon use thereof
for purposes other than a plaza. In a later case, 2 this ruling was
reiterated. Likewise, it has been held that land, originally private
property, has become of public dominion upon its donation to the
town and its conversion and use as a public plaza. 3 It is notable that
under these three cases, the character of the property, and any
change occurring therein, depends on the actual use to which it is
dedicated. 4
Much later, however, the Court held that "until a formal

declaration on the part of the Government, through the
executive department or the Legislative, to the effect that the
land . . . is no longer needed for [public] service- for public use
or for special industries, [it] continue[s] to be part of the public
[dominion], not available for private expropriation or
ownership." 5 So also, it was ruled that a political subdivision (the
City of Cebu in this case) alone may declare (under its charter) a city
road abandoned and thereafter, to dispose of it. 6
In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal declaration to

withdraw the Roppongi property from public domain to make it
alienable and a land for legislative authority to allow the sale of
the property" 7 the majority lays stress to the fact that: (1) An
affirmative act executive or legislative is necessary to reclassify
property of the public dominion, and (2) a legislative decree is
required to make it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties brought
about by earlier interpretations that the nature of property-whether
public or patrimonial is predicated on the manner it is actually used,
or not used, and in the same breath, repudiates the Government's
position that the continuous non-use of "Roppongi", among other
arguments, for "diplomatic purposes", has turned it into State
patrimonial property.
I feel that this view corresponds to existing pronouncements of

this Court, among other things, that: (1) Property is presumed to
be State property in the absence of any showing to the contrary;
(2) With respect to forest lands, the same continue to be lands of the
public dominion unless and until reclassified by the Executive
Branch of the Government; 9 and (3) All natural resources, under the
Constitution, and subject to exceptional cases, belong to the State. 10
8
I am elated that the Court has banished previous uncertainties.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting

With regret, I find myself unable to share the conclusions
reached by Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
For purposes of this separate opinion, I assume that the piece of
land located in 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome, Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan

(hereinafter referred to as the "Roppongi property") may be
characterized as property of public dominion, within the
meaning of Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code:
[Property] which belong[s] to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service -.
It might not be amiss however, to note that the appropriateness
of trying to bring within the confines of the simple threefold
classification found in Article 420 of the Civil Code ("property for
public use property "intended for some public service" and
property intended "for the development of the national wealth")
all property owned by the Republic of the Philippines whether
found within the territorial boundaries of the Republic or located
within the territory of another sovereign State, is not selfevident. The first item of the classification property intended for
public use can scarcely be properly applied to property
belonging to the Republic but found within the territory of
another State. The third item of the classification property
intended for the development of the national wealth is
illustrated, in Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, by
mines or mineral properties. Again, mineral lands owned by a
sovereign State are rarely, if ever, found within the territorial
base of another sovereign State. The task of examining in detail
the applicability of the classification set out in Article 420 of our
Civil Code to property that the Philippines happens to own
outside its own boundaries must, however, be left to
academicians.
For present purposes, too, I agree that there is no question of
conflict of laws that is, at the present time, before this Court. The
issues before us relate essentially to authority to sell the
Roppongi property so far as Philippine law is concerned.
The majority opinion raises two (2) issues: (a) whether or not the
Roppongi property has been converted into patrimonial property
or property of the private domain of the State; and (b) assuming
an affirmative answer to (a), whether or not there is legal
authority to dispose of the Roppongi property.
I
Addressing the first issue of conversion of property of public
dominion intended for some public service, into property of the
private domain of the Republic, it should be noted that the Civil
Code does not address the question of who has authority to
effect such conversion. Neither does the Civil Code set out or
refer to any procedure for such conversion.
Our case law, however, contains some fairly explicit
pronouncements on this point, as Justice Sarmiento has pointed
out in his concurring opinion. In Ignacio v. Director of Lands
(108 Phils. 335 [1960]), petitioner Ignacio argued that if the land
in question formed part of the public domain, the trial court
should have declared the same no longer necessary for public
use or public purposes and which would, therefore, have
become disposable and available for private ownership. Mr.
Justice Montemayor, speaking for the Court, said:
Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a
portion of the shore is no longer washed by the waters of the
sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard service,
the government shall declare it to be the property of the owners
of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We
believe that only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the authority and the power to make the
declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not necessary
for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has
been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part
of the public domain. (Natividad v. Director of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in
the case of Vicente Joven y Monteverde v. Director of Lands, 93
Phil., 134 (cited in Velayo's Digest, Vol. 1, p. 52).
... is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called
upon, nor indeed in a position to determine whether any public
land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the
Law of Waters. Consequently, until a formal declaration on the

part of the Government, through the executive department or
the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no
longer needed for coast-guard service, for public use or for
special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain
not available for private appropriation or ownership. (108 Phil. at
338-339; emphasis supplied)
Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive Department or the
Legislative Department may convert property of the State of
public dominion into patrimonial property of the State. No
particular formula or procedure of conversion is specified either
in statute law or in case law. Article 422 of the Civil Code simply
states that: "Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of
the patrimonial property of the State". I respectfully submit,
therefore, that the only requirement which is legitimately
imposable is that the intent to convert must be reasonably clear
from a consideration of the acts or acts of the Executive
Department or of the Legislative Department which are said to
have effected such conversion.
The same legal situation exists in respect of conversion of
property of public dominion belonging to municipal
corporations, i.e., local governmental units, into patrimonial
property of such entities. In Cebu Oxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles
(66 SCRA 481 [1975]), the City Council of Cebu by resolution
declared a certain portion of an existing street as an abandoned
road, "the same not being included in the city development
plan". Subsequently, by another resolution, the City Council of
Cebu authorized the acting City Mayor to sell the land through
public bidding. Although there was no formal and explicit
declaration of conversion of property for public use into
patrimonial property, the Supreme Court said:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's
application for registration of title was withdrawn from public
use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial
property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.

Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of
public dominion, when no longer intended for public use of for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State."
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore
quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that
"Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from
public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid.
Hence, the petitioner has a registrable title over the lot in
question. (66 SCRA at 484-; emphasis supplied)
Thus, again as pointed out by Sarmiento J., in his separate
opinion, in the case of property owned by municipal
corporations simple non-use or the actual dedication of public
property to some use other than "public use" or some "public
service", was sufficient legally to convert such property into
patrimonial property (Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7 Phil. 20
[1906]- Municipality of Hinunganan v. Director of Lands 24 Phil.
124 [1913]; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968).
I would also add that such was the case not only in respect of'
property of municipal corporations but also in respect of
property of the State itself. Manresa in commenting on Article
341 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code which has been carried over
verbatim into our Civil Code by Article 422 thereof, wrote:
La dificultad mayor en todo esto estriba, naturalmente, en fijar el
momento en que los bienes de dominio publico dejan de serlo.
Si la Administracion o la autoridad competente legislative
realizan qun acto en virtud del cual cesa el destino o uso
publico de los bienes de que se trata naturalmente la dificultad
queda desde el primer momento resuelta. Hay un punto de
partida cierto para iniciar las relaciones juridicas a que pudiera
haber lugar Pero puede ocurrir que no haya taldeclaracion

expresa, legislativa or administrativa, y, sin embargo, cesar de
hecho el destino publico de los bienes; ahora bien, en este
caso, y para los efectos juridicos que resultan de entrar la cosa
en el comercio de los hombres,' se entedera que se ha
verificado la conversion de los bienes patrimoniales?
El citado tratadista Ricci opina, respecto del antiguo Codigo
italiano, por la afirmativa, y por nuestra parte creemos que tal
debe ser la soluciion. El destino de las cosas no depende tanto
de una declaracion expresa como del uso publico de las
mismas, y cuanda el uso publico cese con respecto de
determinados bienes, cesa tambien su situacion en el dominio
publico. Si una fortaleza en ruina se abandona y no se repara, si
un trozo de la via publica se abandona tambien por constituir
otro nuevo an mejores condiciones....ambos bienes cesan de
estar Codigo, y leyes especiales mas o memos administrativas.
(3 Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol, p. 128 [7a ed.;
1952) (Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion says that none of the executive acts
pointed to by the Government purported, expressly or definitely,
to convert the Roppongi property into patrimonial property of
the Republic. Assuming that to be the case, it is respectfully
submitted that cumulative effect of the executive acts here
involved was to convert property originally intended for and
devoted to public service into patrimonial property of the State,
that is, property susceptible of disposition to and appropration
by private persons. These executive acts, in their totality if not
each individual act, make crystal clear the intent of the
Executive Department to effect such conversion. These
executive acts include:
(a) Administrative Order No. 3 dated 11 August 1985, which
created a Committee to study the disposition/utilization of the
Government's property in Japan, The Committee was composed
of officials of the Executive Department: the Executive
Secretary; the Philippine Ambassador to Japan; and
representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the
Asset Privatization Trust. On 19 September 1988, the Committee
recommended to the President the sale of one of the lots (the lot
specifically in Roppongi) through public bidding. On 4 October
1988, the President approved the recommendation of the
Committee.
On 14 December 1988, the Philippine Government by diplomatic
note informed the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic's intention to dispose of the property in Roppongi. The
Japanese Government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs
replied that it interposed no objection to such disposition by the
Republic. Subsequently, the President and the Committee
informed the leaders of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate of the Philippines of the proposed disposition of the
Roppongi property.
(b) Executive Order No. 296, which was issued by the President
on 25 July 1987. Assuming that the majority opinion is right in
saying that Executive Order No. 296 is insufficient to authorize
the sale of the Roppongi property, it is here submitted with
respect that Executive Order No. 296 is more than sufficient to
indicate an intention to convert the property previously devoted
to public service into patrimonial property that is capable of
being sold or otherwise disposed of
(c) Non-use of the Roppongi lot for fourteen (14) years for
diplomatic or for any other public purposes. Assuming (but only
arguendo) that non-use does not, by itself, automatically convert
the property into patrimonial property. I respectfully urge that
prolonged non-use, conjoined with the other factors here listed,
was legally effective to convert the lot in Roppongi into
patrimonial property of the State. Actually, as already pointed
out, case law involving property of municipal corporations is to
the effect that simple non-use or the actual dedication of public
property to some use other than public use or public service,
was sufficient to convert such property into patrimonial property
of the local governmental entity concerned. Also as pointed out
above, Manresa reached the same conclusion in respect of
conversion of property of the public domain of the State into
property of the private domain of the State.
The majority opinion states that "abandonment cannot be

inferred from the non-use alone especially if the non-use was
attributable not to the Government's own deliberate and
indubitable will but to lack of financial support to repair and
improve the property" (Majority Opinion, p. 13). With respect, it
may be stressed that there is no abandonment involved here,
certainly no abandonment of property or of property rights.
What is involved is the charge of the classification of the
property from property of the public domain into property of the
private domain of the State. Moreover, if for fourteen (14) years,
the Government did not see fit to appropriate whatever funds
were necessary to maintain the property in Roppongi in a
condition suitable for diplomatic representation purposes, such
circumstance may, with equal logic, be construed as a
manifestation of the crystalizing intent to change the character
of the property.
(d) On 30 March 1989, a public bidding was in fact held by the
Executive Department for the sale of the lot in Roppongi. The
circumstance that this bidding was not successful certainly
does not argue against an intent to convert the property
involved into property that is disposable by bidding.
The above set of events and circumstances makes no sense at
all if it does not, as a whole, show at least the intent on the part
of the Executive Department (with the knowledge of the
Legislative Department) to convert the property involved into
patrimonial property that is susceptible of being sold.
II
Having reached an affirmative answer in respect of the first
issue, it is necessary to address the second issue of whether or
not there exists legal authority for the sale or disposition of the
Roppongi property.
The majority opinion refers to Section 79(f) of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 which reads as follows:
SEC. 79 (f). Conveyances and contracts to which the
Government is a party. In cases in which the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other

instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other
property the value of which is in excess of one hundred
thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall
prepare the necessary papers which, together with the proper
recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the
Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or
contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the
Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines
unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in
another officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion then goes on to state that: "[T]he
requirement has been retained in Section 4, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)" which
reads:
Two points need to be made in this connection. Firstly, the
requirement of obtaining specific approval of Congress when
the price of the real property being disposed of is in excess of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, has been deleted from Section 48
of the 1987 Administrative Code. What Section 48 of the present
Administrative Code refers to is authorization by law for the
conveyance. Section 48 does not purport to be itself a source of
legal authority for conveyance of real property of the
Government. For Section 48 merely specifies the official

authorized to execute and sign on behalf of the Government the
deed of conveyance in case of such a conveyance.
Secondly, examination of our statute books shows that
authorization by law for disposition of real property of the
private domain of the Government, has been granted by
Congress both in the form of (a) a general, standing
authorization for disposition of patrimonial property of the
Government; and (b) specific legislation authorizing the
disposition of particular pieces of the Government's patrimonial
property.
Standing legislative authority for the disposition of land of the
private domain of the Philippines is provided by Act No. 3038,
entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the Private Domain
of the Government of the Philippine Islands (now Republic of the
Philippines)", enacted on 9 March 1922. The full text of this
statute is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of the
same:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(now Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources) is
hereby authorized to sell or lease land of the private domain of
the Government of the Philippine Islands, or any part thereof, to
such persons, corporations or associations as are, under the
provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and seventyfour, (now Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) known as
the Public Land Act, entitled to apply for the purchase or lease
or agricultural public land.
SECTION 2. The sale of the land referred to in the preceding
section shall, if such land is agricultural, be made in the manner
and subject to the limitations prescribed in chapters five and six,
respectively, of said Public Land Act, and if it be classified
differently, in conformity with the provisions of chapter nine of
said Act: Provided, however, That the land necessary for the
public service shall be exempt from the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, March 9, 1922. (Emphasis supplied)
Lest it be assumed that Act No. 3038 refers only to agricultural
lands of the private domain of the State, it must be noted that
Chapter 9 of the old Public Land Act (Act No. 2874) is now
Chapter 9 of the present Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended) and that both statutes refer to: "any tract
of land of the public domain which being neither timber nor
mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or
for commercial or industrial purposes other than agricultural"
(Emphasis supplied). In other words, the statute covers the sale
or lease or residential, commercial or industrial land of the
private domain of the State.
itc-asl
Implementing regulations have been issued for the carrying out

of the provisions of Act No. 3038. On 21 December 1954, the
then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
promulgated Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-7
which were entitled, respectively: "Supplementary Regulations
Governing the Sale of the Lands of the Private Domain of the
Republic of the Philippines"; and "Supplementary Regulations
Governing the Lease of Lands of Private Domain of the Republic
of the Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. 28-29 [1955]).
It is perhaps well to add that Act No. 3038, although now sixtyeight (68) years old, is still in effect and has not been repealed. 1
Specific legislative authorization for disposition of particular
patrimonial properties of the State is illustrated by certain earlier
statutes. The first of these was Act No. 1120, enacted on 26 April
1904, which provided for the disposition of the friar lands,
purchased by the Government from the Roman Catholic Church,
to bona fide settlers and occupants thereof or to other persons.
In Jacinto v. Director of Lands (49 Phil. 853 [1926]), these friar
lands were held to be private and patrimonial properties of the
State. Act No. 2360, enacted on -28 February 1914, authorized
the sale of the San Lazaro Estate located in the City of Manila,
which had also been purchased by the Government from the
Roman Catholic Church. In January 1916, Act No. 2555 amended
Act No. 2360 by including therein all lands and buildings owned
by the Hospital and the Foundation of San Lazaro theretofor
leased by private persons, and which were also acquired by the
Philippine Government.
After the enactment in 1922 of Act No. 3038, there appears, to my
knowledge, to be only one statute authorizing the President to
dispose of a specific piece of property. This statute is Republic
Act No. 905, enacted on 20 June 1953, which authorized the
President to sell an Identified parcel of land of the private
domain of the National Government to the National Press Club
of the Philippines, and to other recognized national associations
of professionals with academic standing, for the nominal price
of P1.00. It appears relevant to note that Republic Act No. 905
was not an outright disposition in perpetuity of the property
involved- it provided for reversion of the property to the National
Government in case the National Press Club stopped using it for
its headquarters. What Republic Act No. 905 authorized was
really a donation, and not a sale.
The basic submission here made is that Act No. 3038 provides
standing legislative authorization for disposition of the
Roppongi property which, in my view, has been converted into
patrimonial property of the Republic. 2
To some, the submission that Act No. 3038 applies not only to
lands of the private domain of the State located in the
Philippines but also to patrimonial property found outside the
Philippines, may appear strange or unusual. I respectfully
submit that such position is not any more unusual or strange
than the assumption that Article 420 of the Civil Code applies
not only to property of the Republic located within Philippine
territory but also to property found outside the boundaries of the
Republic.
It remains to note that under the well-settled doctrine that heads
of Executive Departments are alter egos of the President (Villena

v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 [1939]), and in view of the
constitutional power of control exercised by the President over
department heads (Article VII, Section 17,1987 Constitution), the
President herself may carry out the function or duty that is
specifically lodged in the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101
Phil. 328 [1957]). At the very least, the President retains the
power to approve or disapprove the exercise of that function or
duty when done by the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources.
It is hardly necessary to add that the foregoing analyses and
submissions relate only to the austere question of existence of
legal power or authority. They have nothing to do with much
debated questions of wisdom or propriety or relative desirability
either of the proposed disposition itself or of the proposed
utilization of the anticipated proceeds of the property involved.
These latter types of considerations He within the sphere of
responsibility of the political departments of government the
Executive and the Legislative authorities.
For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the Petitions for
Prohibition in both G.R. Nos. 92013 and 92047.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ.,
concurring.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur completely with the excellent ponencia of Mr. Justice
Gutierrez and will add the following observations only for
emphasis.
It is clear that the respondents have failed to show the
President's legal authority to sell the Roppongi property. When

asked to do so at the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor
General was at best ambiguous, although I must add in fairness
that this was not his fault. The fact is that there is -no such
authority. Legal expertise alone cannot conjure that statutory
permission out of thin air.
Exec. Order No. 296, which reads like so much legislative,
double talk, does not contain such authority. Neither does Rep.
Act No. 6657, which simply allows the proceeds of the sale of
our properties abroad to be used for the comprehensive
agrarian reform program. Senate Res. No. 55 was a mere request
for the deferment of the scheduled sale of tile Roppongi
property, possibly to stop the transaction altogether; and ill any
case it is not a law. The sale of the said property may be
authorized only by Congress through a duly enacted statute,
and there is no such law.
Once again, we have affirmed the principle that ours is a
government of laws and not of men, where every public official,
from the lowest to the highest, can act only by virtue of a valid
authorization. I am happy to note that in the several cases where
this Court has ruled against her, the President of the Philippines
has submitted to this principle with becoming grace.
PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr., I
only wish to make a few observations which could help in
further clarifying the issues.
Under our tripartite system of government ordained by the
Constitution, it is Congress that lays down or determines
policies. The President executes such policies. The policies
determined by Congress are embodied in legislative enactments
that have to be approved by the President to become law. The
President, of course, recommends to Congress the approval of
policies but, in the final analysis, it is Congress that is the policy
- determining branch of government.
The judiciary interprets the laws and, in appropriate cases,

determines whether the laws enacted by Congress and
approved by the President, and presidential acts implementing
such laws, are in accordance with the Constitution.
The Roppongi property was acquired by the Philippine
government pursuant to the reparations agreement between the
Philippine and Japanese governments. Under such agreement,
this property was acquired by the Philippine government for a
specific purpose, namely, to serve as the site of the Philippine
Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Consequently, Roppongi is a property
of public dominion and intended for public service, squarely
falling within that class of property under Art. 420 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion :
(1) ...
development of the national wealth. (339a)
Public dominion property intended for public service cannot be
alienated unless the property is first transformed into private
property of the state otherwise known as patrimonial property of
the state. 1 The transformation of public dominion property to state
patrimonial property involves, to my mind, a policy decision. It is a
policy decision because the treatment of the property varies
according to its classification. Consequently, it is Congress which
can decide and declare the conversion of Roppongi from a public
dominion property to a state patrimonial property. Congress has
made no such decision or declaration.
Moreover, the sale of public property (once converted from

public dominion to state patrimonial property) must be approved
by Congress, for this again is a matter of policy (i.e. to keep or
dispose of the property). Sec. 48, Book 1 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 provides:

But the record is bare of any congressional decision or approval
to sell Roppongi. The record is likewise bare of any
congressional authority extended to the President to sell
Roppongi thru public bidding or otherwise.
It is therefore, clear that the President cannot sell or order the
sale of Roppongi thru public bidding or otherwise without a
prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi from a
public dominion property to a state patrimonial property, and,
second, authorizing the President to sell the same.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to make
PERMANENT the temporary restraining order earlier issued by
this Court.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.MELITONA ALAGAD, SPOUSES
CARMEN ALAGAD AND ESPIRIDION KOLIMLIM, JUSTO
ALAGAD, CARLOS ALAGAD, SPOUSES LIBRADA ALAGAD AND
EMERSON ABANO, DEMETRIO ALAGAD, ANTONIO ALAGAD,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, and the INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Civil Cases Division), respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Alberto, Salazar & Associates for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Republic appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming two orders of the defunct Court of First Instance of Laguna 2

dismissing its petition for "annulment of title and reversion. 3 The facts
appear in the decision appealed from:
On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for

registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila,
Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan
Psu-116971, which was amended after the land was divided into two
parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with
an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-226971,
amd. 2.
The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground
that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession
of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona
fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not
ceased to be a part of the public domain. It appears that barrio folk
also opposed the application. (LRC Case No. 189. G.L.R.O. Rec. No.
4922 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna).
By virtue of a final judgment in said case, promulgated January 16,
1956, supplemented by orders issued on March 21, 1956 and August
13, 1956, defendants were declared owners of Lot 1 and the
remaining portion, or Lot 2, was declared public land. Decree No. N51479 was entered and Original Certificate of Title No. 0- 40 1, dated
October 18, 1956, was issued in the names of defendants.
In August, 1966, Civil Case No. 52 of the Municipal Court of Pila,
Laguna, was filed by defendants to evict the barrio folk occupying
portions of Lot 1. On August 8, 1968, judgment was rendered in the
eviction case ordering the defendants therein to return possession of
the premises to herein defendants, as plaintiffs therein. The
defendants therein did not appeal.

The foregoing anterior proceedings triggered the filing of the instant
case. On October 6, 1970, as prayed for in the complaint, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of
Laguna or his deputies from enforcing the writ of execution issued in
Civil Case No. 52, and the defendants from selling, mortgaging,
disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the
area.
This case was set for pre-trial on July 6, 1971. Despite notice of the
pre-trial, Atty. Alejandro A. Ponferada, Special Attorney, Bureau of
Lands, representing plaintiff Republic, did not appear. On July 16,
1971, the court a quo dismissed the complaint. The Republic filed a
motion for reconsideration, was set for hearing, and finally denied by
the court a quo, hence, this appeal.
Plaintiff filed its record on appeal on March 13, 1972. It appears that
the appeal was dismissed by this Court for failure to show in the
record on appeal that the appeal was perfected on time. Plaintiff went
to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on the action of this
Court. On November 19, 1982, the Supreme Court set aside the
dismissal resolution of this Court and ordered Us to reinstate and give
due course to plaintiffs appeal. 4
In commencing proceedings below, the Republic claims that the
decree and title [rendered and issued in LRC Case No. 189, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. L-4922] insofar as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion on
end of Lot 1, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, is concerned, are void ab initio, 5
for the following reasons:
(a) That said l.42 hectare northwestern portion or end of Lot l, Psu116971, Amd. 2, like the adjoining Lot 2 of the same survey plan
containing 2.8421 hectares, had since time immemorial, been
foreshore land reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de
Bay (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia, L-20950, May 31, 1965; Antonio
Dizon, et al., vs. Juan de G. Rodriguez, et al., L-20355- 56, April 30,
1965);
(b) That moreover said 1.42 hectare portion is actually now the site of
Barrio Aplaya, formerly a sitio of Linga, Pila, Laguna, having been
occupied by the barrio people since the American occupation of the

country in the early 1900's where they established their houses;
(c) That the barrio people of Aplaya thru the years since the early
1900's have filled up and elevated the land to its present condition of
being some feet above the level of the adjoining Lot 2 of plan Psu116971 and the rest of Lot 1 of the same survey plan so much so that
this barrio site of Aplaya where there are now sixty-eight (68) houses
occupied by more than one hundred (100) families is no longer
reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay; and
(d) That were it not for the fillings made by the barrio people, the land
in question would not have been fit for human habitation, so much so
that defendants and their predecessors-in-interest could not have
acquired an imperfect title to the property which could be judicially
confirmed in a registration case, as in fact said defendants and their
predecessors-in-interest have never been in actual possession of the
land in question, the actual occupants thereof being the barrio people
of Aplaya; 6
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that under
Section 20, of Rule 20, of the Rules of Court, dismissal was proper
upon failure of the Republic to appear for pre-trial. It likewise ruled
that the judgment, dated January 16, 1956, in the said LRC No. 189
has long become final, titles to the properties had been issued (in
favor of the private respondents), and that res judicata, consequently,
was a bar.
In its petition, the Republic assails the decision insofar as it sustained
the lower court: (1) in dismissing the petition for failure of the
Republic to appear for pre-trial; and (2) in holding that res judicata is
an obstacle to the suit.
I.
With respect to the first question, we hold that the Court of Appeals
has been guilty of grave abuse of discretion. It is well-established that
the State cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or
negligent acts of its official or agents, 7 much more, non-suited as a
result thereof.
This is so because:
... [T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity, which is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land under the basic
doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the present
charter. It is charged moreover with the conservation of such
patrimony. There is need therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny
before private claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded
recognition, especially so where the matter is sought to be raked up
anew after almost fifty years. Such primordial consideration, not the
apparent carelessness, much less the acquiescense of public
officials, is the controlling norm . . . 8
The cases of Ramos v. Centra l Bank of the Philippines
and Nilo v.
Romero, cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its decision, are not
applicable. In Ramos, we applied estoppel upon finding of bad faith on the
part of the State (the Central Bank) in deliberately reneging on its
promises. In Nilo, we denied efforts to impugn the jurisdiction of the court
on the ground that the defendant had been "erroneously' represented in
the complaint by the City Attorney when it should have been the City
Mayor, on a holding that the City Attorney, in any event, could have ably
defended the City (Davao City). In both cases, it is seen that the acts that
gave rise to estoppel were voluntary and intentional in character, in which
cases, it could not be said that the Government had been prejudiced by
some negligent act or omission.
9
10
There is no merit either, in claims that res judicata is an impediment

to reversion of property. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 11 this Court
stated:
... [a] certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic v Animas,

et al., . supra), and the cancellation may be pursued through an
ordinary action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the prior
judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such
jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. For it is a
well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a
subsequent case, the following requisites must concur; (1) it must be
a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be
a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and

identity of cause of action (Municipality of Daet vs. CA, 93 SCRA 503;
Mendoza vs. Arrieta, et al., 91 SCRA 113)... 12
In the case at bar, if the parcel registered in the names of the private
respondents were foreshore land, the land registration court could not
have validly awarded title thereto. It would have been without the
authority to do so. The fact that the Bureau of Lands had failed to
appeal from the decree of registration could not have validated the
court's decision, rendered without jurisdiction.
II.
"Property, according to the Civil Code, is either of public dominion or
of private ownership ." 13 Property is of public dominion if it is:
(1) ... intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads and others of similar character; 14 or if it:
(2) . . . belong[s] to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth. 15
All other property of the State, it is provided further, which is not of the
character mentioned in ... article [4201, is patrimonial property, 16 meaning
to say, property 'open to disposition 17 by the Government, or otherwise,
property pertaining to the national domain, or public lands. 18 Property of
the public dominion, on the other hand, refers to things held by the State
by regalian right. They are things res publicae in nature and hence,
incapable of private appropriation. Thus, under the present Constitution,
[w]ith the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated.' 19
Specifically:
ART. 502. The following are of public dominion:

(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in
their natural beds and the beds themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public

dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands, and their
beds;
(5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds, which are also
of public dominion;
(6) Subterranean waters on public lands;
(7) Waters found within the zone of operation of public works, even if
constructed by a contractor;
(8) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands belonging to
private persons, to the State, to a province, or to a city or municipality
from the moment they leave such lands;
(9) The waste waters of fountains, sewers and public establishments.
20
So also is it ordained by the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3,

1866:
Art. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands and fed
by public waters, belong to the public domain.
Lakes, ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of private
individuals, or the State or provinces, belong to the respective owners
of such lands, and those situated upon lands of communal use
belong to their respective pueblos.21
Assuming, therefore, for purposes of this petition, that the lands
subject of the Republic's reversion efforts are foreshore in nature, the
Republic has legitimate reason to demand reconveyance. In that
case, res judicata or estoppel is no defense. 22
Of course, whether or not the properties in question are, indeed,
foreshore lands is the core of controversy. According to the trial court,
the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, 23 and hence, available
disposition and registration. As we have pointed out, the Government holds

otherwise, and that as foreshore laud, it is not registerable.
The question, so it follows, is one of fact: Is the parcel foreshore or is

it part and parcel of the public domain?
Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake . 24 Thus:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth;
it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and
is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to the
definition just quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake. 25
And, "[i]nasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, so Colegio de San
Jose further tells us, "we must resort to the legal provisions governing
the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to
determine the character and ownership of the parcels of land in
question. 26 The recourse to legal provisions is necessary, for under Article
74 of the Law of Waters, [T]he natural bed or basin of lakes ... is the
ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth. 27 and
in which case, it forms part of the national dominion. When Laguna de
Bay's waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been defined as:
... the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry
season, such depth being the regular, common, natural, which occurs
always or most of the time during the year . . . 28
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the extraordinary
action of nature, rainfall for instance, the portions inundated thereby
are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in
question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land
outside of the public dominion, and land capable of registration as
private property.
A foreshore land, on the other hand, has been defined as follows:
. . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and
left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides... 29
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. 30
If the submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it

does not become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters.
The case, then, has to be decided alongside these principles and
regretfully, the Court cannot make a ruling, in the first place, because
it is not a trier of facts, and in the second, it is in possession of no
evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition 31 We
therefore remand the case to the court a quo to determine whether or not
the property subject of controversy is foreshore. We, consequently, reverse
both the Court of Appeals and the trial court and reinstate the Republic's
complaint.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for

further proceedings.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39473 April 30, 1979
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ISABEL LASTIMADO, respondents.
Eduardo G. Makalintal for private respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review (Appeal) by certiorari filed by the
Republic of the Philippines from the Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on September 30, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. Sp-01504
denying the State's Petition for certiorari and Mandamus.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent, Isabel Lastimado, filed on September 11, 1967,
in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I, a Petition for the
reopening of cadastral proceedings over a portion of Lot No. 626 of
the Mariveles Cadastre, consisting of 971.0569 hectares, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 931, as amended by Republic Act No. 2061,

docketed as Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1097. In the
absence of any opposition, whether from the Government or from
private individuals, private respondent was allowed to present her
evidence ex-parte. On October 14, 1967, the trial Court rendered a
Decision granting the Petition and adjudicating the land in favor of
private respondent. The trial Court issued an order for the issuance of
a decree of registration on November 20, 1967, and on November 21,
1967, the Land Registration Commission issued Decree No. N117573 in favor of private respondent. Eventually, Original Certificate
of Title No. N-144 was also issued in her favor. Private respondent
thereafter subdivided the land into ten lots, and the corresponding
titles. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 18905 to 18914 inclusive,
were issued by the Register of Deeds.
On June 3, 1968, or within one year from the entry of the decree of
registration, petitioner filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Sec. 38,
Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud alleging that during the period of
alleged adverse possession by private respondent, said parcel of
land was part of the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan. which was
formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines only on
December 22, 1965, and that the same is inside the public forest of
Mariveles, Bataan and, therefore, not subject to disposition or
acquisition under the Public Land Law. Respondent field an
Opposition thereto, which was considered by the trial Court, as a
Motion to Dismiss, and on December 20,1968, said Court (Judge Tito
V. Tizon, presiding) issued an Order dismissing the Petition for
Review mainly on the ground that the Solicitor General had failed to
file opposition to the original Petition for reopening of the cadastral
proceedings and was, therefore, estopped from questioning the
decree of registration ordered issued therein. On January 28, 1969,
petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial
Court in its Order dated May 20, 1969, for lack of merit.
Petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal and a Record on
Appeal, which was objected to by private respondent. On July 15,
1972, or three years later, * the trial Court (Judge Abraham P. Vera, presiding) refused
to give due course to the appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial Court
denied it in its Order of October 14, 1972 on the ground that the proper remedy of petitioner was
a certiorari petition, not an ordinary appeal, and that the Order sought to be appealed from had
long become final and executory as petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was pro-forma and
did not suspend the running of the reglementary period of appeal.
On November 9, 1972, petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari and

mandamus with the Court of Appeals claiming that the trial Court
gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction when,
without the benefit of hearing, it summarily dismissed the Petition for
Review; and since said Petition raised certain issues of fact which
cannot be decided except in a trial on the merits, the dismissal of the
Petition on the basis of private respondent's Opposition, considered
as a Motion to Dismiss, constituted a denial of due process of law.
Petitioner then prayed that the Order of the trial Court, dated
December 20, 1968 dismissing the Petition for Review, be declared
null and void, and that said trial Court be directed to give due course
to the Petition for Review; or, in the alternative, to give due course to
petitioner's appeal.
On September 30, 1974, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial Court's
dismissal of the Petition for Review stating:
... We cannot find any allegation in the petition for review which
shows that private respondent had committed fraud against petitioner.
Its representations and officials were duly notified of private
respondent's petition for reopening and registration of title in her
name. In said petition, the technical descriptions of the portion of Lot
No. 626 of the Mariveles (Bataan) Cadastre, subject-matter of the
petition were expressly stated, the boundaries, specifically
delineated. The alleged ground that the land forms part of a forest
land exists at the time petitioner was duly notified of said petition.
Failure to file opposition is in effect, an admission that the petition is
actually not part of a forest land. Indubitably, therefore, no justifiable
reason exists for the annulment of the Order, dated December 20,
1968 (Annex D-Petition) of the lower court dismissing herein
petitioner's petition for review of the decree issued in favor of private
respondent Lastimado. 1
The Court of Appeals then disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the respondent Judge has not committed
any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in the
issuance of an Order, dated December 20, 1968 (Annex D-Petition)
dismissing herein petitioner's petition for review, the present petition
for review is hereby denied.

The issuance of the writ of mandamus as prayed for in the petition is
no longer necessary as this Court, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction and authority to supervise orderly administration of justice,
has already resolved on the merits the question whether or not the
dismissal of the petition for review had been done with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 2
From this Decision, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review
(Appeal) by certiorari assigning the following errors to the Court of
Appeals and to the trial Court:
1. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that there can be possession, even for the purpose of claiming title, of
land which at the time of possession is subject to a military
reservation.
that such land which is subject to a government reservation, may
appropriately be the subject of cadastral proceedings, and hence.
also of a petition to reopen cadastral proceedings.
that a parcel of land which is part of the public forest is susceptible of
occupation and registration in favor of private individual.
4. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that the Republic of the Philippines is not estopped from
questioning the decree of registration and the title issued pursuant
thereto in favor of respondent Lastimado over the parcel of land in
question.
5. The Lower Court erred in dismissing the petition for review of the
Republic of the Philippines.
6. The Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioner's petition for
certiorari and mandamus.
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) provides:
Section 38. Decree of registration, and remedies after entry of

decree.
If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant
has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for
registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be
entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet
title thereto. subject only to the exceptions stated in the following
section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including
the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice of citation, or included in
the general description "To all whom it may concern". Such decree
shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affect thereby, nor by any proceeding in any
court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the
right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the
competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year
after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value
has acquired an interest. ... 3
The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review
of a decree are: a) that the petitioner has a real and dominical right;
b) that he has been deprived thereof; c) through fraud; d) that the
petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and
e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent
purchaser. 4
However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be
extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not
been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought
to be annulled was rendered. 5 The following ruling spells out the
difference between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud:
Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,

connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant
"outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented
from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic fraud
takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as
the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not

affect the present action of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case. 6
The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the
Court. 7
In its Petition for Review filed before the trial Court, petitioner alleged
that fraud was committed by private respondent when she
misrepresented that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been
in possession of the land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and
adversely against the whole world as owner for more than forty years
when, in fact, the subject land was in. side the former U.S. Military
Reservation, which was formally turned over to the Republic of the
Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and that she likewise
contended that her rights, as derived from the original and primitive
occupants of the land in question, are capable of judicial confirmation
under existing laws, when the truth is, said parcel of land is within the
public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, and is not subject to disposition or
acquisition by private persons under the Public Land Law.
The trial Court ruled, and was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that no
fraud was committed by private respondent, which deprived petitioner
of its day in Court as there was no showing that she was aware of the
facts alleged by the Government, so that she could not have
suppressed them with intent to deceive. The trial Court also noted
that petitioner had failed to file an opposition to the reopening of the
cadastral proceedings despite notices sent not only to the Solicitor
General as required by Republic Act No. 931. but to the Bureau of
Lands and the Bureau of Forestry as well. It then concluded that "the
remedy granted by section 38 of the Land Registration Act is
designed to give relief to victims of fraud, not to those who are victims
of their own neglect, inaction or carelessness, especially when no
attempt is ever made to excuse or justify the neglect." With the
foregoing as the essential basis, the trial Court dismissed the Petition
for Review.
We find reversible error. Although there was an agreement by the
parties to submit for resolution the Opposition to the Petition for
Review, which was treated as a motion to dismiss, the trial Court, in
the exercise of sound judicial discretion, should not have dismissed

the Petition outright but should have afforded petitioner an
opportunity to present evidence in support of the facts alleged to
constitute actual and extrinsic fraud committed by private respondent.
Thus, in the case of Republic vs. Sioson, et al., 8 it was held that "the
action of the lower Court in denying the petition for review of a decree of
registration filed within one year from entry of the d without hearing the
evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic
fraud upon which the petition is predicated, is held to be in error, because
the lower Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove
it."
If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the
military reservation at the time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot
be the object of any cadastral p nor can it be the object of reopening
under Republic Act No. 931. 9 Similarly, if the land in question, indeed
forms part of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long,
cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction
of the Cadastral Court to register under the Torrens System. 10
Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for

inaction and neglect (although the Solicitor General claims that it
received no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by the
State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials
or agents. 11 Further, we cannot lose sight of the cardinal consideration
that "the State as persona in law is the juridical entity, which is the source
of any asserted right to ownership in land" under basic Constitutional
Precepts, and that it is moreover charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. 12
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated

September 30, 1974, dismissing the Petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed before it, as well as the Order of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan (Branch I) dated December 20, 1968, dismissing
the Petition for Review, are hereby set aside and the records of this
case hereby ed to the latter Court for further proceedings to enable
petitioner to present evidence in support of its Petition for Review.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983
WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY,
APOLONIO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees, vs.THE
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL RESOURCES
JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-appellees,RAVAGO
COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO
MALLARI, intervenors,
Camito V Pelianco Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
Solicitor General for respondent Director.
Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comm'l Co.
Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari.
Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao Happick, Jr.
MAKASIAR, J:
This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in Civil Case No. 56813,
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
prohibitory injunction (p. 2. rec.), which dismissed the petition of
petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that it
does not state a sufficient cause of action, and upon the respondentsappellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources and the
Director of Forestry) motion to dismiss (p. 28, rec.).
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No.
2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land
situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on
or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This public forest land,
consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was
turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine
Government (P. 99, CFI rec.).
On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan
submitted his application in due form after paying the necessary fees
and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants
submitted their offers before the deadline (p. 29, rec.).
Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area
declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the
most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P.
Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry,
which read as follows:
It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation
be made a forest reserve for watershed purposes. Prepare and
submit immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing the said
area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also
desired that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the
issuance of the timber license in the area during the public bidding
conducted last May 22, 1961 be rejected in order that the area may
be reserved as above stated. ...
(SGD.) CARLOS P. GARCIA
(pp. 98, CFI rec.).
On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and
Natural Resources sustained the findings and re comendations of the
Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the
public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under
certain conditions," and
We quote:
Respectfully forwarded to the honorable, the Executive Secretary
Malacanang. Manila inviting particular attention to the comment and

recommendation of the Director of Forestry in the proceeding in
indorsement in which this Of fice fully concurs.
The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of
their zeal to promote forest conservation and watershed protection
especially in Olongapo, Zambales area. In convincing fashion, they
have demonstrated that to declare the forest area involved as a forest
reserve ratify than open it for timber exploitation under license and
regulation would do more harm than of to the public interest. To
convert the area into a forest reserve without an adequate forest
protection force, would make of it a 'Free Zone and Logging
Paradise,' to the ever 'Problem Loggers' of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . .
an open target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of
forest vandals and despoilers. On the other hand, to award the area,
as planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who shall
conduct logging operations therein under the selective logging
method and who shall be obliged to employ a sufficient number of
forest guards to patrol and protect the forest consecration and
watershed protection.
Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already
conducted a public bidding to determine the most qualified bidder to
whom the area advertised should be awarded. Needless to stress,
the decision of the Director of Forestry to dispose of the area thusly
was arrived at after much thought and deliberation and after having
been convinced that to do so would not adversely affect the
watershed in that sector. The result of the bidding only have to be
announced. To be sure, some of the participating bidders like Mr.
Edgardo Pascual, went to much expense in the hope of winning a
virgin forest concession. To suddenly make a turn about of this
decision without strong justifiable grounds, would cause the Bureau
of Forestry and this Office no end of embarrassment.
In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of
Forestry be allowed to proceed with the announcement of the results
of the bidding for the subject forest area (p. 13, CFI rec.).
The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2,
1962, signed by Atty. Juan Cancio, Acting Legal Officer, "respectfully
returned to the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture

and Natural Resources for appropriate action," the papers subject of
Forestry Notice No. 2087 which was referred to the Bureau of
Forestry for decision (p. 14, CFI rec.).
Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was
awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on
April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this
award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao
Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the
Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Benjamin M. Gozon who succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in
office issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963,
pertinent portions of which state:
xxx xxx xxx
SUBJECT: ... ... ...
(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary
timber licenses.
1. ... ... ...
2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new
ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more
than 3,000 hectares each; and (be the extension of ordinary timber
licenses for areas not exceeding 5,000 hectares each;
3. This Order shall take effect immediately (p. 267, CFI rec.).
Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, replacing secretary Benjamin M.
Gozon. Upon assumption of office he Immediately promulgate on
December 19, 19b3 General memorandum Order No. 60, revoking
the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General
Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which
order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963. Pertinent
portions of the said Order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated
May 30, 1963
1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and Nature of
the work of the Department, the authority delegated to the Director of
forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30,
1963, to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area
covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the
extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000
hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of'
new licenses , including amendments thereto, shall be signed by the
secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous
orders, directives, circulars, memoranda, rules and regulations
inconsistent with this Order are hereby revoked (p. 268, CFl rec.;
Emphasis supplied).
On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect,
December 19, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW)
dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was
signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal
without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the
Office of the Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was
not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as
required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.
On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter
to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be
considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution
of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao
Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their
motion for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao
V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof
was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules
and regulations.
On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by
Ravago Commercial Company, the Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as
having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and
is therefore void ab initio. The dispositive portion of said order reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and
so holds that O.T. License No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan should be, as hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED
without force and effect whatsoever from the issuance thereof.
The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging
operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if there be any, in the area in
question and shall see to it that the appellee shall not introduce any
further improvements thereon pending the disposition of the appeals
filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge lao Happick in this
case" (pp. 30-31, CFI rec.).
Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion in
an Order dated March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph appears:
In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of
Forestry in his 2nd indorsement of February 12, 1964, that the area in
question composes of water basin overlooking Olongapo, including
the proposed Olongapo watershed Reservation; and that the United
States as well as the Bureau of Forestry has earmarked this entire
watershed for a watershed pilot forest for experiment treatment
Concerning erosion and water conservation and flood control in
relation to wise utilization of the forest, denudation, shifting
cultivation, increase or decrease of crop harvest of agricultural areas
influenced by the watershed, etc. .... (pp. 3839, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.).
On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, acting on the separate appeals filed by Jorge Lao
Happick and Ravago Commercial Company, from the order of the
Director of Forestry dated April 15, 1963, awarding to Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan the area under Notive No. 2087, and rejecting the
proposals of the other applicants covering the same area,
promulgated an order commenting that in view of the observations of

the Director of Forestry just quoted, "to grant the area in question to
any of the parties herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect public
interest which is paramount to private interests," and concluding that,
"for this reason, this Office is of the opinion and so holds, that without
the necessity of discussing the appeals of the herein appellants, the
said appeals should be, as hereby they are, dismissed and this case
is considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is concerned" (p.
78, rec.).
On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before tile court
a quo (Court of First Instance, Manila), Special Civil Action No.
56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary prohibitory injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI rec.). Petitionerappellant claims that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally
whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of
their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a
valid and existing timber license without just cause, by denying
petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by depriving
him of his constitutional right to property without due process of law,
and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts" (P. 6, CFI rec.).
Petitioner-appellant prayed for judgment making permanent the writ
of preliminary injunction against the respondents- appellees;
declaring the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources dated March 9, March 25, and April 11, 1964, as well as
all his acts and those of the Director of Forestry implementing said
orders, and all the proceedings in connection therewith, null and void,
unlawful and of no force and effect; ordering the Director of Forestry
to renew OTI No. 20-'64 upon expiration, and sentencing the
respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner-appellant the
sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of
pecuniary damage, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) by
way of moral and exemplary damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000-00) as attorney's fees and costs. The respondentsappellees separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, Ravago Commercial Company, Jorge Lao,
Happick and Atanacio Mallari, presented petitions for intervention
which were granted, and they too opposed the writ.
The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964,
alleges the following grounds: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction; (2)
that the respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3) that
the petitioner has not exhausted all available administrative remedies;
(4) that the petition does not state a cause of action; and (5) that
purely administrative and discretionary functions of administrative
officials may not be interfered with by the courts. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources joined the motion to dismiss when
in his answer of May 18, 1964, he avers the following special and
affirmative defenses: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the
petitioner has no cause of action; (3) that venue is improperly laid; (4)
that the State is immune from suit without its consent; (5) that the
court has no power to interfere in purely administrative functions; and
(6) that the cancellation of petitioner's license was dictated by public
policy (pp. 172-177, rec.). Intervenors also filed their respective
answers in intervention with special and affirmative defenses (pp. 7879, rec.). A hearing was held on the petition for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction, wherein evidence was submitted by all the
parties including the intervenors, and extensive discussion was held
both orally and in writing.
After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the
evidence received, resolved not only the question on the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction but also the motion to dismiss,
declared that the petition did not state a sufficient cause of action,
and dismissed the same accordingly. To justify such action, the trial
court, in its order dismissing the petition, stated that "the court feels
that the evidence presented and the extensive discussion on the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction should also be taken into consideration in resolving not
only this question but also the motion to dismiss, because there is no
reason to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments
and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). His motion for reconsideration
having been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.), petitioner-appellant Wenceslao
Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this Court.
I
Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the
trial court erred in:

(1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action:
and
(2) dismissing the petition [p.27,rec. ].
He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not
the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action (p. 31,
rec.). Petitioner-appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion
on the definition of the term cause of action wherein he contended
that the three essential elements thereon, namely, the legal right of
the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the defendants and the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of that right are satisfied in
the averments of this petition (pp. 31-32, rec.). He invoked the rule
that when the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no
cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the facts
alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot
consider other matters aliunde He further invoked the rule that in a
motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of cause of action, the facts
alleged in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted for the
purpose of the motion (pp. 32-33, rec.).
A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant's
contentions are untenable. As already observed, this case was
presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the
petition to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Rule 16
[g], Revised Rules of Court), on the ground that the timber license
relied upon by the petitioner- appellant in his petition was issued by
the Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab
initio. This motion supplanted the general demurrer in an action at law
and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of the motion, ail facts which
are well pleaded however while the court must accept as true all well
pleaded facts, the motion does not admit allegations of which the
court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to
legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to
facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings
to be unfounded (Vol. 1, Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
1970 ed., p. 505, citing cases).
It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case
wherein answers were interposed and evidence introduced. In the
course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to
introduce evidence in support of tile allegations iii his petition, which
he readily availed of. Consequently, he is estopped from invoking the
rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion
to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be
considered. If there were no hearing held, as in the case of Cohen vs.
U.S. CCA Minn 1942,129 F. 2d 733), "where the case was presented
to District Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure
of complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and
no answer was interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts
which the court could properly consider in passing upon the motion
were those facts appearing in the complaint, supplemented be such
facts as the court judicially knew.
In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this
Court, thru Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, held that the trial court can
properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of
cause of action even without a hearing, by taking into consideration
the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto. Pertinent
portion of said decision is hereby quoted:
Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of
action. The Court below granted the motion, dismissed the petition.
The motion to reconsider failed. Offshoot is this appeal.
1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal order issued
without any hearing on the motion to dismiss? Is it void?
WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1,
1961 and set for hearing on February 10 following. On February 8,
1961 petitioner's counsel telegraphed the court, (r)equest
postponement motion dismissal till written opposition filed.' He did not
appear at the scheduled hearing. But on March 4, 1961, he followed
up his wire, with his written opposition to the motion to dismiss.
Adverting to the 5-page motion to dismiss and the 6-page opposition
thereto, We find that the arguments pro and con on the question of
the board's power to abolish petitioner's position to discussed the
problem said profusely cited authorities. The May 15, 1961 8-page
court order recited at length the said arguments and concluded that
petitioner made no case.
One good reason for the statutory requirement of hearing on a motion
as to enable the suitors to adduce evidence in support of their
opposing claims. But here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack
of cause of action. Existence of a cause of action or lack of it is
determined be a reference to the facts averred in the challenged
pleading. The question raised in the motion is purely one of law. This
legal issue was fully discussed in said motion and the opposition
thereto. In this posture, oral arguments on the motion are reduced to
an unnecessary ceremony and should be overlooked. And, correctly
so, because the other intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a
motion, i.e., 'to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and to give to
the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion,' has
been sufficiently met. And then, courts do not exalt form over
substance (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a
motion to dismiss for- insufficiency of cause of action will be granted if
documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts
sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court to go beyond
disclosure in the complaint (LOCALS No. 1470, No. 1469, and No.
1512 of the International Longshoremen's Association vs. Southern
Pacific Co., 6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although
the evidence of the parties were presented on the question of
granting or denying petitioner-appellant's application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly applied said evidence in
the resolution of the motion to dismiss. Moreover, in applying said
evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, the trial court, in
its order dismissing the petition, pointed out that, "there is no reason
to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and
evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant did not interpose
any objection thereto, nor presented new arguments in his motion for
reconsideration (pp. 482-484, CFI rec.). This omission means
conformity to said observation, and a waiver of his right to object,
estopping him from raising this question for the first time on appeal. "
I question not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal" (Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA
276).
Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the
ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of
action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in
the complaint. "The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure
substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is
made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely
secondary in importance are made to override the ends of justice; the
technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial
right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced" (Vol.
1, Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing cases).
What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the
public at large, more particularly the welfare of the inhabitants of
Olongapo City and Zambales province, whose lives and properties
are directly and immediately imperilled by forest denudation.
The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically
comprises the entire Olongapo watershed (p. 265, CFI rec.). It is of
public knowledge that watersheds serves as a defense against soil
erosion and guarantees the steady supply of water. As a matter of
general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the
conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which
includes the country's watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had
been subjected to rampant abusive treatment due to various
unscientific and destructive land use practices. Once lush watersheds
were wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber cutting by
licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers. This is one reason why,
in paragraph 27.of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary
timber license it is stated:
The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the
discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be
made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require
(Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.).
Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case,
We therefore take judicial notice of the fact that, on April 30, 1964, the
area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license has been

established as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve by virtue of
Executive Proclamation No. 238 by then President Diosdado
Macapagal which in parts read as follows:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, 1, Diosdado Macapagal, President
of the Philippines do hereby withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement
and establish as Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve for watershed,
soil protection, and timber production purposes, subject to private
rights, if any there be, under the administration and control of the
Director of Forestry, xx the following parcels of land of the public
domain situated in the municipality of Olongapo, province of
Zambales, described in the Bureau of Forestry map No. FR-132, to
wit: ... ... (60 O.G. No. 23, 3198).
Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64
(NEW) for his alleged right over the timber concession in question.
He argues thus: "The facts alleged in the petition show: (1) the legal
right of the petitioner to log in the area covered by his timber license;
(2) the legal or corresponding obligation on the part of the
respondents to give effect, recognize and respect the very timber
license they issued to the petitioner; and (3) the act of the
respondents in arbitrarily revoking the timber license of the petitioner
without giving him his day in court and in preventing him from using
and enjoying the timber license issued to him in the regular course of
official business" (p. 32, rec.).
In the light of petitioner-appellant's arguments, it is readily seen that
the whole controversy hinges on the validity or invalidity of his timber
license.
WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitionerappellant's timber license was signed and released without authority
by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is
therefore void ab initio. WE hereby quote such findings:
In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May
30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new
ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not
more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the
petitioner contained 6,420 hectares (Exhs. 2-A and 2-B Ravago,
embodied in Annex B; Exh. B). The petitioner contends that only
1,756 hectares of the said area contain commercial and operable
forest; the authority given to the Director of Forestry to grant a new
ordinary timber license of not more than 3,000 hectares does not
state that the whole area should be commercial and operable forest.
It should be taken into consideration that the 1,756 hectares
containing commercial and operable forest must have been
distributed in the whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license
states, 'Please see attached sketch and technical description,' gives
an area of 6,420 hectares and does not state what is the area
covered of commmercial and operable forest (Exh. Ravago Also
Annex B of the petition, which was marked as Exhibit B, states:
Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest containing 6,420
hectares located in Olongapo, Zambales was declared available for
timber utilization and development. Pursuant to this Notice, there
were received bid proposals from the following persons: ...
Wherefore, confirming the findings of said Committee, the area
described in Notice No. 2087 shall be awarded, as it is hereby
awarded to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, subject to the following
conditions: ... ...
In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the
Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license.
The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on
December 19, 1963, and released to the petitioner on January 6,
1964 (Exh. RavaGo The authority delegated to the Director of
Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license was contained in
general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was
revoked by general memorandum order No. 60, which was
promulgated on December 19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director of
Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on
January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio (pp.
479480, CFI rec.).
The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the
impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which
date the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what
is of greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance, and
not the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's
timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was
released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is
acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director
of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on
January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any
legal right under such void license. This is evident on the face of his
petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary
Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in the case of World Wide
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb.
28, 1959), this Court held that if from the face of the complaint, as
supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to
the properties it claims to have been levied upon and sold at public
auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks indemnity, the
said complaint does not give plaintiff any right of action against the
defendants. In the same case, this Court further held that, in acting
on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from
its annexes where it clearly appears that the claim of the plaintiff to be
the A owner of the properties in question is predicated on said
annexes. Accordingly, petitioner-appellant's petition must be
dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
II
Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all
his administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-appellees
have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow
petitioner-appellant to continue operation in the area covered by his
timber license. He further alleged that he has neither recourse by way
of appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law except thru this special civil action, as the last official
act of the respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in declaring void the timber license referred to above after
denying petitioner-appellant's motion for reconsideration, is the last
administrative act. Petitioner-appellant relies on the case of Demaisip
vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (106 Phil. 237, Sept. 24, 1959),
wherein it was held that the failure of the plaintiff to appeal from the
adverse decision of the Secretary to the President cannot preclude
the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the
Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President.
The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied
sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter
(Villena vs. the Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.).
To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order
of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation
No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and
establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve.
Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the
orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the
petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust
his administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs.
Fuertes (5 SCRA 399, 400, June 29, 1962), held that:
At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President
and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not
appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and
that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the
Director of Lands he had exhausted the administrative remedies, is
untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines
is tantamount to not appealing all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal,
because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in
an administrative case.
In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-92, July 22,
1912), this Court stressed the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, thus:
When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within
the executive department of the government the courts will not
interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. Jao Igco vs.
Shuster, 10 Phil. Rep. 448; Ekiu vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 651; U.S. vs. Sing
Tuck, 194 U.S. 161; U.S. vs. Ju Toy 198 U.S. 253; Chill Yow vs. U.S.,
28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201). The administrative remedies afforded by law

must first be exhausted before resort can be had to the courts,
especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and
final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely
and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the
executive department of the government. When the law confers
exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department of the
government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the
judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable by
the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are
subject to be reviewed and modified by them" (emphasis supplied).
Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must
allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy
(Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In
the case at bar, petitioner- appellant's speedy and adequate remedy
is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.
Accordingly, "it is settled to the point of being elementary that the only
question involved n certiorari is jurisdiction, either want of jurisdiction
or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall warrant the issuance
of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when the same is so grave
as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law" FS Divinagracia Agro-Commercial Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 191 [April .1, 1981]). The foregoing is on
the assumption that there is any irregularity, albeit there is none in the
acts or omissions of the respondents-appellees. certiorari is not a
substitute for appeal as held time and again by this Court (People vs.
Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465), "it being a time honored and well known
principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must first
exhaust the administrative remedies available" (Garcia vs.
Teehankee, 27 SCRA 944, April 18, 1969).
Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources complained of, petitioners had a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy by appealing therefrom to the Chief Executive. In
other words, before filing the present action for certiorari in the court
below, they should have availed of this administrative remedy and

their failure to do so must be deemed fatal to their case [Calo vs.
Fuertes, et al., G.R. No. L-16537, June 29,1962]. To place petitioners'
case beyond the pale of this rule, they must show that their case falls
which it does not within the cases where, in accordance with
our decisions, the aggrieved party need not exhaust administrative
remedies within his reach in the ordinary course of the law [Tapales
vs. The President and the Board of Regents of the U.P., G.R. No. L17532, March 30, 1963; Mangubat vs. Osmena, G.R. No. L- 12837,
April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez, G. R. No. L-11078,
May 27, 1959; Pascual vs. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-11959, Oct.
31, 1959; Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. vs. Secretary of Public Works,
G.R. No. L-15982, May 31, 1963; Alzate vs. Aldaba, G.R. No. L14407, Feb. 29, 1960 and Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L13000, Sept. 25, 1959] (Ganob vs. Ramas, 27 SCRA 1178, April 28,
1969).
III
Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a suit against the
State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot
prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued Kawananakoa
vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art.
XV, 1973 Constitution).
The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant's
timber license, were acting within the scope of their authority.
Petitioner-appellant contends that "this case is not a suit against the
State but an application of a sound principle of law whereby
administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the courts
as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression" (p. 122, CFI
rec.). But, piercing the shard of his contention, We find that petitionerappellant's action is just an attempt to circumvent the rule
establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle
of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its
citizens. The promotion of public welfare and the protection of the
inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights and interest of
the State. Accordingly, "the rule establishing State exeraiption from
suits may not be circumvented by directing the action against the
officers of the State instead of against the State itself. In such cases
the State's immunity may be validly invoked against the action as
long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights,
or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer nominally
made party defendant" (SINCO, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35;
Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724; see also Angat River Irrigation
System vs. Angat River Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-10943-44, Dec.
28, 1957, 102 Phil. 789, 800-802; Mobil PhiL vs. Customs Arrastre
Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125; Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of
Printing Employees' Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341, 343).
Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of the State,
representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental
powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber license.
Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would
result in the government losing a substantial part of its timber
resources. This being the case, petitioner-appellant's action cannot
prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued.
IV
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid,
still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license. As
pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included
in the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of
this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of
Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier
date, when public interests so require" (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A
timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest
or public welfare as in this ceise
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would
be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested

right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin 54 O.G. 7576). In the
case of Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal (56 Phil. 123), it was held
that:
A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not
property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process
of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when public
interests so require.
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or
right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power
(Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898,
Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit
all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs.
Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970).
V
As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to
the authority of the Director of Forestry. The utilization and disposition
of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision of the
Director of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut,
gathered and removed from any forest only upon license from the
Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the
Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the Department Head
or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (See. 79[c],
Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable regulations
in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of
Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of
control of the Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the
power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials
(Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969; Montano vs. Silvosa,
97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellee
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has the authority to
revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of
Forestry. There being supporting evidence, the revocation of

petitioner-appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the power
of the respondent- appellee (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources) and therefore, valid.
Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of
conserving forest resources, as corollary to which the alleged right to
them of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into
and more often than not rejected. We do so again" (Director of
Forestry vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our fidelity to the basic
policy of conserving the national patrimony as ordained by the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER
APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS
AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
SO ORDERED,
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner vs.RUPERTO A.
VILLAREAL, respondent.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of
mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If
they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under
the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they
may be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's
claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove

swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto
Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons,
including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First
Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2
The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not
subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the
private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no
dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the
legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner
claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private
respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before
us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the
Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the
country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural,
mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained
in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it
was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter
expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even
permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This
provision has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the
present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in

force when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to be
alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral
and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless
they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for
alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government,
promulgated
in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglares were defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which
grows various kindred plants which will not live except when watered
by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their
seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove
flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some
extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet
we are of the opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in
which that term is used in the cases cited or in general American
jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for
purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the
law, the custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands
into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along
the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty
constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public
disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so
susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared,
despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of the
public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of
1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this
chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially
indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove
swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court
maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years later it
held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry:
...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish

translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We
think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation
would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means land
with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a
tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or
aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa
swamps does not change the general character of the land from
manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section
1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this
Court said that the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926
means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber
or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the
Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the
public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural
lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa
swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the
Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to
its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court
should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are
agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established by
Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de
Centenera v. Obias,
promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen

years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice
Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
8
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land
covered by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in his
opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of
Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that
mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase
is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based
on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling
was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with Justice
Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in
nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial
court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow,

where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes
and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not
convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in
character. They do not form part of the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan,
the Court, citing Krivenko v.

Register of Deeds, reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public
lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural
public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries
or ordinary farm lands.
10
11
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a
line of decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
12
promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no
jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of
the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,
13
the
Court was more positive when it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be
classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a

'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is
included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that
no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first,
second and third groups are found on the land in question.
Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove
swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the
property had been in actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes
and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest
classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on
mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands
of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do
not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's submission that the
land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land,"
were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided
only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
14
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a

need for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and
for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural
lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to

the legislature, which has the authority to implement the constitutional
provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even
permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The
legislature having made such implementation, the executive officials
may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer our public
lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For
their part, the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by
the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is
claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the executive.
Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue
and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and
utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of
the Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of public
lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from
one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and
disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession
under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same
law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of

the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified,
according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined,
as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the
classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in
a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states
as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of
same. - Upon there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with
the approval of the Department Head, the President of the Philippines
may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and he shall by
proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and the
boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not be
entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for
forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public
forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation
alter or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time,
or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such
forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as though
such proclamation had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. Lands in public forest, not including forest reserves, upon the
certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes
and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall
be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised
within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited
Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature
having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its
decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion.
The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less
noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department.
More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite
conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is
thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our
statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove
swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
That determination having been made and no cogent argument
having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to
apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our
agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands
over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative
Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively
legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly
acquired property right protected by the due process clause. So we
ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute
commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later classified as
timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly
a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor
forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from
1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not
be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership
claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for

registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and
reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the
Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove
swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land is
registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a
plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as
forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is
clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the
premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has
the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for
agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as
agricultural land and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the
public domain that until timber or forest lands are released as
disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau
of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of
these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or
other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose
of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain
while such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and
not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land
cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The
adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the
forest land has been declared alienable and disposable. Possession
of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private
property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in

nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive
possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the
existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the
original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the conditions
for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it
been shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or
registered in the registry of property and that the land has been under
the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for
twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These
matters are not presumed but must be established with definite proof,
which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent

were practically the only basis used by the appellate court in
sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and
much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held
in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his
right to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly,
the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative
definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove
swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the
Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution
and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they
are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural
land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE
and the application for registration of title of private respondent is
DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 88883
January 18, 1991
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs.COURT

OF APPEALS, and LIWAN CONSI, respondents.
Mario C.V. Jalandoni for petitioner.Joy B. Labiaga for private
respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set
aside; (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 13, 1989
in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 13528 entitled "Liwan Consi vs. Hon. Judge
Ruben C. Ayson, et al." declaring that both the petitioner and private
respondent hold possessory titles to the land in question, and (b) the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
*
The facts of the case are as follows:

Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in Tuding,
Itogon, Benguet, was located sometime between December 25, 1930
and December 31, 1930, a period of six (6) days, by A.I. Reynolds in
accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
better known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-called Declaration
of Location. The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim was
duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime on
January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other mineral
claims, was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge Mining Company, the
earlier corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc.
(Atok for short; herein petitioner) in a Deed of Sale executed on
November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok has been in continuous
and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to the
present (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 21).

Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia
mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim together with other mineral
claims owned by Atok has been declared under Tax Declaration No.
9535 and that in view of Presidential Decree No. 1214 an application
for lease was filed by Atok covering the Fredia mineral claim (Rollo,
Ibid., p. 22).
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a lot below
the land of a certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He
constructed a house thereon sometime in 1964. The lot is covered by
Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first constructed his house below
the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that it was not necessary for him to
obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one
prohibited him from entering the land so he was constructing a house
thereon. It was only in January 1984 when private respondent Consi
repaired the said house that people came to take pictures and told
him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi has been
paying taxes on said land which his father before him had occupied
(Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed Feliciano
Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that a construction was being
undertaken at the area of the Fredia mineral claim by private
respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier to go
and take pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and
other security guards went to the place of the construction to verify
and then to the police to report the matter (Rollo, Ibid.).
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and
detainer against Liwan Consi (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 32).
On January 29, 1987, after due hearing, the Municipal Trial Court of
Itogon, presided over by Judge Irving rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this case against Liwan Consi is hereby ordered
dismissed. (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 20).
Petitioner ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baguio and Benguet, Branch VI, presided over by Judge

Ruben Ayson (Rollo, Petition, p. 3). On December 5, 1987, the RTC
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Itogon dated January 29, 1987 appealed from
is hereby reversed and set aside and a new one entered in its place
ordering the defendant Liwan Consi and all those claiming under him
to vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral claim at Tuding, Itogon,
Benguet immediately, and to restore possession thereof to the
plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The defendant, Liwan Consi, is further ordered to remove and
demolish his house constructed in the premises of the land of Fredia
mineral claim at Tuding, Benguet, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30).
From said decision, Liwan Consi filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review (Rollo, Petition, p. 4). On March 13, 1989, the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the subject
forcible entry action. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "C" p. 48).
The Court of Appeals further ruled in part to wit:
The determination of whether the subject lot is mineral land or
agricultural awaits the decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources
in a proceeding called for that purpose. Thus, there is a chance that
the subject property may be classified as alienable agricultural land.
At any rate, the mining company may not so readily describe Liwan
Consi as a "squatter" he also has possessory rights over the property.
Such rights may mature into ownership on the basis of long-term
possession under the Public Land Law,
Thus it is Our holding, that both Consi and ATOK are of equal legal
footing with regards the subject lot. Both hold possessory titles to the
land in question the petitioner through his long term occupancy of

the same; the respondent mining firm by virtue of its being the claim
locator and applicant for a lease on the mineral claim within which the
subject lot is found. But it was established that the petitioner has
been in actual and beneficial possession of the subject lot since
before the Second World War in the concept of owner and in good
faith. (Rollo, Annex "C", pp. 47-48).
On June 16, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner ATOK (Rollo, Annex "D", p. 50).
Hence, the petition.
The main issue in this case is whether or not an individual's long term
occupation of land of the public domain vests him with such rights
over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim.
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a
patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corporation case, for all
physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a
patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws;
his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as
good as though secured by patent (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160
SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the petitioner
Atok has faithfully complied with all the requirements of the law
regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral
land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public
domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of any further act
such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it.
As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had
the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok (Ibid.).
As in the instant petition, the record shows that the lot in question
was acquired through a Deed of Sale executed between Atok and
Fredia Mineral Claim.

The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor
upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Where there is a valid location of mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public and the property of the locator. When a
location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by
the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession,
with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as
well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as
limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While
a lode locator acquires a vested right by virtue of his location made in
compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government
until patent issues. (St. Louis Mining & Mineral Co. v. Montana Mining
Co., 171 U.S. 605, 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322)
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to
the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims
which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural
lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The
land was not and could not have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be
shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for
agricultural and mineral purposes (Ibid).
On the matter of possession, private respondent contends that his
predecessor-in-interest has been in possession of said lot even
before the war and has in fact cultivated the same.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 288 1988, this
Court held:
. . . even if it be assumed that the predecessor-in-interest of the de la
Rosas had already been in possession of the subject property, their
possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of
the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was
mineral land, and they are claiming it as agricultural land. They were
not disputing the rights of the mining locators nor where they seeking
to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. . .
.
Since the subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's possession
of the subject lot no matter how long did not confer upon him
possessory rights over the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time
in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession.
Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present
possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one
longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the
one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the
thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in
continuous and exclusive possession of the Fredia mineral claim
while private respondent's possession started only sometime in 1964
when he constructed a house thereon. Clearly, ATOK has superior
possessory rights than private respondent, Liwan Consi, the former
being "the one longer in possession."
It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it was really
petitioner who was in actual physical possession of the property.
Having been deprived of this possession by the private respondent,
petitioner has every right to sue for ejFectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be declared
and held that petitioner Atok has the exclusive right to the property in
question.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED and the
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 13, 1989 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio and Benguet dated June 16, 1989 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.Sarmiento, J.,
took no part
[G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997]
SPOUSES IGNACIO PALOMO and TRINIDAD

PASCUAL, and CARMEN PALOMO VDA.
DE BUENAVENTURA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
FAUSTINO
J.
PERFECTO,
RAFFY
SANTILLAN, BOY ARIADO, LORENZO
BROCALES, SALVADOR DOE, and other
DOES, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15

parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay which form part of the "Tiwi Hot
Spring National Park." The facts of the case are as follows.
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the
Philippine Islands, William Cameron Forbes issued
Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park
purposes some 440,530 square meters of land situated in
Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay pursuant
to the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine Commission.[1]
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay,
15th Judicial District, United States of America, ordered the
registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order
No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on December 9, 1916;

[2] December 28, 1916;[3] and January 17, 1917.[4] Diego
Palomo donated these parcels of land consisting of 74,872
square meters which were allegedly covered by Original
Certificates of Title Nos. 513, 169, 176 and 173[5] to his
heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two
months before his death in April 1937.[6]
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title
were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo
filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First
Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950.[7] The Register of Deeds
of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912,
3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.[8]
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by
Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National
Park," under the control, management, protection and
administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and
Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain and, therefore, is
neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the
Public Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496).
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the
property, paid real estate taxes thereon[9] and introduced
improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and
coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de
Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad
Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a loan of P200,000
from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura
and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual filed Civil

Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First Instance of
Albay for Injunction with damages against private
respondents Faustino J. Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy
Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does
who are all employees of the Bureau of Forest Development
who entered the land covered by TCT No. 3913 and/or TCT
3914 and cut down bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less
than 4 groves worth not less than P2,000.00.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines
filed Civil Case No. T-176 for annulment and cancellation of
Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land registered
in the name of the petitioners and subject of Civil Case T143. Impleaded with the petitioners as defendants were the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi Branch and the
Register of Deeds of Albay.
The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was
dismissed because the loan of P200,000 with the Bank was
already paid and the mortgage in its favor cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted
upon agreement of the parties and on July 31, 1986, the trial
court rendered the following decision:
"WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,judgmentishereby
rendered:
INCIVILCASENo.T143,infavorofthedefendantsandagainst
theplaintiffs,dismissingthecomplaintforinjunctionanddamages,
asitisherebyDISMISSED.
Costsagainsttheplaintiffs.
InCIVILCASENo.T176,infavoroftheplaintiffsandagainst
thedefendants:
(1)DeclaringnullandvoidandnoforceandeffecttheOrderdated
September14,1953,aswellastheOriginalCertificateofTitles
Nos.153,[10]169,173and176andTransferCertificatesofTitles
Nos.3911,T3912,T3913,andT3914,alloftheRegisterof
DeedsofAlbayandalltransactionsbasedonsaidtitles.
(2)ForfeitinginfavoroftheplaintiffGovernmentanyandall
improvementsonthelandsinquestionthatarefoundthereinand
introducedbythedefendants;
(3)DeclaringLotNos.1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11and12,Plan
II9299andLots1,21,[11]3and4ofPlanII9205aspartofthe
TiwiHotSpringNationalPark;
(4)andFinally,theRegisterofDeedsofAlbayisherebyordered
tocanceltheallegedOriginalCertificatesofTitlesNos.513,169,
173and176,TransferCertificatesofTitleNos.T3911,T3912,
T3913andT3914.
Costsagainstthedefendants.
SoOrdered."[12]
The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no
sufficient proof that the Palomos have established property
rights over the parcels of land in question before the Treaty
of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end
of the century. The court further stated that assuming that
the decrees of the Court of First Instance of Albay were
really issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the
Properties because these were issued only when Executive
Order No. 40 was already in force. At this point, we take note
that although the Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands
appointed as one of the Commissioners in the relocation
survey of the properties stated in his reamended report that
of the 3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205,

only 1,976 square meters fall within the reservation area, [13]
the RTC ordered TCT 3913 covering the entire Lot 21 (sic)
Plan II-9205 cancelled.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the findings of the lower Court; hence this
petition raising the following issues:
1.TherespondentCourtofAppealscommittedgraveabuseof
discretioninaffirmingintotothedecisionofthelowercourt.
2.Thedeclarationofnullityoftheoriginalcertificatesoftitleand
subsequenttransfercertificatesoftitlesofthepetitionersoverthe
propertiesinquestioniscontrarytolawandjurisprudenceonthe
matter.
3.Theforfeitureofallimprovementsintroducedbythepetitioners
inthepremisesinfavorofthegovernmentisagainstourexisting
lawandjurisprudence.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not
the alleged original certificate of titles issued pursuant to the
order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and the
subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for
reconstitution are valid.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended
the Spanish-American War at the end of the 19th century
recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino
citizens and the American government had no inherent
power to confiscate properties of private citizens and declare
them part of any kind of government reservation. They allege
that their predecessors in interest have been in open,
adverse and continuous possession of the subject lands for
20-50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917. Hence,
the reservation of the lands for provincial purposes in 1913

by then Governor-general Forbes was tantamount to
deprivation of private property without due process of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies
of a number of decisions of the Court of First Instance of
Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America
which state that the predecessors in interest of the
petitioners' father Diego Palomo, were in continuous, open
and adverse possession of the lands from 20 to 50 years at
the time of their registration in 1916.
We are not convinced.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by
discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the
Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether
agricultural, mineral or forest were under the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence,
private ownership of land could only be acquired through
royal concessions which were documented in various forms,
such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concession
Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by
Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory
Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law
or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the
petitioners' predecessors in interest derived title from an old
Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the
declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record Decision
No. 9820, dated January 17, 1917; Expediente No. 6,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821, dated December 28, 1916;
Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9822, dated
December 9, 1916; Expediente No. 8, G.L.R.O. Record No.
9823, dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the
Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the

United States of America presided by Judge Isidro Paredes
that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and
continuous possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years.
[14] The aforesaid "decisions" of the Court of First Instance,
however, were not signed by the judge but were merely
certified copies of notification to Diego Palomo bearing the
signature of the clerk of court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their
predecessors in interest were in open , adverse and
continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior
to their registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed
only in December 1913, the very same year they were
acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February 1913 or
10 months before the lands were surveyed for Diego
Palomo, the government had already surveyed the area in
preparation for its reservation for provincial park purposes. If
the petitioners' predecessors in interest were indeed in
possession of the lands for a number of years prior to their
registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly
known about the inclusion of these properties in the
reservation in 1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this point to
argue that the government had no right to include these
properties in the reservation when the question should have
been raised 83 years ago.
As regards the petitioners' contention that inasmuch as
they obtained the titles without government opposition, the
government is now estopped from questioning the validity of
the certificates of title which were granted. As correctly
pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle
of estoppel does not operate against the Government for the
act of its agents. [15]
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance
were really issued, the lands are still not capable of

appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases
applies only to alienable lands of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar
were not alienable lands of the public domain. As testified by
the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry show
that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and
disposable and subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up
to the present.[16] Moreover, as part of the reservation for
provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources
that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot convert it into private property,[17] unless such lands
are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in
evidence prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch
as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.[18]
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now
come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of improvements
introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that
Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the
lands in question were surveyed for Diego Palomo.
Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands were
covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for
reconstitution of the lost original certificates of title inasmuch
as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of
Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office Enrique Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of
the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of Lands
dated September 11, 1948[19] contains the following note, "in
conflict with provincial reservation."[20] In any case,

petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of
the government to oppose the registration of the lands in
question is no justification for the petitioners to plead good
faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square
meters covered by TCT 3913 fall within the reservation, TCT
3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid
area. Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913
and subject of Civil Case T-143,[21] were within the perimeter
of the national park,[22] no pronouncement as to damages is
in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that TCT 3913 be
annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area falling
within the reservation zone.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29675
September 30, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE

PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, JUDGE, Court of First Instance of Baguio City,
KOSEN PIRASO, SAMAY PIRASO, COTILENG PIRASO, PETER PARAN and
MARTINA PIRASO, DAISY PACNOS, SPOUSES ALBINO REYES and ISABEL
SANTAMARIA, and ARTURO TONGSON, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor

General Frine' C. Zaballero, Solicitor Rosalio A. De Leon and Major
Santiago O. Tomelden (Staff Judge Advocate, PMA) for petitioner.
Crisologo Law Office for respondent Arturo Tongson.
Raul L. Correa and Francisco Ventura for respondents spouses Albino
Reyes and Isabel Santamaria.
Luis R. Gaduang for respondents Kosen Piraso, et al.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is by statute provided that all persons "claiming title to parcels of

land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings" in actual
possession of the same at the time of the survey but unable for some
justifiable reason to file their claim in the proper court during the time,
limit established by law, "in case such parcels of land on account of
their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared
land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings" instituted
within the forty-year period next preceding June 20, 1953, the time of
the approval of this particular enactment, are granted "the right within
five years" from said date to petition for a reopening of the judicial
proceedings but "only with respect to such of said parcels of land as
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise
provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government, ... ." 1
The jurisdiction of respondent Judge Pio R. Marcos to act in accordance

with Republic Act No. 931 in connection with the petition for a
reopening filed by respondent Kosen Piraso, joined by his kinsmen,
likewise respondents, all surnamed Piraso, is assailed in this certiorari
and prohibition proceeding, included in which are the other
respondents, Daisy Pacnos and the spouses Albino Reyes and Isabel
Santamaria, petitioners being the Republic of the Philippines and the
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy.
In the language of the petition: "This is an original action for the

issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court whereby herein petitioners seek to annul and
set aside: (1) The Order, dated July 13, 1967 ... denying the Motion to
Dismiss dated January 26, 1967 filed by the City Fiscal of Baguio City in
behalf of oppositors-government agencies, and thus insisting on
assuming jurisdiction over the case (without the requisite publication in
the Official Gazette of the petition) and over the subject matter (a
military reservation); (2) The Decision, dated October 7, 1967 ...
decreeing the registration of a parcel of land with an area of 28,215.58
square meters ... within the so-called 'U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation
Center' in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos; (3) The Order of August 2,
1968 ... which in effect denied the Motion to Annul Decision dated
February 9, 1968 filed by the Solicitor General, and instead ordered the
issuance of a decree over the same parcel of land in favor of
respondent Albino Reyes; ... and (4) The Order, dated August 24,
1968 ... allowing respondents Kosen Piraso, et al. to adduce their
evidence of alleged ownership ..., all issued in Civil Reservation Case
No. 1, LRC Record No. 211 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City,
entitled 'In the Matter of the Petition for Reopening of Judicial
Proceedings, Kosen Piraso, et al., petitioners'." 2
It was likewise therein alleged that Civil Reservation Case No. 1

"settled the ownership, private and public, of the Baguio townsite,
terminating with the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
City dated November 13, 1922." 3 Prior to said case, however, a
military reservation known as the U.S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center
consisting of Lots 140 and 141 of the Baguio Cadastre with an
aggregate area of 29 hectares, more or less, was set aside pursuant to
Executive Order No. 1254 of October 10, 1910, issued by the then
President William Howard Taft of the United States, as attested by
Proclamation No. 114 of the then Governor-General W. Cameron
Forbes, and Executive Order No. 5139 of June 19, 1929, issued by the
then President Herbert Hoover, as attested by Proclamation No. 260 of
the then Governor-General Dwight F. Davis. After independence, the

United States relinquished to the Republic of the Philippines all claims
to title over the military bases including the aforesaid lots, their
relinquishment being formalized by an agreement of December 6,
1956. 4 Then came this categorical assertion in the petition that the
land involved in this proceeding "is limited to what is admittedly, and
by unquestionable proof, within the so-called U.S. Fleet Naval
Rehabilitation Center, Lots 140 and 141, Baguio Cadastre." 5
From a summary of the facts appearing in the Petition, the need for
including the other respondents was made clear. It was therein set
forth that on May 21, 1965 the Pirasos, respondents herein, relying on
the controlling statute set forth at the opening of this opinion, sought
the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Rec. No. 211 of the
Court of First Instance of Baguio City, praying for the issuance in their
favor of title to a parcel of land designated as LRC-SWO-6132 (Lots 140
and 141, Baguio Cadastre) consisting of 290,283 square meters, more
or less, situated in Baguio City. On September 11, 1965, respondent
Daisy Pacnos filed an opposition. She sought in a pleading dated March
14, 1966 to be allowed to introduce evidence to prove her alleged right
to registration of a portion of the land, consisting of an area of
28,215.52 square meters, subject of the proceedings. This motion was
granted in an order of the respondent Judge dated May 16, 1966.
On January 26, 1967, the First Assistant City Fiscal of Baguio City, in
behalf of all the government agencies oppositors, filed a motion to
dismiss the main petition and other related petitions, alleging thereto
the following grounds: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition; (2) that the causes of action alleged in
the petition are barred by prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations; (3) that the petition states no cause of action.
On July 13, 1967, the respondent Judge denied the said motion to
dismiss. Then came on October 7, 1967, a decision by respondent
Judge, decreeing the registration of a portion of the land (28,215.58
square meters of Lot 140, Baguio Cadastre), subject matter of the
Pirasos' petition in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos. The Solicitor
General received his copy of this decision on December 4,
1967.1awphl.nt
There was a motion for reconsideration filed by the City Attorney of

Baguio of December 9, 1967, denied by respondent Judge on
December 15, as "having been filed out of time."
On January 3, 1968, the City Fiscal of Baguio City joined by petitioner

Superintendent of the Military Academy and the Director of Lands
jointly filed a notice of appeal. There was on February 7, 1968, an ex
parte motion for extension of time to submit a record on appeal. An
opposition thereto was filed by counsel for respondent Daisy Pacnos.
On February 15, 1968, the Solicitor General filed a motion to annul the
decision dated October 7, 1967, based on lack of jurisdiction.
On August 2, 1968, respondent Albino Reyes filed an ex parte motion

for the issuance of a decree in his favor, having previously manifested
to respondent Judge that respondent Daisy Pacnos had transferred her
right to him. On the same day, respondent Judge issued an order
considering that the motions for reconsideration and the motion to
annul decision filed by the Solicitor General and other government
lawyers "have been rendered academic and of no moment on account
of the filing of the notice of appeal on January 3, 1968," but in his
opinion of no avail the time to do so having lapsed. Moreover, no
record on appeal was submitted. He likewise directed in said order the
issuance of a decree to respondent "Albino Reyes, married to Isabel
Sta. Maria, Filipino, with residence at Dagupan City." Another order
specifically to that effect came from respondent Judge on the day in
question. The last order of pertinence to this petition came from
respondent Judge on August 24, 1968, setting for hearing on
September 11, 1968 the claim of the respondents, surnamed Piraso.
Then on October 18, 1968 came this petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring
respondents to file within ten days from notice an answer, not a motion
to dismiss. A preliminary injunction was likewise issued without bond.
Subsequently, on November 8, 1968, the petitioners, through the

Solicitor General, filed a motion for leave to amend the petition,
alleging that the property, "subject matter of the case which
respondent Daisy Pacnos succeeded in obtaining a favorable judgment
of registration ... and which respondents Albino Reyes and Isabel
Santamaria subsequently succeeded in securing a decree of
registration" was thereafter transferred on August 16, 1968 to one

Arturo Tongson, who, thereby, would be affected by the outcome of the
petition. The proposed amendment, according to this motion, would
consist of his inclusion as one of the respondents. Accompanying his
pleading is the amended petition for certiorari and prohibition. On
November 21, 1968, we adopted a resolution in the following tenor:
"The motion of the Solicitor General for leave to amend petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in L-29675
(Republic of the Philippines, et al. vs Hon. Pio R. Marcos, etc., et al.), is
[Granted]; the amended petition for certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for preliminary injunction is hereby accepted. Respondent
Arturo Tongson is required to file, within 10 days from notice hereof, an
answer (not a motion to dismiss) to said amended petition."
In the meanwhile, even before the motion for leave to file amended
petition was filed, respondents, the Pirasos, submitted their answer on
November 4, 1968. To the assertion in the petition, fundamental in
character, that the reopening sought by private respondents refers to
lands "admittedly and by unquestionable proof, within the so-called
U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation Center," the Pirasos answered in this wise:
"The land in question is not a military reservation under the Republic of
the Philippines although it was formerly reserved and placed under the
control of the Navy Department for the use as Naval Hospital and for
other purposes of the Navy during the American regime (U.S.
Government) pursuant to Executive Order No. 5139 (Annex "B" of the
petition), and was subsequently released or turned over to the
Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the
U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement on Dec. 6, 1956 but the same
has not been reserved for military purposes by the Republic of the
Philippines." 6 They would hedge further by the disclaimer of any
acceptance on their part that the land subject of the petition forms
part of the naval reservation, with the further qualification that in any
event, even if it be admitted that there is such a reservation by the
government, such lot is subject to private rights.
That respondents Pirasos could not very well explicitly deny the
allegation that the lot in question forms part of the naval reservation is
quite apparent from its memorandum submitted in lieu of oral
argument filed on April 7, 1969, wherein in disputing the point raised
by petitioners that the lower court acted without jurisdiction, they
stated the following: "Contrary to the allegation of the City Attorney,
we humbly state categorically that the land involved in this case is no
longer a reservation in its strict sense. It ceased to be a Naval
Reservation of the United States of America upon the termination of its

sovereignty over the islands. It was formerly reserved and placed
under the control of the U.S. Naval Department for the use of Naval
Hospital and for other purposes of the Navy during the American
Regime (U.S. Government) pursuant to Executive Order No. 5139
(Annex "B" of the petition), and was subsequently released or turned
over to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the
provisions of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement on
December 6, 1956. The said parcel of land (Lot 140 of the Baguio City
Cadastre) until this time was not reserved for military purposes by the
Republic of the Philippines." 7
The answer of respondents, Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria, to the

amended petition filed on November 21, 1968, expressly admits what
petitioners so emphatically insist on that this petition before us "is
limited to what is admittedly, and by unquestionable proof, within the
so-called U.S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center, Lots 140 and 141,
Baguio Cadastre." 8 For the first paragraph of their answer is explicitly
worded thus: "1. That they admit the allegations of the Petition with
respect to the Nature of the Case ... and with respect to the Parties and
Jurisdictional Averments ... ." 9 The above assertion of the petitioner
was thus given conformity by respondents Reyes and Santamaria.
Nonetheless, they would seek to blunt the force of their admission by
alleging: "That they deny the allegations in par. V-A-1 of the Petition,
the truth being that the land in question, particularly the area decreed
in the name of the answering respondents, is not part of a military
reservation. The proclamation declaring certain areas to be naval
reservations of the Government of the United States (Annex B of the
Petition) expressly states that such reservations are "subject to private
rights if any there be." Upon the Philippines' becoming independent in
1946 the said areas, by virtue of Executive Agreements, reverted to
disposable lands administered by the Bureau of Lands of the Republic
of the Philippines." 10
There is a similar express admission in the answer filed on December

13, 1968 by respondent Arturo Tongson, its wording being almost
identical with the answer of Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria: "That
in so far as they are borne out by and made part of the records of the
case, he admits the allegations of the Petition with respect to the
nature of the case ... and with respect to the Parties and Jurisdictional
Averments ... ." 11 Again, this particular respondent did attempt to
weaken the force of the above admission by the assertion that the land
decreed in favor of respondent Albino Reyes is not part of the military
reservation. He would justify this seeming contradiction thus: "At any

rate, when said areas were turned over to the Philippine Government
by virtue of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement, the land in
question reverted to the disposable lands administered by the Bureau
of Lands of the Republic of the Philippines." 12
In the light of the allegation in the petition and the admissions made in
the answers of respondents, the Pirasos, Albino Reyes and Isabel
Santamaria as well as Arturo Tongson, even as sought to be qualified, it
would seem to be fairly obvious that the lots in question sought to be
reopened in the proceeding before respondent Judge Marcos form part
and parcel of a naval reservation. It cannot escape attention that the
above private respondents did try by highly sophistical reasoning,
invoking distinctions far from persuasive, to avoid the legal effect of
the admissions as to the location of the disputed lots within a
reservation. They must have realized that unless successful in this
attempt, doomed by failure from the outset, the facts being simply
against them, the jurisdiction of respondent Court can, as petitioners
have done, be successfully impugned. That is what petitioners did;
they must be sustained.
1. Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. It is

quite explicit and categorical. Only persons "claiming title to parcels of
land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings" are granted
the right to petition for a reopening thereof if the other conditions
named therein are successfully met. It cannot admit of doubt,
therefore, that if the parcels of land were not the object of cadastral
proceedings, then this statute finds no application. Considering that as
far back as October 10, 1910, the then President of the United States,
William H. Taft, issued an executive order reserving for naval purposes
the lots now disputed, they could not have been the object of the
cadastral proceeding involving the Baguio townsite reservation,
decided only on November 13, 1922. 13
The Cadastral Act 14 was enacted on February 11, 1913, taking effect
on its passage. As is made clear in the first section thereof, when
public interest requires that titles to any land be settled and
adjudicated, in the opinion of the then executive, the Governor
General, he could order the Director of Lands or a private surveyor
named by the landowners, with the approval of the Director of Lands,
to make a survey and plan of such lands. 15 Clearly, it does not include
the survey of lands declared as reservations.
An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903, 16 specifically governs the

subject matter of reservations. As provided therein: "All lands or
buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying
within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and
declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under
the operations of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands,
buildings, and interests therein as shall not be determined to be public
lands shall become registered land in accordance with the provisions of
said Land Registration Act, under the circumstances hereinafter
stated." The validity of this statute was sustained as against the
allegation that there was a violation of the due process clause, in a
1910 decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron. 17
In a 1918 decision, this Court had occasion to indicate clearly that the
proceeding under this statute, while analogous too, is not covered by
the Cadastral Act. Thus: "It will thus be seen that Act No. 627
contemplates a sort of cadastral proceeding wherein private owners
may be forced to come in and register their titles, under penalty of
forfeiture of all right in the land included in the reservation in case they
fail to act. The validity of a law of this character cannot be questioned;
and this court has uniformly upheld the Act now under consideration."
18
What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the

part of the private respondents to seek a reopening under Republic Act
No. 931 is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, a 1926 decision.19 We there explicitly held: "The
defendant's contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral case,
has jurisdiction to order the registration of portions of a legally
established military reservation cannot be sustained. The
establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of
the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that 'All
lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands
lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and
the operations of the Land Registration Act, ... .' "
The conclusion is therefore inescapable that, as contended by

petitioners, respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction to pass upon the
claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act No.

931.
2. This lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge is made

more patent by another specific restriction of the right of a person to
seek reopening under this statute. For the power of the Court to order
such reopening is limited "to such of said parcels of land as have not
been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally or
permanently disposed of by the Government ... ." 20 Included in the
petition is an executive order of the then President Herbert Hoover of
June 19, 1929, declaring to be a naval reservation of the Government
of the United States "that tract of land known as lot no. 141, residence
Section D, Baguio naval reservation, heretofore reserved for naval
purposes ... ." If there were still any lingering doubt, that ought to be
removed by this reaffirmation of a presidential determination, then
binding and conclusive as we were under American sovereignty, that
the lot in question should be a naval reservation.
3. The private respondents are thus bereft of any right which they
could assert under Republic Act No. 931. Such an enactment is the
basis of whatever standing that would justify their reliance on the
specific power granted courts of first instance to reopen cadastral
proceedings. Such jurisdiction is thus limited and specific. Unless a
party can make it manifest by express language or a clear implication
from the wording of the statute too strong to be resisted, he may not
set in motion the judicial machinery under such specific grant of
authority. This, private respondents have failed to do as the statute in
terms that are crystal clear and free from ambiguity denies them such
a right. Petitioners have made out their case for certiorari and
prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting

aside the order of respondent Judge of July 13, 1967, denying the
motion to dismiss dated January 26, 1967 filed by the City Fiscal of
Baguio City in behalf of oppositors-government agencies; his decision
dated October 7, 1967, decreeing the registration of a parcel of land
with an area of 28,215.58 square meters within Lot 140, Baguio
Cadastre, or within the so-called "U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation Center"
in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos; his order of August 2, 1968 which
in effect denied the motion to annul decision dated February 9, 1968
filed by the Solicitor General, and instead ordered the issuance of a
decree over the same parcel of land in favor of respondent Albino
Reyes; and his order, dated August 24, 1968 allowing respondents
Kosen Piraso, et al, to adduce their evidence of alleged ownership. The
writ of prohibition is likewise granted perpetually restraining
respondent Judge from further taking cognizance of and further
assuming jurisdiction over the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No.
1 LRC Rec. No. 211 as sought by the private respondents. The
preliminary injunction issued is hereby made permanent. With costs
against private respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,

Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.MELITONA ALAGAD, SPOUSES
CARMEN ALAGAD AND ESPIRIDION KOLIMLIM, JUSTO
ALAGAD, CARLOS ALAGAD, SPOUSES LIBRADA ALAGAD AND
EMERSON ABANO, DEMETRIO ALAGAD, ANTONIO ALAGAD,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, and the INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Civil Cases Division), respondents.
Alberto, Salazar & Associates for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Republic appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming two orders of the defunct Court of First Instance of Laguna 2

dismissing its petition for "annulment of title and reversion. 3 The facts
appear in the decision appealed from:
On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for

registration of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila,
Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan

Psu-116971, which was amended after the land was divided into two
parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with
an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-226971,
amd. 2.
The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground
that applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession
of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona
fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not
ceased to be a part of the public domain. It appears that barrio folk
also opposed the application. (LRC Case No. 189. G.L.R.O. Rec. No.
4922 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna).
By virtue of a final judgment in said case, promulgated January 16,
1956, supplemented by orders issued on March 21, 1956 and August
13, 1956, defendants were declared owners of Lot 1 and the
remaining portion, or Lot 2, was declared public land. Decree No. N51479 was entered and Original Certificate of Title No. 0- 40 1, dated
October 18, 1956, was issued in the names of defendants.
In August, 1966, Civil Case No. 52 of the Municipal Court of Pila,
Laguna, was filed by defendants to evict the barrio folk occupying
portions of Lot 1. On August 8, 1968, judgment was rendered in the
eviction case ordering the defendants therein to return possession of
the premises to herein defendants, as plaintiffs therein. The
defendants therein did not appeal.
The foregoing anterior proceedings triggered the filing of the instant
case. On October 6, 1970, as prayed for in the complaint, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of
Laguna or his deputies from enforcing the writ of execution issued in
Civil Case No. 52, and the defendants from selling, mortgaging,
disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the
area.
This case was set for pre-trial on July 6, 1971. Despite notice of the
pre-trial, Atty. Alejandro A. Ponferada, Special Attorney, Bureau of
Lands, representing plaintiff Republic, did not appear. On July 16,
1971, the court a quo dismissed the complaint. The Republic filed a
motion for reconsideration, was set for hearing, and finally denied by
the court a quo, hence, this appeal.
Plaintiff filed its record on appeal on March 13, 1972. It appears that
the appeal was dismissed by this Court for failure to show in the
record on appeal that the appeal was perfected on time. Plaintiff went
to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on the action of this
Court. On November 19, 1982, the Supreme Court set aside the
dismissal resolution of this Court and ordered Us to reinstate and give
due course to plaintiffs appeal. 4
In commencing proceedings below, the Republic claims that the
decree and title [rendered and issued in LRC Case No. 189, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. L-4922] insofar as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion on
end of Lot 1, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, is concerned, are void ab initio, 5
for the following reasons:
(a) That said l.42 hectare northwestern portion or end of Lot l, Psu116971, Amd. 2, like the adjoining Lot 2 of the same survey plan
containing 2.8421 hectares, had since time immemorial, been
foreshore land reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de
Bay (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia, L-20950, May 31, 1965; Antonio
Dizon, et al., vs. Juan de G. Rodriguez, et al., L-20355- 56, April 30,
1965);
(b) That moreover said 1.42 hectare portion is actually now the site of
Barrio Aplaya, formerly a sitio of Linga, Pila, Laguna, having been
occupied by the barrio people since the American occupation of the
country in the early 1900's where they established their houses;
(c) That the barrio people of Aplaya thru the years since the early
1900's have filled up and elevated the land to its present condition of
being some feet above the level of the adjoining Lot 2 of plan Psu116971 and the rest of Lot 1 of the same survey plan so much so that
this barrio site of Aplaya where there are now sixty-eight (68) houses
occupied by more than one hundred (100) families is no longer
reached and covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay; and
(d) That were it not for the fillings made by the barrio people, the land
in question would not have been fit for human habitation, so much so
that defendants and their predecessors-in-interest could not have
acquired an imperfect title to the property which could be judicially

confirmed in a registration case, as in fact said defendants and their
predecessors-in-interest have never been in actual possession of the
land in question, the actual occupants thereof being the barrio people
of Aplaya; 6
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that under
Section 20, of Rule 20, of the Rules of Court, dismissal was proper
upon failure of the Republic to appear for pre-trial. It likewise ruled
that the judgment, dated January 16, 1956, in the said LRC No. 189
has long become final, titles to the properties had been issued (in
favor of the private respondents), and that res judicata, consequently,
was a bar.
In its petition, the Republic assails the decision insofar as it sustained
the lower court: (1) in dismissing the petition for failure of the
Republic to appear for pre-trial; and (2) in holding that res judicata is
an obstacle to the suit.
I.
With respect to the first question, we hold that the Court of Appeals
has been guilty of grave abuse of discretion. It is well-established that
the State cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or
negligent acts of its official or agents, 7 much more, non-suited as a
result thereof.
This is so because:
... [T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity, which is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land under the basic
doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the present
charter. It is charged moreover with the conservation of such
patrimony. There is need therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny
before private claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded
recognition, especially so where the matter is sought to be raked up
anew after almost fifty years. Such primordial consideration, not the
apparent carelessness, much less the acquiescense of public
officials, is the controlling norm . . . 8
The cases of Ramos v. Centra l Bank of the Philippines
and Nilo v.
Romero, 10 cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its decision, are not
applicable. In Ramos, we applied estoppel upon finding of bad faith on the
part of the State (the Central Bank) in deliberately reneging on its
promises. In Nilo, we denied efforts to impugn the jurisdiction of the court
on the ground that the defendant had been "erroneously' represented in
the complaint by the City Attorney when it should have been the City
Mayor, on a holding that the City Attorney, in any event, could have ably
defended the City (Davao City). In both cases, it is seen that the acts that
gave rise to estoppel were voluntary and intentional in character, in which
cases, it could not be said that the Government had been prejudiced by
some negligent act or omission.
There is no merit either, in claims that res judicata is an impediment

to reversion of property. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 11 this Court
stated:
... [a] certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic v Animas,

et al., . supra), and the cancellation may be pursued through an
ordinary action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the prior
judgment of the land registration court, since the said court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such
jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. For it is a
well-settled rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a
subsequent case, the following requisites must concur; (1) it must be
a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be
a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and
identity of cause of action (Municipality of Daet vs. CA, 93 SCRA 503;
Mendoza vs. Arrieta, et al., 91 SCRA 113)... 12
In the case at bar, if the parcel registered in the names of the private
respondents were foreshore land, the land registration court could not
have validly awarded title thereto. It would have been without the
authority to do so. The fact that the Bureau of Lands had failed to
appeal from the decree of registration could not have validated the
court's decision, rendered without jurisdiction.
II.
"Property, according to the Civil Code, is either of public dominion or
of private ownership ." 13 Property is of public dominion if it is:

(1) ... intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads and others of similar character; 14 or if it:
(2) . . . belong[s] to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth. 15
All other property of the State, it is provided further, which is not of the
character mentioned in ... article [4201, is patrimonial property, 16 meaning
to say, property 'open to disposition 17 by the Government, or otherwise,
property pertaining to the national domain, or public lands. 18 Property of
the public dominion, on the other hand, refers to things held by the State
by regalian right. They are things res publicae in nature and hence,
incapable of private appropriation. Thus, under the present Constitution,
[w]ith the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated.' 19
Specifically:
ART. 502. The following are of public dominion:

(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in
their natural beds and the beds themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public
dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands, and their
beds;
(5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds, which are also
of public dominion;
(6) Subterranean waters on public lands;
(7) Waters found within the zone of operation of public works, even if
constructed by a contractor;
(8) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands belonging to

private persons, to the State, to a province, or to a city or municipality
from the moment they leave such lands;
(9) The waste waters of fountains, sewers and public establishments.
20
So also is it ordained by the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3,

1866:
Art. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands and fed
by public waters, belong to the public domain.
Lakes, ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of private
individuals, or the State or provinces, belong to the respective owners
of such lands, and those situated upon lands of communal use
belong to their respective pueblos.21
Assuming, therefore, for purposes of this petition, that the lands
subject of the Republic's reversion efforts are foreshore in nature, the
Republic has legitimate reason to demand reconveyance. In that
case, res judicata or estoppel is no defense. 22
Of course, whether or not the properties in question are, indeed,
foreshore lands is the core of controversy. According to the trial court,
the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, 23 and hence, available
disposition and registration. As we have pointed out, the Government holds
otherwise, and that as foreshore laud, it is not registerable.
The question, so it follows, is one of fact: Is the parcel foreshore or is

it part and parcel of the public domain?
Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake . 24 Thus:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth;
it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and
is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to the
definition just quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake. 25
And, "[i]nasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, so Colegio de San
Jose further tells us, "we must resort to the legal provisions governing
the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to
determine the character and ownership of the parcels of land in
question. 26 The recourse to legal provisions is necessary, for under Article
74 of the Law of Waters, [T]he natural bed or basin of lakes ... is the
ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth. 27 and
in which case, it forms part of the national dominion. When Laguna de
Bay's waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been defined as:
... the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry
season, such depth being the regular, common, natural, which occurs
always or most of the time during the year . . . 28
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the extraordinary
action of nature, rainfall for instance, the portions inundated thereby
are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in
question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore land but land
outside of the public dominion, and land capable of registration as
private property.
A foreshore land, on the other hand, has been defined as follows:
. . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and
left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides... 29
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. 30
If the submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it

does not become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters.
The case, then, has to be decided alongside these principles and
regretfully, the Court cannot make a ruling, in the first place, because
it is not a trier of facts, and in the second, it is in possession of no
evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition 31 We
therefore remand the case to the court a quo to determine whether or not
the property subject of controversy is foreshore. We, consequently, reverse
both the Court of Appeals and the trial court and reinstate the Republic's
complaint.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for

further proceedings.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ.,

concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29675
September 30, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF

THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, petitioners, vs.HON. PIO R.
MARCOS, JUDGE, Court of First Instance of Baguio City, KOSEN
PIRASO, SAMAY PIRASO, COTILENG PIRASO, PETER PARAN
and MARTINA PIRASO, DAISY PACNOS, SPOUSES ALBINO
REYES and ISABEL SANTAMARIA, and ARTURO TONGSON,
respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine' C. Zaballero, Solicitor Rosalio A. De Leon and Major
Santiago O. Tomelden (Staff Judge Advocate, PMA) for petitioner.
Crisologo Law Office for respondent Arturo Tongson.Raul L. Correa
and Francisco Ventura for respondents spouses Albino Reyes and
Isabel Santamaria.Luis R. Gaduang for respondents Kosen Piraso, et
al.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is by statute provided that all persons "claiming title to parcels of
land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings" in actual
possession of the same at the time of the survey but unable for some
justifiable reason to file their claim in the proper court during the time,
limit established by law, "in case such parcels of land on account of
their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be
declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings"
instituted within the forty-year period next preceding June 20, 1953,
the time of the approval of this particular enactment, are granted "the
right within five years" from said date to petition for a reopening of the
judicial proceedings but "only with respect to such of said parcels of
land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
Government, ... ." 1
The jurisdiction of respondent Judge Pio R. Marcos to act in

accordance with Republic Act No. 931 in connection with the petition
for a reopening filed by respondent Kosen Piraso, joined by his
kinsmen, likewise respondents, all surnamed Piraso, is assailed in
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding, included in which are the
other respondents, Daisy Pacnos and the spouses Albino Reyes and
Isabel Santamaria, petitioners being the Republic of the Philippines
and the Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy.
In the language of the petition: "This is an original action for the
issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court whereby herein petitioners seek to annul and
set aside: (1) The Order, dated July 13, 1967 ... denying the Motion to
Dismiss dated January 26, 1967 filed by the City Fiscal of Baguio City
in behalf of oppositors-government agencies, and thus insisting on
assuming jurisdiction over the case (without the requisite publication
in the Official Gazette of the petition) and over the subject matter (a
military reservation); (2) The Decision, dated October 7, 1967 ...
decreeing the registration of a parcel of land with an area of
28,215.58 square meters ... within the so-called 'U.S. Fleet Naval
Reservation Center' in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos; (3) The
Order of August 2, 1968 ... which in effect denied the Motion to Annul
Decision dated February 9, 1968 filed by the Solicitor General, and
instead ordered the issuance of a decree over the same parcel of
land in favor of respondent Albino Reyes; ... and (4) The Order, dated
August 24, 1968 ... allowing respondents Kosen Piraso, et al. to
adduce their evidence of alleged ownership ..., all issued in Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Record No. 211 of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City, entitled 'In the Matter of the Petition for
Reopening of Judicial Proceedings, Kosen Piraso, et al., petitioners'."
2
It was likewise therein alleged that Civil Reservation Case No. 1

"settled the ownership, private and public, of the Baguio townsite,
terminating with the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
City dated November 13, 1922." 3 Prior to said case, however, a
military reservation known as the U.S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation
Center consisting of Lots 140 and 141 of the Baguio Cadastre with an
aggregate area of 29 hectares, more or less, was set aside pursuant
to Executive Order No. 1254 of October 10, 1910, issued by the then
President William Howard Taft of the United States, as attested by

Proclamation No. 114 of the then Governor-General W. Cameron
Forbes, and Executive Order No. 5139 of June 19, 1929, issued by
the then President Herbert Hoover, as attested by Proclamation No.
260 of the then Governor-General Dwight F. Davis. After
independence, the United States relinquished to the Republic of the
Philippines all claims to title over the military bases including the
aforesaid lots, their relinquishment being formalized by an agreement
of December 6, 1956. 4 Then came this categorical assertion in the
petition that the land involved in this proceeding "is limited to what is
admittedly, and by unquestionable proof, within the so-called U.S.
Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center, Lots 140 and 141, Baguio
Cadastre." 5
From a summary of the facts appearing in the Petition, the need for
including the other respondents was made clear. It was therein set
forth that on May 21, 1965 the Pirasos, respondents herein, relying
on the controlling statute set forth at the opening of this opinion,
sought the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Rec. No.
211 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, praying for the
issuance in their favor of title to a parcel of land designated as LRCSWO-6132 (Lots 140 and 141, Baguio Cadastre) consisting of
290,283 square meters, more or less, situated in Baguio City. On
September 11, 1965, respondent Daisy Pacnos filed an opposition.
She sought in a pleading dated March 14, 1966 to be allowed to
introduce evidence to prove her alleged right to registration of a
portion of the land, consisting of an area of 28,215.52 square meters,
subject of the proceedings. This motion was granted in an order of
the respondent Judge dated May 16, 1966.
On January 26, 1967, the First Assistant City Fiscal of Baguio City, in
behalf of all the government agencies oppositors, filed a motion to
dismiss the main petition and other related petitions, alleging thereto
the following grounds: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition; (2) that the causes of action alleged in
the petition are barred by prior judgment or by the statute of
limitations; (3) that the petition states no cause of action.
On July 13, 1967, the respondent Judge denied the said motion to
dismiss. Then came on October 7, 1967, a decision by respondent
Judge, decreeing the registration of a portion of the land (28,215.58

square meters of Lot 140, Baguio Cadastre), subject matter of the
Pirasos' petition in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos. The Solicitor
General received his copy of this decision on December 4, 1967.
1awphl.nt
There was a motion for reconsideration filed by the City Attorney of

Baguio of December 9, 1967, denied by respondent Judge on
December 15, as "having been filed out of time."
On January 3, 1968, the City Fiscal of Baguio City joined by petitioner
Superintendent of the Military Academy and the Director of Lands
jointly filed a notice of appeal. There was on February 7, 1968, an ex
parte motion for extension of time to submit a record on appeal. An
opposition thereto was filed by counsel for respondent Daisy Pacnos.
On February 15, 1968, the Solicitor General filed a motion to annul
the decision dated October 7, 1967, based on lack of jurisdiction.
On August 2, 1968, respondent Albino Reyes filed an ex parte motion
for the issuance of a decree in his favor, having previously manifested
to respondent Judge that respondent Daisy Pacnos had transferred
her right to him. On the same day, respondent Judge issued an order
considering that the motions for reconsideration and the motion to
annul decision filed by the Solicitor General and other government
lawyers "have been rendered academic and of no moment on
account of the filing of the notice of appeal on January 3, 1968," but
in his opinion of no avail the time to do so having lapsed. Moreover,
no record on appeal was submitted. He likewise directed in said order
the issuance of a decree to respondent "Albino Reyes, married to
Isabel Sta. Maria, Filipino, with residence at Dagupan City." Another
order specifically to that effect came from respondent Judge on the
day in question. The last order of pertinence to this petition came
from respondent Judge on August 24, 1968, setting for hearing on
September 11, 1968 the claim of the respondents, surnamed Piraso.
Then on October 18, 1968 came this petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring
respondents to file within ten days from notice an answer, not a
motion to dismiss. A preliminary injunction was likewise issued
without bond.
Subsequently, on November 8, 1968, the petitioners, through the

Solicitor General, filed a motion for leave to amend the petition,
alleging that the property, "subject matter of the case which
respondent Daisy Pacnos succeeded in obtaining a favorable
judgment of registration ... and which respondents Albino Reyes and
Isabel Santamaria subsequently succeeded in securing a decree of
registration" was thereafter transferred on August 16, 1968 to one
Arturo Tongson, who, thereby, would be affected by the outcome of
the petition. The proposed amendment, according to this motion,
would consist of his inclusion as one of the respondents.
Accompanying his pleading is the amended petition for certiorari and
prohibition. On November 21, 1968, we adopted a resolution in the
following tenor: "The motion of the Solicitor General for leave to
amend petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
in L-29675 (Republic of the Philippines, et al. vs Hon. Pio R. Marcos,
etc., et al.), is [Granted]; the amended petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction is hereby accepted.
Respondent Arturo Tongson is required to file, within 10 days from
notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to said amended
petition."
In the meanwhile, even before the motion for leave to file amended
petition was filed, respondents, the Pirasos, submitted their answer
on November 4, 1968. To the assertion in the petition, fundamental in
character, that the reopening sought by private respondents refers to
lands "admittedly and by unquestionable proof, within the so-called
U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation Center," the Pirasos answered in this
wise: "The land in question is not a military reservation under the
Republic of the Philippines although it was formerly reserved and
placed under the control of the Navy Department for the use as Naval
regime (U.S. Government) pursuant to Executive Order No. 5139
provisions of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement on Dec. 6,
1956 but the same has not been reserved for military purposes by the
Republic of the Philippines." 6 They would hedge further by the
disclaimer of any acceptance on their part that the land subject of the
petition forms part of the naval reservation, with the further
qualification that in any event, even if it be admitted that there is such
a reservation by the government, such lot is subject to private rights.

That respondents Pirasos could not very well explicitly deny the
allegation that the lot in question forms part of the naval reservation is
quite apparent from its memorandum submitted in lieu of oral
argument filed on April 7, 1969, wherein in disputing the point raised
by petitioners that the lower court acted without jurisdiction, they
stated the following: "Contrary to the allegation of the City Attorney,
we humbly state categorically that the land involved in this case is no
longer a reservation in its strict sense. It ceased to be a Naval
Reservation of the United States of America upon the termination of
its sovereignty over the islands. It was formerly reserved and placed
under the control of the U.S. Naval Department for the use of Naval
Regime (U.S. Government) pursuant to Executive Order No. 5139
provisions of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement on
December 6, 1956. The said parcel of land (Lot 140 of the Baguio
City Cadastre) until this time was not reserved for military purposes
by the Republic of the Philippines." 7
The answer of respondents, Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria, to
the amended petition filed on November 21, 1968, expressly admits
what petitioners so emphatically insist on that this petition before us
"is limited to what is admittedly, and by unquestionable proof, within
the so-called U.S. Fleet Naval Rehabilitation Center, Lots 140 and
141, Baguio Cadastre." 8 For the first paragraph of their answer is
explicitly worded thus: "1. That they admit the allegations of the
Petition with respect to the Nature of the Case ... and with respect to
the Parties and Jurisdictional Averments ... ." 9 The above assertion of
the petitioner was thus given conformity by respondents Reyes and
Santamaria. Nonetheless, they would seek to blunt the force of their
admission by alleging: "That they deny the allegations in par. V-A-1 of
the Petition, the truth being that the land in question, particularly the
area decreed in the name of the answering respondents, is not part of
a military reservation. The proclamation declaring certain areas to be
naval reservations of the Government of the United States (Annex B
of the Petition) expressly states that such reservations are "subject to
private rights if any there be." Upon the Philippines' becoming
independent in 1946 the said areas, by virtue of Executive

Agreements, reverted to disposable lands administered by the
Bureau of Lands of the Republic of the Philippines." 10
There is a similar express admission in the answer filed on December
13, 1968 by respondent Arturo Tongson, its wording being almost
identical with the answer of Albino Reyes and Isabel Santamaria:
"That in so far as they are borne out by and made part of the records
of the case, he admits the allegations of the Petition with respect to
the nature of the case ... and with respect to the Parties and
Jurisdictional Averments ... ." 11 Again, this particular respondent did
attempt to weaken the force of the above admission by the assertion
that the land decreed in favor of respondent Albino Reyes is not part
of the military reservation. He would justify this seeming contradiction
thus: "At any rate, when said areas were turned over to the Philippine
Government by virtue of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases
Agreement, the land in question reverted to the disposable lands
administered by the Bureau of Lands of the Republic of the
Philippines." 12
In the light of the allegation in the petition and the admissions made
in the answers of respondents, the Pirasos, Albino Reyes and Isabel
Santamaria as well as Arturo Tongson, even as sought to be
qualified, it would seem to be fairly obvious that the lots in question
sought to be reopened in the proceeding before respondent Judge
Marcos form part and parcel of a naval reservation. It cannot escape
attention that the above private respondents did try by highly
sophistical reasoning, invoking distinctions far from persuasive, to
avoid the legal effect of the admissions as to the location of the
disputed lots within a reservation. They must have realized that
unless successful in this attempt, doomed by failure from the outset,
the facts being simply against them, the jurisdiction of respondent
Court can, as petitioners have done, be successfully impugned. That
is what petitioners did; they must be sustained.
1. Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. It is
quite explicit and categorical. Only persons "claiming title to parcels
of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings" are
granted the right to petition for a reopening thereof if the other
conditions named therein are successfully met. It cannot admit of
doubt, therefore, that if the parcels of land were not the object of
cadastral proceedings, then this statute finds no application.
Considering that as far back as October 10, 1910, the then President
of the United States, William H. Taft, issued an executive order
reserving for naval purposes the lots now disputed, they could not
have been the object of the cadastral proceeding involving the Baguio
townsite reservation, decided only on November 13, 1922. 13
The Cadastral Act 14 was enacted on February 11, 1913, taking effect
on its passage. As is made clear in the first section thereof, when
public interest requires that titles to any land be settled and
adjudicated, in the opinion of the then executive, the Governor
General, he could order the Director of Lands or a private surveyor
named by the landowners, with the approval of the Director of Lands,
to make a survey and plan of such lands. 15 Clearly, it does not
include the survey of lands declared as reservations.
An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903, 16 specifically governs the
subject matter of reservations. As provided therein: "All lands or
buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying
within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and
the operations of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands,
buildings, and interests therein as shall not be determined to be
public lands shall become registered land in accordance with the
provisions of said Land Registration Act, under the circumstances
hereinafter stated." The validity of this statute was sustained as
against the allegation that there was a violation of the due process
clause, in a 1910 decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine
Squadron. 17
In a 1918 decision, this Court had occasion to indicate clearly that the
proceeding under this statute, while analogous too, is not covered by
the Cadastral Act. Thus: "It will thus be seen that Act No. 627
contemplates a sort of cadastral proceeding wherein private owners
may be forced to come in and register their titles, under penalty of
forfeiture of all right in the land included in the reservation in case
they fail to act. The validity of a law of this character cannot be
questioned; and this court has uniformly upheld the Act now under
consideration." 18
What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right on the

part of the private respondents to seek a reopening under Republic
Act No. 931 is our ruling in Government v. Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, a 1926 decision.19 We there explicitly held: "The
defendant's contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral case,
has jurisdiction to order the registration of portions of a legally
established military reservation cannot be sustained. The
establishment of military reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of
the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act provides that 'All
lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands
lying within the boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart
and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought
under the operations of the Land Registration Act, ... .' "
The conclusion is therefore inescapable that, as contended by
petitioners, respondent Judge is devoid of jurisdiction to pass upon
the claim of private respondents invoking the benefits of Republic Act
No. 931.
2. This lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge is made
more patent by another specific restriction of the right of a person to
seek reopening under this statute. For the power of the Court to order
such reopening is limited "to such of said parcels of land as have not
been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise provisionally
or permanently disposed of by the Government ... ." 20 Included in the
petition is an executive order of the then President Herbert Hoover of
June 19, 1929, declaring to be a naval reservation of the Government
of the United States "that tract of land known as lot no. 141,
residence Section D, Baguio naval reservation, heretofore reserved
for naval purposes ... ." If there were still any lingering doubt, that
ought to be removed by this reaffirmation of a presidential
determination, then binding and conclusive as we were under
American sovereignty, that the lot in question should be a naval
reservation.
3. The private respondents are thus bereft of any right which they
could assert under Republic Act No. 931. Such an enactment is the
basis of whatever standing that would justify their reliance on the
specific power granted courts of first instance to reopen cadastral
proceedings. Such jurisdiction is thus limited and specific. Unless a
party can make it manifest by express language or a clear implication

from the wording of the statute too strong to be resisted, he may not
set in motion the judicial machinery under such specific grant of
authority. This, private respondents have failed to do as the statute in
terms that are crystal clear and free from ambiguity denies them such
a right. Petitioners have made out their case for certiorari and
prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting
aside the order of respondent Judge of July 13, 1967, denying the
motion to dismiss dated January 26, 1967 filed by the City Fiscal of
Baguio City in behalf of oppositors-government agencies; his decision
dated October 7, 1967, decreeing the registration of a parcel of land
with an area of 28,215.58 square meters within Lot 140, Baguio
Cadastre, or within the so-called "U.S. Fleet Naval Reservation
Center" in favor of respondent Daisy Pacnos; his order of August 2,
1968 which in effect denied the motion to annul decision dated
February 9, 1968 filed by the Solicitor General, and instead ordered
the issuance of a decree over the same parcel of land in favor of
respondent Albino Reyes; and his order, dated August 24, 1968
allowing respondents Kosen Piraso, et al, to adduce their evidence of
alleged ownership. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted
perpetually restraining respondent Judge from further taking
cognizance of and further assuming jurisdiction over the reopening of
Civil Reservation Case No. 1 LRC Rec. No. 211 as sought by the
private respondents. The preliminary injunction issued is hereby
made permanent. With costs against private respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., concur.Barredo, J., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.

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G.R. No.

L-31271 April 29, 1974

Flores Macapagal, Ocampo and Balbastro for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed

The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino

Works and Communications, respectively, as members. This committee

On July 7, 1954, the Committee on Rivers and Streams rendered its

"In view of the foregoing considerations, the spouses Romeo Martinez

The municipal officials of Lubao, led by Acting Mayor Mariano Zagad,

be demolished should the herein appellees fail to comply therewith

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court

"Without pronouncement as to costs."chanrobles virtual law library

As against this judgment respondent officials of the Department of

The Court of Appeals sustained the above-mentioned assignment of

15856 IS A PUBLIC RIVER AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF ITS

the land covered thereby is no longer open to attack under Section 38

At the time of the enactment of Section 496, one right recognized or

Property of public ownership is:chanrobles virtual law library

The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain

In Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769, this Court held:

A simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system

In Mercado v. Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592, it was also

It is, therefore, clear that the authorities cited by the appellants as to

When it comes to registered properties, the jurisdiction of the

As regards the 3rd assignment of error, there is no weight in the

These stipulations were accepted by the petitioners-appellants in the

Romeo Martinez y Leonor Suarez, mayores de edad, filipinos y

Before purchasing a parcel of land, it cannot be contended that the

The ruling that a purchaser of a registered property cannot go beyond

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding

Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July

not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding on February 21,

of the Civil Code (See infra).

Nampeidai (2) the issuance of administrative orders for the

(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights,

(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or

This, the respondents have failed to do.

the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and

Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended,

The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President

(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the

The resolution should be read to mean that in case the

of selling these monuments? Filipino honor and national dignity

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ.,

CRUZ, J., concurring:

has submitted to this principle with becoming grace.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

Public dominion property intended for public service cannot be

Moreover, the sale of public property (once converted from

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to make

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

Much later, however, the Court held that "until a formal

In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal declaration to

I feel that this view corresponds to existing pronouncements of

I am elated that the Court has banished previous uncertainties.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting

land located in 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome, Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan

Law of Waters. Consequently, until a formal declaration on the

property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.