The Hukbalahap Movement

CSC 1984
Subject Area Strategic Issues
THE HUKBALAHAP MOVEMENT
The Writing Program
Command and Staff College
LtCol. Romelino R. Gojo
Philippines
April 6, 1984
Outline
Thesis Sentence: The Philippine Government will not succeed in its counterinsurgency operation
unless an integrated effort of military action against the Huk guerrillas and a civic-action program
for the mass base is undertaken.
I. Introduction
A. Initial Huk Struggle
B. Initial Government Action
II. Hukbalahap
A. Organization
B. Preparation
C. Strategy
III. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
A. Shortcomings
B. Revitalization
C. Strategy and Tactics
IV. Conclusions.
A. Assessments

I. Introduction
In World War II, after the Japanese defeated the Philippine-American defenses in the
country, pockets of resistance against the invaders continued throughout the islands. The people
who composed these resistance groups were either military personnel who refused to surrender or
civilians who had formed a people’s army to fight the Japanese. One of these guerrilla groups was
the “Hukbalahap” (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon), a contraction of the phrase meaning People’s
Army Against the Japanese. The Huks as they were commonly known, became a serious threat to
the new Philippine Republic after the war. The Huks controlled large portions of the sugarcane and
rice growing areas in Central Luzon and they had extended their military and political operations to
the other parts of the archipelago. The Huks, being the armed faction of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP), shifted from the techniques of pre-war struggle or political action, strikes and
demonstrations to an armed confrontation with the government.

1. When the reality of war came, the CPP leadership quickly seized the opportunity to identify
itself with patriotism to increase their power and prestige among the people. On 10
December 1941, two days prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific area, the CPP
issued an anti-Japanese manifesto pledging support to the Allied war effort and
simultaneously prepared for guerrilla warfare on a united front. Through this display of
nationalistic ideals, many people who would have not ordinarily joined them were attracted
to the Huk resistance movement.
 It was during this time that the Hukbalahap was really organized under the able leadership
of Luis Taruc, chairman of the military committee of the united front and concurrently the
field commander of the HMB. Throughout the armed conflict of the Huks against the
Japanese and thereafter against the government, Luis Taruc was the dominating personality
of the Huk insurgency. Between March 1942 and August 1948, the Huks became a trained
and experienced force, well-equipped with US Army weapons and well-prepared for its
guerrilla warfare. The initial force of 500 armed Huks which was organized into five
squadrons had increased to a fully-armed guerrilla force of 20,000 men.

2. In March 1943, the Huks, formidable and successful in their overt operations, forced the
Japanese to conduct a major operation in Northeastern Pampanga. The simultaneous
operations of the Japanese decimated the Huk squadrons and drove several of the units into
the Zambales mountains. This forced the Huks to conduct low-intensity operation and
instead concentrated their efforts to their political objectives. The Huk organization began to
extend their TAOR in Luzon by organizing new squadrons in areas where their influence
had been weakened or had never existed. The CPP leadership redirected its activities away
from anti-Japanese strategy and attended to their long-range postwar goals of Communism.

3. In late 1943, during its political expansion, the Huks launched anew its overt operations
against the Japanese which brought them into conflict with the USAFFE-sponsored guerrilla
units. The result was more clashes with these guerrilla units and less with the Japanese—the
situation which existed until the landing of the US liberation forces in October of 1944. At
this time the Huks had increased their efforts to recruit more people and to secure additional
arms and ammunitions, which strengthened their organization both politically and militarily.
Immediately after the Japanese retreated from the barrios, villages, towns and even cities, the
Huks quickly moved in to occupy these areas. The Huks set up local governments and even
appointed their own governors in the provinces of Pampanga and Laguna. By the time the
American forces liberated the Philippines, the Huks had established control at every level or
government in the provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. (Huklandia)

4. However, the government ignored these Huk-sponsored provincial administrations and

instead appointed its own provincial officials pending the election scheduled for April 1946.
The US Army disarmed several Huk guerrilla units and arrested Luis Taruc and Castro
Alejandrino, the second in command. The leadership of the remaining Huks was left to
Mariano Balgos, a Huk political commissar.
As the election grew near, the CPP leadership quickly exploited the political chaotic
situation of the country. The Huk squadrons were disbanded and the commanders
reorganized their prewar peasant and labor organizations. Their political activities were
integrated with the non-communist liberals to form the political party called, “Democratic
Alliance.” This party became the base of action for the various elements dissatisfied with the
prevailing situation in the country. Further political trouble divided the leading Nationalista
Party which resulted in the formation of the Liberal Party with Commonwealth president
Manuel Roxas as its candidate. The Liberal Party consisted of conservatives and many of the
prominent members were suspected of collaboration during the war.

5. The April elections resulted in the victory of Manuel Roxas and the Nationalista Party on the
national level; and six Democratic Alliance congressional candidates won in Huklandia,
 which included Luis Taruc and Castro Alejandrino. President Roxas rejected the election of
these congressmen and his action brought disaffection in Central Luzon. President Roxas
promised in his election campaign to restore peace and order in the country and to eliminate
the Huks within 60 days after the election. He therefore ordered the military to begin
operations in the provinces of Huklandia.
The AFP had only 37,000 men and 24,000 of which belonged to the Constabulary which
was tasked to deal with the Huk problem. In addition, the provincial governors and the
wealthy landowners formed their own private armies to join the operations. The terrorism,
wanton destruction of property, and the pillage which resulted from the uncoordinated,
uncontrolled and undisciplined operations further alienated the people from the
government. Many peasants innocent of any Huk connection were either killed or
imprisoned and their properties confiscated. President Roxas reduced the military operations
and negotiated for a three-month truce. The government hoped to persuade the Huks to lay
down their arms and return to normal life and peaceful farming.

6. The negotiations with the Huks failed together with the social reform programs of the
government and military operations were resumed. This prompted the Huks to increase its
political and military expansion and to prepare for the bitter struggle with the government.
The Hukbalahap was renamed HMB (Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan), or the Liberation
Army of the People. In March 1947, unable to solve the Huk problem, President Roxas
declared the Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed faction, HMB, to be illegal
and seditious. The HMB whose sole aim was the overthrow of the government, sought to
establish supremacy for the movement by destroying the effectiveness of the AFP. The
government realized that the Huks had no intention of any compromise of surrender until
their political and economic objectives were attained.

7. The roles of the principal adversaries—AFP and the HMB—will be discussed and analyzed
with emphasis on their strategies, doctrines, tactics, and programs which significantly
affected the final outcome of the conflict.

II. The Hukbalahap

The ultimate objective of the CPP is the overthrow of the government by a violent
revolution. On August 1948, the HMB abolished their attempted reforms by parliamentary processes
and began their guerrilla warfare. However the CPP leadership was apprehensive to engage in direct
military confrontation because they were unsure of the effectiveness of their organizational set up.
They also had to convince the peasants and the workers that an armed revolution was the only
remaining solution and the HMB had to perfect and expand their military units.
The CPP organization followed the standard international concept of communism with a
National Congress at the top level which was never formed.

8. The actual Party activities were directed by a 31-member Central Committee under which a
Politburo of 11 members formed the Executive Committee. A Secretariat of five men
consisting of the General-Secretary and the Chairmen of the national departments
conducted the basic work for the Party. The four departments are the National Military
Department, National Organization Department, National Finance Department, and the
National Education Department.
 The military organization which was organized in 1943 was significantly expanded and
formalized after August 1948. The field operations came under the control of the ten
regional commands (RECO) and the Manila City Command. The basic tactical guerrilla unit
remained the squadron with an optimum operating strength of 100 men. Aside from
operating the mass base, the Organization department also supervised the activities of all the
communist infiltrated student and labor groups and operated as the principal intelligence
collection apparatus.
The Education department was primarily tasked with the political indoctrination of the
people. They established schools to teach the illiterates how to read and write and at the
higher level, the young were taught communist ideology and tactics. The Education
department worked closely with the military department for in many areas, the military
training was handled by this department.
Financial supports for the revolutionary activities came from several sources and the larger
monetary donations came from the overseas Chinese supporters. The majority of the
financial requirements came from the taxes collected in the areas under HMB control and
augmented by the confiscated food and medical supplies. Raids, train robberies, kidnap for
ransom and protection racket of the Huks brought in more funds.
The entire communist apparatus coordinated the works of the four vertically-organized
departments while the departments maintained horizontal relationships at every level. This
system of the international communist movements guaranteed the top leadership absolute
control of the revolution. The CPP organization controlled the countryside, made and
enforced laws, collected taxes and supervised the activities of the people in support of the
revolution. Even in the areas patrolled by the government troops during daytime, the Huks
quickly moved in after dark Whichever side controlled the areas after darkness also
controlled the loyalty of the people.
The CPP strategy for the overthrow of the government was laid out in a memorandum of
the Secretariat to the Central Committee. According to Taruc, the CPP strategy was further
articulated in a document, “1950 Politburo Resolutions” which was decided in a conference
held in early January of that year.

9. The salient points were:

1. that there exists in the Philippines a revolutionary era which in the face of international
and national situations would inevitably culminate in a crisis in two years time.

2. that the liberation movement must during 1950 and 1951 complete an intensive two-
year program of preparation for the seizure of power by armed struggle and that all
efforts must be geared toward this one supreme task.
3. that we must announce and define our political objectives and programs as similar to
that of Mao Tse Tung’s model.
4. that the CPP leadership within the liberation movement must be publicized and
projected at every possible opportunity.
5. that we must undertake the armed uprising on our own...and should expose our
former political allies as having recoiled and turned traitors to the people.
6. that we must reorganize and rename the Hukbalahap to make it conform to the
demands of the new political situation.
7. that we must impose military discipline on all the mass organizations led by the CPP.
 The CPP strategy followed the Mao doctrine although the requirements of the first phase
of insurgency had been accomplished. The CPP was well into the second phase (Classic Guerrilla
Warfare) and rapidly attaining the capability to engage the AFP in conventional warfare. Although
an armed struggle was the decided means to accomplish their goals, their strategy also included the
parliamentary struggle method. This method was to infiltrate sensitive and key government
positions, legitimate social and labor organizations and to destroy their vitality as
political forces.
Huk supremo Luis Taruc understood the principle that the momentum of the insurgency
movement had to be maintained. However the concern for the total preparedness of the HMB and
the mass base inhibited increased military activities. With their failure of government infiltration in
the 1949 elections, the CPP decided that it was time for guerrilla warfare. The year 1949 also
witnessed the successes of Mao Tse Tung in China and Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China and with these
victories, the HMB changed the whole character of the struggle. They launched a general offensive,
not only attacking government troops and outposts but entire civilian communities where they
looted, killed and burned.
In Pampanga on 26 August 1949, in observance of National Heroes Day, the Huks entered
the town of Arayat, disarmed the police force, burned the townhall and looted the town. A similar
raid took place in the adjoining Tarlac town where the civil guard detachment was massacred. The
year 1950 witnessed HMB bolder operations with the capture of provincial capitals and attacks on
army and police installations as their objectives. Although their raids were successful, the HMB
normally used hit and run tactics to conserve their forces and keep the AFP off-balanced and
demoralized in fruitless pursuits.
Luis Taruc called the period from March to August 1950 as the “Dress Rehearsal.”

10. In a secret interview with an American correspondent, he admitted that the movement was
communistic and it had relations with the communist parties of Red China and the Soviet
Union. He further stated that the HMB has 25,000 well-armed guerrillas and that his mass
base supporters numbered about two million. On the other hand, the AFP estimated that at
the height of the Huk uprising, there were only 17,500 guerrillas and a mass base of 100,000
supporters. Taruc in his book written many years later admitted that his 1950 strength was
only 15,000 armed guerrillas and that he could have mustered only 4,000 men for the attack
in the city of Manila.

The Secretariat issued new instructions in a document entitled, “Strategic, Political and
Military Guidances” which defined the final phase of the revolution. This memorandum
gave detailed instructions to all Regional Commands on how to conduct the offensive, to
supervise the liberated areas, and to treat and utilize enemy soldiers either captured or
surrendered.
According to Taruc, the HMB successes became their downfall because the reality and
gravity of the situation was now recognized by the governments of the Philippines and the
United States. Both governments took the necessary actions to counteract the rapidly
spreading revolution.
In the words of General Jesus Vargas, AFP Chief of Staff,
 11. “About the only redeeming aspect of the situation was the realization by the officials of the
government of the Philippines that the solution of the problem was well beyond the reach of
normal police action and that a more integrated national effort had to be exerted.”

III. Armed Forces of the Philippines

The Government considered the Huk problem a police affair and unfortunately the AFP
had the same opinion. In the conduct of their anti-Huk campaign, the military merely saturated the
Huk-infested areas with combat troops and suppressed the tumultuous situations with force. They
were unsuccessful and further complicated the problem with numerous abuses which destroyed the
respect and confidence of the people for the men in uniform. The people left with no security in the
rural areas migrated to the relatively secured urban areas. The mass abandonment of the agricultural
fields adversely affected the national economy and created the squatter problem which obviously is
still present.

12. By mid-1950, the Huk attacks increased in unbelievable proportions and the military reacted
ruthlessly. In Maliwalu, Pampanga, with the belief that the people there were active Huk
supporters, constabulary troopers plundered the town and killed several of the menfolk. The
military inadequacies also reflected in their lack of knowledge of the basic military skills. The
AFP did not have the EEI’s about the enemy—-who he was, how he operated, what his
objectives were, and most importantly, how he gained the support of the people.
The Huks, called the agrarian reformers by their propaganda section somehow concealed
the true nature of their movement and this contributed to their initial success. Basic
information collection in the field was negligible and the evaluation of any information
acquired was haphazardly done. The AFP ignored the political aspects of the Huks,
especially the propaganda portion which could have been a vital source of information.
Poor intelligence deprived the AFP of the Huk’s tactical capabilities and its true
organizational strength. This inadequacy was compounded by the little effort to infiltrate
known front organizations and Huk-controlled provincial administrations.
The legal system of the Philippines provided protection to the citizens from unjust and
arbitrary arrests. A captured Huk or a sympathizer enjoyed the same privileges as any citizen
of the country. He must be taken before a judge or a fiscal within six hours after his arrest
and formally charged with a crime within 24 hours. If charged with a crime other than
murder, a Huk guerrilla had the right to demand release on bail. A captured Huk in an
encounter can be free and be back with his squadron in 72 hours or less. The only legal
action that could prevent the legal release of captured Huks was the suspension of the “Writ
of Habeas Corpus.” However the Quirino administrations which won by a narrow margin in
the last elections, considered such drastic action as a political suicide.

13. Another shortcoming of the AFP was its adherence to the organization and doctrine of the
US Army model for conventional warfare. The WWII experience failed to influence the
military leadership toward the development of an army that will protect the Nation from
external aggression and internal threat. With a small Defense budget, the AFP can only
maintain two infantry battalions capable of sustained operations.
The Maliwalu incident and the infamous crime committed by the Huks—-the ambush-
killing of the wife of the late President Manuel Quezon and eight others—-brought
increased criticism of the government.
 14. President Quirino therefore issued Executive Order number 308 which provide the
complete reorganization of the entire armed forces. He also appointed Congressman Ramon
Magsaysay of Zambales as the new Secretary of National Defense, charged with the
responsibility of restoring peace and order. Secretary Magsaysay instilled in the military that
the lost political base of action had to be regained by an integrated military, political, and
social approach. He emphasized that every soldier must be a public relations man, political
warfare specialist, civil administrator, and an expert in guerrilla warfare.
Underlying his policy was the belief, “Any democratic government is neither of necessity
nor automatically better than a communistic government in the eyes of the Common Man.
The local government must clean its own house. A status quo that has bred virulent
communism cannot remain unchanged. Communism seldom flourishes where the people
are content and prosperous basically.”

15. To implement his policy, Magsaysay had these goals:

1. Unity of command in the military
2. Trust and confidence of the people in the military
3. Active civilian support in military operations
4. Friendship between the people and the military

His first step in the reorganization was to merge the Army and the Constabulary under
one command with the latter assigned to police duty. He was opposed by the wealthy landowners
and the powerful elite in the government because the Constabulary was for the protection of their
wealth and properties. President Quirino reluctantly supported this actions which included the relief
of the Chief of Constabulary and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.
The Army was given the primary responsibility for the conduct of counterinsurgency
operations with the overall direction assumed by Magsaysay and coordinated through General
Headquarters. The strength of the army was increased to 56,000 officers and men, organized into 26
Battalion Combat Teams (BCT). A BCT consisted of three rifle companies, one artillery battery, one
recon company and a headquarters and service company, a total of 1074 officers and men. The
majority of the training was in small unit tactics with emphasis on scouting, patrolling and night
operations. The lessons learned from previous operations indicated the need for a commando-type
unit for special operations. The Army Scout Ranger Teams were organized to conduct longer
patrols, raids and ambuscades and each team was equipped with a camera to facilitate intelligence
collection and to provide proof of Huk kills.
Secretary Magsaysay, aside from reorganizing the military restored discipline and
professionalism in the entire command. He removed from office the inefficient, incompetent,
corrupt and the politically-motivated officers, either by court-martial or forced retirement. He also
adopted the system of giving spot-promotions to reward the officers and men who had
accomplished exemplary deeds. He initiated the “Army Attraction Program,” the purpose of which
was to have the soldier accepted by the people as a worthy supporter of the government.
The Civil Affairs Office (CAO) of the DND was created to implement this program.

16. Their mission was to bring the military closer to the people, help solve the problems of the
peasants and to conduct psychological operations. A major task was to publicize praise
worthy accomplishments of the military which significantly impacted on the people. Medical
teams accompanied combat patrols in the rural areas to treat illness and to instruct the
people about hygiene and sanitation. The number of artesian wells and schoolhouses
 constructed by the engineers influenced the thinking and behaviour of the Huks whose
children were now given the chance of being educated. Another task of the CAO was to
indoctrinate the troops about the program, make them realize the consequences of their
actions, and help in the national effort to solve the Huk menace. Military personnel who
were charged with crimes and abuses were immediately tried by court-martial or by the
civilian courts. The AFP also made available the services of the Judge Advocate General
Office to the people in the pursuit of their complaints and court cases.
Another program labeled, “All out Friendship or all out Force” resulted to the defection
of a Huk assassin who revealed the organization and location of the CPP Politburo.

17. In a massive round-up, almost every important Communist in Manila was arrested and their
capture starkly revealed to the people that they were not merely agrarian reformers. This
mass arrest influenced President Quirino to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for all
persons accused of rebellion and subversion. This allowed the Army to hold known or
suspected insurgent leaders for indefinite periods of time while intelligence leads were being
followed up.
Another program initiated was the system of monetary rewards offered for weapons
surrendered and operational information leading to the capture of key communist leaders.
The appeal of money became so enticing that by 1951, the Huks themselves had a serious
internal problem. Civilian commando units were organized in friendly barrios and were
trained and led by army personnel for local area defense.
By April of 1952, the combined military and civic-action programs of the government had
reduced the Huk threat to manageable dimensions. By successive operations, the AFP had
acquired by capture or surrender 4,500 Huk weapons of various calibers which were about 55
percent of their total equipments. The Huk casualties at this time reached 35 to 40 percent of
their 1950 organizational strength.

18. Secretary Magsaysay also recognized that the land reform program of the government had to
work to counter the Huk battle slogan of “Land for the Landless.” In December 1950,
President Quirino authorized the Department of National Defense to organize the
Economic Development Corporation (EDCOR) and assume the responsibility of the
resettlement of the surrendered or captured Huks. The amount of public lands distributed
and the number of beneficiaries of the EDCOR program was small. About 1,000 families
were actually resettled but the value of the program as a counter-propaganda weapon against
the Huks cannot be over-emphasized.
Finally the assistance of the United States government wherein a ten-million dollar
emergency loan was provided to pay the military. The JUSMAG was also established for
advisory assistance and for the immediate delivery of equipments which modernized the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.

IV. Conclusions.
By 1952, with the successful government programs, the Huk movement had lost the
impetus to attain their ultimate goal of establishing a People’s Democracy in the Philippines. The
revitalization of the Armed Forces and the failure of the HMB in August of 1950 to exploit their
tactical and psychological advantages, contributed to the victory of the Government.
Several reasons brought the decline of the Huk power and prestige. The rebels became
tired and exhausted of the fighting due to the continuous military operations which kept them on
the move to elude capture. The people who sympathized with their cause did not have the time to
farm their crops which made it difficult for them to contribute to the revolution. As the villagers
became hesitant to give food and aid, the Huks began to steal from the peasants and sometimes with
the use of force. The effective utilization of reforms and promises improved the image of the
government and provided hope for the insurgents. The 1951 elections were relatively peaceful and
honest, with the AFP deputized to safeguard the sanctity of the ballot.

19. The Huks were also deprived of the opportunity to attend to their political operations
because of the relentless pursuit by government troops. This further eroded their support in
the barrios, caused several insurgents to return to their families, and the others to take
advantage of the amnesty program. By 1954, the Huks had suffered tremendous losses: 9,695
KIA; 1,635 WIA; 4,239 captured; and 15,866 surrendered. It was estimated that by the end of
1954, the Huks could muster no more than 2,000 armed guerrillas.

20. In May of this year, Huk supremo Luis Taruc quit the rebellion and surrendered to the
government. After standing trial for the crimes of rebellion and subversion, he was
sentenced to spend 15 years in prison while the CPP denounced him for abandoning the Huk
cause. A few armed insurgents chose to remain fighting because the revolution had become
their only way of life.
Finally, these Huk remnants began to lose confidence in themselves and in the mass base
they relied on. They were now coercing the very people they were supposed to protect and
were alienating those they needed for support. As the tide of insurgency turned against them,
intimidation through terrorism became their primary means of insuring mass support. The
loss of the initiative and the momentum of a general offensive deprived the Hukbalahap of
their victory.
At present, the HMB of the Communist Party of the Philippines had been reduced to a
few hundreds and many of them had gone into hiding. Insurgency will exist and continue to
exist as long as there are people susceptible to communist exploitation. The only way to
defeat Insurgency is for the Government and its Armed Forces to have the trust and
confidence of the citizenry—the Mass Base.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/GRR.htm