J Indian Philos

DOI 10.1007/s10781-015-9284-5

Horns in Digngas Theory of apoha

Kei Kataoka1

Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Abstract According to Dignaga, the word cow makes one understand all cows
in a general form by excluding non-cows. However, how does one understand the
non-cows to be excluded? Hattori (Buddhist Thought and Civilization: Essays in
Honor of Herbert V. Guenther on His Sixtieth Birthday, 1977, p. 48) answers as
follows: On perceiving the particular which is endowed with dewlap, horns, a
hump on the back, and so forth, one understands that it is not a non-cow, because
one knows that a non-cow (e.g., a horse, an elephant, or the like) is not endowed
with these attributes. Hattori regards observation of a dewlap, etc. as the cause of
excluding non-cows. Akamatsu (Tetsugaku Kenkyu, 540, 87115, 1980) presents a
view similar to Hattoris. Tanizawa (Shinshu Daigaku Jinbungakubu Jinbun Kagaku
Ronshu Ningenjoho gakka hen 32:319, 1998), however, criticises Akamatsu by
pointing out that then the apohavdin would have accepted positive elements such
as a dewlap as defining characteristics of a cow. Stating that X is not a cow because
it is not endowed with a dewlap, etc., amounts to accepting that the dewlap, etc. are
the defining characteristics of a cow. Instead of a real universal cowness the apohavdin would have accepted a dewlap, etc. Akamatsus understanding of apoha, if
it was correct, implies Tanizawa, would destroy the essence of the Buddhist theory
of apoha. Continuing the view of Hattori and Akamatsu, Yoshimizu recently
published two articles on Dignagas theory of apoha. He claims that the word
cow excludes all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on them.
Thus, the word cow can exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that
The present paper is partly based on my Japanese articles published as Kataoka (2012, 2013). A draft of
the present paper was read at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
held at University of Vienna in 2014 August 1823. I thank Peter Sahota, Somdev Vasudeva and Shoryu
Katsura for comments.
& Kei Kataoka
keikataoka1969@gmail.com
1

Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

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K. Kataoka

none of them has all the members of the set of characteristics that form the worldly
definition of cow. Horns, one of the characteristic features of cows, are indeed
mentioned by Dignaga in PS(V) 5:43. Yoshimizu understands Dignagas semantics
as being parallel to the modern semantics of componential analysis. A question
arises: what does Dignaga, the founder of the Buddhist theory of apoha, really think
regarding this issue? The present article sheds light on the incompatibility of the two
interpretations by investigating the relevant source texts. It further shows that the
issue Tanizawa deals with was already discussed by Dignaga. Examining Dignagas
discussions shows that Tanizawa is right in his understanding of apoha. The
interpretation by Hattori and other scholars is not supported by Dignagas text. The
present conclusion is also supported by Madhava, Uddyotakara and Kumarila. None
of them assumes Dignagas theory to be as Hattori, etc. take it.
Keywords

Apoha Dignaga Madhava Jinendrabuddhi Pramanasamuccaya

Previous Studies
The word cow makes one understand all cows in a general form by excluding
non-cows. This is Dignagas basic idea of anypoha, exclusion of others. When one
conceptualizes something as a cow in a general form This is a cow, ones mind in
fact goes through a negative process which can be formulated as This is not a noncow. A conceptual cognition of a cow is made possible by excluding non-cows, as
Dignaga states: A cognition of X is based on observing the nonexistence of Y
[which is non-X] (tmntarbhvadarand tmntare pratyaya) and A
cognition of a cow occurs by excluding non-cows (gopratyayo govyavacchedena).
How then does one understand This is not a non-cow?
Hattori
Hattori (1977) regards a cows attributes such as a dewlap as the criteria for judging
something as not non-cow.1 (Emphasis is mine.)
Hattori 1977: 48: On perceiving the particular which is endowed with
dewlap, horns, a hump on the back, and so forth, one understands that it is not
a non-cow, because one knows that a non-cow (e.g., a horse, an elephant, or
the like) is not endowed with these attributes. Accordingly, he differentiates
the directly perceived object from the non-cow and consequently forms the
concept cow.2
1

Hattoris concluding remark in the same paragraph (With this careful analysis of the process of
conceptual construction, Dignaga stated that a word denotes its own object by means of anypoha, or that
a word expresses the object qualified (viia) by anypoha.) clarifies his intention in his explanation
quoted below.
2

The situation described in Hattoris passage itself is acceptable in Dignagas system if it refers to, not a
general case of forming the concept cow as Hattori intends, but a special case of inferring a cow from
these attributes only, i.e. without directly looking at the particular cow in its entirety. (See my discussion
below regarding Dignagas statement viitvd anava iti and its relevant source VS 2.1.8.)

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Horns in Dignagas Theory of apoha

According to Hattori, the concept cow is based on the exclusion of a horse, etc.,
which again is based on perceiving a dewlap, etc. In other words, by perceiving a
cows defining characteristics such as a dewlap one excludes horses, etc., and then
one understands the object as a cow in a general form.
Perception of dewlap, etc.
Understanding not a horse, etc.
Concept cow
Akamatsu
A similar understanding of apoha is found in Akamatsu (1980, p. 975).
Each one endowed with a dewlap, horns, etc. walking in front of us is
understood as having as its common property a difference from those things
which do not have such characteristics. We apprehend the difference as a
common property of these things; and we use the word cow as an index of
this common property, which is difference in nature, in order to denote the
difference. This is what Dignaga and Dharmakrti claim.3 (My translation)
A cows difference from horses, etc. lies in the fact that a cow has a dewlap, etc.
which horses, etc. do not have. This difference functions as a common property.
Akamatsus understanding of apoha is in the same track as Hattoris understanding.
Perception of dewlap, etc.
Identification of a dewlap, etc. as a difference
Apprehension of the difference as a common property
Tanizawa
Tanizawa (1998, p. 15, n. 2) finds Akamatsus interpretation of apoha unconvincing. Quoting the above-mentioned passage of Akamatsu, Tanizawa comments as
follows:
For example, there is a description as follows in Akamatsu [1980:975], a
representative article on Dharmakrtis theory of apoha. [A quote from
Akamatsu] How many people are convinced by reading this explanation?
How can such a claim be possible? This claim presupposes positive
characteristics such as a dewlap at the outset.4
What Tanizawa implies can be elaborated as follows. If Akamatsus interpretation of the
apoha theory was correct, then the Buddhist claim of apoha would be totally
unconvincing. If the Buddhist held that the nonexistence of a dewlap, etc. is the cause of
excluding non-cows, then he would presuppose a dewlap, etc. as defining characteristics
of a cow, i.e. necessary and sufficient conditions for understanding something as a cow.

Akamatsu (1980, p. 975).

Tanizawa (1998, p. 15, n. 2).

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K. Kataoka

Instead of accepting a real universal cowness, Akamatsus Buddhist ends up accepting a

dewlap, etc. as defining characteristics. Appealing to positive criteria such as a dewlap is
self-contradictory in the system of apoha.
This is an implication that we can derive from Tanizawas criticism of
Akamatsus view.
Yoshimizu
Recently Yoshimizu published two articles on apoha, one in English and the other
in Japanese. His understanding of Dignagas theory of apoha is in the same vein as
those of Hattori and Akamatsu.5 It can be summarized as follows.
As Patanjali states, a cow is commonly defined as something endowed with a
dewlap, etc. Dignaga, too, presupposes this ordinary definition. The set of the five
characteristics, i.e. a dewlap, a tail, a hump, hooves and horns, is the defining
characteristics of a cow. One determines the denotation of cow by excluding all that
lack this set of characteristics. Horses, for example, are excluded by virtue of the fact
that horns are never seen on them. All horses are collectively excluded by the first
condition of horns. The same process of exclusion is repeated for other characteristics. Thus, Dignaga succeeds in defining the determinate denotation of cow
without assuming a single generic property of cowness. Exclusion of others is to
exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that none of them has all the
members of the set of characteristics that constitute the worldly definition of cow.6
horns
hooves
hump
tail
dewlap

not
not
not
not
not

A (horse)
B
C
D
E

cow

5
Yoshimizu (2011a, pp. 573574): But he rejects the second absurdity through a clever device meant to
explain how the word cow excludes all animals other than cows without the help of the generic property
called cowness. We can recognize this device as the componential analysis that is employed in semantics.
According to Dignaga, the denotation of a word can be compared to the negative concomitance of the
logical reason in a valid inference, given that the word cow excludes all horses by virtue of the fact that
horns are never seen on them. Although the species to be excluded by the word cow are innumerable,
the word cow can exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that none of them has all the
members of the set of characteristics that form the worldly definition of cow.
As is illustrated by Patanjali at the beginning of his Mahbhya, people characterize a cow as an animal
that has a dewlap (ssn), a tail (lgla), a hump (kakuda), hooves (khura) and horns (via). All these are
characteristics common to many different kinds of animals, but the combination of these five characteristics
is recognized to be peculiar to only a single kind of animal, and people imagine an animal that has all these
characteristics when they hear the word cow. In the aforementioned explanation Dignaga indicates that the
domain of animals divides into the sphere of horned ones and that of hornless ones. By repeatedly
overlapping the bifurcations generated by this and the other characteristics, one arrives at a fully determinate
denotation for cow without assuming that there is a single generic property cowness.
6

Yoshimizu (2011b, pp. 235236).

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Horns in Dignagas Theory of apoha

Yoshimizu understands Dignagas theory of exclusion as parallel to the modern

semantics of sense-components.7 The sense-components of boy, for example, are
human, male and non-adult.8 By excluding whatever does not meet each of the three
conditions of boy, one arrives at the determinate denotation of boy without
assuming boyhood.
human
not non-human
male
not non-male
non-adult not adult

boy

One can confirm that Yoshimizus interpretation is basically the same as those of
Hattori and Akamatsu in regarding the dewlap, etc. as the basis for excluding noncows.9 His claims can be summarized as follow:
1.
2.

3.
4.

Dignaga presupposes the worldly definition of cow, namely that it is endowed

with the five characteristics, i.e. a dewlap, a tail, a hump, hooves and horns.
According to a view that Dignaga refers to in PSV ad 5.41, the cause of
applying the word cow is the observation that the object is endowed with a
dewlap, etc.
Dignaga illustrates (PSV ad 5.43b) that the function of the word cow is to
exclude all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on them.
By accumulating exclusions of things which do not have the component
characteristics defining a cow, one can determine the denotation of cow
without assuming a single generic property such as cowness.

A Question
Previous studies provide us with two incompatible interpretations regarding the
Buddhist theory of apoha. According to one interpretation, a dewlap, etc., function
as criteria for excluding non-cows, whereas according to the other they do not.10
7

Yoshimizu (2011a, p. 571): Dignaga considers the exclusion (apoha) of others by a word as the result
of a conceptual accumulation of the sense-components accepted in the totality of worldly discourse.
8
Yoshimizu (2011a, p. 574): In their componential analysis linguists extract common factors found in
various kinds of individuals, and then represent the meaning of a term as the product of some of these
common factors called sense-components. The meaning of the word boy, for example, is analyzed as
the conjunction of HUMAN, MALE and NON-ADULT, in other words, the conjunction of the exclusions
of NON-HUMAN, NON-MALE and ADULT.
9

In his English article Yoshimizu refers to none of the three articles in this regard. (He quotes Hattori
1977 in a different context.) In his Japanese article (Yoshimizu 2011b, p. 260, n. 8), he simply refers to
Tanizawa (1998, pp. 319), in particular a note quoted above (Tanizawa (1998, p. 15, n. 2), with a
comment that the theory of apoha is meaningless if it does not provide an explanation regarding how the
non-cow is posited. Although Yoshimizu does not make his attitude explicit, his comment implies that he
is critical of Tanizawa.
10
The two views are irreconcilable in the same context, i.e. with respect to the conceptualization of a
cow in a general form, e.g. by hearing the word cow. See also the next note for further clarification.

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K. Kataoka

The other view, implied by Tanizawa, does not accept positive characteristics as the
criteria, because accepting positive elements contradicts the very essence of the
negative semantics of apoha. Which of the two interpretations is appropriate in
respect to Dignagas own view? Does he accept a dewlap, etc. as the ultimate
criteria for delimiting the denotation of cow? Does Dignaga hold the view that the
word cow excludes all non-cows by virtue of the fact that horns, etc. are never
seen on them? Or does he simply intend, without recourse to such attributes,11 that
the word cow denotes all cows by excluding non-cows?
I
Perception of a dewlap, etc.
Exclusion of non-cows
Notion cow

II
Perception of a dewlap, etc.
Exclusion of non-cows
Notion cow

Sources
Yoshimizu refers to two sources in PSV but does not elaborate on them. Let us
examine what Dignaga really intends.
PS(V) 5.41
In Indian classics, as indicated in the Mahbhya,12 it was commonly accepted that
a cow has a dewlap, etc. as its characteristic features. Therefore, it is natural for
them to say that the notion of a cow is based on the observation of a dewlap, etc.
ssndidarana gopratyaya
This idea develops into an idea that the essential nature of a cow, i.e. the defining
characteristic of a cow, is the set of a dewlap, etc. In other words, a cow is precisely
the collection of a dewlap, etc.13
ssndi(samha) = gau (the object of the notion cow)

11

It is to be noted that Dignaga does resort to the non-observation (ade/adaranamtrea) of the

word cow being applied to non-cows (anyaabdrthe/atulye). See PS(V) 5.34. In other words, one can
extend Tanizawas (implied) view (drawn in the chart) and add \non-observation of the word cow
being applied to non-cows[ as the prerequisite of exclusion of non-cows. Therefore, the incompatibility
between the two interpretations ultimately lies in the issue of vyptigraha (grasping the invariable
concomitance between hetu and sdhya) or the method of vyutpatti, i.e. how to learn the relationship
between the word cow and its meaning.
12

MBh I 1.1011 (quoted and translated in Yoshimizu 2011a, p. 574, n. 8): yenoccritena
ssnlglakakudakhuraviin sapratyayo bhavati sa abda.

13

Although the passage quoted below (ssndaya eva gau) suggests an ontological reading by itself,
I would like to construe it primarily as an epistemological (dealing with govikalpaviaya) and semantic
statement (dealing with goabdrtha) and not purely ontological (a cow is precisely a dewlap, etc.),
because the issue at stake is the general notion cow. Of course the distinction of them does not matter
much for naive realists such as Madhava, because for them what they cognize is precisely what there is.

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Horns in Dignagas Theory of apoha

Dignaga refers to this view, which Jinendrabuddhi attributes to a Samkhya

theorist Madhava.14 Jinendrabuddhi presents Madhavas view of the observation of

a collection of a dewlap, etc. (ssndisamha) as distinct from Dignagas view of
the observation of the nonexistence of horses, etc. which are non-cows
(tmntarbhva) as follows:
Pind 2009: 292, n. 521, PST Ms B233b56: etad ukta bhavati. yath tava

ssndisamhadarand gopratyayas tath mampy tmntarbhvadara15

nd tmntare pratyaya iti.
Jinendrabuddhi makes it explicit that for Dignaga a conceptual cognition of X is
based on observing the nonexistence of Y which is non-X. A cow, for example, is
understood as such by observing that it is not a non-cow such as a horse.
tmntarbhvadaranam tmntare pratyaya
Observation of the nonexistence of horses, etc. Notion cow
In other words, the essential nature of a cow in a general form (i.e. the object of
the notion cow), according to Dignaga, is the nonexistence of non-cows such as
horses.
tmntarbhva = tmntara
not a horse, etc. = cow in general
Jinendrabuddhis statement makes it clear that the basic tenet of the apoha theory
is that the notion of a cow is based on the exclusion of non-cows. Therefore, the
view that the notion of a cow is based on observing a dewlap, etc. contradicts the
apoha theory. In other words, it goes against the spirit of the apoha theory to state
that the object of the notion cow is precisely the collection of a dewlap, etc.,
because it is, according to Dignaga, precisely the nonexistence of non-cows such as
horses. As Tanizawa implicitly warns, accepting positive elements such as a dewlap,
etc. as the criteria, is self-contradictory in the system of apoha. This is in fact
pointed out by Dignagas opponent. Based on Jinendrabuddhis description, we can
reconstruct Dignagas original claim in his lost work as follows:
Pind 2009: 291, n. 516, PST Ms B233a7233b2:

[1A] yasya darand yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati.
[1B] tad yath ssndidarand gopratyayo bhavati, ssndaya eva gau.
[2] tmntarbhvadaranc ctmntare pratyaya.
[3] tasmd tmntarbhva evtmntari.16
14
The issue of attribution is dealt with in my article presented at the fifth International Dharmakrti
Conference held at Heidelberg University in 2014 August 2630.
15

Pind (2009, p. 292, n. 521): What is meant is the following: just as you are of the opinion that the
cognition of a cow is due to the observation of the aggregate of dewlap, and so on, I am of the opinion too
that the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of
other things.

16
My translation: [1A] Among people if a cognition of X arises by observing Y, X is precisely Y. [1B]
For instance, the cognition of cow arises by observing a dewlap, etc. A cow is precisely a dewlap, etc.
[2] And the cognition of one thing arises by observing the nonexistence of other things. [3] Therefore, one

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K. Kataoka

Dignaga states an invariable concomitance (in 1A) that if the notion of X arises
by observing Y, X is precisely Y. To support this invariable concomitance he refers
to an example (in 1B) that a cow is precisely a dewlap, etc., because the notion of a
cow arises by observing a dewlap, etc. He then applies (in 2) this principle to
anypoha. The notion of a cow, for example, arises by observing the nonexistence
of non-cows. Therefore, Dignaga concludes (in 3), a cow (or cows in general)17 is
precisely the nonexistence of non-cows. A certain thing (tmntara), in this case the
object of the notion cow, is precisely the nonexistence of the other things
(tmntarbhva), in this case the negation of non-cows (agonivtti) such as
horses.18
Example:
ssndi
= the object of the notion cow
Conclusion: tmntarbhva = the object of the notion of tmntara
(agonivtti
= the object of the notion cow)
Dignaga refers to the mundane example of observing a dewlap, etc., probably
because he wants to show that his reasoning is in accordance with the ordinary way
of thought. A problem, however, lies in this example. Madhava, a Samkhya theorist,

points out that a proper example is to be accepted by both parties, including the
apohavdin. Madhavas claim is no surprise considering the requirement of debate
that an example must be something well established for both parties. However, is it
really possible for Dignaga to accept that a cow, more precisely a cow in a general
form which is the object of a conceptual cognition cow, is precisely a collection of
a dewlap, etc.? As we have seen above, the basic idea of the apoha theory is that the
object of the notion cow is precisely the nonexistence of non-cows. This view that
a cow (in a general form) is the nonexistence of non-cows is incompatible with
the common view that Madhava holds, namely, that a cow is a dewlap, etc.
(ssndaya eva gau). Madhava points out, according to Jinendrabuddhi, that the
example Dignaga refers to contradicts Dignagas own theory.
Pind 2009: 291, n. 516, PST Ms B233b2-3: atra skhyena pratividhnam

uktam
yadi ssndidarand gopratyayo bhavati, eva sati yad uktam tmntarbhvadarand tmntare pratyayo bhavati iti, tad ayuktam iti. tmntarbh-

Footnote 16 continued
thing is precisely the non-existence of other things. ([1] corresponds to vypti in a syllogism; [2] to
pakadharmat (upanaya in the Nyaya system); [3] to pratij (nigamana).)
Dignaga uses a plural form tmntari probably because he presupposes cows in general. See, for
example, his use of a plural bhvn in his well-known statement: abdo rthntaranivttiviin eva
bhvn ha in PSV 5.36d.
17

18
To put Dignagas statement in other words, the notion cow refers to the nonexistence of non-cows
such as horses, just as it is generally accepted that the notion cow refers to a collection of a dewlap, etc.

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Horns in Dignagas Theory of apoha

vanimittasarvapratyaybhyupagame katha ssndinimittatva gopratyayasyeti

yvat.19
Madhavas point is the same as Tanizawas point. Tanizawa has pointed out that
the apohavdin should not presuppose a dewlap, etc. as a prerequisite. Because the
apohavdin holds the view that the notion of a cow is based on the exclusion of noncows, it is contradictory for the apohavdin to say that the notion of a cow is based
on observing a dewlap, etc. Madhava points out the same when he states that the
example contradicts the apohavdins own thesis (svamataviruddha).
Replying to Madhava, Dignaga in PS(V) 5.41 states that this example is
introduced only by provisionally accepting (abhyupagamya) the Samkhya view.

Jinendrabuddhi summarizes the situation as follows:

PST Ms B233b5: bhavato hi ssndisamha eva gaur iti. atas tad

abhyupagamyya dnta svamataviruddho py ukta.20

For Samkhya scholars, a cow is precisely a dewlap, etc., because one apprehends

something as a cow by observing a dewlap, etc. Only provisionally accepting this

mundane understanding, Dignaga concludes that, similarly, a cow (in a general
form) is precisely the nonexistence of non-cows, because one understands it as a
cow by observing the nonexistence of non-cows. His basic idea is clear from the
following statement in PSV ad 5.41.
PSV ad 5.41: yasya
ssndidarananimitta).21

hy

(agonivttagopratyaya,

tasya

katha

The view that a cognition of a cow is based on the observation of a dewlap, etc.
belongs to the Samkhyas and not the Apohavdins. According to the theory of

apoha, a conceptual cognition of a cow is based on observing the nonexistence of

non-cows. A cow in a general form is precisely the nonexistence of non-cows.
Extending this reasoning, one can probably say that a cognition of a dewlap, etc.
is based on observing the nonexistence of non-dewlaps, etc. In other words, a
dewlap, etc. are precisely the nonexistence of non-dewlaps, etc. Then, a cow and a
dewlap, etc. cannot be one and the same for the apohavdin, because they
respectively require different things to be excluded.
cow (not non-cows) dewlap, etc. (not non-dewlaps, etc.)
19
Pind (2009, p. 291, n. 516) (partly modified): In this context the Sankhya has formulated the
following counter-offensive: If the cognition of a cow is due to observation of the dewlap, and so on, in
that case the claim that the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to observation of the non-existence
of the nature of other things, is not justified. It means: If it is assumed that all cognitions are caused by the
nonexistence of the nature of other things, how then could the cause of the cognition of a cow be the
dewlap, etc.?
20
For a cow is precisely the collection of a dewlap, etc. for you. Therefore, by provisionally accepting
it, this example is referred to [by us] although it contradicts our own view.
21
For how could someone who accepts the cognition of a cow excluded from non-cows assert that it is
caused by the observation of a dewlap, etc.? The words inside parentheses () are postulated by the
present author. Cf. a translation by Pind (2009, p. 110): For how could someone, to whom the cognition
of a cow (*gopratyaya) as precluded from non-cows (*agonivtta), assert that it is caused by the
observation of dewlap, etc. (*ssndidarananimitta)?

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K. Kataoka

Dignaga actually states in PS 5.41 that a cow and a dewlap etc. have mutually
different things to be excluded (bhinnpohys tu te mitha). As a natural
consequence, one can assume that a conceptual cognition of a cow, for Dignaga,
cannot be based on observing a dewlap, etc. Jinendrabuddhi explains the issue as
follows:
Pind 2009: 292, n.522, PST Ms B233b7B234a1: yata eva bhinnam

apohyam, ata ssndiv assndyapohena ssndipratyaya, gavy agovyavacchedena gopratyaya. eva ctrpy tmntarbhvadarand evtmntare
pratyaya.22
In Dignagas theory of apoha, the basic thesis that a conceptual cognition of a
cow is based on observing the nonexistence of non-cows is consistent. Madhavas
reproach for self-contradiction does not apply to Dignaga, because Dignagas
acceptance of the Samkhya view is only provisional. It is introduced only for the

sake of substantiating the invariable concomitance that he is going to apply.

Thus, Dignagas mention of a dewlap, etc. in PS 5.41 is not to be considered as
belonging to his own thesis. The view that observing a dewlap, etc. is the cause of
cognizing a cow should rather be assigned to his opponent, the Samkhya theorist,

Madhava.23
PS(V) 5.43b
Yoshimizu claims that Dignaga illustrates, regarding the function of the word
cow, that all horses are excluded by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on
them. To verify his claim, we need to examine the source, i.e. PS(V) 5.43b, which
runs as follows:
Pind 2009: A17: tasmd yath viitvd anava iti vacane ve viitvdaranena tadvyavacchednumnam, na tu karkdn pratyekam apohate,
npy ekaikeu gavdiu vartate. tavpi vyvttyanuvttibuddhimatam. tath
ctra nyya.24
22

Pind (2009, p. 292, n. 522): Since the excluded referent is different in this way, the cognition
dewlap, and so on, with regard to a dewlap, and so on, is due to the exclusion of non-dewlaps, and so on,
and the cognition cow with regard to a cow is due to the exclusion of non-cows. And thus, in this case
too the cognition of the nature of one thing is only due to the observation of the non-existence of the
nature of other things.

23
The ultimate (paramrtha) level for Buddhists is beyond verbalization. This sphere is not to be
considered here in this context, because anypoha is exactly about verbalization and conceptualization.
The next level down is the issue at stake. Maybe one can call it the savtisatya level, or perhaps the
sastric level. This sphere is surely mundane (savti) for Buddhists, but is accepted from the sastric point
of view. Dignaga does not accept the Samkhya view in question at this level. The third level is the

mithysavti level, at which Dignaga refers

to the Samkhya view by provisionally accepting it.

Lokaprasiddhi, too, can be included at this level.

24

Pind 2009: 111: Therefore, like in the statement It is a non-horse because it is horned (viitvd
anava iti), the inference is from its exclusion from this [namely a horse] (tadvyavacchednumnam)
because of not observing the general property of being horned in a horse (ave viitvdaranena), but
the white horses, etc. (karkdn) are not excluded each separately (pratyekam), nor is every single cow,
etc. (ekaikagavdn) apprehended. Also you maintain the theory that cognitions are based upon exclusion

123

Horns in Dignagas Theory of apoha

Admittedly, there is a statement that It is not a horse because it is horned. This

is followed by another statement that One infers [cows, etc.] by excluding it (horse)
by not observing hornedness in a horse.25 These statements appear to support the
cognitive process based on a dewlap, etc.
viitvdarana avavyavaccheda gavdyanumna
One should, however, pay attention to the structure of the relative construction
yath tath. The clause mentioning the dewlap, etc. is contained in the relative
clause marked by yath. In other words, it belongs to the subordinate clause and not
the main clause beginning with tath. What does Dignaga intend by using yath
tath? Jinendrabuddhi helps us in this regard.26
With regard to the construction yath tath, Jinendrabuddhi quotes Dignagas
passage tath ctra nyya and then comments on it with the reason For a word,
too, is an inferential mark (abdo pi hi ligam). This means that a word, too, is an
inferential mark just as hornedness is. This interpretation is further confirmed by the
following passage in the PST. Jinendrabuddhi formulates Dignagas explanation

into a syllogism as follows.

Ms B235b45 (cf. Tib. Hattori 1982: 213.2224): tad etad ukta bhavati.
Footnote 24 continued
and continuous application (vyvttyanuvttibuddhimatam); and the principle (nyya) in this treatise
(atra) is the same (tath).
The first half of the paragraph is quoted by Yoshimizu (2011a, p. 574, nn. 67) from the two Tibetan
translations and translated into English as follows: Therefore, for example, when it is said that [the
object] is not a horse because it is horned, its (i.e., horses) exclusion is inferred on account of the nonobservation of hornedness in a horse; [a word such as cow] does not exclude [each horse] such as white
ones one by one, nor does it grasp each single (animal) such as a cow [with the help of the generic
property such as cowness].
25

Yoshimizu (2011a, p. 574, n. 6) seems to construe the compound tadvyavacchednumnam as

tadvyavacchedasya anumnam. As Pind (2009, p. 111) correctly understands it, it should be construed as
tadvyavacchedena anumnam. Cf. a Sanskrit fragment from Dignagas no longer extant Hetumukha
quoted at TSP 385.1112 (quoted in Pind 2009, p. 299, n. 539): ajeya kalpita ktv tadvyavacchedena
jeye numnam.

26

PST ad 43b, Pind (2009, p. 298, n. 283; p. 300), n. 545, 547, Ms B235b14:

tasmd
yathetydi. viitvam avd vyvartamnam anavatva gamayati. tac ca vastusatsmnyavdibhir api na kicid anavatva nma smnya vastusat pratijtam. ye 'pi te
'nav gavdaya, tn api viitva na pratyeka vypnoti. ye 'pi tadvijty av, tn api naiva
pratyekam apohate. atha ca *tatra yath vipakavyvttibuddhir bhavati smnyena vijtyatiraskrt
avo na bhavati iti, anuvttibuddhi cvavyvtteu gavdiu smnykrea anava iti, tathtra
nyya. abdo 'pi hi ligam. ato gavdiabdd api gavdiv anuvttibuddhir agavdiu ca
vyvttibuddhir bhavati. *tatra] corr. (Hattori 1982, 213.16: de la), tato Pind
[Dignaga states] Therefore, just as and so on. Hornedness which retires from a horse makes one
understand the property of being non-horse. And even realists who accept real universals do not claim that
the common property of being non-horse whatsoever is real. It is not the case that hornedness pervades
non-horse cows, etc. one by one. Neither is it the case that it (hornedness) excludes, one by one, horses
which are dissimilar to those [cows, etc]. And there, just as the cognition of exclusion from the dissimilar
examples arises in a general form It is not a horse by excluding dissimilar things [collectively] and just
as the cognition of recurrence arises in a general form It is non-horse with regard to cows, etc. excluded
from horses, so is the logic here. For a word, too, is an inferential mark. Therefore, from the word cow,
etc. too, there arises the cognition of recurrence with regard to cows, etc. and the cognition of exclusion
with regard to non-cows, etc.

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K. Kataoka

[1A] yal *liga tat smnyena vijtya vyavacchindat svrtha gamayati.

[1B] tad yath viitvam.
[2] *tath ca abda
[3] iti svabhva.27
If we assume that an animal is walking beneath a window but we only see a horn,
it functions as an inferential mark.28 It collectively excludes dissimilar things such
as horses and makes one understand non-horse cows, etc. This is what Dignaga
assumes in the yath clause. Dignaga asserts that an inferential mark excludes
dissimilar things collectively in a general form and not individually. Similarly, the
cognition of recurrence it is not a horse arises collectively with regard to cows,
etc. and not by picking up cows, etc. individually. What is at stake in this yath
clause is not the conceptual cognizing of a cow by means of the word cow, but the
inferring of cows, etc. by means of an inferential mark hornedness.
In the tath clause Dignaga intends that a word such as cow or tree functions
in the same manner as an inferential mark such as hornedness. In the above,
Jinendrabuddhi mentions the word cow as an example. In the following he
mentions the word tree.
Pind 2009: 298299, n. [283], n. 538, n. 540, PST Ms B235a2-4: na yasmt sa

vkaabdo ny ghadik jti pratidravyam apohate ghao na bhavati

ity evam. ki tarhi vyavacchedyavivakayaikena smnyadharmea. ekena
smnyadharmea vyavacchedyasya y vivak tay hetubhtaypohate.29
The word tree, functioning as an inferential mark, excludes pots, etc. not
individually, but collectively in a general form. Just as the feature of excluding
generally (PS 5.43b: smnyena nirkte) is observed in an inferential mark such
as hornedness, so it is also the case for the words such as cow or tree. This is
Dignagas intention in employing the structure yath tath. Therefore, Dignagas
statements It is a non-horse because it has horns (viitvd anava) and One
infers [cows, etc.] by excluding it (horse) by not observing hornedness in a horse
(ave viitvdaranena tadvyavacchednumnam) are not directed to the word
cow as Yoshimizu understands them. Rather they are about an inferential mark
hornedness, as referred to, for example, in the Vaieikastra 2.1.8. Just as smoke
27

*liga] corr.; ligas Ms. *tath ca] emend.; ca Ms.

Translation: Thus, it amounts to stating what follows: [1A] An inferential mark makes one understand
its own referent by excluding the dissimilar in a general form. [1B] For example, hornedness. [2] And a
word does similarly. [3] This is [classified as] a svabhva-hetu. (I thank late Prof. Helmut Krasser for
allowing me to consult a transcription of the manuscript.)
28
Cf. VS 2.1.8: vi kakudmn prntevladhi ssnvn iti gotve da ligam// Cf. also a fragment
of Dignagas lost Dvdaaatik quoted in Siddhasenaganins Tattvrthabhyavykhy V 24 (quoted in

Pind 2009, p. 134, n. 14; p. 300, n. 545): ki tu tasya vastuna

kacid bhgo rthntaravyvtty loke
gamyate yath viitvd anava iti. This fragment, together with the VS passage that Dignaga most
probably has in mind, convincingly shows that Dignaga regards a verbal understanding of a wordmeaning by means of a word as parallel to an inferential understanding of a non-horse by means of
hornedness.
29
Because it is not the case that the word tree excludes a different class like pots for each substance in
the manner it is not a pot. Rather it excludes by targeting the excluded with a single common property.
By targeting the excluded with a single property, it excludes.

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Horns in Dignagas Theory of apoha

makes one infer fire by excluding non-fire generally, hornedness makes one
understand cows, etc. by excluding all horses generally.
smoke exclusion of non-fire fire
hornedness exclusion of all horses cow, etc.
As Jinendrabuddhi explains, pots, etc. which are non-trees are to be excluded in
the case of the word tree. Similarly, in the case of the word cow, it makes one
understand a cow by excluding non-cows generally. This understanding of language
function is consistently found in Dignagas theory of apoha.
According to Yoshimizu (2011b, p. 236), Dignaga illustrates the function of the
word cow as exclusion of all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen
on them. This interpretation, however, is not supported by Dignagas original text.
What he illustrates is not the function of the word cow but that of an inferential
mark hornedness. Just as hornedness makes one understand cows, etc. by excluding
all horses generally, so the word cow functions by excluding all non-cows
generally. This is what Dignaga intends with the syntax yath tath. Thus, there
is no textual source, at least in PSV ad 5.43b, which supports Yoshimizus
interpretation.
The present interpretation can be contrasted with Yoshimizus as follows.
Yoshimizu regards hornedness, etc. as the cause for the word cow to exclude
horses, etc. and refers to PSV ad 5.43b as a textual source. Dignagas illustration of
hornedness, however, does not deal with the linguistic function of the word cow,
but only with the inferential mark hornedness. There Dignaga says nothing about
hornedness as taking a certain role when the word cow excludes non-cows.
Yoshimizu: gau viitvdi avdivyavaccheda gopratyaya
Kataoka:
viitva avavyavaccheda gavdipratyaya
gau agovyavaccheda gopratyaya

PS(V) 5.43a
The present conclusion is further supported by Dignagas discussion of the first
cognition (dyapratyaya) in PS(V) 5.43a. Dignagas opponent, i.e. Madhava,
criticizes the theory of apoha, because it cannot explain the first cognition in
sasra. According to the apoha theory, a cognition of A is necessarily preceded by
another cognition, i.e. a cognition of the nonexistence of B. The apohavdin,
however, cannot explain how the first cognition arises at the first moment of
sasra, because there is no moment before it in which a theoretically preceding
cognition, i.e. the cognition of the nonexistence of B, arises.30
Pind (2009, p. 294, n. 528), PST Ms B234a6234b1: yady tmntarbhvadarand tmntare
eva nsti. kasmt. na hi tadtmntarbhvadaranam astti.
pratyayo bhavati, dyapratyayasavttir
atrdya pratyayo ya sasre prathama utpadyate tasybhva, tadnm aparasytmano darant.
tmntara cghtv tadabhvopalakitam tmntara grahtum aakyam ity abhyupetahni. If the
cognition of A arises by observing the non-existence of B, the very awareness of the first cognition does

30

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K. Kataoka

Cognition of the nonexistence of B Cognition of A

?
First cognition
Dignaga wards off Madhavas criticism by saying that Madhavas criticism
rather supports the Buddhist view because sasra is beginningless (PS 5.43a:
iisiddhir anditvt). Therefore, no harm is done to the theoretical system of
Buddhism by accepting the apoha theory.
What Dignaga implies here looks more interesting when one considers later
criticisms by Uddyotakara and Kumarila. According to the apoha theory, the
cognition of A (tmntare pratyaya) requires the observation of the nonexistence
of B (tmntarbhvadarana) which is non-A. For example, a conceptual
cognition of a cow requires the observation of the nonexistence of horses, etc.
which are non-cow. Then, in order to cognize the horses, etc. (= B) to be negated,
one further requires the observation of the nonexistence of C which is non-B. And
so forth.
non-B (= C) non-A (= B) A
Thus, there is no positive basis for the negative semantics of apoha. Uddyotakara
precisely points out this fundamental problem by assuming the principle that
negation is preceded by affirmation.
NV 331.19332.3: yasya punar vidhyamna padrtho nsti, tasydym
pratipattim antarea katha pratiedha.31
Positivist: affirmation of B negation of B
Negativist:
?
negation of B
The apoha theory fundamentally is in a danger of falling into the undesirable
consequence of infinite regress.
Kumarila, on the other hand, points out in his SV apoha 8384 that the
apohavda is liable to the problem of mutual reliance. If the cognition of a cow is
based on the negation of a non-cow, the non-cow needs to be established in advance.
The establishment of the non-cow, however, requires the establishment of the cow
in advance. Thus there is a mutual reliance between the cow and the non-cow.
These criticisms equally point out that the apohavda does not provide a positive
basis, such as jti for positivists, which would justify the mundane cognition of

Footnote 30 continued
not exist. Why? Because at that time there is no observation of the non-existence of B. Here [in your
theory] the first cognition, i.e., the one that arises as the first one in the round of transmigration, does not
exist, because at that time there is no observation of B. And it is impossible to apprehend A that is
indicated by the nonexistence of B without having apprehended B. Thus you give up what you have
assumed. (my translation)
31

Pind (2009, p. 294, n. 528): But how could someone, according to whom the thing that is in the
process of being affirmed does not exist, negate without a first cognition.

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Horns in Dignagas Theory of apoha

word-meanings. If Dignaga accepted a dewlap, etc. as the ultimate bases in his

semantics, these criticisms would miss the point. Criticisms by Madhava,
Uddyotakara and Kumarila indicate that Dignaga does not assume the exclusion
of non-cows by means of a dewlap, etc. Yoshimizu himself admits that Kumarila
does not refer to the semantic enclosure by means of the set of conditions that form
the worldly definition of a word-meaning.32 If Yoshimizu was correct in his
understanding of Dignagas theory of apoha, his opponents criticisms of it would
be inappropriate.

Conclusion
1.

The view, mentioned in PSV 5.41, that the notion of a cow is based on
observing a dewlap, etc. must be assigned to the Samkhya and not to Dignaga.

Dignaga refers to the Samkhya view as an example only by provisionally

accepting it (abhyupagamya).
The basic thesis of the apohavdin is that the conceptual cognition of a cow is
based on the observation of the nonexistence of non-cows. It is not the case that
the word cow excludes non-cows by virtue of the fact that a dewlap, etc. are
never seen on them. Dignaga does not assume that the observation of a dewlap,
etc. is the ultimate basis for understanding the meaning of the word cow.
In the passage beginning with yath in PSV ad 5.43b Dignaga illustrates the
function of the inferential mark hornedness and not the word cow.
Hornedness makes one infer cows, etc. by excluding horses collectively.
Similarly, the word cow makes one infer a cow by excluding non-cows
collectively.
As Madhava points out explicitly and Tanizawa implicitly assumes, accepting a
dewlap, etc. as the criteria for excluding non-cows is internally contradictory to
the theory of apoha.
Criticisms by Madhava, Uddyotakara and Kumarila, too, indicate that Dignaga
does not accept a dewlap, etc. as the ultimate criteria for cognizing a wordmeaning.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

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Council of Philosophical Research, 1997.
PST
Pramasamuccayak. See quotations in Pind (2009).

PS(V)
Pramasamuccaya(vtti). See Pind (2009).
MBh The Vykaraa-Mahbhya of Patajali. Ed. F. Kielhorn. 3 vols. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute, 41985, 31965, 31985.
Ms
Manuscript.
VS
Vaieikastra of Kada. Ed. Mani Sr Jambuvijayaji. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1982.
SV
lokavrttika of r Kumrila Bhaa with the Commentary Nyyaratnkara of r Prthasrathi
Mira. Ed. Swam Dvarikadasa Sastr. Varanasi: Tara Publications, 1978.
NV

32

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