Autonomia na Dependncia: A Poltica Externa Brasileira de 1935 a 1942.

by Gerson Moura
Review by: Ricardo A. Silva Seitenfus
The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Nov., 1981), pp. 778-779
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2514656 .
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778

HAHR

I NOVEMBER

iarity with social-science concepts and Weberian theory will find those
insights worth the searching out. Others would do best to begin by reading the conclusion (pp. 180-184) and then to see how far their perseverance will take them.
University of British Columbia

RODERICK

J.

BARMAN

Autonomia na Dependencia: A Politica Externa Brasileira de 1935 a 1942.

By GERSON MouRA. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1980.
Illustrations. Bibliography. Pp. 194. Paper.
After many decades, Brazilian historiography has finally begun to concern itself with foreign relations. This phenomenon is all the more interesting since the critical studies it has given birth to are based on
primary sources-mostly documentary. Gerson Moura's research is one
such study in which the author tries to discern Brazilian policy development in international relations during the period 1935-42. He presents
numerous aspects of this development that he considers fundamental,
such as the Brazilian-American trade agreement of 1935, the Aranha
mission to the United States in 1939, Vargas's speech of June 1940, and
"the ideological and political offensive of the United States" (1939-42).
In this respect, his work is valuable since he brings to public attention
a certain number of documents of Brazilian origin that have been little
used. The other merit of his research is the attempt-not very convincing, it is true-to bridge the gap between particular concepts of political
science and the close documentary analysis of history. The danger of such
a process is that its abstract concepts and absolute certainties may mask
a reality far too complex for apprehension. This is one of the most delicate
aspects of the research. The author sums up the indecisions, the reversals, and the ambiguities of Brazilian politics and politicians during
the period in his key expression, "pragmatic equidistance"-which, for
him, seems to resolve all contradictions and historical riddles. This
expression is, in fact, self-contradictory since "equidistance" precludes
"pragmatism"and vice versa. Making history an exact science is timeconsuming. When it is a question of Brazil in a time of acute internal and
international crisis, this becomes unthinkable.
The same is true of the sources employed. When one analyzes the
Brazilian position toward the United States and Germany, one must necessarily consider the very rich German and Itamarati files. The author
does not do so. Certain misapprehensions, lapses, and hasty conclusions
could have been avoided. For example, the Brazilian-German crisis of

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BOOK REVIEWS

I NATIONAL

779

PERIOD

1938 cannot be summed up as a personal misunderstanding between

Oswaldo Aranha and Karl Ritter, but arose from intense German ideological and political activity in the extreme south of Brazil. In addition,
recent research confirms that since 1936, these activities had become
essential to the German viewpoint.
The author emphasizes the indifference manifested by the United
States during the Varguista putsch of November 1937 when the Estado
Novo was installed. But this interpretation is contradicted by State Department documents. Washington did not regain its calm until after
Aranha's nomination as the head of the Itamarati (March 1938) and, in
particular, after the failed integralista putsch of May of the same year.
This last legitimized, in the eyes of the United States, the estadonovista
corporativism.

The Brazilian government is presented as having had well-defined

foreign policy objectives and its actions as having brought about the greatest possible negotiating power. This is an idyllic vision that is tempered
by historical reality. In fact, the Brazilian position was unstable and often
inconsistent. The passage of time permits us to look at the past with other
eyes, but let us not forget that we are spectators and not actors in the
drama. Did Rio de Janeiro really maximize its negotiating power? The
question is open to debate. In any case, Argentinian neutrality demonstrated that a third position was possible.
Let us hope that the problems raised by the author as well as the
somewhat unsatisfying answers that he gives will bring about further
research.
Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva

RICARDO

A.

SILVA

SEITENFUS

Hitler's Secret War in South America, 1939-1945: German Military Espionage and Allied Counterespionage in Brazil. By STANLEY E. HILTON. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 353. Cloth. $20.00.
Stanley E. Hilton, whose Suastica sobre o Brasil (1979) was the first
scholarly study to pierce the veil of secrecy shrouding German military
intelligence (Abwehr) operations in Brazil during the Second World War,
has now written a much revised and expanded version of that work in
English. Hitler's Secret War in South America deals tangentially with
Abwehr activities in the United States, Mexico, Ecudaor, Chile, and
Argentina, but focuses appropriately on Brazil, which was the center of

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