Trustees of Princeton University

Review: IRAN: A Theory of Revolution From Accounts of the Revolution

Author(s): Marvin Zonis
Source: World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Jul., 1983), pp. 586-606
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010391 .
Accessed: 14/05/2011 18:11
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to World Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

Review Articles
IRAN:
A Theoryof RevolutionFromAccountsof
theRevolution
By MARVIN ZONIS*
Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, eds., The UnitedStatesand Iran:
A Documentary
ofAmerica,
Publications
History.
Frederick,Md.: University
1980, 524 pp., $8.oo.

William H. Forbis, Fall of the Peacock Throne:The Storyof Iran. New

York: McGraw-Hill, ig8i, 309 pp., $6.95.
Mohamed Heikal, The Returnof theAyatollah.London: Andre Deutsch
Ltd., i98i, 217 pp., ?9.95.
Farhad Kazemi, Povertyand Revolutionin Iran. New York: New York
UniversityPress, i980, i8o pp., $17.50.
Michael Ledeen and William Lewis,Debacle: TheAmericanFailurein Iran.
New York: AlfredA. Knopf, i98i, 247 pp., $14.95.
PrincessAshrafPahlavi,Faces in a Mirror:Memoirs
fromExile. Englewood
Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall,i980, 238 pp., $12.95.
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran,Answerto History[citedas Shah].
New York: Stein & Day, i980, 204 pp., $12.95.
Amin Saikal, The Riseand Fall oftheShah. Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press, i980,

279

pp., $14.50.

JohnD. Stempel,InsidetheIranianRevolution.Bloomington:Indiana UniversityPress, i98i, 336 pp., $17.50.

William H. Sullivan, Missionto Iran. New York: W.W. Norton, i98i,
296 pp., $14.95.

HORTLY afterthe electionof PresidentJohnF. Kennedyin No-

vember i960, and followinga period of politicalunrestand economic

turmoilin Iran, the State Department began a searchingreappraisalof
U.S. policy toward that country.The Deputy Director of the Officeof
Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs,JohnW. Bowling,prepareda series
of reportsforthe new President,assessingIranian politicalstabilityand
Iran's futureties to the United States. The prescienceof his reportsis
striking.In early i96i, Bowling identifiedmany of the principalgroups
and processes which would result in the tumultuous success of the
Iranian revolutionof I978, the overthrowof the Shah, and the shocking
loss of the United States' position in the entirePersian Gulf:
* Specialthanksforresearch
ofthisessayto
and otherassistance
towardthecompletion
Daniel Brumberg
and JillSwenson,graduatestudents
ofChicago.
at theUniversity

IRAN: A THEORY OF REVOLUTION

587

Under the Shah, Iran has made considerableprogressin economicdevelopment,

in social welfare,and in internalsecurity
and administrative
efficiency.
The progresshas, however,takenplace withoutparticipation
in the government
by the main oppositiongroups.To some extent,the
Shah's isolationfromthesegroupshas been due to his unwillingness
to
ridedemagogicissuesappealingto thelowerpopularpassions.... To an
equal extent,however,it has been due to his unwillingness
to listento
criticaladvice, to his unwillingnessto share power,and to his nearobsessionwithmilitaryaffairs.
With the confidenceand supportof the Mossadeqists,theShah could
easilycontrolhis rightist
opposition.The converse,however,is nottrue.
The forceand powerof the urbansemi-Westernized
elementscontinue
to growat theexpenseof otherelementsof society.Unlessand untilthe
Shah can come to termswiththemand bringthem,or partof them,into
theprocessof policymaking,
he facesa remorseless
and slowlyincreasing
pressure,whichwill becomesharperand moredangerousto theWestas
moderateleadershipelementsare displacedby the radicals.It seemsunlikely,however,that the Shah can capturethe loyaltyof thiselement
withoutabandoningthe militaryas his internalpoliticalbase, without
givingup muchof his power,withoutabandoninghis openlypro-West
and withouttakingstepsinimicalto internalsecurity
foreignalignment,
and to practicaleconomicdevelopment.
He is unlikelyto be willingto
pay such a price.
... The Shah, thoughhighlyintelligent,
is emotionally
insecure,and
shareswithotherIraniansa deep suspicionthatthe West mayabandon
him in the courseof a detentewiththe U.S.S.R. or by supportinghis
in Washington
internalopposition.The recentchangeof administration
has heightenedhis anxieties....
Bowling went on to suggesthow difficultit would be forthe United
States to influencethe Shah who regarded "even heavy-handedhints"
by the U.S. as "an intolerableinterference."Afterreviewinga number
of policy options,rangingfromgreatersupportfor the Shah to support
for a coup by conservativemilitaryelements, Bowling offereda last
possibility:
The mostforthright
and extremesuggestion
involvesWesternsupportto
a hypothetical
Mossadeqist-oriented
coup, withsupportfromjuniorofficers.
Whiletheresulting
regimewouldnotbe strongly
anti-United
States
and would have popular urban support,it would entailthe following
probableawesome disadvantages,
whichwould accrueat an earlydate
shouldsucha regimeremainin power:
(a) The breakupof CENTO,
(b) The withdrawalof theUnitedStatesmilitary
missionfromIran,
(c) The abandonmentof thecurrenteconomicstabilization
program,
movestoextractmoremoneyfromtheOil Consortium,
(d) Undetermined
(e) A greatblow to theglobal prestigeof theUnitedStates,
forcommunistinfiltration
(f) Opportunity
intotheregime,
(g) The loss of Iran's friendly
UnitedNationsvote,

588

WORLD POLITICS

(h) Neutralismas a positivepolicy,probablymidwaybetweentheNehru

and Kassem models,
aid.
(i) The acceptanceof Sovieteconomic,and possiblyof military,
These probablyshort-range
costswould have to be balancedagainst
thelong-range
advantagesof a morepopularlybasedregimein Iran.The
costdoes notappearto be worththeadvantages....
It wouldappearpreferable
thattheUnitedStateswouldbe bestadvised
to continueitspresentpolicyof reassurance
to theShah of UnitedStates
and support,along with persistent
but delicateinferences
sympathy
by
our Ambassadorto the effectthatthe Shah shoulddevotehis attention
tohisinternalpoliticalproblemsratherthantoforeign
and military
affairs.
... (Bowlingin Alexanderand Nanes,315-21).
What Bowling foresawwithsuch acute trepidationhas come to passwith a vengeance. Not only has the United States lost its dominant
position in Iran, but so have the "Mossadeqists," the Westernized segmentsof Iranian society.Iran's economyis a shambles,itspoliticalsystem
still wracked by devisivenessand violence. Civil war, territorialdisintegration,and Soviet penetrationare constantpossibilities.
What virtuallyeveryone of the studies under review suggestsis that
PresidentCarter seems to have resurrectedparts of Bowling's analysis
and recommendationsof i96i and applied them in I977. But Iran and
its imperialregimehad changed fundamentallyin the interveningyears.
Six key elements in the transformationcan be identified:
(i) the political and personal capacities of the Shah and his regime;
(2) the massive bitternessand rage toward the Shah by virtuallythe
entireIranian population;
(3) the rise of the Islamic Shi'ite hierarchyand its followersas a key
locus of leadership and organization for oppositionactivities;
groups, the Fidayin-i Khalq
(4) the emergence of political/terrorist
and Mujahedin-i Khalq, which radicalized large numbers of the
youth;
(5) the political collapse of the Mossadeqists,the largelymiddle-class,
liberal followersof thatearlierhero of Iranian nationalism,Prime
MinisterMohammad Mossadeq; and
(6) the dramaticallyheightenedrole of the United States in Iranian
society,politics, and economics, as well as the altered Iranian
perceptionsof that role.
As a result,the changes, analyses, and policies which may have been
appropriateforthe i96os proved to be formulasforthe disasterof I978.
The works under review here, and a few others,'provide a detailed
A numberof otherbooks on Iran have recentlybeen published; theysufferfrommost
of the weaknessesof the studiesunder review here. See, forexample,Farah, Shahbanou of

IRAN: A THEORY OF REVOLUTION

589

account of the playersand the eventsof the revolution(Stempel,Heikal,

McFadden and others),a view of the antecedentsof and the U.S. role
in the revolution(Ledeen and Lewis, Sullivan, Alexander and Nanes),
and an account of the actions and thinkingof the Shah (Shah, Pahlavi,
and Farah). The Shah's foreignpolicy and its interactionwith his domestic policy (Saikal), the nature of the trainingand ideology of the
religioushierarchy(Fischer),urban migrantsand theirplight(Kazemi),
and the account of the seizure of American diplomats and the "inside"
storyof the attempts to gain their release (Salinger, McFadden) are
covered in admirable detail.
What is missingfromtheseaccounts is an illuminationof fourfactors
crucial to the outcome of this revolutionand to studentsof revolution
in general. Those four central areas are the role of opposition leaders,
in particularAyatollah Khomeini; the natureof oppositionorganization
as the regime was challenged; the potential for revolutionarymobilization of the city dwellers of Iran; and the nature of the regime's
response-especially the leadership of the Shah-in coping with burgeoning revolutionaryactivities.2An elucidationof these fourareas and
theirinteractionis fundamentalto understandingthe Iranian revolution
and to the constructionof a general theoryof revolution.
There is regrettablylittlehere on the leaders of the firststage of the
revolution,marked by the Shah's flightfromIran on Januaryi6, I979.
While Stempel offersup more analysis than the others,and Heikalforall his considerablefailingshere-the most insight,we are leftwith
the sense that importantissues of revolutionaryleadership have eluded
our grasp. Of prime significanceis the need to understandthe changing
role of Ayatollah Khomeini. On two occasions in Iranian history,I963
and 1978, his charismaticappeal resultedin nationwide politicalexplosions. In i963, on two consecutiveIslamic holydays,he deliveredseveral
sermons which railed against political tyrannyand the oppression of
Muslims by their rulers.3Within hours, he was arrested.A few hours
Iran, My Thousandand One Days, trans. from the French by Felice Harcourt (London:
W. H. Allen, I978); Michael J. Fischer,Iran: From ReligiousDispute to Revolution(Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress,i980); Nikki R. Keddie, RootsofRevolution:
An Interpretive
Historyof ModernIran (New Haven and London: Yale UniversityPress, i98i); RobertD.
McFadden, JosephB. Treaster,and Maurice Carroll, eds., No Hiding Place: Inside Report
on theHostage Crisis(New York: New York Times Books, i98i); Pierre Salinger,America
Held Hostage: The SecretNegotiations(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, i98i); and Sepehr
Zabih, The MossadeghEra, RootsoftheIranianRevolution(Chicago: Lake View Press,i982).
2 It is gratifying
to see the careful work now being done on the opposition.See, for
example,JamesA. Bill, "Power and Religionin RevolutionaryIran," in MiddleEast Journal
36 (No. I, I982), 22-47.
3 For more detailed accounts of the eventsof i963, see Marvin Zonis, The PoliticalElite
of Iran (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1971), I5Iff., and Hamid Algar,"The OppositionalRole of the Ulama in TwentiethCenturyIran," in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars,

590

WORLD POLITICS

lateryet,thousandsof sympathizers
gatheredin the streetsof major
Iraniancities.Calm was restored
onlyafterthreedaysofbloodyrepressionby themilitary.
And notuntilKhomeiniwas exiled,eventually
to
settlein a Shi'iteholycityin Iraq,did itappearthathe hadbeenremoved
as a sourceof antiregime
leadership.
Thirteenyearsaftergoingintoexile,however,
Khomeiniagainplayed
a centralrole.His son had died in Iran in late I977. Rumorscirculated
thathe had beenkilledbytheregime;a nationaloutpouring
ofsympathy
resulted.
In an apparenteffort
todeflateKhomeini'sgrowingreputation,
theMinistry
ofCourthad an articlepublishedin Tehran'sleadingdaily
defamingKhomeini'scharacterand brandinghim as anti-Islamic.It
backfiredwhendemonstrations
theAyatollahbrokeout in
supporting
the religiouscityof Qum. Severalclericsand studentswere killedby
security
forces,and therefolloweda cycleof mourningceremoniesfor
the dead, more deaths,and further
mourningceremonies.That cycle
continuedthroughout
I978, becomingmorefervent,
morewidespread,
and occurringwithgreaterfrequency.
In I978, it culminatedin two
daysofmarchesin Tehranon Decemberi i and I 2, thetwoholiestdays
of the Shi'ite calendar;over one millionpeople marchedeach day,
uncontested
by thesecurity
forces.
These marchesweredramaticevidencethattherevolutionaries
had
But it is by no meansclearjustwhenAyatollahKhomeini
triumphed.
and hisadvisersbegantoplaytheirkeyrolein organizingtheopposition
and in fomenting
theanti-Shahactivity
ratherthanmerelycondoning
it. The Iraniangovernment
had requestedIraq to expeltheAyatollah
in late September,I978, hopingto cut him offfromhis supporters
in
Iran. (The lattercould easilycrossinto Iraq as a resultof the open
borderthathad beenestablished
bytheShah'sagreement
withSaddam
Husseinin Algiersin I975.)
On October 22, Mahdi Bazargan, the secular leader of the Liberation
Movement and a civil-rightsactivist(who was to be Khomeini's first
Prime Minister) had gone to Paris to announce full support for the
Ayatollah. In early November, Karim Sanjabi, the leader of the Mossadeqists, followed; and at the end of that month, Ayatollah Kazem
Shariatmadari,the most eminent of the clerics,declared that "our demands are the same" (Ledeen and Lewis, I53). Whether these pronouncementsof support marked the actual organizational and tactical
unificationof the opposition or only an attemptby opposition leaders
to share in Khomeini's already unassailable leadership position is not
clear.
Saints and Sufis-Muslim Religious Institutions
in the Middle East Since I500 (Berkeley:

of California
University
Press,I972),

23I-55.

IRAN: A THEORY OF REVOLUTION

591

Nor is the nature of Khomeini's own leadershipclarified.The extent

to which he played a commanding tactical role during the revolution
rather than serving as an alternativefocus to the Shah is uncertain.
There are numerousaccountsof the Ayatollah'ssettingbroad constraints
on the directionof the revolution.
For example, when Karim Sanjabi went to Paris, he fullyexpected
to extractmoderate concessionsfromthe Ayatollah.But, faced with the
cleric'simplacable and unalterablecommitmentto the overthrowof the
Shah, it was Sanjabi who backed down and formallyaccepted Khomeini's position for the National Front (Stempel, I29).
Again, afterIranian studentshad seized the United States Embassy
and the American diplomats, the Ayatollah was urged to impose discipline on the students.But, characteristically,
he responded,
Whydo youwantdisciplineand order?... If we insiston disciplineand
order,thatmeansusingthe Armyand the police,and thatshouldn'tbe
done in a revolution.
Our peoplehavebeenin prisonformorethanthirty
years.Nobodycan stopthemfrombreakingthebarsof thatprisonand
gettingout and doingwhatevertheywant.The peoplein thestreetswith
theirferment,
are a guaranteeof thecontinuation
of therevolution.4
One inferenceto be drawn is that the Ayatollah established broad
limitationson the course of the revolution,and lateron his revolutionary
regime. He definitelymade clear what would not be tolerated-e.g.,
compromisewith the Pahlavi ruler. But thereis littleindicationof any
additional leadership role for him. How his directiveswere translated
into policy,and by whom, is neverclarified.In fact,thereare alternative
models of the Ayatollah,rangingfroman active,directingleader to one
who was merely serving as the repositoryof deeply cherished Iranian
values.
At least until the ouster of the Shah, Khomeini was widely believed
to embody many of the central values of Iranian culture,values which
the Shah was seen as having desecrated.Khomeini stood forauthority,
sacrifice,aesceticism,and dignity.With his promiseof a returnto Islam,
he offeredcommunityand authenticityas well. The Shah was never
able to champion such values. But how Khomeini's claims were translated into a leadership role, and the precise nature of that role, is not
clarifiedin these studies.
Anothermajor shortcomingin our abilityto understandtheleadership
of the "winners" is the role of the moderate, liberal opposition to the
Shah. Mention has been made of Bazargan and Sanjabi making their
separatepilgrimagesof obeisance to Khomeini in Paris. But none of the
4 Salinger(fn.i), I02.

592

WORLD POLITICS

studiesunder reviewrevealswhat role thesemen or theirfollowers

actuallyplayedin therevolution.
Bazarganin particular,
bysidingwith
Khomeini,helpedto allaytheanxietiesof "urbandwellersand bazaar
merchantsthata government
withoutthe Shah would ... go to exin this
was especiallysignificant
tremes"(Stempel,50). His participation
activistbitterly
regardbecausehe was also a leadinghuman-rights
opposedto violationsofdue processand civilliberties.
But thesignificance
of his and Sanjabi's role in the successof the revolution
is an entirely
different
matter.
TheirpactswiththeAyatollahcannotbe understood
in termsoftheir
deliveringany "troops."It is not at all clear thattheyhad any troops
to deliver,fortheirorganizations
had largelyatrophiedduringtheyears
of Pahlavi repression.
What theywere able to offerweremainly"celebrity
endorsements."
But,in viewofthemomentum
oftherevolution
and the paralysisof the Shah, it is likelythatsuch endorsements
did
notmake muchdifference
to theoutcome.The demiseof thePahlavis
was perhapsacceptedwithgreatercalm,or even elation,becausethe
endorsements
reducedanxieties.But control,or even major influence,
over significant
eventsseems to have passed out of theirhands well
beforetherevolution.
A second area crucial to understanding
the collapseof the Shah
and his imperialsystem,
as wellas a moregeneraltheoryof revolution,
is theorganizationof theopposition.The worksunderreviewprovide
littleinformation-beyond
theconventional
wisdom-as to how revoview
lutionaryactivitywas organizedand financed.The conventional
has it that,at leastuntiltheearlyfallof 1978, revolutionary
activity
was
conductedratherhaphazardly,witheach of the largenumberof revforcespursuingits own goal in a moreor less spontaneous
olutionary
fashion.As theseactivities
burgeoned-especially
aftertheCinemaRex
firein Abadanin AugustI978, in whichoverfourhundredmoviegoers
wereburnedtodeathin a theaterwhosedoorshad beenlocked-greater
coordination
becameapparent.By thetimeofthekeyleaders'obeisance
to Khomeiniin November,thenationwidenetworkofclericsoperating
outofneighborhood
mosques,and financedbydisgruntled
businessmen,
seemsto have servedas theorganizational
sourceof revolutionary
activity.

Many visitorsto the Ayatollahin Paris-includingthisreviewerreportedthathisaides had constructed

a sophisticated
communications
systemwherebyhis tape-recorded
speecheswere transmitted
virtually
instantaneously
byinternational
telephonesystem
toTehran,wherethey

IRAN: A THEORY OF REVOLUTION

593

werere-recorded.
Cassettereproduction
machinesthenmadethousands
ofcopiesoftheAyatollah'sharangues.Theyweredeliveredthroughout
the country,
playedto gatherings
in mosques,and sold on the streets
(describedby eagervendorsas "used" tapes).
But theseaccountsdo notgo beyondtheconventional
wisdom.How,
forexample,was coordination
effected
amongmajoropposition
groups?
How weretheparadesofhundredsofthousands
ofmarchers
organized?
Who acted as theirmarshals,imposingdisciplineon the participants?
Did theterrorist
groupsservecontinually
as theparamilitary
forcefor
theclerics?When and how did theybeginto cooperate?
Knowledgeabout the financingof the revolutionhas been equally
general.In thefallof I978, forexample,largenumbersofbankaccounts
were establishedto supporta wide varietyof revolutionary
activities.
ofdiversepoliticalgroupswouldurgetheirfollowersRepresentatives
in thethenlargelyuncontrolled
eventhroughadvertisements
press-to
make depositsto those accounts.Many were labeled "strikefunds,"
allegedlyto supportthe thousandsof government
employeeswhose
refusalto workincreasingly
paralyzedtheregime.But it is also known
thatformuchof thisperiodthegovernment
continuedto pay itsemployeeswhethertheyworkedor not,and put immensepressureon the
privatesectorto do likewise,believingthatfailureto do so would lead
to evengreaterdisorder(Stempel,121). For what,then,werethefunds
in thosebank accountsspent?How much was collected?What alternativesourcesoffundswereavailable?The worksunderreviewdo not
provideany information.
The Shah,of course,along witheveryoneelse,had his own theories
abouttheorganization
of theopposition.
He beganto sharetheseviews
withU.S. AmbassadorWilliamH. Sullivanin September.
By then,the
revolutionhad takena qualitatively
different
turn.The Cinema Rex
firehad raisedrevolutionary
consciousness
and was followedbythefirst
massdemonstrations
heldin all majorIraniancities;theywereorganized
of theprincipaloppositionfactions.
At these
throughthecollaboration
thefirst
demonstrations,
"publiccallsforgovernment
action"weremade:
a strictenforcement
of the i906 constitution,
the releaseof political
the endingof corruption,
prisoners,
and the holdingof freeelections
(Stempel,I I4). No calls wereyetheardforthedepositionof theShah.
He had promisedto meetsuchdemandsas recently
as IranianConstitutionDay in August,and hisnewlyinstalledPrimeMinister,
Engineer
was workingto carryoutthosepromises;that,however,
Sharif-Emami,
seemedirrelevant.
Only a few days afterthesedemonstrations,
duringthe nightof

594

WORLD POLITICS

September7-8,thegovernmentdeclared martiallaw and forbadefurther

demonstrations.But earlyon the morningof September8-which came
to be known as "Black Friday"-thousands of demonstrators,possibly
unaware of the martial law declaration,gathered in Tehran's Jhaleh
Square.5 The troopsopened fire-apparently with at least tacitapproval
for the use of force fromthe United States officials.6By the end of the
day, a large number of marchershad been killed-86 according to the
Shah, thousands according to the opposition; the actual figureseems to
have been closer to the smaller number.
Black Friday clearly was a decisive turningpoint. The Shah's and
Sharif-Emami's effortsto placate the opposition even to the point of
appeasement were belied by the impositionof martial law. The shreds
of royal credibilitythat the middle-class citydwellers had still retained
were destroyedwith the lives of the demonstrators.Clearly,thepromises
of the Shah were now worthless.Even more damaging to the imperial
system was the collapse of the Shah's own resolve, which followed
quickly upon the killings. Opposition leaders who had been rounded
up throughoutTehran on September 8 were abruptlyreleased within
24 hours. It became apparent that the Shah could be trustedneitherto
liberalize nor to repress.His indecisivenessand clear lack of any stable
sense of how to manage his political fate chilled even his most ardent
supporters.
The Ayatollah and the opposition,on the other hand, manifesteda
distinctvision of how to pressfortheirgoals, and the continuingcourage
to carrytheirobjective throughto its inevitableconclusion.Few people
are as ready to succumb to decisive authorityas the Iranians; it was
now clear where such authoritywas to be found.
The Shah's private response to these developmentswas to focus on
the question of the organizationof the opposition.By then,Ambassador
Sullivan was seeing the Shah on a regularbasis; along withthe Empress,
Sullivan and laterthe Iranian Ambassador to theUnited States,Ardeshir
Zahedi, were the only persons with whom the Shah could have frank
discussions(Sullivan,I58). All throughSeptember,the Shah railedagainst
the opposition. He believed that the demonstrations
It is of great symbolicsignificanceto the revolutionthat JhalehSquare, an undistinguished public place in a lower-classneighborhoodof south Tehran, servedas the focusof
so much of the revolution.During the turmoilof the Mossadeq period,BaharestanSquare
played that role. Baharestanwas not only surroundedby Tehran's middle classes,but was
borderedby the buildingthathoused the Parliament,forwhose centrality
to Iranian politics
Mossadeq's supporterswere struggling.
6 See one of a recentseriesof articlesin the Washington
Post,byScottArmstrong,
February
3, i982, p. IO. Ironically,it was JohnD. Stempel,thenthe highest-ranking
Persian-speaking
American diplomat,who transmittedthat tacitapproval to the Iranians.

IRAN: A THEORY OF REVOLUTION

595

gave evidenceof sophisticated

planningand [were]nottheworkof spontaneousoppositionists.
He thenturnedto me and in an almostsupplicant
tonesaid he had thoughtthisoverat greatlengthand had concludedthat
theactionshe had justoutlinedrepresented
theworkof foreignintrigue.
What botheredhim, he said, was that this intriguewent beyondthe
oftheSovietKGB and musttherefore
also involvetheBritish,
capabilities
and AmericanCIA. He said he could understandtheBritishintrigueto
some extentbecausetherewere thosein the UnitedKingdomwho had
neverforgiven
him fornationalizingtheoil industry.
...
What botheredhim themost,he continued,was theroleof theCIA.
Why was theCIA suddenlyturningagainsthim? What had he done to
deservethissortof actionfromthe UnitedStates?... had we and the
Sovietsreachedsomegranddesignin whichwe had decidedto divideup
Iranbetweenourselvesas partofan overalldivisionofpowerthroughout
theentireworld?(Sullivan,156-57).
Thus the Shah, as stupefiedby the exploding revolutionas virtually
everyone else, fell back on the old Iranian formula of seeing Iranian
politics as some kind of vibrationelicited by foreignplayers-a vision
complementaryto Ayatollah Khomeini's branding the United States as
the "Great Satan."
But findingthe villain in foreignplots was as much a flightfrom
cogent political analysis for the Shah as it has been for the Ayatollah.
It obviatesthe need to understandthe Iranian players,theirmotivations,
and theirorganization. Unfortunately,the works at hand do not assist
students of revolution and of Iran in the task of understandingthe
organization of the revolutionaries.
A thirdfactoressential to comprehendingthe Iranian revolution,in
addition to those of leadershipand organization,is thatof revolutionary
energy-the propensityfor revolutionaryparticipationby the vast majorityof citydwellers in Iran. There are stilldiehard monarchistswho
think of the events of I978 as afetneh,a disturbance,perhaps even an
uprising,but still not a revolution.One of the most strikingaspects of
I978, however, is the extentto which the Iranian people as a wholeincluding the very sectorsof Iranian societythat benefitedmost from
the Shah's rule-were not only willing to see the dismantlingof the
entirePahlavi systembut were, in fact,eager participantsin its demise.
Three differentexplanationsfor the propensityfor revolutionby the
Iranian people are offered;a fourthneeds to be constructedfrom rich
evidence in the presentaccounts. The firstexplanation is an economic
theoryof revolutionarybehavior. The merchantsand industrialistswho
benefitedmost fromthe economic boom that began in i969 and developed into a hyper-boomfollowingthe OPEC-induced oil price rises of

WORLD POLITICS

596
I973

and

I974

had become disenchantedand angryat the constant

harassmentof state bureaucracies.

Two examples from the I970s illustratetheir dismay. By mid-I975
it was clear to virtuallyeveryone that the Iranian economy was not
merely overheated, but was in danger of flyingapart. The economic
and social developmentplan had been doubled in size in I974, following
the jump in oil revenues. Less than one year later,actual expenditures
were runningahead of planned levels,partiallydue to the Shah's forced
draft expansion of the military.The results were obvious: inflation,
shortagesof manpower at virtuallyeverylevel of skill,horrendoustransportationbottleneckswith clogged portsand jammed warehousesat one
end of the production process and shortagesof materialsat the other,
frequentelectricityoutages-in short,near-chaos.
One response by the bureaucracywas to counterinflationby ending
what it identifiedas the profiteeringof businessmen. Students were
mobilized throughoutthe countryto fightsuch practices;theysurveyed
both retailersand wholesalersto check thattheirpriceswere withinthe
government'sguidelines. As a result,thousands of businessmen were
courts.Fines were levied;
dragged into hastilyconvened antiprofiteering
worse, certainbig businessmenwere sentencedto various termsof "internal exile." The most prominentof these were not Shi'ite Muslims,
but Baha'is and Jews. Businessmen everywherewere chagrined and
outraged,and the Baha'i and Jewishcommunitiessensed the specterof
persecution.
Another campaign that emanated fromthe state bureaucracysought
to tie workers to the systemby making it possible for them to own
shares in theiremployers'corporations.In fact,the governmentforced
large corporationsto sell up to 49 percentof theirfirmsto the workers.
It made low-cost government loans available for the purchases. No
matterhow well-intentionedthe programmay have been,however,both
the industrialistsand the workers feltworse offafterit was enforced.
It was never clear, for example, whether or not the original owners
merelyprintednew shares to sell to theiremployees,or how the price
of the shares had been established,or whether the workers saw any
value in owning shares. The workers believed the governmentwas
forcingthem to transfertheir hard-earned rials to already wealthyindustrialistsfor paper shares that theymight never be able to sell. Both
the industrialistsand the workersconsideredthemselvessubjectto some
formof forcedconfiscation;and both groups feltput upon by the government.
But the most serious source of economically based dissatisfaction

IRAN: A THEORY

OF REVOLUTION

597

stemmednot frompricecontrolsor workers'shareholding,

but from
ofincomeinequality.
thepoliticization
Althoughincomeinequality
had
seemedsignificant:
burgeonedalongwithoil revenue,ithad notinitially
Iraniansat all sociallevelsfeltthattheboomwouldbe endless,and that
theirchancesforwealthwould come in time.When it becameobvious
in mid-I975thatthe boom was slowingdown, therewas panic over
whatwereseenas disappearing
opportunities
forriches,and bitterenvy
directedat thosewho had alreadysucceeded.7
Stempel,and Ledeenand
of
such
and
Lewis,capturetheconsequences
panic
envy.The latternote:
as
The discontent
withworsening
economicconditions
was centered,
always,in thebazaar.And theworsethebazaaris'balancesheets,
the
greater
theangeragainsttheshah."Following
yearsof prosperity
and
risingexpectations,
themoodin thebazaarwas nowoneofdisenchantstrikes
ment.Thismadeiteasierforreligious
leaderstocallforbusiness
towhichthebazaar... responded
impressively"
(LedeenandLewis,I37).8
The mostcomprehensive
of the
analysisof theeconomicdifficulties
in which
Journal
ofEconomics,
mid-I970sis tobe foundin theCambridge
Thomas Walton demonstrates
impressiveparallelsbetweenthe early
i960s

ofthe
andthelateI970s.9 In theformer,
theoverheated
economy

lateI950S had beencooledthroughan IMF stabilization

programwhich
precededthepoliticalunrestof i960-i962. Waltonarguesthattheoilinducedboom of theearlyI970s, followedbya declinein oil revenues
to slow
efforts
beginningin I975, and coupledwiththegovernment's
the economythroughconstricting
creditand othersteps,led to the
of I978. CitingHirschman,
thepoliticalturmoil
Revolution
he attributes
in each periodto thefactthat
of ever-rising
material
wealthwerebecoming
expectations
increasingly
frustated
and thepeople'stolerance
forthecontinually
risingsocialand
economicinequities
whichhad beenin processeversincetheabortive
protests
ofi963, wasbecoming
rapidly
exhausted.
Peoplemaybeprepared
to tolerate
whattheyperceiveas inequities
so longas theyexpectthe
7 Farhad Mehran, "Income Distributionin Iran, The Statisticsof Inequality,"Working
Paper, Income Distributionand EmploymentProgramme(Geneva: ILO, October 1975);
M. H. Pesaran,"Income Distributionand Its Major Determinantsin Iran,"in JaneJacqz,ed.,
Iran: Past, Present,Future (New York: Aspen Institutefor Humanistic Studies, 1976); Jiri
Skolka and Michael Garzuel, "Changes in Economic Distribution,Employmentand Structure of the Economy: A Case Study of Iran," Working Paper, Income Distributionand
Employment
Programme(Geneva: ILO, 1976); George E. Wright,"Regional Inequality in
the Economic Development of Iran," Ph.D. diss. (Universityof Michigan, 1977).
8 Quoted by Ledeen and Lewis fromDavid Menashri,"Iran," in Colin Legum and Haim
Shakhed, eds., Middle East Contemporary
Survey,III, I978-i979 (New York: Holmes &

Meier,i980).

9 Walton, "Economic Development and RevolutionaryUpheavals in Iran," Cambridge

Journalof Economics4 (i98o), 271-92, at 286.

598

WORLD POLITICS

existingdisparitiesand injustices to diminish eventually.But if this does

not happen, the inevitable result under autocratic regimes will be social

tension,politicalprotestsand potentially
revolutionary
upheavals.'0

In short,by I977 the regime of the Shah had lost the confidenceof
and share distrithe major industrialiststhrough its antiprofiteering
bution schemes. Smaller businessmen and bazaaris-never great supportersof the Shah to begin with-became dismayed with the system
when theysaw theirchances for wealth disappear as a consequence of
creditconstrictionsand the declining oil revenues.
Another source of the revolutionaryspiritof the time can be found
in political processes that are counterpartsof the massive expansion of
opportunitiesfor economic betterment-opportunitiesthat raised expectationsand heightenedaspirations,only to be thwartedby economic
contraction.As the Shah himselfexplains it:
On March4, I974 [actually,I975], the ResurgencePartywas formed.I
believedthatrepresentatives
of all sociallevelsand all opinionscould be
gatheredtogetherin one party.I thoughtthatthrougheliminatingan
oppositionparty,I could solicittheaid ofall capablepoliticalpersonalities
withoutconcernforpartypolitics.For thefutureI saw thisorganization
as a greatpoliticaland ideologicalschool....
However,experiencewas to show the creationof thispartywas an
error... itdid notbecometheconduitofideas,needsand wishesbetween
thenationand thegovernment
(Shah, I24).
Initially,the Resurgence or Rastakhiz Party was greeted with the
profoundcynicismso characteristicof Iranians. But, to the amazement
of increasingnumbers of the politicallyambitious, the Shah appeared
to be treatingRastakhizdifferently
fromtheIran Noveen Partyor others
beforeit. To be sure, it developed into a nationwide patronage organization delivering jobs and services in returnfor party work, and especiallyforparliamentaryelectoralpolitics.But in I975, Rastakhizbegan
to change in a more significantdirection-it began to offerthepossibility
for communication,not merely from the top down, but also from the
less to the more powerful."Wings" of the partywere created-both led
by loyalists,but offeringslightlydifferentand legitimateperspectives.
Increasing numbers of the politicallyliteratebegan to believe that the
formationof these wings offered,finally,hope for political democratization (Ledeen and Lewis, 29).
By late I976, democratizationhad gone too far-for the Shah. He
steppedin to ban directcompetitionbetweenthewingsin theparliament,
10Albert0. Hirschman,"The Changing Tolerance forIncome Inequalityin the Course
of Economic Development," Quarterly
Journalof Economics87 (1973), 544-66.

IRAN: A THEORY OF REVOLUTION

599

definingveryclearlythepoliticallimitshe would tolerate.His imposition

of those limits leftthe partyactivistswho had struggledto build politically significantfactions with a sense of having been betrayed.Still,
many-especially the technocratswho were thoroughlyimmersed in
the system-stayed with the party,hoping to keep it positioned for
another period of liberalization (Stempel, 34-38).
But the liberalization of I977 was not extended to the party.When
its SecretaryGeneral criticizedthe governmentforthe killingof several
squattersin a slum eradication campaign in August I977, the end had
come (Kazemi, 85-88). The SecretaryGeneral was firedand "the Shah
announced that active membership... was neithera way to get ahead
in a governmentjob ... nor was the partyto act as a pressuregroup
on behalf of specificpolicies. Members were to be merely watchdogs"
(Stempel, 42).
By the end of I977, then-just when revolutionaryfervorelsewhere
in the societywas being translatedinto revolutionaryaction-the only
national organization capable of providingpolitical supportfor the regime was undone. Its members-even the diehard technocratsseeking
to justifytheir role in the system-realized the extent to which they
had been betrayedand theirpolitical aspirationsthwarted.
The economic and political processes which resulted in feelingsof
betrayal and frustrationwere significantsources of the revolutionary
energy that culminated in the overthrowof the Shah. Moreover, they
are compatible with numerous theories of revolution.sI But they are
inadequate explanations for at least two reasons. First, these economic
and political processes affectedprimarilythe middle sectorsof Iranian
urban society.They do not seem to account for the particularlywidespread participationof the urban masses who were the troops of the
revolution. Second, betrayal and frustrationare affectsof defeat, of
disappointment,and of failure-but not of action.
What must be added here is a process that adds feelingsof injury
and humiliation to those of frustrationand betrayal-not just for the
middle sectors,but for virtuallythe entirepeople of Iran. These added
affectsproduced a rage so implacable thatneitherthe ousterof the Shah
nor the later humiliationof the United States for444 days would calm
it completely.Put simply,as the I970S passed and theoil revenuesslowed,
I] See, for example, Crane Brinton,The Anatomyof Revolution(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:
Prentice-Hall,I965); JamesC. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution,"in C. T. Paynton
and R. Blackey, eds., WhyRevolution?(Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1971); James C.
Davies, ed., WhenMen Revolt-and Why(New York: Macmillan, 197i); Ted RobertGurr,
WhyMen Rebel (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1970).

600

WORLD POLITICS

the behaviorof the Shah increasingly

came to be experiencedas an

insult-a narcissisticinjury to his own people.12

Sufficeit here to give but threefroma listof nearlyinfiniteexamples
of the Shah's behavior that was so offensiveand insultingto Iranians.
In the fullnessof his grandiosityin I976, the Shah had never seemed
to tireof repeatingsuch boasts as "I want the standardof livingin Iran
in ten years' time to be exactlyon a level with that in Europe today. In
twentyyears' time we shall be ahead of the United States" (Heikal, io9).
In his eagerness to reach those goals, he frequentlycommunicatedimplicitlythatthepeople of Iran were thegreatestobstacleto therealization
of his objectives."If our nationwished to remainin thecircleof dynamic,
progressiveand free nations of the world, it had no alternativebut to
completelyalter the archaic order of societyand to structureits future
on a new order compatiblewith the visionsand needs of theday" (Shah,
ioi). But "the visions and needs of the day" were his visions and his
needs. He imposed his set of reformsfromabove-the "White Revolution," which included land reform,rightsfor women, the nationalization of forestsand water, profitsharing,universal literacy,and the
like. He made no attemptto assess his people's visions and needs, and
made littleeffortto explain why his visionsand needs were appropriate.
He showed the Iranians no compassion and no empathy.
A second example of his behavior, which served as a constant humiliationto his own people, was his predilectionforforeign(in particular
American) ways and approval,at theexpense of indigenousIranian ways
and Iranian approval. Answerto Historywas published in French and
English (as was his firstbook, Missionfor My Country),not in Persian;
it is laced with quotations fromspeeches by foreignleaders-especially
the eightAmerican Presidentshe knew personally.To be sure,the Shah
was attemptingto recoversome shred of his own esteem followingthe
massive rejectionhe had experiencedfromhis own people. But the book
is symbolicof his failureeven to appreciate,letalone alter,thewidespread
Iranian perceptionthatthe most importantreferencegroup forhim was
that parade of American Presidentsratherthan the Iranian people. A
reportfrom the U.S. National SecurityCouncil noted as early as i963
that "it must not be forgottenthat the Shah's greatestsingle liability
--For a basic statementof the issues of narcissisticinjuryand narcissisticrage,see Heinz
Kohut, The Analysisof the Self (New York: InternationalUniversitiesPress, 1971), and
Kohut, The Restorationof the Self (New York: InternationalUniversitiesPress, 1978). For
applicationsof these ideas, see Group for the Advancementof Psychiatry,
Committeeon
InternationalRelations,Self-Involvement
in the Middle East Conflictio (November 1978),
and Marvin Zonis, "Self-Objects,Self-Representation,
and Sense Making Crises: Political
in the i980's," forthcoming.
Instability

IRAN: A THEORY OF REVOLUTION

601

and radical
to chargesbybothreactionary
maywell be his vulnerability
oppositionelementsthathe is a foreignpuppet"(Alexanderand Nanes,
357).
A thirdexampleof theShah's failureto deal emphatically
and with
senseofinsult,centers
compassiontowardhispeople,and theirresulting
on theroleof SAVAK, theIraniansecretpolice.Politicalpassionsstill
theextentoftorture
and political
makeitimpossibletoassessobjectively
repression
metedout bySAVAK.'3 Whatis clearis thatbytheoutbreak
of the revolution,
the Iranianpeoplehad come to believein theworst
ofitsexcesses.One resultwas a generalfeelingofintimidation,
certainly
a principalgoaloftheimperialregimein fostering
thesenseofSAVAK's
of theShah: it was
omniscience.
But anotherresultwas thedefamation
widelybelievedthatonly a rulerwithso littleregardforhis people
would subjectthemto such treatment.
relation
To put it differently,
manyhave recognizedthefather-child
betweentheShah and theIranianpeople(A. Pahlavi,i5o, i88; Forbis,
69). SAVAK, or ratherthemythof SAVAK, was a tangiblereminder
of thedisdainof thefatherforhis children.14
Again,an infinite
numberof actionssuggestedto theIranianpeople
thatthe ruleof the Shah was an insultto them.Sufficeit to notethat
any attemptto generatea theoryof revolutionmusttake accountof
be thecase-of thepeople's
revolutionary
rage,and-as willuniversally
senseof humiliationand insultthatproducedthisrage.'5The present
view of this
workson Iran fail to developany coherentor systematic
process.
We have arguedabove that,in orderto understand
theIranianrevolution-and by extension,any revolution-onemustunderstandthe
forrevolutionary
actionon the partof the people,and the
propensity
leadershipand organizationof the oppositionthatcan mobilizethis
potentialon theirbehalfagainsttheexistingpoliticalorder.The fourth
area necessary
forcompleting
therevolutionary
equationis theresponse
'3 For an effort
to evaluate the role of SAVAK in Pahlavi Iran, see Marvin Zonis, "The
Shah of Iran-An Assessment,"BostonGlobe, August 3, i980, pp. Ai-A3.
4 For a highlyelaborate essay on the father-child/ruler-ruled
parallel in Iranian history,
see Reza Baraheni's provocativeessay, "Masculine History," in The CroumedCannibals,
on Repressionin Iran (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).
Writings
15Kohut(fn. 12), develops the psychoanalytic
theorywhich demonstratesthatnarcissistic
injuryis the necessaryprecursorof rage. Studies thatlink such rage to politicalprocesses
include Marvin Zonis, "Some Possible Contributionsof the Psychologyof the Self to the
Studyof the Arab Middle East," in Arnold Goldberg,ed., Advancesin SelfPsychology
(New
York: InternationalUniversitiesPress, i980), 439-46, Zonis (fn. 12), and Group for the
Advancementof Psychiatry(fn. 12).

602

WORLD POLITICS

of the politicalsystem,the strategies

and tacticsof the ruler,and his
systemfordealingwiththefirstthreefactors.
As in thecaseoftheother
elementsnecessaryto producea theoryof this(and by extension,
any)
revolution,
thebooksunderreviewprovideno coherentanalysisof the
Shah's actions,althoughtwo come close to it (Stempel,Saikal). But
virtually
everyone of themprovidesabundantraw materialfordoing
so.

The studiesshowthattherewas nothinginevitable

abouttheoutcome
of the Iranianrevolution-neither
its timingnor the fallof the Shah.
As lateas November6, I978, forexample,theShah instituted
a military
government
underthedirectionof GeneralGholamReza Azhari,who
had beenchiefoftheSupremeCommander'sStaff.For thenextseveral
days,a degreeof stability
and orderwas restored,
as if theopposition,
afraidof thearmedforces,had pausedto takethemeasureof thenew
government.
Whenit becameclearthatthemilitary
government
would
be no moreforcefully
repressive
thanthe armedforcesundermartial
law had been fortheprecedingtwo months,it was back to revolution
as usual. The breathtaking
speed of the finaldenouementcaughtnot
merelythe Shah and the Americansoff-guard;AyatollahKhomeini
himselfhad no idea of thespeedwithwhichthePahlavisystemwould
collapsein thosefinalweeks.Heikal relatesthat,whenhe visitedKhomeiniin Paris in DecemberI978, one of theAyatollah'sadvisers,Dr.
IbrahimYazdi, and theAyatollah'sson-in-law,
Hojjat-ulIslamEshraqi,
asked forhis help in findinganotherresidencefortheAyatollahwhen
his Frenchvisa expiredin Aprilof I979. They did notforeseethatthe
Ayatollahwould returnto Iran in triumph-as earlyas Februaryi,
I979.

theresponsibility
Ultimately,
forthetimingand outcomeof therevolutionrestswiththeShah.He had 37 yearsofexperience
in rulingthe
He commandedone oftheworld'smostpowerful
country.
armedforces.
Billionsof dollarsof oil revenueswerespentannuallyat his discretion.
Everysignificant
foreignstatesupportedhim virtuallyto the endincludingnot just the United Statesand Britain,but also the Soviet
Unionand thePeople'sRepublicofChina.(Indeed,thelastofficial
state
visitover whichthe Shah presidedwas thatof Hua Kuo-Fengof the
PRC.) That he could have losthis throneto therevolution
whilecommandingthoseassetsseemsstaggering-implausible
in the face of it.
Basically,he was overthrown
becausehe neverdemonstrated
thefirm
and tenaciousleadershipnecessary
tocommunicate
an unambiguous
and
sustainedcommitment
to maintaininghis regime,and was unable to
act in waysappropriate
to sucha commitment.

IRAN: A THEORY OF REVOLUTION

603

The worksunderrevieware repletewithexamplesof thosefailures.

It was typicalof the entireprocessof the revolutionthatthe Shah
continually
gaveoutmixedsignals:liberalization-cum-appeasement
and,
simultaneously,
repression.
On November6, I978,theShahwentbefore
his people via televisionto presentthe new military
government.
His
hisapologetics,
and hispromaudiencewas takenabackbyhishumility,
ise of greaterliberalization-allthe while announcingthe imposition
ofmilitary
to himselfas padeshahor kingrule.Moreover,he referred
a termusedinIranforsuchimposing
as thepadeshah
ofThailandfigures
ratherthan as shahanshah
or king of kings,his usual title.How the
Iranianpeople,acutelyconsciousof thefinenuancesof language,were
in thatspeech
tointegrate
thedifferent
levelsofmeaningcommunicated
was
is notclear.It musthaveled themtoassumethattheruler hopelessly
lost.And, as thatfactbecamemore widelyunderstood,
theyrealized
thatpowerwas available,to be taken,at minimalcost.
Four factorsseemto be at workin accountingfortheShah'sfailure
of leadership.For one, despitehis 37-yearreign,he consistently
failed
In August
to demonstrate
anypersonalcapacityto deal withchallenges.
I94I,
while he was stillcrownprince,the SovietUnion and Britain
His twinsisterreportshis response
simultaneously
invadedhiscountry.
to thatcrisis:
ofthewar,
"Mybrother
wasconcerned
notonlyabouttheconsequences
butalsoaboutthethreat
He doubted
thattheIranian
tothemonarchy....
armywouldbe ableto holdthepalacein theeventofan Alliedattack.
me a gunand said:"Ashraf,
Laterthatafternoon
he brought
keepthis
gunwithyou,and iftroopsenterTeheranand trytotakeus,firea few
shotsand thentakeyourownlife.I'll do thesame"(A. Pahlavi,40).
In AugustI953, the Iranianarmedforces,in conjunction
withU.S.
and U.K. intelligence
services,launcheda coup againstPrimeMinister
Mossadeq.'6When thecoup failed,theShah fledto Baghdad,and then
to Rome.Therehe heardthatthecrowdsin Tehranweretearingdown
his statues.Accordingto Forbis,Queen Soraya,who was thenhis wife,
"saysin hermemoirsthatsheaskedhim'Wherewouldyouliketo go?'
and he replied,'ProbablyAmerica,'and suggestedthathe would like
tobuya farmthere"(p. 6i). Here,too,theShahsuccumbedtoa collapse
of will and demonstrated
an absenceof leadership.
Ten yearslater,the Shah was again confronted
by a seriouschalx6
A recentlypublished studyminimizes the role of the CIA and Britishintelligencein
the 1953 cOup; see Zabih (fn. i). For another recentwork (which maximizes the role of
the CIA), see Kermit Roosevelt,Countercoup,The Strugglefor the Controlof Iran (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

604

WORLD POLITICS

lenge-the riotingthatfollowedthe arrestof Khomeini.In thiscase,

theShahappearedtorespondwithfirmness,
evenbrutality.
Troopswere
orderedto clearthe streets-byfiring,if necessary;and firetheydid,
withgreatlossoflife.Whatactuallyhappenedwas thatPrimeMinister
Alam,theShah'sboyhoodfriendand laterMinisterofCourt,calledthe
commanders
to his officeand orderedthemto fireto clearthe
military
streets.When theybalked at acceptingordersfromAlam ratherthan
fromthe Shah,and especiallysuchorders,Alam telephonedthemonarch. A heatedargumentensued; finally,the Shah told Alam to do
whateverhe wantedas long as Alam took fullresponsibility
forthe
consequences.He made it clear thathe was washinghis handsof the
wholeaffair.Alam returnedto theofficers-whohad been allowedto
overheartheentireconversation-andrepeatedhis orders.They were
carriedout.'7
The Shah'sfailuresin I977 and I978 weretherefore
completely
consistent
withthecharacter
he had displayedinpreviouscrises.Two things
and trustedcounselor,Aswere,however,different.
First,his forceful
sadollahAlam had died of cancerin the fall of I977. Since no other
individualwas allowed by the Shah to play the same role,he had no
one else whose politicaljudgmenthe trustedand who could act at
decisivemomentsof therevolution.
Second,thenatureof thechallenge
to his rule,forthereasonssuggestedabove,was farmoreseriousthan
any he had confronted
previously.In the face of this challenge,he
reverted
to hisearlierstyleand withdrew.
As Ledeen and Lewis putit,
"thefundamental
factremainsthatthedecisivepersonto withdrawhis
commitment
to thestatewas theShah himself.Once theShah lostthe
will to fight,the statecrumbledfromwithinand out of its own momentum
..." (p. I40). As I havetriedto makeclear,theShahnever
did have the"will to fight."
A thirdfactorthat must be understoodin unravelingthe Shah's
in his relationship
withthe
leadershipfailurestemsfromthedifference
UnitedStates.During the I950S and i96os, the UnitedStates-either
throughdirectsuggestionor judiciousinnuendo-could influencethe
Shah'sbehaviorand make himcarryout American-inspired
policiesin
Iran (Saikal,57-58).By theearlyI970s, therelationship
appearsto have
Iran"nowhad 'reverseleverage'withWashington
changeddramatically.
and the Shah could magnifyhis role on the worldstage-something
the United Stateswould not onlybe compelledby the erosionof its
area to applaud,butto supportmaterially
positionin theMediterranean
and diplomatically
of
as well" (Ledeen and Lewis,52). This perception
'7 I obtained this account of the events of June I963 in several recentinterviewswith
some of the participants.

IRAN: A THEORY OF REVOLUTION

605

a drasticalterationwas based,as well,on an apparentnew toughness

on the partof the Shah. Thus, "by I976 AmbassadorRichardHelms,
a strongpersonality
himself,
could replyto suggestions
thattheUnited
States'tell' Iran's monarchto liberalizehis systemwiththecomment,
'The firsttimeI tryto tell the Shah whatto do on suchmatterswill
be thelast timeI see him' " (Stempel,2i). The lastU.S. Ambassador,
WilliamSullivan,initially
expressedpuzzlementat beingpostedtoTehran,becausehe "had neverlived in the Islamicworldand knew little
aboutits cultureor itsethos."But in theirfirstmeetingafterSullivan
was appointed,Secretary
of StateVance informed
theAmbassadorthat
exit had been decidedto send a professional
who had considerable
and withleaders
periencein dealingwithauthoritarian
governments
who wereforceful
personalities"
(Sullivan,I2-I3, i6).
As was to becomeclearby I978, theseassessments
of boththeShah's
withthe
personality
and thealterednatureof hiscountry's
relationship
UnitedStateswere fatallywrong.The Shah could be a "forceful
personality"whenno significant
forcewas opposinghim.And Iran could
act witha degreeof independencefromthe UnitedStatesbecausethe
regimehad "committeditselfto a formalalliancewiththe West and
socioeconomic
tiednotonlyIran'sforeignpolicybutalso thecountry's
to theinterests
of thecapitalistic
world"(Saikal,46).18
development
Justhow fundamental
the Shah's psychological
dependenceon the
tothecontrary,
isbestrevealed
UnitedStatesremained,
despitetrappings
in his memoirs.In surveying
his lastmonthsin power,he comments,
For thebalanceoftheyearI received
numerous
fromvarious
messages
peoplein and out of theCarteradministration
U.S support.
pledging
I metSullivanand askedhimto confirm
Whenever
theseofficial
statehe promised
he would.Buta dayor twolaterhe wouldreturn,
ments,
gravely
shakehisheadandsaythathe hadreceived
'noinstructions'
and
therefore
couldnotcomment.
Sullivanappearedto me alwayspolite,
He cametoseemeseveral
timesa week.
alwaysgrave,alwaysconcerned.
He seemedtotakeseriously
I saidtohim.Buthisanswerwas
everything
no instructions.
Is itanywonderthatI
alwaysthesame:I havereceived
feltincreasingly
friends?
isolatedand cutofffrommyWestern
What
weretheyreally
thinking,
whatdidtheywant-forIranandofme.I was
nevertold.I neverknew (Shah, i6i).

Justwhy AmbassadorSullivanhad no instructions

is the primary
themeof his book,as it is of thatby Ledeen and Lewis; in any case,
theeffects
on theShahweredevastating.
Beingso emotionally
dependent
on the UnitedStates,he understoodthe Ambassadorto mean he had
i8
Saikal's quote actually refersto the post-Mossadeq period, but the point remained
applicable throughoutthe Shah's rule.

606

WORLD POLITICS

beenabandonedand rejectedbyWashington.
Consequently,
hisalready
limitedcapacityto act was constrained
even further.
One finalfactorhelpedto seal theShah'sdoom-his cancer.He had
detecteda lump in his abdomenwhileon a skiingtripin I974. Two
Frenchcancerspecialists
diagnosedtheShah'sillnessand puthimon a
regimenof chemotherapy.
From thenuntilhis exile,his illnesswas
apparentlyknown to only a tinycircleof courtintimates,
not even
includinghis twinsisterAshraf(A. Pahlavi,2I4). It was widelyknown
in Iran thattheShah was constantly
on medication,
butalmostno one
knewwhy.Rumorswereplentiful,
but factswerefew.
It is likelythathisillnessaffected
theShahin a numberofdebilitating
For
he
ways.
one, had witnessedthe wastingdeathfromleukemiaof
hisone intimate,
Alam,in I977. In identifying
withhim,theShahmust
have feltpersonallythreatenedand depressed.Further,the chemotherapyin conjunctionwithhis othermedications,
includingsleeping
pills,mayhave alteredthe Shah's cognitivecapacitiesand reducedhis
intellectual
powers.And finally,
his illnessmade theShah all themore
of the
acutelyaware of the need to preparefortheultimatetransition
monarchyto his son-an awarenessthatstrengthened
his own predilectionto avoid theuse of forcein an attemptto mollifytheopposition
to Pahlavirule.
The actualconsequencesof theShah's illnesshaveyetto be satisfactorily
elaborated,
conditioned
buthisfailureofleadership
was sufficiently
The historyof his
by otherfactorsto lessenthe cancer'ssignificance.
rule,his dependencyon the UnitedStates,and his characterstructure
madeitvirtually
thathe couldhaveextricated
from
unthinkable
himself
the frenzyof the revolution.He had spentso manyyearsof his rule
eliminatingall possiblechallengersto his dominationof the political
systemthatin the processhe had eliminatedpotentialalliesand counselorsas well. At theend,he had onlyhis wifeand his formerson-inlaw,ArdeshirZahedi,neitherofwhosepoliticaljudgments
he respected;
he was alone.
fundamentally,
The worksunderreviewprovideabundantinformation
on a variety
of key aspectsof the revolution.
None articulates
a coherentand systematictheoretical
To do so wouldrequirean elaboration
treatment.
of
fourareas centralto revolution:revolutionary
leadershipand organiand systemresponse.Until we understand
zation,mass participation,
the interplayof those factorsand theirdynamicwith revolutionary
action,we will lack a satisfactory
theoryof revolution.