NATIONS AND

NATIONALISM

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J O U R N A L O F T H E A S S O C I AT I O N
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHNICITY
A N D N AT I O N A L I S M

AS
EN

Nations and Nationalism 20 (1), 2014, 1836.

DOI: 10.1111/nana.12029

Gellner redux?
HUDSON MEADWELL
Department of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Canada

ABSTRACT. The work of Ernest Gellner continues to be an influential part of

nationalism studies. A recent appraisal has raised questions about the argument that
Gellner offered in his central text on nationalism, Nations and Nationalism. This article
takes up other issues in Gellners work on nationalism. The article examines Gellners
influential definition of nationalism and the interpretation that he placed on that
definition, as well as his treatment of political cohabitation. It also pays more attention to Gellners later work, namely, Gellners discussion of the time zones of nationalism. The paper draws on secondary literature but its primary purpose is to assess the
coherence of Gellners arguments.
KEYWORDS: Ernest Gellner, industrial society, political cohabitation, political
domination, political legitimation

Introduction
Meadwell (2012) has argued recently that the central claim of Nations and
Nationalism [NN] (Gellner 2006 [1983]) that nationalism is necessary for
industrial society fails. The failure is significant, given the importance of the
book in nationalism studies. The critical examination of this classic text continues in this article. There are other problems that, in this instance, stem from
ambiguities in the definition of nationalism, first of all, and then from the
disconnection between the definition of nationalism and the theory of nationalism that is on offer.
The article is built on a close reading of key passages in Gellners central
text on nationalism. The article also takes into account work by Gellner on
nationalism after NN, notably, his argument about the time zones of nationalism that is set out in Encounters with Nationalism (1994) and Nationalism
(1997). Nonetheless, the primary focus is on this text, Nations and Nationalism,
which is one of the most powerful arguments in the field of nationalism studies.
Of his later work, it is my view that the most important addition is Plough,
Sword and Book [PSB] (Gellner 1988). However, discussion of his arguments in
this source, and their implications for his argument about nationalism, are left
for another occasion. His later work on nationalism is not of the same ambition of either NN or PSB, and it is my position that it does not noticeably
advance his arguments in NN or PSB.1
I anticipate the main lines of my argument before proceeding. First, I argue
that reading NN closely shows that, for Gellner, only the politically dominated
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experience nationalism. While there is a wide range of criticism of Gellner

along the lines that his arguments about nationalism are apolitical, no one, in
my view, has explicitly identified this restriction on the nature and range of
nationalism that characterises NN. It is important to see what this restriction
tends to rule out: nationalism in the political centres of social formations,
hence nationalism as a modality of political rule and, finally, nationalism as
fusion (or assimilation). These are surprising limitations to put on the expression of nationalism but, I argue, they all follow from Gellners treatment of his
own definition of nationalism. Moreover, they are not really fully recognised
in the secondary literature.2
Second, despite the way NN opens, with a definition of nationalism as a
principle of political legitimacy, Gellners discussion (of what I call political
cohabitation) shows that nationalism is in fact not a principle strictly speaking, nor is nationalism self-legitimating. That is to say, the putative principle of
the congruence of nation and state, which is said to make a situation of
political cohabitation illegitimate, in fact, in his own discussion, trades on an
unacknowledged assumption that different nationals sharing a political roof
also share an ethic of impartiality or, even more fully, a theory of justice.
Impartiality, rather than the non-congruence of state and nation, is the principle at work when he speaks of political cohabitation. Third, I introduce a
brief contrast with the arguments of Benedict Anderson (1991 [1983]), in
support of my reading of Gellner. In the concluding section, I explore some of
the implications of my arguments.
The analytics of the argument in NN
The book opens with his famous definition of nationalism as a political principle that holds that the national and the political should be congruent (2006
[1983]: 1). The definition is quickly followed by an interpretation of this
definition. As he continues in this passage, Gellner sets up the issues in a
particular way by arguing that there is one particular violation of this principle to which nationalist sentiment is quite especially sensitive: when the
rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority
of the ruled . . . this, for nationalists, constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable breach of political propriety (2006 [1983]: 1). Definition and interpretation are inconsistent: the definition implies things that the
interpretation cannot support. The purpose of this section is to reveal this
inconsistency. I take up the formal definition first and then turn to his
interpretation.
The formal definition of nationalism
As long as the national and the political are not reconciled, there is social and
political tension. This is consistent with the definition. We might continue
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in this way: the long-run tendency in international society is towards a

tension-reducing equilibrium in which the national and the political are congruent. The long-run equilibrium state of modern international society is one
in which state and nation is congruent.
And thus it is not surprising if it is difficult to imagine, as Gellner argues
later in the book, two large politically viable independence-worthy cultures
cohabiting under a single political roof (NN: 114). Congruence has not been
met. Gellner does qualify this argument. He admits that the sharpness of
nationalist conflict produced in these types of societies may be less under late
industrialisation than under early industrialisation. Nonetheless, the nationalist imperative of the congruence of the political unit and culture will continue
to apply (NN: 115117).
However, there are two basic processes by which equilibrium might be
reached, if we follow the formal definition: fusion or fission.3 Then notice that
this argument about cohabitation does not rule out a process of fusion but
neither is it fully allowed. This is so because under the condition of two
independence-worthy nations, what we should expect is not the possible
absorption of one by the other via fusion, since the odds of successful resistance to incorporation should go up with independence-worthiness but instead
secession by one of the two nations. Thus, even in this important extension of
the basic definition, fusion is not a full possibility, even if fusion is formally
consistent with the definition. It does not matter which of these two formally
secedes, but, either way, we are left with two separate nations who no longer
share a political roof.
Thus, it is not the case that this important passage in NN supports the claim
that there is in Gellners work a simple choice between nationalist homogenization through assimilation [much like what I am calling fusion], and nationalist secessionism which produces another nationalist homogenization . . .
(OLeary 2001: 275. Parenthetical material added. 1998: 6364). It is an understandable mistake to make, given the definition. Nevertheless, this kind of
argument gives too much weight to fusion in Gellners argument. Gellner
never came to grips with the first of these choices homogenisation by
assimilation.
The choice available to nations is even simpler in the case of two
independence-worthy nations it is either separation or continued cohabitation. This is one illustration of the larger problem of inconsistency that plagues
these elements of his argument. I will show it more directly shortly but it needs
to be said now: Gellners interpretation of his own definition does not allow for
assimilation or fusion. It is beside the point whether Gellner did recognise or
would have recognised the historical importance of assimilation. Indeed I
could agree that, as a Czech of Jewish background, whether in Prague,
London or Oxford, Gellner knew about assimilation and exclusion. But what
counts here is not what he knew or thought generally, or what he experienced,
but how he proceeded theoretically to set up his definition of nationalism, and
then to interpret it.
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The interpretation that follows the definition does not rule in what the
definition allows and that is, effectively, a nationalism of the center. Later
work by Gellner (1994, 1997, 1998) never really rectifies the problems with the
argument in NN. I comment on some of this later work shortly. Nonetheless,
we can continue tracing out the formal implications of the definition and note
that, if fusion dominates, we would observe a relatively small number of larger
states. If fission dominates, we would observe a relatively large number of
smaller states.
There is no way to tell in Gellners argument which of these processes will
dominate.4 Industrial civilisation is consistent with, if not any number of
states, at least a rather wide range. However, it might be argued that there is
in the text an implicit criterion by which to determine, in a general way, when
fusion will dominate fission, at least when it is an issue of dealing with those
national cultures that are not independence-worthy. Independence-worthy
national cultures are nations that would be politically viable as independent
political units. For Gellner, this means they must have the capacity to support
the costs of providing standardised education for their members. National
cultures that are not politically viable are not independence-worthy, and their
legitimate fate is to be integrated into larger political units. I will show shortly,
however, that this fairly straightforward extrapolation is not really allowed,
given Gellners interpretation of his definition of nationalism, since this
extrapolation implies a nationalism of the political centre by which national
cultures that are not viable become integrated and assimilated.
Nevertheless, this is indeed a criterion, although it remains rather formal,
beyond the gesture in the direction of political viability (independenceworthiness). The argument implies an anonymous process of sorting by which
independence-worthy cultures become states and independence-unworthy cultures are absorbed into larger units. The independence-worthy must become
independent and the unworthy must be absorbed. Otherwise, tension persists.
Yet it is hard to see how industrial civilisation selects for independence-worthy
nations, sorting the worthy from the unworthy so that (a) the independenceunworthy either fail because they are not viable and are then absorbed by a
larger political unit or are absorbed immediately into a larger political whole
before they fail on their own, and so that (b) the independence-worthy control
states of their own.
There is another response available here which is at first glance more
compelling because it tries to turn what might be seen as a weakness into
strength: these processes fusion and fission are formally equivalent. Each
reduces the tension produced by the non-congruence of state and nation.
These processes issue in international societies of the same sort, no matter the
number of states that compose these two different steady-states. Thus, the
problem I have raised is no problem at all. Any state of the world is made
formally consistent with the argument, including even that short-run situation
in which nations and states have not yet been made congruent. I am sympathetic to this argument because Gellner should not be held to too fine-grained
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an argument about the number and size of nation-states that international

society can support in equilibrium. Gellner is clear: . . . we cannot predict just
which cultures, with which political roofs, will be blessed with success (Gellner
2006 [1983]: 45), I agree with Gellner that this is a difficult exercise.
What should be recognised, however, is the incoherence of his argument.
Important parts are not analytically connected. The definition of nationalism
implies that both fusion and fission are possible responses to the tension
associated with non-congruence of political unit and nation. Yet the extension
of this definition to the apparently general case of independence-worthy
nations sharing political institutions implies only the possibility of fission.
Fusion or incorporation is not very likely. The distribution of power implied
by joint political viability suggests that any political equilibrium that defines
relations between these nations will fall short of full incorporation.
This means that there is no clear and coherent argument in NN about the
carrying capacity of international society, even if we do not hold Gellner to the
fine-grained details about size, number and identity of nation-states. There is,
as well, a further problem that arises before we turn below to his interpretation
of his definition.
The definition of nationalism implies that, if and when congruence characterises the relationship between state and nation, nationalism ends, so to
speak. At this hypothetical point, there is no longer either nationalist sentiment (since this sentiment is aroused only when the political principle is
violated) or nationalist movements (since the latter are actuated by this kind of
sentiment) (NN: 1). On its face, this suggests a very truncated sense of the
social effects of nationalism. Nationalism can have social force, even when
nation and state are congruent.5 We should not rule out these possible consequences simply by definitional fiat.
Interpreting the definition
But let me now turn to the canonical situation that Gellner used to interpret his
definition, introduced earlier, and begin to consider how this interpretation
limits the application of his definition. Recall that there is one particular
violation of this principle to which nationalist sentiment is sensitive: when the
rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of
the ruled . . . this, for nationalists, constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable
breach of political propriety (2006 [1983]: 1. Emphasis added). Now I add the
sentence that immediately follows in the text: This can occur either through
the incorporation of the national territory in a larger empire, or by the local
domination of an alien group [Emphasis added].
This passage shows how Gellners interpretation of his definition implicitly
restricts its application. A sense of political impropriety is limited to the
experience of being dominated. Gellner sets things up here at the outset in order
to associate nationalism with political domination. The way that nation and
state is to be made congruent in this canonical situation is through the
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majority nation throwing off its shackles of political domination. There is no

question or possibility of nationalism among the dominators even if, in the
canonical situation, the dominators constitute a nation. His discussion here
commits him to the position that the dominators are a nation when he states
that the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the
majority of the ruled yet they can never be nationalists because they are not
dominated. Nationalism thus is ruled out as a modality or instrument of
political rule. Only the dominated experience nationalism. This is a striking limit
to place on nationalism.
The upshot of my discussion, namely that nationalism is only available to
the dominated, is thus troubling. But it is the clear consequence of reading this
last passage since, in it, he is referring to the experiences of the majority nation
the dominated nation. The national territory is the territory of the majority
nation, which is living under alien rule (domination). They are the potential
nationalists.
Notice as well that it is alien domination alone that motivates nationalist
sentiment among the dominated. That is, it is not the experience of assimilation or incorporation into the norms, customs and language of the dominant
nation that triggers the experience of impropriety, and then nationalist sentiment. By the way this canonical situation is constructed, alien rulers have not
penetrated society and, by construction, they are not allowed to pursue policies of assimilation, expulsion or killing in the name of the nation. This would
be nationalism, and nationalism is available only to the dominated. In other
words, the nationalism of the dominated is not triggered by nationalism of the
political centre or of the minority ruling nation, as a kind of nationalist
counter-mobilisation in the periphery.
Nationalism in the periphery is pristine. It is the first expression of nationalism. Nationalist counter-mobilisation in the periphery is ruled out in the way
that the situation is constructed. It cannot be like this, simply because nationalism is not allowed to be a modality or instrument of domination or rule.
Thus, it must be alien rule plain and simple that motivates nationalism among
the dominated.6
Gellners canonical setup must mean that the ruling nation, a minority,
controls the state. Consider a thought experiment framed by this question: is
this minority nation independence-worthy? Suppose this minority nation is
not large enough to be independently viable. But, still, the minority nation
controls the state. By hypothesis, the minority nation is not independenceworthy, and then by implication its viability depends on what its continued
political domination of the majority provides through rents of various kinds.
It is certainly not a stretch of political imagination to imagine a situation in
which, in these circumstances, the minority nation seeks to consolidate its
rule via a programme of nation-building within the boundaries of the state it
controls. We could think of this, for current purposes, as an exercise in
state-rationalisation that consolidates the political control of rents and
revenue streams. In effect, this in turn implies the transformation of a
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despotic into an infrastructural state in the process of rationalisation and

consolidation.
Then this is to say that there can be a nationalism of the center or core of
the political unit. But this is exactly what Gellners interpretation of his definition of nationalism rules out. Nationalism is the experience only of the
dominated and nationalism frees one from alien domination. This is the commitment implied by his discussion. Yet it might be that it is nationalism at the
centre of political authority that provokes the sentiment of political impropriety in the subordinated majority nation. And then it is a question, roughly
speaking, of whether the power of numbers in the dominated majority nation
is enough to challenge minority control of the state.
Gellners restriction on the application of his definition implies a despotic
state controlled by a nation that sits atop its territory without effectively
penetrating it, a state without significant or with limited infrastructural capacity.7 But then this is to imply, given the way the definition of nationalism is
developed by Gellner, that nationalism in the majority-dominated nation
arises simply in the presence of despotism. Yet there is clearly nothing intrinsically national, let alone nationalist, about despotism. Furthermore, if we
endow the state in question with infrastructural power, then nationalism might
begin in the core as a project of making congruent the minority nation and
state boundaries, and thus nationalism is not associated in its very first beginnings with a sentiment of political impropriety among those in the majority
nation ruled by a minority nation. Yet Gellner argues the latter, at least if you
read carefully how he interprets his definition of nationalism for us. Now we
can see that this sentiment of impropriety is not only not all of what nationalism is or can be; indeed this type of nationalism, in effect in the periphery, is
quite possibly second order rather than first order nationalism.
Let me consider a possible counter-argument to my line of argument here,
which I acknowledge might address some of these issues. Perhaps all that is
meant in the way in which Gellner develops his definition of nationalism is that
alien rule, and this alone, is enough to produce nationalist sentiment within the
majority nation. But then this is to say, when rulers and ruled are drawn from
different nations and the minority rules, that nationalism emerges in the
majority nation however they are ruled by the politically dominant minority
nation. Even after conceding some ground here as I have done, this is a much
narrower interpretation of nationalism than is warranted by the definition of
nationalism. Strictly speaking, this is still an interpretation of nationalism that
associates the social and political tension produced by nationalism with political domination or inferiority, and this is not equivalent to a definition of
nationalism as the political principle that the national and the political should
be congruent. It continues to set aside the possibility of nationalism as a
modality of political rule.
And in continuing to consider this possible rejoinder, we might also ask, if
it is alien rule pure and simple that counts, why it matters that the dominated
nation is a majority. It should not matter if the dominated nation is a majority
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nation or a minority nation, if it is alien rule alone that produces the sentiment
of political impropriety in the dominated nation. Indeed, if it is majority status
that yields the sense of impropriety, and this is how Gellner proceeded to
interpret his definition of nationalism after introducing the definition, then it is
not alien rule plain and simple that produces the sense that the nationalist
political principle has been violated. (Majority status, however, may be meant
to imply that the nation is politically viable and legitimately can challenge
domination in a way that the independence-unworthy cannot).
In fact, the introduction of numbers in this implied difference between
majority and minority suggests that political power commensurate with
numbers might satisfy nationalists and that is not the same as arguing that
nationalism is the search for congruence between the national and the political. This should prompt recognition of another feature of Gellners interpretation and application of his definition what I been calling his canonical case.
Although this is a less damaging problem, it should be noted.
His setup presupposes the absence of democracy. Otherwise, the dominated
nation can escape domination politically, by virtue of their majority status.
They can implement democratic control, and then proceed with nation building so as to make nation and state congruent by absorbing/assimilating the
minority nation. And again this would become nationalism in the political
centre or core, as the majority nation democratically takes over control of
regime and state. This might provoke, in turn, minority nationalism but this is,
again, second-order nationalism.
It is possible to think, as does OLeary (2001: 275, 1998) and others (e.g.
Gans 2004; Stepan 1998) that in Gellner, we see a simple bifurcation between,
in Ganss (2004) terms, a statist nationalism and a cultural nationalism or in
OLearys terms, between homogenisation via assimilation and homogenisation via secession. Something like this might be read out of Gellners formal
definition of nationalism. But when we look closely we see, first of all, that in
his discussion of political cohabitation, there is really no place for homogenisation via assimilation, for example.
Second, and perhaps even more revealing, in his own discussion of his
definition, Gellner rules out statist nationalism that would proceed via the
political instruments of killing (cleansing) or expulsion or assimilation. What
is presented as a general argument about nationalism turns out to be implicitly
limited. The book opens with an apparently general formal definition of
nationalism that is then immediately modified but without acknowledgement.
There are other ways in which we can examine these difficulties in NN. In
his discussion of a typology of nationalisms, we see that Gellner distinguishes
two kinds of nationalism.8 They are Habsburg nationalism and classical
Western liberal nationalism (NN: 91ff). But by the latter, Gellner (NN: 95)
really means unification nationalism (Germany and Italy). Notice, initially,
what his discussion entails: there is no nationalism before, roughly, 1870. This
is striking. In particular, it will raise questions about his theory of nationalism:
If, as Gellner insisted, nationalism is necessary for industrial society, why are
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the first expressions of nationalism occurring only in the late nineteenth

century and why here, effectively for both types, in or around the edges of the
Habsburg empire?
We should also add that, by this stage of the argument in NN, the linkage
back to the earlier work on nationalism (Gellner 1964), which in turn was
influenced by Gellners work in North Africa, has atrophied. What remains is
the earlier interest in nationalism in the peripheries of social formations, now
reworked in NN as the story about Ruritania (Meadwell 2012: 576). Some of
the commentators on Gellner on nationalism, who take into account his
personal biography, seem to see this typology, and indeed all of NN, as a
simple projection of his life history (Snyder 2011). This is too easily turned on
its head. It is odd to see, in a book presented as a general argument about
nationalism, only one kind of nationalism and such a historically limited
nationalism at that.
One striking feature of these nationalisms is that they do not map on to
homogenisation via fusion/assimilation and homogenisation via fission/
secession, the two basic ways in which nation and states can be made congruent according to the formal definition. The next feature is more surprising:
these different kinds of nationalism are actually of a type the only type
Gellner recognises expressed in different forms. Both unification and
Habsburg nationalism are motivated by people who have been violated in the
same way. Political propriety has been breached because they are ruled by
aliens. Admittedly, this argument works better for Italian unification than for
German unification. These two types are in fact one. Nationalism is the
response of the politically dominated, expressed in different forms, but at heart
the Risorgimento and, say, the Czech awakening,9 are reactions to alien
political rule.
Here is another way to examine the difficulties in NN. In this instance, we
look at arguments that come after NN, where Gellner seems to become aware
of the oddity of a theory of nationalism that, among other things, rules out
nationalism as an instrument of political rule by way of treating nationalism as
a response to (alien) political rule. We can see a glimmer in fact in NN and then
trace out how this gesture is amplified later. [T]he social organization of
agrarian society is not at all favourable to the nationalist principle . . . He then
continues, . . . only very occasionally, by accident, it (agrarian social organization) produced a dynastic state, which corresponded, more or less, with a
language and a culture, as eventually happened on Europes Western seaboard (NN: 39, material in parentheses added).10 This passing comment is
later expanded in his discussion of the time zones of nationalism (Gellner
1997: 508; 1994: 2931) and then again in his posthumously published book
on Malinowski and Wittgenstein (Gellner 1998). In this last book, he returns
to the comment in NN: along the Western Atlantic coast it just so happened
that there was a series of strong dynastic states. Here, nationalism had its
political shells and cultural filling pre-fabricated, ready and waiting (1998:
29]). It is notable that this later discussion never really picks up the specificity
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of Gellners North African experience.11 The historical time implied by the

time zones of nationalism turns out to be European time. The time zones begin
in the dynastic states of Europe and move eastward towards Eurasia, and
culminate in the formation and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union (cf.
Kissane and Sitter 2010).12
But the cryptic remark about dynastic states, once amplified in particular, is
equivalent to conceding, although never directly, that there were agrarian
societies that were, at a minimum, proto-nations well before the transition to
industrial society and without the impetus of industrial takeoff. His argument
that nationalism precedes nation is also violated by this concession. This is an
argument on which he insists throughout NN, which he earlier made in
Thought and Change (Gellner 1964: 168), and again in 1978. Nationalism is
not to be explained by the alleged existence of nations. It is the other way
round (Gellner 1979 [1978]: 271). Given that Gellner concedes (reluctantly)
the existence of proto-nations, it is then not a stretch to propose that protonations should be added to his long list of candidate explanations for the
miracle of the exit from Agraria in northwestern Europe. (Gellner 1988:
15870). Surely, one might conjecture, it cannot be a coincidence that the one
part of the agrarian world that yielded proto-nations is also the site of exit
from Agraria. But then this is to invert the putative relationship between
nations and industrial society. Thus, his reluctance to acknowledge the existence of proto-nations on the Western seaboard is understandable.
It is true that there are important issues here (see, in particular, Breuilly
2005a, 2005b). Nevertheless, Llobera (2001: 190) is on the right track when he
argues that Gellner cannot conceive of nationalism as a principle that could
legitimate agrarian state monarchies in Western Europe. Gellners language
here suggests that he will concede the existence of proto-nations, or perhaps
even national consciousness or nationality, in these agrarian dynastic states
without allowing for the presence of nationalism. This takes some of the sting
out of the concession, as does his claim that the existence of proto-nations
was an accident.13 Nationalism is left waiting off-stage for the opportune
moment to appear. When nationalism appears, however, (and nationalism
does appear) it will be the wrong kind of nationalism by which to legitimate
these states. Why? The nationalism that might legitimate a European dynastic
state cannot be the nationalism of which Gellner writes in NN. By virtue of the
interpretation he places on his own definition of nationalism, nationalism is
limited to the experience of the politically dominated in the peripheries of
social formations. When nationalism does enter stage right in these states
(and to concede the existence of something like proto-nations is to grant that
nationalism in all likelihood will follow), it cannot be the nationalism of NN
because the nationalism of NN is not nationalism of the centre, but of the
periphery, and it is motivated by the experience of domination.14
To conclude this section, the formal and official definition of nationalism is
not doing the work in NN. What is doing the work is clearly the limit put on
the definition of nationalism by Gellner: only the dominated experience
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nationalism in response to alien rule. The definition is modified by Gellner as

soon as he introduces it. On the other hand, the discussion in NN of political
cohabitation, and my discussion of this part of the text, does not provide direct
supporting evidence for the thesis that it is the limit on the definition that is
crucial for his interpretation of cohabitation.
Nevertheless, it is clear that his discussion should be read as ruling out any
form of assimilationist nationalism in the event of two independence-worthy
nations. That, in turn, supports my position that Gellners argument rules out
fusion/assimilation, even if fusion is consistent with his definition of nationalism.15 I do agree that, in his discussion of independence-worthiness and
cohabitation, there is no assumption at work that it is domination that makes
cohabitation difficult. But, as I show below in the next section, there is an even
more revealing assumption in play.
The disconnection between definition and theory
There is often equivocation about Gellners main argument in NN. The thrust
of the argument of this article is that this equivocation follows from the
disconnection between definition and theory. Here is one example: Gellner
emphasized that nationalism is the primary principle of political legitimacy of
modernity along with affluence (OLeary 2001: 276). This looks on its face
to be innocuous, but it cannot be sustained as a satisfactory interpretation of
Gellners argument. There are three difficulties in OLearys claim.
The first is best set out with reference, in fact, to the question of cohabitation. The easiest way to interpret the difficulties of cohabitation is to invoke
the force of this principle of political legitimacy: cohabitation is difficult, and
prone to breakdown, because it runs afoul of this principle. It is politically
illegitimate. But consider this issue: a principle of political legitimation might
draw some of its force from more fundamental principles of legitimacy. It is
notable, then, that the problem of cohabitation is construed by Gellner to be
a problem of trust. Members of each nation believe that political institutions
will not be impartial (NN: 114). But the principle of impartiality cannot be
derived from the principle of congruence. Admitting, even unwittingly, the
importance of impartiality is to acknowledge that the putative principle of
nationalist political legitimacy is not doing all of the work of legitimation.
Thus, it is not non-congruence or congruence of political unit and nation
per se that is at issue. Instead there must exist here, in this political setting, a
theory of justice that can be set out, and which has purchase, quite independent of nationalist propriety (to paraphrase Gellners canonical situation discussed above). And if impartiality is a principle, it is a shared principle, given
how the discussion of cohabitation proceeds. Despite their national divisions,
persons share an ethic of impartiality (and such an ethic likely will also commit
them to other principles). This is implied in Gellners argument that members
of different national cultures do not believe that political institutions will be
impartial.
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A shared ethic of impartiality already suggests, on its own, a fair degree of

social rationalisation. One might even wonder if it is in fact the importance of
such an ethic that makes nationals modern in the case of cohabitation, since
such an ethic is redolent of an up-to-date theory of justice or normative
account of public justification for political action.16 This would be to say that
what makes nationals and nationalism modern is how nationalism proper
the desirability of congruence between state and nation is justified. Nationalism, on this reading, is only modern when it depends on non-national standards for its justification. This is the upshot of bringing the value of impartiality
into the discussion of political cohabitation. It is a damaging problem since it
shows that Gellners interpretation of political cohabitation depends on
exactly what Hall (2010: 161) claims that Gellner neither needed to acknowledge nor wanted to acknowledge in the face of difference, notably, the force of
a shared ethic (in this case) of impartiality.
Then the argument that cohabitation is prone to difficulty and breakdown
is not really, or only, about the putative importance of congruence. Rather, the
issue is why persons who share principles of justice cannot find a way to live
together even if they are not of the same nation. To say that they cannot, or
will not, simply begs the question. The real test then is not whether or not an
impartial solution is in place. The existence of a shared ethic of impartiality has
certain implications. One is that in principle an impartial solution exists, as
long as it is common knowledge among different nationals that they share an
ethic of impartiality. Will politically viable independence-worthy nations still
seek a state of their own if it is common knowledge that they share an ethic?
That is the real test of the putative power of a nationalist principle of political
legitimacy. In other words, Gellners argument would be more faithful to his
definition of nationalism if he had not invoked impartiality, and his argument
would be more powerful, and more consistent at the same time, if he could
show that even under impartiality cohabitation is conflict-ridden. The latter is
the counterfactual that counts. This result is far more damaging to his overall
argument. In invoking impartiality in his discussion of cohabitation, Gellner
has unwittingly revealed that nationalism is not a principle.
The problem of cohabitation actually shows us that the force of nationalism
depends on a claim that the ethic of impartiality should be applied to nations.
This is a kind of normative claim it is, in the first instance, an ought rather
than an is. Notice, however, how different this normative claim is from the
official definition of nationalism as a political principle of legitimation the
principle that nation and political unit should be congruent. Gellners discussion of political cohabitation actually works to undermine his own definition
of nationalism. Nationalism does not generate its own standards of normative
judgment, we can now see, but his definition of nationalism implies that it
does.
Then we can press one step further and ask the question: why should
nations be the primary subject matter to which an ethic of impartiality in this
instance or, more generally normative political judgments, should be applied?
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The answer shows that the ought here very likely rests ultimately on an is:
nations are a fundamental, indeed a kind of primary institutional fact and this
is why, when an ethic of impartiality is applied, it should be applied to nations.
Indeed in some sense, it must be applied in this way. By the nature of things,
as a consequence of the fundamental fact of nations, normative political
judgments will have nations as their subject matter.
However, the answer to the question above cannot be a resting point, for
now we need to know if nations are primary institutional facts. Are they?
Gellners basic answer, compactly stated, is that, yes nations are primary and
fundamental, industrial society (not modernity) makes them so. Nationalism
as political practice then needs no further justification. Nationalism is the fate
of the times, and we should bear the fate of the times as he does in NN like
a man. (Here, too, we have to be careful. It is one thing to say [a] that nations
are a basic fact and another to say [b] that nationalism is the desire to make
nation and state congruent. The latter is not a consequent of the former).
The difficulty here is that Gellner has our nationalist appealing to a standard of impartiality even though, by his own hypothesis, a nationalist would
never settle for impartiality. Impartiality cannot guarantee that our nationalist
will live in a state of his own. But then it is a mistake, a kind of incoherence of
argument, to have our nationalist appealing to impartiality as justification for
his rejection of political cohabitation. But this is exactly what Gellner proceeds
to do in his discussion of political cohabitation.

Gellner and Anderson

I indicated that there were two other issues arising from the commonplace
statement that, for Gellner, nationalism is the primary principle of political
legitimacy of modernity. I take them up now. This statement [1] does not
effectively distinguish Gellners argument about nationalism from other arguments, nor [2] does it pick out the key features of Gellners theory of nationalism. As it stands, this argument does not distinguish Gellners position from
others writing on nationalism. This description of Gellners argument could
also be used to describe Anderson on nationalism. Nationalism is a principle
of legitimacy. It is modern; moreover, nations dream of being free and the
gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state (Anderson 1991
[1983]: 7). Indeed, in some ways, OLearys language fits Anderson better than
Gellner, with the proviso that Anderson aligns nationalism with cultural
systems of meaning.
Yet Gellner and Anderson offer accounts of nationalism that are rivals,
even if they are both modernists. The contrast is between a cultural anthropologist interested in cultural systems of meaning and a social anthropologist
interested in social structure. It is not modernity per se that counts for Gellner
but industrial society, and the connection between these two things nationalism and industrial society is necessity. NN is not about the elective affinity
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31

between nationalism and modernity (OLeary 1998: 77) although, ironically,

this claim might work as an interpretation of Anderson.
There is a further parallel between Gellner and Anderson. Both found the
first expressions of nation-ness (Andersons term) in imperial experiences, as
noted for Gellner in the later years of the Habsburg empire, for Anderson
earlier in the breakup of the Spanish-American empire. Anderson 1991 [1983]:
50) calls this a riddle, but it may turn out to be simply a problem in his
argument. So much of his argument is about changes in cultural systems of
meaning in the heartland of Europe that the reader quite naturally expects the
first expression of nation-ness to emerge in this heartland, not in the peripheries of a blue sea European empire. Like Gellner, Anderson seems to have
difficulty imagining nation-ness at the political centre. And like NN, therefore,
Imagined Communities (IC) seems to have two somewhat unconnected parts.
In NN, it is the disconnection between one part on the necessity of nationalism
and another part on the politicisation of differences in the peripheries of social
formations (Meadwell 2012). In IC, there is the first part of the book that sets
out changes in cultural systems of meaning in European civilisation in the
transition to modernity and then, suddenly, a poorly motivated shift to the
dynamics of crole societies in Spanish America.17

Conclusion
Nations and Nationalism is an influential text in nationalism studies, but its
central arguments are flawed. I summarise the basic flaws here and then offer
brief concluding observations. [1] Gellner does not make good the claim that
nationalism is necessary for industrial society. [2] As a consequence, the
further claim that nationalism is modern is not substantiated. [3] Although
nationalism is defined as a political principle of legitimacy, in his discussion,
Gellner unwittingly acknowledges that nationalism is not self-legitimating. [4]
In NN, nationalism is firmly linked to political domination but political domination is never explicitly examined. [5] As a consequence, there is no recognition let alone discussion of the restriction placed on nationalism: nationalism
is the experience of the politically dominated. [6] The further consequence is
that Gellners two types of nationalism Habsburg and unification nationalism turn out in fact to be one type.
Subsequent work by Gellner stands in an ambiguous relationship to his
arguments in NN. [7] The adjustments that Gellner (1994, 1997) makes to his
arguments in NN are ad hoc. The most telling problem is the difficulty Gellner
has in NN and in later work in taking on board expressions of nation-ness and
nationalism at the political centres of social formations.
We can now draw two more general conclusions. One is that, when all is
said and done, Gellners work is actually fundamentally ambiguous about the
relationship between nationalism, agrarian society and industrial society.
Another, related conclusion is that his central claim to have shown that
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nationalism is necessary for industrial society is illusory.18 If our contrast is

between knowledge and illusion (Hall 2010: 20743) then the claim must be
illusory, since Gellner has not been able to show that belief in the truth of the
proposition that nationalism is necessary for industrial society is justified.
Halls proposal (Hall 2010: 334) that Gellners socio-economic account of
nationalism merely needs to be complemented (in Halls argument with a
political account) therefore seems too vague as to what it is that remains in
Gellners argument upon which to build. The recent biography of Gellner by
Hall (2010) effectively captures his brilliance. Nevertheless, Gellners theory of
nationalism is flawed. It is not obvious what is left as theory, or as explanation,
once we press on his arguments.
Given these problems, what explains the influence of Gellner? The first
point is to say that, despite much critical discussion of Gellner, the specific
issues raised in this article have not been fully appreciated. As a further
suggestion, however, I will hazard a conjecture about Gellners influence in
nationalism studies. It draws on a distinction made by a philosopher of science
(Kaplan 1964). Gellners influence should be located in contexts of discovery
rather than contexts of justification, which is to say that his influence lies in
the realm of inspiration and imagination. This is what remains after his overriding theoretical claim has been shown to fail, namely, that nationalism is
necessary for industrial society, and after inconsistencies in his theoretical
argument are identified.
Then there is the question of Gellners appeal. I attribute some of that
appeal to qualities identified by Hall (2010), although I read these qualities
somewhat differently. A running theme through Halls biography is Gellners
cold intellectual honesty (a leading theme, true, but one that takes into
account Gellners sympathy for Humean custom and the homely comforts of
culture, not to mention his fondness for the Czech folksongs of his youth). I
am somewhat sceptical of this reading of Gellner, in light of how I have argued
NN proceeds and in particular how it concludes (Meadwell 2012: 5768),
notably, the way that Gellner tried to finesse the central proposition of his
most important text on nationalism. Thus, I do not attribute to Gellner special
powers that immunised him from the possibility of self-deception.
In my view, the subtext of NN is the claim that most others are softheaded
on nationalism. Anyone who thinks that nationalism is not fated, inevitable
and unavoidable in our world is deceiving himself. Nationalism is necessary
for industrial society. To think anything else is to engage in wishful thinking.
You may wish it were not so but, please, bear the fate of the times! On the
other hand, however, Gellner is intellectually committed to his central proposition about nationalism. He wants this proposition to be true because its truth
would vindicate his intellectual position. Yet Gellner does not show that it is
true. This itself can invite a form of wishful thinking. This is why NN concludes so oddly. He confesses in his concluding remarks that there are some
things that could be said, indeed should be said, but it would be pedantic and
tedious to say them. He then goes on to rest the necessity of nationalism on our
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33

believing that nationalism is necessary, and this violates what he set out to
show the belief-independence of the necessity of nationalism (Meadwell
2012: 576). Thus, I am inclined to think that Gellner was neither more honest
nor less than most other intellectuals with whom he might have agreed or
disagreed.
Gellner presents as a commentator who took on the shibboleths of idealism,
constructivism, relativism and postmodernism, exposing their intellectual
immaturity. Yet however much scorn he heaped on hermeneutic comfort
blankets (Skorupski 1996: 492), there is certainly some psychological comfort,
and a sense of superiority, to be had in his position and I believe that this is
part of his appeal: Others labour under misapprehension and illusion, we do
not.
Gellner thus becomes an apparent intellectual antidote to the illusions of
the time. And it is a short step from accepting his claim to have exposed
illusions to see in Gellner a kind of intellectual stoicism by which to live. That
is why I invoked earlier the Weberian dictum: Bear the fate of the times like
a man (Weber 1946 [1918]: 155). But I see Gellners intellectual stoicism
(cf. Dannreuther and Kennedy 2007: 342) as much closer to what Skorupski
(1996: 492) called Gellners spiritual machismo.
Notes
1 Indeed, I argue that PSB actually works to make some of my arguments stronger because,
when read in light of my discussion of NN, it implies that nationalism may not be distinctively
modern. Furthermore, the method of philosophic history, introduced in PSB, does not supply the
methodology missing in NN.
2 There are collections and monographs on Gellner (Hall 1998, 2010; Hall and Jarvie 1996;
Lessnoff 2002; Maleevic and Haugaard 2007) as well as a comprehensive discussion of Gellner on
nationalism (Breuilly 2006).
3 I acknowledge that this ignores cleansing and expulsion (but see the discussion below).
4 These terms, fusion and fission, capture my main meaning here but they do have some
extraneous theoretical background that I should acknowledge. They have a somewhat technical
meaning in the literature on segmentary societies, where they describe mechanisms of conflictregulation through the formation of new polities. The context in NN is not the world of segmented, stateless societies but rather a world of states. The equivalent of fission in this latter world
is secession. I will continue to use these terms but will point to issues of nomenclature and
terminology when needed. By fusion, I mean mainly assimilation the notion that state and nation
are made congruent while holding state borders constant.
5 I believe that Breuilly (2006: xxxvi) makes a similar point. See as well the discussion of
Gellners typology of nationalism in OLeary (1998: 49 and 82n.35). I discuss this typology later
in the article.
6 And is it cohabiting with aliens that counts or is it alien domination that counts? As long as
intergroup relations are domination free, do nationalist sentiments and movements not appear?
This question is taken up in the next section through a discussion of the implications of an ethic
of impartiality in political cohabitation.
7 This distinction between despotic and infrastructural power is Manns (Mann 1984). Ertman
(1998) has reason to disentangle state and regime characteristics that are intertwined in these
types of power. Nonetheless, Manns distinction remains useful. Compare, as well, Hechters
(2000) discussion of forms of rule and nationalism.
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8 There is a third type diaspora nationalism but it is less relevant for my arguments.
9 Gellner never liked this term but I use it innocently. It does not signal my endorsement of a
Sleeping Beauty theory of nationalism.
10 In fact, the first mention of the Western seaboard can be found in Gellner (1964: 173) where
he also adduces that this is indeed nationalism but it is not modern, not nationalism proper.
11 Hall (2010: 317) makes an explicit link between this typology and the arguments in Thought
and Change (Gellner 1964) by arguing that secession and decolonisation are equivalent but then
goes on to concede that the Czech awakening was not secessionist which, in effect, is to deny the
link just made. (Not many blue sea colonies forgo political independence).
12 In Nationalism (1997: 79), Gellner also introduces a fifth zone, which evokes a contrast
between Europe and Islam. Unlike all of the European time zones, in the fifth one the world of
Islam cultural standardisation does not take nationalist form (Gellner 1997: 83, 84). This is an
odd contrast which, in opposing a universal religion to a bounded political and cultural construction, leaves out all the world which is neither European nor Islamic.
13 He returns to this concession at the end of the book: It is not denied that the agrarian world
occasionally threw up units which may have resembled a modern national state; only that the
agrarian world could occasionally do so, whilst the modern (ie. industrial) world is bound to do so
in most cases (Gellner NN: 132) (Emphasis in original. Material in parentheses added). (But recall
that, in modernity, these states form around dominated nations, according to Gellner).
14 The best treatment of nationalism and states is Breuilly (1993).
15 For one place in work after NN, where Gellner seems to recognise what he has been arguing,
see Gellner (1997: 75). Here he contrasts assimilation and nationalism (implying that a nationalist
is someone who resists assimilation, which thus is to associate nationalism with the periphery and
with fission) but then adds that indeed one can be assimilationist and nationalist both at once.
There is no discussion, however, only this passing comment.
16 The evident candidates for such a theory would be a Rawlsian-type theory of justice, a
normative account of deliberative democracy or Habermass ideal speech situation.
17 Sewell (2004) notes part of this problem but only in order to reassert the importance of the
French Revolution to the emergence of the nation form. For an analysis that more effectively
situates the Revolution in the political history of nationalism in Europe, see Kadercan (2012).
Andersons interpretation of Latin America is discussed in Miller (2006), Castro-Klarn and
Chasteen (2003), and Lomnitz (2001). It might be further noted that, for all of his interest in
cultural systems of meaning, it is not culture per se that matters in crole societies for Anderson,
but rather the politicisation of place of birth (Anderson 1991 [1983]: 5658), since a Spanish
functionary and a crole functionary were effectively indistinguishable culturally.
18 There are places in his later work where Gellner attempts to introduce allowances to this claim
but they are cursory, when compared to the attention he pays to the necessity of nationalism for
industrial society. For example, in Nationalism (Gellner 1997: 768), he allows that bureaucratisation and Protestant-type religion may contribute to nationalism. But his discussion of the first
takes up one short paragraph and discussion of the second is limited to five paragraphs. (See as
well Gellner 1996: 636). In contrast, he spends roughly 135 pages in NN attempting to demonstrate the necessity of nationalism for industrial society. The Reformation, of course, figures
prominently in Andersons (1991 [1983]) culturalist interpretation of nationalism. Outside of
nationalism studies, the importance of the wars of Reformation to the development of the
state-nation is one of the threads of the argument in MacCullochs (2003: 673ff.) volume on the
Reformation. Philpott (2001: 97149) connects Protestant propositions to the consolidation of a
system of states in Europe, post-1648, through the political equilibrium induced by the terms of
the peace settlements of the wars of religion.

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