Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
The name's the game: Does marketing impact the value of corporate
name changes?
Saim Kashmiri a,1, Vijay Mahajan b,2
a
b
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 13 December 2012
Received in revised form 13 July 2014
Accepted 14 July 2014
Available online 30 July 2014
Keywords:
Corporate naming
Branding
Advertising
Marketing capability
Chief marketing ofcer
Shareholder value
a b s t r a c t
Each year, thousands of rms change their names, many in the absence of an accompanying M&A event. Existing
research reveals signicant heterogeneity in the stock market response to such pure name changes. Why do
some rms reap greater stock market rewards for changing their names? Our study of name change announcements by 180 publicly listed U.S. rms reveals that marketing-related factors play a critical role in the value of
corporate name changes: Firms with high marketing inuence in their C-suite, high marketing investments,
and high marketing capability receive greater stock market rewards for changing their names. Firms that change
their names to leverage a strong brand in their portfolio, or to proactively communicate a change in their scope of
business (i.e., a future change in their product portfolio or geographical markets), are also rewarded more than
rms that change their names to retroactively align their names with a new scope.
2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Each year, thousands of rms across the globe change their names
(Standard & Poor's Capital IQ database), many in the absence of an accompanying merger and acquisition (M&A) event. Prior scholars
(e.g., Wu, 2010) have classied name changes unrelated to M&As
the type of changes we focus on in this article as pure name changes.
Examples include RIM's name change to Blackberry, Apple Computer
Inc.'s name change to Apple Inc., and Federated Department Stores
Inc.'s name change to Macy's Inc.
A rm's name change is a major strategic action that usually comes
with signicant tangible costs associated with communicating the
change to various stakeholders, and intangible costs associated with
loss of the existing name. One wonders whether the benets of these
changes actually justify their costs. Surprisingly, some researchers
(e.g., DeFanti & Busch, 2011) nd a positive, some (e.g., Karbhari &
Sori, 2004) highlight a negative, and others (e.g., Bosch & Hirschey,
1989) report no association between corporate name changes and
shareholder value. Research that sheds light on these inconclusive results and explores the boundary conditions under which name changes
increase shareholder value is limited on at least two fronts.
First, little work has gone into understanding whether certain types
of name changes are rewarded differently than others, and if so, what
E-mail addresses: skashmiri@bus.olemiss.edu (S. Kashmiri),
vijay.mahajan@mccombs.utexas.edu (V. Mahajan).
1
Tel.: +1 662 915 1523.
2
Tel.: +1 512 471 0840.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.07.007
0148-2963/ 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
explains these differential rewards. Second, existing research on corporate name changes (e.g., Bosch & Hirschey, 1989; Cooper, Dimitrov, &
Rau, 2001; Howe, 1982; Karpoff & Rankine, 1994; Kot, 2011), focuses
mostly on nance-related contextual variables such as prior rm performance and rms' classication as nancial or non-nancial institutions.
Notable for their omission are studies exploring the role of marketingrelated factors in the value of corporate name changes. This omission
is highly surprising, given that understanding whether the existing
name has lost its appeal with customers, selecting a name consistent
with the intended rm image, and communicating a name change all
require signicant marketing expertise.
We address these limitations by conducting an event study of pure
name change announcements by 180 publicly listed U.S. rms. We
rst classify different types of name changes, and explain why we expect the stock market to react less positively to one particular kind.
We then explore the impact of three marketing variables on the valuation of name changes.
2. Theory
2.1. Common types of pure name changes
Content analysis of the press releases accompanying name changes
unrelated to M&As helps reveal two common motivations for pure
name changes: (1) Leveraging a strong existing brand in the portfolio,
and (2) communicating a change in the scope of business (i.e., a change
in the rm's product portfolio or geographical markets).
282
rm's top executives are unlikely to risk diluting the adopted brand
without being condent about their rm's future prospects.
A rm that changes its name to communicate a new scope (whether
retroactively or proactively), assuming the new name is appropriate, is
also expected to gain inherent value by changing its perception in customers' eyes. For example, Chinadotcom's name change to CDC is expected to help change customer perception of the rm to a more
globalized one, thereby attracting new customers from outside China.
Similarly, Immtech Inc.'s name change to Immtech Pharmaceuticals is
likely to help attract customers who may otherwise not have been
aware of the company's entry into the pharmaceuticals market.
With regard to signaling value, when a rm proactively changes
its name to communicate a forthcoming change in scope, the name
change helps communicate relatively unexpected news to investors.
The efcient market hypothesis would then dictate that investors
would update their expectations of the rm's future cash ows, and
the expected value of the new strategy would be incorporated into
the rm's stock price quickly. However, when a rm retroactively
changes its name, investors are expected to have already tracked the
rm's gradual transition in scope. Most of the value of the new scope
would then have already been incorporated into the rm's stock price.
Any limited value that the name change announcement provides
would then be reective primarily of inherent value and the limited
additional condence to investors about the potential of the rm's
new scope. Thus:
H1. Relative to a rm that changes its name to retroactively align its
name with a new scope of business, a rm is likely to be rewarded
more by the stock market if it changes its name (a) to leverage a
strong brand in its portfolio or (b) to proactively communicate a
new business scope.
actions accompanying a change in scope such as forming new marketing alliances and channel partnerships.
How, then, do investors diminish their uncertainty? Upper echelon theory suggests that a rm's strategic decisions are a reection of
the attributes of TMT members (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Thus,
when investors are uncertain about the value of a rm's strategic decision, they examine characteristics of the rm's TMT to help diminish their uncertainty. For example, studies have found that such
characteristics of the TMT as education and political experience
(Higgins & Gulati, 2006), provide signals of rm quality, which in
turn inuence the stock market's valuation of an IPO.
In the context of name changes, we expect the level of marketing inuence in the TMT to be an important TMT characteristic inuencing
name change valuation. Firms where marketing holds a seat of inuence in the TMT pay greater attention to customers' voice (Kerin,
2005), are more likely to generate and consider consumer insights
while formulating strategic options (Gilliatt & Cuming, 1986; Kerin,
2005), and are more likely to adopt the marketing concept in their strategic decisions (Crosby & Johnson, 2005). Such rms are likely to reassure investors that the TMT has selected an appropriate name after
carefully analyzing the impact of the new name on customer awareness
and perception.
Similarly, strong marketing inuence in a rm's C-suite, is likely
to reassure investors that the TMT made the decision to change the
rm's scope after closely analyzing the rms' core competencies
and market conditions, and that the TMT has the necessary functional expertise to effectively carry out the strategic marketing actions
accompanying a change in scope: form new marketing alliances,
manage channel relationships, support existing and new customers,
and form strategic partnerships with new suppliers. Increased investor condence, is in turn expected to increase the name's signaling
value. Thus:
H2. Firms that change their names are likely to be rewarded more by
the stock market if marketing has a high inuence in their top management team.
2.3.2. Investigating the role of marketing investments: advertising intensity
We also expect rms' advertising intensity to signicantly impact
the value of their name changes by affecting both the signaling and inherent value components of these changes.
For the rm to gain from the inherent value of adopting an
existing brand, it is important that the rm have a strong brand to
adopt. As researchers have found, advertising is a key investment
that goes toward building strong brands (e.g., Mela, Gupta, &
Lehmann, 1997). Hence, relative to a rm with low advertising intensity, it is more likely that a rm advertising heavily has a strong
brand it can leverage. Similarly, rms with greater advertising intensity are also expected to advertise their new name more heavily,
leading to a greater awareness among customers of the rm's new
scope such as its increased diversication or globalization. With
greater customer awareness of the new name, the inherent value of
the name change via a change in customer perceptions is also likely
to increase.
Similarly, signaling literature (e.g., Kirmani & Rao, 2000) reveals that
a key characteristic of an effective signal is its observability, or the extent
to which outsiders are able to notice the signal. Name changes of rms
with high advertising intensities are likely to be more observable and
therefore likely to be more effective signals: Prior research shows that
advertising increases a rm's salience with individual investors, and
that investors are more familiar with strategic actions taken by rms
that have higher advertising intensities (e.g., Grullon, Kanatas, &
Weston, 2004). Thus:
H3. Firms that change their names are likely to be rewarded more by
the stock market if they have high advertising intensity.
283
3. Methodology
3.1. Sample
To develop our sample, we rst used S&P's Capital IQ database to
identify name change events in the years 20022007 for all public
U.S. rms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ stock exchanges.
The time frame we chose (20022007) was large enough to ensure
that our results did not reect peculiarities of a particular year and
also helped us avoid the turbulent recessionary stock market periods
in the years 2001 and 2008. Next, any name change announcement
that coincided with other major announcements such as dividends
payout, changes of CEOs, or mergers and acquisitions (M&As) within
ten days of the name change were excluded from the sample
(e.g., Geyskens, Gielens, & Dekimpe, 2002). Additionally, as our research focused on three types of pure name changes discussed earlier, we restricted our sample to name changes belonging to one of
these types. Our nal sample was comprised of 180 name changes.
Each of the 180 rms in our sample changed its name once between
2002 and 2007.
284
Market model:
3.4. Data measures and sources
Ri;t i i Rm;t i;t
For both models, Ri,t denotes the rate of return on the stock price of
rm i on day t; Rm,t denotes the average rate of return on a benchmark
portfolio of market assets over an estimation period preceding the
event, i is the intercept, and i,t is the residual of the estimation (assumed to be distributed i.i.d. normal). We report results based on an estimation sample covering 301 to 46 trading days before a name change
announcement. In the Carhart model, Rrf,t denotes the risk-free rate of
return in period t; SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt denote the size factor, value
factor, and momentum factor, respectively. For both models, we estimated abnormal returns (AR) for each announcing rm by taking the
difference between the observed rate of return Ri,t and the expected
rate of return E(Ri,t), i.e., AR = i,t = Ri,t E(Ri,t). We also calculated cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each rm i to account for information leakage:
CARi t1 ; t2
t2
X
i;t
tt1
4
We controlled for major name changes (i.e., changes where the new
name was radically different from the original name), as such changes
being more visible may have higher abnormal stock returns (Horsky &
Swyngedouw, 1987). We controlled for the rm being a nancial institution, as customer trust may be more crucial to nancial institutions
relative to other types of rms (Horsky & Swyngedouw, 1987). We controlled for rms' presence in the durable goods category and the rms
being B2B rms, because a corporate name may be more inuential in
driving sales of durable goods, and the sales of B2B rms (Horsky &
Swyngedouw, 1987; Sethuraman & Tellis, 1991). We controlled for
rms' prior performance, because a poorly performing rm may be
more likely to improve its performance after changing its name. Firm
size was controlled, as larger rms may experience smaller abnormal
returns. Corporate branding was also controlled, given that rms with
3.5. Results
As shown in Table 1, the mean abnormal stock return on the day of
the event, though positive and signicant by the CDA test, was only
marginally signicant according to the Generalized Z test. Moreover, 8
of the 11 mean daily abnormal stocks were non-signicant, according
to both their CDA test scores and their Generalized Z test scores. To
the extent that the mean abnormal returns were non-signicant in
the days 5 to 1, we did not nd evidence of information leakage
prior to the event. All in all, we concluded that rms that changed
their corporate names experienced a marginal increase in their value.
In a separate analysis, we calculated a one-year buy-and-hold return
(BHR) for our sample rms starting from their name change announcement date, and found this one-year BHR to be statistically the same as
that of a control portfolio of rms matched by size and industry
(Barber & Lyon, 1997). While this investigation suggests only a shortterm market impact of name changes, other rm actions during the
course of one year may have diluted name changes' long-term impact.
We therefore consider the question of if and when a name change
285
Table 1
Mean daily abnormal return for sample.
Carhart 4 factor model
Market model
Day
CDA t
Generalized Z
% positive
Day
CDA t
Generalized Z
% positive
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
.20%
.35%
.02%
.02%
.01%
1.11%
.07%
.34%
.08%
.52%
.63%
.613
1.052
.059
.060
.030
3.343***
.214
1.015
.238
1.562
1.895*
.390
.508
.508
.430
.471
1.631
.358
.807
1.257
1.588
1.438
46
49
49
49
44
53
49
50
52
41
42
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
.12%
.24%
.01%
.14%
.04%
1.07%
.08%
.35%
.02%
.45%
.51%
.346
.695
.037
.421
.112
3.163***
.232
1.019
.064
1.317
1.496
.240
.508
1.407
.130
.320
1.482
.508
.958
.958
1.588
1.138
46
49
53
47
46
53
49
51
51
41
43
Note: p b .10, *p b .05, **p b .01, and ***p b .001, one-tailed. N = 180.
increases long-term market value as an interesting question that deserves further exploration.
Next, as shown in Table 2, we carried out some preliminary univariate analysis.
We found CAAR to be positive and signicant when the type of
name change was leveraging a strong brand, or when it was proactively
communicating a new scope, but found CAAR to be negative and significant for name changes retroactively communicating a new scope. We
also found CAAR to be positive and signicant for the subsample in
which the rm had a CMO in its TMT, but non-signicant otherwise.
These results were generally robust to different event windows, different abnormal return models (Carhart 4 factor or market model), and
different tests (CDA test or Generalized Z test). We concluded that
Table 2
Cumulative average abnormal returns for complete sample and sample split according to different factors.
Carhart 4 factor model
Event period
Market model
CAAR
CDA t
% positive
Event period
Generalized Z
% positive
(0)
(1,0)
(1,+1)
(2,+2)
(5,+5)
1.17%
.20%
.11%
.06%
.91%
3.529***
.353
.118
.065
.182
1.557
.765
.407
.048
.407
53
50
49
47
49
(0)
(1,0)
(1,+1)
(2,+2)
(5,+5)
1.07%
1.03%
1.11%
1.31%
.00%
3.163***
2.145*
1.886*
1.729*
.004
1.482
1.107
1.556
.359
.359
53
51
53
49
49
2.98%
3.59%
2.70%
4.22%
.37%
2.29%
2.03%
3.61%
3.40%
4.63%
.87%
1.33%
1.27%
1.57%
3.07%
4.777***
4.070***
2.499**
3.024**
.181
3.137***
1.965*
2.856**
2.085*
1.911*
2.135*
2.313*
1.805*
1.730*
2.282*
2.797**
3.391***
2.662**
2.662**
.718
3.110***
2.080*
3.110***
1.392
2.423**
2.339**
2.116*
2.561**
2.116*
1.449
64
69
64
64
52
74
65
74
59
68
35
37
34
37
41
(0)
(1,0)
(1,+1)
(2,+2)
(5,+5)
(0)
(1,0)
(1,+1)
(2,+2)
(5,+5)
(0)
(1,0)
(1,+1)
(2,+2)
(5,+5)
2.83%
3.41%
2.88%
4.05%
1.08%
2.24%
1.84%
3.38%
3.32%
4.80%
.88%
1.33%
1.35%
1.76%
2.97%
4.501***
3.845***
2.644**
2.886**
.520
3.088**
1.794*
2.688**
2.045*
1.994*
2.119*
2.257*
1.875*
1.900*
2.154*
2.803**
3.159**
3.652**
2.666**
1.186
2.760**
2.073*
2.760**
1.729*
2.073*
2.307*
2.752**
2.974**
2.752**
2.084*
65
68
71
65
55
71
65
71
62
65
35
33
32
33
37
5.082***
4.429***
4.061***
3.896***
1.006
.012
.728
.829
.655
1.202
3.171***
3.395***
2.947**
2.499**
2.051*
.666
.758
.758
1.161
.959
65
66
64
61
59
43
43
43
41
42
2.28%
2.79%
3.12%
3.91%
1.96%
.09%
.39%
.52%
.79%
1.59%
4.662***
4.040***
3.688**
3.586**
1.212
.206
.636
.682
.809
1.097
3.390**
3.390**
3.166**
2.270*
1.822*
1.066
1.559
.753
1.559
1.156
66
66
65
60
58
41
39
43
40
41
Total
[N = 180]
Generalized Z
(0)
(1,0)
(1,+1)
(2,+2)
(5,+5)
(0)
(1,0)
(1,+1)
(2,+2)
(5,+5)
CAAR
CDA t
286
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefcients.
Mean SD
1. Abnormal return (0)
.01
2. Leveraging brand
.37
3. Proactively communicating new scope
.19
4. Marketing inuence in TMT (CMO presence)
.44
5. Marketing investment (advertising intensity)
.03
6. Marketing capability (efciency)
.67
7. Major name change
.53
8. Financial institution
.19
9. Durables
.22
10. B2B
.63
11. Firm size (ln of total assets in $m)
6.03
12. Corporate branding
.41
13. Past performance
.01
.04
.49
.39
.50
.05
.28
.50
.03
.03
.49
2.29
.49
.08
.30
.16 .37
.30 .004
.27 .09
.16
.10
.19
.29
.04
.04
.03
.01
.11
.14
.17 .02
.25
.29
.07
.06
.24
.38
..001
.06
.05
.02
.04
.06
.12
.04
.004
.23
.05
.06
.07
.20 .10
.13
.04
.05
.01
.20
.01
.18 .05
.06 .04
10
11
12
.04
.50
.18
.20
.01
.08
.11
.06
.15 .25
.08
.30
.18
.25
.19 .05
.39
.001
.26 .06
.34
.26
.08
.04
.04
.06
.13 .07
Table 4 summarizes the results of our regression analysis with abnormal return on day 0 serving as the dependent variable. As Table 4 reveals, our results remained robust to the choice of abnormal returns
model (i.e., Carhart 4 factor model in Model 1, and market model in
Model 2.)
We found coefcients of all focal independent variables signicant
and in the hypothesized direction. The coefcients of leveraging brand
(p b .01) and communicating new strategy proactively (p b .01) were
found to be positive and signicant, supporting H1a and H1b, respectively. Similarly, we found the coefcient of CMO presence to be positive
and signicant (p b .01), supporting the hypothesized role of marketing
inuence in the TMT (H2). The coefcient of advertising intensity was
positive and signicant (p b .01), supporting H3. Finally, the coefcient
of marketing capability was positive and signicant (p b .01 in Model 1
and p b .05 in Model 2), supporting H4. Amongst the control variables,
we found smaller rms and nancial institutions experiencing larger
abnormal returns. Furthermore, rms with a corporate branding strategy were found to experience larger abnormal returns, reecting the
Table 4
Result of OLS regression with abnormal return on day 0 as dependent variable.
Variables
Independent variables
Leveraging brand
Proactively communicating
new scope
Marketing inuence in TMT
(CMO presence)
Marketing investment
(advertising intensity)
Marketing capability (efciency)
Controls
Major name change
Financial institution
Durables
B2B
Firm size (ln of total assets in $m)
Corporate branding
Past performance
Intercept
2
R
Overall F-test
Coefcients
(t-values)
Coefcients
(t-values)
Model 1
(Carhart 4 factor)
Model 2
(market model)
.025(3.58)***
.024(2.87)***
.027(3.97)***
.021(2.57)***
.019(3.12)***
.017(2.93)***
.165(2.72)***
.161(2.75)***
.031(2.51)***
.024(2.06)**
3.1E4(.05)
.0182(2.04)**
6.4E3(.92)
5.0E3(.73)
4.3E3(2.92)***
.016(2.44)**
7.2E3(.21)
.015(.96)
35.7%
F(12,167) = 7.73***
.001(.23)
.0131(1.72)*
7.2E3(1.05)
5.7 E3(.86)
4.5E3(3.18)***
.015(2.44)**
6.7E3(.20)
6.3E3(.43)
35.6%
F(12,167) = 7.69***
287
Acknowledgment
An earlier version of this paper was published as part of the Marketing Science Institute Working Paper Series #09-212. The authors thank
Raji Srinivasan, Rajesh Chandy, Ross Rizley, and the faculty at University
of Texas at Austin, for their insightful comments on a previous version of
the paper. The authors also thank the editor, the AE, and three anonymous reviewers for their very constructive suggestions.
288
Appendix A
Table A.1
Parameter estimates of marketing capability: Stochastic frontier estimation with natural logarithm of sales as output.
Variables
Parameter estimates
(standard error)
ln(Ad stock)
ln(SG&A stock)
ln(R&D stock)
ln(Receivables)
Constant
Random error
Inefciency error
Random error standard deviation
Inefciency error standard deviation
composite error variance (e2 = 2 + 2)
Ratio of inefciency error variance to random error variance 2
Wald 2(4)
1 = .065 (.036)*
2 = .110 (.035)***
3 = .0225(.0129)*
4 = .777 (.0361)***
0 = 3.388(.205)***
=.789 (.2745)***
= 1.412 (.167)***
= .674 (.0925)***
= 2.026 (.169)***
e2 = 4.557 (.639)***
2/ 2 = 3.006(.227)***
761.55***
Appendix B
Table B.1
Robustness to alternate estimation windows: Results of OLS regression with AR(0) calculated using different estimation windows as dependent variable.
Variables
Independent variables
Leveraging brand
Proactively communicating new scope
Marketing inuence in TMT (CMO presence)
Marketing investment (advertising intensity)
Marketing capability (efciency)
Controls
Major name change
Financial institution
Durables
B2B
Firm size (ln of total assets in $m)
Corporate branding
Past performance
Intercept
2
R
Overall F-test
Coefcients (t-values)
Model 1: Estimation window:
250 to 30 days
Coefcients (t-values)
Model 2: Estimation window:
175 to 26 days
Coefcients (t-values)
Model 3: Estimation window:
310 to 11 days
.026(3.66)***
.018(2.14)**
.019(3.21)***
.183(3.01)***
.030(2.47)***
.027(3.97)***
.026(3.61)***
.020(3.27)***
.183(2.96)***
.026(2.08)**
.024(3.52)***
.017(2.10)**
.019(3.18)***
.177(2.93)***
.029(2.39)**
7.2E4(.12)
.021(2.30)**
4.7E3(.67)
8.0E3(1.16)
4.7E3(3.23)***
.013(2.03)**
.013(.38)
9.0E3(.59)
36.0%
F(12,167) = 7.83***
2.0E3(.31)
.017(1.72)*
.006(1.05)
6.1 E3(.85)
4.4E3(2.99)***
.012(1.81)*
.013(.36)
6.2E3(.40)
33.9%
F(12,167) = 7.15***
.2.8E4(.05)
.019(2.14)*
7.2E3(1.05)
5.6 E3(.80)
4.3E3(2.99)***
.013(2.00)**
.010(.30)
.010(.72)
34.5%
F(12,167) = 7.33***
Note: AR(0) is calculated using Carhart 4 factor model. *p b .10, **p b .05, and ***p b .01, two-tailed. N = 180.
Appendix C
Table C.1
Robustness to alternate event windows: Results of OLS regression with different cumulative abnormal returns as dependent variable.
Variables
Independent variables
Leveraging brand
Proactively communicating new scope
Marketing inuence in TMT (CMO presence)
Marketing investment (advertising intensity)
Marketing capability (efciency)
Controls
Major name change
Financial institution
Durables
B2B
Firm size (ln of total assets in $m)
Corporate branding
Past performance
Intercept
2
R
Overall F-test
Coefcients (t-values)
Model 1: Dependent variable CAR(1,0)
Coefcients (t-values)
Model 2: Dependent variable CAR(1,+1)
.038(4.02)***
.032(2.81)***
.024(3.00)***
.063(1.77)*
.036(2.20)**
.030(2.50)**
.053(3.75)***
.032(3.18)***
.052(1.70)*
.033(1.79)*
.014(1.60)
.015(1.25)
.013(.92)
5.0E3(1.41)
5.9E3(3.00)***
.025(2.82)***
.016(.34)
.010(.51)
31.3%
F(12,167) = 6.35***
.013(1.25)
.011(.70)
.014(1.15)
.013(1.15)
1.7E3(1.77)*
.031(2.77)***
3.3E3(.06)
.051(1.96)*
24.2%
F(12,167) = 4.45***
Note: CARs are calculated using the Carhart 4 factor model. *p b .10, **p b .05, and ***p b .01, two-tailed. N = 180.
289
Appendix D
Table D.1
Robustness to alternative measures: Result of OLS regression with AR(0) as dependent variable using alternative measures of marketing inuence.
Variables
Independent variables
Marketing investment (advertising intensity)
Marketing capability (efciency)
Marketing inuence (based on CMO's compensation)a
Marketing inuence (based on CMO's rank)b
Leveraging brand
Proactively communicating new scope
Controls
Major name change
Financial institution
Durables
B2B
Firm size (ln of total assets in $m)
Corporate branding
Past performance
Intercept
R2
Overall F-test
Coefcients (t-values)
Model 1
Coefcients (t-values)
Model 2
.176(3.19)***
.028(2.53)***
.368(6.85)***
.141(2.45)**
.027(2.34)**
.020(3.06)***
.017(2.23)**
.064(5.37)***
.022(3.27)***
.023(2.91)***
1.4E3(.25)
.0180(2.24)**
7.9E3(1.23)
3.8E3(.61)
4.2E3(3.15)***
.015(2.51)**
7.0E3(.23)
.014(1.03)
46.8%
F(12,167) = 12.32***
5.2E3(.09)
.0179(2.13)**
7.4E3(1.15)
2.9 E3(.44)
3.5E3(2.50)**
.013(2.04)**
5.5E3(.17)
.018(1.28)
41.9%
F(12,167) = 10.10***
Note: AR(0) is calculated using the Carhart 4 factor model. **p b .05, and ***p b .01, two-tailed. N = 180.
a
Marketing inuence was measured as the compensation of the CMO as a percentage of the total compensation of all TMT members (a measure of inuence proposed by Finkelstein,
1992).
b
Marketing inuence was measured as the proportion of organizational levels in the TMT at or below the CMO's level (a measure used by Nath & Mahajan, 2011).
Appendix E
Table E.1
Predictive validity: Results of 10-fold cross-validation to assess forecasting performance.
Variables entered
CV PRESS
Intercept
Leveraging brand
Marketing investment (advertising intensity)
Marketing inuence in TMT (CMO presence)
Proactively communicating new scope
Corporate branding
Firm size
Marketing capability (efciency)
Financial institution
Durables
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
.3566
.3291
.2980
.2780
.2670
.2633
.2568
.2560
.2502
.2506 N .2502
Note: Following Geyskens et al. (2002) and Dekimpe, Francois, Gopalakrishna, Lilien, and Van den Bulte (1997), our original sample was randomly partitioned into 10 subsamples of
roughly equal size. Of the 10 subsamples, a single subsample was initially retained as the validation set for testing the model, and the remaining 9 subsamples combined were used as
the training set for tting the sample. The cross-validation process was repeated 10 times, with each of the 10 subsamples used exactly once as the validation set. The results from the
10 iterations were then averaged to produce a single estimation. This approach allowed us to drop independent variables that did not contribute toward predictive accuracy. The predictive
validity statistic we report is Cross-Validation Predicted Residual Sum of Squares or CV PRESS where the mean square error (MSE) of prediction is calculated by the formulae: MSE (of
prediction) = CVPRESS/n, with n being the total sample size. The model with the smallest CV PRESS was selected as the model with the best predictive validity. We found that the CV
PRESS score of this parsimonious 8-variable model was .2502, which translated into an MSE of prediction of .00139. Our MSE of prediction was only 3.7% higher than the MSE of estimation
of the same 8-variable model prior to 10-fold cross-validation, which compares favorably with the predictive validity test results reported in prior event studies. For example, for the model
used by Geyskens et al. (2002), the MSE of prediction after 10-fold cross-validation was reported to be 8.6% higher than the MSE of estimation. Thus, all in all, the forecasting performance
of our parsimonious model was reasonable.
References
Barber, B.M., & Lyon, J.D. (1997). Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and specication of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics, 43(3),
341372.
Barth, M. E., Clement, M., Foster, G., & Kasznik, R. (1998). Brand values and capital market
valuation. Review of Accounting Studies, 3(12), 4168.
Bosch, J. -C., & Hirschey, M. (1989). The valuation effects of corporate name changes.
Financial Management, 18(4), 6473.
Boyd, E., Chandy, R., & Cunha, M., Jr. (2010). When do chief marketing ofcers impact rm
value? A customer power explanation. Journal of Marketing Research, 47(6),
11621176.
Brown, S. J., & Warner, J. B. (1985). Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies.
Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1), 331.
Campa, J. M., & Kedia, S. (2002). Explaining the diversication discount. The Journal of
Finance, 57(4), 17311762.
Carhart, M. M. (1997). On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. The Journal of Finance,
52(1), 5782.
Connelly, B.L., Hoskisson, R. E., Tihanyi, L., & Certo, S. T. (2011). Ownership as a form of
corporate governance. Journal of Management Studies, 47(8), 15611589.
Cooper, M. J., Dimitrov, O., & Rau, R. (2001). A Rose.com by any other name. The Journal of
Finance, 56(6), 23712388.
Cowan, A.R. (1992). Nonparametric event study tests. Review of Quantitative Finance and
Accounting, 2(4), 343358.
Crosby, L. A., & Johnson, S. L. (2005). Change agents: Chief marketing ofcers are positioned to create customer-loyalty centered enterprises. Marketing Management,
14(6), 1213.
DeFanti, M., & Busch, P. (2011). Image-related corporate name changes: Their effects on
rms' stock prices. Journal of Brand Management, 19(3), 241253.
Dekimpe, M. G., Francois, P., Gopalakrishna, S., Lilien, G. L., & Van den Bulte, C. (1997).
Generalizing about trade show effectiveness: A cross-national comparison. Journal
of Marketing, 61(4), 5564.
Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K., & Sarin, A. (1997). Agency problems, equity ownership, and corporate diversication. The Journal of Finance, 52(1), 135160.
Dutta, S., Narasimhan, O., & Rajiv, S. (1999). Success in high-technology markets: Is marketing capability critical? Marketing Science, 18(4), 547568.
290
McAlister, L., Srinivasan, R., & Kim, M. C. (2007). Advertising, research and development
and systematic risk of the rm. Journal of Marketing, 71(1), 3548.
Mela, C. F., Gupta, S., & Lehmann, D. R. (1997). The long-term impact of promotion and
advertising on consumer brand choice. Journal of Marketing Research, 34(2), 248261.
Merrilees, B., & Miller, D. (2008). Principles of corporate rebranding. European Journal of
Marketing, 42(5/6), 537552.
Miller, D., & Merrilees, B. (2013). Rebuilding community corporate brands: A total
stakeholder involvement approach. Journal of Business Research, 66(2), 172179.
Morgan, N. A., Slotegraaf, R. J., & Vorhies, D. W. (2009). Linking marketing capabilities with prot growth. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 26(4),
284293.
Muzellec, L., & Lambkin, M. C. (2008). Corporate rebranding and the implications for
brand architecture management: The case of Guinness (Diageo) Ireland. Journal of
Strategic Marketing, 16(4), 283299.
Nath, P., & Mahajan, V. (2008). Chief marketing ofcers: A study of their presence in rms'
top management teams. Journal of Marketing, 72(1), 6581.
Nath, P., & Mahajan, V. (2011). Marketing inuence in the C-Suite: A study of chief marketing ofcer power in rms' top management teams. Journal of Marketing, 75(1),
6077.
Sethuraman, R., & Tellis, G. J. (1991). An analysis of the tradeoff between advertising and
pricing. Journal of Marketing Research, 31(2), 160174.
Sorescu, A., Shankar, V., & Kushwaha, T. (2007). New product preannouncements and
shareholder value: Don't make promises you can't keep. Journal of Marketing
Research, 44(3), 468489.
Srinivasan, S., Pauwels, K. H., Silva-Risso, J., & Hanssens, D.M. (2009). Product innovations,
advertising spending and stock returns. Journal of Marketing, 73(1), 2443.
Swaminathan, V., & Moorman, C. (2009). Marketing alliances, rm networks, and rm
value creation. Journal of Marketing, 73(5), 5269.
Swaminathan, V., Murshed, F., & Hulland, J. (2008). Value creation following merger and
acquisition announcements: The role of strategic emphasis alignment. Journal of
Marketing Research, 45(1), 3347.
Verhoef, P. C., & Leeang, P.S. H. (2009). Understanding marketing department's inuence
within the rm. Journal of Marketing, 73(2), 1437.
Wu, Y. (2010). What's in a name? What leads a rm to change its name and what the
new name foreshadows. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(6), 13441359.
Xiong, G., & Bharadwaj, S. (2013). Asymmetric roles of advertising and marketing capability in nancial returns to news: Turning bad into good and good into great. Journal of
Marketing Research, 50(6), 706724.
Yorkston, E., & Menon, G. (2004). A sound idea: Phonetic effects of brand names on consumer judgments. Journal of Consumer Research, 31(1), 4351.