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DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
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VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA
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PROJECT
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INTERNTIONAL
LAW
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SUBMITTED
SAMVEDAM
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e r t y u i oTOp a Ms
s dPRATUSHA
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NAME- SONAM
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r t y u i o p a s d f g h j k l z x c v b n m qROLLNO:-2013114
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i o p a s d f g h j k l z x c v b n m q w e r t ySEMESTER-V
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:
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bnmrtyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwe
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iopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopa

I have taken efforts in this project. However it wouldn't have been possible
without the kind support and help of many individuals. I would like to extend
my sincere thanks to all of them.
I am highly indebted to Ms Pratusha Samvedam for her guidance and constant
supervision as well as for providing necessary information regarding the
project.
I would like to express my special gratitude and thanks to my friends for giving
me such attention and time and helping me in developing the project and people
who have willingly helped me out with their abilities.

Table of contents
Table of contents........................................................................................................................1
Abstract......................................................................................................................................2
Scope and Structure of the Project.............................................................................................3
Research Methodology...............................................................................................................3
Introduction................................................................................................................................3
United Nations Interference......................................................................................................4
Need for the International Regulation on Gun Control..............................................................5
Government Preferences on International Regulation...............................................................6
Critique on the Protocol and UNs PoA.....................................................................................7
Conclusion..................................................................................................................................8
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................10

Abstract
The project Gun Control and International Issues deals with the International regulations
that are present for the gun control. It aims at discussing the details about the need for the
International regulation on gun trade and also the Governments attitude about the same. The
motivation for the regulations and also the need for them are explained in the project under
three heads which are:
1. Why national regulation is insufficient and why International regulation is necessary
for curbing the negative externalities of small arms.
2. Theoretical framework for explaining Government preferences on International
regulation.
3. Regulation of the trade in small arms.

Scope and Structure of the Project


The project aims at providing an insight into the gun control mechanism existent on
International level and also the States interest in the gun control system. The project also
gives a description about United Nations interference in the gun control regulations and a
critical view about the same. It gives details as to why there is a need for an International
regulation to be made, which must be legally binding and also the details about how the
Governments interest in International regulation changes.

Research Methodology
The project is based on a non-empirical study and the research includes gathering the data
from the existing information like referring the articles, journals and the documents relating
to the topic available online.

Introduction
In an era when it has become fashionable to advocate that social policy be guided by
evidence, social scientists should be riding high. But there is a problem: The available
evidence on what works in the social-policy arena is typically something less than definitive.
Experts disagree. Sometimes the only consensus that can be mustered among researchers is
that more research is required, often a dubious assertion when there has been voluminous
research already. Meanwhile, policymakers are left free to either ignore the research
evidence, or to search out an expert who supports their position. A case in point is the recent
report on gun violence of an expert panel of the National Research Council. In one topic after
another, the NRCs blue-ribbon panel concludes that the existing evidence is inconclusive
(Wellford, Pepper, & Petrie, 2005).1 It calls for an investment in better data, the invention of
better methods for extracting sound conclusions from non experimental evidence, and more
research funding. There is essentially no guidance offered for policy development. At one
level, the NRC reports nihilistic conclusion about this body of research is not surprising. Gun
policy is a contentious issue, among social scientists as much as laymen. In this heated
context, the NRC panel made a reasonable decision to assess the evidence according to the
usual scientific standard that insists on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Their work provided a
public service in pointing out that a number of claims bruited by researchers rested on thin
evidentiary ice. But the panel missed an opportunity to provide guidance on how
policymakers could best take advantage of available research in this area. The evidence may

not be definitive, but it is far from irrelevant to making good policy. In this review essay, we
offer several conclusions that we believe are defensible and relevant to policy choice
The illegal trade in small arms, light weapons and ammunition inflicts havoc everywhere.
Mobs petrifying a neighbourhood. Rebels attacking civilians or peacekeepers. Drug lords
aimlessly killing law enforcers or anyone else interfering with their- illegal businesses.
Bandits hijacking humanitarian aid convoys. In all continents, uncontrolled small arms form a
persisting problem, says UNODA.1Small arms, it says, are cheap, light, and easy to
handle, transport and conceal. They are the weapons of choice in civil wars and for terrorism,
organised crime and gang warfare.
There are no accurate figures for the number of small arms and light weapons currently in
circulation globally.2
The UN resists that small arms and light weapons cause the deaths of over 500,000 people
annually. Gun trafficking is big International business which affects every country. An inquiry
by the Toronto Star stated that guns are purchased in the United States and trafficked into
Canada. The report specified that a gun would first be procured in the United States for $150.
The gun would then be trafficked across the border and sold in the City of Windsor for $800
to $1,000 to a trafficker. The trafficker would then move the gun further north into the City of
Toronto, where that gun is sold for at least $2,000. Pistols in Toronto are also obtainable for
rent for $600 per night, according to the Toronto Star. Up to 70 per cent of all crimes
involving guns in Canada involve firearms purchased in the United States and smuggled into
the country.3
In order to fight the illicit arms trade, The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), a multilateral treaty to
legalise the International trade in conventional arms was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on April 2, 2013 and opened for signature on June 3, 2013. As of July 31,
2013, more than 80 States have signed the Treaty.4

United Nations Interference


In 1995 the United Nations launched a political process intended to combat the negative
effects of small arms proliferation5 and misuse. The UN small arms process has included a
series of resolutions, meetings, and reports. The primary agreement resulting from this
process is the Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
1 http://www.newsday.co.tt/sunday_special_report/print,0,183330.html last viewed on 10 th November
2013.
2ibid
3Ibid
4 Ibid
5

Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Program of Action or PoA), adopted at a UN
conference in 2001.6
As Stated in its preamble, the Program of Action addresses the uncontrolled spread of small
arms which has a wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences and poses a
serious threat to peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable
development.7 The PoA intends to reduce the human suffering and devastating
consequences caused by small arms proliferation and misuse, and therefore establishes a set
of International guidelines for controlling small arms. Given the enormous death toll of small
arms and the destruction they inflict it is expected that there is a tight International control of
small arms, based on a strict agreement, clear and specific norms and a mechanism to ensure
compliance. The Nuclear and chemical weapons are controlled internationally through legally
binding agreements which include monitoring and verification mechanisms;8International
control of small arms should have taken a similar form. Yet the control of small arms as
established by the PoA is far from being compared to it. The PoA has a very loose framework
which is hard to reconcile with the plethora of the problem.
Firstly, the PoA has no legally binding force. Whereas arms control agreements typically take
the shape of treaties, the PoA is merely a political declaration and does not establish legally
binding commitments.9
Secondly, arms control agreements usually lay out clear and unequivocal obligations. Nonnuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT commit not to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons; State Parties to the CWC undertake never under any circumstances to
develop, produce, otherwise acquire or use chemical weapons.

5According to estimates, there are at least 875 million small arms in circulation worldwide. Civilians
own roughly 75% of this total (approximately 650 million small arms). Small Arms Survey
2007.Referred from http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-armssurvey-2007.html.
6 http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptsarms.pdf last viewed on 10th November 2013.
7 http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/arms060626Slo-eng.pdf last viewed on 10th october
2015.
8Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC).Referred from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_Weapons_Convention last viewed on
9th october 2015.
9 http://portal.idc.ac.il/en/schools/Government/Research/Documents/Efrat.IO.pdf last viewed on 10th
october 2013.
6

By contrast, the PoAs language is vague and not precise, allowing Governments to interpret
the document as they see fit. There is no specification, however, of what constitutes
adequate laws or effective control.10
Third, verification arrangements a keystone of arms control agreements like the NPT and
CWC are absent from the PoA. The PoA neither grants States the authority to monitor
compliance, nor does it delegate verification power to a third party. It merely asks States on
a voluntary basis to provide information concerning implementation.
The contrast between the enormous magnitude of the harm inflicted by small arms worldwide
and the weakness of International small arms control is striking and puzzling. As the PoA
itself acknowledges, small arms proliferation sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, and
contributes to the displacement of civilians and fuels crime and terrorism. 11 But the reasons
for not answering these issues in the PoA are unknown.

Need for the International Regulation on Gun Control


Propagation and misuse of small arms result in a variety of negative results, from fatalities in
civil wars and terrorism to trouble of trade and health care. The primary means to curb it is a
national regulation of the import, sale and possession of small arms. In fact, most countries
have gun control laws which strictly regulate civilian possession of arms. Then the question
that arises is why there is any need for International regulation of small arms? And also what
is the need to have an International regulation of small arms. The limitations of law
enforcement agencies and justice systems are a key reason. Restrictions on the import of guns
may exist on the books, but customs and border control often fail to detect and seize guns; the
increasing volume of trade in recent decades has diminished even further the intensity and
effectiveness of customs inspections.12
Gun control legislation is meaningful only if the police can catch the violators and courts
sentences are carried out; in many countries, this is not to be seen. Effective law enforcement
requires significant resources and even developed countries often struggle to fully enforce
gun regulation, let alone developing countries where trained and equipped law enforcement
personnel are a scarce resource.13
10 Ibid
11Program of Action, Preamble, Article 5. Referred from,
http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptsarms.pdf last viewed on 10th October2015.
12 http://www.debate.org/opinions/does-there-need-to-be-stricter-laws-for-gun-control last viewed on
17th October2015.
13 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/983724fc-b589-11dd-ab71-0000779fd18c.html last viewed on 9th
october 2015.
7

The limited effectiveness of domestic gun regulation has another cause. Typically,
Governments respond to the problem of negative deeds by imposing regulation on the source
of the deed, such as an air-polluting factory. This solution, however, is inapplicable for
curbing the negative effects of small arms, because these effects are transnational, in that the
source may sometimes be outside the boundaries of those countries that bear the misgivings.
The source may sometimes be across the border. For example, guns are regularly smuggled
from the United States to Mexico; most weapons used in the separatist conflicts in Georgia in
the 1990s came from Russian stockpiles in the Caucasus. In many other cases, the countries
generating the problems i.e. the arms-exporting countries are far remote from the countries
that are bearing the negative consequences.14
Given that controls on import and circulation of guns are not entirely effective, curbing the
problems created by the small arms requires control at the source which requires having a
restriction on small arms exports. Yet the problem-bearing countries cannot themselves
address the source of the problems, which is outside their boundaries. For that, they turn to
International regulation. International regulation supplements the national controls of the
problem-bearing countries by inducing the problem-generating countries to establish
adequate controls. Through International regulation, countries suffering rampant gun violence
seek to restrain the arms-exporting countries and restrict exports of small arms.15
This concept can be observed in the other related International aspects as well. One of which
is the control over drugs, which has been effectively restricted with the help of the
International regulations.

Government Preferences on International Regulation


For the Government to be interested in the International regulation of the laws there must be
some implications which either affects it positively or negatively. In the case of gun laws
these implications can be put under 3 heads.
Primarily the Government focuses on International regulation to curb the trades negative
effect on its country. For example, the gun homicide victims, archaeological destruction
caused by antiquities looting, or crime associated with widespread drug abuse etc., will put a
pressure on the Government to make sure there are regulations to have a check on it. The
trade models typically equate the public with consumers, and therefore assume that the public
favours trade liberalization. The public, in case of small arms, has distinct preferences from
the actual consumers of the goods. The consumers of the goods, the gun users, indeed favour
uncontrolled trade. The public, however, bears the negative consequences of the trade and so
is interested in curbing them through regulations. There can also be cases where the
Government may be the ultimate bearer of the consequences and so might be interested in the

14 Ibid
15 Ibid
8

control of the gun trade, for instance, in case there is uncontrolled gun violence then the
Government may feel it as a threat to its control over the society.16
Governments with humanitarian foreign policy agenda, such as those of Japan, Canada, and
many European countries, are therefore likely to treat small arms as a pressing humanitarian
concern. These countries have a compulsion to accept the regulations on the gun control
because of the humanitarian policies and so look up to the International regulation for the
same.17
Another strong reason for the Governments to look up to International regulations is the weak
laws or the problems in enforcing the domestic laws. This makes it next to impossible to curb
the trade and its outcome so the strong need for International regulation in order to establish
controls at the other end arises. International regulation allows those Governments to make
up for their own regulatory incapacity.18
The secondary reason can be the related innovation which includes the value-based concerns
about the trades negative effects on foreign countries, this can be considered as a contrary to
the focus of usual trade models on material incentives. The emphasis of the Government in
this regard is to the negative effects that the foreign country is facing because of the trade.
For instance, the situation in China where there was a restriction on opium caused American
missionaries to put pressure on United States to initiate the International drug control. The
customary trade rules fail to establish any benefit to the US in doing this but the Governments
concentrate on the value-based concerns to promote welfare and address humanitarian
problems.
The third reason could be the Governments role: not only as a policy maker, but possibly a
market actor exporter or consumer. In case of small arms manufacture, if there is are State
owned manufacturers, their export will be considered as the income for the State and hence
the more the export is, the more will be the income. This will result in the State trying to
export more for the income and causes harm to the foreign nationals and then the need for a
International regulation to control the export.19
The situation where the Government is a consumer should also be considered to understand
its preferences in the International regulations. The consumption of guns for internal and

16 http://ivn.us/2012/07/25/gun-control-an-International-comparison/?
utm_source=ivn&utm_medium=featured&utm_content=title&utm_campaign=opt-beta-v-1-0
17 Ibid
18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Traffic_in_Arms_Regulations last referred on18th
October 2015.
19 Supra note 16
9

external security is but one prominent example. By opposing International regulation,


Governments-as-consumers wish to maintain their ability to obtain the goods and use them.20

Critique on the Protocol and UNs PoA


The UNs non-functional programme of action can be the main reason for the need in the
development of a legally binding, enforceable mechanism for restricting arms and
ammunitions on an International standard.
In the absence of legally binding force and a meaningful enforcement mechanism and with
critical gaps such as ammunition, the PoA could hardly be considered an appropriate
International response for the devastating consequences of small arms proliferation and
misuse; it also lacks typical attributes of arms control agreements. The reason for this
mechanism to be so is the different structure of Government preferences. Arms control
agreements build on mutual gains and partial convergence of interests. In the case of small
arms, however, Governments hold clearly different preferences with no common ground.
African and Latin American Governments facing rampant gun violence favour stringent
International regulation. They do, however, meet with resistance from Governments that find
International regulation of small arms harmful. Resistance comes, first and foremost, from
decidedly anti-regulation Governments like China and Syria. International regulation yields
no benefits to those Governments, which face very low levels of gun violence. Moreover,
regulation could impose significant costs on both, threatening Chinas commercial interest as
a major arms exporter and possibly establishing a means of pressure on nondemocratic Syria.
With nothing to gain and much to lose from International regulation, those Governments wish
to maintain the small arms trade uncontrolled. Resistance to regulation also comes from the
cross-pressured United States. Torn between its interest in curbing gun violence abroad and
the powerful gun lobby, the American preference, is for weak International regulation.21
This sharp disagreement of preferences and absence of similar kind of interests has yielded a
very weak International regulatory framework for small arms in 2001 and a deadlock at the
2006 Review Conference. Countries favouring weak regulation were interested in creating
the appearance of concern about the grave problem of small arms without establishing
commitments that would have teeth. The African and Latin American countries wished for a
much more stringent regulation but could not overcome the resistance of such powerful
countries as the United States and China. While some Governments are concerned about the
daily loss of life of innocent victims, the others guard the interests of arms exporters. Many
Governments would like to address the issues of civilian possession of small arms and so do
the non-State actors, which are a taboo for others, first and foremost of this group being the
United States.22
20 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulatory_agency last referred on 18th October 2015.
21 Wade Boese, General Assembly and Illicit Firearms Protocol, can be referred from
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_07-08/armsjul_aug01
10

The main obstacle to International regulation of small arms is not difficulties with monitoring
and enforcement, a collective action problem, or uncertainty. The primary difficulty is that
certain Governments benefit considerably from International regulation, whereas others
benefit very little and, in fact, have much to lose. This major hurdle absence of mutual
gains and the resulting large variation of preferences is masked if the assumption of mutual
gains is put into work, and so the Governments create hindrances in the creation, maintenance
and application of the International regulations.23

Conclusion
International law is the collective system of rules and doctrines concerned with the
associations between sovereign States, and relations amid States and Global organisations
such as the United Nations. Domestic law, the law within a State, is concerned with the rights
and duties of legal persons within the State. Even though International law does not have the
coercive enforcement processes available to domestic law, it is in the interests of most States
to ensure stability and predictability in their relations with other States. By complying with
their obligations, they help to ensure that other States comply with theirs. It is in this same
interest that the States are expected to develop an internationally accepted gun regulation, so
that the trade, manufacture and other aspects relating to guns can be controlled.
In the light of need for the International regulations, the project gives an insight about how
the municipal laws are not being properly implemented and so how exactly the need for an
International regulation arises.
The final part of the project deals with the critical view on the UNs programme of action
which has been brought into existence for control of the gun manufacture and supply. This
PoA has also not been implemented properly because of the different preferences of the
Government. So though there is a need for International regulation, the same Government is
responsible for the non-implementation of the PoA. Also the fact that the PoA has evident
flaws in it is noteworthy.
So it can safely be said that the Government is need for a legally acceptable International
control and at the same time is not in a position to accept and implement the regulation.
Which proves that the States will be in the same conditions when it comes to gun control for
the coming few years due to the adamant behaviour of few States and compulsion on the rest.

22 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/review-of-the-implementation-of-theconvention.html last viewed on 19th October 2015.


23 Ibid
11

Bibliography

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/review-of-the-implementation-of-theconvention.html

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_07-08/armsjul_aug01

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Office_on_Drugs_and_Crime#Criticism

http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2163&context=ilj

http://www.debate.org/opinions/does-there-need-to-be-stricter-laws-for-gun-control

http://ivn.us/2012/07/25/gun-control-an-International-comparison/?
utm_source=ivn&utm_medium=featured&utm_content=title&utm_campaign=optbeta-v-1-0

http://portal.idc.ac.il/en/schools/Government/Research/Documents/Efrat.IO.pdf

http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/

http://www.snopes.com/politics/guns/untreaty.asp

http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/

http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/index.html

http://controlarms.org/en/media/2006/7-july-2006-control-arms-un-world-conferenceon

http://www.poa-iss.org/DocsUpcomingEvents/ENN0846796.pdf

http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/

12

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