VSI/TCAS and ATC-transponder.

CONTROL UNIT.
This is a combination of ATC MODE-S transponder and TCAS control.

1. TCAS vertical scan selector.

ABOVE - Expands the vertical scan to 9900 ft above and 2700 ft below the aircraft.
N - Normal position. TCAS vertical scan is +/- 2700 ft.
BELOW - Expands the vertical scan to 2700 ft above and 9900 ft below the aircraft.
2. Function selector.
STBY - Both ATC interrogators are powered but cannot transmit.
TA/RA - This is the normal operating TCAS mode. In this mode, Traffic and Resolution Advisories are enabled.
TA - Only TA (TRAFFIC ALERT) is displayed; no RA. This mode prevents TCAS from issuing RA when
intentionally flying close to other aircraft, i.e closely spaced parallel approaches.
XPDR - In flight: The selected ATC transponder will transmit replies to ground interrogations. The unit not
selected remains in standby. On ground both transponders are in standby.
3. TEST switch.
Initiates ATC transponder and TCAS self test.
4. Code selector knobs.
The large (inner) knob is used for selection of the first two digits in the reply code and the small (outer) knob is
used for selection of the two last digits.
5. IDENT button.
When pressed, the special identification pulse (SPIP) is sent for a duration of approximately 20 seconds.
6. XPDR switch.
Selects transponder 1 or 2 as active transponder. The one not selected will remain in standby. Normally
transponder number 1 is selected on flights with odd flight numbers and number 2 on even flight numbers.
7. ALT RPTG switch.
OFF - The altitude reporting is selected off.
1 or 2 - The transponder will reply to interrogations requesting both code and altitude replies. Selected in the same
manner as XPDR.
8. Readout of selected code.
Each digit can be set from 0 to 7.
9. ATC FAIL light (amber).
Illuminated when the selected transponder or its altitude information source has failed. TCAS fail is announced
on the VSI.

TCAS COMPUTER.

The same instrument during TCAS test.

RED ARC.
Restricted vertical speed. This area instructs the pilot what vertical speed
regions is to be avoided during an RA.
GREEN ARC.
FLY-TO vertical speed arc. This area instructs the pilot of the vertical
speed to ensure safe altitude separation from conflicting traffic. TCAS
expects adjustment in pitch attitude to attain the desired vertical rate
within 5 seconds during an RA.

SYMBOLS
OTHER TRAFFIC - hollow cyan diamond.
Indicates other traffic, (the predicted flight paths do not penetrate the Collision Area) which are within range of
the display.
PROXIMATE TRAFFIC - solid cyan diamond.
Indicates other traffic within 6 NM and within +/- 1200 ft vertically. Proximity traffic are shown to improve
situation awareness.
TRAFFIC ADVISORY - solid amber circle.
Indicates intruder aircraft predicted to enter the Collision Area within 35-45 seconds.
RESOLUTION ADVISORY - solid red square.
Indicates intruder aircraft predicted to enter the Collision Area within 20-35 seconds.
PLUS or MINUS
the amber -03 and "arrow up" indicates an aircraft 300 feet below and climbing with a rate of more than 500 fpm.
The cyan -11 and "arrow down" indicates an aircraft 1100 feet below and descending with a rate of more than 500
fpm

TRAFFIC ALERT/COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM

Building on this and other work, the FAA launched the TCAS program in 1981. TCAS is a
relatively simple system to understand. Basically, the system identifies the location and tracks
the progress of aircraft equipped with beacon transponders. Currently, there are three versions of
the TCAS system in use or in some stage of development; TCAS I, II, and III. TCAS I, the
simplest of the systems, is less expensive but also less capable than the others. It was designed
primarily for general aviation use. The TCAS I transmitter sends signals and interrogates ModeC transponders. The TCAS I receiver and display indicates approximate bearing and relative
altitude of all aircraft within the selected range, usually about forty miles. Further, the system
uses color coded dots to indicate which aircraft in the area pose a potential threat. This is referred
to as a Traffic Advisory (TA). When a pilot receives a TA, it is up to him/her to visually identify
the intruder and is allowed to deviate up to + 300 feet. Lateral deviation is not authorized. In
instrument conditions, the pilot is required to notify air traffic control for assistance in resolving
the conflict.10 TCAS II on the other hand is a more comprehensive system than TCAS I. This
system was required to be installed on all commercial air carriers operating in the United States
by December 31, 1993. It offers all of the same benefits but it will also issue a Resolution
Advisory (RA) to the pilot. In other words, the intruder target is plotted and the system is able to
tell whether the aircraft if climbing, diving, or in straight and level flight. Once this is
determined, the system will advise the pilot to execute an evasive maneuver that will deconflict
the aircraft from the intruder. There are two types of RAs, preventive and positive. Preventive
RAs instruct the pilot not to change altitude or heading to avoid a potential conflict. Positive RAs
instruct the pilot to climb or descend at a predetermined rate of 2500 feet per minute to avoid a
conflict.11 TCAS II is capable of interrogating Mode-C and Mode-S. In the case of both aircraft
having Mode-S interrogation capability, the TCAS II systems communicate with one another and
issue deconflicted RAs.12 Since this system costs up to $200,000 per aircraft, manufacturers have
built in an upgrade capability to the next generation TCAS III. This system will be virtually the
same as TCAS II but will allow pilots who receive RAs to execute lateral deviations to evade
intruders. This will be possible because the directional antenna on TCAS III will be more
accurate and will have a smaller bearing error. There are also hopes that the new antenna will cut
down on false alarms since it can more accurately determine an intruders location. Another
upgrade that is proposed has to do with the Mode-S data link. Through this link, a system will be
capable of transmitting the aircrafts GPS position and velocity vector to other TCAS-equipped
aircraft thus providing much more accurate information.13
A FEW PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

Needless to say, there were a few problems that occurred in the development of TCAS. There
was a problem with the directional capabilities of the antenna used with the system. Signal
clutter was also a big problem. Additionally, software upgrades had to be developed to lessen the
number of false alarms. Then lastly, but certainly not least, there were the problems of getting
pilots and controllers used to the system.

The antenna problem was a complex one. The typical spinning antennas that are located on
airports provide directional information to controllers. This data is available because the antenna
rotates 360 degrees at such a rate that the locations of aircraft can be pinpointed every time the
antenna makes a revolution. This philosophy is impractical for airborne interrogators though. So,
engineers developed an antenna that contains a number of small antenna elements arranged in a
circle around a center element. Fed with the proper signal, they transmit an interrogating pulse
simultaneously in all directions. But when the responses arrive, they strike at slightly different
times. By comparing these patterns, of the returning signals at each element, the computer can
find the directions from whence the signals came.14
Signal clutter was another problem that had to be overcome. During early work on TCAS,
engineers were worried that in crowded terminal areas with many transponders replying to
multiple signals, the system would become overloaded with overlapping signals and clutter. This
problem was overcome with a process called the whisper-shout and with a directional antenna.
The whisper-shout method of interrogation allows the transmitter to send signals in two
strengths. A low power signal (the whisper) is transmitted and only highly sensitive transponders,
or transponders close by, can receive it and respond. Then the transmitter sends a stronger signal
(the shout) which triggers responses from less sensitive transponders or those that are further
away. The operative element in this system is a mechanism that prohibits the transponders that
responded to the whisper from responding to the shout and vice-a-versa, thus reducing the
number of transponders responding at one time. A directional antenna was also incorporated into
the system. This antenna, described in the previous paragraph has the ability to transmit in only
one quadrant at a time thus reducing the number of signals being interrogated at any given time.
These two components were key elements in the development of TCAS and prevent system
overload even in the most crowded terminal areas.15
There was not much for support for TCAS II when it was first introduced because of the large
number of false conflict alerts. These were particularly disturbing because many alerts occurred
when aircraft were on final approach, one of the busiest and most critical phases of flight.
Version 6.00 was the original software for TCAS II. When using this software, some very
interesting problems occurred. False conflict alerts were being triggered by transponders on ships
and bridges. Additionally, parallel final approach courses less than 5000 feet apart were causing
false alerts. It has even been reported that a pilots own aircraft can cause a false alarm. In this
situation the pilot found himself trying to outmaneuver himself. All of these are software
problems and have been addressed in the latest version, 6.04.16 Through Mitre Corporations new
logic-software version, Delta airlines, the first voluntary user, reported an 80 percent reduction in
TCAS conflict alerts. Additionally, the number of Bump-up alerts have been reduced. Bumpup alerts occur when the TCAS of a descending aircraft calls for it to climb to avoid a fastclimbing aircraft below, not knowing that the aircraft will level off at a lower altitude. This was a
common occurrence at Dallas-Fort Worth airport because arriving and departing aircraft use the
same fixes.17 Additionally, the buffer requirements or thresholds between participating aircraft
were lowered, thus reducing the number of false conflict alerts.
We are all resistant to change. It is just a fact of life. This was especially the case with TCAS.
When TCAS was first introduced, it was viewed as a nuisance more than anything else. This was
because the users considered the system unreliable. Pilots viewed it as just another instrument
they had to watch in an already busy cockpit. They, in some cases, became complacent and

began to totally disregard TCAS conflict alerts which defeats the whole purpose of the system.
By reducing the number of unnecessary TCAS alerts, the new software is expected to increase
the confidence of flight crews in responding regularly to TCAS alerts. Already, with the new
software upgrade, pilots opinions are beginning to sway. They have begun to consider TCAS as a
way for them to increase their situational awareness. It gives them the big picture on a screen in
the cockpit; something they had to develop mentally before.18 Additionally, it has been reported
that TCAS has been used to avoid wake turbulence by getting too close to heavy aircraft.