Multiple Realizability Intuitions

r 2006 The Author
Journal compilation r 2006 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
METAPHILOSOPHY
Vol. 37, No. 1, January 2006
0026-1068
MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY INTUITIONS AND THE

FUNCTIONALIST CONCEPTION OF THE MIND
WILLIAM RAMSEY
Abstract: A popular argument supporting functionalism has been what is commonly called the multiple realizability argument. One version of this argument
uses thought experiments designed to show that minds could be composed of
different types of material. This article offers a metaphilosophical analysis of this
argument and shows that it fails to provide a strong case for functionalism. The
multiple realizability argument is best understood as an inference-to-the-bestexplanation argument, whereby a functionalist account of our mental concepts
serves to explain our multiple realizability intuitions. I show that the argument is
inadequate because alternative accounts of our mental concepts exist that provide
equally plausible explanations for these intuitions. Moreover, in the case of our
qualia concepts, a nonfunctionalist account explains several other intuitions that
functionalism cannot explain. Thus, despite its popularity, the intuition-based
version of the multiple realizability argument is a poor reason for accepting
functionalism.
Keywords: dualism, folk psychology, functionalism, inference to best explanation, intuition, mental concepts, multiple realizability, qualia, reduction, thought
experiments.
1. Introduction
Since its inception, the functionalist theory of the mind has been subjected
to a growing number of challenges and criticisms.1 However, in spite of
the existence of what is, by now, a formidable collection of objections, the
theory has proven remarkably resilient. A good deal of this hardiness is
due to the inuence of one line of reasoning, the multiple realizability
argument. This argument claims that mental states can be instantiated in
different mediums, and that they are therefore best understood as
functional states whose identities are determined by their causal-relational properties. While functionalism may have its difculties, its
problems have not proven sufciently damaging to overcome the persuasiveness of this argument. Traditionally, there have been two different
1
See, for example, Shoemaker 1975, Block 1980a, Putnam 1988, and Maudlin 1989.
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WILLIAM RAMSEY
types of multiple realization argument for functionalism, stemming from

two different sorts of evidence: alleged empirical cases of multiple
realization and thought experiments involving hypothetical scenarios.
Recently, the former version of the argument has come under attack
(Bechtel and Mundale 1999; Couch 2004), and it is far from clear whether
there actually are any real cases of type-identical mental states instantiated by sufciently different neural states. No problem for functionalists. They can fall back on imaginary cases to support their claim of
multiple realizability. In fact, it has been the imaginary cases that have
traditionally provided the strongest support for their view.
In this article, I want to focus on the alleged support that the
nonempirical versions of the argument provide for functionalism.
Although multiple realization has recently received considerable attention
(Batterman 2000; Kim 1992; Polger 2004; Shapiro 2004), the manner
in which it supports the functionalist theory of the mind has not
been adequately explored. My goal is to demonstrate that the thought
experiments, and the intuitions they reveal, do not provide a compelling
case for functionalism. In fact, Ill suggest that with regard to an
important class of mental concepts, the multiple realizability argument
for functionalism fares rather badly. Spelling all this out is the primary
objective of what follows. Along the way, I hope to provide a new
perspective on a number of earlier debates and criticisms surrounding the
functionalist position.
To do all this, the article will have the following organization. In the
next section, I give what I believe is the proper interpretation of the
thought-experiment-based version of the multiple realizability argument.
In my reconstruction, I demonstrate that the argument is best understood as an inference to the best explanation that is primarily about
the nature of our mental concepts. Then, in section 3, I show that the
argument fails because there exist plausible alternative explanations for
the way our mental concepts behave, and that at least one of these does
a far better job of accounting for other intuitions that functionalism fails
to accommodate. As I develop my argument, I also try to shed new
light on a host of issues that pertain to functionalism. Section 4 offers a
brief conclusion.
2. How Does Multiple Realizability Support Functionalism?
In this section I want to present the conceptual-based multiple realizability argument for functionalism in its most favorable light. To do that,
I need to establish two things about the argument. The rst is that it is
most naturally understood as having the form of an inference to the best
explanation. The second is that we should understand its primary and
central conclusion to be about the nature of our mental concepts, and that
functionalismFqua metaphysical thesisFis actually a secondary
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MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY INTUITIONS
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conclusion that requires further argument. Since the argument is almost

always presented in a very informal manner, all of this is going to require
a fair bit of reconstruction. We can begin by briey recounting how the
issue of multiple realization typically enters into discussions about the mind.
The central claim of the nonempirical version of the multiple realizability argument is simply that mental states, like beliefs or pain
statesFcan be instantiated by different physical (or even nonphysical)
substances. Polger (2004, 6) and Shapiro (2004, 7) identify four versions
of the multiple realizability thesis, but for our purposes the version they
call the Standard Multiple Realizability Thesis will do just ne:
Systems of indenitely (perhaps inntely) many physical compositions
can have minds like ours (Shapiro 2004, 7). This claim is often defended
through certain thought experiments designed to illustrate its intuitive
plausibility. Here are two familiar examples:
(1) Martians have just landed. One of the creatures injures itself; it
winces and engages in the Martian equivalent of what we would
ordinarily consider to be pain behavior. Upon further investigation, we
learn that the Martians brain has a functional architecture similar to
our own, but made up of silicon. Question: Should learning that the
Martians brain is silicon based (instead of carbon based like ours)
preclude us from attributing pain to the Martian? The obvious, intuitive
answer seems to be no.
(2) A friend has a form of progressive brain cancer that can be treated
only by replacing diseased neurons with articial, nonorganic devices. In
all relevant respects, the prosthetic neurons perform in a way that is
largely indistinguishable from the way real neurons perform. After the
rst operation, in which only a few neurons are replaced, your friend says
she feels normal. Unfortunately, more transplants are necessary to stop
the cancer. This keeps up for years, until your friend winds up with
nothing but articial neurons in her head. Question: Has she gradually
lost her mind, becoming a nonmental zombie? Again, the obvious,
intuitive answer appears to be no.
What do these thought experiments demonstrate? In terms of the
support they provide for functionalism, they serve to establish both
negative and positive theses. The negative thesis is that mental-state types
do not reduce to neurological-state types. The thought experiments seem
to demonstrate the implausibility of such a reduction, since they illustrate
that it is intuitively possible for creatures lacking the requisite neurological make-up nevertheless to possess mental states. Consequently, the
type-identity thesisFwhich claims that types of mental states are to be
identied with types of neurological statesFis mistaken. The positive
thesis is that mental-state types should instead be reduced to functional
states. In other words, the thought experiments are generally regarded as
demonstrating that mental states are functional kinds, dened by their
causal-relational properties.
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The Argument as an Inference to the Best Explanation

It is the argument for the positive thesis that, I would like to suggest,
should be understood as an inference to the best explanation (ITBE). On
this reading, the phenomenon that needs explaining is multiple realizability itselfFthe fact that it clearly seems possible for radically different
kinds of substances to realize minds. The thought experiments serve as
evidence about the nature of minds and, more specically, about the
kinds of properties that are essential for mental states. If it is possible for
creatures like silicon Martians or for people with prosthetic brains to
possess mental states, then mental states must not have a physical essence.
That is, they are not dened by virtue of their physical or compositional
properties, since it is possible for those properties to vary. But if the
physical or compositional properties of a pain state arent what make it a
pain state, then what sort of properties do?
Functionalism provides an answer to this question. Mental states
arent to be dened by virtue of their physical/compositional properties,
because they are really dened by their causal/relational properties.2 The
reason we intuitively think a silicon-based Martian can have a mind, or
that a person can have her neurons replaced without becoming a zombie,
is because what counts is not the stuff but what the stuff does. The
multiple instantiability of mental states is explained by the proposal that
mental states are not natural kinds, like water or gold, but functional
kinds, like doorstops or valve lifters. We nd functionalism about mental
states so plausible precisely because it seems the most obvious way of
accounting for the multiple realizability of mental states. In certain
respects, the argument can be seen not simply as an inference to the
best explanation but as an inference to the only explanation of multiple
realizability worth taking seriously.
In defense of this reading of the multiple realizability argument, we
should note that it accommodates other ways in which multiple realizability has been linked to functionalism. For example, multiple realizability is sometimes treated as a direct consequence of functionalism,
rather than as a premise in a supporting argument. If mental states are
dened by their causal-relational properties, then it follows that any
substance instantiating those properties will instantiate a mind. At rst
glance, this seems to challenge the idea that multiple realizability is used
to argue for functionalism, as things appear to be going the other way
2
There are, of course, a variety of different versions of functionalism (see Block 1980b).
Perhaps the most signicant distinction is between Putnam-style functionalism, which
identies mental states with functional roles, and Lewis-style functionalism, which identies
mental states with occupants of functional roles. Still, all versions of functionalismFincluding LewissFare defended by appeal to multiple realizabilty thought experiments. Im using
the term functionalism to designate the core idea that mental states should be type identied
by virtue of causal or relational properties.
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around. Yet, this is fully consistent with the ITBE interpretation.

Abductive arguments of this sort typically involve premises that are
directly entailed by their conclusions. Since multiple realizability is a
direct consequence of functionalism, any evidence for multiple realizability will count as conrming evidence for functionalism.
As we noted earlier, multiple realizability is also sometimes treated
as providing an argument against functionalisms competitors, such as
the type-identity theory. If mental states can be instantiated in substances other than neurons, then, contrary to the type-identity story,
neurological states are not necessary for mentality. Consequently,
the multiple realization argument rules out certain ways of characterizing the mind. Again, this is exactly what we should expect from an
ITBE argument. It provides us with disconrming evidence against
certain obvious alternatives to functionalism, leaving functionalism
standing as the only apparent theory that can handle this feature of
mentality.
In effect, what I am suggesting here is my own inference-to-thebest-explanation argument for the ITBE interpretation of the multiple
realizability argument. Given the above considerations, and given that
there arent many other ways that multiple realizability could support
functionalism, the ITBE interpretation best explains the arguments
long-standing appeal. Of course, it also opens up certain avenues for
challenging the argument, such as the possibility that there are better
explanations for multiple instantiability attitudes besides functionalism.
The primary goal of this article is to convince you that such alternative explanations do in fact exist. But before I do so, I want to consider
a different problem for the multiple realizability argument. In the
process, I hope to be clearer about just what, exactly, the argument is
an argument for.
The Role of Mental Concepts in the Argument
In the argument as presented above, it was claimed that certain thought
experiments demonstrate that it is possible for minds to be instantiated in
different physical mediums. But strictly speaking, the thought experiments
only demonstrate that it seems possible that minds could be realized in
different mediums; they tell us something about our intuitions about the
mind. We have no direct evidence about what is or is not possible regarding
Martian mentality or mentality associated with prosthetic brains. It is
clearly one thing to demonstrate that we think silicon Martians could have
mental states; it is an entirely different matter to demonstrate that they in
fact could. A critical question, then, is how we go from the observation that
multiple realizations seem intuitively possible to the claim that they actually
are possible. In other words, why should we take these intuitions seriously?
Since intuitions about what is or is not possible have proven mistaken in
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the past, why couldnt someoneFa type-identity theorist, sayFclaim that

our intuitions are simply wrong on this point? How do we get metaphysical
possibility out of mere conceivability? 3
The reliability of intuitions concerning what is metaphysically possible certainly cannot be taken for granted.4 Nonetheless, I think there
are strategies that can, at least initially, help us get around these worries.
What I would like to do next is spell out an argument that can be used
to bridge the gap between our intuitions and the actual nature of mental
states. While the argument is not immune to difculties, it provides what
I take to be the most charitable interpretation of the multiple realizability
argument.
What is needed is an argument that takes us from a psychological
claim about our intuitions to the metaphysical thesis that mental states
are functional kinds. Here is one way to do it:
a. Our intuitions allow the multiple realization of mental states.
b. Therefore, our mental concepts permit the multiple realization of
mental states.5
c. Therefore, our mental concepts are functional concepts.
d. Therefore, to exemplify a given mental concept, a state must be
type-identied by its causal-relational properties.
e. Therefore, functionalism (qua metaphysical thesis about the mind) is
true.
Premise (a) is supported by thought experiments like the Martian and
neural-transplant cases. Premise (b) follows from (a) and the widespread
assumption that our intuitive judgments stem from the utilization and
application of our various concepts. The move from (b) to (c) is what I
would now like to suggest is the proper way to understand the abductive
inference of the multiple realizability argument. Understood in this way,
the explanandum of the argument shifts from multiple realizability to the
intuition that multiple realizations are possible. In other words, the
phenomenon that requires explanation now becomes the psychological
fact that people intuitively think minds are multiply realizable. The
inference is to an account of how we conceive of minds. The claim is
that the best explanation for our multiple instantiation intuitions is to
suppose that our mental concepts are functional concepts. By functional
3
Notice that the skeptical worry here is more serious than the worries we confront
regarding other sources of knowledge, such as observation. At least with observation there is
a causal story to tell concerning how information is conveyed to our mind from whatever we
are observing. In the case of metaphysical possibility and intuition, however, such a story
does not appear to be available.
4
See DePaul and Ramsey 1998 for a number of discussions on this point.
5
Throughout this paper I use the term concept to designate psychological entities, as
opposed to abstract entities.
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concept I mean a concept in which the slot for essential properties is

lled by representations of causal-relational properties. Assuming
that our mental concepts are functional in this manner makes the link
between our multiple realization intuitions and a functionalist conception of the mind fairly direct. The intuitions are explained as conceptual
processes in which representations of causal-relational essences remain
xed, while representations of (contingent) physical properties are
varied. But this still leaves us with a claim about our conception of the
mind. How do we get beyond that to a claim about the actual nature of
the mind itself?
To bridge that gap, premise (d) introduces conditions for concept
instantiation. The point of (d) is to suggest that our conceptual framework puts severe limits on the sort of properties that could qualify as
essential for mentality. If we assume that our mental concepts actually are
functional concepts, then only causal-relational properties would qualify
as dening features of mental states. We couldnt discover that we are
wrong about this, since any other sort of demarcation strategy wont
capture our mental notions. If someone tried to individuate a given
mental-state type by appealing to different sorts of properties, such as
neurochemical properties, then we would have to sayFindeed, many
have saidFthat the person has failed to pick out the right sort of
properties for taxonomizing mental states. If our mental concepts treat
causal or relational properties as essential, then those causal or relational
properties are the criterion for membership in the class of states picked
out by those concepts. It is in this way that we go from a claim about the
nature of our concepts (that is, that our mental concepts are functional)
to a claim about the nature of the world (that is, that mental-state kinds
are functional kinds). What all of this amounts to is a sort of conceptual
analysis, but conceptual analysis pitched at a certain level of abstraction.
Rather than giving actual necessary and sufcient conditions, the argument instead tells of the sorts of properties that qualify as candidates for
necessary and sufcient conditions. In the case of mental states, they
arent intrinsic or compositional properties; instead, they are relational
properties.
As I suggested above, it is not entirely obvious that this sort of story
can be made to work, as there are a host of problems concerning the move
from (c) to (d). For example, there are compelling reasons for thinking
that our conceptual frameworks are far more malleable and open to
revision than the argument just given suggests. But at least we can see that
there is an argument taking us from our multiple realizability intuitions,
through a claim about our mental concepts, to a claim about the nature of
mental states. The move I want to focus upon in the remainder of this
article is not the inference from (c) to (d) but the abductive inference from
(b) to (c)Ffrom our multiple realizability intuitions to the claim that our
mental concepts are functional concepts.
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A natural way to regard the inference from (b) to (c) is to treat the
intuitions as data of sorts, telling us something about the nature of the
conceptual machinery that produces them. This is similar to a strategy
employed by linguists, who argue from certain linguistic intuitions to
specic claims about the nature of the cognitive apparatus used in
language processing. Since aspects of this apparatus are not directly
accessible to consciousness, we can only get at them by probing
intuitive judgments about different types of sentences. Similarly, when
properly lled out, we see that the multiple realization argument is a way
of uncoveringFthrough an appeal to our intuitive judgmentsFwhat
often gets referred to as our tacit folk or commonsense psychology.
One writer who has endorsed the idea that philosophers of mind are investigating mental concepts is David Armstrong, who tells us that the
concept of a mental state essentially involves, and is exhausted by, the
concept of a state that is apt to be the cause of certain effects or apt to be
the effect of certain causes (1981, 20). Not all functionalists, however,
acknowledge this sort of psychologism. For example, Hilary Putnams
important article The Nature of Mental States goes to some length to
argue that it is discussing not what the concept of pain comes to, but
what pain is (Putnam 1975, 433). Putnam insists that since the version of
functionalism he is advancing is an empirical hypothesis, it is not, he
claims, defended on a priori grounds.
Nonetheless, even in Putnams functionalism as protoscience a strong
appeal is made to how we would regard extraterrestrial life, intuitive ways
of attributing mental states to nonhumans, and what seem to be reasonable criteria for identifying creatures with mentality. When Putnam tells
us that functionalism is superior to the identity theory because the former
is more plausible, it appears that what more plausible amounts to
here is agreement with our commonsense conception of the mind. So,
even though Putnam insists he isnt interested in our conception of pain, it
is precisely that conception that appears to serve as an intuitive force
behind his nonempirical versions of the multiple realizability argument.
Summary
So far we have established two important theses about the thoughtexperiment version of the multiple realizability argument. The rst is that
the arguments form is best understood as an inference to the best
explanation. The second is that the argument is at least tacitly a claim
about the nature of our mental concepts. Putting these two together, the
argument says that we must adopt a functionalist interpretation of our
mental concepts (that is, a functionalist reading of folk psychology) in
order to explain our multiple realizability intuitions. It claims that functionalism is the best, if not the only, explanation for the intuition that
mental states could be possessed by cognitive systems made of different
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kinds of stuff. Given this reconstruction, we are now set critically to

evaluate the argument.6
3. Accounting for the Multiple Realizability Intuition
The multiple realization argument is sometimes presented with the
following question: How else besides functionalism could we account
for the fact that silicon Martians (or people with prosthetic brains) could
have minds? Given our reconstruction, we should now view this
question as follows: How else besides a functionalist interpretation of
our mental concepts could we account for the intuition that silicon
Martians (or people with prosthetic brains) could have minds? Although
the question is intended as rhetorical, it is the question I intend to answer
here. To get the ball rolling, Ill rst show that the functionalist account of
our mental concepts is not the only game in town by offering some
alternative explanations for our multiple realizability intuitions. Then Ill
suggest one further account that explains not only our multiple realizability intuitions but also a host of other intuitions that have proven
embarrassing for the functionalist.
Two Alternative Hypotheses about Our Mental Concepts
Dualistic Folk Psychology. One non-functionalist account of our mental
concepts that could possibly explain our multiple realizability intuitions is
the suggestion that our mental concepts are dualistic. On this proposal,
our commonsense intuitions are driven by a deeper conception of
mental states that treats them as existing in some sort of nonphysical
form. In other words, our mental concepts behave as something like
supernatural-kind concepts, where mental states are dened as states of
some yet to be discovered nonphysical substance. Such a conception may
allow brains to interact with nonphysical minds, but it would preclude
physical brains from actually instantiating any sort of mental state. On
this view, despite our enlightened theoretical beliefs, were all closet
CartesiansFat least with regard to our intuition-generating folk theory.
To see how a dualistic folk psychology would explain multiple realizability, consider our earlier examples. So long as the folk theory sanctions
mind-silicon interactionFthat is, allows the nonphysical mind to interact
6
In this section, I construe the multiple realizability argument as involving a claim about
the nature of our mental conceptsFthat our mental concepts are functional concepts. I do
this because it strikes me as the most charitable reading of the argument, despite its
difculties. Without such a claim, the link between the relevant dataFthe multiple
realizability intuitionsFand functionalism as a metaphysical thesis becomes much harder
to see. I appreciate, however, that there are some philosophers who do not nd the
connection between intuitions and metaphysics as troubling as I do and believe that
intuition is a highly reliable guide to the way the world is.
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with silicon brains every bit as much as they interact with carbon-based
brainsFwell naturally come to think that Martians could have mental
states. Similarly, so long as our conception allows for the nonphysical mind
to reestablish causal connections with prosthetic neurons, such a conception
would generate the intuition that the person with a prosthetic brain retains
her mentality. In both cases, the suggestion is that agents with different
sorts of brains can nevertheless have minds, not because minds are multiply
realizable but because deep down we think brains arent where the action is.
That is, with the dualistic explanation, the intuitive interchangeability of
whats in the head is not actually a case of multiple realization. Instead, it is
a simple case where two things (mind and brain) stand in a certain relation
and we recognize that by altering one of the relata (the brain) we neednt
alter the other. We think carbon-based neurons are irrelevant for mentality,
because they never, intuitively, housed mental states in the rst place.
One distinctive advantage of the dualistic theory of our mental
concepts is that it has considerable independent support, apart from its
ability to explain multiple realizability intuitions. For example, people
often express a sincere belief in out-of-body existence both before and
after death. This is typically supported by an appeal to the existence of
some sort of nonphysical spirit or soul that serves as the seat of mentality.
There is also some degree of psychological evidence for this view. For
example, developmental psychologist Henry Wellman tells us that
young children are dualists: knowledgeable of mental states and entities
as ontologically distinct from physical objects and real events (1990, 50).
It seems, in our culture at least, that a fairly strong case could be made for
the thesis that our primordial folk psychology is one that regards the
ontology of the mind as essentially nonphysical.7
Mental Cluster Concepts. A second alternative to functionalism in
explaining our multiple realizability intuitions is the possibility that our
mental concepts are actually disjunctive cluster concepts, admitting of no
single dening essence.8 On this view, our mental concepts are inherently
disjunctive; there isnt any further fact that explains why they are
disjunctiveFthey just are. Thus, mental concepts would have the form
of what Wittgenstein once referred to as a sort of family-resemblance
structure, with no unique set of dening properties. As Wittgenstein
7
It should be emphasized that the advocate of the view suggested here is in no way
committed to the metaphysical truth of dualism. Instead, the claim is about the tacit
conceptual framework that drives our intuitive judgments about mentality. It is worth noting
that even for those of us who consciously reject dualism a more primitive dualistic
conception of the mind may nevertheless inuence our deeper intuitive judgments. Some
studies in cognitive research suggest that a more rudimentary conception can inuence
intuitive judgments even after considerable training and education has been directed against
it (see McCloskey 1983 and Clement 1983).
8
This possibility was rst pointed out to me by David Armstrong.
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noted, our concept of game seems to have this feature, where it is

impossible to construct or discover any single set of essential properties.
Our notion of a game is multiply realizable not because it is a functional
concept (games have too many diverse functions) but simply because the
concept involves a very broad range of only partially overlapping
characteristics.
If mental concepts are like our notion of a game, then we would have
another explanation for the intuitive multiple realizability of mental
states. It would not be because our mental notions have a functional
essence but because they have no essence. If mental concepts have this
form, it would generate the intuition that very different things could
qualify as mental states in different contexts. Pain in a human would
be one type of pain, whereas pain in a silicon-based Martian would be just
a different type of pain. The two cases would both count as instantiations
of our pain concept, not because they share some single set of causalrelational properties but simply because they possess some of the diverse
features that are sufcient to produce the intuition that pain is instantiated. In fact, if our concept is wildly disjunctive the two instances
neednt even share any features. They might, for example, simply be
sufciently close to a central prototype to intuitively qualify as examples
of pain.
As with the dualistic theory, this way of accounting for the multiple
realizability intuitions has a fair amount of independent support. Since
the work of Eleanor Rosch on categorization judgments (Rosch 1973 and
1978), most psychologists have abandoned the classical view that our
concepts have a dening essence. In place of the classical view, researchers have adopted different versions of a prototype theory of conceptual structure, a theory not far from the one suggested by Wittgenstein.
According to some of the more popular versions of this account, intuitive
instances of a given category can be highly heterogeneous in their makeup. If such a theory should prove correct with regard to our mental
concepts, it would provide us with a nonfunctionalist explanation for the
multiple realizability intuitions.
A Functionalist Reply
By now I hope it is clear that a functionalist theory of our mental concepts
is not the only way to account for the intuition that mental states can be
associated with radically different types of brains. There are other
accounts of our mental concepts that also account for those intuitions,
and we have some independent reasons for thinking that those alternative
theories might be correct. In response to all this, the defender of functionalism might reply in the following manner. Sure, it might be admitted that
if we look only at the multiple realizability intuitions, there appear to be
other explanations available. But as with most ITBE arguments, it was
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WILLIAM RAMSEY
never claimed that we should take into consideration only those intuitions.
The original claim was that functionalism provides the best explanation, all things considered. And when we take into account other factors
and intuitions, these competitors to functionalism quickly lose their overall
plausibility. For example, many contemporary philosophers would simply
discount dualism as a serious candidate for explaining the ontological
nature of mentality, primarily because of other difculties that plague
dualism. So when we narrow the eld to serious, viable hypotheses, like the
type-identity theory, then functionalism comes out on top.
In answer to this defense, two points need to be emphasized. First,
remember that the phenomenon that needs explainingFthe explanandum of the ITBE argumentFis not the actual nature of the mind but
rather our intuitions about the mind. The critical question is, Who has the
best account of our mental concepts? With regard to this question, the
dualistic story and the cluster-concept story presented above are not at all
implausible. Whereas dualism may be improbable qua metaphysical
thesis, it is not so improbable qua psychological thesis about our folk
conception. So when we properly see what the multiple realizability
argument is actually about, it turns out that there really is a range of
serious alternatives to functionalism.
Second, as a matter of fact it is not at all obvious that the functionalist
story of mental concepts does a good job of accounting for other
intuitions we have. Indeed, a strong case can be made for thinking that,
at least with regard to an important class of mental concepts, functionalism fares quite poorly. To illustrate this last point, I want to consider
one further theory about our mental concepts that accommodates not
only multiple realizability intuitions but a host of other, counterfunctionalist intuitions as well.
Accounting for Our Qualia Concepts
Suppose that for a certain class of our mental concepts there really is
something like a dening essence, but that it concerns neither the medium
in which the mental states are instantiated nor the states relational
properties. Instead, suppose it concerns the subjective, phenomenal
aspect of the mental statesFtheir so-called what-its-like-ness. If this
were so, then for the class of mental states picked out by such concepts,
what would really matter for type identity would be what those states felt
like. Consider our ordinary concept of pain. Along with whatever
relational properties associated with our notion of pain, there are also
certain subjective, experiential properties concerning how pain feels. Now
suppose, as many have, that these experiential properties play the primary
role in driving our categorization judgments. If we were presented with
some sort of hypothetical example and asked if the person or creature in
question could be in pain, what would really matter to usFwhat would
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really drive our intuitive judgmentsFis what we thought the person or

creature was feeling at the time.
What is being suggested here is not anything terribly profound
or original. The proposal is simply that with regard to those states
we normally characterize as qualia, our folk psychological conception of those states individuates them not by virtue of their relational
properties (as functionalists have claimed) but rather by virtue of
their subjective, qualitative character. The idea that the subjective aspect
of qualia is intuitively essential to their nature has hardly gone unnoticed.9 What has been underappreciated, however, is how this hypothesis,
when applied to our qualia concepts, can explain the same multiple
realizability intuitions that traditionally have been used to support
functionalism.
How might the supposition that our qualia concepts have a phenomenal essence explain these intuitions? To account for these intuitions,
all that is needed is the absence of an intuitive or conceptual link between
the physical medium in which the state is realized, on the one hand,
and the subjective, qualitative character of the state, on the other. If there
is a large conceptual gap between these two, it would explain the intuitive interchangeability of different realization bases. In other words, if
the two sorts of properties are conceptually unrelated and intuitively
independent of one another, so that imagining the presence of one does
not require imagining the presence of the other, then that would explain
why we have the intuition that a neurological medium is unnecessary
and could be replaced without eliminating whats essential to qualia.
The question we need to address, then, is whether our conception of
the phenomenal properties of qualia is sufciently disconnected from
our conception of neurological properties to explain the multiple realization intuition.
For those familiar with the philosophy of mind, answering this
question is, if youll excuse the pun, something of a no-brainer. A
recurring theme since at least Descartes has been that we conceive of the
subjective aspect of the mental and the physical as radically different, and
that it is relatively easy to think of the one without the other. Indeed, if
this werent the case, then various forms of dualism would be literally
inconceivable. On the other hand, the problem of other minds wouldnt
be much of a problem if our ordinary conception of neurological states
intuitively required the presence of mental states. It is precisely the degree
to which the mentalFespecially the qualitative aspect of the mentalFis
intuitively disconnected from the physical that makes the mind-body
problem so difcult.
9
As pointed out by an anonymous Metaphilosophy referee, both Perry 2001 and Loar
1997 advocate accounts of our phenomenal concepts that focus on the experiential nature of
such states.
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WILLIAM RAMSEY
One philosopher who has emphasized this point is Saul Kripke. Like
Descartes, Kripke has argued against the identication of the mental with
the physical because of their conceptual independence. Briey, Kripke
insists that any form of mind-brain identity must be necessary, since
mental-state terms, such as pain, and neurological-state terms, like cber ring, are both rigid designators. Yet it seems intuitively obvious
that the one could easily exist without the other. That is, there appear to
be possible worlds in which pain does not denote c-ber ring, and
vice versa. Hence, according to Kripke (1972), the relation between
mental states and physical states cannot be one of identity.
There have been two related lines of response to Kripkes argument,
both of which are relevant for our discussion. The rst stresses that
because Kripkes argument only tells us something about the way we
happen to conceive of mental states, nothing follows about the actual
metaphysical relation that exists between the mental and the physical. As
Joseph Levine puts it,
[W]hat seems intuitively to be the case is, if anything, merely an epistemological
matter. Since epistemological possibility is not sufcient for metaphysical
possibility, the fact that what is intuitively contingent turns out to be
metaphysically necessary should not bother us terribly. (1983, 350)
Levines point is similar to the one we discussed in section 2 concerning

the difculty of establishing metaphysical claims about the mind on the
basis of what seems intuitively possible. For our purposes here, the
critical thing to note is that it is admitted by Levine and others that, at
least with regard to our conception of things, phenomenal properties are
treated as utterly distinct from neurological properties.
Now given this conceptual gap (which nearly everyone agrees is quite
large), it would seem we have a perfectly straightforward explanation for
the intuition that pain could be realized in systems without neurons.
Given that it is easy to imagine the existence of phenomenal properties
without the existence of any particular physical substrate, it seems there
is no need to appeal to functionalism to explain the intuitive multiple realizability of qualia. Our intuitive reactions to the Martian and
prosthetic-brain cases are exactly what we should expect to nd, given
what we know about the importance of phenomenal properties for qualia
and their conceptual disassociation from the physical. The intuition
that functionalism has been invoked to explain already has a perfectly
good explanation: namely, the large disparity between our conception
of phenomenal properties, on the one hand, and physical properties, on
the other.
This suggests that a second line of response to Kripkes argument should also be reconsidered. Some have argued that functionalism demonstrates that Kripke is mistaken in claiming that terms like
pain are rigid designators. If pain is type-identied with a certain
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67
causal role, then different things can instantiate pain in different

possible worlds. Hence, functionalists claim that the mental and the
neurological seem contingently related because they really are contingently related; the Kripkean intuition about the expendability of c-bers
is just a special case of the multiple realizability intuition explained by
functionalism.
In rebuttal, Kripke has offered a fairly compelling reply to this
argument. He notes that the same intuitive contingency that exists
between mental states and physical properties also appears to exist
between mental states and causal-functional roles (1972, 147). Hence,
causal-functional roles appear to be every bit as contingent for qualia as
neurological states. In the next section, Ill provide some examples that
illustrate this point. For now, I want to offer a suggestion about how
we should view this debate. Given our preceding discussion, we can see
that the functionalist is correct in claiming that the Kripkean intuition
and the multiple realization intuition share a common explanation.
The functionalist is wrong, however, in claiming that the proper explanation is that our qualia concepts treat casual-relational properties
as essential. Instead, the two sets of intuitions are rooted in the
special status our qualia concepts give to phenomenal properties. While
the standard functionalist response to Kripkes challenge is to appeal
to the multiple instantiability that goes with functionalism to explain
away the Kripkean intuition, Im now claiming that this gets things
backwards. We should instead explain the multiple realizability intuitions
as a by-product of what Kripke suggested all along; namely, that our
qualia concepts treat phenomenal propertiesFnot causal-relational
propertiesFas essential.
Why should we think this account is the right one, that our qualia
concepts employ phenonmenal features as essential and not casual or
relational features? To answer this question, Id now like to turn to a host
of other well-known intuitions that support the phenomenal account and
seriously undermine the functionalist picture. As well see, a quick survey
of some other popular thought experiments shows that functionalism
performs rather poorly in handling other sorts of intuitive data.
Inverted Spectrums, Chinese Nations, and Zombies. If our mental concepts
really are functional concepts, we should nd that we judge systems that
are functionally similar to ourselves to be mentally similar. Yet in a
number of well-known thought experiments it is clear that our intuitive
judgments do not behave in this manner. For instance, it seems intuitively
possible for there to be a creature whose brain is functionally
isomorphic to ours but who would nevertheless experience an inverted
color spectrum (Shoemaker 1975). Alternatively, it seems possible for
there to be a complex system that is, again, functionally isomorphic to our
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WILLIAM RAMSEY
brainsFlike the nation of China simulating the neural activity of someone in painFbut that doesnt undergo any qualitative experiences (Block
1980). Indeed, our conception of the mind is such that it seems
metaphysically possible for there to be a person who is indistinguishable
from a normal human in every casual or physical respect but who is
nonetheless a mindless zombie (Chalmers 1996).
Cases like these pose a problem for commonsense functionalism because the intuitions they generate are not what one would expect if our
mental concepts were truly functional concepts. Hence, the intuitions
serve as good reasons for rejecting the functionalist interpretation of our
qualia concepts. On the other hand, there is nothing surprising about
these intuitions if we assume that what really matters for our qualia concepts are the subjective, phenomenal features of qualia. If our conception
of color experience is such that what really counts is the qualitative aspect
of that experience, and if that aspect is conceptually removed from our
causal-physical notions, then of course we are going to think it is possible
to have an inverted spectrum with someone who is functionally identical
to ourselves. If our notion of pain is such that the phenomenal dimension
of pain is far more important than anything else, and if that dimension is
intuitively disconnected from our causal-physical notions, then, quite
naturally, we will judge it possible for there to be systems that are similar
to ourselves in terms of their causal-physical architecture but that nonetheless lack qualia. In short, what we have here is a set of intuitions that
cannot easily be squared with the functionalist account of our qualia
concepts but are precisely what is to be expected on the phenomenal,
qualitative account.
Mad Pain. Just as the functionalist account of our mental concepts
predicts that we should judge functionally similar systems as mentally
similar, it also predicts that we should judge functionally dissimilar
systems as mentally dissimilar. However, in his well-known paper
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, David Lewis points out that it seems
intuitively possible for there to be an individual who possesses ordinary
mental states even though the causal prole of those states is quite unique
to the individual. For example, there could be a madman who feels
pain when exercising on an empty stomach and for whom the state causes
thoughts about mathematics. Lewis insists that if I want a credible
theory of the mind, I need a theory that does not deny the possibility
of mad pain (1980, 216). Yet this is exactly what does seem to be
denied on the functionalist account of our mental concepts. If the
functionalist account of our mental concepts is true, and certain causal
relations are essential for our judgments about a mental states identity,
then any dramatic change in a states causes and effects should undermine
the intuition that the state in question is present. Consequently, the
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69
intuitive possibility of mad pain is a signicant embarrassment for

functionalism.10
On the other hand, the intuitive possibility of mad pain is exactly what
one should expect on the phenomenal analysis of our pain concept. Since
intuitively the phenomenal aspect of our pain state is not dependent on
the states causal relations, those relations can vary without compromising our intuition that pain is present. Mad pain is possible because, given
our conception of the mind, to be in pain is to be undergoing a certain
state that feels a certain way. How that feeling is caused, or what it causes
in turn, is not essential for a positive categorization judgment. So here is
another intuition that is better explained by the phenomenal account of
our qualia concepts.
The Knowledge Argument. The essential features of functional concepts
are the represented causal or relational properties. Consequently, it is
generally possible to achieve complete understanding of a functional kind
by gaining knowledge about those causal-functional relations. When we
know everything a carburetor doesFhow it performs its function and
interacts with other components of an engineFwe have the sense that we
know pretty much all there is to know about a carburetor, qua
carburetor. Notice that it would be very bizarre to have a functional
concept in which, despite having learned of all the causal-functional
relations involved, one still felt there was something essential missing
from ones understanding.
A number of writers, however, have suggested that in the case of qualia
exhaustive knowledge of the causal-relational properties associated with a
given state would intuitively leave something important out. One of the
better-known arguments for this position has been provided by Frank
Jackson (1982). Jacksons argument appeals to the possibility of a neuroscientist, the now-famous Mary, who learns all of the causal-physical
details of color vision in a black-and-white environment. Intuitively, despite her exhaustive neurophysical knowledge, Mary would remain ignorant about certain essential facts concerning red experience. If she were to
10
It should be noted that Lewis himself denies that mad pain undermines functionalism.
According to Lewis, our conception of the mind allows mad pain because the madman is in
the neural state that, in the majority of humans, plays the appropriate causal role of a person
experiencing pain. This similarity with others explains why we are inclined to classify the
madman as a feeler of pain. This way of viewing things has serious problems, however. For
example, it appears that the stipulation that the madman is neurologically similar to
ourselves (that is, in a specic neurological state that is shared by normal people) is not even
needed to generate the intuition that he is in pain. It seems intuitively possibleFat least for
everyone Ive talked toFfor someone to be in pain even though that persons brain state is
both causally and neurologically unique. So long as we are told that the persons state is
phenomenologically similar to an ordinary persons pain state, we are inclined to say the
persons mindFthough quite oddFis undergoing a pain state.
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WILLIAM RAMSEY
see a red object for the rst time, it seems obvious that she would learn
something new about the nature of red experience.
Were our concept of red qualia actually a functional concept, we would
expect a certain intuitive response to Jacksons thought experiment. Upon
hearing of Marys complete knowledge of the various causal relations
involved in red visual experience, we should be inclined to attribute to
Mary full knowledge of the relevant state. But in fact we dont. Instead,
even for those who disagree with Jacksons conclusions, it must be
admitted that there exists a strong intuition that Mary is ignorantFdespite her causal knowledgeFabout the essential nature of red experience.
This isnt what we would expect to nd if our qualia concepts were
functional concepts. While the Jackson argument is intended to challenge
all physicalist accounts of the mind, we can see that it undermines the
functionalist interpretation of our mental concepts as well.
Going the other way, the intuitions that Jackson exploits are exactly
what one would expect on the phenomenalist interpretation of our qualia
concepts. If these concepts treat the subjective what-its-like-ness of
qualitative states as essential, and if it is impossible to know about this
aspect without having experienced the state in question, then the intuitive
response to the Mary case is exactly what we should expect to nd. In this,
and other similar cases, a phenomenalist interpretation of our mental
concepts nicely explains the intuitions involved; the functionalist analysis
does not.
Summary
It is important to be clear on what I am, and what I am not, trying to do
in this section. I am not trying to reintroduce various metaphysical
arguments about how difcult it is for functionalists to account for
qualia. I am not doing metaphysics at all (at least not directly). Instead, I
am making a metaphilosophical claim about the source of the intuitions
that drive these arguments. I am proposing that a nonfunctionalist
understanding of our qualia concepts does as good a job as a functionalist
understanding with regard to explaining our multiple realizability intuitions, and it also explains an array of other intuitive judgments that cant
be explained by the functionalist interpretation. The phenomenalist
account of our qualia concepts explains the multiple realizability intuitions, the functionally similar but mentally different intuitions, the
functionally different but mentally similar intuitions, and our intuitions regarding the incompleteness of causal-physical knowledge of
qualia. The functionalist account only explains the multiple realizability
intuitions. That puts the score at four to one in favor of the phenomenalist account, which strongly suggests it is the proper way to regard our
folk-psychological concepts of qualitative mental states.
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71
Two other points are worth noting in connection with these more
traditional qualia-based objections to functionalism. The rst is that the
intuitions generated by thought experiments like Blocks Chinese nation,
Lewiss mad pain, and Jacksons ignorant neuroscientist are generally
assumed to be unrelated and self-contained. As weve just seen, however,
they are all exactly the intuitions we should have if our qualia concepts
treat phenomenal properties as essential. Hence, one added benet of this
analysis of our folk psychology is explanatory unity with regard to a wide
range of intuitions. Seemingly divergent intuition-based complaints
against functionalism actually stem from a common conceptual source.
The second point is that up to now the defender of functionalism could
concede that there are a few intuitions about qualia that prove embarrassing for his or her theory, but nevertheless fall back upon the strength of
the multiple realizability argument, which appeared invulnerable from
these attacks. We can now see, however, that this is not the case. These
criticisms actually do harm the multiple realizability argument, as they
lend credence to a nonfunctionalist interpretation of our mental concepts
and hence a nonfunctionalist explanation of our multiple realizability
intuitions. It is a mistake to think the imagination-based multiple
realizability arguments are insulated from these other intuition-based
objections.
4. Conclusion
The goal of this article has been to deate the support that the conceptual
version of the multiple realizability argument provides for functionalism.
Once we see how the argument is supposed to work, we can also see the
ways in which it doesnt work. Since alternative explanations exist for our
judgment that we can vary the physical stuff and retain the same mental
states, and since those alternative explanations have a signicant degree
of independent plausibility, we can no longer treat functionalist analysis
of folk psychology as the only serious explanation for these intuitions.
With respect to our conception of qualia, the functionalist account does
even worse. Here, we already have a nonfunctionalist account of our
mental concepts that explains the intuition that the physical medium is
irrelevant to the mind, and this account is superior to functionalism in
accommodating other important intuitions we have.
While other arguments for functionalism exist besides the conceptual
version of the multiple realizability argument, few have played as
important a role in promoting its widespread popularity. Given the
problems discussed here, we can now see that this popularity is unwarranted. Without the support of the intuition-based multiple realizability
argument, functionalism loses a great deal of its attractiveness, both as a
theory of about our mental concepts and as an account of the mental
states those concepts denote. Philosophers have failed to appreciate this
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WILLIAM RAMSEY
because they have ignored metaphilosophical questions about the source

of multiple realizability intuitions. By focusing on these questions, we can
see how these intuitions ultimately fail to support what many take to be
the received view about the mind.11
Department of Philosophy
203 Malloy Hall
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN 46556
USA
ramsey.1@nd.edu
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11
I am grateful to David Armstrong, Marian David, Carl Gillett, Eric Marcus, Dean
Zimmerman, and three anonymous Metaphilosophy referees for helpful comments and
suggestions. Earlier drafts of this article were presented at Illinois State University and the
University of Utah, where the audiences provided very helpful feedback.
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