Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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I.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
- no cases II. MENS REA
Regina v. Cunningham*
gas meter asphyxiation
Holding
1. malice is required for conviction, which entails intent, knowledge, or recklessness as to the
prohibited conduct
For
2. criminal law separates the mental state of the defendant (mens rea) from his actual act
(actus reus) in assessing whether the defendant had a culpable state of mind
Regina v. Faulkner*
run thief burns ship
Holding
1. prosecution must prove mens rea for each individual crime, except for the felony-murder rule
i. defendant is not automatically culpable for collateral acts, except murder, when
committing a felony
For
2. would turn the other crimes into strict liability offenses
State* v. Hazelwood
Exxon Valdez captain
Holding
1. a person is negligent when they fail to perceive an unjustifiable risk that the result will occur,
and failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care of a
reasonable person
Santillanes* v. New Mexico
cuts nephew during altercation
1. crimes involving moral condemnation require criminal mens rea (at least criminal
negligence)
Francis v. Franklin (shots fired through door)
2. a person does not intent all the natural and probable consequences of his actions
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III. MISTAKE
1. Ignorance/Mistake of Fact
Regina* v. Prince (UK) (overruled)
abducts 14yo girl reasonably believing she was 18
Holding
1. if the crime contains no requirement of knowledge of a fact, there is no mistake of fact
defense (overruled in B [a minor])
2. moral wrong principle; lesser crime principle
MPC
1. rejects Prince, 2.04(1)(a) establishes that a mistake of fact can be a defense even if the
requisite mens rea for the material elements of the crime are recklessness or negligence
2. outcome would be different under MPC because an honest and reasonable mistake is
allowed for children between 10-18 for statutory rape
People* v. Olsen
statutory rape, guys breaking into her trailer, belief that victim was 16
Holding
1. mistake of age is not a viable defense when the victim is under 14
For
2. public policy to protect children of tender years
Against
3. strict liability is disfavored: criminal punishment is harsh if the person has done everything
they could have done, and is also unjustified under traditional utilitarian (no deterrence) and
retributive (not morally blameworthy) theories of punishment
MPC
4. 213.1 would allow honest and reasonable mistake under 14, but not under 10
B (a minor)* v. Director of Public Prosecutions (UK)
15 yo boy repeatedly solicits sex from 13yo, honest belief she was 14
Holding
1. an honest mistake of fact is a defense (over-rules prince), and whether belief was
reasonable is not relevant to mens rea, though it may indicate whether defendant actually
held the belief
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For
1. consistent with MPC
- Garnett v. State*
20yo mildly retarded statutory rapes 13 year old, belief she was 16
Holding
1. one off case - strict liability (no mistake of fact defense) to protect young people
- Commonwealth* v. Simcock
Holding
1. minority view of strict liability for sexual consent
i. majority view is that an honest reasonable mistake as to consent is a defense to rape
2. in a statutory rape case, a reasonable mistake as to the victim's age is not a defense
3. other crimes (ex. larceny) allow reasonable honest mistake as a defense State v. Kelly*
(contractor takes estranged wife's fireplace mantles)
State* v. Benningfield
drugs within 300 ft of school
Holding
1. only had to prove knew he possessed the drugs, not that he knew he was near a school
i. strict liability as to the attendant circumstances lesser crime principle
2. Ignorance/Mistake of Law
People* v. Marrero
corrections officer walks with gun into bar mistakenly thinking he is exempt by statute exempting
"peace officers"
Holding
1. an honest reasonable mistake or ignorance of the law is not a defense
For
1. allowing ignorance of the law would be too difficult to disprove
2. Marrero was looking for a loophole rather than making a good faith mistake in an ambiguous
law
Against
1. the statute had never been interpreted before, and a plain text
i. there is a strong lenity argument: the lower court and half the appeals court took the
same reading as Marrero
2. criminal law is predicated on punishing only those who choose to do wrong
3. punishment on a good faith mistake serves no deterrence function (neither utilitarian or
retributive)
i. requiring good faith reasonable mistake encourages the public to learn the law
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ii. JJ: no utility in punishing, so court should have let him off and made a prospectively
applicable ruling saying from then on peace officer does not apply to federal officers
MPC
1. result would be the same under the MPC ignorance or mistake of law is only a defense
when it negates the mens rea required for a a material element of the offense, and the
existence, meaning, and application of the law are not material elements
i. thus defendant's mistake does not negate the mens rea for any material element
2. the result would be different with a legality argument, since half the appellate judges and the
lower court interpreted "peace officer" the same way as
Regina v. Smith* (man installs then damages floorboards in apartment)
1. mistake of law as to a secondary matter ("legal fact" i.e. ownership) may be exculpating
State v. Varszeig* (landlords steals then sells computers thinking he has a claim to them)
1. for specific intent crimes, mistake of the law that negates mens rea is exculpating
- Regina v. Smith*
man installs then damages floorboards in apartment, thinking he had ownership
Holding
1. mistake of law as to a secondary matter ("legal fact" i.e. ownership) may be exculpating
- State v. Varszeig*
landlords steals then sells computers thinking he has a claim to them
Holding
1. ignorance of the law is exculpating for specific intent crimes when it entails defendant did not
have intent to cause the result
Cheek* v. United States
statute makes it an offense to willfully attempt to avoid payment of taxes
had honest belief (tax code is confusing) he was not required to pay income tax
Holding
1. any honest mistake of law negates willfulness, regardless of reasonableness
i. 's honest mistake about having to pay taxes means he did not willfully evade taxes
For
1. court is saying knowledge of the law is required for willfulness
Against - ways to distinguish
1. limited - courts may be especially willing to allow mistake in tax law because it is so
complicated
i. is essentially a mistake as to a secondary civil matter
MPC
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1. he had awareness of a high probability (willfulness) that he was not paying his taxes, so
would not be exonerated under the MPC
i. MPC does not interpret mens rea as requiring knowledge of the existence, meaning,
application of the law unless the statute provides
2. argument: the word "willfulness" implies knowledge of the statute is required, so the statute
triggers the exception under 2.02(9), which says that makes knowledge of the statute's
existence is not a material element of the offense "unless the definition of the offense or the
Code so provides"
i. in this statute willfulness could mean (1) he knew he was not pay his taxes or (2) he
knew he was not pay his taxes and that it was in violation of the law
ii. lenity, but even if (2), likely knew not paying his taxes was in violation of the law (he
suddenly stopped paying taxes, but it's a jury question)
Does willfulness require knowledge of the existence of the law?
- International Minerals (ignorance not okay)
crime to knowingly violating a corrosive liquid transport regulation
Holding
1. only requires that defendant knowingly took the action
- Liparota (ignorance okay)
knowingly using food stamps in an unauthorized manner is illegal
Holding
1. defendant must know of the existence and meaning of the relevant regulation
For
1. danger of criminalizing a broad range of apparently innocent conduct (i.e. defendant going to
the wrong store)
Against
1. slippery slope argument is bad in this case, because no prosecutor is going to charge a
welfare recipient - we can rely on prosecutorial discretion in this case
2. wrongly decided- his act was obviously wrong and not a mala prohibita, and applying
overholt (Congress intent) or lambert (mala prohibita) would not exculpate him
- Ansaldi (ignorance not okay)
knowingly distributing a controlled substance is illegal, argues he didn't know the substance
was controlled
Holding
1. only requires defendant knowingly sold drug, not that he knew it was a controlled substance
For
1. knowledge of the law is not an element of this offense
- Overholt (ignorance not okay)
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Reliance on Officials
- State v. Leavitt
Holding
1. misleading statement from sentencing judge can led to reversal even though knowledge of
illegality is not an element of the statute
- United States v. Wilson
Holding
1. statute had no knowledge requirements so judge's misstatement was not exculpatory
i. opposite of Leavitt
Against
1. unreasonable to expect to know of violation
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- State v. Baker
speeding because cruise control malfunctioned
Holding
1. strict liability only applies to defendant's voluntary acts, but CC malfunctioning is a voluntary
act, because control is delegated voluntarily to the CC by the driver
State v. Guminga
tavern owner arrested for his waitress serving alcohol to minor
Holding (minority holding)
1. it is an unconstitutional violation of due process to hold a person may not be vicariously
liable for the acts of his employees if he did not ratify those acts (i.e. selling alcohol to
minors)
i. majority of courts accept vicarious liability (holding one party strictly liable for the acts of
another)
For
1. vicarious liability should be disfavored strict liability because there can be liability even if
defendant did everything in his power to prevent the offense
2. there is a lack of mens rea and actus reus
3. the staff will be adequately incentivized if they are held liable for their own actions
- City of Maple Heights v. Ephraim*
Holding
1. statute holding parents liable for the crimes of their minors is illegal, since it does not require
an act by the parent- lacking actus reus (either act or omission)
V. LEGALITY
Commonwealth* v. Mochan (overruled)
man makes obscene phone calls, conduct alleged not prohibited by statute
Holding
1. a person may be prosecuted for committing a common law crime even if such crime has not
been specifically enacted into legislation
For
1. like statutes, common law gives fair warning and controls arbitrary enforcement
2. the common law is sufficiently broad, in this case, to punish any act which directly injures the
public
Against
1. nearly all jurisdictions (except Rhode Island) have now abolished common-law offenses
i. common laws are not reasonably available to the public
2. MPC 1.05 would require there to be an statute under which the offense can be charged
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- do we take the meaning when legislature enacted the statute, or as we understand it now?
some judges take the view that the meanings of statutes evolve;
Rogers v. Tennessee*
changing murder rule (eliminating requirement victim had to die within a year) and applying it
retroactively not violation of due process
Holding
1. interpretation must be unforeseeable and indefensible to violate due process (ex post facto
prohibition applies for unforeseeable interpretations), otherwise the ex post facto clause
does not apply to courts
For
1. courts "find" the meaning that was and always had been there, only to legislature since they
give meaning
2. otherwise courts need the leeway to refine criminal defenses as necessary to bring the law
into conformity with common sense
People* v. Garcia (void for vagueness)
defendant throws fishtank at TV, crushes goldfish with shoe
Holding
1. a statute must give fair warning:
i. offense must be defined with sufficient clarity that a person of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited
ii. statute must be written in a manner precluding arbitrary discriminatory enforcement by
the police
For
1. the statute is constitutional as applied because companion animal can be read to include
fish
VI. CAUSATION
People* v. Acosta
police helicopters crash while in high speed chase of Acosta
1. court finds proximate cause, but finds defendant lacked intent to kill required for murder
Holding
1. defendant is liable for all foreseeable consequences of his conduct, meaning any possible
consequence (the collision) that might have been contemplated
i. foresight must exclude extremely remarkable and unusual results
ii. the event (helicopter crash) was foreseeable because it was a possible consequence
which might reasonably have been contemplated
2. there was proximate cause, but he lacked malice because a jury cannot find a conscious
disregard of a risk which is barely cognizable
For
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1. in fact no helicopter crashes have happened before relies more on the flying skill than the
innate probabilities involved
MPC
1. there would be no cause under MPC 2.03
i. ambiguity as to whether "actual result" contemplated 2.03(2)(a) would refer to the
helicopter crash or the deaths
a. if actual result refers to the helicopter crash, then exonerated because it was not
contemplated
b. if actual result refers to the deaths, defendant would still be exonerated under 2.03(2)
(b), which requires the result (death) to not have come about in an unpredictable
manner
People* v. Arzon
two fires in apartment, one started by and one of unknown origin, combine to kill firefighter
Holding
1. there is causation if 's conduct was a sufficiently direct cause of the harm (not an obscure
connection to it) and the ultimate harm was reasonably foreseeable
2. the ultimate harm does not need to be intended
3. the defendant does not have to be the sole cause of the ultimate harm
Application
4. the fire was a reasonably direct cause of the firefighter's death, it was not an obscure or
merely probable connection
5. the firefighter's death was reasonably foreseeable because the victim in a vulnerable
position risking where his death was risked
MPC
6. liable under 2.03(2) because the harm of killing a firefighter was well within defendant's
contemplation, and while the death did occur in an unexpected manner, the final harm was
the same and the chances were not so remote that punishment would be unjust, since he
risked a high probability of the firefighter's death in the blaze anyways
- People* v. Kibbe
man left to die in freezing cold gets hit by truck
Holding
1. the defendant is guilty if his conduct was a sufficiently direct cause of the harm and the
ultimate harm was foreseeable
Application
2. defendant leaving the victim stranded was a sufficiently direct cause of his death
- People v. Stewart*
defendant stabs man, survives stabbing surgery but dies of unrelated hernia operation following
Holding
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1. defendant's conduct must be a reasonably direct cause, not an obscure or merely probable
cause, of the harm
2. must be a but for cause; if the sole cause of the harm was from a factor that is not
attributable to the defendant, then he is exonerated
- People* v. Stamp
man suffering from heart disease dies of heart attack during robbery
Holding
1. the defendant takes the victim as he finds him
2. if the victim had an unforeseeable but pre-existing condition (ex. drug abuse, heart
condition), the defendant is liable for the unforeseeable (but predictable) result
People v. Warner-Lambert Co.*
chemicals in factory create explosion risk, explosion occurs
Holding
1. specific causal mechanism - the nature of the chain of particular events leading to the
harm must be considered
some courts limit it to a commercial or manufacturing context
For
2. actions must be a sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death before criminal liability,
higher than tort standard
Against
3. JJ: the company was a sufficiently direct cause and the explosion was a reasonably
foreseeable result, so there should be liability and no causation problem
1. Medical Malpractice
- Regina* v. Cheshire
Holding
1. medical malpractice is not exculpating if the original wound is still an operating and is a
substantial cause at the time of death
2. malpractice is exculpating for the original assailant if the original wound did not cause the
death, which is only if it can be said that the original wound is merely the setting in which
another cause operates
- State* v. Shabazz
man stabs victim 11 times, victim dies of massive internal bleeding in hospital, some evidence
that surgery was improperly done
Holding
1. medical malpractice or negligent rescue is not a defense for the original assailant if the
original would would have caused death anyways in the absence of medical treatment
i. the gross negligence must be the sole cause of death
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Commonwealth v. Atencio*
playing russian roulette
Holding
1. direct causation may be established by wanton and reckless conduct found in a joint
enterprise
i. they had no duty to prevent deceased from playing, but had a duty not the participate in
the reckless conduct that could lead to the death of one of the participants
2. concerted acts and cooperation in helping to bring about the victim's death is tantamount to
manslaughter
Against
1. JJ: were they really acting concurrently, or is Russian roulette more appropriately thought of
as distinct individual games for each player; weaker case than drag racing
VII. OMISSIONS
Jones* v. United States
baby placed with family friend dies of neglect, contested whether she agreed to take care of
child
Holding
1. if there is a legal duty imposed by law or contract, omission of the duty can result in criminal
liability
2. question of whether defendant had a duty is a question for the jury BRD, and that she was
Pope* v. State
allows church-woman to stay with her, churchwoman starts beating baby to death
Holding
1. had no duty to the child, especially because the mother was present
For
1. merely permitting someone to stay in your house as a guest does not entail you are taking
responsibility for them
i. general acts of kindness should not be interpreted as voluntary assumption of care for
another (unless the act is providing care for the injured person)
ii. homeowners have duties to guests, but only to a certain extent (i.e. to warn of risks and
not injure)
2. JJ: question of cause in fact: baby may have died even if she had intervened or made a 9-11 call
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- Beardsley
man's mistress ODs in her house, he does not call physician to help her
Holding
1. the man does not owe a duty of care to his mistress the way a man would to his wife
- Miranda
live-in boyfriend watches girlfriend beat up and kill her son
Holding
1. duty of care should only be to legal relationships
For
1. would otherwise discourage non-immediate family from taking an interest in and assisting
these vulnerable children (since they would be creating a duty for themselves by getting
involved)
2. allowing case-by-case adjudication of duty will put too much power in the hands of the state
who can use it as a bargaining chip in plea negotiations
- People v. Carroll
Miranda counter-case:
Holding
1. functional equivalent of a familial relationship is sufficient for duty of care Carroll
i. slight expansion limited to parents and spouses
- Commonwealth v. Cardwell
Parent is a Victim
Holding
1. parent is still held liable
For
2. the affirmative performance requires taking all reasonably calculated steps to achieve
success (doing anything possible, including running away)
i. in line with notion that parents have to take greater risks to carry out their legal duty (i.e.
than strangers), and that impossible means impossible
- State v. Martinez
Against
1. bootstrapping: using a misdemeanor (ex. good samaritan statute) to impose duty, creating
homicide liability
Barber v. Superior Court (distinguishing omission from act)
physician charged with murder for taking vegetative but not brain-dead patient off life support at
family's request (failure to continue treatment)
1. a physician has no duty to continue treatment once treatment has proven ineffective
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2. doctor is under no legal duty to keep the patient alive artificially unless requested by family
i. duty only exists when the benefits of care outweigh the burdens, which is whenever
there is a reasonable chance of recovery
3. in this case, no reasonable chance of recovery despite extraordinary measures being taken,
thus no duty
Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland
1. treatment can be withheld from patient being kept alive artificially with no chance of recovery
2. not lawful for doctor to actively bring a patient's life to an end (ex. lethal injection)
3. lawful for doctor to not provide treatment that would continue to prolong life
i. doctor's choice to not continue life support is an omission (of medical care), consistent
with his duty of care
ii. vs. act of interloper who maliciously switches off life support machine, constitutes act of
interference with doctor's care for another
Cruzan
individuals have a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment
VIII.
ATTEMPTS
Smallwood* v. State (attempted murder)
whether defendant had intent to murder his rape victims when he knew he was HIV positive and
did not use condoms in his attacks
Holding
1. intent to kill can be inferred from circumstantial evidence if the victim's death is a natural and
probable result of the defendant's actions
i. a person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions, unless
evidence of subjective intent shows otherwise
a. subjective intent trumps, but there is an evidence problem so we use circumstantial
evidence
2. no evidence that death by AIDS is a probable result of the action
i. sex does not always transmit the virus, and many people survive with AIDS
For
1. may have been a lack of cause in this rape, since it would not necessarily have caused
death
i. would be reckless murder if the victim has died
MPC
1. not guilty, MPC 5.01(1) would also require purpose as to the result, and court has found the
death was to improbable a result to be his purpose
People v. Rizzo* (dangerous proximity) 5.01(1)(c)
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Requirements
1. "harass" is defined as a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person
that seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes that person, and which serves no
legitimate purpose. This course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial
emotional distress to the person
i. repeatedly telling landlord to fix is not harassment- legitimate purpose
2. "credible threat" is a verbal or written threat, or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct,
made with the intent to place the person that is the target of the threat reasonable fear for his
or her safety and made with the apparent ability to carry out the threat. it is not necessary to
prove that the defendant had the intent to actually carry out the threat
3. summary: harassment + threat + intent to cause fear
Requirements
1. follow or harass:
i. willful, malicious and repeat following, or
ii. willful conduct, no legitimate purpose, actually causes distress, distress is reasonable
2. credible threat: written, verbal or implied conduct, intent to cause fear, apparent ability to
carry out threat
3. intent to create fear for own or family's safety
Criticisms
4. difficulty of drafting a law that criminalizes the targeted misconduct withhout sweeping in
constitutionally protected activity, like speech, and without being excessively vague
i. usually require intending to place the victim in reasonable fear (regardless of whether
victim actually felt fear)
5. constitutionality: not overly vague when the statutes define the conduct element of
harassment (ex. conduct that annoys) by an objective standard (ex. would distress a
reasonable person); statutes that make liability depend on the sensibilities of the particular
victim are unconstitutional
6. may be too narrow to deal with some forms of stalking because of harassment and credible
threat requirements
i. cyber-stalking - using the internet to harass: many states expressly include it as stalking,
but otherwise repeated sexual proposals may not involve implied or express threats
ii. man deluges woman with obscenities and demands for attention
iii. stalking apps - tracking software using GPS: not a crime under existing anti-stalking
statutes (since the apps are clandestine, stalker lacks the awareness to be harassed or
threatened)
iv. man gives woman gift, asks her for dates, repeatedly follows her after she tells him to
stop. stalking?
New York Harassment Statute
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does not require credible threat, extends to any course of conduct that causes material harm to
the victims mental or emotional health after defendant has been clearly told to stop
- also see MPC 250.4 (no credible threat requirement)
Anti-Paparazzi Law
1. attempts are primarily concerned with (i) preventing preliminary conduct from escalating into
more serious violence and (ii) finding culpability in acts that indicate a state of mind
2. designed to stop dangerous chases only criminalizes certain state of mind (i.e. chasing to
obtain photo)
Criticisms
3. picks out state of mind of paparazzi alone for censure and punishment
4. raises first amendment concerns
Bullying Law
1. causation issues - does the bullying cause the suicide
i. may be attempted assault - line between preparation and attempt
Massachusetts
1. criminal law: harassment is punishable by imprisonment up to 2.5 years and is committed
when someone willfully and maliciously engages in a knowing patter of conduct which
seriously alarms a specific person and would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress
a. expands prohibitions against bullying, more severe penalties than usual
2. civil law: bullying is written, verbal, or electronic expression that causes physical or emotional
harm to the victim, or creates a hostile environment at school for the victim
MPC 250.4
the offense of harassment (petty misdemeanor) is limited to taunts likely to provoke a violent or
disorderly response, repeated communications in an offensively coarse language or alarming
conduct serving no legitimate purpose of the actor
Defenses to Attempt
People v. Jaffe* (mistaken belief) 5.01(1)(a)
man buys goods he believes are stolen but are not; charged with attempting to buying goods he
knew to be stolen
couldn't be charged with the substantive crime because the attendant circumstances did not
exist as to whether there was a stolen good
Holding
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smuggles letters into prison thinking warden doesn't know, warden did know and agreed to let
courier pretend to cooperate; charged with smuggling without the knowledge and consent of
the warden
Holding
1. factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the commission of the intended crime
not a defense to attempt (ex. pickpocket empty)
2. legal impossibility is when the intended acts, even if completed, would not be a crime
when the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
attempting to do that which is not a crime (sending letters with the warden's consent) is not
attempting to commit a crime (even with the requisite mens rea, in this case thinking the
warden had not given consent)
For
1. it is a legal impossibility because attempting to do that which is not a crime (sending letters
with the warden's consent) is not attempting to commit a crime (even with the requisite mens
rea, in this case thinking the warden had not given consent)
MPC
2. would be guilty under 5.01(1)(a): purpose as to the conduct that would constitute the crime if
the attendant circumstances were as she believed them to be
i. meant to smuggle without consent, believed that she did not have Warden's consent
3. there is no factual/legal defense under the MPC, it does not make the distinction
- United States v. Oviedo*
man sells noncontrolled substance to federal agent in sting thinking it was heroin
Holding
1. distinction between factual and legal impossibility is not well-defined (could be legal because
his act if completed would not be a crime, could be factual because he only failed because
of a circumstance unknown to him)
2. to convict a defendants for acts that are not actually illegal borders on penalizing thoughts
- Bell
child predator sting
Holding
1. inchoate offense
Against
1. defendant argues impossibility
2. other defense would be whether the took a substantial step (factual question)
MPC
1. impossibility defense would not hold under MPC
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- Voodoo Case
man tries to kill using voodoo
Holding
1. inherent impossibility is a defense
For/Against
1. may depend on whether we think defendant has demonstrated his willingness to commit a
crime
Against
1. defendant has not taken a substantial step for attempted murder
MPC
1. would not allow defense of inherent impossibility
2. lacks substantial step for attempted murder
Solicitation as Attempt
State v. Davis*
man solicits undercover police officer to assassinate someone
Holding
1. a mere solicitation is insufficient to constitute the actus reus for an attempt
i. only planning was involved, which are mere preparations
For
1. many states hold that no matter what act the solicitor commits, he cannot be guilty of an
attempt because it is not his purpose to personally commit the offense
Against
1. some courts hold that solicitation can constitute a substantial step to committing the offense
MPC
1. would come out in favor of the state, but under 5.02
2. solicitation is a separate substantive offense under the MPC 5.02
i. thus you can be charged with an attempted solicitation
3. however, soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the
crime is a substantial step for actus reus of an attempt under 5.01
United States* v. Church
man solicits undercover police officer to assassinate his wife
Holding
1. defendant's substantial involvement in the planning of the murder and hiring of the hitman
constituted a substantial step toward commission of the crime, established the requisite
overt act and amounted to more than mere preparation
For
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1. one reason for labeling an acts as a preparation instead of an attempt is to give the accused
a chance to change his mind; if the accused has fully demonstrated willingness to commit
crime and has done everything within his power, the act is properly an attempt
MPC
1. would come out in favor of the defendant
2. solicitation is a separate substantive offense under the MPC 5.02
i. thus you can be charged with an attempted solicitation
3. soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime is a
substantial step for actus reus of an attempt under 5.01
State v. Gladstone*
A (Gladstone) provides undercover police officer P (Thompson) address where he might be able
to get drugs (from someone named Kent)
Holding
1. defendant must intend to assist or encourage the commission of the substantive crime
For
1. JJ: he had clear intent, but the intent may have been to aid in the purchase of the drugs, not
to assist in the sale with which he was charged
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physical presence, which is irrelevant because accomplice liability does not require physical
presence.
decreases the culpability required for accomplice liability because prosecutor does not
need to prove purpose, merely knowingly assisting a serious crime is sufficient
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1. under MPC, Gomez would likely still be liable since in giving the knife, he had the purpose
that Silverstein would use it to stab the guard (because why else would he give him the
knife). since he is guilty for Silverstein's conduct and his own mens rea, he would be guilty if
Columbine Case (gun supplier)
Holding
statute: can't sell firearms to minor, dealer held liable under facilitation statute for providing
guns to juveniles - only requires recklessness as to the age of the handgun recipient and no
mens rea to the injuries the juvenile would commit
supplier had no purpose or even knowledge of furthering the underlying crime, can't get him
on attempt
1. facilitation statutes can be used to punish when there is not even knowledge of the
underlying crime
heavy punishment because of subsequent mass murder committed with the guns
Material Support of Foreign Terrorist Organizaitons (PATRIOT Act)
makes it a serious substantive crime to provide material support to an FTO even if the
assistance is meant to further non-terrorist activities within the organization (ex. how to petition
to the UN for assistance)
material support is any expert advice or assistance
differentiates from independent advocacy (ex. writing an article or petitioning that they
shouldn't be designated as an FTO- does not involve association with the FTO)
requires only knowing provision of support
Abrams: beefed up definition of support requires very low mens rea- not a real principle in
criminal law
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Roebuck (1) by luring, assisted in the conduct leading up to the commission of the offense
(ambiguity), and (2) was reckless (as to result) as he participated in the events leading up to
the victim's death
Holding
1. an accomplice may be liable (for 3 murder) when he acts recklessly as opposed to
intentionally
For
1. ambiguity of "offense" under 2.06(3) rectified by 2.06(4)
2. concurrence: only requires intent to aid in a malicious act that results in a killing
Against
1. ambiguity exists
MPC
2. MPC 2.06(4): when causing a result is an element of the offense (reckless manslaughter),
the accomplice needs to act with the mens rea required for that offense (recklessness), and
is liable if he is an accomplice in the conduct causing the result
3. must look to 2.06(3) to see if he was an accomplice to the conduct (luring) leading up to the
result
4. must prove causation - that his conduct (luring) led to the death
note:
5. under MPC 2.06(3), an accomplice to an offense is anyone who aids or attempts to aid the
principal actor in committing the offense with the purpose of promoting its commission
i. ambiguity as to whether "the offense" refers to the luring or the manslaughter, but 2.06(4)
directs us to only look at the conduct leading up to the manslaughter
6. Pennsylvania Murder Statute:
i. 1 - intentional murder
ii. 2 - felony murder
iii. 3 - reckless murder (recklessness to human life)
- note. negligence is manslaughter not murder
People* v. Russell
school principal killed in 3 way gun fight
all participants charged with second degree murder on the basis that (1) each intentionally aided
the defendant who fired the fatal shot
Holding
1. there is accomplice liability when s are acting in concert (jointly and voluntarily) and have
the purpose to aid each other to engage in the danger-creating conduct
For
2. relies on Abbott (drag racing), liability when defendants are acting concert - participation in
the thing (race/battle) made the danger possible
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3. aided each other (in trying to injure one another) to engage in the mutual combat that
caused Daley's death
court distinguishes this case and a case of an ambush, where defendants don't agree
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Against
3. de minimis under 2.12; his encouragement was insignificant, like in this case, it likely wasn't
sufficient to constitute aiding the crime
MPC
4. Under the MPC mere encouragement is not enough, the word encouragement is left out of
2.06
i. encouragement has to constitute aiding, assisting to be enough for liability (ex. the crime
is taboo and the encouragement is needed to keep the actor going)
New Bedford Rape Case; 2 guys in Nevada Case; Stancid (p692)
1. when there is no duty, an omission is not culpable for bystanders that are present
2. in the Stancid case, she was culpable because she helped and had a legal duty to prevent
her daughter from being raped
State* v. Tally
judge stops telegram warning of danger from getting to his enemy, who is then killed
Holding
1. the aid need not be material or have been effective
i. can be accomplice liability if it made accomplishing the task easier for the principal actor
ii. can be accomplice liability even if it might not have had an effect on the outcome (even if
the outcome might have happened anyways)
For
2. accomplice liability is not rooted in causation
MPC
1. same result under 2.06(3)(a)(ii), accomplice if there is an attempt to aid in the offense
State v. Hayes*
A encourage P to rob the store, but P (related to store owner) had no intention of stealing any
goods and only went through with charade to secure A's conviction
Holding
1. common law: liability is derivative, so a guilty principal is needed to convict an accomplice
For
2. guilty principle requirement: liability is derivative and thus A cannot be convicted if there is no
guilty principle
MPC
1. MPC rejects the guilty principal doctrine under 2.06(7)
2. P merely has to engage in the conduct element of the crime for A to be liable as an
accomplice, providing A had the requisite mens rea
State v. Davis/State v. Church
cases where the hires an undercover officer as an assassin
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MPC
3. since the undercover never goes through with the conduct, lacking both actus reus and
mens rea, the defendant can only have attempted to be an accomplice under 5.01(3)
4. 2.06(3)(a)(ii) vs. 5.01(3)
i. 2.06(3)(a)(ii) - attempt to aid - where the aid is unsuccessful or incomplete, but P does
the actus reus of the crime
ii. 5.01(3) - attempt to aid - where the aid is unsuccessful or incomplete, and P does not do
the actus reus of the crime
Vaden* v. State
Case
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f
Holding
1. d
For
1. d
Against
1. d
MPC
1. d
- Case
f
Holding
1. d
IX. CONSPIRACY
Interstate Circuit v. United States
cinema owner sends letters to distributors and other cinemas to initiate price fixing
1. participation in a scheme with knowledge of the other parties' existence and that their
cooperation is necessary to achieve the target crime is sufficient for conspiracy
i. proof of an agreement can be from circumstantial evidence
ii. the agreement can be tacit
iii. cooperation with a group to achieve a target crime constitutes conspiracy
2. unlawful conspiracy may be formed without simultaneous agreement on the part of the
conspirators
3. JJ: the actus reus is that there is an agreement that can be tacitly inferred
i. you don't need everyone meeting and agreeing, but do you need some evidence or can
you just infer from mere conduct?
a. Garcia seems to imply that you don't need evidence only if pre-arrangement can be
logically inferred because the nature of the crime requires pre-arrangement;
otherwise you probably need some kind of meeting or evidence beforehand
ii. letter creating pre-arrangement from which agreement can be tacitly inferred
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however, most states require purpose even for serious crimes Camerano
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best argument for requiring the mens rea of the underlying crime: some statutes make jx
elements a material element of the crime, and requiring purpose as to these would undermine
the statute
US v. Freed
1. the mens rea of the underlying crime is sufficient for aggravating circumstances (ex. strict
liability as to whether you are selling drugs near a school)
2. thus:
i. if substantive crime says you are strictly liable as to knowledge of being near as school:
if you agreed to sell drugs here, but did not know here was near a school, the agreement
was still sufficient for an agreement to sell drugs near a school
ii. if the substantive crime says you must have the purpose to sell drugs near a school: if
you agree to sell drugs here and didn't know here was near a school, you can't have
agreed to sell drugs near a school
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United States v. Alvarez (proposed drug sale erupts into gun fight killing a federal agent, coconspirators for sale not involved in the fight held liable)
1. application of Pinkerton
2. though murder was not within the original scope of the conspiracy, it was reasonably
foreseeable, and each of the defendants played a significant part in the transaction
i. suggestion that those who play a remote or attenuated role may not be liable (reinfored
in Walton)
ii. issue of what is the requisite mental state for attendant circumstances: would they
normally be liable for the aggravated crime of a federal agent? - if the jury finds it
reasonably foreseeable that they could be dealign with a federal agent, aren't they liable
for the aggravated crime of killing a federal agent under Pinkerton?
Krulewitch
iii. assuming the conspiracy includes concealment of the crime after its completion would
entail the conspiracy lasts forever, and the liability would be endless because you would
always be liable for the acts of co-conspirators under Pinkerton
Jiminez
- also, if there is one conspiracy, joint trial is allowed, which creates guilt by association
Wheel
Kotteakos* v. United States
multiple clients with no relation to one another all using services of one broker to commit fraud
(for loans under National Housing Act); contends no evidence of a single conspiracy between
all
1. where one person is dealing with two or more persons who have no connection with each
other, although each deals individually with the same person, they are not necessarily part of
a single conspiracy
i. not one conspiracy - similarity of purpose by various spokes dealing with one person is
not the same as a common purpose
2. factors: connection between alleged conspirators, proof that parties were part of a single
common plan
i. each loan was an end in itself
3. the jury could not possibly have found one conspiracy here, since many of the alleged
conspirators had no connection with one another and no evidence of a common plan
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wheel and spokes: multiple defendants committing the same type of crime (ex. people
committing insurance fraud) with a common participant (one agent) does not entail one
conspiracy without a connection or relationship between the defendants
some wheel arrangements can be one conspiracy, such as illegal gambling services that
in this case, they are employees of the person at the center of the wheel, so they are
necessarily connected with him and each other as one enterprise as almost employees of
one business, as opposed to mere customers who are not
does stand for principle that you can have one conspiracy with a wheel
Chain
United States* v. Bruno
smugglers imported narcotics, paid by middlemen, who distributed to consumers, no
communication or cooperation between consumers and smugglers, or between the two groups
of retailers; 88 people from each of the 3 groups charged for a single conspiracy to import, sell,
and possess narcotics
1. there is a single conspiracy where each member knows that the success of that part with
which she was immediately concerned was dependent on the success of the whole
2. evidence did not show any cooperation or communication between the smugglers and either
group of retailers, court found one conspiracy because the parties' knowledge of the
existence and importance of the remote links could be inferred from the nature of the
enterprise: smugglers knew that the middle people must sell to retailers who must sell to
customer and the reverse; each group knew that the unlawful business necessarily extended
to each of the other groups
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i.
court: evidence was enough to show one conspiracy, as each member knew that the
success of that part with which he was immediately concerned was dependent on the
success of the whole
3. worry that this is too expansive - warps the idea of criminal agreements that increase
danger; discriminatorily targets criminal economic ventures
4. uncertain in application: how does this work when the players change,
5. under MPC, could conclude that the smugglers conspired to commit the illegal sales to the
retailers, but that the retailers did not commit the importing of the smugglers, since the MPC
only looks at what crimes each individual believes he has agreed to
Peoni (from Bruno)
6. Bruno court distinguishes Peoni (chain where Peoni sells counterfeit money to Regno, who
sells it to Dorsey)
7. not a chain because Peoni knew Regno might sell the fake bills, but it made no difference
whether he passed the bills himself or sold them to a second passer
i. also, the amount sold was not of such a large quantity that a second passer was
necessary
8. Peoni did not plan the further sales, and the sale was not so large that Regno could not
dispose if it himself
9. Peoni is not a one-conspiracy chain because in a one-conspiracy chain, it must be
concluded that the defendants had knowledge of its essential features and broad
scope
i. Peoni did not know whether the drugs would be passed onto the retailers, Bruno
manufacturers did
United States v. Borelli
elaborate heroin importing and distribution operation
chain does not entail liability for the links at either end who do not know of others performing a
similar role to their own
difficult to apply the concept of an agreement in a complex business scheme with changing
players where people move in and out
United States v. Swafford*
Swafford sells iodine to meth cooks, charged with conspiracy to aid meth production, and to
distribute iodine for meth production
1. no single conspiracy because the cooks purchasing the iodine had no relationship with one
another
United States v. Torres-Ramirez*
drug supplier sells 2kg of coke to a distributor
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RICO
Enterprise
1. "enterprise" for RICO can include exclusively criminal organizations United States v. Turkette
i. turning point for RICO's usefulness, massively expanded its scope as a tool to combat
organized crime because it made it practically a crime to be a criminal
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United States v. Urban (inspectors accept bribes from plumbers being inspected engaged in
operation or management)
1. managing an enterprise's affairs requires only a nexus between the person and the conduct
in the affairs of an enterprise
2. RICO expands who can be charged as one conspiracy, in this case a wheel conspiracy case
charged as one conspiracy
RICO Conspiracies
Salinas v. United States
defendant did not accept or agree to accept two bribes, but agreed to facilitate a scheme where
the co-conspirator had accepted multiple bribes (and thus committed at least two acts of
racketeering activity)
1. RICO conspiracies do not require proof of an overt act
2. in a RICO conspiracy the defendant does not have to personally commit, or agree to
personally commit, the two predicate acts requisite for a substantive RICO offense under
1962(c) for a conspiracy conviction under 1962(d)
3. a conspiracy can be charged even if the defendant does not personally commit or agree to
personally commit every each and every part of the substantive offense - 1962(c) Salinas
Fernandez
wife of Mexican mafia boss collects money and send messages on his behalf and smuggles
drugs and money to him during prison visits, convicted of RICO conspiracy
1. RICO conspiracy conviction upheld because wife knowingly agreed to facilitate a scheme
which included the operation or management of a RICO enterprise
2. conspired with someone who is operating and managing an enterprise
United States v. Sutherland*
traffic court judge conspires with two others (Walker and Maynard), who don't know of each
other's activities, to fix traffic tickets
1. RICO provides a new objective (or substantive offense) that can be agreed on, but a RICO
conspiracy still requires an objective on a common objective
2. no common agreement on an overall objective
i. no single RICO conspiracy because the two others did not agree to participate in a
(common) bribery scheme with the judge, and did not necessarily know that there would
be another also conspiring with the judge
United States* v. Castro
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similar facts to Sutherland; three lawyers charged with paying kickbacks to judge in exchange for
appointments, no evidence each of the lawyers knew about or benefitted from appointments of
the others
1. lawyers and judges in a single RICO conspiracy
2. dissent: inconsistent with Sutherland, Sutherland holding is the correct holding
United States v. Elliott
1. protection from organized crime
2. RICO is designed to include those even peripherally involved with the enterprise
3. remote associates of an enterprise may be convicted as conspirators on purely
circumstantial evidence (does not require direct evidence of an agreement)
i. does not violate idea that guilt is individual
ii. individuals are not tried en masse for distinct offenses committed by others
a. distinct offenses are punished because they represent collective action towards an
illegal end
iii. does not punish mere association with conspirators, nor mere knowledge of illegal
activity - RICO proscribes conduct not status
CORPORATE CRIMINALITY
New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v. United States*
attack on the Elkins act, which says that a corporation is responsible for crimes of its agents
1. a corporation can commit a crime
2. "some crimes in their nature cannot be committed by a corporation"
i. inherently human crimes
a. crimes like murder seem inherently human, but a corporation can kill one human by
the act of another human
b. even crimes like murder can be committed by corporations when it benefits the
corporation
ii. crimes where the only punishment is imprisonment
a. corporations cannot be imprisoned
b. usually statutes exist to resolve this by providing fixed fines for corporations
United States* v. Hilton Hotels Corp.
purchasing agent participates in supplier boycott in violation of the Sherman anti-trust act
corporation gave agent express instructions to not participate in the boycott
1. respondeat superior: a corporation is liable for the acts of its agents in the scope of their
employment, even if the acts are contrary to general corporate policy and/or express
instructions to the agents
2. scope of agency: the purchasing agent had complete authority to buy supplies, and was in
the unique position to curtail purchases
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3. the court doesn't buy that the buyer's decision was personal; believe that the corporation
tacitly ordered the boycott and thus the act was to benefit the corporation
4. respondeat superior is arguably too broad, because it makes the corporation liable for things
they actually might not have wanted to happen
group home chain operating several franchises charged for knowingly failing to provide
reasonable and necessary medical care after resident dies in one of its franchise locations
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food company president, warned by FDA of rodent infestation in Baltimore warehouse, assigns
subordinates to clean it up
Park was aware that the person to whom he delegated the task to had previously been unable to
clean up a Philadelphia warehouse
1. when defendant has authority and responsibility to prevent the violation, or promptly correct
it, and fails to do so, there can be personal liability as long as defendant bears a "reasonable
relation" to the violation
i. government must show authority and responsibility for the conduct leading to the
violation
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2. the concept of "responsible relation" means a failure to exercise authority and supervisory
responsibility reposed in the by the business organization resulted in the violation, and thus
imports some blameworthiness
i. blameworthiness required is less than common law negligence
ii. the duty imposed on corporate agents requires the highest standard of foresight and
vigilance - an extraordinary standard of care
3. allows an impossibility defense so does not require what is objectively impossible
i. defense is satisfied as long as the corporate officer exercised "extraordinary care" and
was still unable to prevent the defense; the defense doesn't require the officer to show he
did not have the power to correct or prevent the offense (which would be more strict)
New England Grocers
a. does still permit claims that defendant was powerless to prevent or correct the
violation
ii. thus impossibility defense applies only to individuals and not corporations
4. there cannot be liability solely because of one's position in a company
5. a court can convict the manager of a corporate defendant as long as he was in a position of
power to prevent the crime, even if he was unaware of its existence
Dotterweich
6. applying Park, courts found responsible relation despite not participating in or being present
for the transaction
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.*
dumps toxic waste illegally, president charged with knowingly doing so because he knew or
believed the same illegal activity had happened before
1. when there is a mens rea element (ex. knowledge) in the crime, a mere showing of
responsibility and authority is not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of
that mens rea (ex. knowledge)
2. mens rea cannot be inferred from a person's position of authority of responsibility in the
corporation
i. though the requisite mens rea can be proven indirectly such that the person's position
and authority must be used, it cannot be inferred merely from the position they occupy
3. D'Allesandro's belief or knowledge of previous violations does not mean he knew of this
violation
4. distinguished from Dotterweich/Park, where a corporate officer is criminally liable for strict
liability offenses as long as they bear reasonable relation by virtue of authority and
responsibility, which does not necessarily require personal relation to the crime
i. i.e. Park does not apply to crimes requiring mens rea
a. punishments are usually much more severe
b. Park applies to strict liability offenses (usually health and safety, env't, antitrust)
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9. JJ: it could it be argued that when a person carries a gun illegally, his actions are always
objectively unreasonable?
i. no, the possession of the tool and the acts done with it are two distinct acts because
there is no necessary connection (the former does not always entail the latter; i can have
an illegal gun and do reasonable acts)
a. i.e. i can also have an illegal gun and save lives; would that be unreasonable
- People* v. Romero
brother kills person endangering his brother, tries to introduce evidence of role of honor in
Hispanic culture
Holding
1. cultural defense is irrelevant to self defense
i. would imply that there was such a thing as a "violent culture"
People v. Romero
b. (brother kills person endangering his brother, tries to introduce evidence of role of honor in
Hispanic culture)
-----battered wife cases
State v. Kelly*
chronically abused wife stabs husband, facts unclear as to whether she was aggressor of
defending; husband was charging at her at the time of shooting
she tries to introduce battered wife syndrome evidence to establish that she was acting in selfdefense; trial court rules it inadmissible for the purposes of justifying her perception about
being in fear for her own life (subjective belief)
Holding
1. evidence of battered wife syndrome is admissible to establish that defendant honestly
believed she was in imminent danger of death, but not to show the reasonableness of her
belief
2. the standard is the reasonableness of a normal person in the woman's situation, not of a
reasonable battered woman in her situation
For
3. the battered-woman's syndrome is the effect of sustained physical and psychological abuse
in which the women are trapped in their own fear and believe there is no escape
State* v. Norman
abused wife attempts suicide then goes to social service agency, husband follows her there and
beats her then passes out; Norman kills husband while passed out
Holding
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1. when there is no belief of imminent danger, no self-defense claim (perfect or imperfect) can
be asserted
MPC:
1. MPC 3.04 only allows self defense when it is immediately necessary, and under 3.09 the
belief cannot be negligently or recklessly formed
2. since she was at least negligent in failing to perceive the lack of immediate danger, she
would be guilty of negligent homicide
Commonwealth* v. Sands
battered wife shoots dormant abusive and threatening husband
1. the the abuser is dormant at the time of shooting, there is no honest belief of an imminent
danger
State* v. Schroeder
prisoner stabs sleeping cell-mate who had threatened him
1. no evidence that danger was immediate, and cannot legalize pre-emptive attack
Commonwealth v. Fowlin
man attacked in packed nightclub shoots assailants, injuring one bystander
1. if a defendant reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to avoid death or serious
bodily harm, he cannot be deemed reckless to the extent that he injures innocent bystanders
2. dissent: majority allows actor to respond with as much force as he chooses as long as he is
justified in acting in self-defense
3. MPC 3.09(3): defendant can be reckless even in exercise of self-defense
- the proper holding should separate the analysis of recklessness to the assailant and to the
victims, that one can be reckless in exercising self-defense to the bystanders even if he isn't
reckless to the assailant, but that in this case he wasn't reckless because the risk to the
bystanders was justifiable
Retreat
State v. Abbott
Abbott (victim) hits armed aggressors with a hatchet during a fight, claims
Holding
1. has a duty to retreat before the use of deadly force or serious bodily harm
2. the actor must know of the opportunity
3. the actor must be able to retreat in complete safety
4. the state must prove this BRD
For Abbott/MPC
1. he may not have been using deadly force
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2. even if he were using deadly force, he was in the middle of a fight and unable to retreat in
complete safety
3. his driveway may be part of his dwelling, and there is no duty to retreat from one's dwelling
State* v. Smiley
drunk guy runs at cab driver with knife, cab driver shoots him, 1 murder
Holding
1. must retreat when he knows he can do so in complete safety
Against
1. defendant must know he was able to escape in complete safety, he may have been too
scare to realize
2. castle doctrine - workplace is protected and no retreat requirement
3. he may not have had intent to kill
i. but he did pull the gun at close range, so intent to kill likely to be inferred
Florida Stand Your Ground law
1. defendant cannot be engaged in unlawful activity, must meet attack with proportional force,
and deadly force only to prevent death or serious bodily injury
i. if was carrying a gun illegally, so he would not be entitled to use the stand your ground
law
ii. no retreat requirement
2. repealing stand your ground laws
i. harms domestic abuse victims who are attacked in public
United States* v. Peterson
Keitt attempting to steal windshield wipers from Peterson, P retrieves pistol; K is already leaving
when P threatens to kill K if he comes back; K advances with wrench raised, P shoots K
Holding
1. an affirmative unlawful act reasonably calculated to produce an affray foreboding injurious or
fatal consequences is an aggression which, unless renounced, nullifies the right of homicidal
self-defense
i. aggressor has no right to self defense
Against
1. is a provocation an affirmative unlawful act?
MPC
1. would have been exculpated
2. MPC 3.06(1)(b) allows use of reasonable force to recover possessions
i. gave warning, did not use deadly force by threatening with the pistol
ii. MPC 3.11 states that pointing the gun is not a use of deadly force
iii. victim had a duty to retreat when threatened at gunpoint, thus his advance was an
disproportionate escalation, and thus an unlawful
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iv. under 3.04(1) even if is initial aggressor, is entitled to defend himself if victim
responded with unlawful force (by escalating unlawfully)
a. MPC does not use initial aggressor language
b. only exception is if provoked with the purpose to cause death or serious bodily
harm, evidence suggests he was merely trying to recover his property
United States* v. Dunn
white guy kills black teenager in car at a gas station
claims victim pulled a shotgun but none found
MPC
1. guilty for reckless/negligent homicide
2. 3.04(1) requires only a subjective belief as to the necessity of self defense
3. however, under 3.09(2) a recklessly/negligently formed mistaken belief can lead to liability
for crimes defined by recklessness/negligence
POLICE USE OF FORCE
Graham v. Connor
diabetic roughed up by police
1. police use of excessive force is analyzed under the Forth Amendment, and must be
objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances, without regard to underlying
intent
Scott v. Harris
car chase
1. car chases are usually not an reasonable seizure under the forth amendment because the
high speed chance threatened the life of innocent bystanders
Tennessee* v. Garner (cop)
police respond to unarmed prowler (15) trying to run away, shoot him after he doesn't stop
Holding
1. an arrest must be reasonable in basis and manner under the 4th Amendment ("reasonable
search and "seizure")
i. the force used must be reasonable with respect to the objective (dangerousness/crime
committed)
a. a suspect does not become more dangerous by evading arrest
b. apprehension is not worth death (can find them after)
2. for both felonies and misdemeanors, force can be used to apprehend but deadly force is
permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a risk of
death or serious injury to others if not apprehended, and that deadly force is necessary to
apprehend the suspect
For
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Holding
1. public policy argument: alleviation of symptoms does not outweigh potential impact on
enforcement of drug laws and government interest in regulating the substance (would be too
widespread and easy to obtain exception)
NY Penal Law
1. conduct that would otherwise an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:
i. conduct is necessary to avoid an imminent public or private injury that has developed
through no fault of the actor, and
ii. is so severe that the desirability of avoiding the injury, according to ordinary standards of
intelligence and morality, outweighs the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be
prevented by the statute defining the offense
2. necessity of conduct may not rest on considerations (of morality or advisability) pertaining
only to the statute prohibiting it, either in general or with respect to its application to a class
of cases
3. when evidence relating to necessity is offered, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether
the claimed facts and circumstances, if established constitute a defense
Explanation
- necessity is a defense if:
- necessity of conduct can not be based solely on the need to avoid the statute prohibiting that
conduct itself, either as applied or on its face
- (ex. need to run the red light because the statute prohibiting red lights is undesirable)
choice of evils defense is to help the legal system deal with special situations that
legislature did not think of but could not have intended to exclude, given the competing
values to be weighted
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XVI. DURESS
State v. Toscano
chiropractor charged conspiracy to aid in insurance fraud after threats of harm in dark alley
Holding
3. the defense of duress applies, except to murder, when a person of reasonable firmness in
the defendant's position would have been unable to resist the threatened use of unlawful
force, and the defendant actually does not resist it
MPC
4. MPC and NJ take a focus on whether the standard can be followed by ordinary members of
the community
i. consider the particular defendant's tangible factors like size, strength, age, health
a. do not consider intangible factors like matters of temperament
ii. no requirement that the threat is of death of serious bodily injury, immediate harm, or that
the harm be aimed at the defendant
a. these factors are important but not necessary
5. jury could have found the threats to Toscano would have induced reasonable fear in him
i. jury is to decide whether a person of reasonable firmness like Toscano in his position
would have been expected to refuse to cooperate or call the police
6. duress is not a defense to murder
i. it is under the MPC
United States* v. Fleming
American POW accused of aiding enemy, threatened with deadly torture if he didn't cooperate
Holding
1. the possibility of death (by starvation or grueling conditions tantamount to torture) are too
remote to constitute an immediate threat of death
Against
1. imminence requirement may be too harsh
MPC
1. would come out differently: imminence is not required, but the necessity must be reasonable
United States v. Contento-Pachon*
gangster threatens defendant's family unless he smuggles cocaine, police are corrupt
Holding
1. jury could find he had no recourse and that he reasonably believed failure to cooperate
would result in immediate consequences
2. immediacy and inescapability of threat are crucial elements, but opportunity to escape must
be reasonable
CRIM CASES
54 of 59
3. he had reason to believe failure to cooperate would result in immediate consequences, and
jury could find he had no recourse because the police were corrupt and that having to
relocate with his family in one day was not a "reasonable" recourse
Against
1. JJ: may be used by every drug courier, incentivizes dealers to threaten the couriers so they
can be exculpated
For
2. maybe all drug couriers should have this defense, if they are really being threatened
MPC
1. would come out the same way: imminence is not required, but the necessity must be
reasonable
Regina v. Ruzic* (Canada)
same facts as Conteto-Pachon
Holding
1. court disregards the immediacy requirement
MPC
1. agrees
INTOXICATION
People* v. Hood
drunk man being subdued grabs cop's gun and shoots him in the leg
Holding
1. intoxication is a defense in specific intent crimes but not in general intent crimes
i. intoxicated individuals cannot appreciate the consequences of their actions, but can still
form simple intent (i.e. intent to grab the gun and shoot)
For
2. assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime, since it only proscribes a specific act
i. specific intent crimes proscribe the act only if it is done to achieve some future
consequence
3. in this case, do not consider intoxication because defendant only committed a general intent
crime
Against
1. the specific intent distinction is a brute compromise and not a clear distinction
State* v. Stasio
intoxicated defendant convicted of assault with intent to rob
1. whether the crime a is specific or general intent crime is not does not determine whether to
allow an intoxication defense
CRIM CASES
55 of 59
i.
CRIM CASES
56 of 59
CRIM CASES
57 of 59
Meaning of Wrong
State v. Crenshaw
man murders his wife he suspected of cheating, out of religious duty, and argues he was unable
to perceive his act was morally wrong - he also has history of mental problem
1. society's morals, not those of the individual, are the standard for judging whether one can
appreciate the wrongness of one's acts for the purpose of the insanity defense
i. otherwise defendants would always be exculpated
2. thus, the defendant insanity defense applies only if the defendant is unable to appreciate the
illegality of his act
3. applies M'Naghten test
Decific Decree Exception
4. some courts allow a special decific decree exception, where a defendant is legally insane if
his acts were ordered by God (not that he was merely following his religion
i. applies even if he can perceive acts illegality
Serravo
man deluded, thinking God told him to kill his wife
CRIM CASES
58 of 59
CRIM CASES
59 of 59