CAPATI V OCAMPO

FACTS:

Plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a sub-contract with

the Defendant, a resident of Naga City.
The Defendant completed a construction job for the Plaintiff.
However, the construction was completed on a date later than what was
agreed in their contract.
Hence, Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga an action for recovery of
consequential damages due to the delay.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
venue of action was improperly laid.
The CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint on ground of
improper venue.

Issue: WON stipulation in the Agreement effectively limits the venue of the
case exclusively to the proper court of Valenzuela City? -- NO.
Held:

ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper

venue was correct.
HELD: No

The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found

in Sec. 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such
"actions may be commenced and tried where the Defendant or any
of the Defendants resides or may be found, or where the Plaintiff or
any of the Plaintiffs resides, at the election of the Plaintiff."
The word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon a party.
Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be" connotes
possibility; it does not connote certainty.
"May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity,
permission or possibility.

AUCTION IN MALINTA VS. LUYABEN

Doctrine: Mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to
preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. It must be shown
that such stipulation is exclusive.
Facts:

Warren Embes Luyaben won in the auction of petitioner.

Respondent paid for the equipment but petitioner was not able to
produce the same.

Luyaben then filed a complaint for damages against Auction in

Malinta, Inc. (AIMI) in RTC-Kalinga where Luyaben resides.
AIMI moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper
venue by invoking the following stipulation in the Bidders
Application and Registration Bidding Agreement which states that:
ALL COURT LITIGATION PROCEDURES SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN
THE APPROPRIATE COURTS OF VALENZUELA CITY, METRO MANILA.

The SC held that mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not

enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. It
must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive.
In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as
exclusively and waiving for this purpose any other venue, shall
only preceding the designation of venue, to the exclusion of the
other courts, or words of similar import, the stipulation should be
deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as
limiting venue to the specified place.
In the instant case, the stipulation in the parties agreement, i.e.,
all Court litigation procedures shall be conducted in the
appropriate Courts of Valenzuela City, Metro Manila, evidently
lacks the restrictive and qualifying words that will limit venue
exclusively to the RTC of Valenzuela City.
Hence, the Valenzuela courts should only be considered as an
additional choice of venue to those mentioned under Section 2,
Rule 4.
Being that Kalinga is where the aggrieved party resides, RTCKalinga is a proper venue for the case at bar, following Rule 4
Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that:
o Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may
be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.

PH CONSUMERS FOUNDATION INC V NTC AND PLDT

FACTS:

Private respondent PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the
approval of a revised schedule for its Subscriber Investment Plan
(SIP).
The NTC issued an ex-parte order provisionally approving the
revised schedule which, however, was set aside by this Court on
August 31, 1982.
The Court therein ruled that "there was necessity of a hearing by
the Commission before it should have acted on the application of
the PLDT.
On November 22, 1982, the NTC rendered the questioned decision
permanently approving PLDT's new and increased SIP rates. It is
the submission of petitioner that the SIP schedule presented by the
PLDT is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because
the NTC has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations
implementing Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217.

intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire (words ought to be more

subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words).
It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that the word
"may" in a statute is permissive while the word "shall" is
mandatory. The rule, however, is not absolute. The literal
interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates
a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature and if
the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction which
will effectuate the legislative intention. In the case at bar
compelling reasons dictate that the provision of the decree should
be construed as mandatory rather than merely directory.
There is no justification for the rate increase of the revised
schedule of PLDT's SIP. It is untimely, considering the present
economic condition obtaining in the country. The approved rate
defeats the purpose of the decree which is to spread ownership
among the wide base of investors. Accordingly, the decision of NTC
is annulled and set aside.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
approved the Revised Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT
in the absence of specific rules and regulations implementing Presidential
Decree No. 217.
RURA V LOPENA

HELD:

There is merit in the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of

respondent NTC to promulgate rules and regulations.
In the separate opinion of Justice Abad Santos, it is said that the
case involves a simple problem of statutory construction - that of
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217. The decision sustained
the petitioner's contention that it is the duty of NTC to first
promulgate rules and regulations.
The resolution does not subscribe to the view that the NTC should
or must promulgate rules and regulations because the decree must
be given its ordinary meaning; the word used is the permissive
"may" and not the mandatory "shall."
The non-unanimous resolution thus relies on the canons index
animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and a verba
legis non est recedendum (from the words of the statute there
should be no departure).
Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of
statutory construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with the
canons above mentioned we have the following opposite: verba

Facts:

Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of
estafa committed on different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as Criminal
Case 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527.
The 5 cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered
on18 August 1983.
Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of 17 months and 25
days. In each criminal case the sentence was 3 months and fifteen
15 days.
Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the
decision of the lower court. When the case was remanded to the
court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for
probation.
The application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the
ground that Rura is disqualified for probation under Section 9 (c) of
PD 968 or the Probation Law (i.e. applicable to those who have
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished

by imprisonment of not less than 1month and 1 day and/or a fine

of not less than P200).

despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to

overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage.

Issue The court denied the application for probation. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the instant petition
Held:

DEMAFILES V COMELEC
The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge
to give due course to the petitioners application for probation;
without costs. 1.
Previous applies to date of conviction, not to date of commission
of a crime
The statute relates previous to the date of conviction, not to the
date of the commission of the crime.
When the accused applied for probation he had no previous
conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation the
only conviction against him was the judgment which was the
subject of his application.
Conviction does not retroact to the day of the commission of the
crime.

GREGO V COMELEC
Facts: On October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local Government
Code of 1991, private respondent Humberto Basco was removed from his
position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than the Supreme Court upon a
finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint.
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District
of the City of Manila in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He won and
assumed office. He was successfully re-elected in 1992 and 1995.
It was his latest re-election which is the subject of the present petition on
the ground that he is disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991.
Under said section, those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case are disqualified to run for any elective local position.
Issue: Does Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 apply
retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January
1, 1992?
Held: The Supreme Court held that its refusal to give retroactive
application to the provision of Section 40(b) is already a settled issue and
there exist no compelling reason for the Court to depart therefrom. That
the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a
candidates removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense
should not deter the Court from applying the law prospectively. A statute,

FACTS:

Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board

voting to reject returns.

Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit,

considering that they were re-electionists. Respondent Commission
ruled in favor of Petitioner.

Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board

members in question were disqualified only when the board was
acting as a provincial but not as municipal.

In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous

decision.
ISSUES:
1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the
returns from Precinct 7.
2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were
disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of
canvassers.
3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count
a return.
HELD:

RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the

municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general
elections for local officials and shall have qualified.

The Supreme Court ruled that and shall have qualified is devoid
of meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st
day of January following their election, despite the fact that
Sebaste was a newly created municipality.

No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever
cause. However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass
made and proclamation should be annulled.

The law states any member of a provincial board or of municipal

council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be
incompetent to act on the said body. Since Respondent
Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and
proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order
canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular

Issue: WON Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of vagrancy under the
Attorney-Generals argument based on a mere grammatical criticism.
US V HART

FACTS:

Held:

The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty on a

charge of vagrancy under the provisions of Act No. 519.
All three appealed and presented evidence showing that each of
the defendants was earning a living, at a lawful trade or business
sufficient enough to support, himself.
However, the Attorney-General defended his clients by arguing
that in Section 1 of Act No. 519, the phrase no visible means of
support only applies to the clause tramping or straying through
the country and not the first clause which states that every
person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling
houses, thus making the 3 appellants guilty of vagrancy.
He further argued that it been intended for without visible means
of support to qualify the first part of the clause, either the comma
after gambling houses would have been omitted, or else a comma
after country would have been inserted.

An argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive and t

he effect intended by theLegislature should be the relevant
determinant of the interpretation of the law.
When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is
the duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative
intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will give
it effect.
Moreover, ascertaining the consequences flowing from such
a construction of the law is also helpful in determining the
soundness of the reasoning.
Considering that the argument of the Attorney-General would
suggest a lack of logical classification on the part of the legislature
of the various classes of vagrants and since it was proven that all
three of the defendants were earning a living by legitimate means
at a level of comfort higher than usual, Hart, Miller and Natividad
were acquitted, with the costs
de oficio.