Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon

504 SCRA 704 Political Law Inquiry in aid of legislation public officers

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May
8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be
one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman
Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section
4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered performance of its
task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate
v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in
the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable
them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens
can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their
effective implementation

Senate v. Ermita,

G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006 A report by Charles Aguilar FACTS: On September 21 to 23,
2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and
Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). On September 28, 2005, t
he President then issued Executive Order 464, Ensur
ing Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution,
and For Other Purposes, w
hich, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. ISSUES: 1.

Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; 2.

Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern;
and 3.

Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O.
464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. HELD: 1.

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the

Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is
co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of
legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation. 2.

Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in
investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed
to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. 3.

Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the
same is exempt from the need for publication. It has a direct effect on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. Due process requires that the people should have been
apprised of its issuance before it was implemented

GUDANI VS. SENGA

Posted by kaye lee on 10:51 PM
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative
Investigation]

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential
approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has
been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating
the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of Command. Gen. Senga
ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating
an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to
testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined,
the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military
officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty
to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed
that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised
for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly

detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today
that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the
clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed
with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is
nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

LAMP VS DMB
FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004
(GAA of 2004).

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded
together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the
country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or
direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of
projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify
programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in
receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in
effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects
does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional
sanction,8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than
malfeasance.

RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be
based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.

ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in
this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is
unconstitutional and illegal.

HELD:

I.

A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an
alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there
indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds
have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public
interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the
consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

II.

The Court rules in the negative.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the
law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the
Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition
is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive
which approved it.

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that,
indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend
them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous
Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law
which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

PORK BARREL:

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and
programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is
endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and
determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the

priorities set by the Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members
of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a
direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional
boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intac