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the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every
instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among
barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no
natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female.
The family is the association established by nature for the supply of mens everyday
wants.
The Village - when several families are united, and the association aims at something
more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And
the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family,
composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled with the
same milk. And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by
kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the
barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies
of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same
blood.
The State - When several villages are united in a single complete community, large
enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating
in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And
therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of
them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed,
we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the
final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the
best.
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a
political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is
either a bad man or above humanity;
Man is a Political Animal above the rest - Now, that man is more of a political
animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say,
makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the
gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is
therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure
and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of
speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore
likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he
alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the
association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
The State is a creation of nature and prior to the individual - But things are
defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same
when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they have the same name.
(A hand without a body is but a stone hand.) The proof that the state is a creation
of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not selfsufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable
to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be
either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state.
Principle of order in a political society - If man have not virtue, he is the most
unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But
justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the
determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.
Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and
also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation than exists at present. For
some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management
of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was
saying at the outset, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over
slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists
by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore
unjust.
Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and
the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.
But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a
condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?
There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of
fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but
expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for
rule.
Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and
the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.
Part VI
In some sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the greatest power
of exercising force; and as superior power is only found where there is superior
excellence of some kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply
one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice with goodwill while the
other identifies it with the mere rule of the stronger). If these views are thus set out
separately, the other views have no force or plausibility against the view that the
superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply
to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that slavery
in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law, but at the same moment they
deny this. For what if the cause of the war be unjust? And again, no one would ever
say he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest
rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to have
been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves,
but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean the
natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves
everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard
themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but they deem
the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of
nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative.
We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion, and that all are
not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is in some cases
a marked distinction between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the
one to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicing obedience, the others
exercising the authority and lordship which nature intended them to have. The abuse of
this authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul,
are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his
bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave between them is natural
they are friends and have a common interest, but where it rests merely on law and
force the reverse is true.
Part VII
The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a master is not a
constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of rule are not, as some affirm,
the same with each other. For there is one rule exercised over subjects who are by
nature free, another over subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule of a household
is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a
government of freemen and equals. The master is not called a master because he has
science, but because he is of a certain character, and the same remark applies to the
slave and the freeman. Still there may be a science for the master and science for the
slave.
There is likewise a science of the master, which teaches the use of slaves; for the
master as such is concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet this
so-called science is not anything great or wonderful; for the master need only know
how to order that which the slave must know how to execute. Hence those who are in
a position which places them above toil have stewards who attend to their households
while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics. But the art of acquiring
slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs both from the art of the master and the
art of the slave, being a species of hunting or war.
Lecture 18
Can a University define its social purpose any way it wants to, and then define
admissions policy to meet that criteria?
Challenge: Is there a principle distinction between the invocation of the social purpose
of the university today, in the diversity rationale, and the invocation of the social
purpose of the university (Texas in the 1950s - We prepare lawyers for law firm jobs,
and no law firms are hiring Negroes.) or (Harvard in 1930s - We prepare students for
Presidency and political careers, and no Jews go into those types of jobs.).
Answer: In the 1950s and 1930s it was about exclusion, and today it is about
inclusion. The earlier policies had an element of malice or judgment built into them
about blacks and Jews. So, as long as an institution uses people as valuable to its
social purpose, and so long as it doesnt judge them maliciously as intrinsically less
worthy .
But, doesnt that concede that all of us, when we compete for positions, are we not
being used (not judged) in a way that has nothing to do with moral desert?
Question: Who wants to detach justice from moral desert that goes well beyond
equality? Kant and Rawls
Question: What is their reason? Tying justice to moral virtue is going to lead
away from freedom (from respect of people as free beings).
Looking to the goal or end - in Greek goal or end = telos of the thing.
TELEOLOGICAL REASONING: Reasoning from the telos, goal or end
All of nature was understood to be a meaningful order, and what it meant
to understand nature, to grasp nature , to find our place in nature was to
inquire into and read out the purpose or telos of nature.
Which of the following philosophers hold that justice is a matter of rewarding or honoring virtue or moral
desert?
a)
Rawls.b)
Nozick.c)
Aristotle. d)
EXPLANATION
a) Incorrect. Rawls distinguishes between moral desert and legitimate expectations (what one has a right
to expect once the rules of society are in place) and argues that justice should not be based on virtue or
moral desert.
b) Incorrect. Nozick argues that justice is a matter of respecting rights, not rewarding or honoring virtue
or moral desert. For example, if you become rich because your wealthy uncle decided to leave his fortune
to you, Nozick would say that you are entitled to that money, even if there is no sense in which you
deserve it.
c) Correct. For Aristotle, justice is a matter of giving people what they deserve, a matter of figuring out
the proper fit between persons with their virtues and their appropriate social roles.
d) Incorrect. Answers (a) and (b) are incorrect. Neither Rawls nor Nozick believes that justice should be
based on virtue or moral desert.
QUESTION 2
Imagine that you are a parent trying to determine to which of your three children you should give a flute:
Child A says that the flute should be given to her because she is the best flute player. Child B says the
flute should be given to him because he will get the most enjoyment from it. Child C says that the flute
should be handed to him because he has no other toys to play with. According to Aristotles account of
distributive justice, who should have the flute?
a)
Child A. b)
Child B.c)
Child C.d)
Child A or B.e)
QUESTION 3
What does it mean to engage in teleological reasoning?
a)
You reason from behind the veil of ignorance to determine the just allocation of that good.b)You
reason about justice by working back and forth between your considered convictions about particular
cases and moral principles that seem reasonable.c)
You reason from the purpose or telos or goal of a
thing to define a just allocation of that good. d) All of the above answers are correct.e)
None of the
above answers are correct.
2. PGA case as to whether a disabled golf player should be allowed to use a golf cart
during a tournament.
Both case bring out another feature of Aristotles Teleological way
of thinking about justice. When we use teleology, we sometimes
argue about the end purpose of a social situations, and when we have
those disagreements, we are not just disagreeing about who gets
what (distributive questions), but also an honorific question. What
excellences of persons will be honored. Debates about teleologic
ideas are also debates about honor.
Politics
When we discuss distributive justice these days, were mainly concerned with
the distribution of income, and wealth and opportunity. Aristotle took distributive
justice to mean the distribution of honors and offices. These are Aristotles
questions.
Who should be a citizen?
Who should rule?
How should political authority be distributed?
How did he answer these questions? In line with his teleological reasoning,
Aristotle says we first have to look into the purpose or telos of politics.
Politics, for Aristotle, is about forming good character.
Its about cultivating the virtue of good citizens.
Its about the good life.
The end (telos) of the state, the end of the political community is not mere life,
its not economic exchange ONLY, or security ONLY. Its realizing the good life.
If this is the end (telos) of the polis, then we can derive from that distributive
justice, and who should have the greatest measure of authority.
Those who contribute the most to an association of this character,
namely an association that aims at the good, should have a greater
share in the rule and the honors of the polis because they are in a
position to contribute most to what a polis is all about.
SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1
According to Aristotle, distributive justice is mainly about the distribution
of ...
a) ... income.b) ... wealth.c) ... offices and honors. d) ... opportunities.e)
None of the above.
QUESTION 2
According to Aristotle, what is politics about (what is the purpose or telos of
politics)?
a)
According to Aristotle, politics is about forming good character/
cultivating the virtue of citizens/realizing the good life. b) According to
Aristotle, politics is only about accumulating wealth.c)
According to
Aristotle, politics is only about ensuring security.d) According to Aristotle,
politics is only about protecting individual natural rights.e) All of the above
are correct.
QUESTION 3
Aristotle's argument about the distribution of offices/political authority ...
a) ... has a teleological character.b) ... has an honorific dimension.c) ...
makes use of the idea of the veil of ignorance.d) a) and b). e) b) and c).
If certain social roles are fitting or appropriate to me, where does that leave my
right to choose my roles, my life purposes for myself?
Rawls rejects teleological reasons for social justice because they threaten the
equal basic rights of citizens.
Aristotles defense of slavery - for slavery to be just two conditions have to be
met.
1. It has to be necessary for the community as a whole to function.
i. In his society, he said, it was necessary, because if some citizens
must go to the assembly and debate social issues and thus realize
their true natures, then there must be some who take care of their
menial tasks. Therefore, slavery is necessary for the life of the polis.
2. There also have to be some people who are fit and it is just that they be the
slaves.
i. Aristotle says that there are some people who are meant to be ruled.
They can recognize reason in others but they cant partake of it.
ii. But some argue that some of the Athenian slaves were put into
slavery because they were captured in a war, and not because
that lack reasoning skills. Aristotle agrees that these slaves have
been coerced. Coercion is an indicator that its wrong because its
unnatural.
Arguments to Aristotle
1. What if we cant agree on the fundamental purpose or telos of our shared
public life? Then how can we base social justice on the telos, or end that it
consists in?
i. So, modern political views and constitutions believe that justice and
rights should not be based on any conception of the good or the
purposes of the social life, but should create a framework of rights
that should leave people free to live by their conceptions of the good,
their conceptions of the purposes of life.
2. What if a person is well suited to a role, but wants to go in a different
direction? This goes back to the notion of freedom.
i. Kant and Rawls think that precisely because people disagree in
pluralist societies about the nature of the good life, we shouldnt try to
base justice on any particular answer to that question.
ii. If you tie justice to a particular conception of the good, if you
see justice as a matter of fit between a person and her roles,
you dont leave room for freedom.
iii. To be free is to be independent of any particular roles, or traditions,
or conventions that may be handed down by my parents or my
society.
To decide between Aristotle and Kant/Rawls (these two broad positions), we need
to determine:
1. Whether the right is prior to the good.
2. What it means to be a free person (a free moral agent). Does freedom
require that I stand toward my roles, my ends and my purposes, as an
agent of choice or as someone trying to discover what my nature really is?
SELF-TEST
QUESTION 1
According to Aristotles teleological way of thinking, which of the following considerations would be of
primary importance for determining whether Casey Martin should receive a golf cart?
a)
Will giving Martin a golf cart be pleasing to spectators who can now watch him play?b)
Will
giving Martin a golf cart encourage more handicapped people to play the sport?c)
state to dictate the rules of private institutions, such as the PGA?d)
oppose granting Martin the cart?e) Is walking the golf course an essential feature of the sport?
QUESTION 2
How might Aristotle respond to the claim that people should be free to choose their own ends rather than
be guided to being virtuous by the political community?
a)
Even though most people can learn virtue by themselves, certain people need guidance from
others.b)
Even though good families can inculcate virtue, some families fail. For this reason, the state
their own desires, then the need never arises for the state to say what is virtuous and what is not.d)
In order to exercise meaningful choice, citizens must acquire virtues made possible only by
participation in politics. e)
The regime in which one lives has the final say about the true nature of the
good life. Therefore, people should not be free to decide for themselves what counts as virtuous.
QUESTION 3
According to Aristotle, under which condition(s) is slavery just?
a)
whole to function and there are some people for whom being a slave is the just or the fitting or the
appropriate condition. c)
The slaves are non-Greeks, treated decently, and treated according to law.e) All of the above.
QUIZ 5
QUESTION 1
According to Aristotle, the cultivation of moral virtue arises through ...
a)
... luck.d)
... prayer.e)
the primary purpose of the state. d) While it is always best to have virtuous citizens, the state itself
should remain non-judgmental and take no position on which ways of living are best.e) All of the above
are correct.
You have used 1 of 1 submissions
QUESTION 3
Sometimes we disagree and argue about what the telos or the purpose of a social practice really consists
in. According to Aristotle, when we have those disagreements what's at stake is ...
a) ... only who will get what.b) ... whether the social practice helps maximize pleasure overall.c) ... only
what excellences of persons will be honored.d) ... not just who will get what but also what qualities,
what excellences of persons will be honored. e) None of the above.
You have used 1 of 1 submissions
QUESTION 4
According to Aristotle, ...
a)
the individual is prior to the polis (the political community).b) morality is about the maximized
and is prior to the individual. d) distributive justice is a matter of what would be chosen behind a veil
of ignorance.e)
Walking the course is part of the game. If you allow Martin to ride a cart, he really isnt
playing the game anymore. b) If Martin does not have to walk the course, he will have an unfair
advantage.c) The PGA is a private organization. The courts should not tell a private organization what to
do.d) (a) and (b).e) (a), (b), and (c).