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Constitutional Law 1 Assignment for October 5, 2015

Note: Those smaller in font are assigned by the other groups who did not join with
compilations.
Ill just have to attach those questions for reference.

these

Principles and Policies -Article 2


a.

Promotion of health

Art II, Secs. 15 to 16


Does Art. II, Sec. 16 provide for an enforceable right? Why?
Oposa vs. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 [G.R. No. 101083] (1993) Group 1
In Oposa vs. Factoran, does a basic right have to be indicated or written in the Constitution in order for it to be enforceable?
Can an agency implement ecological protection measures to the objection of Local
Government Units?
LLDA vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42 [G.R. No. 120865-71] (Dec. 7, 1995
Group 2
Also Art. XIII, Sec. 14
In LLDA vs. CA, can a government agency implement ecological protection measure in the area of local
government units who are objecting to such?
b.

Reform in agriculture and other natural resources

Art II, Sec 21


The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.
.
Art XIII, Sec 4 to 8
Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform - ART XIII, Sec 4 to 8
SECTION 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of
other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits
as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and
subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
SECTION 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as
cooperatives, and other independent farmers organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and
management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and
research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.
SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in
accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public
domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be
distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
SECTION 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential use of local marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such
fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing
assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The
protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
SECTION 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform
program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises.
Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.

Asso. of Small Landowners in the Phil. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,


175 SCRA 343 [G.R. No. 78742] (July 14, 1989) Group 3
G.R. No. 78742 [July 14, 1989]
Association of small landowners Vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
FACTS:
Association of small landowners invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their
respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such
lands.
They further claim that they cannot eject their tenants and unable to enjoy their right of retention
because DAR has so far not issued the implementing rules in P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in
implementation of P.D. No. 27. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
for the issuance of the rules.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power.
2. Whether or not the CARP is violative in accordance of just compensation provided by the Constitution.
3. Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle of eminent domain.
HELD:
1. There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case
of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal
waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that
the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and
intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
2. No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no other, what is
being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power and eminent domain. This is a
revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The initially intended
amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at the time. The invalidation
of the said section resulted in the nullification of the entire program.
3. No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full owners of the
land they acquired under PD 27, after proof of full payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its
part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on the receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or
LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to
expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which

case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35It is only where the owner is
unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of
eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of
the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on
the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the
supreme law.
Is CARP Law constitutional? Why or why not?
What is CARP (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program), or RA 6657?
CARP, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, is the redistribution of public and private agricultural
lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement. CARPs vision is to
have an equitable land ownership with empowered agrarian reform beneficiaries who can effectively manage
their economic and social development to have a better quality of life.
One of the major programs of CARP is Land Tenure Improvement, which seeks to hasten distribution of lands
to landless farmers. Similarly, the Department offers Support Services to the beneficiaries such as
infrastructure facilities, marketing assistance program, credit assistance program, and technical support
programs. Furthermore, the department seeks to facilitate, resolve cases and deliver Agrarian Justice.
The legal basis for CARP is the Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) signed by President Corazon C. Aquino on June 10, 1988. It is an act which aims to promote
social justice and industrialization, providing the mechanism for its implementation, and for other purposes.
Is CARP Law constitutional? Why or why not?
RA 6657/ CARP LAW is Constitutional
In the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, the Supreme Court held:
The measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an
exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution.
But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever
lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain.
"Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to
all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures
here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the
Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight"
enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the
other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct
to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they
continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A
statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted
it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the
measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.

G.R. No. 79777 [July 14, 1989]


NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
FACTS:
Nicolas Manaay and his wife owned a 9-hectare rice land worked by 4 tenants while Augustin
Hermano, Jr owned a 5- hectare Riceland also worked by 4 tenants wherein the tenants were declared full
owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
Petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 and they contended that President
Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were constitutional.
HELD:
Yes. The promulgation of PD No. 27 by Pres. Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law
has already been sustained and there is no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of
then Pres Aquino to promulgate PP 131 and Eos 228 and 229, the same was authorized by Section 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress substantially affirmed the challenged measures
and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to RA 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its
provision.
G.R. No. 79310 [July 14, 1989]
PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC. et al., petitioners,
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.
FACTS:
Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, Co-petitioner
Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members.
The petitioners seek to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contended
that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution
belongs to Congress and not the President. They also argue Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have
to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal
protection. Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as
it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of
the E.O. No. 229.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CARP fund provision in PP No.131 is valid in accordance with its appropriation.
HELD:
No. Proc. No.131 is not an appropriation measure even if it provide for the creation of the said fund, for
that is not the principal purpose. Appropriation law is one where the primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main
objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
G.R. No. 79744 [July 14, 1989]
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, et al, respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer
and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private
respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17,
1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were
issued which directly transferred his land to the private respondents.

They also allege the Secretary of DAR, in violation of due process and the requirement for just
compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then
refused payment of lease rentals to him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and EO No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for
retention limits.
HELD:
RA 6657 does not provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law so the argument is no longer
tenable. As such, landowners who were unable to exercise their rights to retention under PD 27 shall enjoy the
retention rights granted by RA 6657 under the condition therein prescribed.
R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most
controversial provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or
indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner,
subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually
tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further,
That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of
the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead

In Association of Land Owners vs. DAR, what is the constitutional mandate on land reform?
What is the effect of land reform on private land ownership? Is this not a deprivation of
property?
A: The retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long
as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit
but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
All rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by
him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said
law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to
keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the
same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his
farm holding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been
determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other
agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that
the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued,
to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an
accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation
Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory
Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the
Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the

corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking
this right.
Letter of InstructionLOI
Is this not a deprivation of property?
The landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in
contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is
consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the
judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on
which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement
Act, is filed. Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry,
title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made.
c. Respect for human dignity and human rights
Art II, Sec 11
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Art XIII, Sec 17-19
ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 17.
1. There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.
2. The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and
other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.
3. Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall
continue to exercise its present functions and powers.
4. The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.
Section 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:
1. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights;
2. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;

3. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the under-privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
4. Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
5. Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the
primacy of human rights;
6. Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation
to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
7. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
8. Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;
9. Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;
10. Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
11. Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
Section 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendations.
Powers of the Commission on Human Rights; Political right and civil right
Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 770 [G.R. No. 100150] (June 2, 1995) Group 4
SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
FACTS: On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners
"to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the
vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental
motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be
understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the
rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss.
And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner
also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno,
et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".

ISSUE: Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?

HELD: No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR.
Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on
complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights". The "order to
desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that it does not possess. The
Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to
issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the
action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC. The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.
Powers of the Commission on Human Rights; Political right and civil right
Simon Jr. v. CHR
human rights; civil rights; political rights Human rights generic term; civil rights those rights that
belong to every citizen or inhabitant of the state or country [by virtue of his citizenship in the country] and are
not connected with the organization or administration of government (marriage, equal protection, freedom of
contract etc.); Political rights right to participate, directly or indirectly in the establishment or administration of
government (suffrage, run for public office); CHR focus on SEVERE cases of human rights violations (right of
political detainees, treatment of prisoners, fair and public trials etc.); CHR can cite or hold any person in direct
or indirect contempt but not order them to desist.
The Commission on Human Rights has no power to issue a restraining order or a writ of injunction and has no
power to cite for contempt for violation of the restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction. The cease and
desist order, according to the Court, is a semantic Interplay for a restraining order. Its power to cite for
contempt should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of
procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers, which it is constitutionally authorized to adopt.

d. A self reliant and independent economic order


Art II, Sec 19
Art II, Sec 20
See Art XVIII, Sec 23
Art XII, Sec 6 (National Economy and Patrimony)

Power of Government to intervene when necessary to promote general welfare


Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. Phil. Coconut Authority
G.R. No. 110526] 286 SCRA 109 (Feb. 28, 1998) Group 5
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. Philippine Coconut Authority, G.R. No. 110526,
February 10, 1998
FACTS: Challenged here is the decision of the Philippine Coconut Authority to issue permits to certain
applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner Association of
Philippine Coconut Desiccators alleged that said decision is beyond the power of the PCA and prayed that said
administrative agency must be compelled to observe its mandatory duty under the provisions of statutes
reguating the desiccated coconut industry. The PCA contended however that the petition should be denied on
the ground that petitioner has a pending appeal before the Office of the President and the latter is guilty of
forum-shopping and that it failed to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal to the President must be made by the petitioner before judicial review is
taken.

HELD: The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek a judicial review has
obviously no application in the case at bar. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of
its rule-making or legislative power. It is settled that only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies
made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion
doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete. Petition is granted.
http://subaylawco23.weebly.com/political.html
In Association of Phil. Coconut vs. PCA, is the government empowered to intervene in private business? When?

Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 1 applied; Effect


Art. XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATIMONY
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and
agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective
organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
Garcia vs. Board of Investments [G.R. No. 92024] (November 9, 1990) group 6
GARCIA VS BOI
FACTS:
The Taiwanese who owned the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) applied to the (BOI) for the
Registration as a new domestic producer of Petrochemicals in the Philippines. The Site was located in Bataan
and they request is to move it in Batangas . By the petition of Congressman Enrique Garcia he requested a
copy of BPCs original and amended application documents but the BOI did not gave him a copy because
those documents are confidential. Congressman Garcia was not agree for the transferring but the BOI granted
the Request of the investors. The Congressman wants the BPC to remain because the inhabitants of Bataan
had an interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital
because it will affect not only their economic life, but even the air tiled that BPCs amended application was in
fact a second application that required a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held.
Issue:
Whether or not the BOI committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the wishes of the investor, though they
know that this involves national interest
Ruling:The Court find that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the
petrochemical plant from bataan to batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naptha only for the
main reason that the investors has the final choice of the site but. The Court has a constitutional duty to step
into this controversy and determine the paramount issue as stated in article 8 sec 1 of the Philippine
Constitution The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. The SC has 6 reasons in this issue these are (1) Bataan was the

original choice as the plant site of the BOI which the BPC agreed That is why it bears the name of bataan. (2)
the BRC ,a government owned Filipino corporation,located in Bataan produces 60 % of the national of naphta
which can be used as feedstock for the plant in bataan. (3) naphta as feedstock has been exempted by law
from the as valorem tax by approval of RA 6767. (4)under sec 10 of article 12 of the 1987 Constitution it is the
duty of the state to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and
in accordance with its national goals and priorities(5)the capital requirements will be minimized if LPC does
not have to buy land for the project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha which is certainly more
economical .lastly (6) if the plant site is maintained in bataan,the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the
gret benefit and advantage of the government which shall have participation in the management of the project
instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.
And this brings us to a prime consideration which the court cannot rightly ignore.
Art.. II, Sec. 26 (Group 6)
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.
In Garcia vs. BOI, what would be the guidelines for government agency to grant applications in
business that are pioneering?
Answer:
(1) For an initial authorized capital of only P20 million, the Central Bank gave an eligible relending credit or
relending facility worth US $50 million and a debt to swap arrangement for US $30 million or a total
accommodation of US $80 million which at current exchange rates is around P2080 million.
(2) A major part of the company's capitalization shall not come from foreign sources but from loans, initially a Pl
Billion syndicated loan, to be given by both government banks and a consortium of Philippine private banks or
in common parlance,
(3) Tax exemptions and privileges were given as part of its 'preferred pioneer status.'
(4) Loan applications of other Philippine firms will be crowded out of the Asian Development Bank portfolio
because of the petrochemical firm's massive loan request. (Taken from the proceedings before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee).

e. Autonomy of local governments


Art II, Sec 25
See Art X
Decentralization of Administration distinguished from Decentralization of Power
Limbonas vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786 [G.R. No. 80391] (Feb. 28, 1989]
Limbona vs Mangelin
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam,
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity
as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner
accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall
be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress.

However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he
was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and
be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC
received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefore. Respondents
argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a
question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now
submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the
extent
of
self-government
given
to
the
autonomous
governments
of
Region
XII?
HELD:
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by
direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still
invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled
matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also,
assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to
this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an
apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the
"recess" called on the ground of good faith.
how is decentralization of power distinguished from decentralization of administration?
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is
subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts
are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the
Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it
comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the
second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction.
And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the
petitioner's removal as Speaker.
Group 7
In Limbonas vs. Mangelin, how is decentralization of power distinguished from
decentralization of administration?

DECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF


POWER, DIFFERENTIATED
There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base
government power and in the process to
make local governments more responsive
and accountable, and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in

Decentralization of power, on the other


hand, involves abdication of political power
in the favor of local governments units
declared to be autonomous. In that case,
the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts

the pursuit of national development and


social progress. At the same time,
relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises
general supervision over them, but only
to ensure that local affairs are
administrated according to law. He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he
can substitute their judgements with his
own.

to self-immolation, since in that event,


that autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities
but to its constituency.

1. APPLICATION OF

DECENTRALIZATION OF
ADMINISTRATION
Occurs when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in
order to broaden the base of government
power. [Ganzon v. CA (1991)]
The purpose of such is to relieve the
central
government of the burden of managing
local affairs
and enable to concentrate on national
concerns.

DECENTRALIZATON OF POWER
Abdication of political power in favor of
LGUs
declared to be autonomous regions,
making the latter
no longer accountable to the national
government,
but to its constituents instead.
Not allowed under the 1987 Constitution

Q: Decentralization of Administration distinguished from decentralization of power.

A: Decentralization transfer of power and authority from central institution to lower or local levels of a
government system
Administrative decentralization seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources for
providing public services among different levels of government. It is the transfer of responsibility for the
planning, financing and management of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies
to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public
authorities or corporations, or area-wide, regional or functional authorities.
3 forms of decentralization
Devolution transfer of power and authority from the national government to local government units (LGUs);
political and territorial
Deconcentration transfer of power, authority or responsibility or the discretion to plan, decide and manage
from central to local levels; administrative and sectoral

Debureaucratization transfer of some public functions and responsibilities, which government may perform, to
private entities or NGOs Aim

With the Local Automy provisions in Constitution, do these affect the relationship between t
he National Government and Local Government units (LGUs)
Lina vs. Pano, 364 SCRA 76 [G.R. No. 129093] (August 30, 2001) Group 8

f.
Honest Public Service and Full Public Disclosure
Art II, Sec 27
Art XI, Sec 4, 5, 6
Art II, Sec 28
Art XI, Sec 17
Art VII, Sec 20
Art XII, Sec 21
Art XII, Sec 2, par 5
Art VI, Sec 12 and 20
Art IX, D, sec 4
Art III, Sec 7

Valmonte v Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 Group 9


G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
RICARDO VALMONTE
vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR
FACTS:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus invoke their right to information and pray that respondent
be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members who were able to secure
clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
Petitioner Valmonte a lawyer and member of the media, wrote a letter to Respondent Belmonte who was then
the GSIS General Manager, requesting permission to grant them access on information or documents relating
to the loans of certain batasang pambansa members with Mrs. Imelda Marcos as guaranty with the GSIS.
The GSIS Deputy General Counsel replied to the letter of petitioner Valmonte on behalf of respondent
Belmonte, stating that what they are requesting contained serious legal implications. In his opinion, is that a
confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that
the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the
GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts. Thus denying petitioners access and thus
filing of the instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
RULING:
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the constitutional right
to information. In Taada v. Tuvera, and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, the Court
upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest and ordered the government
agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution which states:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which
provided:
The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In
this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the
people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey
to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as
a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of
governmental power.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check
the accuracy of information then disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only
critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right to information is an essential premise of a
meaningful right to speech and expression it goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure * and honesty in the public service. ** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the
people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving
public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or
"public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legazpi v.
Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern". As
observed in Legazpi:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. The terms embraces a
broad subject either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis
whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Respondent maintains that a
confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality
restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The
judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the
law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches
of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution
and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the
ambit of the right to information.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if
they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the
loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and
their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy
a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public
scrutiny.

Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether
performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are
within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government
Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing
loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa
In Lina vs. Pano, considering the constitutional provisions of the Constitution on local government autonomy, does this diminish the control of
the central government over local government units?

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 Group 10


G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
FACTS:
Valentin L. Legaspi invokes the fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public
concern through a special civil action for mandamus against the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC
had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees
had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the
information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
Commission to disclose said information.
ISSUE:
WON Legaspi is entitled to compel the Civil Service Commission to disclose information regarding the
eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas., thus invoking his constitutional right to full public disclosure.
HELD: YES.
The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The
Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of examining the public records by the government agency in
custody thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute.
Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided
by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.
The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of public
interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a
public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as to their
eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted that the information on the result of the
CSC eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual

or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person
occupying government positions.
Thus the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of
sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said
position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
o---oOo----o
What is the theory of separation of powers?
What are the powers separated?
What is the purpose of separation of powers/
What is overlapping of functions or blending of powers?
What is the principle of checks and balances? (Group 10)
What is the theory of separation of powers?
The Theory of Separation of Powers holds that the three organs of government must be separate and
independent from one another. Any combination of these three functions into a single or two organs is harmful
and dangerous for individual liberty. Separation of powers of the three organs is essential for the efficiency of
the government and the liberty of the people.
Government can work systematically and efficiently only when each of its organs exercises its own
powers and functions. Similarly, the liberty of the people can be protected only when there is no concentration
or combination of the three governmental powers in the hands of one or two organs.
The theory of Separation of Powers holds that for keeping the government limited, which is necessary
for protecting the liberty of the people, the three functions of government should be separated and performed
by three separate organs.
What is the Doctrine of Separation of Powers?
In essence, separation of powers means the legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the
executive, settlement of legal controversies to the judiciary. Each is therefore prevented from invading the
domain of the others.
What are the powers separated?
>Executive Power
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the
authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative
power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
The President exercises general supervision over all local government units and is also the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
>Legislative Power
The legislative branch, which has the authority to make, alter or repeal laws intended as a rule of
conduct to govern the relation between individuals or between individuals and the state is vested in the
Congress. Congress is vested with the tremendous power of the purse, traditionally recognized in the
constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law. It comprehends both the power to generate money by taxation (the power to tax)
and the power to spend it (the power to appropriate). The power to appropriate carries with it the power to
specify the amount that may be spent and the purpose for which it may be spent.
>The Judicial Power

Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
The judiciary has the moderating power to determine the proper allocation of powers between the branches of
government. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. In the words of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno: The Judiciary
may not have the power of the sword, may not have the power of the purse, but it has the power to interpret
the Constitution, and the unerring lessons of history tell us that rightly wielded, that power can make a
difference for good.
While Congress has the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,
Congress cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction provided in the Constitution. No law shall also be
passed reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its members. The Supreme
Court also has administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof, having the power to
discipline or dismiss judges of lower courts.
What is the purpose of separation of powers/
The separation of powers seeks to prevent the concentration of authority in one person or group of
persons that might lead to irreparable error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of republican institutions.
The principle of separation means that the governmental powers are divided among the three
departments of government: the legislative, executive and judicial, and that each of these is separated from
each other.
What is overlapping of functions or blending of powers?
There are instances under the Constitution when powers are not confined exclusively within one
department but are assigned to or shared by several departments. It is often necessary for certain powers to
be reposed in more than one department, so they may better collaborate with, and in the process check, each
other for the public good.
Blending of powers is remarked as the Great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to another. It encompasses separation and independence on the one hand, as
well as harmony and cooperation on the other hand.
While the three departments are independent and separated, their powers overlap. The doctrine of
separation of powers seem to be that the whole power of one department should not be exercised by the same
hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments, and that no one department ought to
possess directly or indirectly an over ruling influence over the others.
What is the principle of checks and balances?
It allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or
excesses committed by the other departments.
Under the system of checks and balances, one department is given certain powers by which it may
definitely restrain the others from exceeding constitutional authority. It may object or resist any encroachment
upon its authority, or it may question, if necessary any act or acts which unlawfully interferes with its sphere of
jurisdiction and authority.
The following are illustrations where there are checks and balances:
The lawmaking power of the Congress is checked by the President through its veto power, which in turn
maybe overturn by the legislature.
The Congress may refuse to give its concurrence to an amnesty proclaimed by the President and the
Senate to a treaty he has concluded.
The President may nullify a conviction in a criminal case by pardoning the offender
The Congress may limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and that of inferior courts and even
abolish the latter tribunals.

The Judiciary in general has the power to declare invalid an act done by the Congress, the President
and his subordinates, or the Constitutional Commissions.
Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612 [No. 21327] (Jan. 14, 1924) Group 2
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259
[No. 26979] (April 1, 1927) Group 2
Noblejas vs. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 405 [L-28790] (April 29, 1968)
Group 3

April 29, 1968 G.R. No. L-28790


ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration,petitioner, vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive
Secretary, respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic
Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."
In accordance with the "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and
consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles."
respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to explain in writing why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him. Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that,
as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he
could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and,
therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon
conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court
HELD:
The suspension of Noblejas by the Executive Secretary is valid. Pursuant to Republic Act 1151, the
Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance"
did not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and
to be suspended or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said rights would be
violative of the Constitution. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of the Commissioner pursuant to
sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of
jurisdiction.
The right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon
recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate
the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of
supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing the control of the Chief Executive
over such officials.
Noblejas Vs Teehankee
Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers
is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial
functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in
violation of the principle of the separation of powers.
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions
except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
The judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other
than of cases and controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions
which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially
legislative or administrative..

There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative
functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
1. In the following cases, what is the principle of checks and balances? How is the principle of
checks and balances applied in these cases? How does checks and balances work and what is
its relation to separation of powers?
U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 [No. 17122] (Feb. 27, 1922) Group 4
U.S. Vs. ANG TANG HO
FACTS: In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued
Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice
should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the
price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done
on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty
as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence
countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General?
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail
to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard
policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use.
The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the
legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take
effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
1. In the following cases, what is the principle of checks and balances? How is the principle of
checks and balances applied in these cases? How does checks and balances work and what is
its relation to separation of powers?

A: U.S. Vs. ANG TANG HO


In the case of U.S. vs Ang Tang Ho, the principle of checks and balances- the system which gives one
department certain powers which they may restrain other department from exceeding constitutionality, The
congress by law explicitly delegated its legislative powers to the Governor-General by giving the GovernorGeneral the power to fix the price of rice.
The principle of checks and balances was applied in this case by analyzing Republic Act 2868 which was
violated by Ang Tang Ho. When the Judicial Department is faced with the question of the constitutionality of an
act, the Judicial Department which is represented by the Supreme Court which has the power to interpret the
law by construing the provision, they found out that RA 2868 is void and unconstitutional and thus, reversing
the decision of the lower court. The system of check and balances work by giving the 3 departments of the

government certain powers. The Executive Department has the power to enforce the law, the Legisative
Department has the power to make the law and the Judicial Department has the power to interpret the law.
The separation of power is closely related to system of checks and balances since the powers of each
department of the government was provided by the constitution and these departments must not exceed
constitutionality.
Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [No. 46440] (Jan. 18, 1939) Group 5
Planas v Gil
G.R. No. L-46440 January 18, 1939
Laurel, J.:
Facts:
1. The case stemmed from a statement made by petitioner which was published in a newspaper (La Guardia)
wherein he criticized certain government officials acts as well as the election of Assemblyman in 1938.
Petitioner was a member of the municipal board of Manila.
2. An investigation directed by the authority of the President was conducted by the respondent Commissioner
of Civil Service. Hence this petition for prohibition where petitioner contends that respondent lacks the
jurisdiction to investigate him and that it violates Art. 7, Sec.11 (1) of the Constitution, as it seeks to remove or
suspend him.
ISSUE: W/N the President has the legal authority to order the investigation
RULING:
YES. Provided the investigation should be in accordance with law.
The constitution grants to the President the powers of control and supervision. The power to exercise general
supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed authorizes him to
order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner herein.
Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least
implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If
supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a
knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation.
The President in the exercise of the executive power under the Constitution may act through the heads of the
executive departments. The heads of the executive departments are his authorized assistants and agents in
the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business,
are presumptively his acts.
The power of removal which the President may exercise directly and the practical necessities of efficient
government brought about by administrative centralization easily make the President the head of the
administration.
- Source: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/planas-v-gil.html
Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 [No. L-34161] Group 6
Facts:
A five page petition was filed by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V. Fernandez,
for declaratory relief as tax payers, bur purportedly suing in behalf of themselves and the Filipino
people, in assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution, dealing with the range of the authority of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, would have the Supreme Court declare that it is without power,
under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt
proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to
propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein.
The petition was dismissed two days after the filing and on the last day of the month, a thirty-two page
for reconsideration was printed.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners had the requisite standing to seek a declaration of the alleged
nullity of a resolution of the Constitutional Convention?
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to interfere with the Constitutional
Convention?

Held:
No, the petitioners, even though they are taxpayers, have no standing for the petition. The
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The validity of a
statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its
enforcement.
Where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually been considered as possessed
of the requisite personality to bring a suit (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, Tolentino vs. COMELEC).
No, the Supreme Court has no power to interfere with the Constitutional Convention. The
doctrine of separation of powers call for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left
alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The judiciary will neither direct nor restrain executive or
legislative action. The legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to
do or not to do. Such a principle applies as well when the concerns the scope of the competence
lodged in the Constitutional Convention. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its responsibility
according to its lights.
In Gonzales vs. COMELEC, the controlling doctrine, had the good sense to wait before filing his
suit until after the enactment of the statute for the submission to the electorate of certain proposed
amendments to the Constitution. It was only then that the matter was ripe for adjudication. It is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture.
The motion for reconsideration was denied.

In the following cases, what is the principle of checks and balances? How is the principle of checks
and balances applied in these cases? How does checks and balances work and what is its relation to
separation of powers?
TAN VS MACAPAGAL

Group 6
1. What is the Principle of check and balances ?
The Principle of Check and Balance is a constitutional mechanism that will allow one department of
government to perform acts that would check the powers of the other to prevent monopoly, concentration and
abuse of power.
2. How is the principle of checks and balances applied in the case of Tan vs Macapagal?
In this case, the work done of the legislative, the drafting of the Constitution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention delegates was submitted to the people for ratification, after which, the Supreme Court through the
filing of a complaint by Tan et al, was able to review, evaluate the legality and authority of the enacted
legislation.
3. How does checks and balances work and what is its relation to separation of powers?
Our government has divided its key powers to the 3 branches, namely the executive, legislative and
judiciary. The 3 branches have defined abilities and powers excusive to each, and one is not allowed to
encroach on the functions of another. In order not to have a concentration or monopoly of power in one
branch, they have carefully constructed a system that provided specific levers of power to allow each of the
branches to influence the actions of the others in an orderly and predictable way. Those levers are the system of
checks and balances. The core idea of the system of checks and balances was that no one branch of government
should be able to get too far out of control without being put in check by the others.
Doctrine of separation of powers

The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left
alone to discharge their duties as they see fit.
The judiciary will neither direct nor restrain executive or legislative action. The legislative and executive
branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do or not to do. Such principle applies as well when
the inquiry concerns the scope of competence lodged on the Constitutional Convention.
The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its responsibility according to its lights. There is to be no interference.
Its autonomy is to be respected. It cannot be otherwise if it is to perform its functions as well.
1. In the following cases, find out what is a political question and justiciable question? Who
declares that a question is political or justiciable? Who are the parties involved in resolving
these cases?
Casibang vs. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642 [L-38025] (Aug. 20, 1979) Group 7
Dante Casibang v Honorable Narciso A. Aquino Judge of the CFI of Pangasinan and Remegio P Yu
FACTS:
Respondent Yu was proclaimed as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Petitioner Casiang, his rival,
protested against the results. Before the case was cleared, the 1973 Constitution was passed. Respondent Yu
contended that Art XVII Sec. 9 of the new Constitution presents a political question which protects the officials
and employees working in the government, and filed for dismissal. Respondent judge granted it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1973 Constitution, through Art XVII Sec. 9, protects only those who are incumbents like him
at the time of its ratification and effectivity and that full discretionary authority over election protest cases has
been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government.
HELD:
Section 9 Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending and election case
protests and the New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of CFI to hear, try and decide election
protests.
Electoral protest case herein involved has remained a judicial controversy and no political question has ever
been interwoven within this case. Any judgement to be made will not in any way collide or interfere with the
mandate of Section 9 Article XVII of the New
Constitution, as it will merely resolve who between the protestant and the protestee, is the duly elected mayor.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE
RESPONDENT COURT IS DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL AND
DETERMINATION OF THE ELECTION PROTEST BEFORE IT ON THE MERITS. THIS DECISION SHALL BE
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY UPON PROMULGATION HEREOF. NO COSTS.
1. What is Political Question and What is Justiciable Question?

POLITICAL AND JUSTICIABLE QUESTION, DIFFERENTIATED


The term political question refers to:
Implies a given right, legally demandable
1. matters to be exercised by the
and enforceable an act or ommission
people in their primary political
violative of said right, and a remedy,
capacity; or
granted or sanctioned by law, for said
2. those specifically delegated to
breach of right.
some other department or particular (Casibang vs. Aquino, 92 SRA 642)
office of the government, with
discretionary power to act. It is
concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
(Taada v. Cuenco (1957)

Issues dependent on wisdom, not legality.

Where vortex of the controversy refers to


the legality or validity of the contested act.

Connotes what it means in an ordinary


parlance. Policies which under the
constitution

Actual controversies involving rights which


are legally demandable.

are to be decided by the people (in


their sovereign capacity)

full discretionary authority has been


delegated to the legislative or
executive
Proposal of amendments to the
Constitution.
The constitutional validity of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of
Congress
Are not within the ambit of the Course to
decide

The validity the process of amendment,


both as to proposal and ratification
because the Court must review if
constitutional processes were followed.
before it becomes a justiciable one in
the
hands of the Court.

Are within its field of competence

SAMPLE CASES RELATING TO

POLITICAL QUESTION
whether a Constitution has come into force
and effect. This is beyond the
competence of the Court to decide.
(Javellana vs. Executive Secretary)
The legislatures exercise of disciplinary
power over its member is not to be
interfered with by the Court.
Alejandrino v. Quezon (1924)
Inherent right of the legislature to
determine who shall be admitted to its
membership.
Vera v. Avelino, (1946)
Mandamus and injunction could not lie to
enforce or restrain a duty which is
discretionary (calling a special local
election).
Severino v. Governor-General (1910)
On eminent domain
Grant of special authority for special
purpose
Lagcao v. Judge Labra (2004)
The question of legitimacy of a new
government arising from a successful
revolution is a political question beyond

JUSTICIABLE QUESTION
Whether a Constitution was validly ratified
is a justiciable question
(Javellana vs. Executive Secretary
Election of Senate President was done
without the required quorum
Avelino v. Cuenco, (1949)
The selection of the members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal is subject to
constitutional limitations.
Taada v. Cuenco, (1957)
The Commission on Appointments is a
constitutional creation and does not derive
its power from Congress.
Cunanan v. Tan, Jr., (1962)
Grant of general authority
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of
Manila (1919)]

the pale of review by the courts.


(Lawyers League for a Better Philippines
v. Aquino (1986)
Court cannot make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense;
it is a purely political question
(Francisco v. House of Representatives
(2003)
WON Senate Impeachment Rules were
followed is a political question.
Corona v. Senate (2012)
Presidents appointing power is not to be
interfered with by the Court. Manalang v.
Quitoriano, (1954)
2. Who declares a question that is political or justiciable?
The Supreme Court ultimately declares a question whether or not the question is political or justiciable.
However, it bears stressing that each branch of the government is aware as to which issue is political or
justiciable. Only in cases of controversies, Art. 8 Sec.1 paragraph 2 states, ....whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (emphasis supplied)
Further, if a case touches upon the validity of laws or encroaches upon the authority of the other
branches, that's a political question.
On the other hand, justiciable controversy is a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the
application of a law. Courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been
a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect n the legal right of the
person contesting its validity.
In De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, (97 Phil. 358), the Supreme Court was asked to reverse a
decision of the respondent dismissing impeachment charges against Pres. Marcos after deliberating
thereon for only six hours and to compel the said committee to give due course to such charges. The
petition for certiorari and mandamus was dismissed, on the ground inter alia that the issues raised were
political in nature and could be resolved only by the legislator themselves in the exercise of their
discretion. The Court ruled that the dismissal of the charges was within the ambit of the powers
vested exclusively in the Batasan by express provision of Section 2, Art. XII of the Constitution and it is
not within the competence of this Court to inquire whether in the exercise of said powers the Batasan
ated wisely.
3. Who are the parties involved in resolving the cases?
General Applicability. All the parties in the three branches of the government could in one way or
another be called a party to a case in resolving an issue.
Political questions are NOT within the ambit of the Court to decide upon, whereas justiciable questions
are within the field of its competence.
However, the second paragraph of Sec. 1 beginning with and to determine whether or not.... is what is
known as the power of judicial review which is now included in the definition of judicial power.
The reason for inclusion of judicial review in the definition of judicial power is to eliminate the defense
of political questions which in the past deprived the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction to strike down
abuses of power by the government, especially during martial law. (emphasis supplied)

Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 [L-44640] (Oct. 2, 1976) Group 8


Abueva vs. Wood, supra. Group 1
2. In the following cases, what is potestas delegata non delegari potest? To where is this rule applicable?
What is the basis or rationale of this rule? When is there lawful delegation of power? When is there
unlawful delegation of power? What are the standards for the lawful delegation of power? What are the
elements of these standards? In the case assigned, was there a lawful or unlawful delegation of power?
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 [L- 76633] (Oct. 18, 1988) Group 9
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA
Facts:
The petitioner challenged the decision of the POEA awarding a sum of money for damages to the widow of one
Vitaliano Saco, Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris who was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. His
widow sued the petitioner for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the
POEA which was promulgated to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect
their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974.
Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules
and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other
benefits" arising out of such employment. But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No.
2 itself as a violation of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had
been given to the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Issue:
WON Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of the principle of the non-delegation of legislative
powers
WON Vitaliano Saco is an overseas worker and is covered under Memorandum Circular No. 2
WON there is no due process of law
Ruling:
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797,
reading as follows: The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
There are certain instances that the delegation of the legislative powers is permitted because the growth of
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot
be expected reasonably to comprehend. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings,
the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific
solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in
the particular fields assigned to them. This particular delegation is applicable to administrative bodies like
the in this case, the POEA. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is considered as a supplementary regulation
promulgated to aid the Congress by filling in the details which the Legislature may not have the opportunity to
provide.
Therefore, there is no violation of the non-delegation of legislative powers. Petition DISMISSED.
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies vs. POEA, 243 SCRA 666 [G.R. No. 114714] (April 21,
1995) Group 10

Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, petitioner,


vs.
POEA243 SCRA 666 [G.R. No. 114714] (April 21, 1995), respondent
The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. vs. Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration.
FACTS:
The Conference of Maritime Manning, Inc. (petitioner), an incorporated association of licensed Filipino
manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies who hire and recruit Filipino seamen
for and in behalf of their respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge to annul the resolution issue by POEA.
(Resolution No. 01, series of 1994 and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05)
The petitioners contended POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates
affecting death and workmens compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only
Congress can.
Governing Board Resolution No. 01: the POEA Governing Board resolves to amend and increase the
compensation and other benefits as specified under Part II, Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L paragraphs
1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power.
HELD: YES.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest means what has been delegated cannot be delegated. Reason
of which is based upon the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to
be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another. A further delegation of such power would constitute a negation of his duty in violation of the
trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly.
Exceptions to above rule are the powers delegated to the people at large, emergency powers of the
President, tariff powers of the President, delegation to Administrative bodies, and delegation to local
government units.
The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the social justice provisions
of the 1973 Constitution. The constitutional challenge of the rule making power of POEA based on
impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contended by the public respondents,
brushed aside by SC in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
The governing Board of Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of POEA. To many of the problems attendant upon presentday undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious,
not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
While making laws is non-delegable that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may
constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate
the situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be
not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by law.

U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 [No. 4349] (Sept. 24, 1908) No group

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