Carredo v People 183 SCRA 273 (1990)

trial in absentia not allowed when it is necessary to establish the identity of accused by the witness
Facts: Accused after arraignment waives his right to appear in court during the trial while under a bond. At the
presentation of the principal witness the court issued a subpoena to the accused to appear on trial for the purpose of
meeting the witness face to face, however he did not appear with the justification of his waiver. Subsequently the
municipal judge issued order of arrest of the accused with confiscation of his cash bond and ordering the bondsman
to show cause why no judgment shall be rendered against him.
Issue: Whether or not an accused may be compelled by the court to appear before the court despite waiver in favor
of trail by absentia.
Held: The court held that such waiver only constitutes a waiver of the right of the accused to meet the witness face to
face. It does not in effect deprive the prosecution of its right to require the presence of the accused for the purpose of
identification by its witnesses which is vital in the conviction of the accused. It does not further release the accused
from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused is accorded with the right to
waive his own personal right but not his duty and obligation to the court.

Garcia v Domingo 52 SCRA 143 (1973)

Facts: For the convenience of the parties the trial was held in the air conditioned chamber of the respondent judge
Garcia. The complaint was under the premise that such act is in violation of the right to hold a public trial.
Issue: Whether or not such proceeding of holding trial in the chamber of the judge in violation to the principle of right
to a public trial.
Held: It is not in violation of the right to a public trial since the trial was still open to public and there is no showing that
the public was deprived to witness the trial proceeding.

Flores v People 61 SCRA 331 (December 10, 1974)

"rights of the accused to a speedy trial"
Facts: Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by certiorari where the proceeding of the case for
robbery against petitioners dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment rendered by the court.
Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate delay in its disposition. The People in its affirmative
defense raised the facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Phils. against whom it is filed
was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and without the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition
there are insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that the CA took all necessary steps to
complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial.
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial was violated.
Held: The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial.
It re-affirmed with emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural defects pointed out by the People
of the Philippines that the CA should have been made party-respondent to the petition. Technicalities should always
give way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of a valid decision the stage trial was not completed
and the accused should be accorded with the right to contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried
as promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds merit to dismiss the case against the petitioners.

People v Tee GR No. 140546-47 (January 20, 2003)

"rights of the accused to speedy trial"
Facts: The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for illegal
possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible
as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. They further
contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution to produce their
witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure.
Issue: Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the hearing of the
case.
Held: The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not violated. It held that
the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in general 180 days.
However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The right to a speedy trial is
deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2)
when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to
testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of
time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged
caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of
time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that
court trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that
the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in
prosecuting the accused.

Equal Protection Clause

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
- means that the states must apply the law equally and cannot give preference to one person or class of persons over
another.
Tiu v CA GR No. 127410

1.20.99

F: The passage of RA 7227 (An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses,
Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefore and for Other
Purposes) paved the creation of Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). It included City of Olongapo and
the Municipality of Subic Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval bases Agreement and within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan as secured areas of SSEZ
and should, therefore, enjoy the same privileges. Pres. Ramos issued EO 97-A, specifying the areas within which the
tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative (only in secured areas consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic
Naval Base shall be the completely tax and duty-free area in SSEZ some of the citizens from areas no longer
included in the new delineated areas challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A. According to the citizens, EO 97-A
excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has
effectively discriminated against them without reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection
guarantee.
I: WON the issuance of EO 97-A violates the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution. And WON the
exclusion of some locations from the zone is discriminatory.
R: The equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. The fundamental right of equal
protection of the law is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1)
rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing

conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Furthermore, RA 7227 clearly vests in
the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ.
People v Cayat 68 PHIL 12F: Cayat is a member of non-Christian tribe convicted under Act. No. 1639 for
possession of an intoxicating liquor and sentenced him to pay P50.00 or subsidiary imprisonment. Cayat assails the
decision on the ff. grounds: It is discriminatory, denial of equal protection of the law, violative of due process provided
by the constitution, that it is an improper exercise of police power.
I: Does Act No. 1639 unconstitutional
R: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty for equal protection of the law is not violated by
a legislation based on reasonable classification.
For the classification to be reasonable it must have the ff requisites:
1.

must rest on substantial distinction

2.

must be germane to the purpose of the law

3.

must not be limited to existing conditions only

4.

must apply equally to all members of the same class

Due Process of Law defined:

1)

Must rest on substantial distinction

2)

that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the

government.
3)

That it shall be reasonable in its operation

4)

That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedures prescribed

5)

That it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class
- to constitute due process of law, notice and hearings are not always necessary.

The Act No. 1639 is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes to remove all obstacles in their
intellectual and moral growth. It is meant to mark the non-Christian tribe as inferior or less capable race. When public
safety or public moral requires discontinuance of a certain practice by certain classes of persons, the hand of the
legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental convenience which some
members of the class may suffer. The private interest of such member should yield to the paramount interest of the
nation.

Courts as Arbiter of the Law

Arbiter - One who has the power to judge or ordain at will

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v Ignacio M. Capulong GR No. 82398 4.29.88

F: Petitioner is filming a motion picture about the EDSA Revolution and informed Juan Ponce Enrile about it who
opposes the project and filed a temporary restraining order. Petitioner files motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of
action since the mini-series had not yet been completed. The court allowed the petitioners to resume producing and
filming those portions of the projected film that do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to
any fictitious character based on the respondent. In his reply, Enrile is invoking his right to privacy.
I: WON the production of the mini-series would be an intrusion to the privacy of Enrile.
R: No, the court held there is nothing in the film that constitutes an unlawful intrusion on the respondents life and it
could not see any danger such poses into the privacy of respondent. The court held the film is of historical value and
involves public domain and is an appropriate subject on freedom of speech and expression. It further cite the fact that
Enrile is a public figure and being a part of the film is one of the natural consequence of being such and it is limited
only to his character as a public officer and does not extend to his family in general.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Association v Philippine Blooming Mills

51 SCRA 189

F: petitioners staged a mass demonstration before the Malacanang Palace expressing their grievance against the
abuses of the Pasig police. Their employer, herein respondent called for a meeting with the petitioner appealing to go
back to work as it could hamper their operation of business and it is against the no strike, no lockout clause of their
collective bargaining agreement. Petitioners assert they are not performing a strike but an exercise of the laborers
constitutional right to freedom of expression. A second mtng. was called by respondent to urge the petitioners to
report to work otherwise they will be dismissed from work. Petitioners did not grant the request of the respondent who
consequently dismissed the officials of petitioners on grounds for violation of their CBA. The court ruled in favor of
respondents hence this petition for review.
I: WON there is justified cause for the dismissal of the petitioners
R: Workers acted right in the exercise of their freedom to expression. The petitioners explained to the company that
such is what they are trying to assert thus it is not violative of their agreement on no strike, no lockout rule. The
companys right to property should yield to the workers Constitutional right to freedom of speech, freedom of
expression and freedom to petition for redress of grievances. The companys loss of unrealized profits for the day of
the strike is not as important as the workers fight their rights. In fact, they were even able to save money on the
operational expenses for that day. The Court of Industrial Relations should not be confined by technical and
procedural rules in its quest for justice. Since the CIR is a creature of the Legislature and even the rules of the
legislature itself must be liberally applied if strict adherence to it would result in the denial of a persons constitutional
right, the CIR should not have denied their motion for reconsideration. In doing so, the court divested itself of their
jurisdiction which renders their decision in favor of thecompany null and void.The rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to mans enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Human rights are supreme over property rights since property
rights can be lost through prescription while human rights do not prescribe. A constitutional or valid
infringement of human rights requires a morestringent criterion, namely EXISTENCE OF A GRAVE AND
IMMEDIATE DANGER OF A SUBSTANTIVE EVILWHICH THE STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO PREVENT.When a
Court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null and void. A court may suspend its own
rules whenever the purposes of justice requires it.
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT 68 PHIL 12 MAY 5, 1939
Facts: Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, was accused for possessing one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an
intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been
accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. The trial court found him guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50 or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Issue: The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:(1) That it is discriminatory
and denies the equal protection of thelaws;(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution;and(3)
That it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.
R:1. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,(1)
must rest on substantial distinctions;(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only;(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.Act No. 1639 satisfies

these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It
is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of
civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical
area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is
unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian
tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality
with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.That it is germane
to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any
ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act," is
unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad
experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors
by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the
government to raise their standard of life and civilization.The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing
at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not
predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any
civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and
that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.Finally, that the Act applies equally to all
members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number
of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.2.
Appellant contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the
government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of
the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not
involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary.
This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to
particular cases.
Due process of law means simply:(1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers
of the legislative department of the government;(2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation;(3) that it shall
be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;(4) that it shall be applicable alike to
all citizens of the state or to all of a class.Thus a person's property may be seized by the government in payment
of taxes without judicial hearing; orproperty used in violation of law may be confiscated, or when the Property
constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case.3. Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the
state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all the powers of the
government. It has been aptly described as a power coextensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of
overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote, the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the
people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity, is a
legitimate exercise of the police power, and unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the
rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and
order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to
hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other
than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.The law, then, does not seek to mark the nonChristian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion
of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those
privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in
fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and
civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their
Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from
retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competition world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers,
and that they are "a virile, up- and-coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter
of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and inAmerica .
Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government
is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as
to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the
National Assembly to determine.In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to
inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the
wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are
matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated nonChristians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi
suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by a
certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any

incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must
yield to the paramount interests of the nation.
Gashem Shookat Baksh v CA GR No. 97336 2.19.93
F: Petitioner, an exchange student in the Philippines, promised the private respondent to marry her and asked that
they will live together. After taking her virginity, the petitioner began to change his behavior and have become violent.
He confessed that he is already married to someone else which prompted the private respondent to file a case
against petitioner for damages due to breach of promise to marry under the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The court decided in her favor in the account of the deceitful promise of the petitioner and that the parents of the
respondent spent money for the preparation of the marriage. On appeal the CA affirmed lower court decision thus this
petition.
I: WON the private respondent may sue under the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
R: The court held that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. There was a deliberate
omission of the provision that makes it so by the congress but in the interest of justice it incorporates in the Civil Code
Art. 23 which provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Article 21 is designed to expand
the concepts of torts or quasi-delict and fills the vaccum by adding legal remedy for the untold numbers of moral
wrongs without which some injurious acts would be beyond redress. The private respondent therefore may claim for
damages not by breach of promise to marry but because of the fraudulent and deceitful act of the petitioner that
injures her honor and dignity.
Add Comment

Prospectivity of the Law

02/14/2011
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OPERATIVE FACT AND PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS

Operative Facts

A fact that is directly relevant to deciding some question of law. When a legal question is

governed by fact-driven rules, operative facts may be thought of as variables that are plugged in to those rules so that
the right answer can be obtained.-

Adjudicative facts are fact that is either legally operative or important as to be

controlling on some question of law. Adjudicative facts re-create the course of events that led to the dispute and help
in determining the proper outcome in the case. They differ from ordinary facts in that they are considered facts only if
the court recognizes and accepts them.
Que v People 154 SCRA 160

(1987)

F: Petitioner convicted in violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) filed motion for reconsideration before SC on the
following grounds:(1) petition for reconsideration denied by a mere resolution with nothing else but the statement
lack of merit(2) The lower court has no jurisdiction to try the case.(3) Appelate court erred in considering one of the
most impt. Element in the offense against BP 22 which is place of issuance of check which is absent in the instant
case.

I: WON the decision of both the trial court and appellate court and the denial of the Petition for Review are in
accordance with law and evidence
.R: The findings of fact of the trial court reveal that the checks in question were issued at Quezon City
as admitted by petitioner himself in his answer when he was sued by the complainant on his civil liability. It is of no
moment whether the said checks were deposited by the complainant in a bank located outside of Quezon City. The
determinative factor is the place of issuance which is in Quezon City and thus within the court's jurisdiction. Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a
guarantee. The enactment in question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. that the bill was
introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of
paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks.
From the aforequoted paragraphs, it is clear that is the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make
the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.On denial of
resolution by minute resolution, court held that these 'resolutions' are not 'decisions' within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule
46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered
that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion;
and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned
in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
20th Century Fox v CA 164 SCRA 655 (1988)
F: Petitioner sought the help of the NBI in connection with its anti-piracy campaign alleging that some videotape
outlets are engaged in marketing copyrighted films in violation of PD 449 or Decree on the Protection of Intellectual
Property. A search warrant was issued to the NBI which was later withdrawn by the court upon motion to lift search
warrant due to lack of probable cause which was affirmed by the appellate court.
I: WON the court erred in lifting the search warrant due to lack of probable cause.
R: Article 3, section 2 of the Constitution provides that no search warrant shall be issued without probable cause.
PROBABLE CAUSE is defined as a valid search as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The constitutional provisions demand no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of the search warrant may be
justified to convince the judge, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the search
warrant.In the case at bar, the issuance of the warrant was due to the misrepresentation of the NBI that copyright
infringements were being committed. There was no probable cause since the agents have no personal knowledge of
such fact. Court ordered that the master tapes be presented from which the copyrighted films were allegedly copied
for the validity of the issuance of the search warrant since the court could not afford to make any presumption that
duplicates were taken from the master copy of the petitioner.Columbia

Pictures v CA 261 SCRA 144 (1996)

F: Acting upon a formal complaint by the petitioner on violation of PD 449, NBI agents surveillance different video
establishments in Metro Manila including the private respondent. A search warrant was secured with affidavits and
depositions of the NBI with 2 witnesses. Search and seizure of copyrighted materials were taken by the NBI and a
motion to lift search warrant was filed and was denied by the court. On motion for reconsideration, the court upholds
the motion to lift on grounds that no original copy of the films were presented when securing the warrant citing the
case of 20th Century Fox vs CA. On appeal, the CA sustained the ruling of the trial court.
I: WON the ruling on the cited case applicable in the case at bar.
R: No because rules and decisions must be applied prospectively. The ruling in the cited case is not applicable since
the ruling in the case at bar happened before such ruling was ever upheld. The ruling in the 20th Century Fox only
serves as a guidepost and not absolute since it is not always necessary to present the original tapes before
ascertaining probable cause.
Add Comment

Echegaray v Secretary of Justice 301 SCRA 96 1.19.99

02/14/2011
1 Comment

"On finality of decision"

F: Leo Echegaray is a convict subject to lethal injection (RA 8177). The SC issued a temporary restraining order for
the execution until it ensures that there will no longer be any repeal or modification as to the implementation of RA
8177. Such action by the court was questioned since it already rendered a final judgment on the case.
I: WON the court loses its jurisdiction on a decided case with a final judgment.
R: The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment rendered upon it. What it cannot do is
modify or amend the final decision. The court held that by finality of judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend
the decision but retains its power to execute or enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to
execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter a decision. The former continues for the purpose of
enforcing the judgment while the latter terminates after the final judgment is rendered for after the judgment becomes
final, facts and circumstances may transpire which may render the execution unjust or impossible.
1 Comment

Law of tHE cASE

02/14/2011
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LAW OF THE CASE

(Not an absolute law, just a common law)T
he Law of the case is a legal term of art that is applicable mainly incommon law, or Anglo-American, jurisdictions
that recognize the related doctrine of stare decisis. The phrase refers to instances where "rulings made by a trial
court and not challenged on appeal become the law of the case." [1] "Unless the trial court's rulings were clearly in
error or there has been an important change in circumstances, the Court's prior rulings must stand." [2] Usually the
situation occurs when either a case is on appeal for the second time--e.g., if the reviewing court remanded the matter
back to the trial court and the party appeals again, or the case was appealed to a higher appellate court--for example,
from an appellate court to the highest court.As generally used, the term law of the case designates the principle that if
an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the cause to the court below for further
proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a
subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same.[3]The doctrine provides that an appellate
courts determination on a legal issue is binding on both the trial court on remand and an appellate court on a
subsequent appeal given the same case and substantially the same facts.[4]Law of the case, however, is one of
policy only and will be disregarded when compelling circumstances call for a redetermination of the determination of a
point of law on prior appeal, and this is particularly true where an intervening or a contemporaneous change in law
has occurred by overruling former decisions or the establishment of new precedent by controlling authority.[5]The law
of the case doctrine precludes reconsideration of a previously decided issue unless one of three "exceptional
circumstances" exists: (1) when substantially different evidence is raised at a subsequent trial; (2) when a subsequent
contrary view of the law is decided by the controlling authority; or (3) when a decision is clearly erroneous and would
work a manifest injustice.
JM Tuason v Mariano GR. No. L-33140

10.23.78

F: The case involves the question of validity of ownership of a land title of the petitioners filed by the respondents. A
previous civil case was already decided upon by the court upholding the validity of said title owned by the petitioners.
The petitioners herein filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition.
I: WON the respondents may still question the validity of said land title.
R: The court held they cannot question an issue that has already been decided by the court in finality. The validity of
said title is no longer open for attack as it is against public policy that matters already decided on its merits be relitigated once again.
Buaya v Stronghold GR. No, 139020 10.11.00F: Stronghold filed a case against Buaya who is the manager of
its Cebu branch for recovery of un-remitted collection of money. The lower court ruled on Strongholds favor. Buaya

appealed before the CA which ruled in his favor remanding the case back to the lower court. Subsequent hearings
were set with failure of Buaya and his counsel to appear many times until Stronghold filed a petition to reinstate the
previous decision of the court. The court decision becomes final and executory and it denied all other appeals made
before it. Buaya thus herein files a motion for certiorari.
I: (1) Can a decision from the lower court that is annulled by the appellate court be reinstated by the same court that
rendered the decision; (2) When the appellate court annuls the decision of the lower court on grounds of failure to
give notice to Buaya at pre-trial and remanded it back to the said lower court, does the proceeding in the lower court
merely requires presentation of evidence by Buaya alone without requiring Stronghold to present its evidence for
cross examination by Buaya.
R: (1) On annulled decision, the court correct that the CA did not annulled the lower courts decision but merely set
aside to allow petitioner to present his evidence. There is nothing wrong when the court reinstated its decision after
failure of petitioner to present evidence despite the ample time given for him to do so. It is also required for the
petitioner to attach an authentic copy of the original decision to support his claim that the CA annulled the lower
courts decision. Failure to comply said requirement is a ground for dismissal of petition.(2) On final and executory
judgment, it becomes the law of the case regardless of claims that it is erroneous. Final judgments are decisions
rendered by court with competent jurisdiction acting within its authority and its judgment cannot be altered even at
risk of occasional legal infirmities of errors it may contain. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. In view of
efficient and effective administration of judgment once a decision has become final, the prevailing party should not be
deprived of the favorable judgment rendered upon them on suits involving the same issues and parties.
Argel v Pascua A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131 8.20.01
F: Petitioner who was charged with murder was previously acquitted by Judge Pascua. After his acquittal, said Judge
modified her decision on the account that she made a mistake of rendering her previous judgment believing there
was no witness against the accused due to the fact that the testimony of the witness was not attached to the records
when she wrote her decision. After finding the accused guilty of murder she ordered the arrest of the accused.
I: WON a final judgment by the court can be susceptible for amendment or modification.
R: No. The final judgment becomes the law of the case and is immune from alteration or modification regardless of
claims of incorrectness or error. A judgment of acquittal in criminal cases becomes immediately effective upon its
promulgation. It cannot be recalled for amendment only in case of any clerical error, clarify any ambiguity caused by
omission or mistake in the dispositive portion. The inherent power of the court to modify its decision does not extend
to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.
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Res Judicata
02/14/2011

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RES JUDICATA-

the Latin term for "a matter [already] judged", and may refer to two things: in both civil

law and common law legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject
to appeal.[1]; and the term is also used to refer to the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) continued litigation of
such cases between the same parties, which is different between the two legal systems. In this latter usage, the term
is synonymous with"preclusion".
Elements of Res Judicata
1.

The former judgment must be final

2.

Judgment must be on the merits of the case

3.

The former decision is rendered by the court having jurisdiction over the subject.

4.

There is similar identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action for both cases.

Cause of action - defined as "an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act
or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
TEST FOR APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA
In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second action is for the same cause of
action as the first, the test generally applied is to consider the Identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or
whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the
two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a
judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.
LITIS PENDENTIALitis pendentia:
"a pending suit." same parties, same cause. Interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in
court.Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary
and vexatious
Requisites for litis pendentia:(a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts(c) the identity in
the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amounts to res adjudicata in the other.Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the final other.Doctrine of Estoppel an
unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in thePhilippines may bring suit in Philippine courts against a
Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited from said corporation. A party is estopped from

challenging the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it.
This doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence and capacity applies to foreign as well as domestic
corporations.45 The application of this principle prevents a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later
taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits
of the contract.
Replivin - A legal action to recover the possession of items of Personal Property.
Agilent Technologies v Integrated Silicon Technology 4.14.04
F: Petitioner Agilent is foreign corporation not licensed to transact business in thePhilippines but engaged services of
the defendant Silicon Tech by a 5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement ("VAASA"). Silicon filed a
complaint on "Specific Performance and Damages" against Agilent in a civil case No. 3110-01-C alleging breach of
oral agreement by petitioner to extend their contract for 5 more years. Consequently, Agilent filed a complaint against
Silicon on "Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, and Damages" before the RTC as Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C. Agilent prayed that a writ of replevin or a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, be issued ordering defendants to immediately return and deliver to plaintiff its
equipment, machineries which were left in the plant of Silicon. Silicon filed motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of
legal capacity of Agilent to sue, litis pendentia, forum shopping and failure to state cause of action. Such motion was
denied by the trial court and granted motion for replevin by the plaintiff. Without filing motion for reconsideration,
Silicon filed motion for certiorari to the appellate court. Court of Appeals granted respondents petition for certiorari,
set aside the assailed Order of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C thus this
petition for review assailing the decision of the CA.
I: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in giving due course to respondents petition,
notwithstanding the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration and (2) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in dismissing Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C.
R: CA contends RTC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C because of the pendency of Civil Case No.
3110-2001-C therefore, a motion for reconsideration was not necessary before resort to a petition for certiorari. There
is no urgency of the case that merits dispensing the procedure of filing motion for reconsideration before a certiorari
may be filed. Respondents availed of premature remedy which the CA should have dismissed outright.Litis pendencia
is not appreciated in the case since the instituted actions in both civil cases are different, the first is an action for
"Specific Performance and Damages" the other is action for "Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and
Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages." The issues involved are also
different: WON there is a breach of oral agreement for renewing theVAASA on the first case while on the second
case WON the petitioner has the right to possess the subject properties. In the absence of the requisites of litis
pendencia, the court ruled that the trial court is not barred from taking cognizant to both cases.In assailing the legal
capacity of Agilent to sue, the court cited the following principles:
he principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be
condensed in four statements: (1) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it
cannot sue before the Philippine courts;47 (2) if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs

no license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of
any business transaction48; (3) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a
Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the foreign
corporations corporate personality in a suit brought before Philippine courts;49 and (4) if a foreign corporation does
business in the Philippines with the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction.Two
general tests to determine whether or not a foreign corporation can be considered as "doing business" in
the Philippines
.1. substance test - whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body of the business or enterprise for which it
was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another.2. continuity test - implies a
continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or
works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, the
purpose and object of its organization.The court ruled that Agilent categorically is not doing business in
the Philippines, hence as a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines
, it needed no license before it can sue before our courts. The court granted the petition of Agilent reversing the CA
decision of dismissing Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C while granting the petition of Agilent for Writ of Replivin.
Cayana v CA 03.18.04
F: It appears that the petitioners and respondents father, with the marital consent of his wife, sold two parcels of land
to their son, one of the respondents in this case. At the death of the father, the mother filed an Affidavit of Adverse
Claims pertaining to the two parcels of land, alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their son
were forgeries. However, later on, she issued an affidavit withdrawing such adverse claims. Later on, together with
petitioners of this case and respondent Marceliano, they filed a case against respondent Pastor, for the cancellation
of the Deed of Absolute Sale and reconveyance of the two parcels of land. Meanwhile, respondent Pastor entered
into an agreement of counter guaranty with respondent corporation using second parcel of land; mortgaged first
parcel to respondent bank and sold first parcel of land to a certain Rosafina Reginaldo, who then mortgaged the land
to respondent bank.As the civil case against respondents was ongoing, respondents filed an answer but were found
to be in default, the court allowed petitioners to file evidence ex parte. The court decided the civil case in favor of
petitioners, declaring the deed of absolute sale null and void but denied the prayer for reconveyance saying that the
mother was still the owner of the land. No appeal was entered by respondents and the decision was
deemed final. The mortgage on the first parcel of land was foreclosed and the bank being the highest bidder, bought
the property who then sold it to respondent spouses Marceliano Cayabyab. The respondent spouses M.Cayabyab
then sold the land to respondent spouses Ramos. The petitioners filed a verified complaint for the nullification
and cancellation of the deeds of absolute sale of the respondents. They asked also for the possession of the 2
parcels of land due to the alleged donation inter vivos of their mother. The trial court decided in favor of the
petitioners, part of the decision included the application of res judicata. Respondentsappealed this to the CA
contending the misuse of res judicata. CA decided in favor of the respondents. It held that res judicata
was inapplicable and also, declared the deeds of absolute sale and TCTs valid. CA mentioned that it was evident
that there was an affidavit withdrawing adverse claims over land, that the sale of parcels of landwere not simulated
and not done in bad faith, and that there was no evidence for the donation inter vivos being alleged by the petitioners.

I: Whether or not the decision on the first civil case constitutes a bar to the defenses and claims of respondents in the
second case?
R:Both the trial court and CA misread the provisions on the effect of judgments or final orders as given by Rules of
Civil Procedure:SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.--The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:(a) In case of
a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the
estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person
or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition, status or relationship of theperson; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters
of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;(b) In other cases, the
judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement to the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity;(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed
to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessarily thereto.
Res judicata and the bar of prior judgment are not applicable to this case since the requisites for these two
to apply are not present. There is bar by prior judgment when, between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action.
The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or
demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which
might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. But where
between the first and second cases, there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action, the first judgment is
conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not
as to matters merely involved therein. For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on
the merits; (2) the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and, (3) identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions. According to the appellate court, the third
requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in this case.The doctrine that should have been followed in
this case is conclusiveness of judgment--a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and there was judicially
passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as
far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on
either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
Urbana Velasco v Peoples Homesite (GR NO. L-39674) 01.31.78
Supreme court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases in which only errors or questions of law are
involved."cause of action" has been defined as "an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal right or

rights of the other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and
act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
F: The case at bar involves a parcel of land which the petitioner occupies and built a house thereof. Petitioner filed
before the defendant corporation for the award of sale of the said parcel of land and found out that it was already
awarded to defendant spouses. Petitioner filed protest before the court for annulment of deed of sale of said lot.
Defendant spouses invoke res judicata in their counterclaim stating that the petitioner has no cause for action since
there is a decision already to quiet the title and recovery of possession of the Lot
involved in favor of the defendant spouses. The court dismissed the case on ground of res judicata stating that the
court decision has already been final and executory. Petitioner appealed before the appellate court which forwarded
the case to SC since the issue involved is a question of law.
I: WON res judicata is applicable at the case at bar.
R: No. For res judicata be appreciated in a case, 4 elements must be present: (1) there is a former final judgment; (2)
decision rendered by court with proper jurisdiction over the case; (3) judgment must be on merit; (4) there must be
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between 2 cases. The identity of cause of action is the main
issue on the case at bar. The court held that in order to identify whether the second action is of the same cause as
the first the test generally applied is to consider the Identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the
same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered
the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions
rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one
is no bar to the maintenance of the other.The first case involves quieting the title and recovery and possession of the
land while the second case involves the action for annulment of award and deed of sale and cancellation of the land
title. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings.

Mutatis Mutandis
02/14/2011
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MUTATIS MUTANDIS
- Necessary changes
- Latin phrase meaning "by changing those things which need to be changed" or more simply "the necessary
changes having been made". The term is used when comparing two situations with a multiplicity of common variables
set at the same value, in which the value of only one variable is allowed to differ "all other things being equal"
thereby making comparison easier
ABANDONMENT V REVERSAL
People v Mapa 20 SCRA 1164 (1967)

I: WON the position of a secret agent working for a governor a defense against prosecution from illegal possession of
firearms
R: Petitioner relied on the previous ruling of People v Macarandang where the secret agent was acquitted of the
same charge where the court ruled that appointment of a secret agent sufficiently puts him in the category of a peace
officer. But the court now abandoned such jurisprudence finding no provision from the law that exempts a secret
agent from the prohibition of unlawful possession of ammunition and firearms.
Relampagos v Cumba 4.27.95
F: Both parties running are mayoralty candidates with Cumba declared as the winner. Relampagos appealed and the
court declared him as a winner, the decision received by both parties on July 1. On July 4 Cumba appeal. On Jul 8
the court referred the case to the Comelec. On July 12, Relampagos filed motion for execution pending appeal which
Cumbas opposed but the court granted the appeal. Cumbas filed a petition to the Comelec to annul the grant for
execution. In its resolution, the Comelec resolve to declare the courts grant for execution be lifted by virtue of its
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases provided by B.P. Blg.
697. The said resolution was challenged by the petitioner questioning the appellate jurisdiction of the Comelec to
decide over the issue.
I: WON Comelec has the appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving
election cases.
R: The court pointed out that the previous ruling on Garcia v Uy, the comelec was found to have no jurisdiction over
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory
conferment to it of such jurisdiction. But the Comelec stated that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such
jurisdiction which the court finds to be correct as there is no expressed repeal of the said provision. The court thereby
abandons said ruling from the Garcia v Uy.Moreover, the court points out that the petitioner made an appeal after
which the court already divested its jurisdiction over the case to the comelec therefore it could no longer validly act
upon its motion. (Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the
appeal which is 5 days after upon receipt of the court decision. An appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day
for any of the parties to appeal.)On repeal of a statute:
An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are repealed; is in legal
contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some instances
been held to be an express recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as
indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be deemed an express
repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal
for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere
mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is
construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts. This Court is not unaware of the equally settled
rule in statutory construction that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are
omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise expressly

or impliedly.
Serrano v NLRC

5.04.00

F: Isettan, respondent in the case files a motion for reconsideration after it was ordered to pay petitioner full
backwages from the day of its termination from work until it is determined that he has been terminated for an
authorized cause. The Labor Arbiter decision that Serrano was illegally dismissed and ordered to be reinstated was
reversed by the NLRC on ground that he was dismissed by authorized causes (redundancy) which does not
requires the 30 day notice. It is only for reasons of just cause that an employee must be issued the notice to give
them due process. Serrano petitioned for review, which the court ordered Isettan to pay Serrano full backwages until
it is determined whether his termination from service is of authorized cause. Isettans arguments include: (1) failure to
issue a 30 days written notice to Serrano is not a violation of the labor law since the petitioner accepted their form of
notice of giving 30 days pay to their employees in lieu of giving the 30 days notice although the petitioner did not
accept the payment; (2) that the 30 day pay is more advantageous than the 30 days notice; (3) in any event the new
ruling of this case should be applied prospectively.
I; WON the labor law requirement of giving 30 days notice prior to termination may be offset to giving 30 days pay.
R: Art. 283 of the Labor Code intends that the 30 day notice is mandatory. Nothing in the law gives private respondent
the option to substitute the required prior written notice with payment of thirty (30) days salary. It is not for private
respondent to make substitutions for a right that a worker is legally entitled to. Upon the contention of the respondent
that the ruling of the case should only be applied prospectively, the court finds no compelling reason not to apply it
immediately. Respondent relied on the previous rulings of case in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the
new ruling should be applied prospectively and should not be applied on parties who relied on the old doctrine in
good faith which is not applicable in this case.
Vitarich v NLRC 5.20.99
F: Vitarich terminated Recodo for failure to comply with the memo issued upon him involving issues on company
policies on credit transactions and cash advances. Prior to his termination, the Head of Personnel of the company
submitted a report of its investigation finding no just cause to terminate Recodo but Vitarich still terminated Recodo,
who filed a case for illegal dismissal against them. The Labor Arbiter finds Recodo was illegally dismissed but his
findings were set aside by the NLRC ruling otherwise. Upon appeal of Recodo, the NLRC reversed its decision
admitting some flaws on its decision. Vitarich contends that such decision of the NLRC is a grave abuse of its
discretionary powers.
I; WON NLRC abused its discretionary power.
R: The court held that with its findings, although there is truth in the delayed implementation of the memo order to
Recodo, such delay does not constitutes disobedience to merit the cause of his termination on grounds of loss of
trust and confidence of the company upon him. In the name of social justice policy on labor, there must be sufficient
grounds that the employer must prove when terminating its employees. This very norm of social justice demands the
presumption of good faith credited to the employees in the performance of their duties upon failure of their employer

to prove just cause for their dismissal. It is in obedience of this social policy mandate that the NLRC finds itself bound
to reverse its first decision. Court re-affirmed the NLRC decision.
Astraquillo v Javier 13 SCRA 125 (1965)
F: The trial court decide in favor of the respondent declaring the real estate mortgage void and ordered the petitioners
to pay respondents with unpaid rentals and damages. On appeal by the petitioners, it was assailed by the respondent
that it is incomplete and defective thus the court said to wait until the appeal is perfected. For the meantime
respondent moved for the writ of execution pending appeal due to the insolvency of the petitioners. The trial court
granted the writ of execution which the petitioners appealed before the CA by petition for certiorari. CA ruled in favor
of the petitioner but upon appeal of the respondent it reversed its decision upholding the decision of the CA.
Petitioner questions the validity of the decision of CA on reversing its decision when the respondents did not raised
any new issues to make it reverse its decision.
I: WON the CA erred in reversing its decision
R: No. it did not err in its decision to uphold the writ of execution pending appeal in court. Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court provides the discretionary power of the trial court to grant or deny a motion ad the appellate courts will
not interfere or modify or control such discretion unless there is an abuse thereof. The trial court has found the
substantial claim in the case at bar and the appellate court affirmed this in its disputed resolution. There is no merit on
the contention of the petitioner that the CA lacks substantial reason to reverse its decision. Courts have the power to
amend and control its orders and processes to make them conform to law and justice. The SC finds no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the CA to uphold the writ of execution decided upon by the lower court.
Ebranilag v Division Superintendent of Schools 219 SCRA 256
F: Petitioners are children who were expelled by the respondent from school on grounds for refusal to participate in
the flag ceremony in violation of RA 1265 penalizing educational institution that refuses to perform flag ceremony.
Petitioners belong to the sect of Jehovas witness and participating to the flag ceremony and patriotic pledge is
against their religious belief as it amounts to idolatry. Respondent contends that his action is in accordance with
the Gerona
case where the court upholds that the flag is a symbol of the RP that symbolizes its sovereignty, freedom and liberty
which does not involve any religious ceremony and that the determination of certain ritual is religious or not rests
upon the court to decide.
I: WON the expulsion of the children from school is valid.
R: No, since the Gerona case was re-examined by the court and ruled that compelling one to take part in the flag
ceremony undermines ones constitutional rights specifically the FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE.
The court cites the 2 fold aspect of religious freedom namely:
1.

The absolute freedom to believe within the realm of thoughts

2.

the freedom to act on ones belief which may be regulatedIt underscores that the only justification for relief

is the existence of clear and present danger , both grave and imminent which is of serious evil to public interest. In
the case at bar, the court held there is no clear and present danger to society with the refusal of the petitioners
children to participate in the flag ceremony.
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Judicial Review, Jurisdiction

02/14/2011
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JUDICIAL REVIEW
The courts authority to examine executive or legislative act and invalidate that act if it is contrary to constitutional
principles.-

the doctrine under which legislative and executive actions are subject to review, and possible

invalidation, by the judiciary.-

A court's authority to examine an executive or legislative act and to invalidate that act

if it is contrary to constitutional principles.

JURISDICTION
The practical authority granted to a formally constituted legal body or to apolitical leader to deal with and make
pronouncements on legal matters and, by implication, to administer justice within a defined area of responsibility.
Authority to hear and determine cause of action. The geographic area over which authority extends; legal
authority; the authority to hear and determine causes of action
Herrera v Barretto 25 PHIL 245 9.10.13
F: The case at bar involves a motion for certiorari by the petitioner against Judge Barretto for allegedly acting without
jurisdiction on the case involving the cockpit license permit of Constancio Joaquin which the petitioner, in his capacity
of the Caloocan Municipal President revoked to operate. Respondent judge apparently issued a provisional license
upon the filing of Joaquin for a mandatory injunction without notice to the petitioner. The petitioner now files a motion
for certiorari before the higher court against the respondent for acting in excess of jurisdiction for issuing the
mandatory injunction of provisional license.
I: WON a writ of certiorari the proper action on the case at bar.
R: No. A writ for certiorari is not issued unless it is established whether or not the court to which it is directed acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction. Once the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in a case all
decisions exercised within its jurisdiction, however erroneous or irregular, cannot be corrected by certiorari. The court
held that the CFI has the jurisdiction over the present case to resolve all matters arising in question.Court held that

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear
and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of
the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to
decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.
Certiorari on one hand may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court no matter how
irregular or erroneous it is.
People v Mariano GR No. L-40527
F: Accused, a liaison officer of the Province of Bulacan, is charged with estafa in the amount of less than P6,000.00.
He filed a motion to quash the information on the account that the court has no jurisdiction over the case since the
military commission already ruled on his malversation case involving the same subject matter.
I: WON the court has jurisdiction over the case at bar.
R: The court ruled that estafa and malversation constitute different offense. The CFI has original jurisdiction over the
case of estafa citing the Judicial Act of 1948 (CFI shall have original jurisdiction over all criminal cases involving a
penalty of imprisonment for more than 6 months or a fine of P200.00)
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Separation of Powers
02/14/2011
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SEPARATION OF POWERS
Francisco v HRET 11.10.03
2 impeachment cases filed against Chief Justice Davide within a period of 1 year
RULING: The court declared the proceeding to be unconstitutional. Article XI of the Constitution provides that no
public official be subject for impeachment twice within a period of 1 year. While the Congress contends that the S.C.
has no power to inquire about the impeachment proceedings against Davide by virtue of separation of powers where
the Congress has the sole jurisdiction to initiate and hear impeachment proceedings, the court declared it is
empowered by the Constitution to exercise judicial review with the duty vested upon it to check whether there is grave
abuse of discretion on any branch of the government. The SC has the power to interpret the fundamental law of the
land and to answer involving Constitutional issues. The SC is not bar to inquire about any actions of the Congress

especially involving Constitutional issues.

David v Macapagal-Arroyo GR. No. 171396 5.3.06
F: The President issued Proclamation No. 1017 declaring national emergency and placing the AFP under her
command to maintain law and order in the Phils., suppress all forms of lawless violence, and enforce obedience to all
the laws, order, decree promulgated by her or in her direction. Such proclamation was assailed as unconstitutional
and a form of encroachment upon the powers of the legislative department.
I: WON the Presidential Proclamation is unconstitutional
R: The court held that the Constitution grants the President the power to call the AFP to suppress lawless violence
and during times of calamity being the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. However, the provision asserting
her power to issue decrees, direct AFP to enforce obedience to ALL laws she promulgate, impose standard of media
and other forms of restraints against the press are unconstitutional, all of which is the exercise of the legislative
department.
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Judges and Lawyers Cases

02/14/2011
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JUDGESLAWYERS
fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients
Regala v Sandiganbayan GR. No. 105938 9.20.96
F: Corporation clients of petitioner consulted them regarding corporate structure and financial matters upon which
legal advice were given by petitioners. Said corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG involving ill gotten
wealth. Petitioner refuses to provide information on fear that it may implicate them in the very activity from which legal
advice was sought from them and it may breach the fiduciary relationship of the petitioner with their client.
I: WON fiduciary duty may be asserted by petitioner on refusal to disclose names of their clients (privilege
information)
R: SC upheld the right of petitioners to refuse disclosure of names of their clients under the pain of breach of fiduciary
relationship with their client.
As a general rule, a lawyer MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE:

1.

The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.

2.

Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been established.

3.

Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship.

4.

With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his adversary.

EXCEPTION: LAWYERS MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE WHEN:

1.

Strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate the client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyers advice.

2.

Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case)

3.

Government lawyers have no case against the lawyers client unless by revealing the clients name it would
provide them the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime. (present in this case)

4.

Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client seeks legal assistance. (present in this
case)

5.

Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be
confidential.

Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901:Section 383 of the Code
specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or
his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of the
Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following
cases:An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client
to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. 29Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:Sec. 20.
It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with
his knowledge and approval.This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that:Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to
client:The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him,
save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the
full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it
is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the

bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of
law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.
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Cases on Stare Decisis

02/14/2011
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STARE DECISIS-

let the decision stand-

established by decisions in earlier cases.-

The policy of courts to abide by or adhere to principles

The principle of stare decisis was not always applied with uniform

strictness. the principle of stare decisis has always been tempered with a conviction that prior decisions must comport
with notions of good reason or they can be overruled by the highest court in the jurisdiction.
Tala Realty v Banco Pilipinas

6.20.00

disagreement between parties on which lease contract should prevail

RULING: It is the policy of the court to maintain judicial stability in accordance to stare decisis. The case involves the
same questions relating to similarly situated conditions which the court already litigated abd decided upon and the
rule on stare decisis is a bar to attempt to relitigate the same issue (stare decisis et non quieta movere follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has already been settled.) Stare decisis should apply if the facts are substantially
the same even if the parties may be different.
El Pueblo Filipinas v Marcaida 9.18..47
F: Respondent appeals for the decision of lower court finding him guilty of treason. He was allegedly helping
Japanese occupants in arresting Filipinos thought to be guerillas. He contends that he should not be tried by the court
on account that his nationality and citizenship are undetermined, citing previous cases under the doctrine of stare
decisis where a limitation on the application of jus soli for citizenship was established.
I: Whether stare decisis is applicable at the case at bar
R: No. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error. The doctrine stands to be
corrected once it was found out that a previous judgment was erroneous.
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Nicolas-Lewis v Comelec GR No. 162759 8.4.06

02/14/2011

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F: Petitioners are dual citizens (by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225 - Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003, allowing one to retain or re-acquire Phil. Citizenship) who want to exercise their right to suffrage under the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The Comelec denies on the ground that they fail to meet the
qualification of 1-year residency required by the Constitution.
I: WON dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of the 1-yr residency
requirement.
R: Court held that there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish
residence and physically stay in thePhilippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Since it is by basic
knowledge that duals are likely to be non-residents, RA 9189 aims to enfranchise as much as possible OFW the
qualification to vote as court ruling in the case of Macalintal. Furthermore, by the doctrine of necessary implication in
statutory construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even
though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court
rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee
voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
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Asufrin v San Miguel GR No. 156658 3.10.04

02/14/2011
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F: The petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent after it fails to include him among the
employees who signify their willingness to be absorbed by the company after its announcement for retrenchment of
their workers on ground of redundancy. Apparently, respondent gave their employees the choice to opt to avail of the
early retirement package they offer or for re-deployment to its other sales offices. The petitioner chose to be absorbed
but was included in the list among those who want to avail of the retirement package. Despite his manifestation of his
willingness to be demoted to any position as long as the company retain him for employment he was still dismissed
from work. The labor arbiter dismissed his complaint due to lack of merit and on appeal the decision was set aside by
the NLRC which ordered respondent to reinstate petitioner with payment of backwages. The respondent appealed to
the CA which reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the judgment of the labor arbiter. Thus, this petition
before the SC.
I: WON there is an illegal dismissal of the petitioner from employment.

R: The court held that based from Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, citing the leading case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v.
NLRC, the nature of redundancy is an authorized cause for dismissal wherein there is duplication of work of
employees. It is upon the judgment of the employer to determine whether an employees services are sustainable
and properly terminable. However, the employer should declare redundancy with a just cause and in good faith. The
court noted that the respondent was adamant from the request of the petitioner to be retained despite his willingness
to be demoted in position while the same request of other employees was granted. The warehouse which respondent
claims to close remains to be in operation. The respondent also did not establish criteria in dismissing the petitioner
and the court gave weight to the petitioners predicament that his dismissal may be related to his expose on some
irregularities of transaction involving their manager. The court upholds the right of every worker for security of tenure
thus due to failure of the respondent to give justifiable cause for dismissing petitioner, the decision of the CA was set
aside and reinstated the decision of the NLRC, ordering reinstatement of the petitioner with full backwages .
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Philippine Export v Philippine Infrastructures GR No.

120384 1.13.04
02/14/2011
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F: The case involves a collection of sum of money by the petitioner from the respondent by virtue of their Deed of
Undertaking where petitioner stands as a guarantor to the credit accommodation provided by PNB to respondent
which upon failure of the respondent to pay the PNB, the petitioner was made to pay by the bank on behalf of the
respondent. Upon filing of the complaint to collect the said money, respondent files a motion to dismiss due to lack of
cause of action on the part of the petitioner since it does not allege that petitioner has suffered any damage, loss or
penalty because of the guarantees petitioner had extended for and on behalf of respondent. Subsequently petitioner
filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence and the motion to amend resulted to the dismissal of the
case on the on the ground of failure to state a cause of action by RTC decision. The CA denied the motion to set
aside the decision of RTC and its motion for reconsideration.
I: WON the complaint be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
R:.Although the complaint did not allege that the petitioner sustained some actual loss, the complaint of the petitioner
emanates from the obligation of the respondent to indemnify the petitioner once it fails to comply with paying its
creditors by virtue of their Deed of Undertaking. Respondents obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep
petitioner free and harmless from any damage or liability then became operative as soon as the liability of petitioner
arose and there was no need for petitioner to first sustain actual loss before it could have a cause of action against
respondents
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Recuerdo v People GR. No. 133036 1.22.03

02/14/2011
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F: Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as payment for the jewelry
she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to
make payments, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she contends that BP
22 is unconstitutional.
I: WON BP 22 is unconstitutional.
R: The court upheld the constitutionality of BP 22 citing the landmark case of Lozano v Martinez
where it was held that BP 22 punishes the act of making and issuing worthless checks. It is not the non-payment of
debt or obligation which the law punishes and the law does not coerce the debtor to pay debt but the main objective
of the law is the prohibition and penalizing the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Such act is
against public order.
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Villaber v COMELEC GR No. 148326 11.15.01

02/14/2011
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F: Petitioner seeks to annul Comelec resolution disqualifying him as congressional candidate of Davao Del Sur and
for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and denial of motion for reconsideration. Petitioner was disqualified
upon the petition of his rival candidate for disqualification on grounds of his previous conviction in violation of BP 22
(bouncing check law) which constitutes moral turpitude, a ground for disqualification for electoral candidacy under the
Omnibus Election Code.
I: WON a violation of BP 22 constitutes a disqualification for electoral candidacy.
R: A violation of BP 22 involves the following elements:
1.

Accused makes, draws, issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2.

Accused knows at the time of the issuance that there is no sufficient fund on the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment.

3.

The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.

The presence of the 2nd element represents moral turpitude as stated in the ruling of People v Atty. Fe Tuanda where
conviction for violation of BP 22 involves deceit and affects the good moral character of a person.

People v Malmstedt 198 SCRA 401 6.19.91

02/14/2011
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F: Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during a NARCOM inspection.
He was tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the arrest was illegal without the
search warrant.
I: WON the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant.
R: NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a warrantless search upon information that
prohibited drugs are in the possession of the accused and he failed to immediately present his passport.
A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
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Tolentino v Ongsiako GR. No. L-17938 4.30.63

02/14/2011
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F: Appellant is the successor of interest in behalf of the late Severino Domingo who has a case against Ongsiako. It
took 20 years before he came to know about the decision of the case, prompting him to file a complaint for the
enforcement of the dissenting opinion of the case and asserting erroneous decision of the court. The same was
dismissed by the court due to lack of merit and without cause of action.

I: (1) WON an action for the enforcement of a dissenting opinion may be filed before the court. (2) WON the court

should act before the complaint on erroneous decision of the court.

R: (1) No because a dissenting opinion merits no right or claim as it is just merely a dissent from the majority decision
of the case.(2) Appellant is barred from assailing the decision of the court by res judicata and the decision has
already been final and executory already.
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Nolasco v Pao GR No. L-69803 1.30.87

02/14/2011
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F: The case at bar is a question on the validity of the search warrant and arrest of the petitioner charged for the crime
of rebellion. The CA decision holds the search warrant as null and void but the articles seized shall be retained.
Petitioners contend that a lawful search would only be justified by a lawful arrest therefore with the court ruling that
the arrest was illegal the articles seized should also be returned to them. Respondents assert that although the
search warrant was null and void the arrest was not.
I: WON the personalities that were seized by an illegal search warrant should be returned.
R: Yes, it should be returned. The court used the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee invoking the Constitutional
provision from the Bill of Rights that mandates the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of this Constitutional
mandate shall be inadmissible for any purpose or proceedings.
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Ruiz v Ucol GR No. L-45404 8.7.87

02/14/2011
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F: The petitioners laundrywoman filed an administrative complaint against the respondent who alleged that the
petitioner is using the laundrywoman in retaliation for the charges filed by the respondent against petitioner. The case
was dismissed by the court. The petitioner filed a case of libel against the respondent which was likewise dismissed.
The petitioner again filed for damages based on the information in the case of libel which the court dismissed on
grounds of res judicata. On one hand, Ucol files an appeal for certiorari questioning the dissenting opinion of the CA.

I: WON an appeal may be filed questioning a courts dissenting opinion.

R: It would be elementary to know that a dissenting opinion is not the decision of the case. What is subject to appeal
or a special civil action would be the majority opinion of the court.
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Separate opinion, declaratory relief, definitions, etc.

02/14/2011
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Declaratory relief - should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument,
and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the
remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the
parties rights or duties thereunder.
The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.17
Justiciable Controversy - refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.
Legal Standing/Locus Standi personal or substantial interest such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of an act.
Relief specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the right of a plaintiff or petitioner.
Cause of Action - is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing
injury to the latter. Failure of complaint to state cause of action is ground for outright dismissal.
Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.
Essential Parts of A Good Decision:
1.

Statement of the case

2.

Statement of the facts

3.

Issues or Assignments of Errors

4.

Courts ruling

5.

Dispositive portion

Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court:1. Dismissal of cases without allegations:
1. A compliant/petition contain clear facts on which pleading relies and clear of specification of relief sought.
2. If complaint is filed and forwarded> the defendant has 15 days to file an answer. Relief is granted beyond this
period in which no

answer was filed.

3. When counterclaim or answer is filed > it must be answered within 10 days and a reply may then be filed within
10 days from service of

the pleading responded to.4. Failure to answer gives the court the ability to direct

judgment on such pleading.5. After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for a pre-trial.
SEPARATE OPINION-

an opinion written separately by a judge who dissents or who concurs only in the result

of the majority opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION-

an opinion disagreeing with the majority decision.A dissenting opinion is

an opinion of one or more judges expressing disagreement with the majority opinion. By definition, a dissent is
the minority of the court.
A dissenting opinion cannot create binding precedent because the holding in the opinion is not the holding of the
court in the case. Therefore the dissent's holding does not create case law. However, dissenting opinions are
sometimes cited aspersuasive authority when arguing that the holding should be limited or overturned. In some
cases, a dissent in an earlier case is used to spurn a change in the law, and a later case will write a majority opinion
for the same rule of law cited by the dissent in the earlier case.
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Peoples Homesite & Housing v Hon. Ericta GR No. L-40675

8.17.83
02/14/2011
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F: Respondent judge issued an order for a writ of execution of absolute sale to the petitioner in favor of the plaintiff
but herein petitioner contested the decision asserting that the decision that should be executed is the one stated in
the decretal or dispositive portion of the case.
I: WON judgment can only be found in the decretal portion of the decision.

R: Ordinarily, the decision of the case is found in the dispositive portion but there are instances that the ruling is
embodied in other parts of the case as the writing style of the ponente will vary and is personal in nature. The court
cannot implement a stringent rule as to how the ponente may write a decision as long as they do not violate the Rules
of Court.
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Manalang v Rickards GR. No. L-11986 7.31.58

02/14/2011
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F: Respondent filed an ejectment case against petitioner for refusal to pay the increased rental of their lot. Petitioner
filed motion to dismiss which was denied by the court ordering suspension of the proceeding for 2 years. Upon
issuance of court of the date to set the hearing, the petitioner files a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the court. Thus they file motion for certiorari and prohibition before the CFI. Responded argued that such motion is
improper since the court merely issued an interlocutory order and cannot be subjected for review by certiorari and
asserts that the case should be heard.
I: WON there is merit for filing petition for certiorari in this case
R: No, there is no merit for filing a motion for certiorari in this case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower
court merely an interlocutory order which did not provide a definite resolution on the case. The lower court should
hear the case and has the power to re-open the case for trial to determine the rights of the parties involved for the
final resolution of the case.
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SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

02/14/2011
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Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the
resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking
cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission
as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil

Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore
the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike. Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among
workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14
of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the
government service shall be observed,subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the
absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.In Sec. 1 of E.O. No.
180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as governmentemployees and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees
are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting
strikes.Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within its
jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is
appropriate.
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People v Deniega 251 SCRA 626 (637)

02/14/2011
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Facts: The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide. The prosecution was based solely on the
alleged extrajudicial confessions taken by the police officers without the presence of a counsel during custodial
investigation. It was also notable that the prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of the
crime and the basis of the lower courts conviction to the accused was based on their alleged extrajudicial
confessions.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellants based on their extrajudicial confession
Held: The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession
to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be

express and 4) the confession must be in writing.

The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the accused was inadequate to meet the standard
requirements of the constitution for custodial investigation. It seems that the lawyers were not around throughout the
custodial investigation. Citing People vs Javar, the court reiterated that any statement obtained in violation of the
constitutional provision, or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession speaks the truth, if it was
made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion
or even if it had been voluntarily given. Thus, because of these defects in observing the proper procedural
requirements of the constitution on custodial investigation the accused-appellants were acquitted.
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Adiong v Comelec 207 SCRA 712 (1992)

02/14/2011
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Facts: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.

Section 15(a) of the resolution provides: Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election
propaganda: (a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed
materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21
hereof.

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. It is unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether
public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the
campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own
residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election
propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size.

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving
vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a)
of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this
prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform
the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of
February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the

entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas."

Issue: WON the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and
limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes. Held: -The prohibition on posting of
decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.

Held: The posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the
consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election
propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to
doleout more decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread out the same number of decals and
stickers is not as important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech.
The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his personal property. To strike down this right
and enjoin it is impermissible encroachment of his liberties.

Iglesia ni Cristo v CA 259 SCRA 529 (1996)

02/14/2011
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F: This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA affirming action of respondent Board of Review For Moving
Pictures and Television that x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" classifying it not for public viewing on
grounds that they offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
Respondent contends the Board acted without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion by requiring them to
submit VTR tapes and x-rating them and suppression of freedom of expression. Trial court rendered judgment
ordering the Board to give petitioner the permit for their TV program while ordering petitioners to refrain from
attacking and offending other religious sectors from their program. In their motion for reconsideration the petitioner
prays for the deletion of the order of the court to make them subject to the requirement of submitting the VTR tapes of
their programs for review prior to showing on television. Such motion was granted. Respondent board appealed
before the CA which reversed the decision of the lower court affirming the jurisdiction and power of the board to
review the TV program. In their petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Board over
reviewing of their TV program and its grave abuse of discretion of its power to review if they are indeed vested with
such.
Issue: whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over the case at bar and whether or not it has acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Held: The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV programs by virtue of the powers vested upon it by
PD 1986. On the account of suppression of religious freedom, the court ruled that any act that restrains speech is
accompanied with presumption of invalidity. The burden lies upon the Board to overthrow this presumption. The
decision of the lower court is a suppression of the petitioners freedom of speech and free exercise of religion.
Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. It
is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the

community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of
harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive
and imminent evil. Thus the court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review the petitioners TV program while it
reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court that sustained the act of respondent in x-rating the TV
program of the petitioner.

2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely:

1.

Freedom to believe (absolute

2. Freedom to act on ones belief where an individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions affecting the
public, this freedom to do so becomes subject to the regulation authority of the state.
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Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA 348 SCRA 265

(December 15, 2000)
02/14/2011
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Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundations school paper were subjected to
disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the Board
following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the
disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written statement to answer the complaints
against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer
the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the
investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions.
Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee
questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.
Textbook on the new Philippine Constitution
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
Philippine government in action and the Philippine constitution
Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.
Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary Committee in

imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of
higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to
decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to
discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech
in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not
rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus
Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they
write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or
expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and
orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent
part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held
that Miriam Collegehas the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.
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US v Bustos 37 PHIL 731 (1909)

02/14/2011
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Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and
signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and
O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice
of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now,
Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous
against him.

Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free
press.
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
A historical and juridical study of the Philippine Bill of rights
The Philippine constitution explained
Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore,
a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other

public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State
to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction
on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty
it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the
part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning
must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for
public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty
under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes
he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable
cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of
these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did
they abuse the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A privileged
communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.
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Ayer Production PTY Ltd. V Capulong (1988)

02/14/2011
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F:

Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the petitioners from

producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution," a documentary of the EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it
violated his right to privacy. Petitioners contended that the movie would not involve his private life not that of his
family. But the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from making the
movie making reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This, this action for certiorari.
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce motion pictures and to exhibit them. What is
involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. Because of
the preferred character of speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior

restraint. The Judge should have stayed his hand considering that the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore
there was no "clear and present danger." The subject matter of the movie does not relate to the private life of Ponce
Enrile. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful historical account. He is, after all, a public
figure. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between freedom of speech and of expression
and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly
truthful and historical in its presentation of facts. There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth.Notes:
Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had previously been asked for the use of his
character in the movie and had refused the offer, sued to enjoin the filming because he did not want any mention of
his and his family's name. The SC lifted the injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it amounted to
prior restraint, which is no better if imposed by the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by ecclesiatical
officials.In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is part of history and this cannot be
changed or altered; thus his name can be used so long as only his public life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad,
although Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the movie dealth with both the public and private lives of Moises
Padilla.
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Reyes v Bagatsing 125 SCRA 553 (1983)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from
2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in
an open space of public property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and
foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the
resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition
that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken
by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent
intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be
issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants
themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was
granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No.
7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign
mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated.
Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to

free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and
streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an
individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens.With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be
shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity
of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.A summary of the application for permit for rally: The
applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where
and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another
public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the denial.
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Pita v CA 178 SCRA 362 (1989)

02/14/2011
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Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila,
Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police
District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand
owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be
obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M.
Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student
organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and coedited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor
Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin
said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation
thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and
that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also
filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and
burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court
granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the
seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.
Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic
literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of
obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used
not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional
protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene,
is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication
or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of
men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of
the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached
by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to
warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said
materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search
warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in
their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and
present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a caseto-case basis and on the judges sound discretion;
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Reyes v Bagatsing 125 SCRA 553 (1983)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from
2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in
an open space of public property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and
foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the
resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition
that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken
by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent
intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be
issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants
themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was

granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No.
7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign
mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated.
Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to
free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and
streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an
individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens.With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be
shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity
of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.A summary of the application for permit for rally: The
applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where
and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another
public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be
the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the denial.
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Malaban v Ramento 129 SCRA 359 (1984)

02/14/2011
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FACTS:

Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University

Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the university. On the
scheduled date, the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a different place from
that indicated in the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their opposition to the merger and as a result,
classes and office work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were
found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were suspended for one academic year. They
filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic considering that the TRO issued by the SC allowed the
students to enroll. But there is a need to pass squarely on the constitutional question. Respect for the constitutional

rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the order of suspension. Suspending them
for one year is out of proportion considering that the vigorous presentation of views was expected. The excitement of
the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance of the youth should be taken into
consideration.
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Luzviminda dela Cruz v CA, et. al. 305 SCRA 303 (March 25,
1999)
02/14/2011
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Facts: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously
charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by the Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in connection with the administrative complaints filed before its office by their
respective principals for participating in a mass action/strike and subsequently defying the return-to-work order by
DECS constituting grave misconduct., gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law, Rules and
Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential
Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Petitioners contend they are merely
participating in a peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of their grievances in the exercise of their
constitutional right and insist their assembly does not constitutes as a strike as there is no actual disruption of
classes.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners exercise of their right to freedom to assembly and petition were valid.
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
Philippine government in action and the Philippine constitution
The Philippine constitution explained
Held: The court held that previous jurisprudence laid down a rule that public teachers in the exercise of their right to
ventilate their grievances by petitioning the government for redress should be done within reasonable limits so as not
to prejudice the public welfare. The conduct of mass protests during school days while abandoning classes is highly
prejudicial to the best interest of public service. The court stresses that teachers are penalized not because they
exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going
on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced
adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers were responsible.
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PBM Employees Asso. v PBM 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

Facts: Petitioners informed the respondent employers of their schedule for a mass demonstration in protest for the
alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent invoke that the demonstration is a violation of their CBA agreement
however petitioners contend it is an exercise of their freedom to peaceable assembly to seek redress of their
grievances against the abusive Pasig police and not a strike against their employer. Respondent dismissed the
petitioners and the court sustained their demonstration is one of bargaining in bad faith.
Issue: Whether or not there was a restraint in the exercise of the right to peaceable assembly of the petitioners.
Held: The court held that the primacy of human rights such as freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. The obvious purpose of the mass
demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged
police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such
common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. Apart from violating the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the
employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law
to these lowly employees.

Aglipay v Ruiz 64 PHIL 201 (1937)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.
Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds
shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result
of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the
state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends
that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent
for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.
Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is
however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply
felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not

authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor
a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map
of the Philippines and the location ofManila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city ofManila, being the
seat of that congress. This was to to advertise thePhilippines and attract more tourists, the officials
merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and
sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally
resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.
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Garces v Estenzo 104 SCRA 510 (1981)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc Citywere passed:a. Resolution No. 5Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of
the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be
obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano
mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would
remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made
available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saints feast day.These resolutions have
been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in
the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea
refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church funds
were used in its acquisition.Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the
replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain
Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said
resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8
Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.
Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to

facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was
placed in a laymans custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the
image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils funds that were used to buy the image,
therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to
give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every
government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.
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American Bible Society v City of Manila 101 PHIL 386

(1957)
02/14/2011
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Facts: New Yorks Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge
to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education contended that
said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. An order barring the
Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellants members from office for failure to comply
with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of textbooks to be
lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate
Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no standing. The
New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free
exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).'
Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:(7) No law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.The provision
aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.It may be true that in the case
at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher
than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or

occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions
of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it
would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs.With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find
that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise
of religious practices.It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered
unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to
Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless
to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum
of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.
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Ebralinag v Division Supt. of Cebu 219 SCRA 256

(1993)
02/14/2011
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Facts: Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated for
raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students
of Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school authorities expelled
these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the Panatang
Makabayan required by RA1265. They are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious
worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends
constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents
relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are
a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it
doesnt involve any religious ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution
does not mean exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing national
anthem. This exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness
and duties of citizenship.
Issue: Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.
Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to religious

worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.) Freedom to act
on ones belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to religious freedom is the
existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right
to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not justified.The 30 yr old
previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who refuse to obey
RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and worship. Jehovahs
Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right does not give them the right
to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were only standing quietly during
ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesnt present any danger so evil and imminent to
justify their expulsion. What the petitioners request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion
from public schools. The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of
a citizens right to free education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute
ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic
consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to
religious beliefs is unjustified.Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is
ANNULLED.
Add Comment

Pamil v Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978)

02/14/2011
0 Comments
F:

In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition was filed

against him on the basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that "in nocase
shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons
receiving salaries from provincial funds, or contractors for public works." The CFI dismissed the petition
on the ground that the ineligibility has been impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code.
The 1987 Constitution of the PhilippinesPhilippine government in action and the Philippine
constitution
HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive. Seven justices held that section 2175 is no longer
operative. Justice Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on the exercise of the right to
run for public office contrary to Art. III of the 1935 Constitution. Justice Teehankee held that section 2175
had been repealed by the Election Code. Five justices held that section 2175 is constitutional.

Add Comment

Marcos v Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989)

02/14/2011
1 Comment
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their
return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is
without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the
limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to
do so.They further assert that under international law, their right to return to thePhilippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from
the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a
distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat
the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country,
and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the
"right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the
Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right
to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting
the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right
to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of
abode and the right to travel.The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it
is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.The court held that President

did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres.
Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has
determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.The return of the Marcoses poses a serious
threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
1 Comment

Manotoc v CA 142 SCRA 149 (1986)

02/14/2011
0 Comments
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to
the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and
26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the
issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation
Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the
petition.Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty
could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.
Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner
to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the
necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken
by any other person in his behalf.
Add Comment

Silverio v CA 195 SCRA 760 (1991)

02/14/2011
0 Comments
Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent
filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the
DFA to cancel petitioners passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and
there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the
permission of the court.
Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines explained
The Language Provision of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by
reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is
imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. A
person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad,
compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An
accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart
from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20
[2ndpar. ]).Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the
liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose
limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by
law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J.,
Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to
the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was
a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an
interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97
SCRA 121).Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of
thePhilippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to

finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes.
Add Comment

Manotoc v CA 142 SCRA 149 (1986)

02/14/2011
0 Comments
Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation of Articles of
War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various
Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning
the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied.
Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted.
However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal
they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail
guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of
petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does
not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher
court.
The 1987 Constitution of the PhilippinesThe Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
explained
Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.
Cases on constitutional law (Philippine casebook series) A historical and juridical study of the
Philippine Bill of rights
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to
the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of
the military and national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous
soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in
overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners
was reversed.

Add Comment

Silverio v CA 195 SCRA 760 (1991)

02/14/2011
0 Comments
Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent
filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the
DFA to cancel petitioners passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and
there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the
permission of the court.Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines explained
The Language Provision of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by
reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is
imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. A
person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad,
compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An
accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart
from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20
[2ndpar. ]).Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the
liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose
limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by
law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J.,
Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to
the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was
a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an
interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97
SCRA 121).Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of
thePhilippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to
finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes.

Comendador v De Villa 200 SCRA 80 (1991)

02/14/2011
0 Comments

"military members exempted from the right to bail

Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation of Articles of War (AW) 67
(Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation
conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary
injunction before the court which was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty
pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an exemption
from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional
liberty of petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does not
apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court.

Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the
right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and national security
considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty
giving them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower
court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.
Add Comment

Baylon v Judge Sison 243 SCRA 284 (1995)

02/14/2011
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application for bail on offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua/life imprisonment requires a hearing to
give prosecution the chance to present evidence on the guilt of the accused
Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the accused charged with double murder.
Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for bail in violation of Rule 15,
section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from the schedule
of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails that they were not given the chance to present evidence that
strongly prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge justifies not having committed grave abuse of discretion
since the prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the lack of previous notice was cured with the

filing of motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in the grant of bail to the accused.
Held: The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the judge in granting bail to the accused
considering that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing was immediately conducted on Monday
thereby depriving the prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule embodied in Rule
15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing
where the accused is charged with an offense which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of petition for bail before making an outright grant of
this motion.A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:. . The prosecution must first be accorded an
opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such
evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other
words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of
sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
Add Comment

Galman v Sandiganbayan 144 SCRA 392 (1986)

02/14/2011
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Facts: An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case involving the assassination of
Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation of
Galman as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the military
reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino
and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally
preparing a resolution charging the 26 military accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon
the intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused. Marcos however recommended the
filing of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later
on.The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross violation of
constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to present vital
documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a retrial before an impartial tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since legal

jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the
first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the
lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President ordered
the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due pressure to
the judiciary. The courts decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due process
during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the
trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion between the lower court and
Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.The denial on the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null
and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.
Add Comment

Corpuz v People 194 SCRA 73 (1991)

02/14/2011
0 Comments

Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts decision finding him guilty for malversation of public funds. The
accused was the acting supervising cashier at the Provincial Treasurers office. He denied having misused the whole
amount of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a shortage from the government funds contending that the
P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the
petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post said amount in his cash
book despite not actually receiving the amount.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the accused of the charge
against him.
Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive findings that he malversed
the government funds considering all the evidences presented that point out to his guilt on the charge imputed
against him. Records shows that the checks issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused and there
were inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not really on leave on the day the said checks were
disbursed by the paymaster.
Add Comment

People v Agbayani 284 SCRA 315 (1998)

02/14/2011
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Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter and was found guilty of the crime of rape. A
motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing the irregularities
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to
choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a 2 day preparation for trial.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of the
right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new
trial.
Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his
right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed
to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption
can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary
appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to
counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right.
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2)
days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right
must be expressly demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground
for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for
time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to believe that the counsel who
represented the appellant was not prepared during the trial as records showed he was able to cross-examine the
complainant and there was no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Add Comment

Amion v Chiongson 301 SCRA 614 (January 22, 1999)

02/14/2011
0 Comments

Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the respondent judge for ignorance of the law
and oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de officio despite the appellants
opposition because he has his own counsel of choice in the person of Atty. Depasucat. However, many instances that
Atty. Depasucat did not appear in court which prompted respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to
represent the accused stating on record that his representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the accused
own counsel. This was done in order to avoid delay of the trial since the complainant already expressed frustration on

the so many postponement of the hearing.

Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as asserted by the accused in
the case at bar.
Held: The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent judge devoid of merit. An examination of
related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of
counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a
criminal prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to
due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his
defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It
was the strategic machination of delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of appointing him
counsel de officio by the court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case and
causes delay in the administration of justice.
Add Comment

Pecho v People 262 SCRA 518 (1996)

02/14/2011
0 Comments

Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex crime of attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial document was assailed with the contention of the defense that the accused
may not be convicted of the crime for double jeopardy. The charge against the accused was on violation of RA 3019
of which he was acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that shows that
the crime was consummated the accused was acquitted but the court held judgment of prosecuting his conviction for
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime
charged. Accused invokes the defense of double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a
bar for prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document and that the
accused was not informed of this charge against him in the filing of the information.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which he is convicted.
Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
crime he is charged with as follows:
1.

To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense;

2.

To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;

3.

To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had.

In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of law. The complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime. What determines the
real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or
complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a
crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been shown that the information
filed in court is considered as charging for two offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he
can be convicted for both or either of the charges.However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient
evidence that would establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable doubt,
the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on circumstantial evidence, thus the accused was
acquitted.
Add Comment

Gamboa v Cruz 162 SCRA 642 (1988)

02/14/2011
0 Comments

Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he
was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion
to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the
petition.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated.
Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such
stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an
urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or
innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he
was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution
had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
Add Comment

People v Judge Ayson 175 SCRA 216 (1989)

02/14/2011
0 Comments

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in irregularities in
the sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation
was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent
by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him,
and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He
proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos.
Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent
Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and
statement of accused.
Held: No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial investigation when
his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The right
to self incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest
which involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his
freedom in any way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the
evidence should be admitted in court.
--------------Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights
must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded
him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But
unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as
a result of interrogation can be used against him.The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of
constitutional rights."
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People v Mahinay 302 SCRA 455 (February 1, 1999)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of a 12 year old girl. He assailed the court decisions contending
that his conviction was based on circumstantial evidence that fails to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
that an extrajudicial confession was taken from him in violation of his constitutional rights on custodial interrogation.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused merely on ground of circumstantial evidence and not
beyond reasonable ground and WON his rights to lawful custodial investigation was violated.
Held: The court held that absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under
the Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence
provided that the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2). the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3). the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction must be
consistent with each other which were proven in the case.The extrajudicial confession taken from the accused was
within the requirement of Miranda rights and within lawful means where his confession was taken in the presence of
his lawyer.
Miranda Rights include:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to
and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other
warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that anystatement he makes may be used as evidence
against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and
competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him;
and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of
the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any
form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most
expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member
of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate
family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government
organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing
AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver
and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process
that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not
interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any
of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

People v Deniega 251 SCRA 626 (637)

02/14/2011
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Facts: The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide. The prosecution was based solely on the
alleged extrajudicial confessions taken by the police officers without the presence of a counsel during custodial
investigation. It was also notable that the prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of the
crime and the basis of the lower courts conviction to the accused was based on their alleged extrajudicial
confessions.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellants based on their extrajudicial confession.
Held: The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession
to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be
express and 4) the confession must be in writing.The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the
accused was inadequate to meet the standard requirements of the constitution for custodial investigation. It seems
that the lawyers were not around throughout the custodial investigation. Citing People vs Javar, the court reiterated
that any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision, or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. Even if the confession speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. Thus,
because of these defects in observing the proper procedural requirements of the constitution on custodial
investigation the accused-appellants were acquitted.
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People v Bandula 232 SCRA 566 (1994)

02/14/2011
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Facts: The accused was charged of robbery with homicide. During investigation he was investigated and made an
extrajudicial confession during the interrogation in the absence of a counsel. It was 2 weeks later that he was
provided with one in the person of Atty. Zena, a municipality attorney where he was made to sign a sworn statement
admitting the shooting of the victim.Issue: Whether or not the accused was accorded with due process of custodial
investigation.
Held: No, the right of the accused for due process was clearly violated since the authorities failed to provide him
counsel during the interrogation and he was not informed of his right to remain silent and right to a counsel.
Furthermore, the counsel to be provided to the accused should be one who is impartial, independent and of his own

choice. If the accused cannot afford to have his own counsel then he will be provided by the authorities with one.
Providing the accused with municipality attorney as counsel would be prejudicial because of conflict of interest
involved in the performance of duty of said counsel. The court held the evidence inadmissible to court for failure to
meet the requisites of due process for conducting custodial investigation.
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People v Lucero 244 SCRA 425 (1995)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted for robbery with homicide. While he was in custodial investigation the
accused cannot afford a lawyer thus one was provided for him in the person of Atty. Peralta as his counsel. Counsel
explained to the accused his constitutional rights but Atty. Peralta observed no reaction from the accused. He left to
attend the wake of a friend and the police authorities started to take statements from the accused. Apparently during
the custodial investigation no counsel was around while accused gave his extrajudicial confession which was used
against him as evidence in court and merit his conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused may be admissible during the trial.
Held: Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession.
The constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with a
counsel. This is a constitutional guarantee to protect the accused against the hostility and duress from the authorities
during custodial investigation. Any confession or statement made without the presence of a counsel during the
investigation is deemed to be inadmissible as evidence in court. It appears that when the accused was taken with his
statements his counsel was not around. Therefore his extrajudicial confession cannot be used as evidence against
the accused during his trial. The court erred in admitting it as evidence and as a basis of conviction therefore the
accused is acquitted.
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People v Agustin 240 SCRA 541 (1995)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Quiao, the gunman who killed the victims, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City
Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill

Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo
Quiao was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as
transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiao was signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to
before City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the
privileges like that of Quiao. Agustins defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at gunpoint
atKennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private
prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only
two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise that he would be
discharged as a witness did not push through since Quiao escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since
conspiracy was established, hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellants extrajudicial statements are admissible as evidence to warrant conviction.
Held: No. The statement of the accused is inadmissible as evidence in court. Despite asking for his uncle to
represent him he was provided with an impartial counsel who is an associate of the private prosecutor. It also
appears that some of the transcripts of the notes of the proceeding that show the extrajudicial statement made by the
accused were not signed by him. By making his statements the accused voluntarily waived his right to remain silent
but that was not put in writing either.It would be in violation of the mandate of custodial investigation to admit the
statement of the accused when the process undertaken is one bereft of meeting the standard requirements of the
due process that should be accorded to the accused in custodial investigation, hence he should be acquitted.
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People v Bolanos 211 SCRA 262 (1992)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Police authorities arrested the accused for murder. Together with the accused the police boarded a jeep to
take him to their station. While on board the jeep the accused started admitting killing the deceased. This extrajudicial
confession was used as evidence in court and the accused was convicted.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant was deprived of hisconstitutional right to counsel.
Held: Yes. The accused on board the police vehicle on the way to the police station is already under custodial
investigation and should therefore be accorded his rights under the Constitution and be informed of his Miranda
rights. Any extrajudicial confession he makes without his counsel is deemed inadmissible to court.
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Navallo v Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 177 (1994)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Petitioner is the collecting and disbursing officer of NumanciaNational Vocational School found to have
misappropriated public funds for private benefit after a COA audit. He failed to restitute the amount despite COA
demands. A warrant of arrest was issued but petitioner pleaded not guilty and invokes his right to custodial
investigation since during the COA audit and actual cash count he was made to sign the certification on the fund
shortage in the absence of a counsel. He further contends that the shortage of funds was due to the assurance of
certain Macasemo to settle his unliquidated cash advance and his failure to do so resulted to the fund shortage.
Issue: Whether or not the right to counsel be invoked during the COA audit.
Held: No, the right to counsel could not be invoked during the COA audit since the procedure is not within the ambit
of custodial investigation. A person may be subject to malversation of funds even in the absence of direct proof of
misappropriation as long as there is evidence of fund shortage which the petitioner failed to explain with convincing
justification.
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People v Macam 238 SCRA 306 (1994)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Accused was charged and prosecuted for robbery with homicide as guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Defense
assails the court decision contending the constitutional rights of the accused were violated for subjecting them to a
police line up at the hospital where they were identified by the victims without the presence of their counsel and
without any warrant.
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated.
Held: Although the accused were arrested without a warrant such defect was cured during the proceeding when the
defense failed to object on the issue during the initial proceedings before the court. Having failed to assail the issue
beforehand the accused is estopped to assail the validity of their arrest as they further voluntarily submitted their self
before the court by entering the plea of not guilty instead of moving to quash the information before the court on
ground of an invalid arrest. It is also held that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is
inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellants identification at the line-up.
The witnesses identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as
being tainted by illegal line-up. The witnesses and victims positively identified the accused thereby further affirming
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. SC affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Add Comment

People v Alicando GR No. 117487 (December 2, 1995)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested and during the
interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the assistance of a counsel. By virtue of his uncounseled
confession the police came to know where to find the evidences consisting of the victims personal things like clothes
stained with blood which was admitted to court as evidences. The victim pleaded guilty during the arraignment and
was convicted with the death penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review.
Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the accused.
Held: Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He was not informed
of his right to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information against him was written in a
language he could not understand and was not explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the
rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The lower court also violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant
without conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and full understanding of the accused of the consequences
of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted by the court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible because
they were due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide the accused with due process of the law. Thus
the SC annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the case back to the lower for
further proceeding.
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Read RA No. 7438

02/14/2011
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Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro ManilaEighth CongressRepublic Act No. 7438

April 27, 1992AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS

OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF

THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS

THEREOFBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippinesin Congress
assembled::Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human being
and guarantee full respect for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.
(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.(b) Any
public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any
person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person
cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the
investigating officer.lawphi1(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating
officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know
how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel
provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise,
such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents,
elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest
or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence
in any proceeding.(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his
counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.(f) Any person arrested or detained or under
custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of
by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's
"immediate family" shall include his or her spouse, fianc or fiance, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or
grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall
include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those
charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.The assisting
counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees;(a) The amount of One hundred fifty
pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1alf(b) The amount of Two hundred
fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;(c) The amount of Three
hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with a capital offense.The fee for the assisting
counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the
municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided,
That the Municipal or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel
before the province pays said fees.In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and

the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in accordance with the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to
inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand pesos
(P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both.
The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been
previously convicted of a similar offense.The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or
anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense
if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any
lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his
spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).lawphi1The
provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or
prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his
escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Republic Act No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other laws, presidential
decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in
any daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.Approved: April 27, 1992.lawphi1
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People v Dy 158 SCRA 111 (1988)

02/14/2011
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Facts: Accused is the owner of Bennys Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder before the trial court
for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of the
prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said
officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to
the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process required
in custodial investigation.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the accused.
Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the court. An oral

confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to surrender can
be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such confession was made unsolicited by the
police officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no
need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES
GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he
heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be
given in substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be
admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.

People v Pinlac 165 SCRA 675 (1988)

02/14/2011
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Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He
assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as evidence
which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and
without the assistance of counsel.
Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.
Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure of
the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him without appraising him of his
constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented the
extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein
are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.