SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs.

RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust,

RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive
Secretary, respondents.
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The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan.
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for
national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses
in life and property and their suffering during World War II.
Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and
utilization of reparations and development loans. The procurements are divided into those for use
by the government sector and those for private parties.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year
Schedule and listed under the heading "Government Sector".
As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to
Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm
- Kajima Corporation.
However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal.
The President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to be able to
buy the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. Petitioners in this case opposed such.
Petitioners Contention: petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and the related lots
were acquired as part of the reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and consular
use by the Philippine government; That the Roppongi property is classified as one of public
dominion, and not of private ownership. Hence, it cannot be appropriated, is outside the commerce
of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of
contracts.
Respondents Contention: That the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the
laws of Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in
determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a
property.

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ISSUES
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
RULING of above issues:
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the
Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the
Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial.
This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

Conflict of laws issue: Whether or not a conflict of law situation exists?

RULING
NO.
The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the Roppongi property by
insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply. The Japanese law - its coverage and
effects, when enacted, and exceptions to its provision is not presented to the Court It is simply
asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should apply without stating what that law
provides.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A
conflict of law situation arises only when:
(1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take
and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the

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transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See

Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and
(2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law
on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly
dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its
sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

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HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, DEODATO RELOJ and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
A complaint for collection of a sum of money (pp. 49-52, Rollo) was filed by petitioner Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as petitioner BANK) against private
respondents Jack Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj.
Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as COMPANY), a company
incorporated in Singapore applied with, and was granted by, the Singapore branch of petitioner
BANK an overdraft facility.
As a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by petitioner BANK, both
private respondents, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and
Several Guarantee in favor of petitioner BANK whereby private respondents agreed to pay, jointly
and severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated
overdraft facility.
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and
determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore.
We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under
this guarantee..
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, petitioner BANK demanded payment of the
obligation from private respondents, conformably with the provisions of the Joint and Several
Guarantee.
Private respondents filed an MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The
trial court denied the motion. They then filed before the respondent IAC a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order. The IAC rendered a decision
enjoining the RTC Quezon City from taking further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same
for filing with the proper court of Singapore which is the proper forum. MR denied, hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis the Guarantee stipulation
regarding jurisdiction?
HELD: YES
While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint and
Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates that
the stipulation that "[t]his guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall
be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all
disputes arising under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle underlies all rules
of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some
reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam.
To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
As regards the issue on improper venue, petitioner BANK avers that the objection to improper
venue has been waived. However, We agree with the ruling of the respondent Court that:
While in the main, the motion to dismiss fails to categorically use with exactitude the words
'improper venue' it can be perceived from the general thrust and context of the motion that what is
meant is improper venue, The use of the word 'jurisdiction' was merely an attempt to copy-cat the
same word employed in the guarantee agreement but conveys the concept of venue. Brushing
aside all technicalities, it would appear that jurisdiction was used loosely as to be synonymous with
venue. It is in this spirit that this Court must view the motion to dismiss. ... (p. 35, Rollo).
At any rate, this issue is now of no moment because We hold that venue here was properly laid for
the same reasons discussed above.
The respondent Court likewise ruled that (pp. 36-37, Rollo):
... In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it is not authorized by law
to exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it may still refuse to entertain the case by
applying the principle of forum non conveniens. ...

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However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum
non conveniensdepends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court (J. Salonga, Private International Law, 1981, p. 49).lwph1.t Thus, the
respondent Court should not have relied on such principle.
Although the Joint and Several Guarantee prepared by petitioner BANK is a contract of adhesion and
that consequently, it cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to the stipulations of the
contract, substantial bases exist for petitioner Bank's choice of forum, as discussed earlier.
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality.
They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble,
damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass private
respondents.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree
732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.
To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of
instruction, the school decided to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by
it either locally or abroad.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying
the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a
salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on
two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation
factor" and (b) limited tenure.
Petitioner International School Alliance of Educators, a legitimate labor union of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.
Petitioner filed a notice of strike. DOLE assumed jurisdiction.
DOLE issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then
DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioners contention: Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School
is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination.
Respondent Quisumbing: favored the school and said, there is a substantial distinction between
foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their
own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them
to join the teaching faculty of the School.
ISSUE: WON THERE WAS VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
RULING:
There is violation of equal protection. Equal pay for equal work, persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skillsm effort, and responsibility under similar conditions should be paid similar salaries. If an
employer accords the same rank and position, the presumption is that they perform equal work. Here, both
groups have similar functions which they perform under similar conditions. There is no evidence that foreign
hires perform 25% more efficient than local hires. The dislocation factor and tenure are properly accorded by
the benefits they received.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,"[25]
"to afford labor full protection."[26] The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital.[27] These relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good.[28] Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to
public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

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In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is
no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
National law as well as intl law which forms part of the national law should be equally
applied to prevent discrimination in favor of the rights of foreigners as against those of
the citizens of the host country, for the law of the forum, in case of doubt should tilt the
balance in favor of its citizens or its interests as a nation

Cadalin vs POEA Administrator

On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their own
behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing
an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for
money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction;
while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy
Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the
employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and other unpaid benefits.
Complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its
accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all
deployed at various projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries in the Middle East,
such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in
Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the Philippine Government, all the
individual complainants signed standard overseas employment contracts