SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4762. June 28, 2004]

LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
On June 9, 1997, Linda Vda. de Espino wrote a letter-complaint [1] with the then Court
Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, charging respondent Atty. Pepito C. Presquito, a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Misamis Oriental Chapter, for having employed
fraud, trickery and dishonest means in refusing to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio
Espino, when he was still alive, the sum of P763,060.00. According to complainant,
respondents unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics partly triggered the death of her husband,
who died disillusioned and embittered.[2] The letter-complaint and affidavit also alleged
that notwithstanding the numerous oral demands by Mr. Espino and complainant (after the
death of Mr. Espino), respondent still refused to pay the amounts represented by the eight
checks which had all been dishonored. Complainant surmised that Atty. Presquitos refusal to
pay may be due to his reliance on the influence of his father-in-law, a former Executive Judge
of the RTC (Cagayan de Oro), and of his uncle, an RTC judge (Cagayan de Oro).
The records show that sometime in September 1995, respondent was introduced to
complainants late husband, Mr. Virgilio M. Espino. Mr. Espino, a resident of Davao City, had
sought the assistance of respondent, a resident of Cagayan de Oro, regarding the sale of his
piece of land with an area of 11,057.59 sq.m. situated in Misamis Oriental. The discussion
between Mr. Espino and the respondent resulted in the sale of the property to respondent.
[3]
Under the terms of the agreement between Mr. Espino and respondent, [4] the purchase
price of the land was P1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by installments.
[5]
Pursuant to the terms of payment in the agreement, respondent issued eight post-dated
checks, totalingP736,060.00.[6] Respondent then entered into a joint venture or partnership
agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land into home-size lots and
its development, with a portion of the land retained by respondent for his own use. [7] The
land was eventually titled in the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided into 35
to 36 lots.
Meanwhile, the eight post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored. Mr.
Espino made repeated demands for payment from respondent but the latter refused. Mr.
Espino died in December 1996. His widow, complainant, then tried to collect from
respondent the value of the eight checks. When complainants numerous pleas remained
unheeded, she filed the complaint in June 1997.
In his comment dated September 22, 1997, respondent denied any wrongdoing, and
said that the allegations that he had employed fraud, trickery and dishonest means with
the late Mr. Espino were totally false and baseless. The complaint, according to respondent,
stemmed from complainants lack of knowledge as to the real story of the transaction

between complainants husband and respondent. He also vehemently took exception to the
imputation that he was banking on the influence of his father-in-law and uncle-in-law.
Respondent does not deny the issuance of the eight checks. What respondent claims,
however, is that the nonpayment was justified by the unresolved problems he and Mrs. Ares
have with respect to the right-of-way of the land. He alleged that Mr. Espino had made
assurances that the land had a right-of-way required for its development, but respondent
later found out that such road-right-of-way required the consent of four other land owners,
and the expense would be considerably more than he was made to believe. According to
respondent, he and Mr. Espino had agreed that the latter would not encash the checks or
demand the equivalent of the same until the right-of-way problem of the land had been
resolved.[8] Respondents position is that until the problem of obtaining a right-of-way to the
land has been resolved, nothing has yet accrued against him or Mrs. Ares (his partner), as it
would be very unfair and unjust for them to pay Mr. Espino when the land could not be
developed and sold.[9]
Respondent also alleged that he was entitled to set-off against the amount he owes Mr.
Espino or his heirs from the purchase of the land, the advances he made to Mr. Espino, and
the cost he incurred when he defended Mr. Espinos son in a criminal case. He later on
manifested that he has fully paid the portion of the land which had been titled in his name
through the same advances and incurred expenses.[10]
In a resolution dated November 26, 1997,[11] the case was referred to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision, and assigned
to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
In the IBP-CBD report dated November 12, 2002, [12] Investigating Commissioner Caesar
R. Dulay found that the facts and credible evidence made available in this case indubitably
establish respondents failure to live up to the demands of the Lawyers Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. For having failed to act with candor
and fairness toward complainant, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months, and ordered to immediately account
with complainant regarding the sale of the piece of land which had been subdivided in the
name of respondent and his business partner. On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of
the IBP passed a Resolution adopting/approving the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Dulay, finding that respondents lack of fairness and candor and honesty
[was] in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, we agree that respondent
was wanting in fairness, candor and honesty demanded of him by the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. We find, however, the recommended
penalty of six (6) months suspension too light considering respondents gross misconduct.
Complainants testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1) there was an
agreement between respondent and complainants late husband for the sale of the latters
land; (2) respondent had issued the eight checks in connection with said agreement; (3)
these checks were dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing

road-right-of-way. Complainants exhibits were formally offered as early as January 6, 1999,

[13]
and were admitted without objection from respondent.[14]
In the face of these uncontroverted facts, it was incumbent upon respondent to prove a
legal excuse or defense for nonpayment of the eight checks.
Respondent utterly failed in this regard.
From the termination of complainants presentation of evidence on December 1998 until
Commissioner Dulays report on November 12, 2002, the records show that respondent was
unable to present evidence - either testimonial or documentary - to prove that he had legal
cause to refuse payment, or that he was entitled to legal compensation. Even respondents
own statements - which, without corroborating evidence, remain mere self-serving
allegations - fall short of testimony, as he failed to submit to cross-examination by opposing
counsel or for clarificatory questions by the IBP-CBD. Worse, respondent attached eighteen
documents to his comment, but only went so far as to mark (without a formal offer) the
agreement between him and Mr. Espino (for the sale of the land), and the partnership
agreement between him and Mrs. Ares. Thus, respondent had no evidence other than
his own allegations.
Respondents failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,[15] especially in the light of the numerous postponements and
resettings he requested for and was granted with, on the ground that he needed more time
to prepare his evidence. We note that respondent was first scheduled to present his
evidence onDecember 14, 1998. Two years - five resettings, and three orders submitting the
case for resolution - later, respondent still had not proffered testimonial or documentary
evidence.
Respondent claims that his failure to present evidence was due to his financial
difficulties, i.e., he could not afford to spend for travel expenses of his witnesses. [16] We are
not persuaded. First, it boggles the mind how financial constraints could have prevented
respondent from presenting the originals of the documents attached to his comment,
proving, among others, the alleged advances and costs on Mr. Espinos behalf. The originals
of these documents are presumably in his possession. Second, with respect to the absence
of testimony, respondent could have submitted the affidavits of his witnesses - the taking of
which he could have done himself in Cagayan de Oro to keep down the cost. The records
are clear that he was allowed this option.[17] But he did neither.
All these circumstances lead us to the ineluctable conclusion that respondent could
not present evidence because there really was none to justify his nonpayment. [18]
Even if we were to excuse respondents procedural lapse and consider his written
pleadings as testimony, we agree with Commissioner Dulay that respondents problems with
respect to the right-of-way or his partnership with Mrs. Ares do not excuse his
nonpayment. As stated in the IBP-CBD report:
[T]he solution to the right-of-way problem however clearly lies in the hands of
respondent.We note that respondent has already taken title over the property together

with Guadalupe Ares by making complainants late husband, sign over the property by way
of the Deed of Sale. We therefore find respondents position vis--vis the widowed
complainant sneaky and unfair. We reiterate that respondent has assumed responsibility for
the negotiations on the road-right-of-way and was aware of the problem. To [sic] our mind
he has used the alleged road-right-of-way problem only as an afterthought and a reason to
delay and in fact deny the complainant payment of what is due her. Respondent also
alleges and blames the deceased husband of complainant for the failed project but the facts
show otherwise. They are just bare allegations and remain unsubstantiated. Besides,
respondent and Ares took risks in the business venture and are now the titled owners of the
property. The seller cannot be blamed for any failure in the project. Respondents
actuations in the whole transaction is [sic] not at par with the standards demanded of him as
a member of the bar. Respondent is lacking in fairness and candour [sic] and honesty. The
fact that he has unreasonably delayed and failed to account with complainant for a long
time and the fact of his having allowed the checks he issued to bounce is [sic] unacceptable
and censurable behavior for a member of the bar. [19] [citations omitted]
Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the eight dishonored checks, respondents
indifference to complainants entreaties for payment was conduct unbecoming of a member
of the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct towards complainant and her
late husband,[20] first by allowing the eight (8) checks he issued to bounce, then by ignoring
the repeated demands for payment until complainant was forced to file this complaint, and
finally by deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with dilatory tactics. Considering
that the property of complainant and her late husband is already in respondent and Mrs.
Ares name, the injustice of respondents different maneuvers to evade payment of the eight
checks - due and unpaid since 1996 - becomes more manifest.
It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8) worthless checks, seemingly
without regard to its deleterious effects to public interest and public order. We have already
declared, most recently in Lao v. Medel,[21] that the issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyers moral character in serious doubt,
though it is not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar. [22] He not only sets
himself liable for a serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but also transgresses the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically the mandate of Canon 1 to obey the laws of
the land and promote the respect for law.
It behooves respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for
any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral
character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar. [23] A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in
his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the
court.[24] Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
Given the foregoing, and in line with jurisprudence involving lawyers who issued
worthless checks - Lao v. Medel,[25] Co v. Bernardino,[26] and Ducat v. Villalon, Jr.,[27] we find respondents reprehensible conduct warrants suspension from the practice of law
for one (1) year.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO is found guilty of gross
misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year,
and ORDERED to immediately account with complainant regarding the sale of the piece of
land, which has been subdivided in the name of respondent and his business partner.
Let a copy of this decision be spread in his file at the Office of the Bar Confidant and of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6273

March 15, 2010

ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
An Information for Estafa1 was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa
(complainant) along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar
Paguinto (respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not
indicate the involvement of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the
Information which the trial court granted.2 Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the
quashal of the Information was denied3
Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of
Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw them. 4
On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez
Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special General Assembly of
GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the Board of
Directors (the Board), including her and the General Manager.5 The notice was signed by
respondent.

At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt.
Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of the then current
Board,6 Gerango, complainants predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared
himself Chair, appointed others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent
as Board Secretary.
On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its
premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations. On even date, respondent sent
letter-notices to complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their removal
from the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from
further discharging the duties of their positions.7
Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development Authority
(CDA)-Calamba a complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during the October 14,
2001 Special General Assembly.
The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the
questioned general assembly null and void for having been conducted in violation of
GEMASCOs By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. 8 The RDs Resolution of
February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction 9 of CDA.
In her present complainant10 against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that
respondent:
X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID AND
CONSENT TO THE SAME11
X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION12
X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING
COUNSEL13
X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN
THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW14
X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES
COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING COMMUNITY AS
WELL15
Despite the Courts grant,16 on respondents motion,17 of extension of time to file Comment,
respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus required him to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with,18but just the same he failed to comply. 19
The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.20

It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant proposed the
following issues:
1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly the following:
1.1 Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal [processes].
1.2 Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
1.3 Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
1.4 Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds
of the law.
1.5 Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
2. Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyers
oath, particularly the following:
2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein
2.2 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court
2.3 will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same
2.4 will delay no man for money or malice
3. Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for
disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 21
Respondents counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of
whether, on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, misconduct was committed by
respondent.22
After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position
papers.23 Complainant filed hers,24 but respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension
of time, did not file any position paper.

In her Report and Recommendation,25 Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing

found respondent guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule
12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been
previously suspended for six months, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be
suspended for two years.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of
the complaint, however, for lack of merit.261avvphi1
On Motion for Reconsideration,27 the IBP-CBD Board of Governors recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and
the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyers Oath, which provides
that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he
violated the Lawyers Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent
failed to file any and ignored this Courts subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule
12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so." Sebastian v.
Bajar28 teaches:
x x x Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondents obstinate
refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her
character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show
respect to their processes.29 (Citations omitted).
The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for
six months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 30 he having been found to
have received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case
for her when he had not.31 It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways.
A more severe penalty this time is thus called for.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from the
practice of law for violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
DIGEST
Facts: Complainant, Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa, who was Chairperson of the General
Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), was removed as a member of the
Board of Directors (the Board) and thereafter, respondent, Oscar Paguinto and his group took
over the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations.
Complainant thus filed a complaint for annulment of the proceedings of her removal as well
as other members of the Board and a complaint against respondent for disbarment alleging
that respondent had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly, among
others, Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court, when having
ordered to submit position papers and despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time, did
not file any position paper and further ignored the Courts subsequent show cause order.
Moreover,

respondent

caused

the

filing

of

baseless

criminal

complaints

against

complainant.
Issue: Whether or not respondents acts constitute a violation of the provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, particularly, Canon 10.
Held: Yes, lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondents
deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not
only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts
and to show respect to their processes. The Court further noted that respondent had
previously been suspended from the practice of law for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. Hence, a more severe
penalty is thus called for, respondent was subjected to suspension for two years
A.C. No. 7922

October 1, 2013

MARY ANN T.MATTUS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALBERT T. VILLASECA, Respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Mary Ann T. Mattus against Atty.
Albert T. Villaseca for gross and inexcusable negligence in handling Criminal Case No. 1030902.
Background Facts
The complainant, German Bernardo D. Mattus and Dexter Aligan were the accused in
Criminal Case No. 10309-02 a case for estafa thru falsification of public document filed in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite. The complainant and her husband,
German, engaged the services of Atty. Villaseca to represent them in the proceedings. The
complainant maintained that she and German were convicted due to Atty. Villasecas gross
and inexcusable negligence in performing his duties as their counsel.
In her complaint-affidavit,1 the complainant alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca: (1)
was often absent during court hearings but still collected appearance fees; (2) frequently
sought the postponement of trial when he was present; (3) failed to ask the RTC to direct a
National Bureau of Investigation expert to examine the signatures of the spouses Leslie and
Zuraida Porter2 in the special power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to file a demurrer to
evidence despite having been granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit one; (5) failed to
present evidence on behalf of the defense, and only filed a memorandum; (6) did not inform
her and German of the dates of the presentation of defense evidence and the promulgation
of judgment; and (7) erroneously indicated the wrong case number in the notice of appeal.
According to the complainant, Atty. Villasecas negligence in handling the case resulted in
her own and her husbands conviction.
In the Courts Resolution3 of July 16, 2008, we required Atty. Villaseca to comment on the
complaint.
On September 10, 2008, Atty. Villaseca filed his comment, 4 refuting the allegations against
him. Atty. Villaseca explained that he made known to the complainant that the testimony of
a handwriting expert was necessary only if the prosecution would be able to produce the
original copy of the SPA. Atty. Villaseca also claimed that his absences during the hearings,
as well as his numerous motions for postponement, were justified and were never intended
for delay. He denied having collected appearance fees when he did not attend the scheduled
hearings, and maintained that the fees he received were intended to compensate him for his
services in the other cases filed by the complainant. Atty. Villaseca further claimed that he
immediately corrected the case number in the notice of appeal when he discovered this
error.
In a Resolution5dated October 15, 2008, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In his Report and Recommendation6 dated September 16, 2009,Investigating Commissioner

Salvador B. Hababag recommended that Atty. Villaseca be suspended for six (6) months
from the practice of law.
Commissioner Hababag ruled that Atty. Villasecas reckless and gross negligence deprived
his clients of due process; his actuations in the criminal case showed utter disregard for his
clients life and liberty. Commissioner Hababag explained that Atty. Villaseca failed to file a
demurrer to evidence despite the sufficient length of time that had been given to him by the
RTC to submit this pleading, and waived his right to present evidence for the defense, opting
instead to file a memorandum only. Commissioner Hababag concluded that Atty. Villasecas
failure to properly attend to the interests of his clients led to their conviction.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-2517 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, but increased Atty. Villasecas
period of suspension from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year.
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to
support the IBPs findings. We, however, increase Atty. Villasecas period of suspension from
the practice of law from one (1) year to five (5) years.
We stress at the outset that a lawyer "is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to
preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves
the ends of justice."8 Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. He owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in maintenance and
defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end
that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. A
lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession.9
The records of the present case show that Atty. Villaseca had been grossly remiss in handling
Criminal Case No. 10309-02. To recall, Atty. Villaseca requested for time to file demurrer to
evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. In its order 10 of July 1, 2004, the RTC
gave him 20 days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes within which to file a
demurrer to evidence. Atty. Villaseca, however, did not file a demurrer to evidence, without
offering any explanation why he failed to do so. As a result, the RTC issued an
order 11 stating that Atty. Villaseca "is deemed to have waived his right to file the said
pleading."
To our mind, Atty. Villasecas failure to submit a demurrer to evidence to explain such
omission constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in
preserving his clients cause. We point out that nine months had lapsed from the time the
RTC granted Atty. Villaseca 20 days to file the demurrer to the time it ruled that he was
deemed to have waived his right to file this pleading. Clearly, Atty. Villasecas actuations
violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer

shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so."
The records further disclosed that after Atty. Villasecas failure to file a demurrer to evidence,
the RTC set the initial presentation of defense evidence on May 9, 2005. However, this
hearing was postponed thrice: the May 9, 2005 hearing was reset to August 8, 2005 due to
Atty. Villasecas failure to appear;12 the August 8, 2005 hearing was reset to November 17,
2005 upon Atty. Villasecas motion;13 and the November 17, 2005 hearing was reset to March
1, 2006 because of Atty. Villasecas manifestation that his intended first witness was
unavailable.14During the March 1, 2006hearing, the respondent manifested that the defense
would no longer present any evidence, and moved that he be given time to file a
memorandum.15
We point out that the prosecution rested its case on July 1, 2004; yet Atty. Villaseca waited
until March 1, 2006 only to manifest that he would no longer present any evidence. We are
at a loss why Atty. Villaseca chose not to present any evidence for the defense, considering
that the accused wanted and were ready to take the witness stand. As a result, the
testimony of the lone prosecution witness remained uncontroverted. To make matters worse,
Atty. Villaseca directed German to attend the hearing on June 6, 2007without informing him
that it was already the date of the promulgation of judgment.1wphi1
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." 16 It further
mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." 17 It also
states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."18
Atty. Villasecas failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the
defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it
showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and
livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts tore but the
presented prosecution evidence. He could have presented the complainant and/or her
husband to the witness stand, instead of just opting to file a memorandum. Or, at the very
least, the reason for this move should have been fully explained to the clients, and later to
the IBP and to this Court. But no such explanation ever came. We are thus left with the stark
reality that Atty. Villaseca failed to file, despite the promise made to the lower court, a
demurrer to evidence. After failing in this first line of defense for his clients, it should have
been incumbent upon Atty. Villaseca to present evidence for the defense, but again, he
unexplainably failed to do this, leaving the lower court with no evidence to appreciate
except that of the prosecution, to the detriment of his clients cause.
We emphasize that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ
in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of
the law to support his clients cause. A memorandum, no matter how lengthy, should not be
made a substitute for testimonial, object or documentary evidence, more so in a criminal
case where a conviction could lead to dire consequences. In saying so, we are not
insinuating that the RTC decision would have tilted in favor of the defense had Atty. Villaseca

presented evidence; we simply stress that utmost fidelity and attention are demanded once
counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client's cause.
We again remind members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the
legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting
the latter's interest with utmost diligence. It is his duty to serve his client with competence
and diligence, and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law,
the interests of his client.19 A lawyers diligence and vigilance is more imperative in criminal
cases, where the life and liberty of an accused is at stake. Verily, the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the
court, to the bar and to the public. As we explained in Spouses Bautista v. Atty. Arturo
Cefra:20
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They
must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients,
in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
"The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts."21 Under the circumstances, we find that the IBPs
recommended penalty of one years suspension from the practice of law is not
commensurate to Atty. Villasecas transgressions. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society indicate a high degree of
irresponsibility that casts dishonor on the legal profession.
The present case finds a close forerunner in Santeco v. Atty. Avance, 22 where we suspended
Atty. Luna B. Avance from the practice of law for five(5) years for being grossly remiss in the
performance of her duties as counsel. In this cited case, the civil case entrusted to Atty.
Avance was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During the pendency of her motion for
reconsideration (which she had filed way beyond the reglementary period), she told her
client that she would file a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the dismissal of the
civil case. She did not file this petition, but failed to inform her client of this omission.
Moreover, Atty. Avance stopped appearing as counsel for her client without notifying the
latter.
Atty. Villasecas negligence in the present case had much graver implications, as the legal
matter entrusted to him involved not merely money or property, but the very liberty and
livelihood of his clients. We stress that the moment Atty. Villaseca agreed to handle the
complainants criminal case, he became duty-bound to serve his clients with competence
and diligence, and to champion their cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford
his clients every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law, Atty. Villaseca fell short
of what is expected of him as an officer of the Court. We cannot overstress the duty of a
lawyer to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.

All told, Atty. Villaseca showed a wanton and utter disregard to his clients cause; his failure
to exercise due diligence in attending to their interest in the criminal case caused them
grave prejudice. Under the circumstances, we find a five-year suspension from the practice
of law to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against him. The increased penalty serves
the purpose of protecting the interest of the Court, the legal profession and the public.
WHEREFORE premises considered, we find Atty. Albert T. Villaseca guilty of negligence, in
violation of Rules 12.03 and 18.03 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133090

January 19, 2001

REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners,

vs.
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the
Court of Appeals1affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus,
Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of
court.1wphi1.nt
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of
Civil Case NO. 1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel2 Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and
Beatriz Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance
and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in
the sala of respondent judge Dolores S. Espaol of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch
90, Imus, Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial
court issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant
Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996,
petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to
the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was
granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the
defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on
November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt of Court. 3
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the
following incident transpired:

ATTY. BUGARING:

For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.

ATTY. CORDERO:

Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our
motion for contempt, your Honor. May we know from the record if the
Register of Deeds is properly notified for today's hearing.

COURT:

Will you call on the Register of Deeds.

INTERPRETER:

Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING:

We are ready, your Honor.

COURT:

There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court
which directed your office to register lis pendens of the complaint in
connection with this case of Royal Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis
Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o'clock [in the morning] the
subpoena.

ATTY. BUGARING:

May we put in on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of

the Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor
please, and the record will bear it out. Until now they did not file any
answer, opposition or pleadings or pleadings with respect to this motion.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only
the Deputy Register of Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk
of our office regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I
received this morning the subpoena, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the
respondent that he was not informed.

COURT:

That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here
is recorded.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we
will be [filing] a case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him
your Honor please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of
Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of the official duty of the clerk
not to inform the parties concerned.

COURT:

Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the
video recording at this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court
that such proceedings should be taken.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just
accompanied me this morning.

COURT:

Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure
the permission of this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.

COURT:

Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that
shots should be done.

ATTY. BUGARING:

This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from
an occasion last night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I
could prove your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other
matters your Honor please. I was just surprised why he took video tape your
Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend this Court
your Honor please.

COURT:

It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary

authority or permission should be secured.

ATTY. BUGARING:

In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.

COURT:

After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please,
that is personal to that guy your Honor please if this representation is being
.

COURT:

That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.

ATTY. BUGARING:

At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary
evidence as part of our motion for contempt, your Honor please.

COURT:

What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this
contempt you are talking. I am willing now to testify.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This
is a criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.

COURT:

If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for

the Register of Deeds.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your
Honor.

COURT:

That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply
represented.

ATTY.
CONCEPCION:

As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing.

ATTY. BARZAGA4:

Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just
mark our documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and
thereafter your Honor please.

COURT:

You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by
newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as
the privately hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of
this contempt proceedings. How much time do you need to go over the
record of this case so that we can call the other case in the meanwhile.

ATTY. BARZAGA:

Second call, your Honor.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COURT:

Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?

ATTY. BARZAGA:

Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the
case your Honor, I noticed that the motion for contempt of Court was filed
on November 6, 1966 and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated
that, 'the record of the case shows up to the filing of this motion, the
Register as well as the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of the Office
of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not comply with the
Court Orders dated February 27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively.'
However, your Honor, Atty. Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter
coming from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September 18, 1996 addressed

to the Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT Nos. T519248, 519249 and 519250 and this letter request, your Honor for the
annotation of the lis pendens clearly shows that it has been already entered
in the book of primary entry. We would like also to invite the attention of the
Hon. Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was filed on November 6,
1996. The letter for the annotation of the lis pendens was made by the
counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996, your Honor. However,
your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has already been issued
by the Hon. Court reading as follows, 'Wherefore in view of the above, the
motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL the notice of lis pendens
annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248, 51949 (sic) and
51950 (sic).'
ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our
documentary evidence.

COURT:

You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The
counsel has just made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let
us wait until he is finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what
to do to have an orderly proceedings in this case.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated
your Honor, considering that the order regarding the annotation of the lis
pendens has already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just
request that we be given a period of ten days from today your Honor, within
which to submit our formal written opposition your Honor.

COURT:

Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by
Atty. Tutaan in connection with the refusal of the Register of Deeds to
annotate the lis pendens because of certain reasons. According to the
manifestation of Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier part of the
record of this case, the reason for that is because there was a pending
subdivision plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March, 1996. May 1
have the record please.

ATTY. BARZAGA:

Yes, your Honor.

COURT:

This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this,

your Honor.

COURT:

Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court

can be guided accordingly. Because this Court believes that the root of the
matter started from that. After the submission of the . What are you
suppose to submit?

ATTY. BUGARING:

Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in

contempt of Court.

COURT:

After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment
to the counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the counsel for the
plaintiff an equal time within which to submit his reply.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor

please, that we will be marking first our documentary evidence because this
is set for hearing for today, your Honor please.

COURT:

If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment
yet what are we going to receive as evidence.

ATTY. BUGARING:

If your Honor please

COURT:

Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the
submission of the comment.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion
for contempt was copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado
Concepcion.

COURT:

Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to
do. This should be an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a
Court of record the comment has to be in first then in your reply you can
submit your evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put up by
the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case smoothly.

ATTY. BUGARING:

My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time
furnished of this contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they
should have filed it in due time in accordance with the rules and because it
is scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and present to this
Court, your Honor

COURT:

(Banging the gavel) Will you listen.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am listening, your Honor.

COURT:

And this Court declares that you are out of order.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all
officers of the Court, your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we know also
our procedure, your Honor.

COURT:

If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first
and then do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of
the Court of this representation ever since I appeared your Honor please
and I put on record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.

COURT:

Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)

ATTY. BUGARING:

Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.

COURT:

Do that right away.

ATTY. BUGARING:

We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our
witness.

COURT:

You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was
presented.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I did not.

COURT:

With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file
his comment.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on
anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying
this case.

COURT:

You can do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.

COURT:

As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.

ATTY. BUGARING:

Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.

COURT:

Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the
horse.

ATTY. BUGARING:

No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than
this Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, I've been winning in
many certiorari cases, your Honor.

COURT:

Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court.
(Banging the gavel) You call the police and I am going to send this lawyer in
jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.

COURT:

You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion
of this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING:

I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is
one way I am protecting my client, your Honor.

COURT:

That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion
of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that this guy is put in
jail." (pp. 29-42. Rollo)

Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Espaol cited petitioner in direct
contempt of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one
(1) operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case
while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that
he was ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in
contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause
the appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they
came from a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow
with him and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel
sent out the cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the
proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its
permission was not sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he
needed the services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio
Barzaga to present him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call,
Atty. Burgaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his
documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that
he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the Motion
has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary
evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the
fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring
appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for
the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so.
Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the
uttered words insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows better than the latter as he

has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the
Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for
allegedly being antagonistic to his client,' and other invectives were hurled to the
discredit of the Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the
Court's sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring
committed an open defiance, even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant,
and contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is
sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His
detention shall commence immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite. 5
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus
Municipal Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00.6
While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December
6, 1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration. Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on
December 8, 1996.7
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before
the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing
him in direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds
that respondent Judge Dolores S. Espaol had no factual and legal basis in citing him in
direct contempt of court, and that said Order was null and void for being in violation of the
Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.8
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic
notes of the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was
indeed arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being
disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the court. 9 It affirmed the order of the
respondent judge, but found that the fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00
prescribed by the Rules of Court,10 and ordered the excess of P1,000.00 returned to
petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
order dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the
petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S SUBMISSIONS
SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE
ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION.11
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the
subject proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent judge had

no factual and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the
court as he always addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please."
We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95
provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings
before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to
subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be
summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both,
if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to
the trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your Honor please"
throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15,
tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts".
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of
the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule
11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from
attributing to a judge "motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to
the case".
3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the
proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) I in utter disregard to
Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to
"maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to maintain its
importance in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to
the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he
was making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by
the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of
Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse
witness "with fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12 of Code of Professional

Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase
"your honor please." For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court
in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and
should not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during
court proceedings.12
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to
the extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said
counsel and the court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and
obstructed the administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administrative of justice.13 Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a
court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without
hearing.14 Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of
respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the
petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The
records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during he hearing in the sala of
respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt order on
the same day.15
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in
espousing the case of his client by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked
despite the respondent judge's contrary order he did so in the honest belief that he was
bound to protect the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda
v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court,
bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA
432, 439). He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends
of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes,
in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."16
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she
erred in imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00
under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16,
1995. It was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals
thus properly ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three
days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit
prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to
return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine
of P3,000.00.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27662

October 29, 1968

MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ATANACIO A. MARDO, as Chief Hearing
Officer of Regional Officer of the Department of Labor, CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA
and MARIO ABITRIA, respondents.
Manuel A. Corpuz for petitioner.
Pagano C. Villavieja and Cecilia E. Curso for public respondent Atanacio A. Mardo.
Hector C. Regino for private respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court, in a resolution of June 21, 1967, was persuaded, regrettably as it turned out, to
give due course to acertiorari and prohibition proceeding with a plea for preliminary
injunction, a restraining order being issued, in view of the rather vehement and earnest
protestations of petitioner Manila Pest ControI, Inc. that it was denied procedural due
process. As will be more fully explained, such is not the case at all.
More specifically, it was alleged that on February 24, 1967, respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission, through its referee, considered a complaint filed against it by
the other respondent, Mario Abitria, for compensation submitted for decision after he and a
physician had testified, petitioner's counsel having failed to appear at the hearing of
February 24, 1967.1 Then came, according to the petition, a motion for reconsideration
dated March 7, 1967, petitioner praying that he be allowed to present evidence on his
behalf.2 It was denied in an order of April 4, 1967, as a decision had already been rendered
against petitioner, as employer, awarding respondent Abitria P6,000.00 as his disability
compensation benefit. It was also pointed out in such order that there was no plea in such
motion for reconsideration for such decision being set aside, as it was limited to seeking an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. It could not be granted as the matter was
looked upon as "moot and academic."3 It was then alleged in the petition that on April 11,
1967, a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was filed with the averment that
petitioner was not aware of any decision rendered in the case as no copy of the same had
theretofore been furnished to its counsel.4 After a denial of such motion for reconsideration
on April 24, 1967, and a plea for execution on behalf of respondent Abitria, which was
granted on June 14, 1967, the City Sheriff of Manila, likewise made a respondent, levied on
petitioner's properties on June 14, 1967, by virtue of the above writ of execution. 5
It is petitioner's contention that in the light of the above alleged infringement of procedural
due process, the actuation of respondent Commission was either in excess of its jurisdiction

or with grave abuse of discretion. That was the basis for the relief sought, seeking a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining City Sheriff of Manila, from proceeding with the sale at
public auction of petitioner's properties and after hearing, annulling the aforesaid writ of
execution and likewise all the proceedings in RO4-WC Case No. 5503, thereafter making the
injunction permanent, and ordering respondent Abitria to pay petitioner the sum of P500.00
as attorney'sfees. Thus was imparted more than just a semblance of plausibility to the
petition, deceptive in character, as subsequent pleadings proved, but nonetheless
insufficient to call for its summary dismissal.
On June 21, 1967, this Court issued a resolution to this effect: "The respondents in L-27662
(Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al.) are required to
file, within 10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition
for prohibition; let temporary restraining order issue, effective immediately and until further
orders from this Court."
The answer of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission of July 21, 1967 and the
later pleadings, revealed quite a different story. It is now quite clear that instead of being the
offended party suffering from a legitimate grievance, its right to due process having been
summarily disregarded, petitioner was not above resorting to every technicality the law
affords to evade the performance of an obligation, which under the law it must fulfill,
namely, to compensate for the serious and debilitating ailment of tuberculosis acquired in
the course of employment by respondent Abitria. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition should be, as it is hereby, denied.
The facts as found by respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission, which must be
deemed conclusive, can yield no other conclusion but the undeniable liability for
compensation to respondent Abitria on the part of petitioner. Thus: "From the recorded
evidence, it appears that claimant was employed with the respondent since February 4,
1956, working six (6) days a week and receiving an average monthly wage of P180.00 as
laborer for the respondent. He was assigned in the Research Division which conducted
research on rat traps and other matters regarding extermination of pests, animals and
insects. It was testified to by the claimant and his witnesses that in the place of his
employment he was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the atmosphere was polluted with
poisonous chemical dusts. The working condition of his place of work was also warm and
humid in view of the products being manufactured by the respondent. He was not extended
any protective device and he was also made to lift heavy objects in the painting and
soldering. In his soldering work muriatic acid and soldering paste [were] used. Sometime in
July, 1966 while the claimant was soldering [he] began to experience symptoms of
pulmonary tuberculosis. Because of his spitting of blood or hemoptysis, he went to consult
Dr. Felix Tuazon of the Quezon Institute whose diagnosis was pulmonary tuberculosis,
chronic, active moderately advanced, right: minimal, left. He was confined at the Quezon
Institute under the care of Dr. Felix Tuazon. According to the attending physician, he was
admitted in the hospital ward as a hemoptic patient or one who is bleeding from the lungs.
When he was admitted he was prescribed Vita K. ampules, bronocal, ablocid, duestrep
injections and other anti-TB drugs. His clinical history showed that the claimant was
diagnosed with severe coughing followed by expectoration of fresh blood amounting to two
glassful [when] he was brought to the Philippine General Hospital and given injection and
was X-rayed. From that hospital he was transferred to the Quezon Institute where he was

subsequently admitted. The attending physician testified further that the right lung had
bronchogenous lesions in the upper lobe with honeycomb at 2nd and 3rd intercostal space,
while the left lung had fibrotic lesion behind the anterior rib II. ... He was discharged from the
Quezon Institute on September 3, 1966, but the illness was not yet arrested although there
was stopping of the hemoptysis. The doctor testified on cross examination that the nature of
work of the claimant involving strenuous physical exertion and other factors of work such as
the lowering of his resistance in view of the enormous inhalation of chemical fumes also
brought about the aggravation of the claimant's present condition. According to the claimant
the respondent was duly notified of his illness through the general manager and in view of
the respondent's refusal to pay him disability compensation despite repeated demands,
claimant filed this instant claim."6
The sole issue then, as accurately set forth in the above decision, was "to determine in this
case ... whether ... there is sufficient or substantial evidence in support of the claim for
disability compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The evidence on
record is crystal clear that the claimant had already substantially proven his case and all
indications point that the illness of moderately advanced, pulmonary tuberculosis was
service connected in view of his work as laborer involving strenuous physical exertion which
brought about the lowering of his resistance due to the massive inhalation of injurious
chemical fumes to the extent that he was made an easy prey to the contraction of TB bacilli.
The fact that there was no evidence on record that claimant was sick upon entrance to his
employment, it is presumed that he was normal in every respect during the first period of his
employment and the disease of pulmonary tuberculosis showed only during the later part of
his employment when he was assigned in the research division of the respondent. The
attending physician himself stated that claimant's exposure to his work aggravated the
illness and we believe that the respondent had failed to dispute the work connection as
there is no showing that claimant's ailment was due to the lowering of his resistance by
causes other than the nature of his work as laborer of the respondent." 7
It must be a realization that no valid defenses could be interposed that prompted petitioner
to rely on the alleged deprivation of due process, a contention, which as will now be shown,
is without basis.
The petition was so worded that the employer's right to be heard appeared to have been
disregarded. No further attention should be accorded such an alleged grievance. If it did not
introduce any evidence, it had itself solely to blame. No fault could be attributed to
respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. There must be such a realization on the
part of petitioner for its four-page memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument did not
bother to discuss such a matter at all. Accordingly, such a contention need not detain us
further as it ought never to have been raised in the first place.
Petitioner would make much however of the allegation that, as shown in the answer of
respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission,8 the decision was sent to a certain
Attorney Manuel Camacho but care of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel Corpuz.
Petitioner would emphasize that the one "officially furnished" with a copy of such decision
was not its counsel, who was without any connection with the aforesaid Attorney Camacho.
It would conclude, therefore, that it had not received a copy of a decision which could not
thereafter reach the stage of finality calling for a writ of execution.

This contention was squarely met in the reply-memorandum of November 6, 1967 of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. Why it happened thus was explained in an affidavit
of one of its employees, a certain Gerardo Guzman, included therein. 9 As set forth in such
reply memorandum: "As stated in the affidavit of Mr. Guzman, he went to the office of Atty.
Corpuz, on March 10, 1967 to deliver a copy of the decision ..., but Atty. Corpuz refused to
receive the said decision alleging that he was no longer handling the case. Atty. Corpuz,
instead instructed Mr. Guzman to deliver the said decision to Atty. Camacho since it was
already Atty, Camacho who was handling the case, and Atty. Camacho, according to Atty.
Corpuz, even had the records of the case."10In view of such instruction, it was further noted,
Guzman "went the office of Atty. Camacho, but since Atty. Camacho was not around he
handed the copy of the decision to the receiving clerk therein, who received it as evidenced
by the stamp pad bearing the name of the Law Office of Camacho, Zapa, Andaya &
Associates on the attached true copy of the Notice of Decision, ..." 11
From which it could make the apt observation. "It is indeed sad to note that after the
Counsel for Petitioner refused to receive the copy of said decision, he is now impugning the
delivery of said decision to Atty. Camacho and is denying knowledge of it when in fact and
truth the delivery of said decision to Atty. Camacho was made per his instruction to Mr.
Guzman, as evidenced by the attached affidavit of Mr. Guzman."12
In view of the rather persuasive character of such an affidavit and the understandable
reflection on the actuation of counsel for petitioner, there was, as could be expected
submitted by petitioner's counsel a rejoinder, dated November 26, 1967. He would have this
Court believe that the reply-memorandum is contradicted by what appeared in respondents'
answer, where it was stated that a copy of the decision was received, not by him but by the
law office of a certain Attorney Camacho. He would then ask why Guzman did not serve a
copy of the decision to him. He would even assume, for argument sake, that there was a
refusal on his part to accept a copy of this decision, but he would argue why did not
Guzman, who could be expected to know the duties of a service officer, fail "to state said
refusal in his official return."
Which of the above conflicting versions is entitled to credence? That of respondent
Workmen's Compensation Commission would appear to be more in accordance with the
realities of the situation. It is entitled to belief.
This would not be the first time, in the first place, where out of excess of zeal and out of a
desire to rely on every conceivable defense that could delay if not defeat the satisfaction of
an obligation incumbent on one's client, counsel would attempt to put the most favorable
light on a course of conduct which certainly cannot be given the stamp of approval. Not that
it would clear counsel of any further responsibility. His conduct leaves much to be desired.
His responsibility aside, it made evident why, to repeat the effort to evade liability by
petitioner by invoking the due process guaranty must not be rewarded with success.
Under the above circumstances, no due process question arose. What was done satisfied
such a constitutional requirement. An effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the
decision; that such effort failed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel. True,
there was a denial; it is far from persuasive, as already noted. It does not have the ring of

truth. There is no reason why the decision would have been served on some other counsel if
there where no such misinformation, if there where no such attempt to mislead.
No benefit would have accrued to respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. It was
merely performing its official function. Certainly, it could be expected to see to it that the
law's beneficiaries were not inconvenienced, much less frustrated, by its failure to follow the
regular procedure prescribed. It was unlikely that the employee entrusted with serving a
copy of the decision, in this particular case, and in this particular case alone, would depart
so radically from what the law requires, if there were no such intervening cause that resulted
in his going astray. How could petitioner escape responsibility?
Petitioner, and petitioner alone, could be expected to furnish such a cause. Who would
benefit thereby? The answer cannot be in doubt. Through such circumstance, wether
intended or otherwise, a basis was laid for at least a delay of the fulfillment of a just claim.
For it is to be noted that there is no, as there could not be any, valid ground for denying
compensation to respondent Abitria on the facts as found. Considering how great and
pressing the laborer's need for the compensation due him was and the consequent
temptation to settle for less if in the meanwhile, the money he had the right to expect, was
not forthcoming, petitioner, as the employer liable, had everything to gain and nothing to
lose by such a turn of events. Even if it were an honest mistake, the consequences were still
deplorable.
It is quite revealing that in not one of the pleadings filed by petitioner did it ever indicate
how it could validly avoid its liability under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which
disclosed that the ailment suffered by respondent Abitria while in its employment was
indeed compensable. Neither in its memorandum submitted on October 19, 1967 nor
rejoinder of November 21, 1967, did it ever occur to petitioner to allege that if given the
opportunity for hearing it could interpose a plausible, not to say a valid defense. It did not do
so because it could not do so. Our decisions as to the undeniable liability of an employer
similarly situated are impressive for their number and unanimity. 13
It would thus be grimly ironic if the due process concept, in itself an assurance and a
guaranty of justice and fairness, would be the very vehicle to visit on a hapless and
impoverished litigant injustice and unfairness. The law itself would stand in disrepute, if such
a gross perversion of its dictates were allowed. Any other view is unthinkable. Otherwise,
there would be a stultification of all our efforts to promote social justice 14 and a mockery of
the constitutional ideal of protection to labor.15
Considering the above, it is not enough that petitioner be required to pay forthwith the sum
due respondent Abitria. The unseemly conduct, under the above circumstances disclosed, of
petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz calls for words of reproof.
It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability to protect the interest of one's client. It is
quite another thing, and this is to put it at its mildest, to take advantage of any unforeseen
turn of events, if not to create one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due
and demandable, especially so, when as in this case, the obligee is a necessitous and
poverty-stricken man suffering from a dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts so many

of our countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far beyond the means of
our poverty stricken masses.
The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses fairness and honor; that must ever be
kept in mind by everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and who expects to remain a member
in good standing. This Tribunal is rightfully entrusted with the serious responsibility of seeing
to it that no deviation from such a norm should be countenanced. If what occurred here
would not be characterized for the shocking thing it was, then it could be said that the law is
less than fair and far from honorable. What happens then to the ideal that only he is fit to
belong to such a profession who remains a faithful votary at the altar of justice? Such an
ideal may be difficult to approximate. That is true, but let it not be said that when such a
notorious breach of its lofty standard took place, as unfortunately it did in this case, this
Court exhibited magnificent unconcern.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied.
With treble costs against petitioner to be paid by his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.
Malonzo v. Principe
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a complaint[1] dated December 1, 2003 for the disbarment of respondent

Atty. Salvador N. Moya II filed by complainant Jerry T. Wong with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1172 for
violation of Batas Pambansa 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt.

Complainant avers that he is the owner of J & L Agro-vets, a company engaged in the
business of selling agricultural and veterinary products and medicine.

Sometime in 1997,

he retained the services of respondent for the purpose of collecting due and demandable
debts in favor of the company. Respondent also handled personal cases of complainant and
his wife.

As their relationship prospered, respondent asked financial help from complainant for
the construction of his house and purchase of a car. Complainant willingly helped
him. Pursuant to their arrangement, complainant purchased a car on installment basis from
Transfarm for respondent. He

issued postdated

checks to cover its payment to

Transfarm. The respondent in turn issued checks in favor of the complainant to reimburse
the latter.

The checks issued by complainant in favor of Transfarm were duly encashed upon
presentment. However, the checks issued by respondent to reimburse complainant were
dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Respondent refused to comply with the
repeated demands of the complainant to replace the dishonored checks.

Furthermore, complainant introduced respondent to Quirino Tomlin and to the owner

of Unisia Merchandising Corporation, from whom respondent obtained construction materials
for the construction of his house on credit in the amount of P164,000.00. Respondent also
failed to pay this indebtedness, which remained unsettled and thus caused embarrassment
to complainant.

Respondent as well handled another case of complainant against Berting Diwa,

docketed as Civil Case No. 1482 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan. It was decided on September 21, 2000. After the decision became final and
executory, complainant and his wife sought the execution of the judgment through
respondent.

On August 15, 2001, Diwa paid the amount of P15,680.50 for the satisfaction of the
judgment. As complainants counsel, respondent received the payment but he did not
inform complainant about it. Complainant had knowledge of it only when he got hold of a
copy of the Manifestation with Prayer to Terminate Proceedings filed by respondent before
the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.

On December 1, 2003, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to file his answer to the
complaint for disbarment within 15 days from receipt of thereof. He filed three motions for
extension of time to file his responsive pleading/answer. The first motion dated January 5,
2004 asked for a 15-day extension from January 5, 2004 or until January 20, 2004within
which to file his responsive pleading. He filed on January 20, 2004 his second motion for
extension of time for another 15-day or until February 4, 2004.[2] On February 4, 2004, he
filed a Manifestation/Explanation for Extension of Time to File Responsive
Pleading/Answer/Motion to Dismiss, citing that as early as October 1, 2003, complainants
third cause of action pertaining to a debt with Unisia Merchandising was already filed in
court.

Subsequently, he filed his Motion to Dismiss [3] dated February 27, 2004 on the
following grounds:

That complainant is not the proper party in interest and has no cause
of action.
That complainant has prematurely prejudged respondent relative to
the latters intention of not paying his debt as the former impresses the
honorable body that respondent would not pay at all.
That complainants action in the Berting Diwa case should be
addressed to the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and not to the
IBP.

In the aforesaid motion, respondent never denied and even acknowledged what he
described as honest debts to Unisia Merchandising and Mr. Tomlin, [4] which he admitted he
was unable to pay on time due to financial constraints.

He added that the IBP, being not a

collection agency, was not the proper forum to lodge the complaint against him that merely
concerned the collection of his monetary obligations which were then subject of pending
court suits. Similarly, respondent argued that the complaint against case should be
addressed to the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.

On April 28, 2004, the IBP-CBD issued an Order [5] denying respondents motion to
dismiss as it is prohibited pleading under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission. Respondent was given a new period of fifteen (15) days within which to file
his verified answer.

On May 28, 2004, respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration [6] which was denied
in an Order dated June 16, 2004.[7]

On June 28, 2004, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Give Respondent
Extension of Time to File His Answer/or Responsive Pleadings,[8] requesting for a fresh period
of fifteen (15) days or until July 13, 2004 to file his answer.

In the Order dated June 30,

2004, respondents motion was granted with warning that no further request for extension
shall be entertained.[9]

On July 13, 2004, respondent filed another Very Urgent Motion for Extension to File
Answer,[10] seeking another period of ten (10) days within which to file his answer or
responsive pleading. On July 21, 2004, the IBP-CBD issued an Order finding the ground for
extension not justifiable. Respondent was also declared in default and complainant was
directed to file his verified position paper within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order,
after which, the case shall be considered submitted for report and recommendation, with or
without the position paper.

On July 23, 2004, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Terminate

Proceedings on the Ground of Prescription, considering that six (6) months had already
passed from the date of discovery of the offense.[11]

On August 10, 2004, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Recall Order Dated July
21, 2004[12] in the interest of higher justice and fair play.

On January 3, 2005, the IBP-CBD issued an Order giving both parties a period of ten
(10) days to file their respective verified position paper, as follows:

Respondent should be informed that a complaint for disbarment,

suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date
of the professional misconduct. (Section 1, Rule VIII, Rules of Procedure of
the Commission on Bar Discipline). And records show that the acts
complained of took place in 2002.
In the interest of justice, both parties are given ten (10) days from
receipt of this Order to file their respective verified position papers. After the
expiration of the said period, with or without the position paper, the case shall
be considered submitted for report and recommendation.

Respondent did not file any responsive pleading at all.

Thus, on April 27, 2005, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Rebecca VillanuevaMaala submitted her Report and Recommendation.[13] She recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. The pertinent portions of the said
Report and Recommendation read as follows:

After a careful study and consideration of the facts and evidence

presented, we find merit to warrant disciplinary action against
respondent. His failure to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due
notice on several occasions and to appear on the scheduled hearings set,
shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his
despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary
sanction. (Ngayan v. Tugade, 193 SCRA 779).
Respondents contention that there were cases already filed in court
against him is of no moment. The pendency of a criminal action against a
respondent from the facts of which the disciplinary proceedings is predicated,
does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the
disbarment case (In re Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1; Calo v. Degamo, 20 SCRA 447).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is hereby recommended that respondent
ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II be SUSPENDED for a period of ONE YEAR from
receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a
member of the Bar.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[14]

On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Maala in its Resolution No. XVII2005-113.[15] Respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years
with a notification that this suspension of two (2) years must be served in succession to the
initial recommendation of the IBP Board of Suspension of two (2) years in CBD Case No. 031171, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondents violation of B.P. 22 and for failure and refusal to comply with his
obligations, Atty. Salvador N. Moya is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years, with a notification that this suspension of two years must
be served in succession to the initial recommendation of the IBP Board of
Suspension of two years in CBD Case No. 03-1171.[16]

On January 12, 2006, respondent through counsel filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a notice informing it that respondent is filing an Appeal Memorandum. On
the same date, respondent filed his Appeal Memorandum with the following assignment of
errors:
I

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS SUSPENSION FORM THE PRACTICE
OF LAW FOR TWO (2) YEARS FOR HAVING ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO FILE HIS
ANSWER ON THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT DESPITE DUE NOTICE.
II
THE
BOARD
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
INTEGRATED
BAR
OF
THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS SUSPENSION
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO (2) YEARS FOR HAVING ALLEGEDLY
VIOLATED BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE BOUNCING
CHECKS LAW.
III
THE
BOARD
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
INTEGRATED
BAR
OF
THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS SUSPENSION
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO (2) YEARS FOR HAVING ALLEGEDLY
REFUSED TO SETTLE HIS OBLIGATIONS.

On January 31, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution noting the aforesaid Notice of
Resolution No. XVII-2005-113 dated October 22, 2005 of the IBP.[17]

On various dates,[18] the Court issued Resolutions noting the following pleadings filed
by the respondent:

1. Appeal Memorandum filed on January 12, 2006;

2. Manifestation/Supplement[19] to the Appeal Memorandum With Motion to

Give Due Course To said Pleading More So That The IBP Had Gone Beyond the
Period Provided For By Law To Conduct Investigation As In The Case of
Malonzo v. Principe, 447 SCRA 1.

3. Urgent Manifestation with Motion to Remand the Case to the IBP-CBD and
Treat the Appeal Memorandum as Motion for Reconsideration to the
Resolution of the IBP-CBD filed on November 3, 2006.

At the outset, respondents Urgent Manifestation with Motion to Remand the Case to
the IBP-CBD and Treat the Appeal Memorandum as Motion for Reconsideration to the
Resolution of the IBP-CBD, is denied. It is not necessary to remand this case to the IBP

because the latter no longer have jurisdiction over the case which had already been
endorsed to this Court for final action. Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

Xxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,
determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law
or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

Regarding the merits of the case, we sustain the findings and conclusions of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, as approved, adopted and modified by the IBP Board of
Governors.

Respondent was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing worthless
checks as payment for his loan from complainant and the latters friends which were
incurred at the time when he was engaged as complainants counsel.

He did not deny the

aforesaid allegations but he contended that he committed neither a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility nor any dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct because he
never denied his debts and he was only unable to pay them on time due to financial
constraints.

Respondents contention is untenable.

Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so.[20]

In Lao v. Medel,[21] we ruled as follows:

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all

members of the Bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that [a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In Co v.
Bernardino, [ A.C. No. 3919, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 102] the Court
considered the issuance of worthless checks as violation of this Rule and an
act constituting gross misconduct.

Moreover, in Cuizon v. Macalino,[22] we also ruled that the issuance of checks which
were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty
and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a
ground for disciplinary action. Similarly, Sanchez v. Somoso[23] held that the persistent
refusal to settle due obligations despite demand manifests a lawyers low regard to his
commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem.

This

conduct deserves nothing less than a severe disciplinary action.

Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to
cover the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the
public confidence in the legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless
checks by his dire financial condition. Respondent should not have contracted debts which
are beyond his financial capacity to pay. If he suffered a reversal of fortune, he should have
explained with particularity the circumstances which caused his failure to meet his
obligations. His generalized and unsubstantiated allegations as to why he reneged in the
payment of his debts promptly despite repeated demands and sufficient time afforded him
cannot withstand scrutiny.

The Court finds unmeritorious the justification of the respondent as to his failure to
immediately deliver to the complainant the payment made by Diwa for the satisfaction of
the judgment in Civil Case No. 1482 of the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
accused of delay in the delivery of the sum of money due to his client.

Respondent is

His failure to explain

such delay cannot be excused by his bare allegation that the same had already been
transmitted to the complainant.

His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in this case is also a matter of
serious concern. He submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several extensions of
time to file his answer.

His failure to attend the hearings and belated plea to dismiss the

case, despite orders to the contrary, show a callous disregard of the lawful orders of the duly
constituted authority, which caused undue delay in the IBP proceeding.

This conduct runs

counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility [24] and violates the
lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for
money or malice. Respondent has failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with

conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality and faithful compliance with the Rules of the Legal Profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has
ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not
only a right but a bounden duty as well. [25] Sadly, herein respondents conduct falls short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a member of the legal profession. Accordingly,
administrative sanction is warranted by respondents gross misconduct.

We come now to the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v. Bernardino[26] and Lao v.
Medel[27] we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year
suspension from the practice of law.

However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the
IBP-CBD, i.e., respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, respondent
also had seriously breached his clients trust and confidence to his personal advantage and
had shown a wanton disregard of the IBPs Orders in the course of its proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVII-2005-113 dated October 22, 2005 of the IBP which
found that respondent Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is AFFIRMED in toto. He is hereby SUSPENDED for

two years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it
to all courts for their information and guidance as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant,
which is directed to append a copy to respondents personal record. Let another copy be
furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7062

September 26, 2006
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355]
RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and FREDILYN
BACULBAS,complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. SUING, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Complainants, via a complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have
sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing (respondent) on the grounds of deceit,
malpractice, violation of Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2
Herein complainants were among the complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-0403180-98,
"Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, et al. v.
Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil," for Unfair Labor Practice
(ULP) and Illegal Dismissal, while respondent was the counsel for the therein respondents.
Said case was consolidated with NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98, "Microplast Incorporated v.
Vilma Ardan, et al.," for Illegal Strike.
By Decision of August 29, 2001,3 Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal
Strike case, and declared the employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor
Arbiter disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal strike is dismissed for
lack of merit.
Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and Manuel Rodil are hereby declared
guilty of Unfair Labor Practice for union busting and that the dismissal of the nine (9)
complainants are declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC Case No. 00-04-0316198 for illegal dismissal are directed to reinstate all the complainants to their former

position with full backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement
computed as follows:

3. CRISANTO CONOS

Backwages:

Basic Wage:

2/21/98 10/30/99 = 20.30 mos.

P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30

P104,
504.40

10/31/99 - 10/31/00 = 12 mos.

P223.50 x 26 days x 12

69, 732.00

11/01/00 - 8/30/01 = 10 mos.

P250.00 x 26 days x 10

65,000.00

P239,236.40

13th Month Pay:

1/12 of P239,236.40

19,936.36

SILP

2/16/98 - 12/31/98 = 10.33

mos.
P198.00 x 5 days x 10.33/
12
=

852.22

1/1/99 - 12/31/99 = 12mos.

P223.50 x 5 days x 12/12
= 1,117.50

1/1/00 - 10/30/01 = 20

= 2,083.33

4,053.05

mos.
P250.00 x 5 days x 20/12

P263,225.81

xxxx

7. RONALD SAMBAJON
(same as Conos)

263,225.81

8.FREDELYN BACULBAS
(same as Conos)

263,225.81

9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON
(same as Conos)

263,225.81

Total Backwages

P2,370,674.
38

Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the above-mentioned backwages
including the various monetary claims stated in the Manifestation dated August 24,
1998 except payment of overtime pay and to pay 10% attorney's fees of all sums
owing to complainants.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Decision having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on September 2,
2003 a Writ of Execution.5
In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February
27, 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to by seven of the complainants in the ULP and
Illegal Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent, the Labor
Arbiter dismissed said case insofar as the seven complainants were concerned, by Order
dated March 9, 2004. 6
Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents
or having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative
complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and
Manuel Rodil, "frustrated" the implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting before
the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.

In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against
respondent, together with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutor's Office
of Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No. 04-5203. 7
In his Report and Recommendation8 dated September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner Salvador
B. Hababag, who conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar,
recommended that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded
therefor with warning, in light of his following discussion:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged
manipulation of four alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein
complainants who subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and falsified.
A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar. By doing so he thereby
becomes an Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of
assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings involve, on the one hand, the right of
a litigant to seek redress against a member of the Bar who has, allegedly caused him
damaged, either through malice or negligence, while in the performance of his duties
as his counsel, and, on the other, the right of that member of the Bar to protect and
preserve his good name and reputation, we have again gone over and considered
[the] aspects of the case.
All the cases protesting and contesting the genuineness, veracity and due
execution of the questioned RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent ExParte Motion to Recall, Appeal and Falsification are PENDING resolution in their
respective venues. Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to know the
identities of the herein complainants is not impleaded by the complainants when it
was his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true and real identities of person
executing Release Waiver with Quitclaim.
The old adage that in the performance of an official duty there is that presumption of
regularity unless proven otherwise, such was proven in the January 28, 2005
clarificatory questioning . . . :
xxxx
. . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or not respondent actually committed
the despicable act would seem to be fairly debatable under the
circumstances.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and adopted
the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag.
After the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the
Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP10 transmitted additional records including a Motion to
Amend the Resolution No. XVII-2005-22611 filed by respondent.
One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon (Sambajon), by Petition 12 filed before the OBC,
assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The Petition was filed three days after the 15-day period
to assail the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains that while his counsel received the
Resolution on February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he visited on March 16, 2006 his

counsel who could not reach him, he (Sambajon) having transferred from one residence to
another.
Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind the reason for the 3-day delay in filing the
present petition, in the interest of justice, this Court gives his petition due course.
In respondent's Motion to Amend the IBP Board Resolution, he does not deny that those
whom he met face to face before Commissioner Hababag were not the same persons whom
he saw before Labor Arbiter Santos on February 27, 2004. 13 He hastens to add though that
he was not familiar with the complainants as they were not attending the hearings before
Arbiter Santos.14 Complainants15 and their former counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan16 claim
otherwise, however. And the Minutes17 of the proceedings before the National Conciliation
Mediation Board in a related case, NCMB-NCR-NS-02-081-98, "Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor
Dispute," which minutes bear respondent's and complainants' signatures, belie respondent's
claim that he had not met complainants before.
Respondent, who declared that he went to the Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27,
2004 on the request of his clients who "told him that on February 27, 2004 the seven
claimants w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter Santos [to] submit their respective quitclaims
and waivers," heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of ascertaining the identity of the
parties who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. But respondent himself had the
same responsibility. He was under obligation to protect his clients' interest, especially given
the amount allegedly given by them in consideration of the execution of the documents. His
answers to the clarificatory questions of Commissioner Hababag do not, however, show that
he discharged such obligation.
COMM. HABABAG:
But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask.. that the money of your
client would go to the deserving employee?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because there was already as you call
it before a precedentin February of 1998 when my client directly made
settlement to the nine or eight of the seventeen original complainants, Your
Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po ako nakialam don sa kanilang
usapan because it is my belief that the best way, Your Honor, to have a
dispute settled between the parties is that we let them do the discussion, we'll
let them do the settlement because sometimes you know, Your Honor, sad to
say, when lawyers are involved in a matters [sic] of settlement the dispute
does not terminate as in this case, Your Honor.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Yes. What made you appear on said date and time before Arbiter Santos?
ATTY. SUING:
I was called by my client to go to the office of Arbiter Santos, number one, to
witness the signing of the documents of Quitclaim and Waiver; number 2,

so that according to them someone as a lawyer will represent them in that

proceedings.
COMM. HABABAG:
My query, did it not surprise you that no money was given to you and yet
there would be a signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
I am not, your Honor, because it happened before and there were no
complaints, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
Just because it happened before you did not bother to see to it that there is a
voucher so you just rely on your precedent, is that what you mean?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that the parties who are talking and
it is my client who knows them better than I do, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
So, you just followed the instruction of your client to be present at Arbiter
Cadiente Santos office because there would be signing of Quitclaim Receipt
and Release, it that clear?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
[You] [d]id not bother to ask your client where is the money intended
for the payment of these workers?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not ask.
COMM. HABABAG:
You did not asked [sic] your client who will prepare the documents?
ATTY. SUING:
As far as the documents are concerned, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:

The Quitclaim Receipt and Release?

ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked me before February of 1998.
COMM. HABABAG:
When you say they whom are you referring to?
ATTY. SUING:
I'm referring to my client, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
They asked me attorney can you please prepare us a document of Quitclaim
and Waiver or give us a simple [sic] of Quitclaim and Waiver. I do recall that I
made one but this document, Your Honor, is only a single document where all
the signatories named are present because my purpose there really, Your
Honor, is that so that each of them will be there together and they will identify
themselves, see each other para ho siguradong sila-sila yong magkakasama
at magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing took place in February of
2004 it was made for any [sic] individual, Your Honor, no longer the
document that I prepared when all of the seven will be signing in one
document.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom [sic] made the changes?
ATTY. SUING:
I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the time when I was there, there
are already people there, the seven complainants plus another
woman.18 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
To be sure, respondent's client Manuel Rodil did not request him to go to the Office of Labor
Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive witness to the signing of the Release Waiver and

Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there could only mean that he would exert vigilance
to protect his clients' interest. This he conceded when he acknowledged the purpose of his
presence at the Office of Labor Arbiter Santos, thus:
ATTY. SUING:
To go there, Your Honor, and represent them and see that these document[s]
are properly signed and that these people are properly identified and
verified them in front of Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos.19 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
That there was an alleged precedent in 1998 when a group of complainants entered into a
compromise agreement with his clients in which he "did not participate" and from which no
problem arose did not excuse him from carrying out the admitted purpose of going to the
Labor Arbiter's office "that [the complainants] are properly identified . . . in front of [the]
Arbiter."
Besides, by respondent's own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on
the true identity of those who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. 20 That should
have alerted him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients'
interest. But he was not and he did not.
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is
the opposite of negligence." A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that
norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to
the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and
the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be
taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in
the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the
client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia)
or that "extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence
and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is
ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater
familias. x x x21 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And this Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the answers of his client Manuel
Rodil when the latter testified before Commissioner Manuel Hababag:
COMM. HABABAG:
May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and Release. Ito ho ba sinong may
gawa nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Sila po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo
nitong Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?

MR. RODIL:
Si Atty. Suing po.
ATTY. SUING:
In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa iyo yong mga dokumentong ito
or what?
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa iyo ha hindi na English. Ito
bang Release Waiver and Quitclaim sino ang may gawa nito, sino ang
nagmakinilya nito?
MR. RODIL:
Kami yata ang gumawa niyan.
COMM. HABABAG:
Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino sa inyong mga officer, tauhan
o abogado ang gumawa nito?
MR. RODIL:
Matagal na ho yan eh.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong. Sino ang naghatid nito kay Ariel
Cadiente Santos para pirmahan ni Ariel Cadiente Santos?
MR. RODIL:
Si attorney po.
ATTY. SUING:
Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Commissioner is asking kung sino
ang nagdala ng mga dokumento?
MR. RODIL:
Yong mga tao.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:

Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo muna. Kanino mo inabot

ang bayad sa nakalagay dito sa Release waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Kay attorney po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy mong attorney?
ATTY. SUING:
Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang tanong.
COMM. HABABAG:
Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo.
MR. RODIL:
Opo.
COMM. HABABAG:
Huwag kang tatawa. I'm reminding you serious tayo dito.
MR. RODIL:
Opo serious po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera?
MR. RODIL:
Opo.
COMM. HABABAG:
Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang tinutukoy mo?
MR. RODIL:
Atty. Suing po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay.

ATTY. SUING:
Your Honor,
COMM. HABABAG:
Pabayaan mo muna. I'll come to that. Magkano kung iyong natatandaan ang
perang inabot kay Atty. Suing?
MR. RODIL:
Yan ang hindi ko matandaan.
x x x x22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions in
an apparent attempt not to incriminate him (respondent). His client contradicted
respondent's claim that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared
was not the one presented at the Arbiter's Office, as well as his implied claim that he was
not involved in releasing to the complainants the money for and in consideration of the
execution of the documents.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He
is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or
impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. 23 While the Commission on Bar
Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial
proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the
misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character. 24
In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.25 the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for
his attempts to delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP.
Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension of one month from the practice of law was
enough to give him "the opportunity to retrace his steps back to the virtuous path of the
legal profession."
While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances attendant to the
case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross
misconduct and isSUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months,
with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35252

October 21, 1932

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee.
Nat. M. Balboa and Dominador J. Endriga for appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving
the defendant from the complaint, without a special finding as to costs.
The appellant makes the following assignments of error:
The trial court erred:
1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone
the balance of the judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in favor of
the Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the Court o First Instance of
Manila.
2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in certificate of title No.
11274 situated at Ronquillo Street, Manila, to Mariano Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2),
the appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of condonation to appellee
Uy Teng Piao.
3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the
balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328.
4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such
promise to condone, could bind the appellant corporation.
5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for
the balance of the said judgment from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is "una
senal inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the balance of the said
judgment.
6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of
P8,600, the said judgment in civil case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid even
discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest bidder for the said
property.
7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D-1,
reflects only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case with
the appellant bank.

8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the
amount claimed in the complaint with costs.
On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of
the Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of
P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the
sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said
amount with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and
in case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates
of title Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and
the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila
sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14,
1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.
On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of
his right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on
the same date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net
Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by
the bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of
P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it
when it resold the two parcels of land.
The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33,
with interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.
In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right
to redeem the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 8274 in consideration of an
understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him the
balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant
from the complaint.
In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank
not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon
the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the pertinent part of whose testimony on
direct examination was as follows:
P. En este documento aparece que usted, por consideracion de valor recibido del
Banco Nacional demandante en la presente causa, renuncia a su derecho de
recompra de la propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica subasta el catorce de
octubre de mil novecientos veintecuatro a favor del Banco Nacional; quiere usted
explicar al Honorable Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion de valor? R. Si, seor.
Esto desde mil novecientos veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro, no recuerdo
bien, me haba dicho el seor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos
intereses mensuales. Entonces me dijo Pecson, "como puede usted recibir alquileres
y no paga usted intereses?"

P. Quien es ese seor Pecson? R. Era encargado de este asunto.

P. Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? R. Era encargado de estas
transacciones. Cuando tenia necesidad siempre llamaba yo al seor Pecson.
Entonces hable al seor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los
alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado.
Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la pregunta.
Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el testigo su contestacion.
JUZGADO. Que la termine.
TESTIGO. Me dijo el seor Pecson que es cosa mala para mi "por que usted cobra
alquileres y no paga los intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para cubrir
sus deudas.
P. El seor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes," a que
bienes se referia el ? R. Al terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco.
P. Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el que se refiere aqui en el
Exhibit 1? R. Paco, primeramente, los dos ambos.
P. Pero este Exhibit 1, a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de Ronquillo? R. Parece que
Paco.
P. No recuerda usted muy bien? R. No recuerdo.
P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el seor Pecson mejor que dejara todos sus bienes, le dijo
a usted a favor de quien iba usted a dejar sus bienes? R. Al Banco Nacional.
P. Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el seor Pecson con respecto al saldo
deudor que usted todavia era en deber a favor del Banco Nacional? R. No recuerdo
mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos.
P. Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo, si el cobraria todavia o se le condonaria?
Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me opongo.
JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta.
P. Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una vez otorgado este Exhibit 1?
SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos openemos.
Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los terrenos.

JUZGADO. Puede contestar.

Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.
R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted
esos terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas.
Entonces dije ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta que al fin yo dije
que queria yo comprar.
P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil novecientos veintecinco este
documento Exhibit 1, recibio usted algun centimo de dinero del Banco? R. Nada,
absolutamente.
When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of
defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, the defendant answered that he did not know;
asked when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the defendant replied that he did
not remember.
One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to
redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant
was interested in buying it.
The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was not
residing in Manila at the time of the trial.
With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although
the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a
cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary,
and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal
Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as
the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of
the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer
should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.
Defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. There is no mention in
Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on the part of the bank. Exhibit 1 relates only to the land
in Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant claims, it is
reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to waive his right to
redeem both parcels of land, and that the defendant, a Chines business man, would have
insisted upon some evidence of the agreement in writing. It appears to us that the
defendant waived his right to redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his
wished to purchase it and was willing to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit
the defendant with the full amount of the sale.
Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson and
the defendant as the latter claims, it is not shown that Pecson was authorized to make any

such agreement for the bank. Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by the
board of directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There is no merit in the
contention that since the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate
the alleged agreement. The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold
it at the instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full
amount of the resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver
of his right to redeem.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is
condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7
per cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances.
Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND
NATIONALISM-OLALIA,petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA
ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees,
and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism
and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since
June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up
pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times
obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials
and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen
and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene
and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns
haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.

These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap
and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty.
Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the
pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same
constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for
as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a
resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring
Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and
Nelson Centeno, union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case
and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto
Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor
Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before
the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they
should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW
CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.
On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court,
represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of
record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the
Court for the above-described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be
repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why
their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as
may be warranted under the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency
considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng
Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about
seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro
Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union. 2
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the
resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the
Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.
To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for
the citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated,
the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which
respondents complied with on July 17, 1987.
We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition
of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance
taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES
EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721,
March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an
acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a longrepressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full
force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into
acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be

ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other
pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice
entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice." 3
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free
governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been
invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is
a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision
of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts
should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such
facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." 4
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered
by the courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or
interference." 5 The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to
the dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse
parties and the citizenry at large.
We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in
her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights
of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or
influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof,
is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such
efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and
responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of
their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did
his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this
incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their
duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and
proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a
continuing educational program for their members.
WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth,
no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting
one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the
premises of any and all courts.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL
GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO
IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS

OLIVER
OWEN
L.
GARCIA,
EMMANUEL
VELEZ, petitioners, vs. ATTY. LEONARD DE
GOVERNORS,respondents.

RAVANERA
and
TONY
VERA And IBP BOARD OF

DECISION
TlNGA, J.:
This is a Petition[1] filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony
Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera from being
elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Regional Governors elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP
Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent
President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) was set on April 26,
2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The
election was so set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:
SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one month before the
national convention, the delegates from each region shall elect the governor of their region,
the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution[2] No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16,
2003, reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP
Rizal Chapter, sent a letter [3] dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider
its Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering
to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors
at least one month prior to the national convention of the IBP will prevent it from being
politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates into engaging
in unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render
it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests in the election for governors
not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By Laws, to wit:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within
two days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the
Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such
petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of
Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The
decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be
final and conclusive.

On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution
No. XV-2003-162.[4]
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon
of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed a Petition[5] dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board
seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or third
week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected
Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region.
The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The pertinent
portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the
elections for regional governors and, second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.
WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for the
postponement of the elections especially considering that preparations and notices had
already been completed.
WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the
petition to be premature considering that no nomination has yet been made for the election
of IBP regional governor.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the
petition.[6]
Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same
date, May 29, 2003, the petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the
same reliefs as those sought in their Petition before the IBP.
On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners application, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents,
representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from
proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao. [7]
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection of
the IBP officers from the Chapter Officers up to the Regional Governors constituting the IBP
Board which is its highest policy-making body, as well as the underlying dynamics, to wit:
IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years. The
IBP Chapter Presidents in turn, elect their respective Regional Governors following the
rotation rule. The IBP has nine (9) regions, viz: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater
Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and
Western Mindanao. The governors serve for a term of two (2) years beginning on the 1st of
July of the first year and ending on the 30th of June of the second year.
From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President (EVP)
shall be chosen, also on rotation basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the election of

both the Regional Governors and the Vice President is to give everybody a chance to serve
the IBP, to avoid politicking and to democratize the selection process.
Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the
incumbent EVP will automatically be the National President for the following term.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have
had two (2) National Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected
Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will
automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. For the next term
in turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2007, the EVP immediately before then will
automatically assume the post of IBP National President.
Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his
IBP membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to
Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP presidency. [8] The transfer of
IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of
the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern
Mindanao for it implies that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve
the IBP.[9]
Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional
governor, executive vice-president and national president, the petitioners submit that
respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude. According to them, respondent De
Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC
Justices during the deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. They add that he
could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his clients funds had he
not surrendered his California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having
actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National
Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws. [10]
After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful
Comment [11] on the Petition.
In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no
jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of the
IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the
organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and
exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent De Vera also assails the
petitioners legal standing, pointing out that the IBP By-Laws does not have a provision for
the disqualification of IBP members aspiring for the position of Regional governors, for
instead all that it provides for is only an election protest under Article IV, Section 40,
pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can validly lodge an election protest which is to
be made after, not before, the election. He posits further that following the rotation rule,
only members from the Surigao del Norte and Agusan del Sur IBP chapters are qualified to
run for Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region for the term 2003-2005, and the petitioners
who are from Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental are not thus qualified to be nominees. [12]

Meeting the petitioners contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP
member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership. [13] He cites the last
paragraph of Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a
particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province,
city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is
located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in its
membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated
on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his
membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the
transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in
Section 4, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first of the
above-quoted provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular
Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political
subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no
case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del
Sur IBP Chapter that he transferred his IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits that it
is unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was done for
convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao
governorship.[14]
On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect
to the Court or to any of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the
plunder law. As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when
he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California
license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral
qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is
as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied
upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are
recommendatory in character similar to the recommendatory findings of an IBP
Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final decision of
the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative
case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainants money, but
unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. Finally, on the
alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24,
2003, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was campaigning simply because he
declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for governorship in the Eastern
Mindanao Region and that the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their

claim that he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from his region at the Century Park
Hotel.[15]
On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply[16] to the Respectful Comment of
respondent De Vera who, on July 15, 2003, filed an Answer and Rejoinder.[17]
In a Resolution[18] dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this
case, the IBP Board, to file its comment on the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General
Counsel, filed a Manifestation[19] dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the position stated in
its Resolution dated 29 May 2003 that it finds the petition to be premature considering that
no nomination has as yet been made for the election of IBP Regional Governors. [20]
Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:
(1)

whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;

(2)

whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera,

the determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two subissues, namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper
remedy under the IBP By-Laws; and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;

(3)

whether the present Petition is premature;

(4)

assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present
petition is not premature, whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run
for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region;

Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent
De Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of
the qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such

rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP,
including the election of its officers.
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution.
Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law. It reads:
SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines.
The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly
worded provision in the intervening 1973 Constitution [21] through all the years have been the
sources of this Courts authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The term Bar
refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys.[22]Pursuant to this power of supervision, the Court initiated the integration of the
Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration, which was
tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. [23] Not long after, Republic
Act No. 6397[24] was enacted and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per curiam Resolution of
this Court captioned In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines, we
ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the Rules of
Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power under the 1935
Constitution.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP
independence from the Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 77 [25] of the IBP By-Laws
vests on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu
propio or upon recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15,
[26]
the Court is authorized to send observers in IBP elections, whether local or national.
Section 44[27] empowers the Court to have the final decision on the removal of the members
of the Board of Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the
irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter
No. 491 entitled In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989 elections.
The results of the investigation showed that the elections were marred by irregularities, with
the principal candidates for election committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP ByLaws.28 The Court invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as
well as explicitly disqualified from running thereat the IBP members who were found
involved in the irregularities in the elections, in order to impress upon the participants, in
that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern
disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of
the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering.
The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed
direct election by the House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b)
IBP President; and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system
of the IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from
among themselves on a rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the
automatic succession by the EVP to the position of the President upon the expiration of their
common two-year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional
Governors shall be elected by the members of their respective House of Delegates and that
the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated among the different chapters in the
region.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP
and establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action
against him, respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to
disqualify candidates for Regional Governors since what it authorizes are election protests or
post-election cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within
two days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the
Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such
petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of
Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The
decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be
final and conclusive.
Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification
of candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the
election protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to just anybody.
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees
for the position of regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4)
of the IBP By-Laws, to wit:
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a
candidate must be raised prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by
the Chairman. An appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates in attendance

who shall forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands.
The decision of the Delegates shall be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed.
Recourse to the Board of Governors may be had in accordance with Section 40.
The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of
the Board of Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the
members of the House of Delegates at its annual convention held every other year. 29 The
election was a two-tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret
plurality vote, not less than two nor more than five nominees for the position of Governor for
their Region. The names of all the nominees, arranged by region and in alphabetical order,
were written on the board within the full view of the House, unless complete mimeographed
copies of the lists were distributed to all the Delegates. 30 Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in
his absence, his alternate voted for only one nominee for Governor for each Region. 31 The
nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of votes was declared and
certified elected by the Chairman.32
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court
deemed it best to amend the nomination and election processes for Regional Governors. The
Court localized the elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated and elected by the
delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation process through the following
provisions, to wit:
SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be
governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions
as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one
Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different chapters in the
region.
SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the
national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region,
the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less
controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the
pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation
process operates.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Courts vision of an Integrated Bar
which is non-political33 and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of
the legal profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing to the growth
and progress of the Philippine society.34
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on
disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant
petition has no firm ground to stand on.

Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the
IBP By-Laws, petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not
qualified to be nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He
argues that following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended, only
IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition,
petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section,
only nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the
grounds therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only
IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and
elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant
to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws.
Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and
Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even
qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners
to seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the
Eastern Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated
first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In
fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of the House of
Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets
nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not
really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a
member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the
way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency.
Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the
domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP
Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
Section 19. Registration. ....
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall
be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or
area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case
shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)

It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic
that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is
located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain
membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a member
of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains his office. The only proscription in
registering ones preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter
at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section,
transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set
forth therein, thus:
SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its
membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated
on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his
membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the
transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made
not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer
wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to
Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M.
Vibar wrote a letter35 addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM
Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing
them of respondent De Veras transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in
their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification
mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De Veras transfer was made effective
sometime between August 1, 2001 and September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the
elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as
mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter
Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other
year.36 Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen months had elapsed.
This makes respondent De Veras transfer valid as it was done more than three months
ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not
morally fit to occupy the position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements
provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who
wishes to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good
standing of the IBP;37 2) he is included in the voters list of his chapter or he is not
disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws
of the Chapter to which he belongs; 38 (3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a
regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a new season
or cycle;39 and (4) he is not in the government service.40

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of
moral fitness of a candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of
Delegates. Indeed, based on each members standard of morality, he is free to nominate
and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law.
For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness
should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or
conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged
sanction imposed by the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of
the plunder law, is apparently referring to this Courts Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re:
Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by
Atty. Leonard De Vera.41 In this case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect
contempt of court and was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) for his remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in
the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of the report, with De Veras
statements written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition
filed by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed
vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were greatly disturbed by the rumors from Supreme Court
insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said
Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the
prosecution of Estrada.
We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justicesconsidering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will
most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional
or vague, the group said.42
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001

SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes

Xxx
People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged. said lawyer Leonard De
Vera of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign
movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to
People Power II.
Xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the jueteng scandal that led to People Power II if
the rumor turned out to be true.
People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong.
Sovereignty must prevail. 43
In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made
said statements but denied to have uttered the same to degrade the Court, to destroy
public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute. 44 He explained that he was merely
exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were
aimed at influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of
the Plunder Law.45
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for
which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines 46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on
Elections,47 the Court defines moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. 48 The determination of
whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on the
circumstances attending the violation of the statute.49
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion on a public
interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De
Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his
views on the Plunder Law. 50 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the
administrative case as evidence of respondent De Veras alleged immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was
still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the

California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to
protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it
impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the
absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the
burden to prove the same.51 In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the
administrative complaint affects respondent De Veras moral fitness to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the
delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his
candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be
emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
under our Rules of Court.52
WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the
position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of
Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30
May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in
Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
ordered to hold said election with proper notice and with deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12871

July 25, 1959

TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V.
Cruz against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him
from continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in
connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay
City. To better understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered
from the pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated.
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as
involved and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay
City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis
Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all
appealed the sentence although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the
extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar
Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty
and his former conviction of sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.

It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the
case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway,
intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacaang
conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and
obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those
convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions
obtained by those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacaang. Fiscal Salva
conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held
with the Secretary of Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the
Philippine Constabulary and Malacaang investigators made available to counsel for the
appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial
with this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some
of those persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman,
Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this
Tribunal, action on said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and
determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to
the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written
statements, of which the motion for new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to
conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a committee of three composed of
himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendaio and Ernesto A.
Bernabe.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee,
petitioner Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on
September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be
conducted at the time and place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for
murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking
for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from September 21, due to the fact that this
counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting
upon said request for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on
September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the
jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary
investigation in view of the fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy
was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day filed the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent
Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being
conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent
to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated,

implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing
of Manuel Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case
of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration
before us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would
be obstructing the administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal
of the main case wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced;
neither had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was
because of the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation
with his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence
therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the
contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the
investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to
appear at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request
had been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of
Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being
investigated by Salva and his committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been
interested, even desirous of being present at that investigation so that he could face and
cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their
affidavits or confessions, either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in
the communication, addressed to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled
for September 21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend,
Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was
objecting to his being cited to appear at the investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his
committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though
nominally, for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the
Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is
tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and
actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government
by the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion
for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime
involved in the appeal.
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for
his reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et
al., one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the
reason that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only
after the trial against the other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had
rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista
remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of Realista,

had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that
before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan
of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the
original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and
confessions sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and determine
the value of said evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced
that the persons criminally responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than
those already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants,
including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the
dismissal of the case against Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as
suggested by authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute
and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the
prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to
any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is
unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid
injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding
informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the
United States, theprosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one. (69 United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p.
309, cited in the case of Suarezvs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before
him at the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be
present at that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply
involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions,
affidavits and testimonies respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said
preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said investigation because his
presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation.
Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be
given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter changed his mind
and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said
investigation, he could not be compelled to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent.
If, as contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with
and evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo,

Cosme Camo and others by questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have
conducted the investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare,
much less publicity.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation
was conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of
Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding,
including members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were
everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with
the permission of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and
newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by
the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions,
the first, after Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the
newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let
you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose
Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the
newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours." Why
respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and
address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the
press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the
press and publicize his investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the
press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and
prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this according to the transcript now
before us.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during
the investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and
comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the
incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal
responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally
determined by the lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal,
was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place and
complaisance of respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity
and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In
this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to
find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond
the bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue
publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being
tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when
the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes
inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and
called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an
appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.

Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others
favored the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we
have finally agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the
preliminary investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for
which reason the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary
investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the
said investigation, respondent may not compel him to attend said investigation, for which
reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and
denied in part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva
is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and
sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which
we consider and find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a
repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No
costs.
G.R. No. L-30894 March 25, 1970
EDUARDO L. MARTELINO, CIRILO OROPESA, TEODORO FACELO, RUPERTO AMISOTO,
ALBERTO SOTECO, SOLFERINO TITONG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE ALEJANDRO, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, AVELINO C. MENEZ,
EFRAIN S. MACLANG, ET AL., respondents.
Amelito R. Mutuc for petitioners.
Colonel Manuel V. Reyes (Judge Advocate General, GSC), Major Samuel M. Soriano (JAGS),
Major Higinio E. Dacanay, Jr. (JAGS, PC) and Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant
Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista, Solicitor Jaime M. Lantin and Guillermo Nakar, Jr. for
respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings against the petitioner,
Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and the officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a
result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing
commando training on the island of Corregidor. Once before the question was raised before
this Court whether the general court-martial, convened on April 6, 1968 to try the case
against the petitioners, acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the fact that earlier, on
March 23, a complaint for frustrated murder had been filed in the fiscal's office of Cavite City
by Jibin Arula (who claimed to have been wounded in the incident) against some of the

herein petitioners. The proceedings had to be suspended until the jurisdiction issue could be
decided. On June 23, 1969 this Court ruled in favor of the jurisdiction of the military court. 1
The jurisdiction question thus settled, attention once again shifted to the general courtmartial, but no sooner had the proceedings resumed than another hitch developed. This
came about as the petitioners, the accused in the court-martial proceedings, in turn came to
this Court, seeking relief against certain orders of the general court-martial.
It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino sought the
disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission
that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended that the
case had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact
was being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on
November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court
denied the challenge.
Thereafter the petitioners raised peremptory challenges against Col. Alejandro, as president
of the court-martial, and Col. Olfindo, Lt. Col. Camagay, Lt. Col. Valones, Lt. Col. Blanco and
Col. Malig, as members. With regard to peremptory challenges it was the petitioners'
position that for each specification each accused was entitled to one such challenge. They
later changed their stand and adopted that of the trial judge advocate that "for each
specification jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only 1 peremptory challenge; and
that with respect to the specifications tried commonly, each one of the accused is entitled to
one peremptory challenge." They there contended that they were entitled to a total of
eleven peremptory challenges. On the other hand the court-martial ruled that the accused
were entitled to only one peremptory challenge as the specifications were being jointly tried.
The petitioners therefore filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the orders
of the court-martial denying their challenges, both peremptory and for cause. They allege
that the adverse publicity given in the mass media to the Corregidor incident, coupled with
the fact that it became an issue against the administration in the 1969 elections, was such
as to unduly influence the members of the court-martial. With respect to peremptory
challenges, they contend that they are entitled to eleven such challenges, one for each
specification.
On August 29, 1969 this Court gave due course to the petition, required the respondents as
members of the general court-martial to answer and, in the meantime, restrained them from
proceeding with the case.
In their answer the respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had
received, no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness
and impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own
counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity, experience and background" of the members
of the court. As a preliminary consideration, the respondents urge this Court to throw out the
petition on the ground that it has no power to review the proceedings of the court-martial,
"except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction of the
person and subject matter, and whether, though having such jurisdiction, it had exceeded its

powers in the sentence pronounced," and that at any rate the petitioners failed to exhaust
remedies available to them within the military justice system.
I
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. "The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction." 2 But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of
discretion what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion"
as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. 3 This is precisely the point at issue in this
action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition, namely, whether in
overruling the petitioners' challenges, the general court-martial committed such an abuse of
discretion as to call for the exercise of the corrective powers of this Court. It is thus obvious
that no other way is open to this Court by which it may avoid passing upon the constitutional
issue thrust upon it. Nor will the fact that there may be available remedies within the system
of military justice bar review considering that the questions raised are questions of law. 4
And so the threshold question is whether the publicity given to the case against the
petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial. As already stated, the petitioner
Martelino challenged the court-martial president on the ground that newspaper accounts of
what had come to be referred to as the "Corregidor massacre" might unduly influence the
trial of their case. The petitioner's counsel referred to a news item appearing in the July 29,
1969 issue of the Daily Mirror and cited other news reports to the effect that "coffins are
being prepared for the President (of the Philippines) in Jolo," that according to Senator
Aquino "massacre victims were given sea burial," and that Senator Magsaysay, opposition
Vice President candidate, had gone to Corregidor and "found bullet shells." In addition the
petitioners cite in this Court a Manila Times editorial of August 26, 1969 which states that
"The Jabidah [code name of the training operations] issue was bound to come up in the
course of the election campaign. The opposition could not possibly ignore an issue that is
heavily loaded against the administration." The petitioners argue that under the
circumstances they could not expect a just and fair trial and that, in overruling their
challenge for cause based on this ground, the general court-martial committed a grave
abuse of discretion. In support of their contention they invoke the rulings of the United
States Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd,5 Rideau vs. Louisiana,6 Estes v. Texas,7 and Shepard
v. Maxwell.8
An examination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are widely disparate from
this case in a fundamental sense. In Irvin, for instance, the Supreme Court found that shortly
after the petitioner's arrest in connection with six murders committed in Vanderburgh
County, Indiana, the prosecutor and police officials issued press releases stating that the
petitioner had confessed to the six murders and that "a barrage of newspaper headlines
articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against him during the six or seven months
preceding his trial." In reversing his conviction, the Court said:
Here the "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' shown to be present
throughout the community, ... was clearly reflected in the sum total of the voir
dire examination of a majority of the jurors finally placed in the jury box. Eight

out of the 12 thought petitioner was guilty. With such an opinion permeating
their minds, it would be difficult to say that each could exclude this
preconception of guilt from his deliberations. The influence that lurks in an
opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment
from the processes of the average man. ... Where one's life is at stake and
accounting for the frailties of human nature we can only say that in the
light of the circumstances here the finding of impartiality does not meet the
constitutional standard.9
Irvin marks the first time a state conviction was struck down solely on the ground of
prejudicial publicity. 10 In the earlier case of Shepherd v. Florida, 11 which involved
elements of publicity, the reversal of the conviction was based solely on racial discrimination
in the selection of the jury, although to concurring Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justice
Frankfurter, "It is hard to imagine a more prejudicial influence than a press release by the
officer of the court charged with defendants' custody stating that they had confessed, and
here just such a statement unsworn to, unseen, uncross-examined and uncontradicted, was
conveyed by the press to the jury. 12
In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the robbery of a bank in Lake Charles, Louisiana and in
the kidnapping of three of its employees, and in the killing of one of them, was similarly
given "trial by publicity." Thus, the day after his arrest, a moving picture film was taken of
him in an "interview" with the sheriff. The "interview," which lasted approximately 20
minutes, consisted of interrogation by the sheriff and admission by Rideau that he had
perpetrated the bank robbery, kidnapping and murder. The interview was seen and heard on
television by 24,000 people. Two weeks later he was arraigned. His lawyers promptly moved
for a change of venue but their motion was denied and Rideau was convicted and sentenced
to death. Rideau's counsel had requested that jurors be excused for cause, having
exhausted all of their peremptory challenges, but these challenges for cause had been
denied by the trial judge. In reversing his conviction, the Court said:
[W]e hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request for a
change of venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish had been exposed
repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in
detail to the crimes with which he was later to be charged. For anyone who
has ever watched television the conclusion cannot be avoided that this
spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a very
real sense was Rideau's trial at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any
subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such
a spectacle could be but a hollow formality. 13
In the third case, Estes, the Court voided a televised criminal trial for being inherently a
denial of due process.
The state ... says that the use of television in the instant case was "without
injustice to the person immediately concerned," basing its position on the fact
that the petitioner has established no isolate prejudice and that this must be
shown in order to invalidate a conviction in these circumstances. The State
paints too broadly in this contention, for this Court itself has found instances

in which a showing of actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to reversal. This is

such a case. It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process
deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused.
Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the State involves such a
probability that prejudice will result that it is inherently lacking in due
process. 14
In Sheppard, the celebrated murder case of Sam Sheppard, who was accused of the murder
of his wife Marilyn, the Supreme Court observed a "carnival atmosphere" in which "bedlam
reigned at the courthouse ... and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom,
hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard." It observed that "despite
the extent and nature of the publicity to which the jury was exposed during the trial, the
judge refused defense counsel's other requests that the jury be asked whether they had
read or heard specific prejudicial comment about the case. ... In these circumstances, we
assume that some of this material reached members of the jury." The Court held:
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news
comment on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due process
requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside
influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the
difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial
courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed
against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an
independent evaluation of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that
proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But
where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will
prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates,
or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity. In addition
sequestration of the jury was something the judge should have sua
sponte with counsel. If publicity during the proceeding threatens the fairness
of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must remember that
reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will
prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule
and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside
interference. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused,
witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction
of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration
between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a
criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and
worthy of disciplinary measure. 15
In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a
"massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the
petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to
protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the
conduct of the trial 16 either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove
the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have

subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under
circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of
procedure which have come to be identified with due process.
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the
petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but
simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the
court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners'
challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have
returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity surrounding the
Corregidor incident has so far abated that we believe the trial may now be resumed in
tranquility.
II
Article of War 18 provides that "Each side shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge, but
the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause." The general courtmartial originally interpreted this provision to mean that the entire defense was entitled
to only one peremptory challenge. Subsequently, on August 27, 1969, it changed its ruling
and held that the defense was entitled to eight peremptory challenges, but the petitioners
declined to exercise their right to challenge on the ground that this Court had earlier
restrained further proceedings in the court-martial.
It is the submission of the petitioners that "for every charge, each side may exercise one
peremptory challenge," and therefore because there are eleven charges they are entitled to
eleven separate peremptory challenges. The respondents, upon the other hand, argue that
"for each specification jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory
challenge and that with respect to specifications tried commonly each of the accused is
entitled to one peremptory challenge." Although there are actually a total of eleven
specifications against the petitioners, three of these should be considered as merged with
two other specifications, "since in fact they allege the same offenses committed in
conspiracy, thus leaving a balance of eight specifications." The general court-martial thereof
takes the position that all the 23 petitioners are entitled to a total of only eight peremptory
challenges.
We thus inescapably confront, and therefore now address, the issue here posed.
We are of the view that both the petitioners and the general court-martial misapprehend the
true meaning, intent and scope of Article of War 18. As will hereinafter be
demonstrated, each of the petitioners is entitled as a matter of right to one peremptory
challenge. The number of specifications and/or charges, and whether the accused are being
jointly tried or undergoing a common trial, are of no moment.
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a
handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval
academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of
officers learned in military law, this aside from the fact that the officer corps of the

developing army was numerically inadequate for the demands of the strictly military aspects
of the national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that
peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges
for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War
(Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of
the Act, made no mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge
advocate of a court-martial or by the accused. After December 17, 1958, when the Manual
for Courts-Martial 17 of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's
Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and
education in military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This
program was pursued until the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific on December 7, 1941.
After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of the
officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances
that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12, 1948 to entitle "each side" to one
peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be
challenged except for cause."
By its very inherent nature a peremptory challenge does not require any reason or ground
therefor to exist or to be stated. It may be used before, during, or after challenges for cause,
or against a member of the court-martial unsuccessfully challenged for cause, or against a
new member if not previously utilized in the trial. A member challenged peremptorily is
forthwith excused from duty with the court-martial.
The right of challenge comes from the common law with the trial by jury itself, and has
always been held essential to the fairness of trial by jury. 18
As was said by Blackstone, and repeated by Mr. Justice Story: 'In criminal
cases, or at least in capital ones, there is in favorem vitae, allowed to the
prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number
of jurors, without showing any cause at all, which is called a peremptory
challenge; a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for
which our English laws are justly famous. This is grounded on two reasons: 1)
As every one must be sensible, what sudden impression and unaccountable
prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of
another; and how necessary it is that a prisoner (when put to defend his life)
should have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally
disconcert him; the law has conceived a prejudice even without being able to
assign a reason for his dislike. 2) Because, upon challenges for cause shown, if
the reason assigned prove insufficient to set aside the juror, perhaps the bare
questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment, to prevent
all ill consequences from which, the prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases,
peremptorily to set him aside.' 19
The right to challenge is in quintessence the right to reject, not to select. If from the officers
who remain an impartial military court is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused to
a fair trial is maintained. ... 20

As we have hereinbefore stated, each of the 23 petitioners (accused before the general
court-martial) is entitled to one peremptory challenge, 21 irrespective of the number of
specifications and/or charges and regardless of whether they are tried jointly or in common.
Three overriding reasons compel us to this conclusion.
First, a peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly,
honestly feels that the member of the court peremptorily challenged by him cannot sit in
judgment over him, impartially. Every accused person is entitled to a fair trial. It is not
enough that objectively the members of the court may be fair and impartial. It is likewise
necessary that subjectively the accused must feel that he is being tried by a fair and
impartial body of officers. Because the petitioners may entertain grave doubts as to the
fairness or impartiality of distinct, separate and different individual members of the courtmartial, it follows necessarily that each of the accused is entitled to one peremptory
challenge.
Second, Article of War 18 does not distinguish between common trials and joint trials, nor
does it make the nature or number of specifications and/or charges a determinant.
Reference is made by the respondents here to US military law, in support of their argument
that for each specification jointly tried all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory
challenge and with respect to all specifications tried in common each of the accused is
entitled to one peremptory challenge. We have carefully scrutinized U.S. military law, and it
is unmistakable from our reading thereof that each accused person, whether in a joint or
common trial, unquestionably enjoys the right to one peremptory challenge. 22
Third, a perceptive analysis of the companion articles 23 to Article 18 convinces us that the
word, "each side," as used in the said article in reference to the defense, should be
construed to mean each accused person. Thus, Articles of War 17 (Trial Judge Advocate to
Prosecute; Counsel to Defend), 19 (Oath), 21 (Refusal or Failure to Plead), 28 (Court to
Announce Action), 29 (Closed Sessions), 30 (Method of Voting), and 36 (Irregularities
Effect of), unequivocally speak of and refer to the "accused" in the singular.
ACCORDINGLY, subject to our pronouncement that each of the 23 petitioners is entitled to
one separate peremptory challenge, the present petition is denied. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on August 29, 1969 is hereby lifted. No
pronouncement as to costs. .
In re Request Radio TV Coverage
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners
were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst electionrelated violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident
which came to be known as the Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of

murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly
entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Following the transfer of venue and the
reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of
Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City inside Camp Bagong Diwa
in Taguig City.
Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the
Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the
victims,[1] individual
academe

[3]

journalists[2] from

various

media

entities,

and

members

of

the

filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of

the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape
recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and
reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of
devices.[4] The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.
In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines [5] (NPC) and Alyansa ng
Filipinong Mamamahayag[6] (AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition praying that the
Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City as a special court to focus only on the
Maguindanao

Massacre trial to relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned duties,

and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of video cameras that
shall beam the audio and video signals to the television monitors outside the court. [7] The
Court docketed the petition as A.M.

No. 10-11-6-SC.

President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010 [8] addressed to Chief
Justice Renato Corona, came out in support of those who have petitioned [this Court] to
permit television and radio broadcast of the trial."

The President expressed earnest hope

that [this Court] will, within the many considerations that enter into such a historic
deliberation,attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and humaneness, such a
petition merits.[9] The Court docketed the matter as A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.
By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010, [10] the Court consolidated A.M.
No. 10-11-7-SC with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. The Court shall treat in a separate Resolution
A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.
Meanwhile, various groups[11] also sent to the Chief Justice their respective resolutions
and statements bearing on these matters.
The principal accused in the cases, Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan), filed a
Consolidated Comment of December 6, 2010 in A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC and A.M. No. 10-11-7SC. The President, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and NUJP, et al. filed
their respective Reply of January 18, 2011 and January 20, 2011. Ampatuan also filed a
Rejoinder of March 9, 2011.
On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of
court proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV
and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case [12] and
the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the
Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada [13] which rulings, they
contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be
narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable
alternative.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted
intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused,
and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and
searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict

orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners
allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010
letter

[14]

to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage

of the proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge Solis-Reyes replied, however,
that matters concerning media coverage should be brought to the Courts attention through
appropriate motion.[15] Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the
freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly
and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and
freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live
broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to the guidelines which shall be
enumerated shortly.
Putts Law[16] states that technology is dominated by two types of people: those who
understand what they do not manage, and those who manage what they do not
understand. Indeed, members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the
experts gown, so to speak, in a pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices or
risks from the use of technology inside the courtroom.
A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the Court is once again faced with
the same task of striking that delicate balance between seemingly competing yet
certainly complementary rights.
The indication of serious risks posed by live media coverage to the accuseds right
to

due

process,

left

unexplained

and

unexplored

in

the

era

obtaining

in Aquino andEstrada, has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public
information.
The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now,
inside the comfortable cocoon of a feared speculation which no scientific study in
the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be dealt with by
safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and exacting regulations.

In

this

day

and

age,

it

is

about

time

to

craft

a win-win

situation that

shall not compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom
and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial
proceedings. Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable
solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the same time,
maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm [a] trial of any kind or in any court is a
matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of
entertainment[, and t]o so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and
departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are
formulated. The observation that [m]assive intrusion of representatives of the news
media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere
and decorum stands.
The Court concluded in Aquino:
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due
process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and
considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to
information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and
prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall
not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be
restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the
parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official
proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial
proper.
Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to
prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last
analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court
hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.
[17]

The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case.

It held that [t]he

propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve[s] the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the
one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the

constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial
trial. The Court disposed:
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific
advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid
to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the
concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[18]

In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by Resolution of

September 13, 2001, provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered the audio-visual recording
of the trial for documentary purposes, under the following conditions:
x x x (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such
portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held
public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras
shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of
TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of
scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live
broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its
decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under
pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the
prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control
of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to
rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audiovisual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in
the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for
preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.[19]

Petitioners
Texas

[20]

note

that

the

1965

case

of Estes

v.

which Aquino and Estrada heavily cited, was borne out of the dynamics of a jury

system, where the considerations for the possible infringement of the impartiality of a jury,
whose members are not necessarily schooled in the law, are different from that of a judge
who is versed with the rules of evidence. To petitioners, Estes also does not represent the
most contemporary position of the United States in the wake of latest jurisprudence[21] and
statistical figures revealing that as of 2007 all 50 states, except the District of Columbia,
allow television coverage with varying degrees of openness.

Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage. Almost all the proceedings
of United

Kingdoms

Supreme

Court

are

filmed,

and

sometimes

broadcast. [22] The

International Criminal Court broadcasts its proceedings via video streaming in the internet.
[23]

On the media coverages influence on judges, counsels and witnesses, petitioners

point out that Aquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack empirical evidence to support the
sustained conclusion. They point out errors of generalization where the conclusion has been
mostly supported by studies on American attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study
on the particular matter dealing with Filipinos.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court
judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the
right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v.
Teehankee, Jr.[24] and Estrada v. Desierto,[25] that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of
an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is
not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the
validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional
right. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of
venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the
judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise
exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the
earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases the
private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom. On
public trial, Estrada basically discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to
him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not
be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete
conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it
only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit

in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense,a courtroom should have enough facilities
for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too
small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the
trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to
report what they have observed during the proceedings. [26] (underscoring
supplied)

Even before considering what is a reasonable number of the public who may
observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings
already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that
the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere
curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial
participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have
listed more than 200 witnesses each.

The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will

accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is
unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of
the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of
the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the
Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines toward
addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be
made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and
television broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application,
manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and
technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will
faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover the entire
remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall
be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an application duly approved
by the trial court.

(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial
court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting
or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary
equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a duly designated official
or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not
produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs
showing the equipment is operating should not be visible. A limited number of
microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology,
must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator
shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera
and equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to
the media entities shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical
disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the
camera equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the
media entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the
cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the
unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue
commotion in case of technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the
media entities facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual
recording either via wireless technology accessible even from outside the court
premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which
streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time
audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be
continuous and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court [27] applies, and where the trial court excludes,
upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances
where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification issues or there are issues
which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony
(e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the
witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the
pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no
commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the days proceedings
are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the trial court and
during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going
proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs,

except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to

explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall
observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after
the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or
cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news
purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to
the contempt power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and
the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.
(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the trial court which may issue supplementary
directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or revocation of
the grant of application by the media entities.

(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study,
design and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations,
and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live
broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the aboveoutlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also report and recommend
on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that
would meet the herein requirements. It may conduct consultations with
resource persons and experts in the field of information and communication
technology.
(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial
court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape
recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the courtroom)
shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.

Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling
the

abstract

discussion

of

key

constitutional

precepts

into

the

workable

context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that
need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the
various rights herein involved, within the contours of defined guidelines.
WHEREFORE,

in

light

of

the

foregoing

disquisition,

the

Court PARTIALLY

GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial
court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein
outlined.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7199
July 22, 2009
[Formerly CBD 04-1386]
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing
and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand
name "CDO," filed a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L.
Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as "Batas Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of
tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a
television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program
Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of
lawyers oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in
Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the
spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration
(BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD
conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero
demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the
demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy and, in any event,
"outrageous."
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by
the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And
the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the
meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front

page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1,
No. 122 which complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing
vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless
complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon
reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to
the Corderos andP35,000 to his Batas Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to
place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the withdrawal of their complaint
before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. 4 Respondent, who affixed his
signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a
tabloid that he prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract 5 asking
complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues
at P15,000 per issue or a total amount ofP360,000, and a Program Profile6 of the television
program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with
the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC
at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the
tabloid amounting toP45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second
TVC in the television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainants
offer, respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the
offer and threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns. 7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- Batas ng Bayan at radio
station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program,
which announcement was transcribed as follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas
Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa
telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito
muna ang contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan
malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread
ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549
st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang
mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas
an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad
light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an
article captioned "KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote "IBA PANG
PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which appeared in the same publication in its September 713, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote
another article entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO." 10

Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA
published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles: 11 (a) "Uod sa liver
spread," Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);12(b) "Uod, itinanggi ng CDO," Setyembre 7,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277);13 (c) "Pagpapatigil sa CDO," Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.278);14 (d) "Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279); 15 (e)
"Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod," Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280); 16 (f) "Kaso VS. CDO
itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281);17 (g) "Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO
guards," Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards," Setyembre
15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);19 (i) "CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP," Setyembre 17, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg.287);20 (j) "May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili," Setyembre 18, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg.288);21 (k) "Desperado na ang CDO," Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290); 22 (l)
"Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO," Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291); 23 (m)
"Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero," Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292); 24 (n) "Bakit
nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO," Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293). 25
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in Hataw!, respondent wrote
an article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread." 26
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi
Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be
the "same baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against it. 27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel
and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints
were pending at he time of the filing of the present administrative complaint. 28
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela
City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with
Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice, 29 alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to
happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on
his complaint?
xxxx

8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an
investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor,
can Respondents expect justice to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude
them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of
their cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had
been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also
with reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in
the past distributing products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents
to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by
mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the
Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate
and ask their associates and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only,
complaints against the Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and
insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here; 30
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction31 which respondent filed, as
counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their
thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this
action.32 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and
several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,33 before the Regional Trial Court,
Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding,
respondent continued to publish articles against complainant 34 and to malign complainant
through his television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5,
2005 Report and Recommendation:35
I.
xxxx

In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the
Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge
Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:
"Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the
instant plaintiffs motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or
file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiffs prater, as it is
GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents,
representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from
further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the
instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its
products."
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch
Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated
10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein
addressed to him to desists [sic] from "further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any
matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices
and/or defects on plaintiff and its products", respondent in clear defiance of this Order came
out with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column "Atty. Batas", 2004 in the
December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid "Balitang Bayan Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1
of the Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of
Professional Responsibilitywhich reads: "A lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, respondent filed his "Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to
Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent made the
following statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity
of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office.
Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases
filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild
allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is
manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: "A
lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o
[j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers."

III.
The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of
the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent.
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said
"Kasunduan" was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and
this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein
complainant.
However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the consequent dismissal of the
complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a
media offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are
the numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to
17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to
come out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary
restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not
deny that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose
the defects of complainants products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that
there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent
retaliated for complainants failure to give in to respondents "request" that complainant
advertise in the tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainants explanation
is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of
articles against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously
violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he himself prepared and signed and
submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared
said "Kasunduan" and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what
was supposedly already settled in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of
with the BFAD case proceeding as it could have defended itself against the charges of the
Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media
personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct
contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.36 (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006,
adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to
act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession,37 which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.

By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter
alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain
funds for his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids
and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to
the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its
products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes." For he defied said status quo order,
despite his (respondents) oath as a member of the legal profession to "obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper, by using intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to
use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings
must be dignified.39 (Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal
profession, respondent alsoviolated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

which directs a lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal
profession."401avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated.
In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondents
services as "she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a
media personality,"42 only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein
complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him.
Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio
and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain
extent, have affected the sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for
reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when
he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant. 43
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the
premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and breach of
ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
FOODSPHERE INC v ATTY MAURICIO DIGEST
FACTS:
[A] certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City
canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. As Cordero and his relatives were eating
bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a
colony of worms inside the can. This was complained before the BFAD. After conciliation
meetings between Cordero and the petitioner, the Corderos eventually forged
a KASUNDUAN seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus
dismissed the complaint. Respondent, Atty. Mauricio, Jr., who affixed his signature to
the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he
prepared the document.
Complainant filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the

Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were
pending at the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint. Despite the
pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to
the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its
products.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent suspended for three (3) years from the practice of law.
RATIO:
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of
Professional Responsibility which reads: A lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
The language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the
Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent
clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before
it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The
use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of
Canon 11 and the fundamental Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes. Respondent defied said status quo order, despite his
(respondents) oath as a member of the legal profession to obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, and by failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the
exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and
the dignity of the legal profession.

G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990

KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros
Occidental, Respondents.
Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of
the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros
Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the
requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for
the legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies
of the questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for
reconsideration, the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2chanrobles virtual law
library
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved
for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of
P316.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent
judge's decision, and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership
dues. The motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true
copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for
reconsideration was denied "with FINALITY." 4chanrobles virtual law library
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty.
Castellano a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the
President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty.
Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with
"biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or
resolution." 5 The complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the
conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant
Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its
improper filing with the Office of the President, which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no
jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7,
1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct. 7 On March 21, 1990, Atty.
Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite For Contempt Or Administratively
Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)."8chanrobles virtual law library
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices
concerned, as Respondents (sic). 9Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and
jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as
"they are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they
have no more jurisdiction to give such order." 10 Thus, according to him, "the most they
(Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint
satisfactorily so that they will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common
tao." 11chanrobles virtual law library
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds
the various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office
of the President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of
which read as follows:

VIchanrobles virtual law library

That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most Honorable
Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file this Administrative Complaint
to our Motherly President who is firm and determined to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos
Appointees and Loyalists) still in your administration without bloodshed but by honest and
just investigations, which the accused-complainant concurs to such procedure and principle,
or otherwise, he could have by now a rebel with the undersigned with a cause for
being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied of Equal Justice to be heard by our Justices
designated to the Highest and most Honorable Court of the Land (Supreme
Court); 12(Emphasis ours.)
VIIchanrobles virtual law library
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being Constitutionally
created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic), being bias (sic), playing
ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust Resolutions the reason observed by the
undersigned and believed by him in good faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees,
whose common intention is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from innocent
Filipino people the genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they will be left in confusion and
turmoil to their advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved President's honest, firm and
determined Decision to bring back the real Justice in all our Courts, for the happiness,
contentment and progress of your people and the only country which God has given us. PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)
VIIIchanrobles virtual law library
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice, yet they
refused to grant to the poor and innocent accused-complainant, so to save their brethren in
rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado, . . . 14
IXchanrobles virtual law library
. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the Justices of the
Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was based more of money
reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our very Breath of Life to every Filipino, who is
brave to face the malicious acts of the Justices of the Second Division, Supreme Court. By
reason of fear for the truth Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and innocentaccused (complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person in our Judiciary
to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the respondents is too expensive and
can't be reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein are inconsiderate, extremely
strict and meticulous to the common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath of Office and
our Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal Justice to any man,
regardless of ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library

5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the
Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his appeal by complying (sic) all the
requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the respondents denied just the same which
legally hurt the undersigned in the name of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were so
strict orinhumane and so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine justice was
too far and beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as proved by
records of both cases mentioned above. 16
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by Judges and
Justices, against practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino people in general for no
Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court Records were cited for contempt by any
presiding Judge. That this weapon if maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a
righteous and innocent complainant and to favor any person with close relation. 17
scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did so
"to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and that the
dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his insinuation that the Court
maintains a double standard in dispensing justice - one set for the rich and another for the
poor - went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not relevant to the
cause of his client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's integrity as a neutral
and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should
know that the Court in resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to
any extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates.
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure
to fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on
expeditious disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective
January 1, 1989, after due publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of
his client a motion for reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the
Court with a duplicate original copy of the assailed trial court's decision, 19 and indicated his
IBP O.R. No. and the date he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the
requirements of Circular No. 1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or
duty certified true copies of the other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court
judge. At any rate, the explanation given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier
negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated in our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which
denied with finality his motion for reconsideration, "no valid or compelling reason (having
been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought." Precisely, under paragraph 5 of
Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance with the above requirements
will not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it be shown that such noncompliance was due to compelling reasons."chanrobles virtual law library
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly
ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his
inexcusable negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the
blame for his deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his
client. Unfortunately, the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to

speak, are grossly improper. As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to
smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and
again we have emphasized that a "lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration
of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must
advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he
is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo." 22chanrobles virtual law
library
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through
the criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct
whatever mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal
condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this regard, it is precisely
provided under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS
AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
RULE 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing language or
behavior before the courts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
RULE 11.04 - A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or
have materiality to the case.
xxx xxx xxx
We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second
Division, even the most basic tenet of our government system - the separation of powers
between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has - been lost on Atty.
Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the
Supreme Court is supreme - the third great department of government entrusted exclusively
with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private.
No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them
'unjust.'" 24 Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the
Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's
acts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended
to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as
Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and
irresponsible accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has
no jurisdiction to question his act of having complained before the Office of the President,
and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against

practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his
criticism. Rather, Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the
Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render
justice according to law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and
IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby
ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail
of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED
from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this
Resolution becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part
will be dealt with more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's
record, and be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the
Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country, for their
information and guidance.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.