GUINTO V.

MEDINA, 50 OG #1, p 199 (1953)

FACTS: On Oct 3, 1941, Leon Guinto filed an action for forcible entry
against Santiago Medina. Guinto alleged that he has been in possession of
the said land in since 1934, and that in 1941, by means of force and
intimidation, Medina deprived him possession of said property. The trial
court held in favor of Guinto. Pending appeal, Medina died.
ISSUE: WON the liability of the heirs may exceed the amount of their
inheritance from the decedent
HELD: No. The heirs of the original defendant in this case have
been merely substituted in his place upon his death, their liability
for damages (money debt) is only to the extent of the value of the
property that they might have received, if any, from him.

FACTS: Memoracion Cruz filed an action against her son, Oswaldo Cruiz, for
the annulment of sale, reconveyance and damages. She alleged that she
acquired a parcel of land during her union with her common-law husband.
Said property was registered in her name. Sometime in 1992, she
discovered that the property was transferred to respondent through a Deed
of Sale. She averred that the Deed of Sale was executed through fraud and
forgery, hence void. After the presenting her evidence, Memoracion died
and was survived by her other son, Edgardo Cruz.
Oswaldo, for his part, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
action for reconveyance is a personal action which does not survive a
partys death and since the plaintiff died pending the case, said action
should be dismissed
ISSUE: WON the action for reconveyance survives the death of the plaintiff

The heirs of the original defendant in this case have been merely
substituted in his place upon his death, their liability for damages (money
debt) is only to the extent of the value of the property that they might have
received, if any, from him.

HELD: Yes. The question whether an action survives or not depends

on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In causes of
action which survive, the wrong complained of affects primarily
and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental. While in the causes of action which do
not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental.
CAB: In Sumaliag v. Literarto, the SC held that a petition for declaration of
nullity of deed of sale of real property is one relating to property and
property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petition. As such,
the instant case for annulment sale of real property survives despite the
death of the petitioner.
The question whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of
the action and the damage sued for. In causes of action which survive, the
wrong complained of affects primarily and principally property and property
rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental. In Sumaliag v.
Literarto, the SC held that a petition for declaration of nullity of deed of sale
of real property is one relating to property and property rights, and
therefore, survives the death of the petition. As such, the instant case for
annulment sale of real property survives despite the death of the petitioner.

CRUZ V. CRUZ, G.R. 173292 (2010)

BALTAZAR V. LAXA, G.R. 174489 (2012)

FACTS: Pasencia Regala (aged 78) executed a notarial will on Sept 13,
1981. The will was read to her twice and after which, the testator signed
the document tin the presence of her witnesses (Dr. Limpin, Francisco
Garcia and Faustino Mercado). The 3 witnesses attested and signed the
notarial will in the presence of the testator and the notary public. In the will,
the testator bequeathed all her properties to Lorenzo Laxa, his spouse, and
children. In 1996, the testator died.

The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally
unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind.

It appears that Laxa was the nephew of the testator whom she raised as
her own son. 4 years after the testators death, Laxa filed a petition for
probate of the decedents will. The witnesses positively identified the
notarial will as that of the testator but the notary public did not testify (he
suffered a stroke and as such, he could no longer talk and remember his
name).
Baltazar opposed the probate of the will on the ground that properties that
the testator bequeathed to Laxa belonged to Nicomeda Regala, his
predecessor-in-interest. They further alleged that the testator was not of
unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will. According to the
oppositors, the testator was forgetful (magulyan) and paranoid, based on
the personal assessment of their witness
ISSUE: WON the testator was of unsound mind at the time the will was
executed
HELD: No. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a
will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
Art 799 NCC provides: To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the
testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind
be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or any
other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of the
making of the will know the nature of the estate to be disposed of,
the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary.
CAB: There was no showing that Pasencia was publicly known to be insane
one month or less before the making of the will. Thus, the burden of proof
that Pasencia was of unsound mind was upon the shoulders of petitioners,
which they failed to prove. There is no substantial evidence presented,
medical or otherwise, to show that Pasencia was of unsound mind at the
time of the execution of the will.

NERA V. RIMANDO, 18 PHIL 450 (1911)

FACTS: Rimando opposes the admission for probate of a certain will on the
ground that one of the subscribing witnesses therein was present in the small
room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses attached their signatures. That time he was outside,
some eight or ten feet away in a large room connecting with the smaller room
by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for
one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

Is it enough, therefore, that the testator and each of the witnesses be able to
see each of them sign the will without physical obstruction - even if there is
lack of understanding as to the nature of the document being executed?

ISSUE: WON the will was validly witnessed by one of the subscribing
witnesses to make the will valid.
HELD: Yes, the will may be admitted for probate. The true test of presence of
the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they
actually saw each other sign but whether they might have been seen each
other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical
condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription
of each signature.
The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the
subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other
sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator
and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument
in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able
to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative
positions or existing conditions. At the moment when a witness signs the
document he was actually and physically present and in such position with
relation to the other witnesses that he could see everything that took place by
merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and without any physical
obstruction to prevent his doing so.
The question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to
an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other
does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually
cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of
them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position
with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes
in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.
Art 805 requires that the will must be signed by the testator and the witnesses
in the presence of one another. Nera provides the test of presence. It is not
essential that the testator and the witnesses should look at the paper
purporting to be the will of the testator at the time each of them affix their
signatures. It is sufficient that each of them be physically present at the place
where execution will take place and that they be in such position with respect
to each one, that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction, they
would have been able to see each one affix his signature on the will without
any physical obstruction.

ICASIANO V. ICASIANO, 11 SCRA 422 (1964)

FACTS: Josefa Villacorta executed her last will and testament in duplicate on
June 2, 1956 and she died on Sept. 12, 1958. The will was:
a) attested by three instrumental witnesses- Justo Torres Jr., Jose
Natividad and Vinicio Dy
b) acknowledged by the testatrix and the three instrumental
witnesses on the same date before Atty. Ong, Notary Public
c) the will was actually prepared by Atty. Samson who was present
during the execution and signing of the decedents last will and
testament.
d) pages of the original and duplicate were duly numbered
e) the attestation clause contains all the facts required by law to be
recited therein and signed by the attesting witnesses
f)
will is written in the language known to and spoken by the
testatrix (Tagalog)
g) will was executed in one single occasion in duplicate copies
h) both original and duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before
the Notary Public on the same date.
The will consisted of five pages and while signed at the end and in every
page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses,
Atty. Jose Natividad on page 3 thereof; but the duplicate copy attached was
signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses in each and every
page.
ISSUE: Does the failure of one of the attesting witnesses to sign on one
page of the original invalidate the will, and hence, denial of the probate?
HELD: No. The inadvertent failure of one of the witnesses to affix his
signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two
pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify the denial of
the probate. The impossibility of substituting this page is cured since the
testatrix and two other witnesses signed the defective page, and that the
document bears the imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom
the testament was ratified by the testatrix and all three witnesses.

These precedents exemplify the Courts policy to require satisfaction of the

legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith, but
without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.
The appellants also argued that since the original of the will is in existence
and available, the duplicate is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed
the probate of the original because of the lacking signature on page 3, it is
easily discerned that the oppositors-appellants run into a dilemma. If the
original is defective and invalid, then in the law, there is no other will but
the duly signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the
original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed
duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At
any rate, said duplicate, serves to prove that the omission of one
signature in the third page of the original testament was
inadvertent and not intentional.
Art 805 requires that each of the subscribing witnesses should sign each and
every page of the will on the left margin. This requirement is, as a rule,
mandatory and a failure to comply therewith is a fatal defect. Icasiano holds
that the failure of a witness to sign one of the pages of the will through
inadvertence or oversight (there being no bad faith or fraudulent intent) can
be cured by the presentation of a carbon duplicate of the will which contains
all the required signatures. This ruling is based on the principle of liberal
interpretation of the statutory requirements for the formal validity of the will,
provided that the need to safeguard the genuineness and authenticity of the
will is not compromised. It is important, for the proper understanding of this
case, to differentiate a duplicate copy of a document from a duplicate-original
thereof.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the
testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose
conduct she has no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the
identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained,
no intentional or deliberate deviation existence, and the evidence on record
attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.
Despite the literal tenor of the law, the Court has held that in other cases
that;
a. a testament with the only page signed at its foot by the testator and
witnesses but not in the left margin could be probated(Abangan vs.
Abangan)
b. despite the requirement of correlative lettering of the pages of a will,
the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not
a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro).

GONZALES V. CA, 90 SCRA 187 (1979)

FACTS: Gabriel died a widow. Santos, a niece of the deceased who lived
with her prior to the time of her death, filed for a petition for the probate of

her will. The three instrumental witnesses of the will included a family
driver, a housekeeper, and a piano teacher. The petition as opposed by
Rizalina Gonzales, one of the nieces named in the will, who contends that
the will was not executed and attested as required by law as there was
absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses were credible
witnesses, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good
standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright, and reputed to
be trustworthy and reliable. She alleged that credible is not synonymous
with competent
ISSUE: WON the witnesses are credible witnesses as required under Art
805
HELD: Yes. Art 820 NCC provides the qualification for the witness to the
execution of the will while Art 821 sets forth the disqualification. Under the
law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or
at any time during the trail as to his good standing in the community, his
reputation for trustworthiness and reliability, his honesty and uprightness in
order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It
is enough that the qualifications in Art 820 are complied with, such that
soundness of his mind can be shown or deduced from his answers to the
questions propounded to him that his age is shown from his appearance,
testimony, as well as that he is not blind, deaf or dumb, that he is able to
read or write, and that he has none of the disqualification in Art 821. The
term credible as used in Art 805 should not be given the same meaning it
has under the Naturalization law in that the witnesses must prove their
good standing and reputation. In probate proceedings, unlike in petitions
for naturalization, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses
for they merely attest to the execution of a will, and affirm the formalities
attendant to said execution. The relation of the beneficiary of the will to
the testator does not disqualify one to be a witness. The main qualification
of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age,
mental capacity and literacy are present, is that the said witness must be
credible i.e., his testimony may be entitled to credence. In a strict sense,
the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is
determined by Art 820 and 821, whereas his credibility depends on the
appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of
the court that said witness is telling the truth.
Art 805 requires the notarial will to be attested by at least three credible
witnesses. Art 820 prescribes the qualifications of a witness, while Art 821
enumerates the disqualifications. Thus, an issue arises as to whether or not a
witness competent under Arts 820 and 821 is necessarily credible as required
by Art 805. Gonzales makes a distinction between a competent witness and a
credible witness. Furthermore, Gonzales stresses that competence may be
proved or inferred; whereas, credibility, which is a matter to be determined by
the court, is presumed unless evidence to the contrary is presented.
GAGO V. MAMUYAC, 49 PHIL 902 (1927)

FACTS: The testator Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. Within the
same month, Gago presented to court a will supposed to have been
executed by the testator on July 27, 1918. The will was not admitted on the
ground that the testator had, on April 16, 1919, executed a new will and
testament. Gago then petitioned for the probate of the 2 nd will which was
denied again by the court on the ground that the same will had been
revoked by the testator as testified by Fenoy, the person who typed the
will and Bejar, to whom a house and lot in the 1919 will was sold to.
Another witness testified that the 1919 will was in the possession of the
testator but could not be found after his death. It was also successfully
established that another will was executed in 1920. The 1919 will
presented was found by the lower court to be a mere carbon copy of the
original.
ISSUE: WON the 1919 will was cancelled
HELD: Yes. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or
cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times
to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such
cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or
be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will
cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to
have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the
presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that
the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption
arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the
will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed
that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the
knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of
cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being
weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but
may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator
with intent to revoke it.
CAB: The fact that the original 1919 will could not be found after the death
of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the
same had been cancelled, the Court concluded that the conclusions of the
lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a
proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent
clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved
its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show
that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are
destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of
cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with
the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great
caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was
executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities
and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in

evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was
not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.
A will being essentially ambulatory, it may be revoked at any time by the
testator at any time prior to his death. Article 830 enumerates the modes of
revocation. Gago holds that a revocation of the will may be implied if the
testator in his lifetime had ready access to the same, and that after his death

the will cannot be found. The presumption, while disputable, may be

reinforced by testimony regarding the circumstances of the alleged revocation
of the will. And if the presumption of revocation should apply, a duplicate copy
of the said will cannot be admitted to probate.