PASEI VS.

DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing
the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It
claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and
that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the
validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed
the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there
exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department
Order No. 1.
HELD: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino
female domestics working abroad were in aclass by themselves, because of the special risk
to which their classwas exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female
contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is
well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect
identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment
ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects
among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law.
Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power
as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power
as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
Article III Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances

LIWAYWAY VS PERMANENT CONCRETE

FACTS: Permanent concrete workers union and its members picketed the gate leading to
Liwayway's bodega. This gate is about 200 meters from the gate leading to the premises of
the employer of the appellants. Liwayway is not in any way related to the striking union
except for the fact that it is the sublessee of a bodega in the company's compound. The
picketers belonging to the union had stopped and prohibited the truck of the Liwayway from
entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega, the union members intimidating
and threatening with bodily harm the employees of the Liwayway who were in the truck. The
union members also stopped and prohibited the general manager, personnel manager
including the man in-charge of the bodega and other employees of the Liwayway
Publications, Inc. from getting newsprint in said bodega. The business of Liwayway is
exclusively the publication of the magazines Bannawag Bisaya, Hiligaynon and Liwayway
weekly magazines which has absolutely no relation or connection whatsoever with the cause
of the strike of the union against their company, much less with the terms, conditions or
demands of the strikers. As a consequence thereof, plaintiff rented another bodega during
the time members of the defendant union prevented its employees from entering its bodega
in the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and thus incurred expenses both in
terms of bodega rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier to the temporary
bodega.
Liwayway filed a writ of preliminary injunction which the trial court granted. Defendant union
moved to dismiss the complaint on the following ground:
1. That this case arose out of a labor dispute involving unfair labor practices and,
therefore, the Court of First Instance where this action was brought has no jurisdiction
to issue an injunction since this case fans within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Industrial Relations
ISSUE: WON the Liwayway is a third party or an "innocent bystander" whose right has been
invaded and, therefore, entitled to protection by the regular courts.
HELD: The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a
phrase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it
cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection
as an exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are not without power to confine or
localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor
dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with
no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus,
the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent bystanders" if it
appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor
dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the
picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights.

This Court ruled that Liwayway was an innocent bystander and thus entitled to enjoin the
unions strike because Liwayways only connection with the employer company was the fact
that both were situated in the same premises.
Innocent bystanders' - are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the courts and the
courts may, accordingly, legally extend the same.

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.
VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE
FACTS:Benjamin Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Kristo and an employee of the
Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. and therefore is a member of the Elizalde Rope Factory Union in
pursuant to the compromise agreement between the union and the company that all
employees must be members of union too.
Under Section 4 (a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a
labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic
Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of
section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits membership to any labor association,
Victoriano twice presented a resignation to the union. The union advised the company to
separate Victoriano from the company. This prompted Victoriano to file an action for
injunction. Trial Court ruled in favour of Victoriano. The union appealed in the Supreme Court
and contested the constitutionality of RA 875
ISSUE: WON RA 875 is constitutional.
HELD: The following are the contentions of the Union followed by the answer from the
Supreme Court.
1. that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a labor
organization is banned to all those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting
affiliation with any labor organization" 4 , "prohibits all the members of a given
religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their
members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their
constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935
Constitution.

2.

3.

4.

5.

appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be
deduced by necessary implication therefrom. RA 3350 recognizes the right of a
person, and that entails the right to join an organization as well as the right to NOT
join an organization.
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional for
impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with
its collective bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act
relieves the employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the
maintenance of union membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act,
furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from
members who, under the Act, are relieved from the obligation to continue as such
members.
The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express terms of the union
security clause; the Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual
obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members in permanent
positions, It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of
said union security clause.
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation
of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. In spite of the constitutional
prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital
interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may
modify or abrogate contracts already in effect.
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those
religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions, in violation of
Article Ill, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution;
The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of any
religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion
by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional
provision that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right,"
The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither
does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members
from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a
labor union.
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal
protection of laws" as by exempting from the operation of closed shop agreement the
members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages
over their fellow workers
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another
in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 52 The
very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. 53 All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the

purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
6. Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
provision regarding the promotion of social justice.
Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. 63 Republic Act
No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who,
because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their
being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining whether
any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire
state be directly benefited it is sufficient that a portion of the state be
benefited thereby.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated August 26,
1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed
from is affirmed, with costs against appellant Union. It is so ordered.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Section 18. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted

KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA V. GOTAMCO SAW MILL

(GR No. L-1573, 29 March 1948)
FACTS: The Kaisahan ng Manggagawa ng Kahoy sa Pilipinas declared a strike against
Gotamco Saw Mill because the latter did not accede to the formers request of a salary
increase. While the case was being heard by the Court of Industrial Relations, the parties
reached a temporary wage arrangement and the workers were ordered to go back to work
while the saw mill was ordered to increase the salaries of the workers by P2.00, let them
take home small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood, and was enjoined from layingoff, suspending, or dismissing any labourer affiliated with the petitioning union. Conversely,
the workers were enjoined from staging walk-outs or strikes during the pendency of the
hearing. Gotamco Saw Mill subsequently filed an urgent motion asking that the petitioning
union be held in contempt of court for having staged a strike during the pendency of the
main case, for picketing on the premises of the saw mill, and for grave threats which
prevented the remaining laborers from working. The union alleged that one of its
representatives conferred with the management of the saw mill, but instead of entertaining
their grievances, the saw mill ordered the stoppage of the work and employed four new
Chinese laborers without express authority of the court and in violation of Section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103. The CIR ruled that there was a violation of the previous order of

the CIR by the union, which warranted the commencement of contempt proceedings and
that the saw mill did not violate Section 19 of CA 103.
ISSUE: W/N Section 19 of CA 103 is unconstitutional for being in violation of the organic
proscription of involuntary servitude.
RULING: NO. Section 19 of CA 103 does not offend against the constitutional inhibition
proscribing involuntary servitude. The provisions of CA 103 were inspired by the
constitutional injunction making it the concern of the State to promote social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. In order to attain this object,
Section 19 was promulgated which grants to labor what it grants to capital and denies to
labor what it denies to capital. Among other things, Section 19 lays down the implied
condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee,
tenant or laborer has been submitted to the CIR for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to
the provisions of the Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or
laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so joined by the court after
hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall
forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when
public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or
settled. Thus, the voluntariness of the employees entering into such a contract of
employmenthe has a free choice between entering into it or notwith such an implied
condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.
ISSUE: W/N the previous order of the CIR, which ordered the union laborers to go back to
work, is unconstitutional for being in violation of the organic proscription of involuntary
servitude.
RULING: NO. The order of the court was for the striking workers to return to their work. That
order was made after hearing, and Section 19 of CA 103 authorizes such order when the
dispute cannot in its opinion be promptly decided or settled. The very impossibility of
prompt decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the CIR the power to issue the
order for the reason that the public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or
paralyzation of the wheels of industry.
Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the human rights of individuals were
subjected to regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power.
From Justice Perfectos concurring and dissenting opinion: If the laborers should feel that
they are compelled against their will to perform something which is repugnant to their
conscience or dignity, they need not resort to any court action to seek judicial settlement of
the controversy, as they can resign from their work and there is no power that can compel
them to continue therein.
Right to Self-Organization
LABOR
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living
wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right
of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.

SSSEA VS CA
FACTS: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages
with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike.
The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error
in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the
National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends
on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation
thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court
may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
ISSUE: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

HELD: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted
activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service
shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum
Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the
enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees
enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action
which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the
absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing
so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as government
employees and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original
charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service
and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ
of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general
court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
Art. 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time
his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (As
amended by Section 34, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Minimum Wage
Minimum wages are set both nationally and statewide. The minimum wage gives employers
a guideline as to the legal minimum amount paid to employees. In 1968 the minimum wage
served to keep 86% of workers and their families above the poverty line for a family of four.
Today that percentage has dropped to 64%, in effect leaving 36% of wage earners living at
or below the poverty line. The current minimum wage amounts are roughly half of what the
projected living wage is in any given area. Living wage is defined as the estimated amount
of income necessary to live comfortably and put a family into the bracket of middle class.
Living Wage
According to the living wage calculator from the Poverty in America website, the typical two
parent, two child family forced to live on a minimum wage income puts them closer to the
poverty line than middle class. Living wage for this family in an urban area such as Los
Angeles is $34.07. The minimum wage is $8.00 and the poverty wage is $9.83. In a more
rural area of California the numbers change to $25.01 for a living wage, $8.00 for the

minimum wage and $9.83 for the poverty wage. It certainly proves that a single income
family is a thing of the past. According to theUniversal Living Wage Website, 10.1 million
people are working at minimum wage jobs and they are staying at these jobs for up to ten
years and attempting to raise their families on these wages.
Art. 255. Exclusive bargaining representation and workers participation in policy and
decision-making. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative
of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an
individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject to
such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to
participate in policy and decision-making processes of the establishment where they are
employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For
this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management councils: Provided, That
the representatives of the workers in such labor-management councils shall be elected by at
least the majority of all employees in said establishment. (As amended by Section 22,
Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)