ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED vs. HONORABLE APOLONIO G.

EXEVEA
G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997
FACTS:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) but was dismissed by President Fidel V. Ramos
from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993 due to three
complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette ObarZamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR for alleged malversation through falsification
of official documents, violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations on
unliquidated cash advances and defrauding the government by intentionally concealing said cash
advances through falsification of accounting enties, and for oppression and harassment whereby
private respondent was relieved by Lumiqued from her duties as Regional Cashier without just
cause. The issue was referred to the DOJ and Committee hearings on the complaints were
conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992 whereby Lumiqued appeared without the assistance of a
counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to
employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case
submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued.
Hence, Department of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon adopted the recommendation in his
Memorandum to the President. On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 52 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the
alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his
retirement and other benefits

ISSUE:

Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled against Lumiqued saying that the right to counsel, which cannot be
waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect
or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked
or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the
case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent
and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime
in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department
Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable
under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to
due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. Whatever irregularity
attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqueds appeal and his
subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration. Hence, the said petition for certiorari and
mandamus was dismissed and Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the President was
affirmed.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010
FACTS:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) filed a petition for review and a motion
for reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679
dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009.
These resolutions delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) to due process
was violated.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due process was
not violated for it was given an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679.
According to the SC, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. And as
applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the merely the opportunity to explain ones
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal
or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is deemed
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy. What is avoided is the absolute lack of notice and hearing.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION and MARK B. JIMENEZ

G.R. No. 139465 October 17, 2000
FACTS:
On January 13, 1977, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country. OnNovember 13, 1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the Extradition Treaty between
the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A.. The Philippine Senate
ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs
U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark
Jimenez to the United States. Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax
evasion to wire-tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. The US government, pursuant to
the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested
for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ
secretary refused to provide him copy advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it
is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies and further
denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in
Article that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. Respondent Jimenez sued the DOJ Secretary
and the lower court ruled in his favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that private respondent is entitled to the due process right to
notice and hearing even during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. In this case, there
exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply with the
provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of
due process. The human rights of a person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting
state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when
they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. The court held that the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which
will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an
extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting
the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation
since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent.
SC ordered the Secretary of Justice to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and
its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.

GOVERNMENT OF THE USA vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN

G.R.No. 148571 September 24, 2002
FACTS:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government sent to the Philippine Government
Note Verbale 0522 dated 16 June 1999 requesting the extradition of Mark B. Upon receipt of the Notes
and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs transmitted them to the Secretary of Justice for appropriate
action. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the
RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The validity of the TRO was assailed by the Secretary of Justice in a Petition before the
Supreme Court. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Secretary of Justice, the Supreme
Court issued its 17 October 2000 Resolution where it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It
held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory. The Government of the United
States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the
appropriate Petition for which alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999 : (1) conspiracy
to defraud the United States 371; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud,; (4) false statements, in violation of Title
18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions. In order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest". Jimenez filed before
the RTC a motion which prayed that his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing which was
subsequently granted. After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should
issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000 which was then set for hearing on 15 June
2001. Thereafter, the court issued an order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
for his temporary liberty. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. The DOJ filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his
arrest can be issued and;
2. Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending.
HELD:
1. No. The case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action thus does not justify
the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. The SC
opined that the foregoing procedure will best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases.
2. No. Extradition is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. There is no provision in the
Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition
request and arrest warrant. The constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.

BIRAOGO vs. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036 December 7, 2010
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated
July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. The Truth Commission has all the powers of an investigative body but it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions raising several issues among others the fact that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel
of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those
of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondent raises the defense that E.O. No. 1 and the creation of the Truth Commission does not
violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD:
Yes, E.O. No. 1 is violatie of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. Equal protection clause does permits
classification in order to be valid such must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. Executive Order No. 1 is violative of the equal protection clause
given that the clear mandate of Truth Commission is to investigate and find out the truth about
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. The Arroyo administration is
only just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.The Philippine Truth Commission must not
exclude the other past administrations. and must at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations and not only focus its attention in investigating the Arroyo Administration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is therefore GRANTED.

PEOPLE vs. JALOSJOS

G.R. Nos. 132875-76 November 16, 2001
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and
acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jalosjos, by virtue of his reelection to Congress should be allowed to attend the
legislative sessions and committee hearings despite having been convicted of a non-bailable
offense.
HELD:
No, Jalosjos should not be allowed to attend the legislative sessions and committee hearings
given that he has already been convicted of a non-bailable offense.Section II, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that a member of Congress shall be immune from arrest or detention
immunity from arrest only if the offense is punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment.
The privilege from arrest of members of Congress has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Sec.11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. Being an elective
official does not result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment when it comes
to incarceration. Also, being a Congressman is not a substantial differentiation which removes
the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law.
Wherefore, the motion of petition is DENIED.

Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. (TELEBAP) vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as
citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates
radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted
by Congress. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the
Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within
the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all
radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television
time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.
Petitioners contend that Sec. 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause and the eminent
domain provision of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and television broadcasting
stations without payment of just compensation. They contend that while Section 90 of the same
law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment,
Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it argues
that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims
that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands
to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws.
HELD:
No, Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of
some form of public service. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires." The
argument of the petitioners rest on the fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the same
treatment under the free speech guarantee of the Constitution as the print media. There are
important differences in the characteristics of the two media, however, which justify their
differential treatment for free speech purposes. Because of the physical limitations of the
broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those
wishing to use them. There is no similar justification for government allocation and regulation of
the print media. Therefore, the petition is thereby DISMISSED.

JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 199082 September 18, 2012
FACTS:
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged
election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
Due to allegations of electoral fraud and manipulation during the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec.
In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May
14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao
were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners to be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage. After the preliminary investigation,
the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of
electoral sabotage be filed against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. while that the charges against
Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, the petitioners assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel
and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court. Arroyo raised the issue in his
petition that the creation of the Joint Committee is violative of the equal protection clause since it
was created with the sole purpose of investigating and prosecuting certain persons and incidents
only, specifically those involving the 2004 and 2007 elections to the exclusion of others contrary
to the finding of the Supreme Court in Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of the Joint Committee is violative of the equal protection clause.
HELD:
No, the creation of the Joint Committee does not violate the equal protection clause. The
Supreme Court held that Joint Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it
singles out the officials of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, infringes the equal
protection clause. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the
purpose of investigating alleged graft and corruption during the Arroyo Administration since
Executive Order No. 177 specifically referred to the previous administration; while the Joint
Committee was created for the purpose of conducting preliminary investigation of election
offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections. While Mike Arroyo and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked
to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in
the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the
investigation by the Joint Committee. Equal protection merely requires that all persons under like
circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. Given that the creation of the Joint Committee was not purposefully created to
investigate only the involved parties specifically, there is no violation of the equal protection
clause in this case.

COMELEC vs CONRADO CRUZ

G.R. No. 186616 November 20, 2009
FACTS:
Involved in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as
amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991) which states:
Sec.
2. Term
of
Office.

The
term
of
office
of
all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act
shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of
office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared such provision constitutionally infirm and thus the
present petition was filed by COMELEC to review the decision of the RTC. It declared that the
retroactive application of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule for barangay officials to the
1994 barangay elections is unconstitutional. The COMELEC assails that the law is valid and
constitutional and that RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local
Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex
post facto la. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided
in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts
that laws which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so
provided and when it does not impair vested rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the retroactive reckoning of the 3 consecutive term limit for barangay officials to
the 1994 barangay elections is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD:
No, the retroactive reckoning of the 3 consecutive term limit for barangay officials to the 1994
barangay elections is not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court held that no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has
been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987
Constitution took effect. It was continued under the Local Government Code and can still be
found in the current law. The equality guaranteed under the Equal Protection clause is equality
under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not
similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of substantial
distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or
circumstances, they may be treated differently in law. In the present case there is no basis for an
equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local
elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these
elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction,
expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term
and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the
three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through
legislation. Likewise, there is no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard
because the challenged provision did not result in any differential treatment
between barangay officials and all other elective officials given that there was no actual
retroactive application involved.