RamanujasCritiqueofShankarasPhilosophyofNonDuality

PartI
FromRamanujasCommentaryontheBrahmaSutras
M.Sudduth

I.RamanujarejectsthefollowingmetaphysicalclaimsmadebyShankara
A.Brahmanisnondifferentiatedpureconsciousness.
B.Theuniverseisunreal(i.e.,anonenduringexistent).
C.Individualsouls(jivas)areunreal(i.e.,anonenduringexistent).
D. Individual consciousness is dissolved in moksha. (Follows from C, for the
unrealityofsoulsisnotadenialoftheirprovisionalexistence,butadenialoftheir
enduringcharacter).
II.ScripturalArguments(BS,4955):RamanujarejectsShankarasdoctrineofnon
dualBrahmanonthegroundsofthetestimonyofthesacredscriptures(sastras),the
veryscripturesShankaraallegedlyaccepts.Ramanujacontendsthatthesastras,for
example Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita, directly affirm or logically entail that
Brahmanisdifferentiated.
A. Many passages in the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita affirm that Brahman has
attributes(saguna),butwithoutanysuggestionthatthisisaprovisionalfactabout
Brahman.However,sincenothingcanhaveanattributeandbenondifferentiated,
for possessing attribute Q entails that one is distinct from anything that does not
haveQ,itfollowsthatthesastrasteachaBrahmandifferentiatedfromotherthings.
(BS,49,54)
B. The satras teach that Brahman is satchitananda (beingconsciousnessbliss)
which (i) has no meaning unless its constituent terms have meaning, but (ii) the
constituent terms have no meaning unless they are differentiated from their
opposites,thatis,nonbeing,nonconsciousness,andnonbliss.(BS,5053)
C.Brahmansays,MayIbemany,mayIgrowforth(ChandogyaUpanishad6.2.23),
andthisRamanujatakestoshowthattheworldofdiversityisasrealasBrahman,
beingamanifestationofBrahman.(BS,51,54,7980)
III. Whereas Shankara appeals to sastra passages (e.g., Mundaka Upanishad 1.1.6)
that state that Brahman is nirguna (without attributes), Ramanuja provides an
alternativeinterpretationofthesepassages.
A.WhenthesastrasstatethatBrahmaniswithoutattributes,theymeantosaythat
Brahman lacks all evil qualities (or qualities supervening on material nature,

prakrti). For example, Brahman is not perceived by senses, colorless, having no

body, not grasped, etc. Brahman is the opposite of material things. He must
thereforebedifferentiated.(BS,4950,52,79)
B.Brahmanisoneonlywithoutasecond(ChandogyaUpanishad6.1.1)meansthat
Brahmanaloneistheefficientcauseoftheuniverseandthehighestrealitybecause
Brahmanhasexcellentauspiciousqualities,byvirtueofwhichheisdifferentiated
fromeverythingelse.(BS,49,5051).
C.TatTvamAsiThouareThat!(ChandogyaUpanishad6.13.3)doesnotmean(as
Shankaramaintains)thouAtmanartidenticalwiththatBrahman,butThouJivaart
thebodyofBrahman.Inotherwords,BrahmanistheSelfofeverythinginthatall
individualthingshaveBrahmanastheiressence.SoBrahmanexistsintwomodes,
astheJiva(microoratomicversionofBrahman)andastheSupremecauseofthe
world.SotherelationbetweeneachindividualsoulandBrahmanisoneofpartto
wholeandthusonlyapartialidentity.(BS,7381)
IV.TheScripturalargumentsshowthatRamanujawantsVedantatomostaccurately
andconsistentlyreflectthetotalityoftheteachingssastras.IsRamanujaawareof
thepresuppositionsbroughttothesastrasthatgovernhisinterpretivemoves?In
eithercase,hisengagementwiththesastrasinvolvesarigorousapplicationofrules
ofgrammarandlogic.Heisnotdemandingblindfaithintheteachingsofthesastras.
V.ThePhilosophicalArgumentfromSourcesofKnowledge:Ramanujaarguesthat
oursourcesofknowledgedonotpermitaproofthatBrahmanisnondifferentiated
pureconsciousness.(Heseemsatpointstoconflatethisweakerclaimwiththe
strongeronethattheconsiderationsprovethatBrahmanisnotnondifferentiated.
BS,19,esp.23,whichseemstobethefallacyofappealtoignorance:wecannot
provep,thereforepisfalse.
A.Experience:Onlyobjectscanbeexperienced,butobjectsarequalifiedbysome
difference;thereforewecannotexperienceanondifferentiatedobject.(BS,20)
B. Consciousness: (i) Conscious is always intentional, i.e., directed towards an
object,whichisnecessarilydistinctfromconsciousnessasthatbywhichtheobject
isapprehendedortowhichtheobjectisgiven.(ii)Consciousnessisalsosaidtohave
qualities like eternal and selfluminous, but this makes no sense unless
consciousnessisdifferentiatedfromthosethingsthatlackthesequalities.(BS,20)
C.DirectPerception:Perceptionsareoftwokinds,determinate(savikalpa)andnon
determinate(nirvikalpa).Theformernecessarilyinvolvesdifferentiatedobjects,as
whenoneseesacowweseeanobjectqualifiedbyagenericnatureoressence:this
thingherehasacowessence.Thefirsttimeweseeacowweperceiveittogether
with its generic character, but we dont differentiate the individual cow and its
generic nature because we havent see other cows that have the same generic
nature. So the individual and essence is undifferentiated, but the object of
perceptionremainsdifferentiatedinrelationtootherkindsofthings.Soaccording

toRamanuja,nondeterminateperceptionsdonotinvolveapprehensionofanobject
devoidofallattributes,butonlydevoidofsomeattributes.(BS,2122).
D.Inference:Allinferenceinvolvesadistinctionbecauseitinvolvesarelation
betweenthingsthatareobjectsofperception,andasalreadyestablished
perceptiondealsonlywithobjectsqualifiedbydifference.
E.Scripture:Argumentsgivenabove.
Conclusion: Since all our sources of knowledge involve objects qualified by
difference,wearenotpermittedthroughsuchsourcestoprovethatthereareany
nondifferentiated objects. (One might consider this an inductive argument for
supposingthatnonondifferentiatedobjectsexist).
VI.ConsciousnessandExistencecannotbeOne
Ramanujasbriefargumentisthatconsciousnessandexistencecannotbethesame
becauseexistenceisalwaysanobjectofconsciousness.Sincethatbywhichwegrasp
anobject(consciousness)isdifferentfromtheobjectwegrasp,consciousnessand
existencecannotbeone.(BS26)
VII.TheSelfCannotbePureConsciousness
Here Ramanuja argues that the Self cannot be identical with pure consciousness.
Hisargumentisasfollows.TheSelfisreallytheknower,whichisthesubstrateof
consciousness,fortheknowerhaspermanenceorcontinuityofexistence(whichis
trueoftheSelf),asisshownfromaknoweratanytimebeingabletorecallanobject
seen earlier. There is a persisting I, but this persisting I is not identical with
consciousnesssinceconsciousnessisnotpermanent,asisshownfromoursayingI
knewthisorIforgotthat.(BS,34)
ComparethisargumenttowhatRamanujaargueslater(BS,41),namelythatindeep
sleep the I persists but consciousness does not. Therefore the Self (which is the
I)cannotbeidenticalwithconsciousness,pureorotherwise.Islepthappily,not
Iwaspureconsciousness.