After the fall The chaos was avoidable say: the top Brit in Baghdad, pageNew culture wars Where do you stand on the big divisive issues? page 7‘THE SUNDAY TIMES OCTOBER 21, 2007 For the first time, the British general at the heart of post-war planning for Iraq tells Heidi Kingstone of the chaos in London and Washington a ‘carly March 2003, as Beitain and America prepared to invade Iiag, casually dressod ‘Tony. Biait unexpeciclly walked into the room at 10 Downing Stoot where ‘Major General Tim Cross had just brefed Alastair Campbel Blair's oom- munications chic. Cross was Britain's point man in Washington on post-war Planning and he was not getting a “warm Teeling"” about it. Campbell vas clearly uneasy. For the next half hour Cross briefed Blair, ‘The heart of the matter was simple post-war planning. was completly Incohereat. “The plan was, vee do not need plan,” said Cross lat week, “AS we teased out the issues, Blair listened and questioned. None of ft seemed to come as much of a sur pile. Indeed, it seemed to reinforce ‘What he was starting fo pick up fom elsewhere” ‘He remembered telling Blair; “We want to be jolly careful that we don't start this war unl we know how we ‘ate going to finish I. And I, for one, am far from cleer om how we are ‘going to do that” Cross Knew what he was talking about. He had been a logistics vom mander during the 1991 Gulf wat and his sil in post-war planning had been honed in Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo He left Dovming Street with a nag- ing fear that Blar did not under Stand what was really. going to. be needed to deliver a stable oF recon- struded tag: 7 ine, ked and respected Blair from our caller opera ions in the Balkans, But he didn't seem to have the instint fr or under- sand the scope and complexity of ‘what was going to he needed in the afiermath of an invasion. I don’ think hhe understood what the possible consequences could be.” For Cross, the story of rag i one of a fallure of leadership, Tallng forthe {rst time about this failure, he sai “We got it wrong. We underestimated the resources we would need to see the campaign through. We under- ‘Gilacel to sake Cae. Toppled in E Clueless in \NEWS REVIEW ° _ NEWS REVIEW © 3 Rou Poe Nol sary Yung | hls lack of authority brutally ex. posed. It was announced that Paul Bremer would replace himn with the ‘ew tile of head of the Coalition Prov. Sonal Authority. According 10 Cross, y the Bush administration had realised Its catastrophic mistake and “un- {tily” hung Garner out to dry. Crucially, Bremer came to Baghdad With the authorty of the president Which Gamer had never had. Cross and others briefed him abot the tu ation tht he would be inheriing, But Bremer hen ued everything oni head, implemening his thre’ pitas =, disband the army, to beain dee'ahiteation and t slow dows the pital process, “By the Une he arid it was ready to late,” concluded Cross “No mater that he atempted o do be would have stugeted bat wilt those thee decsons he. virally threw avay any chance of Shortt medium tem sees.” ‘There was one catly succes, however Cns inal found the of nisty balding empty and rippel par but within shone, end et ite fanfare, the mins wat led over io be ran By 2 anor Tag From Cross’s point of view the Arnaticans seemed no tore inte sted inthe oll misty than duce ton or heath or any other depart. ‘ment: “Ia all he debates in Wasting. ton or Kuwalt, I never heard anyone talking about oi a the hey ise woul be idle wo suggest wasnt facto, but tobe fro the Amerie ail 'cver heard belng discussed as that we would get the oll iis op and running and once we did that te oil would flow and bring revenue to rag. Thea ieg eoald rebuild ile, “Tnover sensed any overt dese to hold on 16 or contol the pl minisuy any moe than ay eter® ‘Almost as proof this, Gordon Brown, as chanoalos, had berly set aside any funds towards the arteys rebuilding Basa, witht southern, feds was inthe UR’ ara of respon silty and had eaméling nest tute in ned of investment The ine. national “development deparunent located £154 n apr 2005 and = furter £60m was announced fn he spring budget: Just 210m fr recon, struction and humanitarian work On October 30, 2005, Straw sd the government planned to spend od on recon of during the tire-year pengd cont tmencng Ap 2008, Cees Se then and now, was that t wes never foing to be enough and that the ‘tical moments had passed ‘Cross stil feels, howeven that theronths. We fled to recopnne the amount of money and talent ~ both miliary “and non-miitry — tat ‘would aso be required” The fate f0 plan was a fare cross Whitehall ™ not just acne Washington. There_vas ho. desty sxcepted “end state” no consensis ‘on what we wanted t0 achieves nor vas 'thero a cobrent and Joined ‘an governmental “campaign pan “Taking! a. democracy 10 wat is prety obviously serious business 4nd We did't take it anywhere nest seriosly enough," sad Cros, the ost senior insider to talk on the re cord about the planning cattrop He first became Involved in the autumn of 2002 whea he was ordered {ocestish the logs headguates for possible operations in rag witch ps 2 Norwood nore London, the permanent joint heads quarters the fling monte he sscrossed the ante as momen tm bul towards invasion In February 2003 he went to Wash ington to join the tea run by Tay Gamer, the roned three-star general in charge of US post wer planning Cross's mision wast find out what was happening. He sen dally reports {0 London from the British embsoy, tok him tore than eo weeks Just ge the necessary clearance to £0in ard ou ofthe Pentagon without having "10" be escorted constanly sound the building He was alarmed that at this crucial time there was no Bris ambessaar inthe American capital Chistopher Meyer had just retuned to the UC and it made Cross wonder if the government tly’ undetsiod_ the Scale of what it was taking on. ‘Even wit operations looking mm nent there were no answers tb some Serious questions. How would we reoonstrtaq's economy? ‘What éaurtency would we use? What would we do with the judiciary and the police? ‘Things started to go badly wrong with looting and levessness soon after Saddam fell, but Gross, above, says the allies were wholly unprepared There was no war cabinet as there dnad been daring the Falklands cat ign, It was only In February, just ‘weeks before the war began, thatthe P Foreign Office established the Iraq Planning Unit (PU). Dominic Chil ‘ot the diplomat who headed it, "was ‘an eacellent man, but he had ® tiny ‘eam around jim, far smaller even than Garner's, said Cross. “The IPO ‘was on to alos from the tar. twas never going to be able o deliver @ Joined-up and coherent post-war plan inthe time then avaiable What frightened “him was the Washington neoconservatives’ cet fainty that once the Ameccans and Britsh amived, ral el revenue ‘would rebuild” the ‘oninty “Too ‘many people lost themselves in the luxury of political theary ad forgot or chose to ignore the practical relies of what was actually going to happen fn the ground, and that was at the heat ofthe planning bight “The cabal in Washington convin- ‘ed themselves that they didnt need ¢ plan because everything would be fine once Saddam Hussein was top. pled ... There were few dissenting voices you either agreed with their Paradigm or you were frozen out” He added: "What they “didn't seem to understand was that you cannot bring true democracy to these fagie places ness than a generation ortwo” ‘As for Britain, “it was apparent that Whitehall had got tse locked into the US way of thinking, not realising Just how litle America understood of {he rus, When we goto fag and ings started to go wrong there was Just this stunned silence. There was ho reserve ofl the vacuum, no abi ity to rethink the issues” Gamer “was very good at not ‘appearing to be disloyal, but it was retty clear that he was Binding it very frustrating, He would be in meetings for hours and’ retary mated. He i ‘couldn't seem to get the authority to 6 Blair di dive things forward. We inewtwas | to under hans.” Ip adalton: "Garner dnt hve ‘sufcent resources fiom the | SCOPE of start ofthe nexessary authenty over | Soe the mibtary. He was given a smal | GOIng to planning team of reguigr American 1 roiltary and a slack handful of ether | MEeded i People including his retined bude, who were good people. aftermat But he was notin the Betway oon | invasion and so had no more knowiedge about the war plan than he found in the hhewspapers. Gatner tled to recruit key sa fom across Washington but found those not partof the neacon fax temity were withheld by the defence deparmnent ‘The war was obviously going 10 star and Gamer wanted 10 get his people out on the ground, But. std Cross, *he didn't have a plece of Diaper that made it clear he was in ‘The miltary never say him as the boss, in fact they didn't know What to make of him wae unclear what his postion was, so he never hhad the authority o say tthe” hhead of the US forces that he was in charge” r ‘Ata funch with a gung-ho Don- @ ald Rumsfeld, the defence ‘secre. tary, before leaving. Washington, (Cross found himself shutout winen he raised the key issues of available foree Tatios, the lack of 2 reserve and the ‘overriding need to interationaise the reconstruction, Garner’ team was being built ago- alsingly slowly. He ended up leaving Washington for Kuwait to await the snvasion with fewer than 100 people and with 77 posts still empty. This NCO) ms the Best Global Priva =n re1 asthe tam the Americans sen p tseem ‘rebuild Iraq. “He wanted to be an en- And the asad Cox's vimana fond of Gamer, “and he was a hga, that was loredantesbiclace pa) 2 general lak of unewenin e ‘tg a ging Wot he En route to Kuwait, Cross stopped the in London to talk to Campbell He Of the found him bots helpful and proses 4a arranging a much-needed and sadly Jacking media team to. work wth Garner. Tas ding this seas: sion that Campbell eft the room and eturned with the prime minister AS late as Apri, Cross stil had no sense of what Britain wanted out of the war and what the government thought Iraq should look ike once it was over: “The oaly thing that was ‘made clear to me was that they did ot want tobe seen tobe acting in any ‘way that looked like they supported the division of lag, which was fir enough.” As the lead-up tothe invasion inten silfled, Cross became Gamer's oficial alton deputy. But here was still no senior Forelgn Office person in place ‘0 oversee the politcal reconstruc tion. Cross told Jack Stave, the for- eign secretary, who’ visited Kuwait, tht he needed a polit ical “driver” alongside him, someone to influence polit, cal events. Suawte- sponded by cling Cross that he as. doing = reat ob and left things a8 they were, By the time Gamer and Cross got to Bazh= iad in early Apri, in the Wake of the invasion, things (on the ground were warse than they Inad antetpated “Even with my misgivings I did not realise what a mess the place would bein" Cross sai Tt was held together with chicken wie and chewing gum, Inirastrucure suchas power satons were ony oper. ating with a complete hotch-poteh of spare pars brought in over the years ftom Various counties around the world during the years of sanctions |i hospitals, “whatever” equipment ‘hoy had was old’ and there: wasn't much of open sewers ran through ‘he main hospital in Basra” Within days he could sens thatthe smenu ad lead begun lp Nay. Buildings were being et on fire ‘and insurgens bad stated to eset ge Whea General Sir Mike Jackson, head of the British Army, came to Baghdad. Cross. briefed: him. “The ‘resentation he gave was entitle Snatching Defeat fom the Jaws of Vicor. Tackson asked Cross: “How are we ‘making a diference?™ Cross answered: "Were not” Cross told Jackson that ‘Gamer's team was too smal. It did not have adequate communications, being dependent on unreliable satelite ‘phones that were ofen useless Team ‘members lived in an abandoned pal ace with no hot water, eating ready~ ‘made meals. Because Gamer's esin oul! pot get adequate protection sirugaled to leave the green zone and $0 was Isolated. Daily fe turned out 'o be a struggle for survival, Within days of Gamers arival in Baghdad he seemed ott of his depth *Source: about mora ipa Sad Sn onal sovereignty and | bubs he ase ea or docs he bly ht his the fine for Brno “abandon Fe thinks the Uk miliary ty ow being propoied is cies Bi that deste the whet say ve he OX has nevi inde the decion Yo reduce te Se comnts lity conan. Suporte rag seer tare tiny Ways Bat we done oon nue to Ives foie on mney Capablnes “ead = il te oi lndusy obviously needs lp wo gt ep and nnn, Wo aka need is hlp the leis eae lish the various organs of tc Soa cry. the dierent fons a lnmrgency Have sare take apotier andthe ae some rns for hope: butt bat hope ea ft hey wl reed out help me. ou witht W's eal of he mei, which continue wis hat even Gist and Bein sola pu on “eala pressure fas not ea hee fu They demand easy angers at suk sluions when there re none fnd can be This as ays bees stuaton that was going to have lng term inpleatons ad loge, cotter The UR mst ea lesions and bois nave rss fears tat ye sll have net leat ur Toso “Gordon ewe recon alain of hus 300 Levant onanting reo Baa doesnt sind’ much of ressurag message We sil ed ‘twers fo uestons about whether the governments ting nse soc and nt, ot iy Gross dos ot thik we are. “Tete 5 silo caberen national campos Plan rth socal gold ner se terror wid ater alt wits use al sare he's “ox Seong Suflcent reeures oneal hoe ay el eet" ‘uromoney 2006 Awards. www.bs.com/uk