Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay No.

L-74324 17November1988
THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) & 8(2) OF THE R.P.C.
"
A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
"
"
A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not from instinct,
then through fear of incurring punishment.
"
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing
them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May
19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of
gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire
making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal responsibilities of the accused?
There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the
same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to
the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene of the incident was purely
coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed
against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was committed by him.
**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.
Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his
companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE
SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And
granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE
HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR
MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.
THE UNITED STATES,
plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE,
defendants-appellants.

on the 30th day of December, 1915, the alleged offended persons Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco executed and delivered to the
defendants a contract evidencing the fact that the former had borrowed from the latter the sum of P300, and (2) that, by virtue of the
terms of said contract, the said Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco obligated themselves to pay to the defendants interest at the rate
of five per cent (5%) per month, payable within the first ten days of each and every month, the first payment to be made on the 10th day of
January, 1916.

on the 6th day of May, 1921, a complaint was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, charging the defendants with a
violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655). they were each arrested, arraigned, and pleaded not guilty.

on the 1st day of September, 1921. the Honorable M. V. del Rosario, judge, Guilty sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P120 and,
in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law.

The appellants now contend:

(
a
) That the contract upon which the alleged usurious interest was collected was executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted;
(b

) that at the time said contract was made (December 30, 1915), there was no usury law in force in the Philippine Islands;
(
c
) that said Act No. 2655 did not become effective until the 1st day of May, 1916, or four months and a half after the contract in question
was executed;
(
d
) that said law could have no retroactive effect or operation,
(
e
) that said law impairs the obligation of a contract, and that for all of said reasons the judgment imposed by the lower court should be
revoked; that the complaint should be dismissed, and that they should each be discharged from the custody of the law.
The lower court
time of the execution and delivery of said contract there was no law in force in the Philippine Islands punishing usury; but, defendants
had collected a usurious rate of interest after the adoption of the Usury Law in the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2655), they were guilty of a
violation of that law and should be punished in accordance with its provisions.

The law when a contract contains an obligation to pay interest upon the principal, the interest thereby becomes part of the principal
and is included within the promise to pay obligation to pay interest on money due under a contract, be it express or implied, is a part of
the obligation of the contract.

Laws adopted after the execution of a contract, changing or altering the rate of interest, cannot be made to apply to such contract without
violating the provisions of the constitution which prohibit the adoption of a law "impairing the obligation of contract." (8 Cyc., 996; 12
Corpus Juris, 1058-1059.)

The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land,
morals or public order. If a law impairs the obligation of a contract, it is prohibited by the Jones Law, and is null and void.

penal law not retroactive

Ex post facto
laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done
before the passage of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action, is an ex post facto law. The
Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law which will make an act done before its adoption a crime. A law may be given a retroactive
effect in civil action, providing it is curative in character, but ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is
favorable to the defendant.

plaintiff-appellee: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

defendant-appellant: ABELARDO FORMIGONES
Facts:
In the month of November 1946, Abelardo was living on his farm in Camarines Sur with his wife, Julia Agricola and their 5 children. From
there they transferred in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones in the same municipality to find employmentas harvesters of
palay. After a month, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house when Abelardo, without previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bofo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a
severe hemorrhage resulting in her death. Abelardo then took his dead wife and laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down
beside her. In this position, he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones.

The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his statement, he used to have quarrels with his wife for reason that he often
saw her in the company of his brother, Zacarias; that he suspected the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his wife
had become indifferent to him. During the preliminary investigation, the accused pleaded guilty. At the case in the Courts of First Instance, he
also pleaded guilty but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to
the effect that his conduct was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person, at times he would remain silent, walk around stark
naked, refuse to take a bath and was his clothes etc... The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an IMBECILE and
therefore exempt fromcriminal liability under article 12 of the RPC.

Issue
: Whether or not Abelardo is an imbecile at the time of the commission of the crime and therefore exempted from criminal liability
Held:
No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr. Francisco Gomes, he was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he
could distinguish between right and wrong. In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the RPC
so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of
committing the crime.

As to the strange behavior of the accused during his confinement, assuming it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either
to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. A man who could feel
the pangs of jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of killing his wife who he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that
in doing so, he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not the suspicions were justified, is of little or
no importance. The fact is that he believed her faithless. Furthermore, in his written statement, he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and
at the trial he made no effort to deny of repudiate said written statements, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching
him and securing his conviction.

There are however 2 mitigating circumstances present:

1) Passion or obfuscation (having killed his wife in a jealous rage)

2) Feeblemindedness

In conclusion, the appellant is found guilty of parricide and the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed with the modification that he
appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone (because of the 2 mitigating circumstances)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff
-
appellee
,
vs
. FERNANDO SULTAN y LATO,
accused
-
appellant
.
Facts
:
According to her, on 2 June 1997 at 9:00 oclock in the evening she was on her way home from a visit to her cousin Cristina Mansilongan in
Novaliches, Quezon City; when she passed the dark alley in her cousin's compound she was accosted by someone, later identified as
accused-appellant Fernando L. Sultan, who pointed a sharp instrument at her neck and announcing it was a "hold-up." He grabbed her and
brought her to a house along the alley which turned out to be his. Once inside the house, he made her sit down. He offered her a drink; she
refused it. Then he started divesting her of her watch, ring, earrings, and necklace the values of which are now reflected in the Decision of the
court
a quo
, and her cash of P130.00. After taking her valuables, he started kissing her on the lips and cheeks. As if to discourage him from
making further sexual advances, she told him that she was married with two (2) children but accused-appellant was not dissuaded from
pursuing his intentions. While pointing an ice pick at her he ordered her to undress. She acceded for fear that he would kill her as she was
under constant threat. After she had completely undressed, accused-appellant ordered her to lie down on the floor. He then kissed her again
from head down. Still she could not resist him because of fear. He went on top of her, held her two (2) hands on the level of her head, spread
her thighs and inserted his penis into her vagina. The coital encounter lasted for ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes.
After satisfying his lust, he ordered her to put on her bra and panty, tied her hands and went out of the room to smoke. After ten (10) to
fifteen (15) minutes, he came back, untied her, and once again with threat and intimidation sexually abused her. Thereafter, he tied her hands
to a protruding piece of wood in the room and held her in his arms. She cried. He told her that he loved her and that he would answer for what
he had done to her. They talked until noon the following day without sleeping.
In her effort to release herself from his clutches she "agreed" to elope with him. Perhaps convinced that she was going to run away with him,
he allowed her to go home at noon to get her things. She was then staying with her cousin Nita del Rosario, at No. 9 Sta. Eleuteria Street,
Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City. He even accompanied her to the highway to get a ride home

The next day she told her sister who consequently informed their brother who was a policeman. He suggested that Juditha pretend to elope so
that he could arrest the assailant with the help of his two companions later on. They were able to do this while Juditha and the accused were
inside a bus during heavy traffic. He was tried and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape. He appeals to the SC.
Issue
: Whether or not the testimony of the victim can be considered credible on the basis of the alleged robbery and rape.

Held
: Yes. Regarding the robbery: while there may have been no effort on the part of the victim to retrieve her personal belongings after the
threat had passed, her failure to do so does not necessarily dispute the commission of the robbery.

Article 293 of the RPC provides that: Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.

All the necessary elements for the execution and accomplishment ofthe crime were present: (1) personal property belonging to another; (2)
unlawful taking; (3) intent to gain; and (4) violence or intimidation.

Regarding the rape- the accused alleges that the requisite force/intimidation was not proved and there was some form of consent because the
victim did not put up enough resistance. The court answered that though force may not have been employed by the assailant, intimidation
was vividly present in the fear that it produced within the victim. With fear instilled in Judithas mind, failure to put up resistance does not
mean consent so as to make her a willing participant in the sexual confrontation that transpired.

Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC condemns a person to reclusion perpetua to death when robbery shall have been committed with rape. In the
present case, the victim was raped TWICE but since additional rapes committed do not count as aggravating circumstances1 (People v. Regala),
the court must construe the penal law to be in favor of the offender. Unless a law is passed providing that additional rape/s or homicide/s may
be considered aggravating, this will always be the case because:

Article 63, par. 2 of the same Code explicitly states that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, when there
are neither mitigating or aggravating circumstances inthe commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias
"Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry,"

accused-appellants.
on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the
following manner:

Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her
own just as her husband does
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who
was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred
had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary took his place
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on the wheel.
After the car turned right in a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poked a
gun at her

Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money
inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station
in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and
prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for
P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique
ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro,
according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was
finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress were torn and had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground
and was injured when she jumped out of the car.On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (
Id
., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati.
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he
stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until
he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway.
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or
police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot.
Much later, Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he
was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with
extortion committed on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of
reclusion perpetua
.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00
as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate damages.
Appeal: court
a quo
erred
(1) in convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein;
(2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and
cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense charged.

Crime not kidnapping for ransom

look at the motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts to know what crime was committed
In this case, no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against
complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
Puno "Mam, (
sic
), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (
sic
) advances from our office but they refused to
give me any bale (
sic
). . . ."

for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her
liberty,
and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended
by the offenders.

United States vs
. Ancheta
, detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but
for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in
relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity.
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is
reclusion perpetua
.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
The appellant was convicted after a jury trial in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles. The evidence against him was given by two Los Angeles
police officers. had occasion to examine the appellant's arms one evening on a street in Los Angeles some four months before the trial.
observed "scar tissue and discoloration on the inside" of the appellant's right arm, and "what appeared to be numerous needle marks and a
scab which was approximately three inches below the crook of the elbow" on the appellant's left arm. The officer also testified that the
appellant, under questioning, had admitted to the occasional use of narcotics.
Based upon more than 10 years of experience as a member of the Narcotic Division of the Los Angeles Police Department, Officer Lindquist
gave his opinion that "these marks and the discoloration were the result of the injection of hypodermic needles into the tissue into the vein
that was not sterile." He stated that the scabs were several days old at the time of his examination, and that the appellant was neither under
the influence of narcotics nor suffering withdrawal symptoms at the time he saw him. This witness also testified that the appellant had
admitted using narcotics in the past.
The trial judge instructed the jury that the statute made it a misdemeanor for a person
"either to use narcotics, or to be addicted to the use of narcotics. . . . That portion of the statute referring to the 'use' of narcotics is based
upon the 'act' of using. That portion of the statute referring to 'addicted to the use' of narcotics is based upon a condition or status. They are
not identical. . . . To be addicted to the use of narcotics is said to be a status or condition, and not an act. It is a continuing offense, and differs
from most other offenses in the fact that [it] is
chronic, rather than acute; that it continues after it is complete, and subjects the offender to arrest at any time before he reforms. The
existence of such a chronic condition may be ascertained from a single examination if the characteristic reactions of that condition be found
present." jury returned a verdict finding the appellant "guilty of the offense charged."
A California statute makes it a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for any person to "be addicted to the use of narcotics," and, in
sustaining petitioner's conviction thereunder, the California courts construed the statute as making the "status" of narcotic addiction a
criminal offense for which the offender may be prosecuted "at any time before he reforms," even though he has never used or possessed any
narcotics within the State and has not been guilty of any antisocial behavior there.

Held:
As so construed and applied, the statute inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments