Bayan Muna v Alberto Romulo

Bayan Muna, Petitioner.

Alberto Romulo, Blas Ople, Respondents.
FACTS:
In 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
aggression crimes), in which by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented
by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to
protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment
suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and
ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or
at least declared as without force and effect.
ISSUES:
Whether the Respondents abused their discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in
contravention of the Rome Statute.
Whether the agreement is valid, binding and effective without the
concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Rome Statute
First issue
The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a
matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.
According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states].
the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP,
over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling
or unable to prosecute.

Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a

State-Party and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only
a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the
Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines
to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. And even assuming that
the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of
international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States
is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 2/3 concurrence
Second issue
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by
long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered
executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular
relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As
the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of
the nation is, as Bayan would put it, executive altogether. The right of the
President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been
confirmed by long practice.
Petition is DISMISSED.

White Light Corp v City of Manila

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses

and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of
mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said
Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it
is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the
City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes
upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance
invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up
rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest
or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the
said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC
reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.
Tanada v Tuvera
Lorenzo Tanada, Abraham Sarmiento, MABINI, Petitioners.
Hon. Juan Tuvera, Hon. Joaquin Venus, Melquiades De la Cruz, Florentino Pablo,
Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished Executive
Issuances such as; Presidential Decrees, Proclamations, Executive Orders, general
orders, letters of implementation, and administrative orders. In defense,
respondents stated that the petitioners have no legal personality in the
case citing sec. 3 of rule 65 of the Rules of Court which lays-out the requirement for
filing for a Writ of Mandamus. Petitioners contended that the issue touches
the public and thereby does not require any special circumstance to
institute an action. On the other hand, respondents stated that publication

of the mentioned issuances is not asine qua non requirement as the Law
provides its own affectivity date as stated in Art. 2 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not publication affects the validity of the Executive Issuances.
Held:
The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the respondents to publish the
Executive Issuances of general application, and further stated that failure
for publication would render the Issuances no binding force and effect. It
was explained that such publication is essential as it gives basis to the legal maxim
known as ignorantia legis non excusat. Thus, failure to publish would make create
injustice as would it would punish the citizen for transgression of the law which he
had no notice. The court declared that Presidential issuances with general
application without publication would be inoperative and null and void. However,
some justices in their concurring opinions made a qualification stating that
publication is not an absolute requirement. As Justice Fernando stated that,
publication is needed but it must not only confined in the Official Gazette because it
would make those other laws not published in the Official Gazette bereft of any
binding force or effect.
Commissioner of Customs v Hypermix Feeds Corporation
Facts:
The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying wheat as (1)importer
or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge and depending on
these factors, wheat would be classified further as either food grade with a tariff
rate of 3% or feed grade with a tariff rate of 7%. The regulation also provides for an
exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and
countries of origin. On December 19, 2003, the respondent filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas contending the
following: (1) the regulation was issued without following the mandate of the
Revised Administrative Code, (2) that the regulation classified them to be a feed
grade supplier without prior assessment and examination, (3)the equal protection
clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated the non-flour
millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all, and(4) the retroactive
application of the regulation is confiscatory. The petitioners thereafter filed a motion
to dismiss contending that: (1) the RTC does not have jurisdiction of the subject
matter, (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper,(3) CM 27-2003 was an
internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of the
respondent were speculative and premature. On March10, 2005, the Regional Trial

Court rendered a decision ruling in favor of the respondent. It held that the
jurisdiction is properly held because the subject matter is quasi-legislative in nature.
It also held that the petition for declaratory relief was proper remedy and that the
respondent was the proper party to file it. On matters relating to the validity of the
regulation, the court held that the regulation is invalid because the basic
requirements of hearing and publication were not complied with. The petitioners
then appealed to Court of Appeals but it was, however, dismissed. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule45 assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Issue: W/N the issuance of CMO 27-2003 is within the powers of the Commissioner
of Customs
Held: The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and
determine the classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed.
Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the
customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of
Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard
to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officers prior
examination and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat. It is wellsettled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to
create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but inconformity
with, the standards prescribed by law.
Victorias Milling Co. Inc. v. Social Security Commission
FACTS:
The Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor:
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the
System, will take into consideration and include in the Employees remuneration all
bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of
remuneration. All these will comprise the Employees remuneration or earnings,
upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of
P500 for any one month.

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through
counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the
circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, expressly excluding overtime
pay and bonus in the computation of the employers and employees respective
monthly premium contributions, and submitting, In order to assist your System in
arriving at a proper interpretation of the term compensation for the purposes of
such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and
on the general interpretation of the words compensation, remuneration and
wages. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority
on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval
of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section
4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission to adopt,
amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this
Act.
HELD:
No. The Commissions Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the
approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but
a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general
policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed. The Circular purports
merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the
amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions
should be based. The Circular neither needs approval from the President nor
publication in the Official Gazette.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS v OVEJERA

FACTS:
NFSW struck against private respondent Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC) to
compel the latter for the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851 (13th Month
Pay Law) in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being

enjoyed by CAC workers which amount to 1- months salary. Labor Arbiter Ovejera
declared the strike as illegal and no pronouncement was made as to the demand on
the 13th month pay. This caused petitioner to file an instant petition with SC.
ISSUE:
W/N under PD 851, an employer is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in
addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the aggregate of which
exceeds the 13th month pay.
HELD:
No. The intention was to grant some relief not to all workers but only to the
unfortunate ones not actually paid a 13th month salary or what amounts to it, by
whatever name called; but it was not envisioned that a double burden would be
imposed on the employer already paying his employees a 13th month pay or its
equivalent whether out of pure generosity or on the basis of a binding agreement
and, in the latter ease, regardless of the conditional character of the grant, so long
as there is actual payment. Otherwise, what was conceived to be a 13th month
salary would in effect become a 14th or possibly 15th month pay.