7a Supreme Court Record

No.
14-1305
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.,

v.
Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.

Pro se
9816 MEMORIAL BOULEVARD #205
HUMBLE, TEXAS
(281) 540-2255
April 29, 2015
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. (202) 789-0096 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether a court of general jurisdiction is authorized

to extend its jurisdiction beyond the boundaries fixed
therefor by the Constitution, into geographic area
fixed by the Constitution exclusively for courts of
limited jurisdiction.
(I)
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., Petitioner

and Defendant-Appellant below
United States of America, Respondent
and Plaintiff-Appellee below
(II)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Question presented for review ................................... I
Parties to proceeding ................................................. II
Table of authorities .................................................. VI
Introduction ................................................................ 1
Opinions and orders below ......................................... 2
Jurisdiction ................................................................. 2
Constitutional and statutory provisions involved ......... 2
Statement ................................................................... 2
A. Facts giving rise to this case................................. 2
B. The district court proceedings .............................. 3
C. The appellate court proceedings ........................... 3
Reasons why certiorari should be granted ................ 5
I. There is no evidence that Petitioner is
a resident of, domiciled in, or a legal
resident of any territory over which
the district court of first instance has
jurisdiction ......................................................... 5
The district court proceeding is an
attempt to collect an alleged debt ................. 5
Congress exercise two species of
legislative power ............................................ 5
The true distinction between courts
is as to jurisdiction: general or limited ......... 6
The Constitution provides expressly
for federal trial courts of limited
jurisdiction, but is devoid of express
provision for federal trial courts of
general jurisdiction ........................................ 7
Today, every district court has
jurisdiction to hear criminal matters
and enter judgments in criminal
proceedings regarding a debt ........................ 8
(III)
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTSContinued
Page
Every federal district court is a court
of general jurisdiction. .................................
Courts of general jurisdiction are not
constitutional but territorial courts
created by virtue of the sovereign
congressional faculty, granted under
Article 4 3(2) of the Constitution ..............
Congress manufacture jurisdictional
confusion by giving constitutional and
territorial courts the same name.................
The United States District Court of
first instance is a mere territorial court .....
No court of general jurisdiction has
jurisdiction without territory or other
property belonging to the United States .....
II. The only material fact relative to the
jurisdiction of the district court of first
instance is that Petitioner resides in
Harris County, Texas, a geographic area
without the jurisdiction of any territorial
court, such as said district court ....................
III. The district court of first instance
extended its jurisdiction beyond the
boundaries fixed by the Constitution at
Article 4 3(2) for courts of general
jurisdiction, into geographic area fixed
by the Constitution at Article 3 2(1)
exclusively for courts of limited
jurisdiction .......................................................
Summary ..................................................
10
10
13
14
15
16
17
17
V
Page
Systemic fraud in the judiciary of the
inferior courts invites anarchy and
terrible retribution and imperils the
existence of the government ........................ 19
A supplemental petition ........................... 22
Conclusion................................................................. 23
Appendix:
Appendix A District court judgment
(May 23, 2014) .............................. 1a
Appendix B District court order
(May 23, 2014) .............................. 2a
Appendix C Court of appeals opinion
(Feb. 3, 2015)................................. 7a
Appendix D Court of appeals judgment
(Feb. 3, 2015)............................... 10a
Appendix E Tax Court Memo
(June 4, 2003).............................. 12a
Appendix F Amended motion to dismiss
(Apr. 29, 2014) ............................ 14a
Appendix G Demand for dismissal
(May 20, 2014) ............................ 28a
Appendix H Appellants appeal brief
(Aug. 18, 2014) ............................ 37a
Appendix I Appellants reply brief
(Oct. 6, 2014) ............................... 41a
Appendix J Appellants opposition to
motion for, and motion for,
sanctions (Oct. 2, 2014) .............. 54a
Appendix K Appellants reply to response
to motion for sanctions
(Oct. 14, 2014) ............................. 62a
Appendix L Constitutional provisions ........... 66a
Appendix M Statutory provisions ................... 68a
VI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Page(s)
Balzac v. People of Porto Rico,

258 U.S. 298 (1922) ................................. passim
Basso v. Utah Power and Light Company,
495 F.2d 906 (974) ........................................... 4
Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. 2 Dall. 419 (1793) ................................ 21
Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265,
5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) ...................................... 6, 17
Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960) .............................. 2, 21, 22
Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd., v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694 (1982) ......................................... 7-8
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co.,
260 U. S. 226 (1922) ....................................... 17
Linardos v. Fortuna,
157 F.3d 945 (2d Cir. 1998) ........................... 19
Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) ........................................ 22
Mookini v. United States,
303 U.S. 201 (1938) ............................ 12, 13, 15
Texas v. Florida,
306 U.S. 398 (1939) ................................... 15-16
VII
TABLE OF AUTHORITIESContinued
Constitutional provisions
Page(s)
Art. I 8, cl. 17 .................................................. 17

Art. III ......................................................... passim
Art. III 1 ........................................................ 7, 8
Art. III 2, cl. 1 ....................................... 7, 8, 17
Art. IV .................................................... 13, 14, 15
Art. IV 3 .......................................................... 11
Art. IV 3, cl. 2 .......................... 10, 14, 15, 17, 18
Preamble ............................................................ 21
Statutory provisions:
26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) ............................................ 3
28 U.S.C. 132. .................................................... 13
28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 .................................... 4, 9
28 U.S.C. 1254(1) ................................................. 2
28 U.S.C. 3002 ..................................................... 9
28 U.S.C. 3002(2) ........................................... 9, 14
28 U.S.C. 3002(3) ........................................... 9, 14
28 U.S.C. 3002(8) ........................................... 9, 14
Foraker Act, Ch. 191, 18 Stat. 75,
April 12, 1900 ..................................... 11, 12, 13
Miscellaneous:
Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary,
Second Edition (West Publishing Co.: St.
Paul, Minn., 1910) ............................... 6, 14, 19
VIII
Page(s)
John Bouvier, Bouviers Law Dictionary,
Third Revision (Being the Eighth
Edition), revised by Francis Rawle
(West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn.:
1914) ........................................................ passim
The Oxford Companion to American Law,
Kermit L. Hall, Editor in Chief (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 2002) ...................... 8
The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen
united States of America of July 4, 1776,
Conclusion ...................................................... 21
USCourts.gov, District Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourtsUn
derstandingtheFederalCourts/DistrictCour
ts.aspx (accessed March 18, 2015)........................ 9
Wests Encyclopedia of American Law
(West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1998) ............. 10
IN THE
No. 14-1305

v.
Petitioner,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
INTRODUCTION
Federal district courts are authorized to hear both

civil and criminal matters and enter judgments in civil
and criminal proceedings: authority which defines a
court of general jurisdiction.
This poses no particular problemexcept that the
district court ensconced in every federal judicial
district throughout the freely associated compact
states of the Union, such as the district court of
first instance, is exercising jurisdiction beyond the
boundaries fixed by the Constitution for courts of
general jurisdiction, in geographic area fixed by the
Constitution exclusively for courts of limited
jurisdiction.
2
Willful disobedience of a Constitution by judges of
the inferior courts sworn to uphold it, according to this
Court (Elkins v. United States, infra), invites anarchy
and terrible retribution and imperils the existence of
the government.
The within entreaty is Petitioners effort to avoid
being defrauded of his property under color of law,
office, and authority by a legislative officer of a
territorial court of general jurisdictionthe judge of
the district court of first instanceand say what,
evidently, no one else is willing to say, in order to help
this Honorable Court avert calamity for us all.
OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW
Amended final judgment (see Appendix, hereinafter

App., infra, 1a) and order of sale and vacature
(App., infra, 2a) of the district court; and unpublished
opinion (App., infra, 7a) and judgment (App., infra,
10a) of the court of appeals.
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on February

3, 2015. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Relevant constitutional and statutory provisions

are reproduced in the appendix to this petition.
(App., infra, 66a-68a).
STATEMENT
A. Facts Giving Rise To This Case

This case arises out of alleged unpaid federal income
taxes of Petitioner for tax years 1993-1997 and the
3
federal tax liens recorded against real property owned
by Petitioner in respect thereof, and is an action to
foreclose on said liens.
The only material fact in the record of this case
relevant to the question presented is that Petitioner
resides in Harris County, Texas (App., infra, 12a).
B. The District Court Proceedings
In Petitioners February 4, 2014, answer to Plaintiffs January 7, 2014, complaint, Petitioner tacitly
admits to all facts alleged in the complaint via solemn
covenant to discharge in full the obligation alleged
therein upon Plaintiffs production of evidence that
Petitioner is a citizen or resident of the Title 26 U.S.C.
7701(a)(9) geographical United States and therefore of
the subject, and Petitioners property of the object, of
Title 26 U.S.C. To this offer to settle Plaintiff stands
mute, rather opting for pretrial motions and filings
that continue for four months.
The record of the district court reflects multiple
proper challenges of jurisdiction, to which Plaintiff
fails to produce evidence at any juncture; instead
relying exclusively on allegation and statutes, which
the district judge accepts and uses to deny Petitioners
three motions and one demand to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction.
The district court issues its Amended Final
Judgment authorizing foreclosure of the aforesaid tax
liens May 23, 2014.
C. The Appellate Court Proceedings
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit issues its judgment and unpublished opinion
affirming the district courts order as of February 3,
2015.
4
The panel infers in its aforesaid opinion that
Petitioners failure to contest the validity of the alleged
tax liabilities or his ownership of the real property
at issue operates as a waiver of jurisdiction, a false
inference.1
Said appeals-court judges also mischaracterize the
substance of Petitioners filings and impute to Petitioner acts for which no evidence exists; e.g., when
they allege in their opinion that Petitioner argues, i.e.,
propounds, that (a) Harris County, Texas, is not in
the United States, (b) he is not a citizen of the United
States, and (c) he is not subject to federal income
taxes. (App., infra, 7a). Rather, as the record reflects:
Petitioner only provides proof of the meaning of
the definition of the term United States in Titles 26
U.S.C. (App., infra, 14a) and 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176
(App., infra, 28a) and avers under oath that he has
neither seen nor been presented with any evidence or
material fact that demonstrates the positive of any of
the foregoing negatives cited supra in (a), (b) and (c) as
to the District of Columbia. (App., infra, 14a).
The seven case authorities upon which the judges of
the panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rely in their February 3, 2015, opinion (App., infra, 7a),
consist exclusively of Fifth Circuit judgments.
[L]ack of jurisdiction cannot be waived and jurisdiction

cannot be conferred upon a federal court by consent, inaction
or stipulation. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct.
390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686
(10th Cir. 1968); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Riverview
State Bank, 217 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1955). Basso v. Utah
Power and Light Company, 495 F.2d 906 (1974).
5
Said panel also fails to mention in its opinion that
the record on appeal is devoid of evidence or proof of
jurisdiction.
When reconciled with the record of this case, the
opinion of the aforesaid appellate judges reveals
among other crimesculpability for fraud for the
same reason as the district judge: gross negligence
by reason of ignorance / dereliction of law, including,
but not limited to, the jurisdictional provisions of
the Constitution.
REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED
I.
There Is No Evidence That Petitioner Is A
Resident Of, Domiciled In, Or A Legal Resident
Of Any Territory Over Which The District
Court Of First Instance Has Jurisdiction.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDING IS AN

ATTEMPT TO COLLECT AN ALLEGED DEBT.
This case is constituted at the district court of first
instance as a debt-collection proceeding whose subject
matter is alleged federal income tax liability, and is an
action to foreclose on alleged federal tax liens recorded
by claimant United States against real property
owned by Petitioner, and arises from alleged unpaid
federal income taxes, penalties, and interest assessed
against Petitioner by the Internal Revenue Service.
CONGRESS EXERCISE TWO SPECIES OF

LEGISLATIVE POWER.
It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body,
exercise two species of legislative power: the
one, limited as to its objects, but extending all
6
over the Union: the other, an absolute, exclusive
legislative power over the District of Columbia.
* * * Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434,
6 Wheat. 265, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821).
THE TRUE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COURTS IS AS

TO JURISDICTION: GENERAL OR LIMITED.
General jurisdiction is that which extends to a
great variety of matters. General jurisdiction in
law and equity is jurisdiction of every kind that a
court can possess, of the person, subject-matter,
territorial, and generally the power of the court in
the discharge of its judicial duties. * * *
* * * Limited jurisdiction (called, also, special
and inferior) is that which extends only to
certain specified causes. John Bouvier, Bouviers
Law Dictionary, Third Revision (Being the
Eighth Edition), revised by Francis Rawle (West
Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn.: 1914) (Bouviers
Law Dictionary), p. 1761.
Limited jurisdiction. This term is ambiguous,
and the books sometimes use it without due
precision. It is sometimes carelessly employed
instead of special. The true distinction between
courts is between such as possess a general and
such as have only a special jurisdiction for a
particular purpose, or are clothed with special
powers for the performance. * * *
Henry
Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary, Second
Edition (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn.,
1910) (Blacks Law Dictionary), p. 673.
THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES EXPRESSLY FOR

FEDERAL TRIAL COURTS OF LIMITED
JURISDICTION, BUT IS DEVOID OF EXPRESS
PROVISION FOR FEDERAL TRIAL COURTS OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION.
The Constitution creates the federal judicial power

in Article 3 1 and defines the maximum extent of that
power in Article 3 2(1) thereof; to wit:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. * * *
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority;
to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;to
Controversies between two or more States;
between a State and Citizens of another State,
between Citizens of different States,between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
or Subjects.
Courts ordained and established by Congress under
authority of the provisions of Article III of the
Constitution are courts of limited jurisdiction; to wit:
The character of the controversies over which federal
judicial authority may extend are delineated in Art. III,
2, cl. 1. * * * Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd.,
8
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701
(1982).
The authority to hear criminal matters and enter
judgments in criminal proceedings, however, does not
appear among the certain specified causes enumerated in Article 3 2(1) of the Constitution, to which
the judicial power extends.
Just because a lower federal court, such as the
district court of first instance, happens to possess
authority to hear civil matters and enter judgments
in civil proceedings, does not make said court a
court of limited jurisdiction ordained and established
by the Congress under authority Article 3 1 of the
Constitution; to wit:
The United States District Courts are trial courts.
Trial courts, as opposed to appellate courts, are
courts that hear both civil and criminal cases
through examination and cross-examination by
attorneys. * * * The Oxford Companion to
American Law, Kermit L. Hall, Editor in Chief
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), p. 175
(s.v. Courts, United States).
TODAY, EVERY DISTRICT COURT HAS

JURISDICTION TO HEAR CRIMINAL MATTERS AND
ENTER JUDGMENTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
REGARDING A DEBT.
The United States district courts are the trial

courts of the federal court system. Within limits set by
Congress and the Constitution, the district courts
have jurisdiction to hear nearly all categories of
9
federal cases, including both civil and criminal
matters.2 USCourts.gov.
Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection
Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
3002. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
* * * (2) Court means any court created by
the Congress of the United States, excluding
the United States Tax Court.
(3) Debt means
* * * (B) an amount that is owing to the
United States on account of a fee, duty, lease,
rent, service, sale of real or personal property,
overpayment, fine, assessment, penalty,
restitution, damages, interest, tax, bail bond
forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery of a cost
incurred by the United States, or other source
of indebtedness to the United States, but that
is not owing under the terms of a contract
originally entered into by only persons other
than the United States; * * *
* * * (8) Judgment means a judgment,
order, or decree entered in favor of the United
States in a court and arising from a civil or
criminal proceeding regarding a debt.
USCourts.gov, District Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/

FederalCourtsUnderstandingtheFederalCourts/DistrictCourts.aspx
(accessed March 18, 2015).
2
10
EVERY FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT IS A COURT OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION.
The best-known courts are courts of GENERAL
JURISDICTION, which have unlimited trial jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, within their
jurisdictional area. At the federal level, these are
called DISTRICT COURTS. * * * Wests Encyclopedia
of American Law, Volume 9 (West Group: St.
Paul, Minn., 1998), p. 316 (s.v. Special courts).
On the federal level, the district courts are courts
of general jurisdiction. * * * Id. at Volume 6, p. 293
(s.v. Jurisdiction).
COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION ARE NOT
CONSTITUTIONAL BUT TERRITORIAL COURTS
CREATED BY VIRTUE OF THE SOVEREIGN
CONGRESSIONAL FACULTY, GRANTED UNDER
ARTICLE 4 3(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Counsel for the Plaintiff in error also rely on the

organization of a United States District Court
in Porto Rico, on the allowance of review of the
Porto Rican Supreme Court in cases when the
Constitution of the United States is involved, on
the statutory permission that Porto Rican youth
can attend West Point and Annapolis Academies,
on the authorized sale of United States stamps
in the island, on the extension of revenue, navigation, immigration, [258 U.S. 298, 312] national
banking, bankruptcy, federal employers liability,
safety appliance, extradition, and census laws in
one way or another to Porto Rico. With the
background of the considerations already stated,
none of these, nor all of them put together, furnish
ground for the conclusion pressed on us.
11
The United States District Court is not a true
United States court established under article 3
of the Constitution to administer the judicial
power of the United States therein conveyed. It is
created by virtue of the sovereign congressional
faculty, granted under article 4, 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory belonging to the United
States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that
of true United States courts * * * does not change
its character as a mere territorial court. Balzac v.
People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922).3
The United States District Court referenced in Balzac is that

in the Foraker ActCh. 191, 18 Stat. 75, April 12, 1900which
establishes that, among other things, (a) federal criminal laws
are applicable in Porto Rico, (b) the attorney-general of Porto Rico
is a legislative-branch officer answerable ultimately to Congress,
and (c) no matter what name it may be given, the court therein
established, like the provisional military court it succeeds, is a
territorial court of general jurisdiction; to wit:
3
SEC. 14. That the statutory laws of the United States not
locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or hereinafter
otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect in
Porto Rico as in the United States, except the internalrevenue laws, which, in view of the provisions of section
three, shall not have force and effect in Porto Rico.
* * * SEC. 21. That the attorney-general shall have all the
powers and discharge all the duties provided by law for an
attorney of a Territory of the United States in so far as the
same are not locally inapplicable, and he shall perform such
other duties as may be prescribed by law, and make such
reports, through the governor, to the Attorney-General of
the United States as he may require, which shall annually
be transmitted to Congress.
* * * SEC. 34. That Porto Rico shall constitute a judicial
district to be called the district of Porto Rico. * * * The
12
The term District Courts of the United States as
used in the rules, without an addition expressing
a wider connotation, has its historic significance.
It describes the constitutional courts created
under article 3 of the Constitution. Courts of
the Territories are legislative courts, properly
speaking, and are not District Courts of the
United States. We have often held that vesting a
territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that
vested in the District Courts of the United States
does not make it a District Court of the United
States. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
154; The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460; In re
Mills, 135 U.S. 263, 268, 10 S.Ct. 762; McAllister
v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 182, 183 S., 11
S.Ct. 949; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S.
445, 476, 477 S., 19 S.Ct. 722; Summers v. United
States, 231 U.S. 92, 101, 102 S., 34 S.Ct. 38;
United States v. Burroughs, 289 U.S. 159, 163,
53 S.Ct. 574. * * * Mookini v. United States,
303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938).
district court for said district shall be called the district

court of the United States for Porto Rico * * * *
The United States district court hereby established shall be
the successor to the United States provisional court
established by General Orders, Numbered Eighty-eight,
promulgated by Brigadier-General Davis, United States
Volunteers, and shall take possession of all records of that
court, and take jurisdiction of all cases and proceedings
pending therein, and said United States provisional court is
hereby discontinued. [Underline added.]
13
CONGRESS MANUFACTURE JURISDICTIONAL

CONFUSION BY GIVING CONSTITUTIONAL AND
TERRITORIAL COURTS THE SAME NAME.
Qulibet jurisdictio cancellos suos habet. Every

jurisdiction has its bounds.
Bouviers Law
Dictionary, p. 2156.
Rerum ordo confunditur, si unicuique jurisdictio
non servatur. The order of things is confounded if
every one preserves not his jurisdiction. Id. at 2161.
As of June 25, 1948, Congress confound the order
of things by further conflating the jurisdictional
distinctions between Article III and Article IV courts
first blurred in section 34 of the Foraker Act,4 supra,
fn. 3, necessitating clarification in Balzac, supra, and
amplification in Mookini, supraby giving them the
same name, i.e., United States District Court, in
Title 28 U.S.C.; to wit:
132. Creation and composition of district courts
(a) There shall be in each judicial district a district
court which shall be a court of record known as
the United States District Court for the district.
* * * (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 895; Pub. L.
88176,2, Nov. 13, 1963, 77 Stat. 331.)
Whereas, in the Foraker Act the name by which the judicial

district of Porto Rico is called is identified with particularity via
quotation marks, i.e., the district of Porto Rico, the name by
which the court in said judicial district is called, the district court
of the United States for Porto Rico, is not so distinguished.
4
Congress thereafter in Section 34 refer to the same district

court of the United States for Porto Rico as the United States
district court.
14
The true distinction between courts is between
such as possess a general and such as have only a
special jurisdiction for a particular purpose * * *
Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 673 (s.v. Limited
jurisdiction)and as of June 25, 1948, the only way
to know if a particular United States District Court
is a judicial Article III constitutional court or mere
legislative Article IV territorial court is to identify
which species of jurisdiction said court is authorized
to exercise, i.e., general or limitedand there is no
provision of Article III of the Constitution that
authorizes a court of limited jurisdiction to hear
criminal matters and enter judgments in criminal
proceedings.
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE IS A MERE TERRITORIAL COURT.
The United States District Court of first instance is
a court with jurisdiction to hear criminal matters and
enter judgments in criminal proceedings regarding
a debt whose subject matter is alleged income tax
liability arising from alleged unpaid federal income
taxes, penalties, or interest assessed by the Internal
Revenue Service (28 U.S.C. 3002(2), (3), and (8)
(App., infra, 68a)i.e., the selfsame subject matter
specified in the complaint of the Plaintiff against
Petitionerand therefore a mere territorial court
(Balzac, supra) created by the Congress of the United
States (App., infra, 29a-30a) under authority of the
territorial clause, Article 4 3(2), of the Constitution.
15
NO COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION HAS

JURISDICTION WITHOUT TERRITORY OR OTHER
PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE UNITED STATES.
As affirmed in Balzac and Mookini, supra, the only

federal courts of general jurisdiction are legislative
Article IV territorial courts with jurisdiction only
in geographic area described in Article 4 3(2) of
the Constitution, which provides, in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; * * *
Non refert quid notum sit judice si notum non sit in
forma judici. It matters not what is known to the
judge, if it is not known to him judicially. Bouviers
Law Dictionary, p. 2150.
A verbis legis non est recedendum. From the words
of the law there should be no departure. Id. at 2124.
The record of this case is devoid of evidence or
proof that Petitioner resides, is domiciled, or has legal
residence in Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States5 (U.S. Const., Article 4 3(2)):
Physical fact of residence and major life interests in the
geographic area occupied by Harris County, Texas, bars
peremptorily any claim that for the purpose of taxation Petitioner
is domiciled or has legal residence elsewhere; to wit:
5
When one intends the facts to which the law attaches

consequences, he must abide the consequences whether
intended or not. 13. One can not elect to make his home in
one place in point of interest and attachment and for the
general purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact has
no residence, for the purpose of taxation. P. 426. 14. Physical
facts of residence, united with major life interests may fix
domicile ones preeminent headquarters. Id. 15. The
burden of proof is on one who claims that an earlier domicile
16
only geographic area in which legislative courts of
general jurisdiction, such as the district court of first
instance, have jurisdiction.
II.
The Only Material Fact Relative To The
Jurisdiction Of The District Court Of First
Instance Is That Petitioner Resides In Harris
County, Texas, A Geographic Area Without The
Jurisdiction Of Any Territorial Court, Such As
Said District Court.
The record of this case is devoid of evidence or proof
that that section of territory occupied by that certain
commonwealth united by and under authority of the
Constitution and admitted into the Union December
29, 1845, i.e., Texas, wherein Petitioner resides, is
domiciled, and has legal residence (App., infra, 12a), is
situate within territory or other property belonging to
the United States.
was abandoned for a later one. P. 427. Texas v. Florida,

306 U.S. 398 (1939). (App., infra, 37a).
For Plaintiff to prove jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction over Petitioner and Petitioners property, Plaintiff
would have to produce evidence / proof consistent with the
following (of which the record of this case is devoid):
To constitute a change of domicil, three things are essential:
(1) Residence in another place [territory or other property
belonging to the United States] ; (2) an intention to abandon
the old domicil [Texas] ; and (3) an intention of acquiring a
new one [territory or other property belonging to the United
States] ; or as some writers express it there must be an
animus non revertendi and an animus manendi, or animus
et factum [Citations omitted.] * * *
Bouviers Law
Dictionary, p. 921. (App., infra, 37a).
17
III.
The District Court Of First Instance Extended
Its Jurisdiction Beyond The Boundaries Fixed
By The Constitution At Article 4 3(2)
For Courts Of General Jurisdiction, Into
Geographic Area Fixed By The Constitution
At Article 3 2(1) Exclusively For Courts
Of Limited Jurisdiction.
Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
derived directly from the Constitution. Every
other court created by the general government
derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority
of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided
it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed
by the Constitution. Turner v. Bank of North
America, 4 Dall. 8, 10; United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, 7 Cranch, 32; Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How.
441, 448; Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165. * * *
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226, 234
(1922).
SUMMARY
This Court declares in Cohens, supra, that Congress

exercise two species of legislative power: the one,
limited as to its objects, but extending all over the
Union: the other, an absolute, exclusive legislative
power over the District of Columbia.
The federal judges of the trial court and appeals
court involved in this case are pretending, through
dereliction of the jurisdictional provisions of the
Constitution, that (a) the absolute, exclusive legislative power granted Congress in Article 1 8(17) of the
18
Constitution and echoed in Article 4 3(2) thereof, is
not limited to the District of Columbia and other territory and property belonging to the United States but
extends all over the Union, and (b) the geographic
area over which federal courts of general jurisdiction
have jurisdiction is not restricted to the District of
Columbia and other territory and property belonging
to the United States but extends all over the Union.
The district court of first instance is authorized
to hear both civil and criminal matters and enter
judgments in civil and criminal proceedings regarding
a debt: authority that defines a court of general
jurisdiction.
The only provision of the Constitution that allows
for a federal trial court to exercise general jurisdiction
is an implied authority: the territorial clause, Article
4 3(2).
The district court of first instance is a mere
territorial court.
The geographic area over which the jurisdiction of a
territorial court can extend is restricted to Territory
or other Property belonging to the United States
(U.S. Const., Article 4 3(2)).
That (a) there is no evidence or proof that Texas is
part of Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States (id.), (b) there is competent evidence
and proof (App., infra, 23a-27a) that Petitioner neither
resides nor is domiciled nor has legal residence in any
geographic area over which any territorial court has
jurisdiction, and (c) Plaintiff has failed, at all times,
to produce evidence or proof of jurisdiction despite
19
multiple proper challenges thereof,6 constitutes sufficient ground for reversal and dismissal with prejudice
of this case for clear absence of all jurisdiction.
SYSTEMIC FRAUD IN THE JUDICIARY OF THE

INFERIOR COURTS INVITES ANARCHY AND
TERRIBLE RETRIBUTION AND IMPERILS THE
EXISTENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT.
Intentio inservire debet legibus, non leges intentioni.

Intentions ought to be subservient to the laws, not the
laws to intentions. Bouviers Law Dictionary, p. 2139.
Lata culpa dolo quiparatur. Gross negligence is
equivalent to fraud. Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 698.
Willful disobedience of the Constitution by officers
in a position of Public Trust charged with interpreting
and declaring the law, as proved hereinabove and elsewhere in the record of this case, evinces, minimally,
systemic actual and constructive fraud, i.e., universal
6
It is also hornbook law that the party invoking federal

jurisdiction bears the burden of proving facts to establish that
jurisdiction. See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure 3522, at 62-65 (2d ed.1984); 15 J.
Moore, Moores Federal Practice 102.14, at 102-24
(3d ed. 1998) (The burden of proving all jurisdictional facts
is on the party asserting jurisdiction.); see also Scelsa v.
City University of New York, 76 F.3d 37, 40 (2d Cir.1996).
That party must allege a proper basis for jurisdiction in
his pleadings and must support those allegations with
competent proof if a party opposing jurisdiction properly
challenges those allegations, see, e.g., McNutt v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780,
80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936), or if the court sua sponte raises
the question, see, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42,
53 L.Ed. 126 (1908). Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945
(2d Cir. 1998). (App., infra, 37a).
20
gross negligence among the bench officers of the inferior courts, by reason of dereliction of the jurisdictional
provisions of the Constitution and other more serious
crimes, hidden in plain sight in a culture of silence
(App., infra, 41a-65a)but cannot be concealed indefinitely and, according to this Court, invites anarchy
and terrible retribution and imperils the existence of
the government; to wit:
But there is another consideration the imperative of judicial integrity. It was of this that Mr.
Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis so
eloquently spoke in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, at 469, 471, more than 30 years ago.
For those who [364 U.S. 206, 223] agree with me,
said Mr. Justice Holmes, no distinction can be
taken between the Government as prosecutor and
the Government as judge. 277 U.S., at 470.
(Dissenting opinion.) In a government of laws,
said Mr. Justice Brandeis, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the
law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means to
declare that the Government may commit crimes
in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal would bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine this Court
should resolutely set its face. 277 U.S., at 485.
(Dissenting opinion.)
21
This basic principle was accepted by the Court
in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332. There
it was held that a conviction resting on evidence
secured through such a flagrant disregard of
the procedure which Congress has commanded
cannot be allowed to stand without making
the courts themselves accomplices in willful
disobedience of law. 318 U.S., at 345. Even less
should the federal courts be accomplices in the
willful disobedience of a Constitution they are
sworn to uphold. [Mr. Justice Stewart, delivering
the opinion of the Court.] [Judgment of Court of
Appeals set aside and case remanded to District
Court.] Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960).
Whereas, Petitioner wants to avoid being defrauded
of his property under color of law, office, and authority,
he also wants to be able to look forward to life in
America for himself and his posterity and the other
joint tenants in the sovereignty7as envisioned
and ordained by the good People of these Colonies8
and We the People of the United States9 and
implemented by, respectively, the Founding Fathers
and Framers and secured by the provisions of the
[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people,

and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they
are sovereigns without subjects * * * and have none to
govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as
fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 2 Dall. 419, 472 (1793).
The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of

America of July 4, 1776, Conclusion.
8
Constitution for the United States of America of March 4,

1789, Preamble.
9
22
Constitutionwithout threat of upheaval. The luxury
of life under the aegis of that instrument cannot
be found anywhere else on this orband to fail to
rein in rogue elements who pervert or disregard the
meaning of its provisions and exploit that perversion
or dereliction for their own personal and fraternal
aggrandizement at the expense of all others, is to risk
the fate of the Republic as augured by this Court in
Elkins, supra.
A SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly

than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence. * * *
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
Maxime paci sunt contraria vis et injuria. The
greatest enemies to peace are force and wrong.
Bouviers Law Dictionary, p. 2145.
Legibus sumptis desinentibus, lege natur
utendum est. When laws imposed by the state fail, we
must act by the law of nature. Id. at 2142.
Wherefore, irrespective of the primary object of
this petition, Petitioner also suggests that time is
of the essence and hereby respectfully calls upon
this Honorable Court to out and annul forthwith the
hereinabove-identified and -documented culture of
silence populated by the bench officers of the inferior
courts so as to prevent any further usurpation of
jurisdiction in geographic area occupied by the freely
associated compact states of the Union by territorial
courts of general jurisdiction; restore order; sanctify
the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution
from disobedient bench officers in the inferior courts;
obviate any need for the American People to act by
23
the law of nature; and, hopefully, preclude destruction
of the government despite its disregard of the charter
of its own existence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully submits that this Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
Pro se
HUMBLE, TEXAS
(281) 540-2255
April 29, 2015
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Civil Action H-14-27

Plaintiff,
versus
JOHN P. TROWBRIDGE, JR., et al.,
Defendants.
Amended Final Judgment

1. The United States of America:
A. Takes $3,326,015.01, plus statutory additions
accruing after April 7, 2014, from John P.
Trowbridge including his assumed name
Freedom Ventures, UBO.
B. Has tax liens on Trowbridges property,
including 25117 Ramrock Drive, Porter, Texas
77365.
C. May foreclose its liens against 25117 Ramrock
Drive.
D. Has all right, title, and interest in the property
including the right to possession.
2. The clerk will leave the case open for the court to
supervise Trowbridges eviction.
Signed on May 23, 2014, at Houston, Texas.
/s/ Lynn N. Hughes
Lynn N. Hughes
United States District Judge
(1a)
2a
APPENDIX B
[Filed 05/23/14]

versus
Plaintiff,

Defendants.
Order of Sale and Vacature

1. The United States of America, having attached
its liens, may foreclose 25117 Ramrock Drive, Porter,
Texas 77365, also known as:
Lot 16, block 1, of Bentwood, section 1, a
subdivision of 156.8 acres, out of the William
Massey Survey, A-391, and the Mary Owens
survey, A-405, in Montgomery County, Texas, as
imposed by the map and dedication records in
cabinet G, sheets 138A 141A.
2. The Internal Revenue Service is directed under
28 U.S.C. 2001, 2002, and 2004, to offer the
property at a commercially reasonable and public sale.
3. The Service may access the property to preserve
it, including retaining someone to change or install
locks or other security on the property until the deed
is delivered to a buyer.
4.
3a
The terms and conditions of the sale are:
A. The sale will be free and clear of all liens or
other claims inferior to the Services lien.
B. The sale is subject to building lines, laws,
ordinances, and governmental regulations
affecting the property and easements and
restrictions of record.
C. The sale of the property by public auction
must be held on the front steps of the
Montgomery County Courthouse.
D. The date and time for the sale is to be
announced by the Service.
E. After the Service has determined the date
and time for the sale, it must include it in
the notice of sale and mail the notice, by
regular and certified mail, return receipt
requested, to:
Joshua D. Smeltzer
Trial Attorney, Tax Division
United States Department of Justice
717 North Harwood, Suite 400
Dallas, Texas 75201
John P. Trowbridge, Jr.
9816 Memorial Boulevard, Suite 205
Humble, Texas 77338
F. The date and time of the auction must be
announced by the Service by advertising the
sale once each week for four consecutive
weeks in at least one generally circulated
newspaper in Montgomery County, Texas,
through the Houston Association of Realtors, and otherwise at the discretion of the
4a
Service. The notice of sale will describe the
property and the terms of the sale in this
order in brief, direct, and plain English.
G. The minimum bid will be determined by the
Service and must be in the notice of sale. If
the minimum bid is not met, the Service may
hold a new sale with a reduced minimum
bid.
H. Each successful bidder must deposit at the
time of the sale at least 10% of the bid by a
certified or cashiers check payable to the
United States District Court. Before being
allowed to bid, bidders must have shown
that they can comply.
I. The buyer must pay the Service within 28
days after his bid is accepted by certified or
cashiers check payable to the United States
District Court. If the buyer does not comply,
his deposit is forfeited and will be used to
cover the expenses of the sale, with residue
applied to Trowbridges tax liabilities. The
clerk will distribute the deposit, by a check
to the United States Treasury. The property
will again be offered for sale under the terms
of this order or sold to the next highest
bidder. The United States may bid as a
credit against its judgment without tender of
cash.
J. The sale is confirmed unless someone objects
within 35 days. After confirmation, the
Service will execute and deliver a deed
conveying the property to the buyer.
K. The sale is without right of redemption.
5a
5. Until Trowbridge vacates the property, he must
preserve it in its current condition and insure it
against fires and casualties. He must do nothing that
reduces the value of the property like vandalism or
recording liens.
6. If Trowbridge interferes with the sale, vandalizes the property, or attempts to re-enter it, he may be
punished with fines, incarceration, or both.
7. By noon on June 6, 2014, Trowbridge must
vacate the property. If he does not leave, the United
States Marshal will evict him. The marshal may use
reasonable force to enter the property and arrest
people who interfere. Unremoved personal property is
forfeited, and the Service must dispose of it in a
commercially reasonable manner. Proceeds from the
sale of his personal property must be applied to his tax
liabilities.
8. By June 9, 2014, Trowbridge must give
Smeltzer his new address.
9. After the sale is confirmed, the clerk will
distribute the proceeds in this order:
A. First, to the costs or fees of the clerk and
marshal.
B. Second, to the Service for the reasonable
costs of the sale, which will be examined by
the court at confirmation.
C. Third, to ad valorem taxes due to Montgomery County.
D. Fourth, to the United States of America for
unpaid tax debts.
10. All remaining proceeds are to be held by the
clerk until this court orders otherwise.
6a
11. The United States
Trowbridge with this order.
Marshal
will
serve
Signed on May 23, 2014, at Houston, Texas.

/s/ Lynn N. Hughes
Lynn N. Hughes
7a
APPENDIX C
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
[Filed: February 3, 2015]
No. 14-20333
Summary Calendar

v.
Plaintiff-Appellee

Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas
No. 4:14-CV-27
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON,

Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
John Parks Trowbridge (Trowbridge) appeals the
district courts grant of summary judgment in favor
of the government, which ordered Trowbridges
income tax liabilities for 1993 through 1997 reduced to
judgment, the associated tax liens on the real property
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
8a
foreclosed, and the real property sold. Trowbridge
has not contested the validity of the tax liabilities or
his ownership of the real property at issue. He has
therefore waived those issues. Yohey v. Collins, 985
F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). Instead, Trowbridge
argues that Harris County is not in the United States
and that he is not a citizen of the United States. He
contends that this means the district court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over tax actions
against residents of states and that he is not subject to
federal income taxes.
This court has already rejected as frivolous the
argument that district courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over tax actions against residents of
states. United States v. Masat, 948 F.2d 923, 934 (5th
Cir. 1991). This court has also stated that 26 U.S.C.
7602(a) and 7604, which authorize the issuance and
enforcement of IRS summonses, are federal laws that
the district court has jurisdiction to consider under
28 U.S.C. 1331. United States v. Henderson, 209 F.
Appx 401, 402 (5th Cir. 2006). Moreover, 28 U.S.C.
1340 explicitly grants district courts jurisdiction in
internal revenue cases and 28 U.S.C. 1345 explicitly
grants jurisdiction for civil suits commenced by the
United States.
Trowbridges argument that he is not a citizen of
the United States is equally frivolous. He presents
shopworn arguments characteristic of tax-protestor
rhetoric that has been universally rejected by this and
other courts. Stearman v. Commissioner, 436 F.3d
533, 537 (5th Cir. 2006). This court has already held
that the citizens of Texas are subject to the Federal
Tax Code. United States v. Price, 798 F.2d 111, 113
(5th Cir. 1986). We do not address his arguments
further as there is no need to refute these arguments
9a
with somber reasoning and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest these arguments have
some colorable merit. Crain v. Commissioner, 737
F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1984). They have no merit at all.
This is not the first time Trowbridge has had
these frivolous arguments rejected. In Trowbridge et
al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-164, 2003 WL
21278475, Trowbridge made similar arguments in
contesting his 1991-1995 tax liabilities. The tax court
imposed a $25,000 sanction. In contesting his 19961997 tax liabilities, Trowbridge again used similar arguments in the tax court; he was sanctioned a second
time. Trowbridge et al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2003-165, 2003 WL 21278414, at *10. Trowbridge
appealed to this court and once again resorted to
frivolous arguments. This court upheld the tax courts
sanctions and imposed additional sanctions.
Given Trowbridges history of frivolous appeals, we
GRANT Appellees motion for sanctions pursuant to
Fed. R. App. P. 38 in the amount of $8,000. We also
order that Trowbridge be barred from filing any further appeals in this court until (1) the sanctions
awarded by this court are fully paid; and (2) a district
court certifies his appeal as having some arguable
merit. See Smith v. McCleod, 946 F.2d 417, 418
(5th Cir. 1991). Trowbridges motions are DENIED as
moot.
Accordingly, the order of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
10a
APPENDIX D
[Filed: February 3, 2015]
No. 14-20333
Summary Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 4:14-CV-27

Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas, Houston
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON,

Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT
This cause was considered on the record on appeal
and the briefs on file.
It is ordered and adjudged that the order of the
District Court appealed from is affirmed.
IT IS ORDERED that defendant-appellant pay to
plaintiff-appellee the costs on appeal to be taxed by the
Clerk of this Court.
11a
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38 in the amount of $8,000
be taxed against Trowbridge. We also order that
Trowbridge be barred from filing any further appeals
in this court until the sanctions awarded by this court
are fully paid; and a district court certifies his appeal
as having some arguable merit.
12a
APPENDIX E
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
Docket Nos. 473-01, 474-01

T.C. Memo. 2003-164
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE,

Petitioner,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
SABRINA MARTIN, F.K.A. SABRINA L. TROWBRIDGE,

Petitioner,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Filed June 4, 2003.
* * * *
Procedure. For the sake of convenience, all dollar
amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Preliminary Facts
At the time the petitions were filed in these cases,
each petitioner resided in Harris County, Texas.
13a
Petitioners were married to each other during the
years at issue but filed separate returns for those
years.
Dr. Trowbridge is a physician, and Ms. Martin is a
nurse and administrative assistant who, during the
years at issue, was sometimes employed by Dr.
Trowbridges professional corporation.
Both petitioners are calendar year taxpayers.
Respondents examination with respect to Dr.
Trowbridges 1991, 1992, and 1993 taxable years
commenced before 1998. Respondents examinations
with respect to Dr. Trowbridges 1994 and 1995
taxable years and Ms. Martins 1991 through 1995
taxable years commenced after July 1998.
Dr. Trowbridges 1993, 1994, and 1995 Forms 1040
1993 Form 10402
On November 26, 1996, Dr. Trowbridge mailed to
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) a Form 1040, U.S.
Individual Income Tax Return 1993 (Dr. Trowbridges
1993 Form 1040), which the IRS
* * * *
As discussed infra, Dr. Trowbridges 1993 Form 1040 is

relevant to the determination of whether he is liable for the sec.
6654 addition to tax with respect to his 1994 taxable year.
2
14a
APPENDIX F
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
[Filed: April 29, 2014]
Civil No. 4:14-cv-00027

v.
Plaintiff,

FREEDOM VENTURES UBO, AND
MONTGOMERY COUNTY TAX OFFICE,
Defendants.
DEFENDANTS AMENDED OPPOSITION TO

UNITED STATES MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER
JURISDICTION; AND MEMORANDUM
AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
NOW COMES John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. in the

above-captioned matter, respectfully and without
attorney, to request that this Honorable Court take judicial notice of the enunciation of principles as stated
in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, wherein the court
directed that the pleadings of those unschooled in law,
such as Defendant JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.
(the Defendant), shall be held to less stringent
15a
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers
and, pursuant to pertinent parts of The unanimous
Declaration of the thirteen united States of America
of July 4, 1776; that certain Constitution ordained,
established, and implemented for the United States of
America, March 4, 1789; The Public Statutes at Large
of the United States of America; Revised Statutes of the
United States; Revised Statutes of the United States
Relating to the District of Columbia; United States
Code; Code of Federal Regulations; and Bouviers
Law Dictionary and various other recognized law
dictionaries and dictionaries of the English language,
universal rules and principles of statutory construction and interpretation, opinions of the Supreme Court
of the United States, United States District Court
* * * *
Because 1101(a)(1) of the Social Security Act of
August 14, 1935, uses another Social Security Act
term, includes, within the definition of State, we
must ascertain the meaning of that particular term
before we can determine the full extent of the meaning
of State. Section 1101(b) thereof provides:
The terms includes and including when used in a
definition contained in this Act shall not be
deemed to exclude other things otherwise within
the meaning of the term defined.
The above definition of includes and including is
a hybrid composite of two of the principal rules
of statutory construction/interpretation, (1) ejusdem
generis, and (2) expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
defined, respectively and in pertinent part as follows:
16a
EJUSDEM GENERIS (Lat.). Of the same kind.
In the construction of laws, wills, and other
instruments, general words following an enumeration
of specific things are usually restricted to things of the
same kind (ejusdem generis) as those specifically
enumerated. . . .51
(5) The rule ejusdem generis (of the same kind):
when a list of specific items belonging to the
same class is followed by general words (as in
cats, dogs, and other animals), the general
words are to be treated as confined to other
items of the same class (in this example, to
other domestic animals). 52
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other. . . .
36 Fed. 880 ; 104 U.S. 25, 26 L. Ed. 367. It is a rule
of construction. 222 U. S. 513, 32 Sup. Ct. 117, 56
L. Ed. 291.53
(6) The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius
(the inclusion of the one is the exclusion of
the other): when a list of specific items is not
followed by general words it is to be taken
as exhaustive. For example, weekends and
public holidays excludes ordinary weekdays.54
Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. Ejusdem

generis.
51
A Dictionary of Law, 7th ed., Jonathan Law and Elizabeth

Martin, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), s.v.
Interpretation, Rules and Principles of Statutory.
52
53
Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. Maxim.
A Dictionary of Law, 7th ed., Law and Martin, eds., s.v.

54
17a
Wherefore, whenever includes or including
is used within a definition contained in the Social
Security Act, though any such definition be exclusionary generally, said definition nevertheless shall comprehend other things of the same kind (members of the
same associated group) as those listed therein.
Section 1101(a)(1) of the Social Security Act provides that The term State (except when used in
section 531) includes Alaska, Hawaii, and the District
of Columbia. Wherefore, application of 1101(b) of
said Act means that the definition nevertheless
comprehends other things of the same kind (same
associated group) as Alaska, Hawaii, and the District
of Columbia, just not specifically listed therein.
Notwithstanding that the specific items listed in
1101(a)(1) of the said Act (Alaska, Hawaii, and the
District of Columbia) are all members of the same
associated group identified earlier in our analysis of
the meaning of state in the Act of June 30, 1864
(supra, pp. 15-16), i.e., properties other than Places
purchased for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings,
over which the Constitution authorizes Congress
to exercise power of exclusive legislationof which,
on August 14, 1935, there are a total of six others
(American Samoa, Guam, Midway Islands, Panama
Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands)
these particular three have distinction in that they are
all members of a smaller, more exclusive, associated
group; specifically, they are all geographical areas
whose residents have political status of citizen of the
United States; to wit: Alaska, as of July 20, 186855;
Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, 107; 15 Stat. at L. 167, U. S.
Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2277.
55
18a
Hawaii (retroactively), as of August 12, 189856; and
District of Columbia, circa July 16, 1790.57
On August 14, 1935, there are only two other such
geographical areas of the aforesaid other six whose
residents have political status as citizen of the United
States: (1) Puerto Rico, as of March 2, 191758; and
(2) the Virgin Islands, as of February 25, 1927.59
* * * *
Meaning of the Title 26 U.S.C. terms
United States, State
The controlling definition of the Title 26 U.S.C.
(26 U.S.C.) terms United States and State is
found at 26 U.S.C. 7701, which provides, in pertinent
part:
(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise
distinctly expressed . . .
(9) United States
The term United States when used in a
geographical sense includes only the
States and the District of Columbia.
(10) State
The term State shall be construed to
include the District of Columbia, where
such construction is necessary to carry
out provisions of this title.
56
Act of April 30, 1900, Pub. L. 56-331, Ch. 339, 31 Stat 141.
57
Act of July 16, 1790, 1 Stat. 130.
58
Pub.L. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951.
[ Title 8 U.S.C. 1406.]

59
19a
Statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly
construed,93 and because the controlling Title 26
U.S.C. definition of the term includes, found in
26 U.S.C. 7701(c) and used in the above definition of
United States, is substantially identical94 to that of
1101(b) of the Social Security Act of August 14, 1935
(supra, p. 23), the derivative product of such exercise
is foreknown and therefore unnecessary and is omitted
here; to wit:
(c) Includes and including
The terms includes and including when
used in a definition contained in this title
shall not be deemed to exclude other things
otherwise within the meaning of the term
defined.
Wherefore, re the full extent of the meaning of
States, which appears in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9),
the controlling definition of State, 26 U.S.C.
7701(a)(10), supra, reveals very little; only that the
District of Columbia shall be construed to be a State.
The preamble to the above controlling definition
of the terms United States and State provides,
however, at 26 U.S.C. 7701(a), an instruction as to
how to identify any other State, besides the District of
Columbia, that is embraced by the said definition of
United States; to wit: When used in this title, where
not otherwise distinctly expressed . . .
93
Non differunt quae concordant re, tametsi non in verb is

iisdem. Those things which agree in substance, though not in the
same words, do not differ. Ibid.
94
20a
State is otherwise distinctly expressed in 26 U.S.C.
3121(e)(1); to wit:
The term State includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.
Use of the term includes in the 26 U.S.C.
3121(e)(1) definition of State requires the same
application as with 1101(a)(1), State, of the Social
Security Act of August 14, 1935. Wherefore, we need
to identify other members of the associated group
of States that are of the same kind as those
enumerated in 26 U.S.C. 3121(e)(1), just not listed.
In Title 26 U.S.C., the District of Columbia is a
State only because the controlling definition thereof
construes it to be such and makes no mention of any
other State. Wherefore, we can disregard the District
of Columbia as being a member of the same associated
group or of the same kind listed in the definition of
State in 26 U.S.C. 3121(e)(1).
Searching the Secretary of the Treasurys website,
www.irs.gov, we discover that the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American
Samoa are all insular U.S. possessions that have their
own governments and tax systems; to wit, in pertinent
part:
U.S. possessions can be divided into two groups:
1. Those that have their own governments and
their own tax systems (Puerto Rico, U.S.
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands), and
2. Those that do not have their own governments
and their own tax systems . . .
21a
The governments of the first group of territories
impose their own income taxes and withholding
taxes on their own residents. . . .95
In addition to the four insular U.S. possessions
with their own respective government and tax system
listed in the definition of the term State in 26 U.S.C.
3121(e)(1), there is one and only one other member
of the same associated group, the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands, and the full extent
of the meaning of the Title 26 U.S.C. term United
States when used in a geographical sense is the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
and no other thing.
Further, when used in a governmental sense, United
States means the District of Columbia; to wit:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise
exclusive Legislation . . . over such District . . . as
may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the
United States . . .96
The District is created a government by the name
of the District of Columbia . . .97
IRS gov, Persons Employed In a U.S. Possession / Territory

- FIT, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/
Persons-Employed-In-U.S.-Possessions.
95
96
Constitution, Article 1 8(17).
Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District

of Columbia . . . 187374 2, p. 2.
97
22a
When used in a political sense United States
means the District of Columbia municipal
corporation98; to wit:
United States means (A) a Federal corporation;99 and
Used in a commercial sense, United States means
the District of Columbia; to wit:
The United States is located in the District of
Columbia.100
Whereas: The Constitution authorizes Congress to
exercise personal legislative power and jurisdiction
only in such District . . . as may . . . become the Seat
of the Government of the United States and all
Places purchased by (Article 1 8(17)), and Territory
or other Property belonging to (Article 4 3(2)), the
United States; and
Whereas:
On the part of the plaintiffs, it has been urged
that Columbia is a distinct political society, and is
therefore a state according to the definitions of
writers on general law.
* * * *
98
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. A public corporation, created by government for political purposes . . . Bouviers Law
Dictionary, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. Municipal corporation.
99
Title 28 U.S.C. 3002(15).
100
Uniform Commercial Code 9-307(h).
23a
Affidavit in Support of Amended Motion to Dismiss
Preamble
In this Affidavit in Support of Amended Motion to
Dismiss, the term Affiant means John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr. (and is not intended to exclude
derivative variations in the spelling thereof, such as
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.).
Introductory Certification
Affiant hereby solemnly swears, declares, and states
as follows:
1. Affiant can competently state the matters set
forth herein.
2. Affiant has personal knowledge of the facts
stated herein.
3. All the facts stated herein are true, correct, and
complete in accordance with Affiants best firsthand personal knowledge and belief.
Averments of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
4. Affiant has neither seen nor been presented with
any evidence, and likewise any material fact,
that demonstrates that:
(a) Affiant is one born within the exterior limits
of that certain section of territory occupied
by the District of Columbia;
(b) Affiant is one wholly brought into separate
existence within the exterior limits of that
certain section of territory occupied by the
District of Columbia;
(c) At any point in time, Affiant intends, of
Affiants own free will, to:
(i)
24a
Renounce and renounces birthright in
that certain republic (hereinafter the
American Union) created and established by way of confederation of those
certain component commonwealths (numbering 50 at present, the last of which
being Hawaii, August 21, 1959) united
by and under authority of that certain
Constitution ordained, established, and
implemented March 4, 1789, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
and adopts the political and municipal
status involved by permanent residence
of choice, with domiciliary intent, in that
certain section of territory occupied by
the District of Columbia;
(ii) Establish and establishes personal presence in true, fixed, and permanent home,
habitation, and principal abode, with
domiciliary intent, within the exterior
limits of that certain section of territory
occupied by the District of Columbia;
(iii) Reside and resides within the exterior
occupied by the District of Columbia for
purposes of trade;
(iv) Reside and resides within the exterior
purposes of carrying on Affiants trade;
(v) Go into and goes into the District of
Columbia to engage in trade;
(vi) Reside and resides within the exterior
25a
purposes of carrying on Affiants
business;
(vii) Go into and goes into the District of
Columbia to engage in business; or
(viii) Change and changes the country of
domicil and legal residence in which
Affiants true, fixed, and permanent
home, habitation, and principal abode
is situate, from the American Union to
any other sovereign jurisdiction; or
(d) At any point in time, Affiant chooses, of
Affiants own free will, to establish and
establishes, for legal purposes, Affiants
true, fixed, and permanent home, habitation, and principal abode in that certain
section of territory occupied by the District
of Columbia;
(e) At any point in time. Affiant chooses, of
establishes, as the center of Affiants legal
relations and business, Affiants true, fixed,
and permanent home, habitation, and principal abode in that certain section of territory occupied by the District of Columbia;
(f) Affiants country of domicil is the District of
Columbia;
(g) Affiants legal residence is the District of
Columbia;
(h) The sovereignty to whom Affiant owes
allegiance is the District of Columbia;
(i)
Affiant is a citizen of the District of

Columbia;
(j)
26a
Affiant is a resident of the District of
Columbia;
(k) Affiant is a resident, for legal purposes, of

(l)
Affiant is a resident, for purposes of

taxation, of the District of Columbia;
(m) Affiant is a resident, for purposes of

licensing, of the District of Columbia;
(n) Affiant is domiciled in the District of
Columbia;
(o) Affiant is a citizen of the federal (United
States) government;
(p) Affiant is a United States Government
employee; or
(q) At the time of Affiants apparent execution
of that certain conditional (assessment)
contract with the District of Columbia
municipal corporation via said corporations
instrumentality, the United States Social
Security Administration, Affiant is located
within the exterior limits of that section
of territory occupied by the District of
Columbia,
and believes that none exists.
Verification and Certification
5. The Undersigned Affiant, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., hereby solemnly swears, declares,
and states that Affiant executes this Affidavit on
Affiants unlimited liability, that Affiant can
competently state the matters set forth herein,
and that the facts stated herein are true, correct,
27a
and complete in accordance with Affiants best
firsthand personal knowledge and belief.
Further Affiant sayeth naught.
Date: The twenty-ninth day of the fourth month in
the year of our Lord two thousand fourteen
[April 29, A.D. 2014]
John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
Affiant
04-29-14
Date
/s/ Catherine Diane Guion

Witness: Catherine Diane Guion
04-29-14
Date
/s/ Lucrecia Taylor

Witness: Lucrecia Taylor
04-29-14
Date
/s/ Rena Jeannette Parker

Witness: Rena Jeannette Parker
28a
APPENDIX G
HOUSTON DIVISION
[Filed: May 20, 2014]
Civil No. 4:14-cv-00027

v.
Plaintiff,

Defendants.
DEFENDANTS OBJECTION TO THE COURTS

RULING (Dkt. #42) THAT AN ACT OF CONGRESS,
AND NOT THE RESIDENCE OF THE
DEFENDANT, DETERMINES JURISDICTION
IN THIS CAUSE; DEMAND FOR SANCTIONS
AGAINST COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES
FOR FRAUD UPON THE COURT UNDER COLOR
OF LAW AND OFFICE, AND SUMMARY
DISMISSAL, WITH PREJUDICE, OF THE
COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR
CLEAR ABSENCE OF ALL JURISDICTION
* * * *
29a
MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACTS,
FRAUD ON THE COURT ON THE PART OF
COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES AS TO THE
NATURE AND JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Color of law, color of office, and in fraudem legis
are defined, in pertinent part, as follows:
COLOR OF LAW. The appearance or semblance,
without the substance, of legal right. McCain v.
Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168, 19 Sup. Ct. 644,43 L.
Ed. 9363;
COLOR OF OFFICE. . . . An act wrongfully done
by an officer, under the pretended authority of his
office, and grounded upon corruption, to which the
office is a mere shadow of color. . . . 4 ; and
IN FRAUDEM LEGIS (Lat.). In fraud of the law;
contrary to law. Taylor, Gloss. Using process of
law for a fraudulent purpose.5
Statutes in derogation of common law must be
strictly construed,6 and the controlling definition of
the various judicial fora in Title 28 U.S.C. 451 make
no provision for United States District Court.
The Supreme Court, in Balzac v. People of Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) and Mookini v. United
States, 303 U.S. 201 (1938), elucidates as to the nature
and origin of a United States District Court; to wit,
respectively and in pertinent part:
Blacks Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. Color of law.
Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd rev. 8th ed., s.v. Color of office.
Ibid, s.v. In fraudem legis.
Ibid, s.v. Maxim.
30a
The United States District Court is not a true
United States court established under article 3
of the Constitution to administer the judicial
power of the United States therein conveyed. It
is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional
faculty, granted under article 4, 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory belonging to the United
States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to
that of true United States courts, in offering an
opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not
change its character as a mere territorial court.
[Balzac]
The term District Courts of the United States,
as used in the rules, without an addition
expressing a wider connotation, has its historic
significance. It describes the constitutional courts
created under article 3 of the Constitution. Courts
of the Territories are legislative courts, properly
speaking, and are not District Courts of the
United States. We have often held that vesting
a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to
that vested in the District Courts of the United
States does not make it a District Court of
the United States. Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 154; The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453,
460; In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263, 268,10 S.Ct. 762;
McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 182,
183 S., 11 S.Ct. 949; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,
174 U.S. 445, 476, 477 S., 19 S.Ct. 722; Summers
v. United States, 231 U.S. 92, 101, 102 S., 34 S.Ct.
38; United States v. Burroughs, 289 U.S. 159, 163,
53 S.Ct. 574. [Mookini]
31a
Whereas, Title 28 U.S.C. 451 is devoid of provision
for territorial courts of the United States established
under Article 4 of the Constitution, only constitutional
courts under Article 3 thereof, Counsel for the United
States assertion that the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas covers seven
divisions, including the Houston Division, which division comprises the counties of Austin, Brazos,
Colorado, Fayette, Fort Bend, Grimes, Harris,
Madison, Montgomery, San Jacinto, Walker, Waller,
and Wharton, is patently false and constitutes
concealment of material fact and misrepresents,
in fraudem legis, under color of law and office (1) that
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Houston Division is an Article 3 constitutional court, (2) that Title 28 U.S.C. provides for
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston
Division in Harris County, Texas, and (3) the nature
of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Houston Division, and constitutes
fraud against Defendant, for which said Counsel
should be sanctioned and Defendant is entitled to
damages.
As reflected in the jurisdictional provisions of the
Constitution, no territorial court, such as United
States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division, has jurisdiction anywhere
within the exterior limits of any section of territory
occupied by one of the several commonwealths
united by and under authority of the Constitution
such as Texas; rather, only [O]ver such District . . .
as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the
United States . . . Places purchased . . . for the Erection
of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other
32a
needful Buildings, or Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States.8
7
Wherefore, Counsel for the United States Kenneth

Magidson and Joshua D. Smeltzers express and implied assertion and insinuation in United States
Opposition to Formal Challenge of Jurisdiction of
May 16, 2014 (Dkt. #48), that (1) Trowbridge clearly
resides within the jurisdiction of this Court, and
(2) Title 28 U.S.C. provides the Court with jurisdiction
in Harris County, Texas, constitute incontrovertible
evidence of, among numerous offenses, said Counsels
admission of fact that Defendant resides in
Texas, a geographical area over which no legislative
Article 4 territorial court, such as the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division, has jurisdiction.
NATURE OF JURISDICTION OF TERRITORIAL
COURTS FOR PURPOSES OF FEDERAL DEBT
COLLECTION UNDER TITLE 28 U.S.C. VIS--VIS
INTERNAL REVENUE UNDER TITLE 26 U.S.C.
The apparently perplexing nature as to the jurisdiction of the Court resolves as follows: Title 26 U.S.C.
obtains only against individuals, of which there
are two kinds: (1) citizens or residents of the United
States, whether American or alien, and (2)
nonresident aliens engaged in trade or business within
the United Statesand Congress define United
States in Title 26 U.S.C. in a geographical sense to
mean the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American
Ibid, Article 4 3(2).
33a
Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands and no other thing.9
Congress authorize the Courta legislative Article
4 territorial courtto proceed in matters of Federal
debt collection only in sections of territory occupied by
a Federal corporation; to wit:
UNITED STATES CODE . . .
TITLE 28JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE . . .
CHAPTER 176FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION
PROCEDURE . . .
3002. Definitions
As used in this chapter: . . .
(15) United States means
(A) a Federal corporation;
(B) an agency, department, commission,
board, or other entity of the United
States; or
(C) an instrumentality of the United
States. [Emphasis added.]
Whereas, (1) Statutes in derogation of common law
must be strictly construed,10 (2) the meaning of the
definition of the term United States in parts (B) and
(C) of subsection (15) of 28 U.S.C. 3002 is ambiguous
unless the definition in part (A) is applied, (3) the controlling definition of United States in Title 28 U.S.C.
See Defendants May 29, 2014, Amended Motion to Dismiss
(Dkt. #28), pages 34-36 of Memorandum appended thereto for
proof thereof.
9
10
Ibid, s.v. Maxim.
34a
Chapter 176 therefore, is 3002(15)(A) thereof, (4) the
jurisdiction of the Court in matters pertaining to the
collection of alleged Federal debt in the United States
extends only to those sections of territory occupied by
a Federal corporation, and the ultimate parent
Federal corporationover all agencies, departments,
commissions, boards, instrumentalities, and other entities of the United States, as well as all other Federal
corporationsis the District of Columbia,11 and (5)
there is no evidence in the record of this cause that
demonstrates that Defendant is a resident of the
District of Columbia or resides within the jurisdiction
of the Court.
INTERSECTION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
TITLE 26 U.S.C. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
AND TITLE 28 U.S.C. CHAPTER 176
FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE
Notwithstanding that Congress provide for six
geographical States of the United States under Title
26 U.S.C., only citizens or residents of one particular
State of the United States are liable to income tax
thereunder; i.e., those of the District of Columbia; to
wit:
An Act to provide a Government for the District of

Columbia, ch. 62, sec. 1, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later
legislated in An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government
for the District of Columbia, ch. 180, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878,
to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought
forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2,
1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes
of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . .
187374, sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935,
49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of
Columbia Code (1940)).
11
35a
Islands), and
and their own tax systems . . . The governments of the first group of territories impose
their own income taxes and withholding taxes
on their own residents . . . .12 [Emphasis added.]
Whereas, the provisions of (1) Title 26 U.S.C. obtain
only against those Americans and aliens who reside
in that section of territory occupied by the District of
Columbia, and (2) Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 allows
for legislative Article 4 territorial courts, such as
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, Houston Division, to proceed in
Federal debt collection in civil actions only against
residents of sections of territory occupied by a Federal
corporationthe supreme or ultimate parent of all
of which corporations is the District of Columbia
(supra, n. 11): The only geographical area of mutual
jurisdiction between Title 26 U.S.C. Internal Revenue
Code and Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 Federal Debt
Collection Procedure is that section of territory
occupied by the District of Columbia.
Wherefore, notwithstanding that the Court has
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue
IRS.gov, Persons Employed In a U.S. Possession / TerritoryFIT, http://www.irs.gov/lndividuals/International-Taxpayers/Per
sons-Employed-In-U.S.-Possessions.
12
36a
(28 U.S.C. 1340 (2012)) over any resident of the
District of Columbia: The instant civil action, as
shown above, is not an internal-revenue cause
per se but rather a non sequiturbased on the
erroneous and unsupportable presumption that
Defendant resides within the jurisdiction of the
Court, a presumption rebutted and disproved
herein and elsewhere in the record of this cause
because there is no evidence in the record hereof
that shows that Defendant is a resident of the
District of Columbia.
Wherefore: In respect of the foregoing, (1) 28 U.S.C.
1340 (2012) is inapposite as a determinant of jurisdiction or authority for Plaintiff to proceed against the
property of the Defendant, (2) the Court is bereft of
discretion to proceed in this cause and no further
proceeding of any kind whatsoever is authorized,
and (3) it is incumbent on the Court, and Defendant
hereby demands, that the Court sanction Counsel
for the United States Kenneth Magidson and Joshua
D. Smeltzer for fraud upon the Court and against
Defendant under color of law and office and dismiss,
summarily and with prejudice, the Complaint of the
Plaintiff as authorized by Rules 12(b)(l) and (2) and
required by Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for clear absence of all jurisdiction.
Date: May 20, 2014
9816 Memorial Boulevard #205
Humble, Texas
(281) 540-2329
37a
APPENDIX H
[Filed: Aug. 19, 2014]
Case No. 14-20333

v.
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Defendant-Appellant.
On Appeal from the United States District Court

Houston Division, Civil No. 4:14-cv-00027
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT


PRO SE
9816 Memorial Blvd. #205
Humble, Texas
Telephone (281) 540-2329
Telefacsimile (281) 540-4329
* * * *
38a
Whereas, only one Federal corporation has a
Congress: The trial court is a court created by the
legislature of the District of Columbia municipal
corporation by virtue of the sovereign congressional
faculty, granted under article 4, 3, Balzac, supra,
p. 40, and therefore a territorial court whose jurisdiction is limited to geographical area identified in Article
1 8(17) or 4 3(2) of the Constitution.
TROWBRIDGES RESIDENCE, DOMICIL, AND
LEGAL RESIDENCE
Trowbridge is a resident of Harris County, Texas.
(ROA.153, 181).
The geographical area occupied by Harris County,
Texas, is situate without every section of territory
identified in Article 1 8(17) and 4 3(2) of the
Constitution and the jurisdiction of any territorial
court.
The material / physical fact of Trowbridges residence for the general purposes of life and major life
interests, in the geographical area occupied by Harris
County, Texas, i.e., Trowbridges preeminent headquarters, bars peremptorily any claim that for the
purpose of taxation Trowbridge resides in the District
of Columbia; to wit:
When one intends the facts to which the law
attaches consequences, he must abide the consequences whether intended or not. 13. One can not
elect to make his home in one place in point of
interest and attachment and for the general
purposes of life, and in another, where he in fact
has no residence, for the purpose of taxation.
P. 426. 14. Physical facts of residence, united with
major life interests may fix domicile ones
preeminent headquarters. Id. 15. The burden of
39a
proof is on one who claims that an earlier domicile
was abandoned for a later one. P. 427. Texas v.
Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
For Plaintiff to prove Plaintiffs claims against
Trowbridge and Trowbridges property and that
Trowbridge resides within the jurisdiction of the trial
court, a legislative Article IV territorial court, Plaintiff
would have to produce evidence consistent with the
following:
To constitute a change of domicil, three things are
essential: (1) Residence in another place [District
of Columbia]; (2) an intention to abandon the old
domicil [Texas]; and (3) an intention of acquiring
a new one [District of Columbia]; or as some
writers express it there must be an animus non
revertendi and an animus manendi, or animus et
factum [Citations omitted.] . . . Bouviers 8th,
p. 921. (ROA.299).
Trowbridge challenges properly Plaintiffs allegation of jurisdiction multiple times.15 The ROA, however, reflects no evidence of jurisdiction from Plaintiff,
despite the burden to produce such; to wit:
It is also hornbook law that the party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving
facts to establish that jurisdiction. See 13 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure 3522, at 62-65 (2d ed.1984); 15 J.
Moore, Moores Federal Practice 102.14, at
102-24 (3d ed. 1998) (The burden of proving all
jurisdictional facts is on the party asserting
jurisdiction.); see also Scelsa v. City University of
New York, 76 F.3d 37, 40 (2d Cir.1996). That
15
ROA.56-62; 107-112; 291-336; 348-357; 382.
40a
party must allege a proper basis for jurisdiction in
his pleadings and must support those allegations
with competent proof if a party opposing jurisdiction properly challenges those allegations,
see, e.g., McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed.
1135 (1936), or if the court sua sponte raises
the question, see, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908).
Linardos v. Fortuna, 157 F.3d 945 (2d Cir. 1998).
* * * *
41a
APPENDIX I
[Filed Oct 6, 2014]
No. 14-20333

v.
Plaintiff-Appellee,

ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
HOUSTON DIVISION
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT
Tamara Wenda Ashford, Robert Joel Branman,

Robert W. Metzler, Carol A. Barthel, Kenneth
Magidson, Joshua David Smeltzer, and Lynn
Nettleton Hughes are co-workers and officers of the
same Federal corporation, the District of Columbia
municipal corporation,1 28 U.S.C. 3002(1), (2), (8),
Columbia, ch. 62, sec. 1, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later
for the District of Columbia, ch. 180, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878,
1
42a
(15) (App. 44-46; see also ROA.329-330), feigning
ignorance of lawi.e., refusing to recognize certain
material portions of the law fatal to their cause, a
denial of due process of lawin order to defraud
appellant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr. (Trowbridge)
of his property under color of law, office, and authority
via an unauthorized sham legal proceeding protected
from general scrutiny and detection by means of a
culture of silence under a policy of Never respond,
confirm, or deny.
The employer of all aforesaid officers, the District
of Columbia municipal corporation, is situated in the
legislative branch of the de jure constitutional
government established March 4, 1789 (n. 1, supra).
Legislative-branch officers Tamara Wenda Ashford,
Robert Joel Brannan, Robert W. Metzler, Carol A.
Barthel, Kenneth Magidson, and Joshua David
Smeltzer are posing as officers of the executive branch
of said de jure constitutional government and Lynn
Nettleton Hughes, of the judicial branch thereof,
under color of office and authority, and opposing
appellant John Parks Trowbridges appeal brief (the
Appeal) and prosecuting and hearing the instant
lawsuit in fraudem legis under color of law, in violation of the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution
and breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers.
to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought

forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2,
1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, Revised Statutes
of the United States Relating to the District of Columbia . . .
187374, sec. 2, p. 2); as amended by the Act of June 28, 1935, 49
Stat. 430, ch. 332, sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of Columbia
Code (1940)). (ROA.312; App. 16-17).
43a
RE IGNORANCE OF LAW
It is indisputable that appellee United States of
America (the Appellee) holds appellant John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr. (Trowbridge) accountable for
knowledge of the law; to wit:
Ignorantia excusator, non juris sed facti. Ignorance of fact may excuse, but not ignorance
of law. Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd rev., 8th ed.,
p. 2136.
Ignorance of law consists of the want of knowledge
of those laws which it is our duty to understand,
and which every man is presumed to know. Id. at
1488.
Counsel for Appellee and all other aforesaid
legislative-branch officers are no less accountable.
The principal provisions of law material to the allegations in the Complaint and Issue I in Trowbridges
appeal brief (the Appeal) are the Title 26 U.S.C. terms
United States, State, and includes (ROA.324-326,
App. 36), and the Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 terms
material to the nature and jurisdiction of the trial court
and Issue II in the Appeal, United States, counsel
for the United States, court, debt, and judgment.
(App. 44-46).
The ROA and Appeal reflect fidelity to the controlling definition and meaning of every aforesaid material statutory term on the part of Trowbridge and
ignorance thereof on the part of counsel for Appellee
and all other aforesaid legislative-branch officers and
there is no evidence to the contrary.
44a
THE TRIAL COURT
kangaroo court. 1. A self-appointed tribunal or
mock court in which the principles of law and
justice are disregarded, perverted, or parodied. . . .
2. A court or tribunal characterized by unauthorized
or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair
proceeding impossible. 3. A sham legal proceeding.
Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th ed., p. 259.
Whereas, Trowbridge resides in Harris County,
Texas (ROA.153, 181); and
Whereas, there is no legal evidence that Texas is a
part of the geographical United States (ROA.324-326;
App. 36-39); and
Whereas, there is no evidence that Trowbridge is of
a species of individual2 who is a nonresident alien or
citizen or resident of the political or geographical
United States (id.; App. 39-49; ROA.333-336); and
Whereas, there is no provision in the Constitution
that authorizes Congress to exercise power of personal
legislation without the geographical areas described in
Articles 1 8(17) and 4 3(2) thereof; and
Whereas, there is no provision in the Constitution
that authorizes exercise of personal jurisdiction
without the geographical areas described in Articles 1
8(17) and 4 3(2) thereof; and
Whereas, only territorial courts created by virtue
of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under
article 4, 3, of that instrument [the Constitution]
(2) the term individual means a citizen of the United States

or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence;
5 U.S.C. 552a(a) Records maintained on individuals.
45a
(ROA.395, 407; App. 40) are authorized to exercise
personal jurisdiction; and
Whereas, the trial court is a court authorized by
Congress to exercise personal jurisdiction (App. 42-49).
Wherefore, the trial court is a District of Columbia
municipal corporation legislative Article IV territorial
tribunal of plenary jurisdiction masquerading as a
constitutional Article III judicial court of limited
jurisdiction and conducting a sham legal proceeding
in concert with co-worker corporate attorneys posing
as national-executive-branch officers in violation of
the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution and
breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers, for the purpose defrauding Trowbridge of
Trowbridges property under color of law, office, and
authority.
The Response constitutes additional fraud on the
part of District of Columbia municipal corporation
attorneys.
THE QUESTION OF FRIVOLOUSNESS
Plaintiff-Appellees Response provides, in pertinent
part (Emphasis added in all citations.):
Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 28.2.3, counsel for
the appellee believe that oral argument is not
necessary in this case because the appellant is
proceeding pro se and his arguments are frivolous.
(Resp. i).
. . . Trowbridge raised only frivolous arguments in
opposition to the Governments motion. (Resp. 3).
The Government moved for summary judgment.
Opposing, Trowbridge raised only frivolous arguments, asserting that the District Court lacked
46a
jurisdiction over him, and the Internal Revenue
Code did not apply to him, because he did not
reside in the District of Columbia or one of the
territories . . . (Resp. 4).
On appeal, Trowbridge advances only frivolous
arguments . . . (Resp. 14).
E. Trowbridges arguments are frivolous (Resp. 24).
Trowbridges argument that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction over this case is equally
frivolous. (Resp. 27).
Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd rev., 8th ed. (Bouviers
8th) provides, in pertinent part of page 1317:
FRIVOLOUS. . . .
An answer cannot be stricken out on the ground
that it is frivolous, where an extended argument
or illustration is required to demonstrate its
frailty . . .
Whereas, the principal argument (Resp. 14-29) in the
Response is that Trowbridges Appeal is frivolous, it is
reasonable to characterize said argument as extended
and Trowbridges Appeal cannot be stricken out on the
ground that it is frivolous.
Blacks Law Dictionary, 1st ed. provides, in pertinent
part of page 522:
FRIVOLOUS. An answer or plea is called frivolous when it is clearly insufficient on its face, and
does not controvert the material points of the opposite pleading, and is presumably interposed for
purposes of delay or to embarrass the plaintiff . . .
Peacock v. Williams (C. C.) 110 Fed. 916.
47a
Ignorance of law excuses not. For those in a position
of public trust and charged with making, pronouncing,
or applying the law, such as the co-authors of the
Response, ignorance of law, feigned or actual,
constitutes, minimally, denial of due process of law,
gross negligence, i.e., fraud, and misfeasance in public
office.
It is unknown what definition or meaning of United
States (or any other aforesaid material term) counsel
for Appellee uses in the Response.
Whereas, inspection of the ROA, Appeal, and
Response evinces that (1) Trowbridge relies on and
cites the controlling Title 26 U.S.C. and Title 28 U.S.C.
Chapter 176 definition of United States and all other
aforesaid material terms at all times, and (2) authors
of the Response (a) propound and argue an unknown,
undisclosed meaning of United States and every
other aforesaid material term, to the exclusion of the
controlling definition of each, and (b) cite opinions
from cases about the meaning of United States
and other statutory terms that likewise are devoid of
citation of or reference to the respective controlling
definition or meaning: Any argument or case citation
which purports to opine about the meaning of a
particular statutory term to the exclusion of the
controlling definition thereof is clearly insufficient on
its face for ignorance of law.
Neither argument nor opinion supersedes or
supplants the definition or meaning of a statutory
term as provided by lawwhich all men are presumed
to know and understand. Whereas, the material points
of Trowbridges pleading consist in the controlling
definition and meaning of the aforesaid terms: The
principal argument of the Response that Trowbridges
Appeal is frivolous, is itself a frivolous argument for
48a
ignorance of the law, albeit feigned, and should be
stricken out therefor, irrespective of the fact that it is
fraudulent.
ANOMALIES EXPLAINED
1. Trowbridge on February 4, 2014, offers to discharge in full the debt alleged in the Complaint
upon Kenneth Magidsons production of evidence
that Trowbridge is a citizen or resident of the
United States.3 (ROA.59). To said offer Kenneth
Magidson stands mute and rather opts for four
months of pre-trial filings and motions, ostensibly
a waste of the trial courts time. (ROA.101-102).
At no time does Trowbridge withdraw said offer.
2. Response authors feel the need to cite 41 cases in
support of the principal argument in the Response
that the Appeal is frivolous.
The reason for both anomalies is the same: There is
no evidence that Trowbridge is a citizen or resident
of the United States and the ROA is devoid of the
same and the attorneys prosecuting the lawsuit and
opposing the Appeal are dependent on complicity in
the fraud and the culture of silence in order to prevail.
Fraud is facilitated by group agreement among
District of Columbia municipal corporation officers
and supporters as to the meaning of United States
and the other aforesaid material statutory terms,
irrespective of any controlling definition, and is hidden
in plain sight via the culture of silence; to wit: It
Said offer is a constructive avoidance for fraud and is the

reason the trial court construes it to be an answer to the
Complaint, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1): (ROA.91).
3
49a
is extremely difficult for a target to avoid being defrauded if no one prosecuting or hearing the lawsuit or
opposing the Appeal will acknowledge or apply the
law.
As cited supra, Ignorantia excusator, non juris sed
facti. Ignorance of fact may excuse, but not ignorance
of law (Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd rev., 8th ed.,
p. 2136), and it is immaterial whether the ignorance of
law is actual or feigned.
Quod per recordum probatum, non debet esse
negatum. What is proved by the record, ought not to
be denied (id. at 2159), and the ROA and Response
prove ignorance of the law on the part of the District
of Columbia municipal corporation judge and attorneys involved in the instant lawsuit and Response,
constituting, minimally, gross negligence (fraud) and
misfeasance in public office.
RESPONSE AUTHORS M.O.: CONNIVANCE
WITH ACTUAL CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATIVE
FRAUD, SUBVERSION OF THE
CONSTITUTION BY INFERENCE
The Supreme Court explains the constitutional
difference between, on the one hand, the states of the
Union and, on the other, Columbia and the Territories:
On the part of the plaintiffs, it has been urged that
Columbia is a distinct political society, and is
This is true. But as the act of Congress
obviously uses the word state in reference to the
term as used in the Constitution, it becomes
necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a state
in the sense of that instrument. The result of that
50a
examination is a conviction that the members of
the American confederacy only are the states
contemplated in the Constitution.
. . . These clauses show that the word state
is used in the Constitution as designating a
member of the union, and excludes from the
term the signification attached to it by writers on
the law of nations. Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey,
6 U.S. 445,452,2 Cranch 445, 2 L.Ed. 332 (1805):
(ROA.302-304; App. 17).
It has been attempted to distinguish a Territory
from the district of Columbia; but the court is of
opinion, that this distinction cannot be maintained. They may differ in many respects, but
neither of them is a state, in the sense in which
that term is used in the constitution. New Orleans
v. Winter, 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 91, 4 L. Ed. 44 (1816).
(ROA.304-305; App. 18).
Title 26 U.S.C. provides, in pertinent part:
Chapter 21 - FEDERAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS ACT
Subchapter A - Tax on Employees
3121 - Definitions
. . . (e) State, United States, and citizen
(1) For purposes of this chapter
The term State includes the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Whereas, (1) the Supreme Court in Hepburn and
New Orleans, supra, is unequivocal that neither
Columbia nor any Territory is a state [sic] as that
51a
term is used in the Constitution, and (2) Congress in
26 U.S.C. 3121(e)(1) define the term of art State
so as to comprehend expressly only the District of
Columbia and certain of the Territories (ROA.313-314
and App. 31-32; ROA.324-326 and App. 35-36) and
exclude impliedly every commonwealth united by and
under authority of the Constitution and admitted into
the Union: Response authors contradict both the
Supreme Court and Congress by propounding by way
of inference and feigned ignorance of the law that the
Title 26 U.S.C. term State comprehends Texas and
other members of the Union as well as the District of
Columbia and U.S. territories, i.e., that the body
politic of Texas or Iowa is the constitutional / political
equivalent of that of Guam or Puerto Rico, evincing
connivance with actual congressional legislative fraud
and sedition and constructive treason to the de jure
constitutional government of March 4, 1789; to wit:
He [Trowbridge] contends that the terms state
[sic4] and United States as used in those statutes [Title 26 U.S.C. and Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter
176] refer only to the District of Columbia and to
U.S. territories and not to . . . the constitutional
union that includes Texas. (Resp. 24-25).
Treason is a breach of allegiance, and can be committed by him only who owes allegiance, either
perpetual or temporary. The words, therefore,
owing allegiance to the United States, in the
first section, are entirely surplus words, which
do not, in the slightest degree, affect its sense.
The construction would be precisely the same,
were they omitted. United States v. Wiltberger,
18 U. S. 76, 97, Sup. Ct. (1820).
4
So in Response; should be State.
52a
The reason Response authors feign ignorance of
the controlling definition and meaning of all aforesaid
statutory terms and cite only cases that likewise
are devoid of reference thereto and rather propound
arguments, i.e., dissemble and prevaricate, exclusively is because there is no legal or competent
evidence of that which they need to prove, i.e., that
Trowbridge is of a species of individual who is a nonresident alien or citizen or resident of the political or
geographical Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 or Title 26
U.S.C. United States.
For Response authors to disclose their legal reasoning as to why the District of Columbia municipal
corporation has a right of action against Trowbridges
property would be to admit of the aforesaid crimes and
high crimes and work against interest.
The degree of artfulness of the Response authors
argument that the Appeal is frivolous and the capacity
of the culture of silence to keep a lid on the offenses
evidenced herein will determine whether other
District of Columbia municipal corporation officers
and supporters will be willing to risk their career in
support of the Response authors by way of the specter
of subjection to public scrutiny of the record of any
ratification of the Response; to wit: In maleficio ratihabitio mandaro comparatur. In a tort, ratification
is equivalent to authority, Bouviers Law Dictionary,
3rd rev., 8th ed., p. 2138.
53a
CONCLUSION
Response authors are liable to criminal prosecution
for perpetrating the Response under color of law,
office, and authority, and said Response should be
stricken out as frivolous and fraudulent.
Date: October 6, 2014
Humble, Texas
(281) 540-2329
54a
APPENDIX J
[Filed: Oct. 03, 2014]
No. 14-20333

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
APPELLANTS OPPOSITION TO APPELLEES

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; AND APPELLANTS
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Appellant John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., (Trowbridge),
respectfully requests that the motion of appellee
United States of America (the Appellee) for sanctions
against Trowbridge be denied, and that (1) Appellee
be sanctioned $5,000 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1912
and Rule 39(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure for maintaining a frivolous, fraudulent
response to Trowbridges appeal brief (the Appeal or
App.), (2) District of Columbia municipal corporation
officers litigating the instant lawsuit and authoring
Appellees response brief (the Response) be indicted
for / charged with actual fraud under color of law,
office, and authority and all other crimes and high
crimes attendant therewith, and (3) a grand jury comprised of non-District of Columbia municipal corporation employees be convened to hear the evidence and
55a
matters of fact in the ROA, Appeal, and Response and
declare the truth of actual and systemic fraud among
District of Columbia municipal corporation judges and
attorneys, as warranted by the facts stated herein
below.
In all matters relating to Federal debt collection
procedure, of which the instant lawsuit and appeal is
one, United States is a Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176
term with a limited and specified meaning and means
a Federal corporation (ROA.329-330; App. 44-45);
and in Federal debt collection procedure, no one can
take said term in any other than its technical sense.
(App. 26, 28).
Whereas, only one Federal corporation has a
Congress, i.e., the District of Columbia municipal
corporation (ROA.311-312; App. 44-46), it is selfevident that in Federal debt collection procedure,
every appearance of the term of art United States
means District of Columbia municipal corporation.
(ROA.329-330; App. 44-45).
Wherefore, in all in Federal debt collection proceedings, such as the instant lawsuit: United States
District Court means District of Columbia municipal
corporation District Court; United States District
Judge means District of Columbia municipal corporation District Judge; United States Department of
Justice means District of Columbia municipal
corporation Department of Justice; United States
Attorney means District of Columbia municipal
corporation Attorney; and Assistant United States
Attorney means Assistant District of Columbia
municipal corporation Attorney.
Every officer participating in the instant lawsuit
is an officer / employee of a Federal corporation:
56a
the District of Columbia municipal corporation.
(ROA.329-330).
The mechanics of the actual fraud, documented
with specificity in Trowbridges filings in the ROA
and Appeal, are as follows:
1. For purposes of internal revenue, Congress
transmute by legislative act the words state,
State, and United States into terms of art
by way of application of the rules of statutory
construction (ROA.322-323; App. 26), so as
to comprehend only the District of Columbia
and certain of the territories / Territories and
exclude from each respective definition all of
the component commonwealths united by
and under authority of the Constitution and
admitted into the Union (ROA.305-307; 309311), but conceal the definition and meaning of
the former words, now terms of art, from the
public through a culture of silence (App. 23-24);
2. Congress incorporate the Government of the
District of Columbia (ROA.311-312), creating
new jobs for themselves that are territorialtype, municipal-alter ego counterparts of their
job in the de jure national government, March
4, 1789, but use the same job title in both
national and municipal governments and
conceal the duplicity from the public through a
culture of silence (App. 23-24);
3. Officers of the District of Columbia municipal
corporation (supra, p. 2; ROA.329-330; App.
44-45) masquerading as officers of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of the
de jure national government established
March 4, 1789, pretend they have power of
57a
personal legislation (legislative branch) and
personal jurisdiction (judicial and executive
branches) over all residents of a State or
the United States (both of which equate statutorily to the District of Columbia; ROA.324326) andpreying on the ignorance of nonresidents of the District of Columbia as to the
novel defmition and meaning of said terms and
erroneous personal belief that they are a
resident of a State and the United States
enact and enforce laws that authorize,
without constitutional authority, exercise of
personal legislation and jurisdiction over
Americans residing without the geographical
area described in Articles 1 8(17) and 4 3(2)
of the Constitution; e.g., 26 U.S.C. 72017241, Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 3002(8);
4. Actors within the District of Columbia municipal corporation induce the American People to
enroll in a personal retirement program
called Social Security and domiciled in the
District of Columbiafor which more than
99% of the American People are legally ineligible by reason of foreign residence, domicil, and
legal residence (ROA.312-315; App. 30-32)
that carries a contractual duty via assessment
contract (ROA.316-317; App. 34) to pay a
tax on personal income and whereby every
American entitled to a benefit under said
program is deemed, by way of defective and
fraudulent legal reasoning (ROA.296-299), to
waive the unalienable and constitutional Right
of Liberty and become a resident for certain
legal purposes, such as taxation and licensing,
of the District of Columbia (ROA.312-315);
58a
5. Using the new laws authorizing exercise
of personal legislation and jurisdiction over
Americans residing without the District of
Columbia as justification, judges and attorneys
of the District of Columbia municipal corporation posing as, respectively, national-judicialbranch and national-executive-branch officers,
institute and carry out civil and criminal kangaroo-court Federal debt collection proceedings
wherein, by way of use of the names of things
that appear to be words to non-insiders but are
actually legislative terms of art with a limited
and specified meaning, victims are unaware
that they are in a legislative forum with power
of personal jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 3002(2),
(8), and (15)) and putatively of the subject,
and their property of the object, of District of
Columbia municipal legislation (ROA.312);
6. Whenever Trowbridge uses the same rules of
statutory construction and interpretation that
Congress use to compose statutes (ROA.322323; App. 25-27), to determine and cite the
meaning of the definition of the statutory
terms appearing in the language of the pleadings used to prosecute the case against him,
every legislative-branch judge and attorney
involved in the instant case and appeal, i.e.,
Lynn Nettleton Hughes, Kenneth Magidson,
Joshua David Smeltzer, Tamara Wenda
Ashford, Robert W. Metzler, Carol A. Barthel,
and Robert Joel Branman, in observance of the
District of Columbia municipal corporation culture of silence, refuses to respond to, admit,
or deny the existence of any such statutory
definition or meaning, an actual / constructive
denial of due process of law;
59a
7. To prove their case against Trowbridge, the
aforesaid District of Columbia municipal
corporation officers:
(a) cite or rely on facts in the ROA or
Responsewith which Trowbridge does
not disagree and in substance confesses
and admitsbut refuse to recognize the
controlling definition and meaning of the
Title 26 U.S.C. terms United States,
State, and includes and Title 28 U.S.C.
Chapter 176 terms United States,
counsel for the United States, court,
and judgment, which terms are used
nominally to hear and prosecute the instant lawsuit and oppose the instant
appealapplication of the definition and
meaning of which, in combination with
the solitary material fact relating to
Trowbridges residence, domicil, and legal
residence, avoids by way of legal evidence
any apparent right of action against
Trowbridges property; and
(b) in support of said judges conclusions and
rulings and said attorneys arguments,
cite only municipal statutes, court cases
which likewise ignore citation of or reference to the controlling Title 26 U.S.C. or
Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 definition or
meaning of United States, or mistakes
made by Trowbridge as a proximate result
of actual legislative fraud on the part of
the legislature of the District of Columbia
municipal corporation or connivance
therewith on the part of other legislativebranch personnel.
60a
The ROA and Appeal evince every single fact set
forth in this opposition and motion for sanctions.
Based on the job title of the senior District of
Columbia municipal corporation attorney authoring
the Response, it is reasonable to presume that, in
matters relating to Federal debt collection procedure,
the hereinabove-described fraud, denial of due
process, connivance, and culture of silence is systemic
within the District of Columbia municipal corporation
Department of Justice.
It is likewise reasonable to presume that the same
condition exists among all territorial judges of the
District of Columbia municipal corporation, such as
Lynn Nettleton Hughes.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, Trowbridge respectfully requests the
Court deny Appellees Motion for Sanctions and
exercise its discretion and impose sanctions against
Appellee so that Trowbridge can be compensated
for the costs of and opposing Appellees frivolous,
fraudulent Response. Sanctions of $5,000 for the
Reply would be appropriate.
Moreover, in light of the scope and egregiousness of
the fraud and culture of silence among the legislativebranch personnel participating in the instant lawsuit
and appeal and posing as officers of the judicial or
executive branches of the de jure national government,
established March 4, 1789, Trowbridge respectfully
suggests that Lynn Nettleton Hughes, Kenneth
Magidson, Joshua David Smeltzer, Tamara Wenda
Ashford, Robert W. Metzler, Carol A. Barthel, and
Robert Joel Branman be indicted for / charged with
fraud under color of law, office, and authority and all
61a
other high misdemeanors, crimes, and high crimes attendant therewith1; and that the Court convene a
grand jury comprised of non-District of Columbia
municipal corporation employees to hear the evidence
and matters of fact in the ROA, Appeal, and Response
(and Trowbridges reply brief, to be filed October 6,
2014), hereby adduced by Trowbridge, and declare the
truth of the matter among members of the legislature,
judges, and attorneys of the District of Columbia
municipal corporation, for the purpose of identifying
and rooting out the ultimate source of the fraud and
culture of silence in order to protect non-residents of
the District of Columbia from further damage / injury.
Humble, Texas
(281) 540-2329
Lynn Nettleton Hughes, Kenneth Magidson, Joshua David

Smeltzer are the subject of an affidavit of information (criminal
complaint) sworn to as true, correct, and complete by Trowbridge
and witnessed by three competent witnesses May 29, 2014, and
filed with the Clerk of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals May 30,
2014.
1
62a
APPENDIX K
[Filed: Oct. 14, 2014]
No. 14-20333

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
APPELLANTS REPLY TO APPELLEES

RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Appellee United States of America (the Appellee),
has filed a response to the motion of appellant John
Parks Trowbridge, Jr. (Trowbridge) that, among
other things, Appellee and counsel for Appellee be
sanctioned for maintaining a frivolous and fraudulent
response to Trowbridges appeal brief (the Appeal or
App.). Trowbridge hereby replies to Appellees
response to Trowbridges motion for sanctions, which
motion should be granted.
The words of a statute are to be taken in their
ordinary and popular meaning, unless they are
technical terms or words of art, in which case
they are to be understood in their technical
sense. . . . [Emphasis added.] Henry Campbell
63a
Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws (West Publishing Co.: St.
Paul, Minn., 1896), 57, 128. (ROA.308).
Linguistic inference canons provide guidelines
about what the legislature likely meant, given
its choice of some words and not others. The
linguistic inference canons include classic logical
canons such as expressio unius,42 noscitur a
sociis,43 and ejusdem generis.44 Other inferential
rules encourage interpreters to follow the ordinary usage of text unless the legislature has itself
defined the word or the phrase has acquired
a technical meaning.45 [Emphasis added.] Jacob
Scott, Codified Canons and the Common
Law of Interpretation, The Georgetown Law
Journal, Vol. 98, Issue 2, January 2010, 352-353.
(App. 26, 28).
Table 1. Linguistic Inference Canons . . .
. . . Ordinary usage: Follow ordinary usage of
terms, unless the legislature gives them a
specified or technical meaning. . . .
Dictionary definition: Follow dictionary definitions of terms, unless the legislature has provided
a specific definition. [Emphasis added.] Id. at 357.
(App. 28).
Contra negantem principia non est disputandum.
There is no disputing against one who denies
principles. Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd rev.,
8th ed., p. 2129.
Appellees reply to Trowbridges motion for sanctions is frivolous and fraudulent for the same reasons
as Appellees response brief (the Response): Counsel
64a
for Appellee propound by inference some kind of
Title 26 U.S.C. or Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 nexus
between Trowbridge and the geographical or political
United States, to the exclusion of the controlling
definition of the geographical and political United
States in Title 26 U.S.C. and Title 28 U.S.C. Chapter
176. Cases cited by counsel for Appellee in support of
the arguments in said reply likewise are devoid of
reference to either of said controlling definitions.
Counsel for Appellee not only refuse to follow the
law, but also attempt to lead the Court astray into reliance on counsel for Appellees own private, unknown,
unwritten version of law as to the definition and
meaning of United States, by which Trowbridge
should be held liable by inference.
All of Appellees filings evince a defiance and
ignorance of material law that is indispensable to
resolution of the allegations in the Complaint and
operates to deny Trowbridge due process of law.
Said law consists of the Title 26 U.S.C. terms
United States, State, and includes; and the Title
28 U.S.C. Chapter 176 terms United States, counsel
for the United States, court, debt, and judgment.
That Tamara Wenda Ashford, Robert Joel Braman,
Robert W. Metzler, and Carol A. Barthel (and
Kenneth Magidson, Joshua David Smeltzer, and Lynn
Nettleton Hughes) are legally ignorant of the meaning
of the respective definition of every aforesaid statutory
term is indisputablebecause there is no evidence
in the ROA or any of Appellees filings that indicates
otherwise.
It is not possible for Trowbridge to receive fair treatment or enjoy due process of law if every actor involved
65a
in the instant lawsuit and appeal is ignorant of the
selfsame law upon which each relies for authority to
prosecute or hear the instant cause or oppose the
instant appeal.
The decision before this Honorable Court is a simple
one: whether the Court should excuse counsel for
Appellee, counsel for plaintiff United States of
America, and the trial court for documented ignorance
of law, refusal to follow / observe the law, failure to
produce evidence of jurisdiction following proper
challenge thereof, and advocacy of an inferred law
known only to Tamara Wenda Ashford, Robert
Joel Branman, Robert W. Metzler, Carol A. Barthel,
Kenneth Magidson, Joshua David Smeltzer, and Lynn
Nettleton Hughes by which Trowbridge should be
held liable for the allegations in the Complaint.
CONCLUSION
Appellees reply to Trowbridges motion for sanctions, like the Response, is frivolous and fraudulent for
the reasons cited hereinabove.
Trowbridges motion to impose sanctions against
Appellee and counsel for Appellee for pursuing a frivolous and fraudulent response to Trowbridges Appeal
should be granted, as well as all other sanctions
recommended in said motion.
Humble, Texas
(281) 540-2329
66a
APPENDIX L
1. U.S. CONST., ARTICLE 1 provides, in pertinent part:
Section 8.
The Congress shall have Power * * *
* * * To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten
Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States,
and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
the Government of the United States, and to exercise
like Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;
***
2. U.S. CONST., ARTICLE 3 provides, in pertinent part:
Section. 1.
The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. * * *
Section. 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;to Controversies between
two or more States;between a State and Citizens
of another State,between Citizens of different
67a
States,between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned,
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
3. U.S. CONST., ARTICLE 4, SECTION 3 provides, in
pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; * * *
68a
APPENDIX M
1. 28 U.S.C. 132 provides, in pertinent part:
Creation and composition of district courts
(a) There shall be in each judicial district a district
court which shall be a court of record known as the
United States District Court for the district.
* * * (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 895; Pub. L. 88
176, 2, Nov. 13, 1963, 77 Stat. 331.)
2. 28 U.S.C. 3002 provides, in pertinent part:
Definitions
As used in this chapter:
* * * (2) Court means any court created by the
Congress of the United States, excluding the United
States Tax Court.
(3) Debt means
* * * (B) an amount that is owing to the United
States on account of a fee, duty, lease, rent, service,
sale of real or personal property, overpayment, fine,
assessment, penalty, restitution, damages, interest,
tax, bail bond forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery of a
cost incurred by the United States, or other source of
indebtedness to the United States * * *
* * * (8) Judgment means a judgment, order,
or decree entered in favor of the United States in a
court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding
regarding a debt.
E-Mail Address:
briefs@wilsonepes.com
775 H Street, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20002
Web Site:
www.wilsonepes.com
Tel (202) 789-0096

Fax (202) 842-4896
No. 14-___

Petitioner,
v.
Respondent.
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 29, 2015, three (3) copies of PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI in the above-captioned case was served, as required by U.S. Supreme Court Rule
29.5(c), on the following:
DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.
Solicitor General of the United States
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Room 5614
Washington, DC 20530-0001
(202) 514-2203
The following email addresses have also been served electronically:
supremectbriefs@usdoj.gov
ALAN SMITH
WILSON-EPES PRINTING COMPANY, INC.
775 H Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 789-0096
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 29th day of April 2015.
CHRISTOPHER R. DORSEY
NOTARY PUBLIC
District of Columbia
My commission expires July 31, 2018.
No. 14-1305
IN THE

v.
Petitioner,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pro se
HUMBLE, TEXAS
(281) 540-2255
June 30, 2015
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. (202) 789-0096 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of authorities ................................................... V
Petition for rehearing ................................................. 1
Procedural summary .................................................. 2
I. Certain evidence, newly discovered as
overbearing that being used against
Petitioner as proof of jurisdiction (the
1997 Form 1040), constitutes substantial
grounds not previously presented that
affect the appeals courts authority to
affirm the district courts judgment
against Petitioner .............................................. 3
Two different sovereign authorities,
each with its own particular geographic
area in which it exercises supreme
political power ................................................ 4
Congress have no authority to alter
the Constitution by ordinary act
(statute) .......................................................... 6
Basic rules of statutory construction ......... 6
Congress effectively alter the
Constitution by ordinary act ......................... 6
Only citizens or residents of the
District of Columbia are of the subject
of Title 26 U.S.C. ............................................ 7
Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty:
nonresident aliens re the Title 26
U.S.C. geographical United States
(District of Columbia) .................................... 7
POTUS William Howard Taft reveals
the legislative intent behind the 16th
Amendment: an income tax upon the
National Government .................................... 8
(I)
II
Page
Nonresident aliens who are not part
of the National Government are not of
the subject of the revenue laws of the
United States and have no duty to
make an income tax return ........................... 8
American nonresident aliens (Joint
Tenants in the Sovereignty) may elect
to be treated as a resident of the Title
26 U.S.C. United States (District of
Columbia) and make themselves liable
to Federal income tax..................................... 9
II. Because Joint Tenants in The Sovereignty
(nonresident aliens) are not inherently
liable to federal income tax but may elect
to make themselves so: (a) the duty to file
a tax return is not a jurisdictional
obligation but a contractual one, and (b)
petitioners apparent consent (election) to
be treated as a resident of the title
26 U.S.C. United States (District Of
Columbia) was given by mistake (no
meeting of the minds) and obtained by
the Internal Revenue Service through
fraud. ................................................................ 11
Universal contract law ............................. 11
Nature of Federal income taxes ............... 13
Conclusion ................................................................. 14
III
Page
Appendix:
Appendix A Opposition to request for
entry of default, motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
(Mar. 19, 2014) .............................. 1a
Appendix B District court (written) order
to enter in evidence a taxreturn example
(Management Order)
(Apr. 7, 2014) ................................ 9a
Appendix C District court (verbal) order to
file in evidence a tax-return
example (Hearing)
(Apr. 7, 2014) .............................. 10a
Appendix D United States court-ordered
supplement (IRS Form 1040
for 1997)
(Apr. 14, 2014) ............................ 14a
Appendix E Amended opposition to motion
for summary judgment,
amended motion to dismiss
(Apr. 29, 2014) ............................ 35a
Appendix F Appellants appeal brief
(Aug. 18, 2014) ............................ 40a
Appendix G Appellants appeal brief
(Aug. 18, 2014) ............................ 44a
Appendix H Amended opposition to motion
(Apr. 29, 2014) ............................ 47a
IV
Page
Appendix I
Amended opposition to motion

(Apr. 29, 2014) ............................
Appendix J Amended opposition to motion
(Apr. 29, 2014) ............................
Appendix K Amended opposition to motion
(Apr. 29, 2014) ............................
Appendix L Affidavit in support of
(Apr. 29, 2014) ............................
52a
64a
73a
76a
V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Page(s)
Chisholm v Georgia,
2 U.S. 419 (1793) .............................................. 4
Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 265,
5 L.Ed., 257 (1821) ........................................... 5
Julliard v. Greenman,
110 U.S. 421 (1884) .......................................... 5
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U. S. 137 (1803) ............................................. 6
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886) .......................................... 4
Constitutional provisions:
Art. 1 8, cl. 17 .................................................... 5
Art. 4 3, cl. 2 ...................................................... 5
Statutory provisions:
26 U.S.C. ..................................................... passim
26 U.S.C. Chapter 1 .......................................... 13
26 U.S.C. Chapter 24 ........................................ 13
26 U.S.C. 6013 ..................................................... 9
26 U.S.C. 7701 ..................................................... 7
26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) ...................................... 7, 13
31 U.S.C. 321(d)................................................. 13
Cal. Civ. Code 1550 ........................................... 11
Cal. Civ. Code 1565 ........................................... 12
Cal. Civ. Code 1567 ........................................... 12
VI
Page(s)
26 C.F.R. 1.871-1 ................................................. 9
26 C.F.R. 1.6013-1 ............................................. 10
26 C.F.R. 1.6013-6 ............................................. 10
Rule:
Sup. Ct. R. 44.2 ............................................. 3, 15
Miscellaneous:
44 Cong. Rec. 3344 (June 16, 1909) .................... 8
Constitution for the United States of
America, March 4, 1789 ................................... 4
John Bouvier, Bouviers Law Dictionary,
Third Revision (Being the Eighth
Edition), revised by Francis Rawle
(West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn.:
1914) ........................................................... 3, 13
Michael L. White, Att., Office of the
Federal Register, Letter to Richard
Durjak (May 16, 1994) ..................................... 8
The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen
united States of America of July 4, 1776 ........ 4
IN THE
No. 14-1305

v.
Petitioner,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
When plaintiff United States omits for 19 days

to enter in evidence, proof of jurisdiction over the
property of petitioner John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
(Petitioner) following Petitioners March 19, 2014,
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (Appendix,
App., 1a), the district judge on April 7, 2014, sua
sponte, (a) commands the United States via written
order, that The United States must promptly give the
court one of the objectionable tax returns (App., 9a),
and (b) verbally instructs the United States, I want you
just to file it [one of Petitioners 1040s] * * * (App., 10a).
2
Thereafter, on April 14, 2014, the United States
files a copy of Petitioners signed Form 1040, U.S.
Individual Income Tax Return for 1997 (the 1997 Form
1040) (App., 14a). The court then issues on May 2,
2014, an order denying Petitioners March 19, 2014,
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
As recently confirmed by Petitioner and documented
herein: The 1997 Form 1040 is the only evidence
relating to jurisdiction in the record of the case.
Notwithstanding the foregoing: The 1997 Form 1040
is reduced to mere prima facie / presumptive evidence
and shown to be insufficient as proof of jurisdiction
when reconciled with certain other material evidence
in the record of this case, infra.
For these reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests a
rehearing and reversal of the order entered by the
Court June 8, 2015, denying the Petition. Specifically:
Petitioner requests an order granting, vacating, and
remanding to (GVR) and instructing the Fifth
Circuit to remand to the district court for an order
reversing and dismissing, with prejudice, the
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
ordering the removal of all liens and payment of such
damages, compensation, and reparation to which
Petitioner may be entitled, and for such further relief
as the Court may deem proper.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
When the Fifth Circuit affirms on February 3, 2015,
the order of the district court, Petitioner, believing
there is no evidence of jurisdiction in the record, timely
files, on April 29, 2015, the Petition.
3
Non refert quid notum sit judici, si notum non
sit in forma judici. It matters not what is known
to the judge, if it is not known to him judicially.
John Bouvier, Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third
Revision (Being the Eighth Edition), revised
by Francis Rawle (West Publishing Co.:
St. Paul, Minn.: 1914) (hereinafter Bouviers Law
Dictionary), p. 2150.
On or about June 8, 2015, however, Petitioner
discovers why the district judge, sua sponte, ordered
the United States to file the 1997 Form 1040 into the
record: (a) Denial of Petitioners March 19, 2014, motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction could not be justified
without it, and (b) judgment in favor of the United
States, if appealed, could not be affirmed without it.
In light of these new grounds, this Courts denial of
the Petition works to deprive Petitioner of use of clear
and convincing evidence that demonstrates that the
1997 Form 1040 is insufficient as proof of jurisdiction.
I.
Certain Evidence, Newly Discovered As
Overbearing That Being Used Against
Petitioner As Proof Of Jurisdiction (The 1997
Form 1040), Constitutes Substantial Grounds
Not Previously Presented That Affect The
Appeals Courts Authority To Affirm The
District Courts Judgment Against Petitioner.
A rehearing of denial of a petition for a writ of
certiorari is appropriate when, as in this instance,
there are other substantial grounds not previously
presented. Sup. Ct. R. 44.2.
4
TWO DIFFERENT SOVEREIGN AUTHORITIES, EACH
WITH ITS OWN PARTICULAR GEOGRAPHIC AREA IN
WHICH IT EXERCISES SUPREME POLITICAL POWER
The author and source of law in America and creator

of Congress and the National Government, in whose
name and by whose authority Congress publish, on
July 4, 1776, The unanimous Declaration of the
thirteen united States of America, who ordain and
establish, on March 4, 1789, the Constitution for the
United States of America, and in whom all political
power inheres, i.e., the American People, are joint
tenants in the sovereignty (hereinafter the Joint
Tenants in the Sovereignty), in contradistinction to
Congress, who exercise sovereign authority as well,
but only in territory and other property belonging to
the United States; to wit:
The same feudal ideas run through all their
jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the
distinction between the Prince and the subject. No
such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the
sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are
truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are
sovereigns without subjects * * * and have none to
govern but themselves; the citizens of America are
equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in
the sovereignty. [Underline added.] Chisholm v
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793).
Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law,
for it is the author and source of law; but, in our
system, while sovereign powers are delegated
to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself
remains with the people, by whom and for whom
all government exists and acts. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
5
The Congress shall have Power * * * To exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever,
over such District * * * as may * * * become the
Seat of the Government of the United States,
and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased * * * for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; * * * U.S. Const., Article 1 8(17).
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States; * * * Id. at Article
4 3(2).
It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body,
exercise two species of legislative power: the one,
limited as to its objects, but extending all over
the Union: the other, an absolute, exclusive
legislative power over the District of Columbia.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434, 6 Wheat.
265, 5 L.Ed., 257, 277 (1821).
[T]here is no such thing as a power of inherent
sovereignty in the government of the United
States. It is a government of delegated powers,
supreme within its prescribed sphere but powerless outside of it. In this country, sovereignty
resides in the people, and Congress can exercise
no power which they have not, by their Constitution, entrusted to it; all else is withheld. * * *
Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 467 (1884).
6
CONGRESS HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO ALTER THE
CONSTITUTION BY ORDINARY ACT (STATUTE).
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that
the constitution controls any legislative act
repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter
the constitution by an ordinary act. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U. S. 137, 176 (1803).
BASIC RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Understanding the statutes of Congress is not

possible without application of the same basic rules
of statutory construction (App., 35a) used by Congress
and this Court to legislate the law into existence and
pronounce it thereafter (App., 40a).
When a word is given a limited and specific meaning
within a particular branch of study or area of knowledge, its ordinary definition is forfeit and, as a term,
no longer means what the dictionary says, only what
the special definition provides (App., 35a), and in that
particular branch of study or area of knowledge there
is no discretion to take the new term to mean anything
other than that which the new definition provides
(App., 44a and 47a).
CONGRESS EFFECTIVELY ALTER
THE CONSTITUTION BY ORDINARY ACT.
As of June 30, 1864; March 9, 1878 (retroactive
to December 1, 1873); and September 8, 1916, for
purposes of internal revenue, Congress transmute
the words state, State, and United States, respectively, into statutory terms via specific definition
whose meaning, upon standard application of the basic
rule of statutory construction known as expressio unius
est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of the one is the
7
exclusion of the other) (App., 35a), comprehends only
the District of Columbia and the territories /
Territories and excludes all of the commonwealths
united by and under authority of the Constitution and
admitted into the Union, the last of which being
Hawaii, August 21, 1959 (App., 52a). Since June 30,
1864, there is no statutory definition of state, State,
or United States that comprehends any aforesaid
commonwealth.
In the contemporary controlling definition of United
States in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9), standard application
of the same aforesaid rule of statutory construction
and one other, ejusdem generis (of the same kind)
(App., 35a), reveals that Congress define United
States in a geographical sense to mean the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and
no other thing (App., 64a).
ONLY CITIZENS OR RESIDENTS OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA ARE OF THE SUBJECT OF TITLE 26 U.S.C.
Whereas, the governments of the five aforesaid
insular territories impose their own income taxes and
withholding taxes on their own residents (App., 75a,
fn. 95), the only residents of the Title 26 U.S.C.
geographical United States who are of the subject of
Title 26 U.S.C. are those of the District of Columbia.
JOINT TENANTS IN THE SOVEREIGNTY: NONRESIDENT
ALIENS RE THE TITLE 26 U.S.C. GEOGRAPHICAL
UNITED STATES (DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)
Title 26 U.S.C. 7701 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) When used in this title * * *
8
(b) Definition of resident alien and nonresident
alien
(1) In general
* * * (B) Nonresident alien
An individual is a nonresident alien if such
individual is neither a citizen of the United
States [District of Columbia] nor a resident
of the United States [District of Columbia]
***
POTUS WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT REVEALS THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE 16TH AMENDMENT:
AN INCOME TAX UPON THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
I therefore recommend to the Congress that both
Houses, by a two-thirds vote, shall propose an
amendment to the Constitution conferring the
power to levy an income tax upon the National
Government without apportionment among the
States in proportion to population. [Underline
added.] Message from President of the United
States William Howard Taft to both Houses of
Congress, quoted by the Secretary of the Senate
and read into the Congressional Record (Senate),
44 Stat. 3344 (June 16, 1909).
NONRESIDENT ALIENS WHO ARE NOT PART OF THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ARE NOT OF THE SUBJECT
OF THE REVENUE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
HAVE NO DUTY TO MAKE AN INCOME TAX RETURN.
Our records indicate that the Internal Revenue
Service has not incorporated by reference in the
Federal Register (as that term is defined in
the Federal Register system) a requirement to
make an income tax return. Michael L. White,
9
Attorney, Office of the Federal Register, letter to
Richard Durjak, May 16, 1994.
AMERICAN NONRESIDENT ALIENS (JOINT TENANTS
IN THE SOVEREIGNTY) MAY ELECT TO BE TREATED
AS A RESIDENT OF THE TITLE 26 U.S.C. UNITED
STATES (DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA) AND MAKE
THEMSELVES LIABLE TO FEDERAL INCOME TAX.
Title 26 C.F.R. 1.871-1 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Classes of aliens. For purposes of the income
tax, alien individuals are divided generally into
two classes, namely, resident aliens and nonresident aliens [Joint Tenants in the Sovereignty].
* * * [N]onresident alien [Joint Tenant in the
Sovereignty] individuals may elect, under section
6013 (g) or (h), to be treated as U.S. residents for
purposes of determining their income tax liability
under Chapters 1, 5, and 24 of the code. * * *
Because the following statute and regulations are
prefaced with the words In general, the provisions
thereof apply equally to all nonresident aliens (Joint
Tenants in the Sovereignty), not just those married to
a spouse who is a citizen or resident of the Title 26
U.S.C. United States (District of Columbia):
Title 26 U.S.C. 6013 provides, in pertinent part:
(g) Election to treat nonresident alien [Joint
Tenant in the Sovereignty] individual as resident
of the United States [District of Columbia]
(1) In general
A nonresident alien [Joint Tenant in the
Sovereignty] individual with respect to whom
this subsection is in effect for the taxable year
10
shall be treated as a resident of the United
States [District of Columbia]
(A) for purposes of chapter 1 for all of such
taxable year, and
(B) for purposes of chapter 24 (relating to
wage withholding) for payments of wages
made during such taxable year.
* * * (4) Termination of election
An election under this subsection shall
terminate at the earliest of the following times:
(A) Revocation * * *
If either taxpayer revokes the election * * *
(a) In general.
* * * (b) Nonresident alien [Joint Tenant in the
Sovereignty]. A joint return shall not be made if
either the husband or wife at any time during the
taxable year is a nonresident alien [Joint Tenant
in the Sovereignty], unless an election is in effect
for the taxable year under section 6013 (g) or (h) *
**
(a) Election for special treatment
(1) In general. Two individuals who are
husband and wife * * * may make an election
under this section * * * if * * * one spouse is a
citizen or resident of the United States
[District of Columbia] and the other spouse is
a nonresident alien [Joint Tenant in the
Sovereignty]. The effect of the election is that
* * * [the nonresident alien] spouse is treated
11
as a resident of the United States [District of
Columbia] for purposes of chapters 1, 5, and 24
and sections 6012, 6013, 6072, and 6091 of the
Code * * *
* * * (b) Termination of election
(1) Revocation.
* * * (ii) Revocation of the election is made by
filing a statement of revocation * * * by submitting it to the service center director with
whom was filed the most recent * * * return * * *
II.
Because Joint Tenants In The Sovereignty
(Nonresident Aliens) Are Not Inherently Liable
To Federal Income Tax But May Elect To Make
Themselves So: (A) The Duty To File A Tax
Return Is Not A Jurisdictional Obligation But A
Contractual One, And (B) Petitioners Apparent
Consent (Election) To Be Treated As A Resident
Of The Title 26 U.S.C. United States (District Of
Columbia) Was Given By Mistake (No Meeting
Of The Minds) And Obtained By The Internal
Revenue Service Through Fraud.
UNIVERSAL CONTRACT LAW
Universal contract law and, in pertinent part,

California Civil Code provide:
1550.
It is essential to the existence of a contract that
there should be:
1. Parties capable of contracting;
2. Their consent;
12
3. Lawful object; and,
4. A sufficient cause or consideration.
* * * 1565.
The consent of the parties to a contract must be:
1. Free;
2. Mutual; and,
3. Communicated by each to the other.
* * * 1567.
An apparent consent is not real or free when
obtained through:
1. Duress;
2. Menace;
3. Fraud;
4. Undue influence; or
5. Mistake.
Petitioners October 15, 1998-notarized DISCLAIMER STATEMENT DENYING ANY TAX
LIABILITY (App., 28a-34a) (the Disclaimer Statement) is evidence that Petitioners apparent election
to be treated as a resident of the Title 26 U.S.C. United
States by way of the 1997 Form 1040 (App., 16a-17a),
was made unwittingly by mistake and obtained by the
Internal Revenue Service through fraud on the part of
Internal Revenue Agent Roy Fite.
Regarding alleged liability to Federal income taxes:
(a) Petitioners Affidavit in Support of Amended
Motion to Dismiss (App., 76a) (the Affidavit)
is conclusive evidence that Petitioner never freely
consented or elected to be treated as a resident of the
13
Title 26 U.S.C. United States (District of Columbia) for
purposes of chapters 1 and 24 of Title 26 U.S.C. for
taxable year 1997, and (b) proof that the exclusive
object of the controlling Title 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9)
definition of United States is the District of Columbia,
appears in Petitioners April 29, 2014, amended objection and motion to dismiss (App., 65a-72a) appended
to the Affidavit.
NATURE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES
Title 31 U.S.C. 321(d) provides:

(1) The Secretary of the Treasury may accept,
hold, administer, and use gifts and bequests of
property, both real and personal, for the purpose
of aiding or facilitating the work of the
Department of the Treasury. * * *
(2) For purposes of the Federal income, estate,
and gift taxes, property accepted under paragraph
(1) shall be considered as a gift or bequest to or for
the use of the United States.
Nemo agit in seipsum. No man acts against himself
(Bouviers Law Dictionary, p. 2146), and, as shown
hereinabove, Petitioner never knowingly, willingly,
intentionally, deliberately, or voluntarily intended or
consented or elected to obligate himself to make gifts
or bequests of his property, real or personal, in perpetuity for the purpose of aiding or facilitating the work
of the Department of the Treasury.
The 1997 Form 1040, when reconciled with (a) the
Disclaimer Statement is contradicted and reduced to
mere presumptive evidence, and (b) the Affidavit
is rendered inconclusive / insufficient as evidence of
14
Petitioners consent / election to be treated as a resident of the Title 26 U.S.C. United States (District of
Columbia).
CONCLUSION
Petitioners recent discovery, after 26 years of
searching, that (a) Petitioner is deemed to have elected
(consented) to be treated as a resident of the
District of Columbia, a.k.a. United States, by reason
of the making of an income tax return, and (b) the
hereinabove-cited evidence demonstrating that Petitioner never wittingly so elected (consented), are
substantial grounds not previously presented that
affect the authority of the Fifth Circuit to affirm the
judgment of the district court of first instance.
For these reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests
that the Court grant a rehearing and issue a GVR
order to the Fifth Circuit with instructions substantially as initially requested hereinabove.
/s/

Pro se
HUMBLE, TEXAS
(281) 540-2255
June 30, 2015
APPENDIX
1a
APPENDIX A
HOUSTON DIVISION
[Filed: March 19, 2014]
Civil No. 4:14-cv-00027

v.
Plaintiff,

Defendants.
DEFENDANTS OPPOSITION TO UNITED

STATES REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT;
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECTMATTER JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OVER
THE PROPERTY UPON WHICH THE UNITED
STATES SEEKS TO FORECLOSE ITS LIEN;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

attorney, to thank this Honorable Court for its
observance of the enunciation of principles as stated
in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, re the pleadings of
those unschooled in law and the Courts construction
of the prior submission by Defendant JOHN PARKS
2a
TROWBRIDGE, JR., (the Defendant) in this case,
and, pursuant to 28 USC 3002(15)(A), the doctrine of
estoppel by matter of record, the filings and evidence
entered in the record of this case, and Rules 12(b)(1)
and (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to move
the Court to deny United States Request for Entry of
Default against Freedom Ventures UBO and dismiss
the Complaint of the Plaintiff for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction of the Court.
In support of this Motion, Defendant would show the
Court the attached Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, made fully part hereof and included
herein by reference as though set forth in full.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays the Court:
1. That the cause of the Plaintiff be dismissed for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over the
property upon which the United States seeks to
foreclose its lien;
2. That the cost of this action be taxed against the
Plaintiff; and
3. For such other and further relief that the Court
may deem just and fair.
DATE: March 19, 2014
Humble, Texas
(281) 540-2255
3a
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES
The court, in United States of America v. William M.
Slater (D. Delaware) 545 F.Supp. 179, 182 (1982), stated,
in pertinent part:
Slaters protestations to the effect that he derives
no benefit from the United States government have
no bearing on his legal obligation to pay income
taxes. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 44 S.Ct. 444,
68 L.Ed. 895 (1924); Benitez Rexach v. United
States, 390 F.2d 631 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 393
U.S. 833, 89 S.Ct. 103, 21 L.Ed.2d 103 (1968).
Unless the defendant can establish that he is not
a citizen of the United States, the IRS possesses
authority to attempt to determine his federal tax
liability. [Emphasis added.]
Title 26 CFR provides, in pertinent part:
1.1-1 Income tax on individuals.
(a) General rule.
(1) Section 1 of the [Internal Revenue] Code
imposes an income tax on the income of every
individual who is a citizen or resident of the
United States . . . [U/L emphasis added.]
Title 5 USC Government Organization and Employees
552a Records maintained on individuals, provides,
in pertinent part:
(a) Definitions.For purposes of this section . . .
(1) the term agency means agency as defined
in section 552(e) [sic] [1] of this title;
To the best of Defendants knowledge, the definition of the
term agency referenced in 5 USC 552a(a)(1) as defined in
1
4a
(2) the term individual means a citizen of the
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence;
(3) the term maintain includes maintain, collect, use, or disseminate;
(4) the term record means any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including,
but not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual, such as
a finger or voice print or a photograph; . . .
[Emphasis added.]
Title 5 USC Government Organization and Employees
552 Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders,
records, and proceedings provides, in pertinent part:
(f) For purposes of this section, the term
(1) agency as defined in section 551(1) of this
title includes any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government
controlled corporation, or other establishment in
the executive branch of the Government (including
the Executive Office of the President), or any
independent regulatory agency; and . . .
Wherefore, the (1) February 4, 2014, Conditional
Acceptance and Demand for Proof by Defendant
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR. (hereinafter the
Defendant), construed by the Court as Defendants
section 552(e) of this title, rather is found in section 552(f)
thereof.
5a
Answer to the instant lawsuit, and (2) Defendants
March 11, 2014, Notice of Plaintiffs Failure to
Demonstrate Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant or
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over the Property upon
which the United States seeks to Foreclose its Lien,
evidence of each of which is filed in the record of this
case, establish that Defendant is neither a citizen or
resident of the United States nor an individual nor one
with a federal tax liability.
Plaintiff United States of America (the Plaintiff),
in 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint, alleges, among other
things, that Defendant, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.,
resides within the jurisdiction of this Court. Title
28 USC Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Chapter
176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure provides, in
pertinent part of Subchapter A thereof:
3002. Definitions
As used in this chapter: . . .
(15) United States means
(A) a Federal corporation; . . .
(B) an agency, department, commission, board,
or other entity of the United States; or
(C) an instrumentality of the United States.
Because the meaning of the definition of the term
United States in parts (B) and (C) of subsection (15)
of 28 USC 3002 is ambiguous unless the definition in
part (A) is applied, the controlling definition of United
States in Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure
of Title 28 is 3002(15)(A) and the jurisdiction of
the Court alleged by Plaintiff in 4 of the instant
Complaintwhich is an action to collect an alleged
Federal debtin matters pertaining to the United
States, extends only to Federal corporations, such as
6a
the ultimate parent Federal corporation, the District
of Columbia.2
There is no evidence that Defendant is a citizen or
resident of a Federal corporation and Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate that Defendant resides within
the jurisdiction of the Courtdespite Defendants offer
to discharge in full the debt alleged in this matter
upon demonstration of the factualness of Plaintiffs
express and implied jurisdictional claims.
Regarding the subject matter of the instant action:
In 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Plaintiff names Freedom
Ventures UBO (Freedom Ventures) as a party to
the instant action as required by 26 USC 7403(b),
because Freedom Ventures has or may claim an interest
in the property upon which the United States seeks to
foreclose its liennot because of any alleged federal
tax liability of Freedom Ventures.
Plaintiff alleges by implication in 15-18 of Plaintiffs
Complaint that the contract between Defendant and
Freedom Ventures by which ownership of the property
upon which the United States seeks to foreclose its
lien, namely the real property located at 25117 Ramrock
Drive, Porter, Texas, and referred to therein and hereinafter as the Porter property, is spurious and that,
Columbia, Ch. 62, Sec. 18, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later
for the District of Columbia, Ch. 180, Sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June
11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation
(brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of
March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878, i.e., Sec. 2
of the Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District
of Columbia . . . 187374); as amended by the Act of June 28,
1935, 49 Stat. 430, ch. 332, Sec. 1 (Title 1, Section 102, District of
Columbia Code (1940)).
2
7a
notwithstanding transfer of ownership of the Porter
Property from Defendant to Freedom Ventures and
registration thereof with the Montgomery County
Clerks Office, said transfer of property should be set
aside as void with respect to the United States and
the federal tax liens against the defendant, John
Parks Trowbridge, Jr., should be foreclosed upon the
Porter property and the Porter property should be
sold free and clear of all rights, titles, claims, and
interests of the parties, and the proceeds of the sale
should be distributed according to law (in satisfaction
of, or set-off against, Defendants alleged federal tax
liability).
Estoppel by matter of record is defined as:
Estoppel by matter of record. An estoppel founded
upon matter of record; as a confession or admission
made in pleading in a court of record, which precludes the party from afterwards contesting the
same fact in the same suit. Steph. Pl. 197. [Blacks
Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. Estoppel]
Wherefore, Plaintiff is estopped from denying that
the Porter property is (1) the property of Defendants,
or (2) not the property of Freedom Ventures by reason
of the doctrine of estoppel by matter of record.
Whereas, there is no evidence in the record of this
case that demonstrates that Defendant is one who (1) is
a citizen or resident of the United States, (2) resides
within the jurisdiction of the Court, or (3) has a federal
tax liability, there can be no evidence of jurisdiction
over Defendants property, i.e., the Porter property, the
subject matter of Plaintiffs Complaint.
8a
Rules 12(b)(1) and (2) of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure authorize the Court to dismiss this case for
lack of jurisdiction; to wit:
(b) How to Present Defenses. Every defense to a
claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted
in the responsive pleading if one is required. But
a party may assert the following defenses by motion:
(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;
(2) lack of personal jurisdiction;
WHEREFORE: Defendant respectfully moves the
Court to dismiss the instant action for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.
DATE: March 19, 2014
9a
APPENDIX B
[Filed: 04/07/14]

Plaintiff,
versus
Defendants.
Management Order
1. By April 28, 2014, John P. Trowbridge, Jr., and
Freedom Ventures, UBO, must respond to the
United States of Americas motion for judgment.
2. The United States must promptly give the court
one of the objectionable tax returns.
Signed on April 7, 2014, at Houston, Texas.
/s/
Lynn N. Hughes
Lynn N. Hughes
10a
APPENDIX C
[1] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
HOUSTON DIVISION
Civil No. H-14-0027
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

versus
Houston, Texas
April 7, 2014
9:50 a.m.
HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LYNN N. HUGHES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
For the United States:

Mr. Joshua David Smeltzer
United States Department of Justice,
Tax Division
717 N. Harwood Street
Suite 400
Dallas, Texas 75201
For the Defendant:
Mr. John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
25117 Ramrock Dr.
Porter, Texas 77365
PRO SE
11a
Court Reporter:
Fred Warner
Official Court Reporter
515 Rusk Avenue
Houston, Texas 77002
Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, produced by computer-aided transcription.
* * * *
[15] UBO? What is that?
MR. TROWBRIDGE:
organization.
Unincorporated
business
THE COURT: Ah.

MR. TROWBRIDGE: Thank you.
THE COURT: Are you supposed to put that there?
MR. SMELTZER: I dont know.
THE COURT: I mean, its fine. I just wasnt familiar
with that. Under the benefit of, and then theres
nothing else.
Do you have a copy of one of these objectionable tax
returns?
MR. SMELTZER: I do not have them on me right
now, but I can get one for Your Honor.
THE COURT: So its the governments position that
he reported all the taxes and then just said it doesnt
apply to me?
MR. SMELTZER: I know that he reported amounts
owed and then attached a statement saying that it was
actually zero for the reasons
THE COURT: No. I understand that.
12a
MR. SMELTZER: I dont have it in front of me, so I
couldnt tell whether or not full amounts were done or
not.
THE COURT: Well, I would like just to see an exemplar. Just pick whatever the Service thinks is the most
[16] egregious statement.
You know, your client often attacks people for writing screw you on a form and things like that.
MR. SMELTZER: I dont believe that was written.
THE COURT: And there is, in the same book with
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixteenth Amendment.
There is a First Amendment that says we can say
anything we want to. That does not impede the collection of the tax. It hurt some clerks feelings.
And sometimes they write without prejudice under
the signature.
I had a case, a guy claimed that it wasnt a return
and I said it was a returnso they couldnt get him for
failure to file a return. It was signed.
If he had written without Thursdays garbage
under his signature, it doesnt have any affect.
So I just want to make sure that your client didnt
get thuggy on us.
MR. SMELTZER: All right, Your Honor. We didnt
include those just because we didnt feel we needed to,
but I can get a copy.
THE COURT: Well, just one.
MR. SMELTZER: I will.
THE COURT: And just the 1040, the first couple
of pages of it, plus whatever attachment that would
affect [17] liability.
13a
MR. SMELTZER: All right.
Would you like me to attach that and to reply?
THE COURT: No. I want you just to file it, and
redact his address and social security. Well, his name
is already on the case, so . . .
MR. SMELTZER: We have redacted all social security numbers but for the last four, and the street address is on the supplement.
THE COURT: Okay. Do that. Just file one as
MR. SMELTZER: A supplement.
THE COURT: the attachment the Court ordered.
MR. SMELTZER: Will do.
THE COURT: I just want to see what one looks like.
All right. Do you have any questions?
MR. SMELTZER: I do not, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Well, youll hear from me
sometime after the 28th.
And if you move, please tell me, because I dont want
to have to find you. And believe me, I had a fellow that
had not shown up as he was ordered to for the third
time. And they went by his office, and while they were
there, he called and the secretary gave the Marshals
the phone, and he explained to the fellow why they
were there.
And the man repeated, so youre like police;
* * * *
14a
APPENDIX D
HOUSTON DIVISION
[Filed: 04/14/14]
Civil No. 4:14-cv-0027

Plaintiff,
v.
FREEDOM VENTURES, UBO, and
Defendants.
UNITED STATES COURT ORDERED

SUPPLEMENT
Pursuant to the Courts April 7, 2014, Order (Dkt. #21),
the United States submits one of the objectionable tax
returns (Form 1040 for 1997) as an example of the
returns discussed by the Tax Court when upholding
deficiencies against Mr. Trowbridge for the tax years
at issue (i.e. 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997). The
objectionable return example is attached to this supplement as Government Exhibit F.1
This exhibit continues the exhibit numbers contained in the

United States Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. #19.)
1
15a
As discussed by the United States in its motion for
summary judgment (Dkt. #19), the tax deficiencies
were upheld by the Tax Court for all the years at issue
in this lawsuit. (Dkt. #19 at Gov. Exs. C-1 and C-2.) As
part of both decisions, the Tax Court noted that Trowbridge filed returns containing a disclaimer indicating
zero tax liability. (Dkt. #19 at Gov. Ex. C-1 at 5 and
Gov. Ex. C-2 at 7.) The Tax Court quoted a portion of
Trowbridges disclaimer as follows:
[14-20333.222]
28a
DISCLAIMER STATEMENT DENYING
ANY TAX LIABILITY
AN ATTACHMENT TO and incorporated as part of
Form 1040 -- Calendar Year 1997
John Parks Trowbridge identifying number xxx3513
Over the past several years, I have attempted to
obtain the assistance of the agency to be certain of
(1) my compliance with any mandatory filing requirements, and of (2) their compliance with relevant
federal laws governing notice and procedural
requirements, any lack of which would prejudice my
rights to due process under original jurisdiction and
further deny me valuable administrative remedies.
Hale v. Hinkel, 201 U.S. 43; Long v. Rasmussen, 281
F2d. 236; Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196; In re: Oliver,
333 U.S. 257; U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542; Burkes
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471; U.S. v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389;
Lojeski v. IRS, 788 F2d. 196; Supervisors Rock Island
Co. V. U.S. ex rel State Bank, 71 US (4 Wall) 435.
Specifically, I have filed a number of written requests,
since August 1992, with local, district, and service
center officers, including several with the District
Director, asking for a written determination of my
filing status for tax purposes prior to filing a report or
return, pursuant to Internal Revenue Manual Policies
P-(11)-23, P-1-156, P-1-179, P-1-180, and IRM
3(17)(46)1.5(2) and (3); 26 USC 7801, 7802, and 7805;
26 CFR 601.201(a)(1)(3); 26 CFR 601.102(0(1); 26 CFR
31.3306(1)1; 5 USC 552a(e), 5 USC 556(d). U.S. v.
Tweet, 500 F2d. 299; Spreckles Sugar Refining Co. v.
McClain, 192 U.S. 397; U.S. v. James L. Tenzer, 950
FSupp 554; U.S. v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741; Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528; Stanard v. Olesen, 74 S.Ct. 768;
Yench v. Stockmar, 483 F2d. 820; Lebold v. Inland
29a
Steel Co., 125 F2d. 369; Walling v. LaBelle SS Co., 148
F2d 198.
Mr. Roy Fite, acting as an agent, in September 1996
purported to provide to me the District Directors
response in consideration of my circumstances: a
determination that completion and submission of
Form 1040 is mandatory for me as an American
citizen, performing as a private independent contractor in the private sector. Despite my repeated
requests, I have never received the requested written
letter that clarifies the bases for such filing being
determined as mandatory. Neither have I been
answered regarding the exact taxing statute(s) and
federal regulations for each particular tax that would
set forth the proper procedures to insure correct
completion of the ordered mandatory compliance in
my circumstances. In my many letters to the agency, I
specifically raised, under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, questions regarding jurisdiction and
application of statutes and regulations pertaining to
notice, filing status, and voluntary payments, as these
issues are governed by Articles Four, Five, Thirteen,
and Fourteen in Amendment (1789). I have made
every attempt to comply in good faith with my
understanding of the agents directive. I remain
concerned that my many attempts to request
clarification letters, and administrative hearings, and
appeals hearings have been denied in clear violation of
procedural (and substantive) due process. 26 USC
sections 7430(c)(4)(B)(ii) and (iii)(I) and (iii)(II).
[Page 1 of 3]
[14-20333.238]
30a
I am fearful of the very real possibility that my filing
compliance has been engineered in violation of notice
and due process through mistake or misunderstanding, mischief or menace, errors or omissions, or even
fraudulent (or missing) determinations or record
entries, missing or incomplete or even fraudulent
Form 2866 document authentications, incorrect or
invalid or inappropriate or missing entries on
computerized records (including, but not limited to,
the agency Individual Master File), unreasonable
interpretations, or inadvertent or intentional violations of statutes, regulations, policies, or procedural
requirements, all of which would be subject to judicial
review. U.S. v. Community TV Inc., 327 F2d. 797; IRM
HB 4233 (06-14-94); 26 CFR 601.106(f)(1); 26 USC
6001, 26 CFR 301.6001-1, 26 CFR 301.6011-1, 26 CFR
1.61-1; U. S. v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431; Commissioner v.
Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614; U. S. v. Shaunessey 347 US 260
(1954); Lofeski v. Boandl, 788 F2d 196 (CA3 1986);
International House v. National Labor Relations
Board, 676 F2d 906 (CA2 1982); Vandermolen v.
Stetson, 571 F2d 617 (1977); Connecticut Lighting and
Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 673 F2d
525, cert den 107 Sct 79 (1982); U. S. v. James L
Tenzer, 950 FSupp 544; Montilla v. INS, 926 F2d 167;
U. S. v. Caceres, 440 US 741; Lansons Inc. v. C.I.R.,
662 F2d 776 (1980); and also Botany Mills v. U. S., 73
LEd 379; U. S. v. Taylor, 305 F2d 187; IRM 3-31-83,
Part I, Chapter 4200, Section 4240(b).
Since I am neither a lawyer nor an accountant, my
studies over the years have been circuitous, frustrating, and often confusing, sometimes leading to
contradictory conclusions. I understand there are now
over 110 taxing statutes in the IRC, and over 50 of
them are under Subtitle A. I cannot be familiar with
the constantly changing scope of the applicable
31a
statutes, the regulations, the internal agency procedures, and the relevant court cases; thus, I must look
first to and rely upon the agency to assist and advise
me correctly and pursuant to statute, regarding my
status for mandatory filings and any tax liability,
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and to
attempt to resolve any differences by requesting
administrative hearings and appeals procedures. U.S.
v. General Dynamics Corp., 828 F2d. 1356; Lansons
Inc. v. C.I.R., 662 F2d. 774; Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616;
Endecott v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501; U.S. v. Mobil Corp.,
543 F Supp 507; Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 US
614, 626-7.
Solely in reliance on the instruction issued by Mr.
Fite and in the expectation that the agency has
thereby made a correct determination and directive
that filing a Form 1040 is a compelled testimony and
is not voluntary I have made a good faith effort,
limited by my total lack of response despite repeated
requests and appeals to the agency, to order this Form
1040 prepared for my signature and submission as
compelled. In taking this action, I am without any
intention of inadvertently or erroneously (1) applying
the wrong statutes or the wrong regulations, or
(2) making an 871(d)(1)(B) election, or (3) making any
voluntary filing that is not required of me upon
demonstration of the applicable taxing statutes and
their implementing regulations, or (4) waiving or
prejudicing any of my procedural or other rights under
original jurisdiction. I am acting in good faith, and my
[Page 2 of 3] [14-20333.239] protests and requests for
administrative and appeals hearings do not reflect or
mirror any of the sections listed as a tax protestor
under the Internal Revenue Manual or applicable
court decisions. Without the agency having provided
me with notice of the actual taxing statute (and, thus,
32a
the applicable regulations for each particular tax), my
good faith effort to prepare and submit a return in a
fashion which comports to law in all respects and
without any error has been fatally compromised. Fed.
Crop. Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380; Brady v. U.S.,
397 U.S. 742; U.S. v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179; Guardian
T & D Co. v. Fisher, 26 S.Ct. 186; 4 USC 110(e); Botta
v. Scanlon, 288 F2d. 504; Edwards v. Keith, 231 F. 100;
Wright v. U. S., 302 U.S. 583; Garner v. Fuller, 1994
US Dist LEXIS 16403, 74 AFTR 2d (P-H) 6971; Peck
v. U. S., 1995 US Dist LEXIS 17606, 76 AFTR 2d (PH) 7499; U. S. v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39.
My best understanding is that the assessment and
payment of income taxes is voluntary with no distraint.
Flora v. U.S., 362 U.S. 145, 4 L.Ed. 2d 623, 80 S.Ct.
630; Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 82 L.Ed. 917,
58 S.Ct. 630. I respectfully decline to volunteer
concerning assessment and payment of any tax balance
appearing to be due on the return, filed under protest
and without prejudice, or any redetermination of said
tax. Be it known that I hereby deny any tax liability
and do not admit that the stated amount of tax on
return, as calculated solely by reference to provided
tables, is due and collectible. Continental Accounting
and Audit Co., 2 BTA 761 (1925); Moir, John, 3 BTA
21 (1925); The General Explanation of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, p.
372, Federal Tax Practice, Casey, Section 2.7. The tax
return read as a whole shows no amount as being the
tax and shows the tax to be zero and zero is the
starting point in determining a deficiency or any other
action involving this return. Kearney v. AHearn, 210
F. Supp. 10; 26 USC 6213, Federal Tax Practice,
Casey, Section 2.4; 26 USC 6213(a), Federal Tax
Practice, Casey, Section 2.5. (See also attached Exhibit
A, section 1-3618 of the Federal Tax Coordinator 2d
33a
8/92, p. 50,253.) I have provided payment in the
amount of $100.00 as a voluntary contribution,
without prejudice and with reservation of all my
fundamental and procedural rights, under original
jurisdiction. 26 USC sections 6213(b)(1), 6213(b)(2)(A),
6213(b)(2)(B), and 6213(b)(2)(A); Federal Tax Practice,
Casey, Section 2.7, 2.7(a); 26 USC 6213(b)(2) and
Bothke v. Fluor Engineers and Constructors, Inc., 713
F2d 1405; Texaco Inc. v. Short, 454 US 545-6; U. S. v.
Mobil Corp., 82-1 USTC 9242 at 83; IRM HB 4233 (0614-94).
John Parks Trowbridge
John Parks Trowbridge
Notary to verify
signature: Kathryn L. Krenzke
Date 10/15/98
Date 10/15/98
[Seal]
Kathryn L. Krenzke
My Commission Expires
April 20, 2002
[Page 3 of 3]
[14-20333.240]
34a
Exhibit A
Federal Tax Coordinator:
Taxes Reported on the Taxpayers Return
T-3618 Assessment of tax reported on the
taxpayers return.
IRS must assess all taxes determined by the taxpayer or IRS to which returns are made. (9)
However, IRS cant assess the tax shown on a return
if taxpayer disclaims liability for the tax by a statement on the return or filed with it. In that event, the
tax liability admitted by the return is zero. Hence no
tax is assessable on the basis of the return. Any tax
claimed by IRS in excess of the liability admitted on
the return is a deficiency. (10)
Any failure by IRS to comply with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 86 (PRA)
doesnt preclude IRS from determining and assessing
an income tax liability, including additions to tax and
penalties against a taxpayer. Thus, the Ninth Circuit
declined to inquire into taxpayers argument that he
was not required to file a Form 1040 because the form
did not comply with the requirements of the PRA (specifically, that his Form 1040 allegedly displayed the
wrong OMB control number.) (11)
(9)
Code Sec. 6201(a)(1)
(10)
Continental Accounting and Audit Co. (1925) 2 BTA 761;

Moir, John, (192510) 3 BTA 21.
(11)
Lucia, Flyod v. Com., 5/7/92, CA-9, 1992 US App Lexis

10835, affg TC Memo 1991-77.
[14-20333.241]
35a
APPENDIX E
HOUSTON DIVISION
Civil No. 4:14-cv-00027

v.
Plaintiff,

Defendants.


36a
* * * *
For the next 75 years, state and its counterpart,
State, are words (common noun and proper noun,
respectively) as found in the dictionary, with a popular
and ordinary meaning that all Americans understand
as the basic building block of the United States of
America, i.e., one of the commonwealths united by and
under authority of the Constitution.
Whereas, a word is a vocal sound or combination of
vocal sounds that symbolizes and signifies an idea or
thought, a term or term of art is rather a word or group
of words, especially a technical word or expression,
with a restricted, precisely limited meaning; to wit:
word . . . A vocal sound or combination of vocal
sounds, used as a symbol to embody or signify an
idea or thought, especially a notion or conception,
and forming one of the elements of language; a
37a
single, independent utterance, forming usually a
constituent unit of a sentence ; vocable. . . .30
term . . . A word or expression used to express or
designate some fixed or definite thing ; a word
having a limited and specific meaning, naming
and characterizing some particular object,
quality, state, or the like ; especially, a technical
word or expression, as in the sciences, arts, trades,
and the like . . .31
t. of art, a term of specific sense in some specific
branch of study; a technical term.32
When a word is given a limited and specific meaning
within a particular branch of study or area of
knowledge, its ordinary definition is forfeit and, as a
term or term of art, no longer means what the
dictionary says, only what the restricted definition
provides.
When legislators, such as Congress, compose
statutes or provide via statute a definition of a
particular term, they can employ certain timeless and
universal rules and principles of statutory construction and interpretation that allow them to, among
other things, provide full and comprehensive meaning
for that term in the fewest possible words, thus
making statutes more manageable for one and all. The
principal rules and principles of statutory construction
and interpretation, though found piecemeal in most
law dictionaries, appear in tandem in the Oxford
Dictionary of Law; to wit, in pertinent part:
30
Funk & Wagnalls Dictionary, 1903 ed., s.v. Word.
31
Ibid, s.v. Term.
32
Ibid.
38a
The principal rules of statutory interpretation are as
follows:
(1) An Act must be construed as a whole, so that
internal inconsistencies are avoided.
(2) Words that are reasonably capable of only one
meaning must be given that meaning
whatever the result. This is called the literal
rule.
(3) Ordinary words must be given their ordinary
meanings and technical words their technical
meanings, unless absurdity would result.
This is the golden rule.
(4) When an Act aims at curing a defect in the
law any ambiguity is to be resolved in such a
way as to favour that aim (the mischief rule).
other domestic animals).
(the inclusion of the one is the exclusion of the
other): when a list of specific items is not
followed by general words it is to be taken as
exhaustive. For example, weekends and
public holidays excludes ordinary weekdays.
(7) The rule in pari materia (on the like matter):
when a prior Act is found to be on the like
matter it can be used as an aid in construing
the statute in question . . .
39a
(8) The rule noscitur a sociis (known by its
associates): when a word or phrase is of
uncertain meaning, it should be construed in
the light of the surrounding words . . .
Penal and taxing statutes are subject to
strict construction. . . .33
Regarding distinctions in the nature of states/States
of the Union vis--vis that of the District of Columbia
and the territories, the opinion of the Supreme Court
in Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445, 2 Cranch
445, 2 L. Ed. 332, provides:
ON CERTIFICATE OF DIVISION OF OPINION
OF THE JUDGES OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF THE DISTRICT OF
VIRGINIA
Syllabus
A citizen of the District of Columbia cannot
maintain an action in the circuit court of the
United States, not being a citizen of a state within
the meaning of the
* * * *

33
40a
APPENDIX F
[Filed: Aug. 19, 2014]
Case No. 14-20333

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT


PRO SE
Humble, Texas
Telephone (281) 540-2329
* * * *
41a
pronounce it thereafter; e.g.: It is presumable that
Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules
of statutory construction . . ., McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888,
112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991).
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Linguistic inference canons provide guidelines
about what the legislature likely meant, given its
choice of some words and not others. The linguistic inference canons include classic logical canons
such as expressio unius,42 noscitur a sociis,43 and
ejusdem generis.44 Other inferential rules encourage interpreters to follow the ordinary usage of
text unless the legislature has itself defined the
word or the phrase has acquired a technical meaning.45 Because dictionaries report common usage,
the dictionary rule supports consulting widely
used dictionary definitions of terms the legislature has not defined.46
[24. 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 65A:13,
at 797 (7th ed. 2008) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND].]
42. The inclusion of one thing indicates exclusion of
others. See Tate v. Ogg, 195 S.E. 496, 499 (Va. 1938)
(holding that where a statute applied to any horse, mule
cattle, hog, sheep or goat, it did not apply to turkeys); 2A
SUTHERLAND, supra note 24, 47:23, at 404 (7th ed. 2007)
(stating that where a list of things is designated, all
omissions should be understood as exclusions).
43. Literally, it is known from its associates, but more
usefully described as outlining the inference that ambiguous
words may be illuminated by the words grouped with it in a
statute. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 24, 47:16 (7th ed.
2007); see Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 305-07
(1961) (given the word string resulting from exploration,
discovery, or prospecting, the Court construed discovery
42a
to mean only discovery of mineral resources and to not
include scientific discoveries).
44. Meaning of the same kind and the touchstone for
inferences that particular words implicitly establish a class
of objects and that provision applies to that class. 2A
SUTHERLAND, supra note 24, 47:17 (7th ed. 2007); see
Heathman v. Giles, 374 P.2d 839, 839-40 (Utah 1962) (given
the word string any sheriff, constable, peace officer, state
road officer, or any other person charged with the duty of
enforcement of the criminal laws of this state, the court
held that prosecutors were not other person[s] charged
with the duty of enforcement of the criminal laws because
other person[s] is limited by the class described in the
initial word string).
45. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218,
228 (1994) (using ordinary usage canon to hold that the
Federal Communication Commissions authority to modify
tariff requirements does not allow it to waive tariffs because
[m]odify, in [the Courts] view, connotes moderate change
and stating that [i]t might be good English to say that the
French Revolution modified the status of the French
nobilitybut only because there is a figure of speech called
understatement and a literary device known as sarcasm).
46. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128
(1998) (consulting the Oxford English Dictionary, Websters
Third New International Dictionary, and Random House
Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged for the
meaning of the word carry); 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note
24, 46:2, at 162-64 (7th ed. 2007).9
Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of

Interpretation, The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 98, Issue 2,
January 2010, 352-353.]
9
43a
THE SUPREME COURT ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Deliberate congressional transmutation of the
words / proper nouns State and United States into
terms of art with a limited and specific meaning, however absurd in respect of the Constitution, nevertheless constitutes a clearly expressed legislative intention that the ordinary meaning, as found in the dictionary, is extrinsic to construction / interpretation of
the language of any statute in which they appear, and
that the statutory definition and meaning thereof
obtains exclusively; to wit:
As in all cases involving statutory construction,
our starting point must be the language employed
by Congress, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
337, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979),
and we assume that the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words
used. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9,
82 S.Ct. 585, 591, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962). Thus
[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention
to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive. Consumer Product Safety
Commn v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108,
100 S.Ct. 2051, 2055, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). . . .
American Tobacco Company v. John Patterson,
No. 80-1199, 456 U.S. 63, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 71 L.Ed.2d
748 (1982). (ROA.323).
* * * *
44a
APPENDIX G
[Filed: Aug. 19, 2014]
Case No. 14-20333

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT


PRO SE
Humble, Texas
Telephone (281) 540-2329
* * * *
45a
JUNE 30, 1864, MEANING OF THE TERM OF ART STATE
ordinary and popular meaning, unless they are technical terms or words of art, in which case they are
to be understood in their technical sense. . . . Henry
Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction
and Interpretation of the Laws (St. Paul, Minn.:
West Publishing Co., 1896), 57, 128. (ROA.308).
Table 1. Linguistic Inference Canons . . .
. . . Ordinary usage: Follow ordinary usage of terms,
unless the legislature gives them a specified or
technical meaning. . . .
Dictionary definition: Follow dictionary definitions of terms, unless the legislature has provided
a specific definition. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons
and the Common Law of Interpretation, The
Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 98, Issue 2, January
2010, 357.
Because Congress transform by statute the word
state into a technical term / term of art, in matters
of internal revenue no one may take it in any other
than its technical sense.
The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius (supra,
p. 26, SCOTT n. 42), applies in this instance and is
defined elsewhere, as well; to wit, in pertinent part:
47:23 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
As the maxim is applied to statutory interpretation, where . . . the persons or things to which it
refers are designated, there is an inference that
all omissions should be understood as exclusions.
The maxim does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping. It has force only when the items
expressed are members of an associated group or
46a
series, justifying the inference that the items not
mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice.
[Extensive footnoting of cases omitted.] Norman
J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and
Statutory Construction, 7th ed., 2007 new ed.,
vol. 2A, Thomson West, 398412. (ROA.306).
* * * *
47a
APPENDIX H
HOUSTON DIVISION
Civil No. 4:14-cv-00027

v.
Plaintiff,

Defendants.


48a
* * * *
All five essential elements necessary to constitute
an estoppel by conduct being present in the hereinabove-identified internal-revenue scheme, devised,
orchestrated, implemented, and perpetuated by Congress: Any American who, though politically ineligible
for enrollment and participation in the Social Security
retirement program of the Government of the United
States (Social Security) as a matter of law, by reason
of foreign domicil and foreign legal residence, nevertheless is induced to act upon, and relies and acts
upon, the acts, declarations, or silence of Congress
concerning Social Security, which, taken collectively,
amount to inference or representation that he or she
is eligible to participate in Social Security, and apparently assents to certain rights and duties associated
therewith and enters into a transaction with the District
of Columbia municipal corporation via its instrumentality, the United States Social Security Administration,
ultimatelyby way of apparent nexus to the revenue
49a
laws of the United Statesto his or her injury, shall
have remedy in the affirmative defense of equitable
estoppel in any action brought against him or her, or
his or her property, related thereto.
The Supreme Court on basic rules
of statutory construction.
In deciding a question of statutory construction,
we begin of course with the language of the
statute.84
It is presumable that Congress legislates with
knowledge of our basic rules of statutory
construction . . .85
When the words of a statute are unambiguous,
then, this first canon is also the last: judicial
inquiry is complete. Rubin v. United States,
449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981); see also Ron Pair
Enterprises, supra, at 241.86
The Court, in another context, has said pertinently: Had Congress intended so fundamental a
distinction, it would have expressed that intent
clearly in the statutory language or the legislative
history. It did not do so, however, and it is not this
Courts function to sit as a super-legislature,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482, 85 S.Ct.
1678, 1680, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), and create
statutory distinctions where none were intended.
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63,
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (111 S.Ct. 599,
112 L.Ed.2d 608).
84
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479,

111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991).
85
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 US 249, 254

(1992).
86
50a
72, n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1539, n. 6, 71 L.Ed.2d 748
(1982).87
In a statutory construction case, the beginning
point must be the language of the statute, and when
a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial
inquiry into the statutes meaning, in all but the
most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.88
As in all cases involving statutory construction,
our starting point must be the language employed
by Congress, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
337, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979),
and we assume that the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words
used. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9,
82 S.Ct. 585, 591, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962). Thus
[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention
to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive. Consumer Product Safety
Commn v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108,
100 S.Ct. 2051, 2055, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980).89
We have held that the construction of a statute
by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that
it is wrong, especially when Congress has refused
to alter the administrative construction. Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381,
89 S.Ct. 1794, 1801-1802, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969)
Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 468 U.S. 137, 104 S.Ct. 2979, 82 L.Ed.2d
107 (1984).
87
Estate of Floyd Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,

112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992).
88
American Tobacco Company v. John Patterson, No. 80-1199,

456 U.S. 63, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982).
89
51a
(footnotes omitted). Accord, Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,
412 U.S. 94, 121, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 2095-2096,
36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973). Such deference is particularly appropriate where, as here, an agencys interpretation involves issues of considerable public
controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct
any misperception of its statutory objectives.
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554,
99 S.Ct. 2470, 2476, 61 L.Ed.2d 68 (1979).90
If the statute contains an express preemption
clause, the task of statutory construction must in
the first instance focus on the plain wording of the
clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress preemptive intent.91
Rules of statutory construction are to be invoked
as aids to the ascertainment of the meaning or
application of words otherwise obscure or doubtful. They have no place, as this court has many
times held, except in the domain of ambiguity.
Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 414, 421, 20 Sup.
Ct. 155, 44 L. Ed. 219; United States v. Barnes,
222 U. S. 513, 518-519, 32 Sup. Ct. 117, 56 L. Ed. 291.
They may not be used to create but only to remove
doubt.92
CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 453 US 367,

101 S.Ct. 2813, 69 L.Ed.2d 706 (1981).
90
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664,

113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993).
91
Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514,

43 S.Ct. 428, 67 L.Ed. 778 (1923).
92
52a
APPENDIX I
HOUSTON DIVISION
Civil No. 4:14-cv-00027

v.
Plaintiff,

Defendants.


53a
* * * *
differ in many respects, but neither of them is a
state, in the sense in which that term is used in
the constitution. . . . 35
Second American legislative epoch.
Notwithstanding the clarity of the Court in Hepburn
and New Orleans (nn. 3435, respectively), re the
distinction between, on the one hand, the States of the
United States and, on the other, the District of
Columbia and the territories, Congress, on June 30,
1864, in defiance of the Supreme Court and contravention of the Constitution and dozens of legal principles,
amidst the Civil War, in the 182nd of 182 sections, on
the 84th page of an 84-page statute, to provide
Internal Revenue (n. 36, infra), strip the word
state of its popular and ordinary meaning, as found
New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 91, 4 L. Ed. 44
(1816).
35
54a
in the dictionary and used in all American legislative
instruments since and including July 4, 1776, and
understood by all Americans as the basic building
block of the Republic, and transmute it into a term of
art and define it to mean the same thing as its
constitutional opposite, the District of Columbia or
one of the territories; to wit:
SEC. 182. And be it further enacted, That wherever
the word state is used in this act it shall be
construed to include the territories and the
District of Columbia, where such construction is
necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.36
Wherefore, in respect of the above-referenced
internal-revenue act of Congress: Hereinafter in
this Memorandum, state and State (revealed
infra) and the plural of each, shall mean what
Congress define them to mean, not what the
dictionary providesexcept when state or
State or the plural of either appears within the
text of quoted material or in the title of an
instrument first published prior to June 30,
1864, thus requiring fidelity to the meaning
thereof contemporaneous with original date of
publication.
strictly construed37and to determine the full extent
of the meaning of the above June 30, 1864, statutory
definition of state, we must look to the appropriate
rule of statutory construction. Because the list of
The Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations of the
United States of America, An Act to provide Internal Revenue to
support the Government, to pay Interest on the Public Debt, and
for other Purposes, Ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 306, June 30, 1864.
36
37
55a
specific items therein, i.e., the territories and the
District of Columbia, is not followed by general words,
the pertinent rule is expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, defined, in pertinent part, as follows:
47:23 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
As the maxim is applied to statutory interpretation, where . . . the persons or things to which it
refers are designated, there is an inference that
all omissions should be understood as exclusions.
The maxim does not apply to every statutory
listing or grouping. It has force only when the
items expressed are members of an associated
group or series, justifying the inference that the
items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate
choice.38
The most exclusive associated group of which the
territories and District of Columbia are members is
properties other than Places purchased for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards,
and other needful Buildings, over which the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise power of exclusive
legislation, and the list in the said 182 is exhaustive
as given.
Wherefore, as of June 30, 1864, the full extent of the
meaning of the new statutory definition of state is
the District of Columbia, Arizona Territory, Colorado
Territory, Dakota Territory, Indian (Oklahoma)
Territory, Montana Territory, Nebraska Territory,
Nevada Territory, New Mexico Territory, Utah
Territory, and Washington Territory and no other
Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and
Statutory Construction, 7th ed., 2007 new ed., vol. 2A, Thomson
West, 398-412. [Extensive footnoting in Singers omitted here.]
38
56a
thing; and none of the 36 commonwealths united by
and under authority of the Constitution as of that date
is a state. Shortly thereafter, Congress revise state
to State (and territories to Territories); to wit:
SEC. 3140. The word State, when used in this
Title, shall be construed to include the Territories
and the District of Columbia where such construction is necessary to carry out its provisions.39
Wherefore, as of March 9, 1878 (retroactive to
December 1, 1873), the full extent of the meaning of
the new congressional definition of State is the
District of Columbia, Alaska Territory, Arizona
Territory, Dakota Territory, Indian (Oklahoma)
Territory, Midway Atoll Territory, Montana Territory,
Nevada Territory, New Mexico Territory, Utah
Territory, or Washington Territory and no other thing.
Strictly legally speaking, per the language of Section
3140 of Revised Statutes of the United States, it is
conclusive that Congress exclude every commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution as a State by deliberate choice.
Summary congressional transmutation of state
and State into terms of art with a constitutionally
opposite meaning to that intended by the Founding
Fathers and Framers and used in all legislative acts
since and including July 4, 1776, contravenes the
spirit of both The unanimous Declaration of the
thirteen united States of America of July 4, 1776, and
Constitution of March 4, 1789, operates to contravene
Revised Statutes of the United States, Passed at the First
Session of the Forty-third Congress, 187374, Title XXXV
Internal Revenue, Chapter 1 Officers of Internal Revenue, p. 601,
approved retroactively as of the Act of March 2, 1877, amended
and approved as of the Act of March 9, 1878.
39
57a
the letter per se of each of those instruments, and
violates a number of rules and principles of law and
statutory construction and interpretation, among
which are (all citations from Bouviers Law Dictionary,
3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. Maxim unless noted otherwise):
Words that are reasonably capable of only one
meaning must be given that meaning whatever
the result. This is called the literal rule.40
Ordinary words must be given their ordinary
meanings and technical words their technical
meanings, unless absurdity would result. This is
the golden rule.41
The words of a statute are to be construed with
reference to its subject matter. If they are
susceptible to several meanings, that one is to be
adopted that best accords with the subject to
which the statute relates. . . .42
ordinary and popular meaning, unless they are
technical terms or words of art, in which case
they are to be understood in their technical
sense. . . .43

40
41
Ibid.
Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and

Interpretation of the Laws (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co.,
1896), 56, 125.
42
43
Ibid, 57, 128.
58a
Lex est ratio summa, quce jubet quce sunt utilia et
necessaria, et contraria prohibet. Law is the perfection of reason, which commands what is useful
and necessary and forbids the contrary.
Ex facto jus oritur. The law arises out of the fact;
that is, its application must be to facts.44
Intentio inservire debet legibus, non leges
intentioni. Intentions ought to be subservient to
the laws, not the laws to intentions.
A verbis legis non est recedendum. From the words
of the law there must be no departure.
Si nulla sit conjectura quce ducat alio, verba
intelligenda sunt ex proprietate, non grammatica
sed populari ex usu. If there be no conjecture
which leads to a different result, words are to be
understood, according to the proper meaning, not
in a grammatical, but in a popular and ordinary
sense.
Proprietates verborum observerandce sunt. The
proprieties of words (i.e. proper meanings of
words) are to be observed.
Quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas ibi nulla
expositio contra verba fienda est. When there is no
ambiguity in the words, then no exposition
contrary to the words is to be made.
Quce ad unum finem locuta sunt, non debent ad
alium detorqueri. Words spoken to one end, ought
not to be perverted to another.
44
Bouviers Law Dictionary, 6th ed., s.v. Maxim.
59a
Quando verba et mens congruent, non est
interpretationi locus. When the words and the
mind agree, there is no place for interpretation.
Sensus verborum ex causa dicendi accipiendus est,
et sermones semper accipiendi sunt secundum
subjectam materiam. The sense of words is to be
taken from the occasion of speaking them, and
discourses are always to be interpreted according
to the subject-matter.
Verba ita sunt intelligenda, ut res magis valeat
quam pereat. Words are to be so understood that
the subject-matter may be preserved rather than
destroyed.
Rerum ordo confunditur, si unicuique jurisdictio
non servatur. The order of things is confounded if
every one [sic] preserves not his jurisdiction.
Omnis definitio in jure periculosa est; parum est
enim ut non subverti possit. Every definition in
law is perilous, for there is very little that cannot
be overthrown. (There is no rule in the civil law
which is not liable to some exception; and the least
difference in the facts of the case renders its
application useless.)
Nihil quod est contra rationem est licitum.
Nothing against reason is lawful.
Nil tamere novandum. Nothing should be rashly
changed.
Sicut natura nil facit per saltum, ita nec lex. As
nature does nothing by a bound or leap, so neither
does the law.
Ubi quid generaliter conceditur, in est haec
exceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque.
Where a thing is concealed generally, this
60a
exception arises, that there shall be nothing
contrary to law and right.
Quicquid est contra normam recti est injuria.
Whatever is against the rule of right is a wrong.
Ubicunque est injuria, ibi damnum sequitur.
Wherever there is a wrong, there damage follows.
Verba nihil operandi melius est quam absurde. It
is better that words should have no operation,
than to operate absurdly.
Application of the universal rules and principles of
statutory construction and interpretation to American
legislative statutes subsequent to the aforementioned
Act of June 30, 1864, up to and including the present
day, reveals that, without exception, each and every
legislative act, including, without limitation, every
amendment to the Constitution, hews to the new
definition of state as a common noun and State as
a proper noun.
Between 1864 and 1916 Congress only infer or
construe the United States to include the States,
i.e., certain of the Territories and the District of
Columbia, based on the statutory meaning of State,
which appears within United States. The Revenue
Act of September 8, 1916, officially transforms United
States into a term of art; to wit:
TITLE I.INCOME TAX. . . .
SEC. 15. That the word State or United
States when used in this title shall be construed
to include any Territory, the District of Columbia,
Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands, when such
61a
construction is necessary to carry out its
provisions.45
Whereas, Statutes in derogation of common law
must be strictly construed,46 the full extent of the
meaning of the definition of State and United
States in 15 of the Act of September 8, 1916, is
determined by two factors: (1) use of the phrase any
Territory, which necessarily comprehends all other
Territories extant on September 8, 1916, just not listed
in the definition, and (2) the absence of general words
following the specific things listed in the definition,
requiring application of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.
Whereas, the aforesaid rule of statutory construction does not apply to every statutory listing or
grouping, only to those where the items listed are all
members of an associated group, such is the case
with said 15 because all things listed therein are
properties other than Places purchased for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards,
and other needful Buildings, over which the
Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise power of
exclusive legislation.
Wherefore, the full extent of the meaning of the
definition in said 15 of the Revenue Act of September
8, 1916, embraces all other members of the same
associated group of properties not listed therein,
namely Alaska, Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam,
Midway Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone; and
therefore identifies the totality of the geographical
area over which the United States has territorial
An Act To increase the revenue, and for other purposes,
Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 773, September 8, 1916.
45
46
Bouviers Law Dictionary, 31d rev., 8th ed., s.v. Maxim.
62a
jurisdiction. In respect thereof, the said Revenue Act
also provides for which Americans, exactly, are liable
to income tax, language still substantially in use
today; to wit:
TITLE I.INCOME TAX.
PART I.ON INDIVIDUALS.
SEC. 1. (a) That there shall be levied, assessed,
collected, and paid annually upon the entire net
income received in the preceding calendar year
from all sources by every individual, a citizen or
resident of the United States, a tax of two per
centum upon such income; . . .
All commonwealths united by and under authority
of the Constitution are deemed excluded from the
meaning of State and United States by Congress by
deliberate choiceand therefore situate without the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Presently there are no less than 75 different statutory definitions of United States throughout the
United States Code, all of which, however, upon strict
construction (Statutes in derogation of common law
must be strictly construed.), are found to consist
either of (1) the District of Columbia and certain of the
Territories, or (2) the District of Columbia (only).
Congress incorporate the District of
Columbia for political purposes.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. A public corporation, created by government for political purposes,
and having subordinate and local powers of
legislation : e. g. a county, town, city, etc. 2 Kent
275; Ang. & A. Corp. 9, 29; Bonaparte v. R. Co.,
Baldw. 222, Fed. Cas. No. 1,617. An incorporation
of persons, inhabitants of a particular place, or
63a
connected with a particular district, enabling
them to conduct its local civil government. Glover,
Mun. Corp. 1. . . .47
As of February 21, 1871, Congress, as authorized by
Article 1 8(17) the Constitution, incorporate the
District of Columbia and thereby create a novel
sovereign domicilsituate without the section of
territory occupied by the collective of the component
commonwealths of the Unionwithin the seat of the
national government and known as the District of
Columbia, and assume, in addition to their legislative
duties as the national legislature, those of the
territorial-type legislature of the new municipality; to
wit, in pertinent part:
* * * *
Bouviers Law Dictionaly, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. Municipal

corporation.
47
64a
APPENDIX J
HOUSTON DIVISION
Civil No. 4:14-cv-00027

v.
Plaintiff,

Defendants.


65a
* * * *
Because 1101(a)(1) of the Social Security Act of
August 14, 1935, uses another Social Security Act
term, includes, within the definition of State, we
must ascertain the meaning of that particular term
before we can determine the full extent of the meaning
of State. Section 1101(b) thereof provides:
The terms includes and including when used in a
definition contained in this Act shall not be
deemed to exclude other things otherwise within
the meaning of the term defined.
The above definition of includes and including is
a hybrid composite of two of the principal rules
of statutory construction/interpretation, (1) ejusdem
generis, and (2) expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
defined, respectively and in pertinent part as follows:
66a
EJUSDEM GENERIS (Lat.). Of the same kind.
In the construction of laws, wills, and other
instruments, general words following an
enumeration of specific things are usually
restricted to things of the same kind (ejusdem
generis) as those specifically enumerated. . . .51
other domestic animals). 52
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other. . . .
36 Fed. 880 ; 104 U.S. 25, 26 L. Ed. 367. It is a rule
of construction. 222 U. S. 513, 32 Sup. Ct. 117,
56 L. Ed. 291.53
(the inclusion of the one is the exclusion of
the other): when a list of specific items is not
followed by general words it is to be taken
as exhaustive. For example, weekends and
public holidays excludes ordinary weekdays.54
Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. Ejusdem

generis.
51

52
53
A Dictionary of Law, 7th ed., Law and Martin, eds., s.v.

54
67a
Wherefore, whenever includes or including
is used within a definition contained in the Social
Security Act, though any such definition be exclusionary generally, said definition nevertheless shall comprehend other things of the same kind (members of the
same associated group) as those listed therein.
Section 1101(a)(1) of the Social Security Act provides that The term State (except when used in
section 531) includes Alaska, Hawaii, and the District
of Columbia. Wherefore, application of 1101(b) of
said Act means that the definition nevertheless
comprehends other things of the same kind (same
associated group) as Alaska, Hawaii, and the District
of Columbia, just not specifically listed therein.
Notwithstanding that the specific items listed in
1101(a)(1) of the said Act (Alaska, Hawaii, and the
District of Columbia) are all members of the same
associated group identified earlier in our analysis of
the meaning of state in the Act of June 30, 1864
(supra, pp. 15-16), i.e., properties other than Places
purchased for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings,
over which the Constitution authorizes Congress
to exercise power of exclusive legislationof which,
on August 14, 1935, there are a total of six others
(American Samoa, Guam, Midway Islands, Panama
Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands)
these particular three have distinction in that they are
all members of a smaller, more exclusive, associated
group; specifically, they are all geographical areas
whose residents have political status of citizen of the
United States; to wit: Alaska, as of July 20, 186855;
Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, 107; 15 Stat. at L. 167, U. S.
Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2277.
55
68a
Hawaii (retroactively), as of August 12, 189856; and
District of Columbia, circa July 16, 1790.57
On August 14, 1935, there are only two other such
geographical areas of the aforesaid other six whose
residents have political status as citizen of the United
States: (1) Puerto Rico, as of March 2, 191758; and
(2) the Virgin Islands, as of February 25, 1927.59
* * * *
Meaning of the Title 26 U.S.C. terms
United States, State
The controlling definition of the Title 26 U.S.C.
(26 U.S.C.) terms United States and State is
found at 26 U.S.C. 7701, which provides, in pertinent
part:
(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise
distinctly expressed . . .
(9) United States
The term United States when used in a
geographical sense includes only the
States and the District of Columbia.
(10) State
The term State shall be construed to
include the District of Columbia, where
such construction is necessary to carry
out provisions of this title.
56
Act of April 30, 1900, Pub. L. 56-331, Ch. 339, 31 Stat 141.
57
Act of July 16, 1790, 1 Stat. 130.
58
Pub.L. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951.
[ Title 8 U.S.C. 1406.]

59
69a
strictly construed,93 and because the controlling Title
26 U.S.C. definition of the term includes, found in
26 U.S.C. 7701(c) and used in the above definition of
United States, is substantially identical94 to that of
1101(b) of the Social Security Act of August 14, 1935
(supra, p. 23), the derivative product of such exercise
is foreknown and therefore unnecessary and is omitted
here; to wit:
(c) Includes and including
The terms includes and including when
used in a definition contained in this title
shall not be deemed to exclude other things
otherwise within the meaning of the term
defined.
Wherefore, re the full extent of the meaning of
States, which appears in 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9),
the controlling definition of State, 26 U.S.C.
7701(a)(10), supra, reveals very little; only that the
District of Columbia shall be construed to be a State.
The preamble to the above controlling definition
of the terms United States and State provides,
however, at 26 U.S.C. 7701(a), an instruction as to
how to identify any other State, besides the District of
Columbia, that is embraced by the said definition of
United States; to wit: When used in this title, where
not otherwise distinctly expressed . . .
93
Non differunt quae concordant re, tametsi non in verb is

iisdem. Those things which agree in substance, though not in the
same words, do not differ. Ibid.
94
70a
3121(e)(1); to wit:
State in 26 U.S.C. 3121(e)(1).
part:
Islands), and
71a
the Northern Mariana Islands, and the full extent
of the meaning of the Title 26 U.S.C. term United
States when used in a geographical sense is the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
and no other thing.
Further, when used in a governmental sense, United
States means the District of Columbia; to wit:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise
exclusive Legislation . . . over such District . . . as
may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the
United States . . .96
The District is created a government by the name
of the District of Columbia . . .97
IRS.gov, Persons Employed In a U.S. Possession / Territory FIT, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Per

95
96
Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to the District

of Columbia . . . 187374 2, p. 2.
97
72a
When used in a political sense United States
means the District of Columbia municipal corporation98;
to wit:
United States means(A) a Federal corporation;99 and
Used in a commercial sense, United States means
the District of Columbia; to wit:
The United States is located in the District of
Columbia.100
Whereas: The Constitution authorizes Congress to
exercise personal legislative power and jurisdiction
only in such District . . . as may . . . become the Seat
of the Government of the United States and all
Places purchased by (Article 1 8(17)), and Territory
or other Property belonging to (Article 4 3(2)), the
United States; and
Whereas:
On the part of the plaintiffs, it has been urged
that Columbia is a distinct political society, and is
* * * *
98
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. A public corporation, created by government for political purposes . . . Bouviers Law
Dictionary, 3rd rev., 8th ed., s.v. Municipal corporation.
99
Title 28 U.S.C. 3002(15).
100
Uniform Commercial Code 9-307(h).
73a
APPENDIX K
HOUSTON DIVISION
Civil No. 4:14-cv-00027

v.
Plaintiff,

Defendants.


74a
* * * *
3121(e)(1); to wit:
75a
State in 26 U.S.C. 3121(e)(1).
part:
Islands), and
the Northern Mariana Islands, and the full extent of
the meaning of the Title 26 U.S.C. term United States
* * * *
IRS.gov, Persons Employed In a U.S. Possession / Territory FIT, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Per

95
76a
APPENDIX L
HOUSTON DIVISION
Civil No. 4:14-cv-00027

v.
Plaintiff,

Defendants.


77a
* * * *
Affidavit in Support of Amended
Motion to Dismiss
Preamble
In this Affidavit in Support of Amended Motion to
Dismiss, the term Affiant means John Parks
Trowbridge, Jr. (and is not intended to exclude
derivative variations in the spelling thereof, such as
JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.).
Introductory Certification
Affiant hereby solemnly swears, declares, and states
as follows:
1. Affiant can competently state the matters set
forth herein.
2. Affiant has personal knowledge of the facts
stated herein.
78a
3. All the facts stated herein are true, correct, and
complete in accordance with Affiants best firsthand personal knowledge and belief.
Averments of John Parks Trowbridge, Jr.
4. Affiant has neither seen nor been presented with
any evidence, and likewise any material fact,
that demonstrates that:
(a) Affiant is one born within the exterior limits
of that certain section of territory occupied
by the District of Columbia;
(b) Affiant is one wholly brought into separate
existence within the exterior limits of that
certain section of territory occupied by the
District of Columbia;
(c) At any point in time, Affiant intends, of
Affiants own free will, to:
(i)
Renounce and renounces birthright in

that certain republic (hereinafter the
American Union) created and established by way of confederation of those
certain component commonwealths (numbering 50 at present, the last of which
being Hawaii, August 21, 1959) united
by and under authority of that certain
Constitution ordained, established, and
implemented March 4, 1789, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
and adopts the political and municipal
status involved by permanent residence
of choice, with domiciliary intent, in that
certain section of territory occupied by
79a
(ii) Establish and establishes personal presence in true, fixed, and permanent home,
habitation, and principal abode, with
domiciliary intent, within the exterior
occupied by the District of Columbia;
(iii) Reside and resides within the exterior
purposes of trade;
(iv) Reside and resides within the exterior
purposes of carrying on Affiants trade;
(v) Go into and goes into the District of
Columbia to engage in trade;
(vi) Reside and resides within the exterior
occupied by the District of Columbia
for purposes of carrying on Affiants
business;
(vii) Go into and goes into the District of
Columbia to engage in business; or
(viii) Change and changes the country of
domicil and legal residence in which
Affiants true, fixed, and permanent
home, habitation, and principal abode
is situate, from the American Union to
any other sovereign jurisdiction; or
80a
(d) At any point in time, Affiant chooses, of
establishes, for legal purposes, Affiants
true, fixed, and permanent home, habitation, and principal abode in that certain
section of territory occupied by the District
of Columbia;
(e) At any point in time. Affiant chooses, of
establishes, as the center of Affiants legal
relations and business, Affiants true, fixed,
and permanent home, habitation, and principal abode in that certain section of territory occupied by the District of Columbia;
(f) Affiants country of domicil is the District of
Columbia;
(g) Affiants legal residence is the District of
Columbia;
(h) The sovereignty to whom Affiant owes
allegiance is the District of Columbia;
(i)
Affiant is a citizen of the District of

Columbia;
(j)
Affiant is a resident of the District of

Columbia;
(k) Affiant is a resident, for legal purposes, of

(l)
Affiant is a resident, for purposes of

taxation, of the District of Columbia;
(m) Affiant is a resident, for purposes of

licensing, of the District of Columbia;
81a
(n) Affiant is domiciled in the District of
Columbia;
(o) Affiant is a citizen of the federal (United
States) government;
(p) Affiant is a United States Government
employee; or
(q) At the time of Affiants apparent execution
of that certain conditional (assessment)
contract with the District of Columbia
municipal corporation via said corporations
instrumentality, the United States Social
Security Administration, Affiant is located
within the exterior limits of that section
of territory occupied by the District of
Columbia,
and believes that none exists.
Verification and Certification
5. The Undersigned Affiant, John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., hereby solemnly swears, declares,
and states that Affiant executes this Affidavit on
Affiants unlimited liability, that Affiant can
competently state the matters set forth herein,
and that the facts stated herein are true, correct,
and complete in accordance with Affiants best
firsthand personal knowledge and belief.
Further Affiant sayeth naught.
Date: The twenty-ninth day of the fourth month in
the year of our Lord two thousand fourteen
[April 29, A.D. 2014]
Affiant
04-29-14
Date
82a
/s/ Catherine Diane Guion
Witness: Catherine Diane Guion
04-29-14
Date
/s/ Lucrecia Taylor

Witness: Lucrecia Taylor
04-29-14
Date
/s/ Rena Jeannette Parker

Witness: Rena Jeannette Parker

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No.

Supreme Court of the United States

JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. (202) 789-0096 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether a court of general jurisdiction is authorized

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

John Parks Trowbridge, Jr., Petitioner

Balzac v. People of Porto Rico,

Art. I 8, cl. 17 .................................................. 17

Supreme Court of the United States

JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Federal district courts are authorized to hear both

Amended final judgment (see Appendix, hereinafter

The court of appeals entered judgment on February

Relevant constitutional and statutory provisions

A. Facts Giving Rise To This Case

[L]ack of jurisdiction cannot be waived and jurisdiction

THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDING IS AN

CONGRESS EXERCISE TWO SPECIES OF

THE TRUE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COURTS IS AS

THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES EXPRESSLY FOR

The Constitution creates the federal judicial power

TODAY, EVERY DISTRICT COURT HAS

The United States district courts are the trial

USCourts.gov, District Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/

Counsel for the Plaintiff in error also rely on the

The United States District Court referenced in Balzac is that

district court for said district shall be called the district

CONGRESS MANUFACTURE JURISDICTIONAL

Qulibet jurisdictio cancellos suos habet. Every

Whereas, in the Foraker Act the name by which the judicial

Congress thereafter in Section 34 refer to the same district

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF FIRST

NO COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION HAS

As affirmed in Balzac and Mookini, supra, the only

When one intends the facts to which the law attaches

was abandoned for a later one. P. 427. Texas v. Florida,

This Court declares in Cohens, supra, that Congress

SYSTEMIC FRAUD IN THE JUDICIARY OF THE

Intentio inservire debet legibus, non leges intentioni.

It is also hornbook law that the party invoking federal

[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people,

The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of

Constitution for the United States of America of March 4,

Nothing can destroy a government more quickly

Civil Action H-14-27

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Amended Final Judgment

Civil Action H-14-27

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

JOHN P. TROWBRIDGE, JR., et al.,

Order of Sale and Vacature

Signed on May 23, 2014, at Houston, Texas.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

JOHN PARKS TROWBRIDGE, JR.,