ASAPHIL CONSTRUCTION vs INDUPLEX, INC

G.R. NO. 134030

The allegations in Tuasons complaint do not make out a case for a mining dispute or controversy
within the jurisdiction of the DENR. While the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims is a mining
contract, the ground upon which the contract is sought to be annulled is not due to Asaphils
refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, but due to Induplexs alleged
violation of the condition imposed by the BOI in its Joint Venture Agreement with Grefco, Inc..
Also, Tuason sought the nullity of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore, based on the
same alleged violation. Obviously, this raises a judicial question, which is proper for
determination by the regular courts.1[18] A judicial question is raised when the determination of
the question involves the exercise of a judicial function; that is, the question involves the
determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the
matter in controversy.2[19]
The DENR is not called upon to exercise its technical knowledge or expertise over any mining
operations or dispute; rather, it is being asked to determine the validity of the agreements based
on circumstances beyond the respective rights of the parties under the two contracts. In Gonzales
v. Climax Mining Ltd.,3[20] the Court ruled that:
x x x whether the case involves void or voidable contracts is still a judicial question. It may, in
some instances, involve questions of fact especially with regard to the determination of the
circumstances of the execution of the contracts. But the resolution of the validity or voidness
of the contracts remains a legal or judicial question as it requires the exercise of judicial
function. It requires the ascertainment of what laws are applicable to the dispute, the
interpretation and application of those laws, and the rendering of a judgment based thereon.
Clearly, the dispute is not a mining conflict. It is essentially judicial. The complaint was not
merely for the determination of rights under the mining contracts since the very validity of
those contracts is put in issue. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the DENR Regional Executive Director was correct in dismissing the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction over Tuasons complaint; consequently, the MAB committed an error in taking
cognizance of the appeal, and in ruling upon the validity of the contracts.

Given the DENRs lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of Tuasons complaint, the Court
finds it unnecessary to rule on the issue of validity of the contracts, as this should have been
brought before and resolved by the regular trial courts, to begin with.

BENGUET CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON OSCAR L. LEVISTE,

At issue in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is the jurisdiction
of the regional trial court (RTC) to take cognizance of an action for annulment of operations
agreement entered into by and between two mining companies.

While admitting that the contract sought to be annulled is a mining contract, private
respondent nonetheless opines that the action for its annulment does not fall under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines. The reason given is that Section 7 (c) of P.D. 1281
contemplates a mining contract, valid and binding in all respects, but either the
claimowner or operator refuses to comply with its terms and conditions. In the case at
bar, the contract is null and void because of the mental incapacity of the late Celestino
Dizon to execute the Deed of Ratification on the validity of which the validity of the
Operations Agreement is in turn dependent. Thus, the principal issue in this case is not
whether or not the claimowner or operator refuses to comply with the contract's terms
and conditions, but rather the mental capacity of the attorney-in-fact to execute a prior
agreement upon which the Operations Agreement is based. It is claimed that the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences is not equipped to determine the question of mental
capacity.
Anent the issue of venue, private respondent contends that the case does not affect title
to or possession of real property, and therefore, is not a real action but an action in
personam, for which venue is laid in the residence of the plaintiff.
We grant the petition. Presidential Decree No. 1281 which took effect on January
16,1978 vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdictional supervision and control over all
holders of mining claims or applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits,
leases and/or operators thereof, including mining service contracts and service
contractors insofar as their mining activities are concerned. 12 To effectively discharge
its task as the Government's arm in the administration and disposition of mineral
resources, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281 confers upon the Bureau quasi-judicial powers as
follows:

Sec. 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over

companies, partnerships or persons engaged in mining exploration,
development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide case involving:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal
of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof.
Analyzing the objectives of P.D. 1281, particularly said Section 7 thereof, the Court in
Twin Peaks Mining Association, 13 the case relied upon by petitioner, noted that the
trend is to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter. This
observation was reiterated in the more
recent case of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. 14
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the subject agreement is a mining contract and
private respondent, in seeking a judicial declaration of its nullity, does not wish to abide
by its terms and conditions. These elements alone bring the action within the ambit of
Section 7 of P.D. 1281. Whatever the basis for the refusal to abide by the contract's
terms and conditions, the basic issue remains one of its cancellation, which is precisely
what P.D. No. 1281 places within the exclusive original jurisdiction for the Bureau.
The reason underlying such refusal is indeed an irrelevant matter insofar as
jurisdictional competence is concerned, for to make jurisdiction dependent thereon
would not only be "ratifying two judicial bodies exercising jurisdiction over an essentially
the same subject mattera situation analogous to split jurisdiction which is obnoxious
to the orderly administration of justice" 15 but also clearly ignoring the object of P.D.
1281 to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter.
And if, perchance the law did intend to split jurisdiction, it could have done so by
providing exceptions to par. (c), Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281. Not having done so, there
can be no justification for restricting or limiting the Bureau's jurisdiction over "actions for
cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the
claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof."
In the light of our ruling that the jurisdiction over private respondent's action to annul the
Operations Agreement pertains to the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences rather than
the regional trial court, the question of venue becomes immaterial.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING
COOPERATIVE

In the first assigned error, petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded
that the assailed memorandum order did not adopt the direct state utilization scheme in resolving
the Diwalwal dispute. On the contrary, petitioner submits, said memorandum order dictated the
said recourse and, in effect, granted management or operating agreements as well as provided for
profit sharing arrangements to illegal small-scale miners.
According to petitioner, MO 97-03 was issued to preempt the resolution of the Consolidated
Mines cases. The direct state utilization scheme espoused in the challenged memorandum is
nothing but a legal shortcut, designed to divest petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area
under its EP No. 133.
We are not persuaded.
We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively
adopt direct state utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the
memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this
option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that
matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its
feasibility. As the Court of Appeals extensively discussed in its decision:
x x x under the Memorandum Order, the State still had to study prudently and exhaustively the
various options available to it in rationalizing the explosive and ever perilous situation in the
area, the debilitating adverse effects of mining in the community and at the same time, preserve
and enhance the safety of the mining operations and ensure revenues due to the government from
the development of the mineral resources and the exploitation thereof. The government was still
in earnest search of better options that would be fair and just to all parties concerned, including,
notably, the Petitioner. The direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the area was only
one of the options of the State. Indeed, it is too plain to see, x x x that before the State will settle
on an option, x x x an extensive and intensive study of all the facets of a direct state exploitation
was directed by the Public Respondent DENR Secretary. And even if direct state exploitation
was opted by the government, the DENR still had to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the same x x x, in coordination with the other concerned agencies of the
government.i[17]
Consequently, the petition was premature. The said memorandum order did not impose any
obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to
the dispute. At this stage, petitioner can show no more than a mere apprehension that the State,
through the DENR, would directly take over the mines after studies point to its viability. But
until the DENR actually does so and petitioners fears turn into reality, no valid objection can be
entertained against MO 97-03 on grounds which are purely speculative and anticipatory.ii[18]

With respect to the alleged vested rights claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is
invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines
cases. A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133
is one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting that Marcopper cannot
legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or not
petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and
unsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in the
Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights
that can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.
Similarly, there is no merit in petitioners assertion that MO 97-03 sanctions violation of mining
laws by allowing illegal miners to enter into mining agreements with the State. Again, whether
or not respondent BCMC and the other mining entities it represents are conducting illegal mining
activities is a factual matter that has yet to be finally determined in the Consolidated Mines
cases. We cannot rightfully conclude at this point that respondent BCMC and the other mining
firms are illegitimate mining operators. Otherwise, we would be preempting the resolution of the
cases which are still pending before the Court of Appeals.iii[19]
Petitioners reliance on the Apex Mining case to justify its rights under E.P. No. 133 is misplaced.
For one, the said case was litigated solely between Marcopper and Apex Mining Corporation and
cannot thus be deemed binding and conclusive on respondent BCMC and the other mining
entities presently involved. While petitioner may be regarded as Marcoppers successor to EP No.
133 and therefore bound by the judgment rendered in the Apex Mining case, the same cannot be
said of respondent BCMC and the other oppositor mining firms, who were not impleaded as
parties therein.
Neither can the Apex Mining case foreclose any question pertaining to the continuing validity of
EP No. 133 on grounds which arose after the judgment in said case was promulgated. While it is
true that the Apex Mining case settled the issue of who between Apex and Marcopper validly
acquired mining rights over the disputed area by availing of the proper procedural requisites
mandated by law, it certainly did not deal with the question raised by the oppositors in the
Consolidated Mines cases, i.e. whether EP No. 133 had already expired and remained valid
subsequent to its transfer by Marcopper to petitioner. Besides, as clarified in our decision in the
Apex Mining case:
x x x is conclusive only between the parties with respect to the particular issue herein raised and
under the set of circumstances herein prevailing. In no case should the decision be considered as
a precedent to resolve or settle claims of persons/entities not parties hereto. Neither is it intended
to unsettle rights of persons/entities which have been acquired or which may have accrued upon
reliance on laws passed by appropriate agencies.iv[20]
Clearly then, the Apex Mining case did not invest petitioner with any definite right to the
Diwalwal mines which it could now set up against respondent BCMC and the other mining
groups.

Incidentally, it must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioners rights
under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in
its challenged decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which
may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is
necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral
resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining
exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the
purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution,v[21] since
the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in
accordance with the demands of the general welfare.vi[22]
Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which
the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article
XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically provides:
SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant. (Underscoring ours)
Likewise, Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states:
SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources. - Mineral Resources are owned by the State and the
exploration, development, utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control and
supervision. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral
agreements with contractors. (Underscoring ours)
Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources, by either
directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENR
Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study of the first option, which may be
undertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above.
Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it
is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. As
implied earlier, the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling for
this option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.

In this regard, petitioners imputation of bad faith on the part of the DENR Secretary when the
latter issued MO 97-03 is not well-taken. The avowed rationale of the memorandum order is
clearly and plainly stated in its whereas clauses.vii[23] In the absence of any concrete evidence
that the DENR Secretary violated the law or abused his discretion, as in this case, he is presumed
to have regularly issued the memorandum with a lawful intent and pursuant to his official
functions.
Given these considerations, petitioners first assigned error is baseless and premised on tentative
assumptions. Petitioner cannot claim any absolute right to the Diwalwal mines pending
resolution of the Consolidated Mines cases, much less ask us to assume, at this point, that
respondent BCMC and the other mining firms are illegal miners. These factual issues are to be
properly threshed out in CA G.R. SP Nos. 61215 and 61216, which have yet to be decided by the
Court of Appeals. Any objection raised against MO 97-03 is likewise premature at this point,
inasmuch as it merely ordered a study of an option which the State is authorized by law to
undertake.

HELD:
NO
. MO 97 -03 did not concl usi vel y adopt "di rect st at e ut il iz ation" as a pol i cy i n
resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clea rly indicate that
what was directed there under was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to
petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to
small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR
officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. As to the alleged "vested
rights" claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133,
whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading of the appealed
MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133
s one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting that
Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or
not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite
and unsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in
the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that
can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.It must likewise be pointed out that under no
circumstances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly
held by the Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which
may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is
necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral
resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration
permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-

impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its
all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the
demands of the general welfare. A dd it io na ll y, th e r e c a n be no v al i d o pp o s it io n r ai se d
a g ai n s t a m er e s tu dy o f a n alternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to
undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4,
Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of
full control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the country's
natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements
with qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study
of the first option, which may be un de rt ake n co n s ist en tly i n ac c o r dan c e wi t h t he
co ns ti tu tio na l po li cy e n un ci ate d a bo v e . Obviously, the State may not be precluded from
considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing
complexities generated by the gold rush

Rosemoor Mining And Development Corporation Corporation (Rosemoor),

ISSUE: W/N Rosemoors license was validly cancelled. YES.RATIO:
Validity of License
PD 463, as amended, pertained to the old system of exploration, development and utilizationof nat ural
res ources throu gh lic ens es, conces si ons or l ea s es, but was om itt ed i n the
1 9 87Constitution as it was deemed violative of its provisions. This was replaced by
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 repealed or amended all laws, executive orders,
presidential decrees, rules and regulations -- or parts thereof -- that are inconsistent with it. While RA 7942
has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent with its own, it nonetheless
respects previously issued valid and existing licenses. In this case, the terms of Rosemoors license was
subject to PD 463, the existing law when it was granted. And under such law, it is clear that a license
should only cover 100 hectares without exceptions or consideration to the number of
applications. The intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented by ruling that a license may
cover an area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing several
applications. Such ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited by the law.
Validity of Proclamation No. 84
Rosemoors license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national interest
so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. This condition to the license was acknowledged by Rosemoor in its
permit. Moreover, granting that Rosemoor license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by the
State in the exercise of police power. The exercise of such power through Proclamation No. 84 is

clearly in accord with the regalia doctrine which reserves to the State ownership of all
natural resources. Proclamation 84 does not impair the non-impairment clause because the
license is not a contract. Even if the license were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws and
a reservation of police power are deemed read into it, because it concerns a subject impressed
with public welfare.PN 84 is also not a bill of attainder because the decl aration that the
license was void is not a punishment. It is also not an ex post facto law because the
proclamation does not fall under any of the enumerated categories of an ex post facto law. And
an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature
McDANIEL, petitioner,
vs.
GALICANO APACIBLE, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,

It is alleged and admitted that the defendant Juan Cuisia has made an application under this Act
"for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of
Tayabas, Philippine Islands, which said parcel of land included within its boundaries the three
said petroleum placer claims 'Maglihi No. 1,' 'Maglihi No. 2' and 'Maglihi No. 3.' " It is also
alleged and admitted that the defendant Rafael Corpus "is about to grant the lease application of
the defendant Juan Cuisia, and to place the said defendant Juan Cuisia in possession of the said
three petroleum placer claims held by plaintiff."
Under the provisions of this Act, the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to make such a lease is confined to lands "containing petroleum and other mineral oils
and gas in the Philippine Islands."
The legal effect of such allegations and admissions in the pleadings is to carry with it and to
imply that the lands in question contain petroleum and other mineral oils. Otherwise the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources would not have any authority to make such a
lease, and the defendant Juan Cuisia would not want to lease the lands unless they did contain
petroleum and other mineral oils.
The growth and development of minerals add new resources and undiscovered wealth to a
country, and provide employment for labor. For such reasons, it has always been the policy of
the mining law to encourage the prospector. He has been the pioneer in the discovery of minerals
in all countries, and often his task had been sad and lonely, and he has had many bitter
disappointments.
In the instant case, the stipulation shows that the mining claims are situated in a comparatively
uninhabited district four miles from any port, and that they can only be reached over mountain
trails which have been maintained at the expense of the plaintiff. If it be a fact that the claims do
contain petroleum in paying quantities, it would be of immense value to the commercial interests
of the Philippine Islands. As evidence of his good faith, the plaintiff has expended P12,000 in the
development of the property, and has found evidence tending to show that the claims do contain
petroleum and other mineral oils. At this time and under such circumstances, it would be a gross

injustice to deprive him of his property rights through forms and technicalities. The locations
were made upon the unappropriated public domain, and to maintain them, and as evidence of
good faith, the law requires the performance of the annual assessment work, and that question is
not disputed or presented in the record.
To deny the writ would, in legal effect, take from and give to another the P12,000 which the
plaintiff has expended in good faith in the development of the property.
A number of important questions have been raised and discussed in the briefs of opposing
counsel which, under the pleadings, are unnecessary to the decision of this case. It having been
admitted, in legal effect, that the original locations were valid, and that P12,000 have been
expended in development, and there being no plea of forfeiture for failure to do the annual
assessment work, and the record tending to show that the original locations were made in good
faith, and that the lands in question do contain "petroleum and other mineral oils," it must follow
that the plaintiff is entitled to the writ prayed for in his petition, and it is so ordered.
Many of the authorities cited by the defendants are good law, but this decision is based upon, and
confined to, the stipulated facts and the admissions made in the pleadings, and for such reasons
the authorities are not in point.
Justice Johnson has pointed out that the language in his opinion above quoted may be
misleading. The purpose and intent of that decision was to hold that Act No. 2932 was void in so
far as it applies to valid mineral locations, which were made prior to the time that Act became a
law, and upon which the annual assessment work has been performed after the law was enacted.
In the instant case, we hold that, even though a valid mineral location was made prior to the
passage of Act No. 2932 and the annual assessment work had not been performed since the
passage of the Act, and that question is raised and presented by an appropriate plea and sustained
by the proof, any prior rights under the location would then be forfeited, and such lands would
then be subject to, and come under, the provisions of Act No. 2932.

G.R. No. 75962 June 30, 1988

GREENHILLS MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

The instant petition seeks the review of (a) the decision dated July 8,1986 issued by respondent Office of the President and signed by
Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., declaring all mining claims located and registered within the Southern Zambales
Forest Reserve as null and void and granting private respondent Green Valley Company preferential right to possess, exploit, develop and
operate the area covered by its exploration permit, and (b) the order dated September 10, 1986 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

n upholding Green hills's prior right over the mining areas subject of conflicting claims, the Office of the
President rightly relied on the provisions of Section 28(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 137 (now Section
13(a), Presidential Decree No. 463). Under this provision, and under the regulations implementing it, it is
required that the lessor shall, first, secure a prospecting permit from the BFD and second, obtain an
exploration permit in case of discovery of minerals in the area or when there is strong proof of
mineralization. The records show that the petitioner's mining claims were backed up by no prospecting
permit.
On the other hand, Green Valley had fully complied with such requirements, for which its claims should
be declared superior.

The cases of McDaniel v. Apacible, Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, and Salacot Mining
6
Company v. Abadilla, relied upon by the petitioner, and where we held that the appropriation of a
mineral land pursuant to a valid claim segregates it from the public domain, are not in point. The petitioner
assumes that the claims of other claimants recorded in 1933 and 1934 were still valid when the Southern
Zambales Forest Reservation was established in 1956. According to the office of the President, however,
the original claimowners had failed to perform annual development work on the claims in violation of the
provisions of Section 36 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. As a consequence, the area became "open to
7
relocation ... as if no location of the same had ever been made." Conversely, assuming that the
government lost the property when the petitioner, or the original claimowners staked their claims in 1933
and 1934, it reverted to the public dominion upon abandonment thereof Accordingly, when President
Magsaysay established the Southern Zambales Forest Reserve in 1956, the areas covered by the said
abandoned claims already formed part of the public domain. The petitioner cannot, moreover, claim
privity of title with the owners of the prior locations. Such prior locations had been abandoned, or at most,
forfeited, and the petitioner's own location cannot be considered a continuation thereof.

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PNOC-EDC) v VENERACION

G.R. No. 129820
November 30, 2006

RED of the DENR Office in Zamboanga City: ruled in favor of VENERACION and ordered the PNOC to
amend its Mineral Production Sharing Agreement [MPSA] by excluding therefrom Block 159 *DENR
secretary: dismissed the appeal on the ground that petitioner's right to appeal had already prescribed.

ISSUES:
(1) whether or not the petitioner has already lost its right to appeal the RED's Order dated 12
April 1993; and
(2) whether or not the petitioner acquired a preferential right on mining rights over Block 159.
HELD: *On propriety of appeal: The correct mode of appeal would have been to file a petition
for review under Rule 43, before the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, this Court has taken into
account the fact that these cases [which provided the doctrine] were promulgated after the
petitioner filed this appeal on 4 August 1997, and decided to take cognizance of the present case.

(1) YES, the right to appeal is lost. Petitioner's insistence that the 30-day reglementary period
provided by Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended, applies, cannot be
sustained by this Court. By providing a five-day period within which to file an appeal on the
decisions of the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences, Presidential Decree No. 463
unquestionably repealed Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137.
Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest
of substantial justice. The right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory
privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to state any compelling reason for not filing its appeal within
the mandated period. Instead, the records show that after failing to comply with the period within
which to file their motion for reconsideration on time, they again failed to file their appeal before
the Office of the DENR Secretary within the time provided by law.
(2) NO, Even if petitioner had not lost its right to appeal, it cannot claim any mining rights over
Block 159 for failure to comply with the legal requirements.
SEC. 15. Government Reserved Land. Lands reserved by the Government for purposes other
than mining are open to prospecting. Any interested party may file an application therefore with
the head of the agency administering said land, subject always to compliance with pertinent laws
and rules and regulations covering such reserved land. Such application shall be acted upon

within thirty (30) days. In such cases, the compensation due the surface owner shall accrue
equally to the agency administering the reserved land and the Bureau of Mines.
The law enumerates the following requirements:
(1) a prospecting permit from the agency that has jurisdiction over the area, in this case, the
OEA;
(2) an exploration permit from the BMGS;
(3) if the exploration reveals the presence of commercial deposit, the permitee applies before the
BMGS for the exclusion of the area from the reservation;
(4) granting by the president of the application to exclude the area from the reservation; and
(5) a mining agreement approved by the DENR Secretary.
In this case, petitioner complied with the first requirement and obtained a prospecting permit
from the OEA. In its correspondence with the petitioner, the OEA, however, advised the
petitioner on two separate occasions to obtain a "prospecting permit" from the BMGS, although
the OEA was probably referring to an exploration permit. The petitioner did not apply for an
exploration permit with the BMGS, nor would the BMGS have granted petitioner an exploration
permit because when petitioner wrote to the BMGS informing the latter of its intention to enter
into an MPSA with the DENR over Block 159, the BMGS informed the petitioner that the
respondent's claim over Block 159 had already preceded that of the petitioner. The advice given
by the BMGS was justified since at that time, the respondent already had a pending application
for the exclusion of Block 159 from the Malangas Coal Reservation. Thereafter, the petitioner
filed his MPSA application, without complying with the second, third and fourth requisites.
Since it ignored the sound advice of the OEA and the BMGS, the government agencies
concerned, and stubbornly insisted on its incorrect procedure, petitioner cannot complain now
that its MPSA was revoked for failure to comply with the legal requirements.
OBITER DICTA:
(1) Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes have recognized a distinction between
(1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an executive or administrative
nature, such as "granting of license, permits, lease and contracts, or approving, rejecting,
reinstating or cancelling applications, or deciding conflicting applications," and
(2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual nature between litigants which are
questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice.
(2) Findings of fact by the Mines Adjudication Board, which exercises appellate jurisdiction over
decisions or orders of the panel of arbitrators, shall be conclusive and binding on the parties, and
its decision or order shall be final and executory. But resort to the appropriate court, through a
petition for review by certiorari, involving questions of law, may be made within thirty days
from the receipt of the order or decision of the Mines Adjudication Board.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the POLLUTION ADJUDICATIONBOARD

(DENR)
vs.
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION
FACTS:
Respondent MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings sea disposal system. In the
meantime, the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) was abolished by EO
No. 192dat ed Jun e 10, 1987, and i ts powers and functi ons wer e int egrat ed i nt o
t he Envi ronm ent al Management Bureau and into the Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB).On April 11, 1988, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as Ch airman of the
PAB, issued an Order directing MMC to "cease and desist from discharging mine
tailings into Calancan Bay."This was appealed by the MMC with the Office of the President
(OP).In line with the directive from the OP, the Calancan Bay Rehabilitatio n Project
(CBRP) was created, and MMC remitted the amount of P30,000.00 a day, starting from May
13, 1988 to the Ecology Trust Fund (ETF) thereof. However, on June 30, 1991, MMC
stopped discharging itstailings in the Bay, hence, it likewise ceased from making further
deposits to the ETF. The PAB sought for the enforcement of the order issued by the OP,
however, the CA acted on Marcoppers petition and ordered the PAB to refrain and desist
from enforcing aforesaid Order. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Republic Act No. 7942 repealed the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984,
with respect to the power and function of petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board to
issue, renew or deny permits for the discharge of the mine tailings.
HELD:
The SC held that the CA erred in ruling that the PAB had no authority to issue the
Order from the The rul ing of t he C ourt of Appeal s that the P AB has been
di vest ed of authority t o act on pollution-related matters in mining operations is anchored
on the provisions of RA 7942(Philippine Mining Act of 1995). However, Section 19 of
EO 192 vested the PAB with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in
general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD 984 defines the
term "pollution" as referring to any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological properties
of any water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines , or any discharge thereto of any liquid,
gaseous or solid wastes as will or is likely to create a harmful environment. On the other hand,
the authority of the mines regional director is complementary to that of the PAB.
While the mines regional director has express administrative and regulatory powers
over mining operations and installations, it has no adjudicative powers over complaints for
violation of pollution control statutes and regulations. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, RA 7942

does not vest quasi-judicial powers in the Mines Regional Director. The authority is
vested and remains with the PAB. Neither was such authority conferred upon the Panel of
Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board which were created by the said law. The scope of
authority of the Panel of A r b i t r a t o r s a n d t h e M i n e s A d j u d i c a t i o n B o a r d
c o n f e r r e d b y R A 7 9 4 2 c l e a r l y e x c l u d e adjudicative responsibility over pollution
cases