Judicial Conduct

Investigations Office
___________

Complaint form
Thank you for sending us details of your complaint.
Below is a copy of the details you supplied, please keep this form for your records.
When we reply you we will provide you with a unique case reference number. In the meantime, if you
need to contact us, please quote the reference number provided here.
Date form submitted

7 November 2015

Your details
Title

Mr

First name

Neil

Last name

Gilliatt

Address

x
y
z

Postcode

Daytime telephone
Email
Details about your case
Type of judicial
office holder

District Judge (Magistrates Court)

Name of judicial
office holder

Daniel Curtis

Name of the court

or tribunal

Grimsby Magistrates Court

Case number

Not known

Is your case still

ongoing

No

JCIO Complaint form (09.13)

Date of Hearing

30 October 2015

Brief description of your complaint

Category
of complaint

Miscellaneous

Description of your complaint

Background to case
North East Lincs Council (the 'Claimant') erroneously applied for a liability order for non-payment of council tax
due to misallocating monies to a sum that had arisen from a previous years summons costs, which were
disputed and appealed to the High Court. That sum was suspended pending the court's decision; therefore no
payments in respect of the current liability were ever overdue. The case (High Court) is yet to be determined so
the costs still suspended; therefore, under no circumstances was it a sum to which the Claimant could
legitimately allocate payment.
Myself (the "Defendant") submitted extensive evidence to support that i) the appeal (as alleged) had never
been withdrawn and so the suspension of costs from the account never lifted, ii) payments were in any event
inferred by the circumstances to be appropriated to the current liability, iii) it was inconceivable that the
summons costs as applied on making complaint could have been incurred by the claimant, as per the
Claimants breakdown.
The Claimant made a statement (material in the proceedings) which he knew to be false, to the effect that the
appeal challenging the costs had been withdrawn. Indisputable evidence was submitted to support why the
statement was untrue and why the Claimant could not have believed it to have been true. The Defendant's
suspicion that the statement was made with deliberate intent to deceive the court was made clear in those
representations.

Professional Misconduct
The judge was unwilling to listen to, accept or understand any evidence which didn't fit in with the predetermined outcome (to accept the false statement to justify granting the order). It was sensed throughout the
hearing that the judge pretended to be out of his depth as a strategy for denying evidence that might, if
considered, defeat the Claimant's argument and make granting the order more difficult to justify. His ineptitude
was almost certainly put on for show; therefore a description far more accurate would be of 'Professional
Misconduct' than that of incompetence.

Criminal Allegations
The judge was so lacking in objectivity and obviously pro-prosecution that had an unsighted person walked into
the courtroom he would have almost certainly mistaken him as the Claimant's barrister, albeit one grasping at
straws, raising irrelevant matters with the intention of hoodwinking the bench. It can therefore be stated
unreservedly that there had been not even a hint of a fair hearing.
There seems no doubt that the judge had acted with intent to pervert the course of justice as he had before him
indisputable evidence that a false and corrupt statement had been made. Granting an order therefore made
him complicit in the Claimant's criminal actions that sought to exploit a complaint to the court for the purposes
of defrauding the Defendant with an attached claim of costs.

Inappropriate Comments / Discrimination

His manner (the judge) was antagonistic and belittling and although there was no retaliation to speak of, the
provocation was such that a conflict could have easily arisen. It is easily seen how such an approach might be
used to distract attention from the case in order to discredit someone or simply to goad someone who the judge
took a personal dislike to. If such incidents have occurred, which is difficult to see how they could not have,
based upon my experience, I would fully support anyone who has fallen victim who might now, for example be
on a charge for contempt of court, as a consequence of the provocation.
His concluding comments in so far as they can be recalled were that hed listened for half an hour to an
outburst of political diatribe for which only 5 minutes made any sense. This can only be put down to his inability
(or demonstration thereof) to understand the representations which had in any event been submitted as
detailed written evidence. The diatribe referred to can only reasonably be put down to a couple of issues raised.
A reference to the misconduct of the Justices Clerk for the Humber and South Yorkshire which is considered so
serious as to warrant answering charges of misconduct in public office is one. Secondly, a matter which the
Claimant relied on was contended as being misleading evidence (additional to the false statement).
As for the political reference, it was merely pointed out that the issues were of general public importance as
they could detrimentally affect significant numbers and more so since government reforms introduced changes
to council tax benefits. These issues were material to the case and did not exceed a brief mention as the judge
made it plain that they were not matters worthy of consideration, presumably because they were not favourable
to the outcome that had obviously been pre-determined in the interest of the Claimant. Again everything
relevant to these points was set out in the written evidence.
His comments were far from the most tactful thing to say to someone, who whilst over the period of time that
the judge will have received over half a million pounds of taxpayer's money, has had no remuneration
whatsoever for consistently and voluntarily dedicating around 15 hours a day, 7 days a week to matters
concerning the wholesale fraud, which it has become obvious is endorsed by people appointed in a judicial
capacity.
The judge was acting beyond his authority when again in his belittling manner his interrogation turned to an
irrelevant matter concerning the number of payments, in what sum those payments were made and the method
chosen for paying council tax instalments. It irked him, so much so, that he enquired if a bank account was held
and why payments werent made by standing order like everyone else. It wasnt for the court to lay blame
elsewhere for the Claimant exploiting its council tax processing system as a means of defrauding taxpayers.
Unashamed bias was displayed again when the judge referred to previous maladministration, similarly in
respect of misallocated payments, for which 27 days was taken by the Claimant to respond and resolve the
matter, by which time reminders and a summons were wrongly issued. The facts were distorted out of all
recognition and portrayed in the courtroom to be the Defendants fault for the Claimants gross error. The judge
was again noticeably irked to the point that he was motivated to make a spurious statement which was that the
Claimant, as a consequence, had a right to demand subsequent years liability up-front thus removing the
statutory instalment entitlement.
Misuse of Judicial Powers
Not withstanding his reliance on a statement which he knew was false, the judge acted outside his powers by
granting the order. The regulations governing council tax liability do not give the court authority to make an
order when the defendant has proved that there is no outstanding debt. No discretion in such cases is given to
impose a penalty (especially not for ones own perverse gratification) which is what the judge did in this case by
allowing the application and granting costs, based on his own opinion differing from the Defendants about how,
and in what manner bills are paid.

Neither is the court allowed discretion in the amount of costs it orders. The regulations restrict the level so that
no more than the expenditure incurred by the applicant in respect of instituting the complaint is rechargeable to
the defendant. The breakdown contained indisputable evidence that the vast majority of the costs claimed were
not incurred by the Claimant in respect of instituting the complaint in the Defendants case. The judge approved
the level from a brief glance of the breakdown. It was then explained to him that the costs itemised referred
largely to council resources dealing with enquiries, rescheduling and monitoring payment plans etc. and
subsidising bad debt for which none could be attributable to the Defendants summons. A detailed analysis in
this regard had in any event been submitted in the written evidence.
The order was not made because there was a legal obligation, but for what appeared to be the assistance that
imposing a financial penalty might provide in coercing the Defendant into conceding and making payments in
line with the Claimant's preferred method.
There was a substantial amount of evidence before the court. Had due process followed and the
representations considered objectively it is inconceivable that the judge would have determined the case in the
way he did. He seemed to view his role as a disciplinarian rather than someone who was duty bound to deliver
a decision based on the legal arguments that were before him.
It is appreciated that a complaint cannot consider the judge's decision (that is now a police matter), but this is
not a complaint about that, rather it concerns the failure to carry out his duties in an unbiased way and for that
reason unfit to sit on the bench in a court of law and should no longer be allowed to for the sake of future
potential victims of the judicial system.

Annex A to C
The misconduct is of such a serious nature that should the concerns raised be misjudged and no action taken
as a consequence, the justice systems reputation will be seriously at stake. That is why material has been
included in Annex A to C which demonstrates, for want of a better phrase, that it is beyond reasonable doubt,
that the Defendant has been stitched-up by what points to a criminal conspiracy between the Claimant and the
court.

Annex A
Contained here is an exhibit identified as NELC12. In its Witness Statement, the Claimant refers to the letters
in that exhibit to justify having no further reason to believe that the costs were being disputed because the
Defendant had withdrawn his application for the Judicial review of the costs.
It is not only clear from the content of the Defendants letter dated 20 November 2013 that the application to
state a case regarding costs had not been withdrawn (only the claim for a mandatory order), but the letter was
not a copy of the original. It is beyond all reasonable doubt that the Claimant had sourced those letters from a
public forum, the same forum which it had sourced the contents of another of its exhibits (NELC11).

Annex B
The letters contained in Annex A had been redacted and matched the entries that were posted on the public
forum as seen in Annex B. The forum is the only place from which those letters could be sourced in that
redacted form. The characteristics of the letters which the Claimant submitted to the court were identical to the
forum posts.

Clearly the Claimant had not sought the original letters and had presumably for convenience consulted the
public forum on which all letters connected with the matter (albeit redacted) where conveniently in one place. It
is a reasonably assumption that if on this occasion the Claimant consulted the forum to produce its exhibit, it
would have done so subsequently where further updates on that forum continued providing evidence that the
case stated was still very much being pursued. That would only reinforce the established fact and so does not
matter whether the Claimant did or did not continued monitoring the forum, as the crux of the matter is that the
post (Annex A) from which the content was sourced was accompanied with some commentary which reinforced
the matter in itself. Crucially the commentary ended with this sentence: the next move will be to arrange to
appear before the Magistrates' Court to agree terms of a recognizance.

Annex C
The exhibit (NELC1) is the Defendants 2015/16 council tax bill (demand notice) which displays unambiguously
at the bottom of the document that an amount of 60.00 is a sum which is subject to Court Proceedings. The
same has been included on each of the Defendants demand notices ever since the appeal, by way of a case
stated, was instituted.
Allegations of Judicial Misconduct
For the avoidance of doubt, this does not constitute an appeal of the courts decision, it is a complaint made in
accordance with the Judicial Conduct (Judicial and other office holders) Rules 2014 about the judges conduct
on several counts which are set out in detail above and itemised as follows:

i)

Professional Misconduct

ii)

Criminal Allegations

iii)

Inappropriate Comments / Discrimination

iv)

Misuse of Judicial Powers

I confirm that the information I have provided is correct.

Judicial Conduct and Investigations Office, Royal Courts of Justice,
Queens Building, Strand, London WC2A 2LL
Enquiry Line: 020 7073 4719
JCIO Complaint form (09.13)

Fax: 020 7073 4725

Annex A

Grimsby Magistrates Court

Claimant
North East Lincolnshire Council

V
Defendant

This is exhibit NELC12 as referred to in the

Application for Liability Order

Administrative Court Office at Leeds

Leeds Combined Court
1 Oxford Row
Leeds

Your ref: CO/7281/2013

20 November 2013

Dear Sir/Madam

Re: The Queen on the application of [.................................................. .......] v GRIMSBY MAGISTRATES COURT
I'm asked to advise the court whether I will be withdrawing this judicial review claim as it deems there
to be no longer a need for further action on the part of the High Court.

Representations have been made upon the draft case though I've neither entered into a recognizance
nor since been asked to. The purpose of the judicial review claim was, I believed, to mandate the
Justices to state the case without being subject to terms of a recognizance.

I had viewed that agreeing such terms would pose risks, potentially greater than subjecting myself to
forfeiture of the proposed sum if, for example, to avoid a penalty the appeal was prosecuted
knowing that the stated case omitted the points in law I was questioning. In terms of successfully
appealing the decision I would be disadvantaged from the outset and disproportionately exposed to
the financial risks of incurring costs. It could be argued that in these circumstances, requiring
recognizance would either be denying my access to justice or unduly burdening me financially, as
presently I'm in receipt of no income.

Although the claim prompted service of the draft case, it still remains that delivery of the final signed
case has, in accordance with CrimPR Part 64, rule 64.3(7), overrun by approximately two months.
Presumably then, the agreement detailed in the acknowledgement of service was only to serve the
draft case.

I am therefore in the same position now as I was before the claim for a mandatory order as it seems
the Justices will unlikely deliver the signed case unless recognizance is entered into.

However, where my queries with the Magistrates' court went unanswered, the judicial review process
succeeded in drawing from the Clerk that if I had appeared before the court to enter into a
recognizance, its appropriateness and/or the amount could have been considered. This is exactly the
information I was seeking and would never have obtained had I not proceeded with this claim for
judicial review.

Knowing as I do now, that a possibility exists to negotiate terms which are mutually acceptable, it
seems arranging to appear before the court to enter into a recognizance is now appropriate.

In light of the Justices expressing regard for the Administrative Court's time and public money, it
would also seem appropriate, if, whilst appearing before the Magistrates' Court to agree terms of a
recognizance, I also seek agreement to terms of an order that the court consider the matter on the
papers and that there be no order as to costs, as the case involves a matter of general public
importance.

After considering the options that appear available to me now, please take this as formal notice that I
am withdrawing this judicial review claim.

HM Courts & Tribunals Service

Administrative Court Office at Leeds
Leeds Combined Court
1 Oxford Row
Leeds
West Yorkshire
LS1 3BG
25 November 2013
Our ref: CO/7281/2013
Your ref:

Dear Sir/Madam
Re The Queen on the application of [.................................................. .......] versus GRIMSBY MAGISTRATES
COURT
I am writing to inform you that your letter in the above case was received by this office on 22/11/2013.

Unless you hear from us within four weeks from the date of this letter, you can assume that your letter
to withdraw has been accepted and the Court file has been closed.

Please note that all copy documents in the above matter will be destroyed immediately following the
closure of the case, unless you have already notified the court that you would like them returned.

If you require any further information, please contact the Administrative Court Office General Office on
0113 306 2578.

Annex B

Annex C

Grimsby Magistrates Court

Claimant
North East Lincolnshire Council

V
Defendant

This is exhibit NELC1 as referred to in the

Application for Liability Order