Uniquene

US anti-submarine warfare is on the decline

Keller 12, (U.S. anti-submarine capability is eroding, and it may be too late to turn it around John - editorin-chief of Military & Aerospace Electronics magazine, 2012, http://www.militaryaerospace.com/blogs/aerospacedefense-blog/2012/12/u-s-anti-submarine-capability-is-eroding-and-it-may-be-too-late-to-turn-it-around.html, GV)
Here's a not-so-comforting thought. The U.S. Navy's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) skills are getting
rusty during the same period that quiet submarine technology in China and Iran is improving at a noticeable rate. I

We have U.S. ASW

capability going backward, submarine capability of U.S. strategic adversaries going forward, and U.S.
Navy capability as a whole in decline , according to a top Navy official. "We're long past the point of
doing more with less," says Under Secretary of the Navy, Robert Work. " We are going to be doing less
with less in the future."
wish that were the only bad news on the submarine warfare front, but it isn't.

Links

Satellites
Satellites increase ocean knowledge which is key to antisubmarine warfare.
Chu et al. 6, (Impact of GFO Satellite on Naval Antisubmarine Warfare Dr. Peter C. Chu, LT Guillermo
Amezaga - Naval Ocean Analysis and Prediction Laboratory Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, CDR
Eric L. Gottshall - Office of Naval Research Global, Mr. David Cwalina Naval Undersea Warfare Center, 2006,
http://faculty.nps.edu/pcchu/web_paper/proceedings/nato/nato_06_chu.pdf, GV)

The outcome of a battlefield engagement is often determined by the advantages

and disadvantages held by each adversary. On the modern battlefield, the possessor of the best technology often has the
upper hand, but only if that advanced technology is used properly and efficiently. In order to exploit this
advantage and optimize the effectiveness of high technology sensor and weapon systems, it is
essential to understand the impact on them by the environment ( Mancini, 2004). Chu, P.C.;
Amezaga, G.; Gottshall, E.L.; Cwalina, D. (2006) Impact of GFO Satellite on Naval Antisubmarine Warfare. In Emerging and Future
Technologies for Space Based Operations Support to NATO Military Operations (pp. 9-1 9-26). Meeting Proceedings RTO-MP-RTBSPSM-001, Paper 9. Neuilly-sur-Seine, France: RTO. Available from: http://www.rto.nato.int/abstracts.asp. Impact of GFO Satellite on
Naval Antisubmarine Warfare 9 - 2 RTO-MP-RTB-SPSM-001 UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED

Understanding the ocean environment is imperative and directly coupled to the

successful performance of ASW sensors and subsequent employment of an ASW
weapon system. In order to optimize the performance of ASW sensors and weapons systems, it is crucial to gain
an understanding of the acoustic wave propagation in the ocean. Having an
accurate depiction of the ocean environment is therefore directly related to gaining
a better understanding of the acoustic wave propagation . How acoustic waves propagate from one
location to another under water is determined by many factors, some of which are described by the sound speed profile (SSP). If the
environmental properties of temperature and salinity are known over the entire depth range, the SSP can be compiled by using

The satellites use

radiometers to measure the thermal radiation emitted by the sea surface (from which sea
surface temperature is derived) and radar altimeters to measure sea surface height (SSH). The
satellite data assimilation of SSH into MODAS was previously studied by Chu et al. (2004a) and Chu et al. (2006). Chu et al.
them in an empirical formula to calculate the expected sound speed in a vertical column of water.

(2004a) compared the acoustic coverage of the Generalized Digital Environmental Model (GDEM) and MODAS, with SSH data
assimilation, and Perry found that MODAS provided more realistic acoustic coverage than GDEM. Mancini compared the acoustic
coverage of MODAS, without SSH data assimilation, and MODAS, with SSH data assimilation. Mancini found that MODAS, with SSH
assimilation, provided more realistic acoustic coverage than MODAS, without SSH data assimilation.
However, value-added of the Navys satellite (GFO) on the Naval ASW has not been studied. MODAS, with SSH data assimilation,
gives a better depiction of the ocean environment. Altimeters that have different exact overhead repeat period will have different
temporal and spatial resolutions. An altimeters capability to resolve mesoscale features in the ocean is directly relate to the
altimeters exact overhead repeat period. MODAS fields derived from an altimeter with an exact overhead repeat pattern designed to
detect mesocale features should be different from MODAS fields derived from an altimeter that is not designed to detect mesocale
features, especially in regions of high mesoscale variability. Large differences in the MODAS fields are related to different depictions
of the undersea environment. The differences in the depiction of undersea environment may then change the outcome of a tactical
engagement. This study tries to answer the following question: What is the impact of the Navys satellite (GFO) on the Naval ASW?
This question is answered through studying the sensitivity of an ASW weapon system of a naval ASW system, specifically the Mk 48
torpedo WAPP, to satellite altimeter orbit. The sensitivity analysis is conducted by examining the relative difference (RD) in the
output of WAPP when two different SSP input fields. The only difference is how to establish these SSP fields, one from MODAS using
TOPEX/POSEIDON (T/P) altimetry data and the other from MODAS using GFO altimetry data. The parameters in WAPP are held
constant; therefore, any differences in the output were attributed to differences in the input. The two areas below (Figure1) are
selected for analysis because of the high mesocale variability (Figure 2) and tactical significance. The northern box is hereby
referred to as the East China Sea (ECS) and is bound by 25D N, 30D N, 120D E, and 130D E. The southern box is hereby referred to
as the South China Sea (SCS) and is bound by 19D N, 23D N, 118D E, and 123D E. Data analysis was conducted in the ECS and SCS
during the winter and summer of 2001. Six days (5, 10, 15, 20 25 and 30) and two months (JAN 2001 and JUL 2001) were selected
for analysis in each box. A total of 24 cases (2 areas of interest, 2 months, and 6 days in each month) were analyzed

Ocean Knowledge Exploration

Increase in ocean knowledge is key to ASW.
Harding and Rigney 6, (OPERATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHY IN THE U.S. NAVY: A GODAE
PERSPECTIVE, John Harding and James Rigney - U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office, Stennis Space Center, 2006,
http://coaps.fsu.edu/pub/eric/RSMAS/GODAE_School/GODAE_Book/Chap21-Harding.pdf, GV)

Transformation, in response to the U.S. naval warfighters changing environmental needs , captures the
essence of the evolution of U.S. Naval operational oceanography . From its 19th century
genesis under Matthew Fontaine Maury and his immediate predecessors to the 21st century needs of today,
operational oceanography has continued to adapt. U.S. naval oceanography first grew from Navy concerns for
safety of navigation, more specifically the creation and archiving of navigational charts. By the middle of the 20th

increasing oceanographic support for mine warfare (MIW), amphibious

warfare (AW), and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) (Pinsel, 1982). With the threat of undersea
launched nuclear missiles, ASW became the dominant concern of naval operational
oceanography in the last half of the 20th century through the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. 468 JOHN
century, World War II required

HARDING AND JAMES RIGNEY With the Cold War over, Navy leadership again reemphasized the importance of
nearshore warfare requirements (Dalton et al., 1994; Kelso et al., 1992) such as MIW and AW and with a growing

ASW, no longer the dominant warfare area, remained a

significant requirement and again has arisen in importance in the 21st century
important role for naval special warfare (NSW).

(Kreisher, 2004). Technological change has greatly influenced the nature of these transformations. The longer time

navigational charting and ocean data base creation , while still important, are being
superseded by more immediate response capabilities where near-real-time
oceanographic knowledge can now provide relevant environmental information within
scales of

the warfighters tactical decision loop (Burnett et al., 2002). Key to this faster response time is the operational

This ability allows the

translation of oceanographic knowledge into operationally significant information,
allowing the warfighter to more efficiently and safely perform his job . Participation by the
oceanographers ability to understand the language and needs of the warfighter.

U.S. Navy in the Global Ocean Data Assimilation Experiment (GODAE) is a key element in providing these relevant,
real-time products. While the regions within ~200 km of coastal regions are presently major concerns for the U.S.
Navy, the GODAE emphasis, namely the creation of assimilative global and regional ocean prediction capability

These larger domain prediction systems can supply

important information to open-ocean ASW needs , provide boundary conditions to high resolution
(Smith and Lefebvre, 1997), is also required.

coastal models, and eventually supply global capability of sufficiently high horizontal resolution to be directly
applicable to the warfighter in nearshore areas.

Impact
Anti-submarine warfare decreases stability.
Kokoshin 11, (Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions,
Andrei- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School, June 2011,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Ensuring%20Strategic%20Stability%20by%20A.%20Kokoshin.pdf, GV)

Strategic stability has one more problem component, which definitely requires more
attention in most instances. This is the activity of anti-submarine force s of the sides, which in
fact can seriously destabilize the situation . And, needless to say, there is always a risk of a
collision of submarines, both attack and strategic submarines. It was once again proven when two
missile-carrying nuclear submarinesFrench (Triomphant-class) and British (Vanguard-class)
collided in the Atlantic on 3 February 2009.111 Repeated attempts by the Russian side to raise
the question of antisubmarine activities in strategic submarine patrol areas were
rejected by the U.S. side without any rational arguments with relation to common
interests concerning securing of strategic stability . In particular, the Soviet side suggested that
the Soviet Union and the United States should reach an agreement on establishment of special zones (for
strategic missile-carrying submarines on combat patrol missions), where any antisubmarine activities
of the other side would be prohibited. The major challenge related to
accomplishment of this task is development of proper verification procedures and
measures to control the abidance by such agreement. However, discussion of this issue while
preparing for the U.S.-Russia talks seems expedient. Due to the reduction of the number of Russias strategic
missile-carrying submarines, this issue is even more topical for us. On 25 May 1972, the U.S. and Soviet
Governments signed the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (which was modified and amended in 1979 and
1986 by mutual agreement of the parties). This agreement played an important role in securing strategic stability
and resulted in a drastic reduction of the number of incidents involving ship and aircraft collisions.

Collapse of strategic stability leads to nuclear war

Kokoshin 11, (Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions,
Andrei- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School, June 2011,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Ensuring%20Strategic%20Stability%20by%20A.%20Kokoshin.pdf, GV)

The core of the modern military and strategic balance is its most dangerous and destructive
component: nuclear forces and means, starting with strategic assets. In this context, there are very close connections among the

the stability of
the balance, especially in the event of nuclear stalemate, is essentially influenced by their generalpurpose forces and conventional arms. The concept of stability is implied to
estimate how easy it is to startle and destabilize a system in this instance, the super-system of
strategic nuclear interactionout of its current state.27 This concept logically implies an estimate of the
risk of an outbreak of nuclear war , in view of the given correlation and structure of the
parties military forces and, first and foremost, the strategic potential of those forces. The main aspect of stability is
the existence of a certain potential barrier that, if cleared as a result of some
external disturbance, would cause the transition of the strategic military supersystem into a qualitatively new statefrom the typical interactions of peacetime to the interactions that are
characteristic of the fundamentally different logic of military conflict, a logic that leads to a nuclear , strategic war.
two sides separate offensive and defensive forces and within each of their military forces. At the same time,

ASW capabilities put countries on hair trigger alert and make a

first strike inevitable.
Uhlig 83, (BEFORE HIGH NOON, Mark - associate editor of Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, December
6, 1983, http://www.nytimes.com/1983/12/06/opinion/before-high-noon.html GV)
A second crucial arms-control tool spurned by the Administration is negotiation toward the banning or restriction of missile flight
tests. Such tests are essential for further development of the highly accurate ''silo- busting'' missiles that can reliably destroy an
adversary's weapons sites. A flight-test ban would thus greatly inhibit the acquisition of first- strike capabilities. It would also help
block testing of ''depressed-trajectory'' flight paths, which would shorten the flight time of submarine-launched missiles in order to

we can still contain - if not prevent - qualitative

improvements. One is submarine detection and anti-submarine warfare - a field in which a
major technological breakthrough could overturn the nuclear balance virtually
overnight. This risk could be hedged considerably by negotiation of so-called submarine sanctuaries, which would protect
help achieve surprise in a first strike. In other areas,

submarine-based deterrent forces by placing them in large, specified ocean areas where enemy access is restricted. Finally, on a

sustained efforts must be made to ne gotiate new ways of monitoring

and verifying all categories of nuclear weapons activity. The verification question governs virtually
much broader level,

all aspects of arms control, because it defines the boundaries of confident negotiation. Yet, the major obstacles to progress in this
field - on-site inspection of weapons facilities, for example - arise from political, rather than technical, considerations. Even modest
progress on such issues could thus make possible a wide variety of new and effective arms restrictions. In the absence of these
kinds of initiatives, we are headed for a very different strategic world - one in which few of the current restraints against nuclear war
will apply. The initial steps toward a first-strike capability already have been made on both sides, in the advanced Soviet SS-18 and

real dangers, however, lie ahead, when development of terminally

anti-submarine warfare and other attack technologies will make such first-strike
potential inescapable. We can and must avoid such a hair- trigger world. This - far more than
American MX missile programs. The
guided warheads, advanced

endless arguments over arbitrary ceilings on weapons - will be the necessary focus of meaningful arms control in the years ahead.