Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
5 November 2015
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 69861/11) against the
Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(the Convention) by a Chinese national, Ms Qing Xu (the applicant), on
6 November 2011.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr V. Carreto Ribeiro, a lawyer
practising in Torres Vedras. The Portuguese Government (the
Government) were represented by their Agent, Mrs M. F. da Graa
Carvalho, Deputy Attorney General.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that her pre-trial detention had
been arbitrary, unreasonably lengthy and because of her foreign nationality.
4. On 2 September 2014 the application was communicated to the
Government.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Parede. At the material
time, she was working as a Chinese-Portuguese translator and was married
to a Portuguese national.
6. On 16 December 2010 criminal proceedings were initiated against the
applicant, her husband and others by a public prosecutor of the Central
12. The investigating judge also remanded the applicant in custody for
the duration of the investigation, noting as follows:
The acts committed by the defendants are objectively serious. [They] are Chinese
nationals, with the exception of defendant J.G. [the applicants husband], raising fears
that when confronted with the seriousness of the facts attributed to them, they would
evade justice and flee to their home country.
It is also evident that there is a risk the investigation will be obstructed with regard
to the gathering of evidence, as there are numerous investigative steps to be carried
out, namely the examination of witnesses.
... taking into account the profits obtained from the criminal activity, it is also
evident that there is a risk that the criminal activity will continue.
...
The defendants Qing Xu and K.G. are primarily responsible for the criminal
organisation acting in Portugal... Thus, having regard to the severity and multiplicity
of the crimes against them, the risk of absconding and ... obstructing the investigation
and finally, it being predicted that a custodial sentence will be imposed after trial, only
detention on remand would be adequate and proportionate to the severity of the facts
and the preventive aims required in this particular case.
With regard to defendants B.G., J.G. [the applicants husband] and M.M., the
application of other preventive measures which would not deprive them of liberty
[medidas no privativas de liberdade] would be proportionate to the purpose of
preventing the above-mentioned risks.
In view of the above:
- defendants K.G, Qing Xu and Z.M. should ... be held in pre-trial detention
pursuant to Articles 191, 193, 196, 202 1 (a) and 204 (a), (b) and (c) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
- defendants B.G, M.M. and J.G. [the applicants husband] are prohibited from
leaving Portugal and must surrender their passports, prohibited from contacting each
other, and must attend their nearest police station on a weekly basis ... the prohibition
on contact does not apply to J.G. and defendant Qing Xu or to B.G. and defendant
K.G., as they live together.
been any justification for her arrest or for the application of the custodial
measure as her family situation, place of residence and other personal
circumstances had not been taken into account when the court had ordered
her detention. She also argued that she had voluntarily shown that she was
available to be questioned by the authorities in April 2011.
14. On 13 July 2011 the public prosecutor in charge of the criminal case
asked the investigating judge to classify the proceedings as particularly
complex, noting that more time was needed to complete the investigation.
15. On 5 August 2011 the investigating judge accepted the public
prosecutors request to classify the proceedings as particularly complex and
extended the pre-trial detention to twelve months, taking into account the
number of applicants and crimes that were being investigated.
16. On 14 September 2011 the Lisbon Court of Appeal dismissed the
applicants appeal against the arrest warrant and upheld the courts decision
of 16 June 2011 to hold her in pre-trial detention. The court held, inter alia,
the following in relation to the lawfulness of the arrest warrant:
...
The public prosecutors reasoning that there were grounds for considering that [the
applicant] would not present herself to the authorities on a scheduled date could not
eventually be justified; however, one cannot say that the arrest warrant was unlawful
because of that.
17. The applicant filed a request for clarification with the Lisbon Court
of Appeal regarding its decision of 14 September. On 2 November 2011 it
was rejected.
18. Between October 2011 and February 2012 the applicant lodged three
requests with the investigating judge of the Lisbon Criminal Investigation
Court asking for her release and the remand in custody to be replaced with
police supervision pending trial or house arrest with electronic surveillance,
reiterating that there was no risk of her absconding or continuing criminal
activity, that she had contacted the police voluntarily, that she had not
committed the alleged crimes, that she was a mother of two children living
in Portugal, and that she had a permanent place of residence there.
19. On 12 October 2011, 13 December 2011 and 13 February 2012 the
investigating judge of the Lisbon Criminal Investigation Court upheld the
decision to maintain her in pre-trial detention, noting as follows:
A. Decision of 12 October 2011
... the requirements for the order [of pre-trial detention] remain unchanged and
strengthened. For that reason, [the defendants] should remain in pre-trial detention
pending trial (Article 213 1 a) of the CCP).
20. Between October 2011 and February 2012 the applicant also lodged
two requests with the Prosecutor Generals Office to have the criminal
inquiry expedited (pedido de acelerao processual).
21. On 9 November 2011 and 20 February 2012 the Prosecutor
Generals Office rejected the request. It substantiated its decisions by the
fact that the requests were manifestly ill-founded, given the complexity of
the proceedings and the fact that the investigation was under way.
22. On 19 March, 30 May, 30 August and 19 November 2012 the
investigating judge reviewed the grounds for application of the applicants
pre-trial detention, in accordance with Article 213 1 of the CCP. He noted
that they remained unchanged and, therefore, upheld the custodial measure
applied in respect of the applicant.
23. On an unspecified date the applicant was indicted and her case sent to
the Lisbon Criminal Court for trial.
24. On 29 January 2013 the investigating judge decided to release the
applicant from pre-trial detention and place her under house arrest with
electronic surveillance. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:
From the analysis of the case file ... there are no new facts capable of affecting the
strong grounds surrounding the acts attributable to the defendants; nor does it seem
that the risks mentioned [in the 16 June 2011 order] have ceased to exist.
From the evidence provided to date, namely with regard to their personal and family
circumstances, less severe preventive measures can be applied in respect of the
defendants. The risk of absconding still exists; however, it can be safeguarded through
electronic surveillance.
provides sufficient grounds for believing that the suspect or accused may:
(i) abscond or present a risk of absconding; (ii) obstruct the normal course
of the inquiry or preliminary investigative stage and, in particular, hinder
the collection, preservation or veracity of evidence; (3) due to the nature and
circumstances of the offence or his personality, continue his criminal
activity or seriously disturb public order and the peace.
33. Under Article 213 1, the investigating judge must review the
grounds for application of a custodial measure at least every three months.
34. Article 215 sets the time-limit for detention on remand, which is a
year and two months from the relevant order in the event there is no
conviction at first instance, or after a year and six months if there is no res
judicata conviction (Article 215 1). These time limits may be extended up
to a year and six months and two years respectively, in cases involving,
among other things, organised crime (Article 215 2).
35. Under Article 254 1, detention is aimed at (i) bringing a detainee
before a judge within forty-eight hours to be questioned and have a
preventive measure applied in respect of him or her; and (ii) assuring his or
her presence before a judicial authority immediately, or failing that, within
no more than twenty-four hours.
36. Under Article 257 1, an arrest in the situation where the suspect is
not caught in the act (fora de flagrante delito) may only be made upon the
order of a judge or public prosecutor where there are well-grounded reasons
for believing that the suspect will not voluntarily present him or herself to
the authorities in the period established by them, in cases in which pre-trial
detention is permitted.
B. Extradition agreement between Portugal and the Peoples
Republic of China
37. A treaty on extradition between Portugal and the Peoples Republic
of China was signed in Beijing on 31 January 2007. The relevant provisions
of the agreement are as follows:
Article 1 Obligation to extradition
Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and at the
request of the other Party, to extradite to each other persons found in its territory and
wanted by the other Party for the purpose of conducting criminal proceedings against
or executing [a] sentence imposed on that person.
Article 3 Mandatory grounds for refusal
1. Extradition shall be refused if:
...
d) The person sought is a national of the Requested Party at the time the request for
extradition is received by the Requested Party;
...
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 1 (c) OF THE
CONVENTION
39. Relying on Article 5 of the Convention, the applicant complained
that her arrest and detention had been arbitrary. The Court takes the view
that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 5 1 (c) of the
Convention, which reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law:
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
A. Admissibility
40. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 3 (a) of the Convention, and that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties submissions
41. The applicant claimed that her arrest and detention were arbitrary
and unlawful.
42. The Government contended that the deprivation of the applicants
liberty had been Convention compliant, having been ordered by a competent
court, in strict compliance with domestic law, and effected for the purpose
of bringing her before the competent legal authority, there being a
reasonable suspicion that she had committed several criminal offences, for
which she was being investigated.
43. They noted that both the investigating judge and Lisbon Court of
Appeal had found that the grounds for the applicants detention had not
ceased to exist. The possibility of releasing her on bail or placing her under
electronic surveillance had been examined, but the courts had found that
these measures would not have ruled out the possibility of her absconding,
obstructing the establishment of the truth or influencing witnesses.
2. The Courts assessment
(a) General principles
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whether this law has been complied with (Toshev v. Bulgaria, no. 56308/00,
58, 10 August 2006, and Shteyn (Stein) v. Russia, no. 23691/06, 89 and
94, 18 June 2009).
45. It further reiterates that under Article 5 1 (c) a person may be
detained in the context of criminal proceedings only for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion
of his having committed an offence. A reasonable suspicion that a
criminal offence has been committed presupposes the existence of facts or
information that would satisfy an objective observer that the person
concerned may have committed an offence (Woch v. Poland, no. 27785/95,
108, ECHR 2000-XI).
(b) Application of those principles to the present case
46. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes
that on 9 June 2011 the public prosecutor of the Central Department of
Investigation and Prosecution in Lisbon ordered the applicants arrest on
suspicion of money laundering, forgery and aiding illegal immigration and
because of a risk she might abscond, obstruct the investigation or continue
the alleged criminal activity (see paragraph 8 above). The Court notes that
the arrest warrant was issued within the public prosecutors powers and with
the aim of bringing the applicant before a judge, as required by Articles 254
1 and 257 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
47. The applicant was subsequently arrested on 14 June 2011 and
brought before a judge on 15 June 2011, within forty-eight hours of the
arrest, as required by Article 254 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see
paragraph 35 above).
48. On 16 June 2011 the investigating judge remanded the applicant in
custody on the basis of a number of considerations, including the
seriousness of the charges against her, the existence of a reasonable
suspicion that she had committed the offences of aiding illegal immigration,
money laundering and forgery, and because there was reason to believe that
she was the leader in Portugal of an international organised crime group.
The investigating judge also considered that there was a risk of the applicant
absconding, obstructing the investigation or continuing criminal activity
(see paragraph 12 above). The decision to remand her in custody was
upheld by the Lisbon Court of Appeal on 14 September 2011 (see paragraph
16 above).
49. In this regard the Court notes that both the public prosecutor and the
investigating judge acted within their powers and in compliance with the
Portuguese rules of criminal procedure when issuing the arrest warrant and
detention order (see paragraphs 28-36 above).The Court does not overlook
the fact that the applicant sent letters to the domestic authorities informing
them that she was available to present herself for questioning (see paragraph
7 above), whereas the domestic authorities did not invite the applicant to do
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so. However, it takes further note that the domestic authorities based their
decisions on other grounds under domestic law, namely the risk of
obstruction to the investigation and the risk of continuing criminal activity.
50. The Court concludes that the applicants initial arrest and detention
were based on relevant and sufficient grounds (see paragraphs 8 and 12
above). Consequently, the Court sees no reason to consider these decisions
unlawful.
51. It follows that there has been no violation of Article 5 1 (c) with
respect to the applicants arrest and detention on 14 and 16 June 2011.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 3 OF THE CONVENTION
52. The applicant complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, that
her pre-trial detention from 14 June 2011 until 30 January 2013 had been
unreasonably lengthy. The Court will examine the complaint under Article 5
3 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provision of paragraph 1 (c)
of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release
pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
A. Admissibility
53. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 3 (a) of the Convention, and that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties submissions
54. The applicant argued that her detention had been unreasonably
lengthy and that the domestic courts had not addressed her personal and
family circumstances when reviewing the detention on remand. They had
also failed to assess whether less severe preventive measures could had been
applied.
55. The Government contested that argument. They considered that the
length of the applicants pre-trial detention had been reasonable. The
applicants detention had been justified by the complexity of the criminal
proceedings, which had involved several suspects and multiple counts of
various crimes. The investigation had required very extensive work,
including technical examinations, international cooperation and translations.
The complexity of the proceedings had allowed the pre-trial detention timelimit to be extended.
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56. The Court first reiterates that, in determining the length of pre-trial
detention under Article 5 3 of the Convention, the period to be taken into
consideration begins on the day the accused is taken into custody and ends
on the day when the charge is determined, even if only by a court of first
instance, or, possibly, when the applicant is released from custody pending
criminal proceedings against him (see Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826/03,
112, 22 May 2012, with further references).
57. The question whether a period of time spent in pre-trial detention is
reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract. Whether it is reasonable for
an accused to remain in detention must be assessed on the facts of each case
and according to its specific features. Continued detention can be justified in
a given case only if there are actual indications of a genuine requirement of
public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence,
outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty laid down in Article 5 of
the Convention (see Idalov, cited above, 139, and Kuda v. Poland [GC],
no. 30210/96, 110 et seq., ECHR 2000-XI).
58. The existence and persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the
person arrested has committed an offence is a prerequisite for the lawfulness
of the continued detention. However, after a certain amount of time has
elapsed it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish
whether the other grounds cited by the judicial authorities continued to
justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are relevant and
sufficient, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national
authorities displayed special diligence in the conduct of the proceedings
(see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, 152 and 153, ECHR 2000-IV).
Justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be
convincingly demonstrated by the authorities (see Shishkov v. Bulgaria,
no. 38822/97, 66, ECHR 2003-I (extracts)). Arguments for and against
release must not be general and abstract (see Smirnova v. Russia,
nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, 63, ECHR 2003-IX (extracts)). When
deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are
obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial
(see Idalov, cited above, 140, and Suslov v. Russia, no. 2366/07, 86,
29 May 2012, with further references).
59. The responsibility lies primarily with the national judicial authorities
to ensure that in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused person
does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must examine all the
facts arguing for or against the existence of a public interest which justifies
a departure from the rule in Article 5, paying particular regard to the
principle of the presumption of innocence, and must set them out in their
decisions on the applications for release. To establish whether the detention
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60. The Court observes that the applicants complaint under Article 5
3 concerns her detention from 14 June 2011, when she was arrested, to
30 January 2013, when she was placed under house arrest. It notes that her
complaint does not concern the period she was under house arrest. The
Courts analysis of the length of detention will therefore only take into
account the period 14 June 2011 to 30 January 2013. The applicant thus
spent a year, seven months and eighteen days in detention during the
judicial proceedings. The length of her detention is a matter of concern for
the Court. The presumption being in favour of release, the Portuguese
authorities were required to put forward very weighty reasons for keeping
her in detention for such a long time.
61. The Court notes that the investigating judges decision on 16 June
2011 to apply a custodial measure in respect of the applicant was based on a
number of considerations, including the seriousness of the charges against
her, the existence of a reasonable suspicion that she had committed the
offences of aiding illegal immigration, money laundering and forgery, and
because there was reason to believe she was the leader in Portugal of an
international organised crime group. The Court accepts that in cases
concerning alleged organised crime, the risk that a detainee might put
pressure on witnesses or might otherwise obstruct the proceedings if
released is often particularly high. These factors can justify a longer period
of detention; however, they do not give the authorities unlimited power to
extend the preventive measure (see, Celejewski v. Poland, no. 17584/04,
37-38, 4 May 2006, and Osuch v. Poland, no. 31246/02, 26,
14 November 2006). Furthermore, the investigating judge considered that,
in view of the fact that the applicant was of Chinese nationality (see
paragraph 12 above) there was a risk of her absconding. Lastly, the
investigating judge considered that there was a risk of her obstructing the
investigation and continuing criminal activity. This reasoning was later
reiterated by the Lisbon Court of Appeal on 14 September 2011 when it
examined and rejected her request for release, having established no
grounds for replacing detention on remand with a more lenient preventive
measure (see paragraph 16 above).
62. The Court has already established (see paragraphs 46-51 above) that
at that initial stage, the applicants detention was based on relevant and
sufficient grounds. However, with the passage of time those grounds
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A. Admissibility
73. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 3 (a) of the Convention, and that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties submissions
74. The applicant submitted that she had been detained on remand
because she was a foreign national.
75. The Government submitted that the applicant had not been
discriminated against on the grounds of her national origin, as prohibited by
Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 5 1 of the Convention. In fact,
two other Chinese nationals in the same criminal proceedings had not been
held in pre-trial detention.
76. The Government acknowledged that the applicants nationality had
been one of the reasons used to justify her pre-trial detention; however, this
reference had been made to explain the severity of one of the crimes
imputed to the applicant, aiding Chinese illegal immigration, and the
probable risk of her absconding. Nevertheless, the Government stressed that
reference to the applicants nationality and the characteristics of the Chinese
community in Portugal had in no way been made with discriminatory intent.
2. The Courts assessment
(a) Applicability of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 5 1 (c) of
the Convention
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79. The Court has established in its case-law that in order for an issue to
arise under Article 14 there must be a difference in treatment of persons in
analogous or relevantly similar situations (see, inter alia, D.H. and Others
v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, 175, ECHR 2007-IV, and Clift
v. the United Kingdom, no. 7205/07, 66, 13 July 2010). The Court notes
that the requirement to demonstrate an analogous position does not
require that the comparator groups be identical. An applicant must
demonstrate that, having regard to the particular nature of his or her
complaint, he or she was in a relevantly similar situation to others treated
differently (see Clift, cited above, 66).
80. Article 14 prohibits differences in treatment based on an identifiable,
objective or personal characteristic or status by which persons or groups
of persons are distinguishable from one another (see Kafkaris, 160, and
Clift, 55, both cited above).
81. Such a difference in treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective
and reasonable justification; in other words, if it does not pursue a
legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see Burden
v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, 60, ECHR 2008; Andrejeva v.
Latvia [GC], no. 55707/00, 81, ECHR 2009; and Sejdi and Finci
v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, 42, ECHR
2009).
82. The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in
assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar
situations justify a difference in treatment (see Gaygusuz v. Austria,
16 September 1996, 42, Reports 1996-IV, and Burden, cited above, 60).
The scope of this margin will vary according to the circumstances, the
subject matter and its background (see Andrejeva, 82, and Sejdi
and Finci, 42, both cited above). While in principle a wide margin of
appreciation applies in questions of prisoner and penal policy, the Court
must nonetheless exercise close scrutiny where there is a complaint that
domestic measures have resulted in detention which was arbitrary or
unlawful (see Clift, cited above, 73). Very weighty reasons would have to
be put forward for the Court to regard a difference in treatment based
exclusively on the grounds of nationality as compatible with the Convention
(see Gaygusuz, 42, and Andrejeva, 87, both cited above).
83. As to the burden of proof in relation to Article 14 of the Convention,
the Court has previously held that once an applicant has shown a difference
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84. The applicants complaint under Article 14 relates to the fact that she
was held in pre-trial detention on account of her Chinese nationality.
85. The Court notes that in the instant case, there were six defendants
being investigated in the same criminal proceedings, all suspected of being
part of the same criminal group. From those six defendants, five were
Chinese nationals and one, the applicants husband, a Portuguese national.
The Court secondly observes that three of the applicants were held in pretrial detention and the other three, one of whom was the applicants
husband, were not (see paragraph 12 above).
86. Even assuming that a distinction was made on the grounds of the
applicants nationality, the Court cannot ignore the particular aims of her
pre-trial detention and the existence of relevant grounds which may
justify its application differently to her co-defendants in the proceedings.
87. In the instant case, the Court observes that both the investigating
judge from the Lisbon Criminal Investigation Court and the Lisbon Court of
Appeal made reference to the applicants nationality in their decisions of
16 June and 14 September 2011 ordering and upholding her detention on
remand. In these decisions (see paragraphs 12 and 16 above), the fact that
the applicant was a Chinese national was used for assessing the risk of her
obstructing the investigation and absconding and was therefore one of the
factors which determined her detention.
88. The Court has already held that the danger of a person absconding
cannot be gauged solely on the basis of the severity of the possible sentence;
it must be assessed with reference to a number of other relevant factors
which may either confirm the existence of that risk or make it appear so
slight that it cannot justify pre-trial detention. In this connection, particular
regard must be had to the character of the person involved, his morals,
assets, links with the State in which he is being prosecuted and international
contacts (see Bolech v. Switzerland, no. 30138/12, 47, 29 October 2013).
The Court has also acknowledged that being of a nationality of a State
which would make extradition impossible can justify pre-trial detention
(Barfuss v. the Czech Republic, no. 35848/97, 69-70, 31 July 2000).
89. In the case at hand, the Court notes that the applicant was arrested
and remanded in custody on suspicion of money laundering, forgery and
aiding illegal immigration. It also notes that the domestic courts relied on
the seriousness of the charges, the risk of her continuing criminal activity
(which was committed from home) and the danger that the proceedings
would be obstructed if she absconded or communicated with third parties
(see paragraphs 12 and 16 above). Secondly, the Court observes that the
national authorities took into consideration the fact that the crimes being
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If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.
A. Damage
94. The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary
damage, which included the loss of salary she would have earned during her
employment had she been released.
95. The applicant claimed a further EUR 50,000 in respect of nonpecuniary damage suffered as a result of her unlawful preventive detention
and the discrimination against her.
96. The Government contested both claims.
97. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation
found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, having regard to its above findings, it considers that the
applicant must have suffered distress as a result of the pre-trial detention.
Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards her EUR 2,200 in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
B. Costs and expenses
98. The applicant also claimed EUR 3,020.40 for the costs and expenses
incurred before the Court, which included a lump sum of EUR 3,000 for the
legal fees for her representation and EUR 20.40 for photocopying expenses.
99. The Government contested this claim.
100. According to the Courts case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown
that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as
to quantum (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96,
54, ECHR 2000-XI). Regard being had to the documents in its possession,
the above-mentioned criteria and to the fact that the applicant has only been
successful in part, the Court considers that the applicant should be awarded
the sum of EUR 1,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable to her.
C. Default interest
101. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
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Andr Wampach
Deputy Registrar
Andrs Saj
President