Hearsay Evidence Rule and Its Exception Compilation

12.
HE SAID, SHE SAID

Hearsay Evidence Rule and its Exceptions
a.
b.
testimonial knowledge (rule 130, section 36)

EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY EVIDENCE
1. dying declaration (rule 130, section 37)
2. declaration against interest (rule 130, section 38)
3. pedigree (rule 130, section 39)
4. family tradition (rule 130, section 40)
5. common reputation (rule 130, section 41)
6. res gestae (rule 130, section 42)
7. entries in the course of the business (rule 130, section 42)
8. entries in the official records (rule 130, section 44)
9. commercial lists (rule 130, section 45)
10. learned treaties (rule 130, section 46)
11. prior testimony (rule 130, section 47)
12. admission against interest (rule 130, section 26)
13. hearsay exception in child abuse case (section 28, rules in the examination of child witness)
14. hearsay rule in writ of amparo
DYING DECLARATION (RULE 130, SECTION 37)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEMARIE CERILLA
GR 177147, 28 November 2007
Facts of the Case:
On 6 July 1998, an Information was filed against appellant charging him of the crime of murder.
The prosecutions evidence shows that at around 6:00 pm on 24 April 1998, the victim, Alexander Parreo (Alexander), his 14-year old
daughter, Michelle, and neighbor, Phoebe Sendin (Sendin), went to the house of appellant. They were cordially welcomed and
entertained by appellant and his wife. An hour later, a blackout occurred. At this time, Alexander sought permission from the couple
to leave, which the latter acknowledged. On their way home, Michelle was walking ahead of Alexander with the latter closely
following his daughter. Suddenly, after walking for about 100 meters from appellants house, Michelle heard an explosion. Michelle
immediately turned her back and saw appellant pointing a gun at Alexander who, at that moment, was staggering towards
her. Sendin, who was also with Alexander and Michelle, did not look back but instead ran away and proceeded to the house of Mrs.
Parreo. Meanwhile, Michelle was cuddling Alexander beside the road when the latter repeatedly told her that it was appellant who
shot him. Twenty minutes later, Alexanders other daughter, Novie Mae, arrived; she was also told by Alexander at that moment that
it was appellant who shot him.
SPO3 Frederick Dequito (SPO3 Dequito) and other police officers rushed to the crime scene and helped carry Alexander to an
ambulance. SPO3 Dequito was able to ask Alexander who shot him to which he answered "Pato." "Pato" is an alias by which appellant
is known.
Alexanders wife, Susan, who rushed to the hospital was also told by Alexander that it was appellant who shot him. Alexander died
the following day.
Dr. Tito D. Doromal, Philippine National Police medico-legal officer, performed an autopsy on the body of Alexander. The autopsy
report stated the cause of death to be hemorrhage secondary to pellet wounds.
The defenses evidence consists of the testimonies of appellant himself and of his wife, Madoline, his stepdaughter, Franlin, PO1
Manolito Javelora, PO3 Alberto Sarmiento, and PO3 Wilson Allona. Appellant interposed alibi as his main defense. He claimed that
Alexander, together with his daughter and Sendin, had gone to his house on 24 April 1998 at around 6:00 p.m. where they were
welcomed and offered snacks. They were having a conversation when a blackout occurred. Alexander then asked permission to leave.
After the visitors had left, appellant ordered his stepdaughter Franlin to buy candle at the store across their house. Appellant and
Madoline posted themselves at their doorway holding a flashlight to light Franlins path. Upon Franlins return to the house, appellant
heard an explosion and he immediately closed the door. Later, the policemen went to his house and told him that he was a suspect in
the shooting of Alexander and was then brought to the police station. The following day, he was subjected to paraffin test the result
of which turned out to be negative.
On 15 August 2000, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
The trial court regarded the victims dying declaration as the most telling evidence pointing to appellant as the assailant. It
appreciated the presence of treachery in qualifying the crime to murder because the victim was unarmed and walking on his way
home when he was suddenly and unexpectedly shot from behind by appellant. The trial court ruled that appellants alibi and denial
could not prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling but modified the award of moral damages.
Issue:
WON the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Michelle, as well as the dying
declaration of Alexander considering that the circumstances under which the crime was committed rendered the identification of the
gunman impossible.
Ruling of the Court:
Basic is the principle that the findings of fact of a trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect.
This is because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and is in the best position to discern
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whether they are telling the truth. This rule holds true especially when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court.
Appellants authorship of the crime was proven by the positive identification of an eyewitness and the victims dying declaration.
The prosecution presented Michelle, who categorically identified appellant as the one who
Michelles account of how her father was shot by appellant was corroborated by the post-mortem examination which reveals that the
entrance wound is located at the back of the victim. In the same vein, the medico-legal expert concluded that the gunshot was fired
at a close range, as evidenced by the presence of a power burn measuring four (4) centimeters in diameter surrounding the periphery
of the wound and penetrating his internal organs.
Significantly, the eyewitnesss positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime is fully supported the victims dying
declaration.
A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts which concern the cause and
circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or
in a very short time, without an opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement
made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating the facts concerning the cause
and circumstances surrounding his/her death.
As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence of the
highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless
and false accusation. It is thus admissible to provide the identity of the accused and the deceased, to show the cause of death of
the deceased, and the circumstances under which the assault was made upon him. The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and
trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarants death renders it impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens
that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; allowing it, therefore, prevents a failure of justice. And trustworthiness,
because the declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive to falsehood is silenced
and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. The law considers the point of death as a situation so
solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.
Of the doctrines that authorize the admission of special classes of hearsay, the doctrine relating to dying declarations is the most
mystical in its theory and, traditionally, among the most arbitrary in its limitations.
Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus: first, the declaration must concern the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both
before and after the assault having a direct causal connection with it. Second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant
must be under the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed
belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all
hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending. Third, the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where
the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Fourth,
the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. Anent this
requisite, the same deserves no further elaboration as, in fact, the prosecution had caused its witnesses to take the stand and testify
in open court on the substance of Alexanders ante mortem statement in the present criminal case for murder.
The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to three persons who testified with unanimity that they had been told by the
victim himself that it was appellant who shot him.
The statements of victim complied with all the requisites of a dying declaration. First, Alexanders declaration pertains to the identity
of the person who shot him. Second, the fatal quality and extent of the injuries he suffered underscore the imminence of his death as
his condition was so serious that his demise occurred the following morning after a thirteen (13)-hour operation. Third, he would have
been competent to testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he was
the victim.
The fact that the crime was committed during a blackout does not cast doubt on Alexanders and Michelles positive identification of
appellant. While the place of occurrence was dark, this did not prevent the Alexander or Michelle from identifying the assailant,
especially since the shot was delivered at close range.
The positive identification of appellant must necessarily prevail over his alibi. 54 It was not physically impossible for appellant to have
been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The distance of his house, where he supposedly was, from the
locus criminis is only 120-150 meters, more or less.
G.R. No. 173608
November 20, 2008
JESUS GERALDO and AMADO ARIATE, petitioners vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Facts of the Case:
Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were, by Information dated December 23, 2002 filed on December 27, 2002 before the
Regional Trial Court of Surigao del Sur, charged with Homicide.
At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter Mirasol, and son Arnel, among other persons, on being informed of the shooting of
Arthur Ronquillo (the victim), repaired to where he was, not far from his residence, and found him lying on his side and wounded.
Although gasping for breath, he was able to utter to Mirasol, within the hearing distance of Arnel, that he was shot by Badjing and
Amado.
Petitioners who were suspected to be the "Badjing" and "Amado" responsible for the shooting of the victim were subjected to paraffin
tests which yielded negative results.
In a document dated July 1, 2002, the victim's son Arnel gave a statement in a question and answer style that herein petitioners Jesus
Geraldo and Amado Ariate were the ones who shot his father.
In another document dated July 4, 2002, Mirasol also gave a statement in a question and answer style that her father uttered that
herein petitioners shot him.
At the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her father's declaration that "Badjing" and "Amado" shot him. Arnel substantially corroborated
Mirasol's statement.
Upon the other hand, petitioners gave their side of the case as follows:
Petitioner Ariate, a barangay tanod of Bunga, declared that Barangay Kagawad Omboy Roz (Roz) woke him up at 3:00 a.m. of July 1,
2002 and informed him that the victim was shot. He and Roz thus borrowed a tricycle, proceeded to the crime scene and, along with
others, brought the victim to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Ariate submitted himself to a paraffin test and
tested negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates.
Petitioner Geraldo declared that he slept in his house located also in Barangay Bunga, Lanuza at 9:30 p.m. of June 30, 2002 and woke
up at 4:00 a.m. the following day. At 6:30 a.m., on seeing many people in the vicinity of the 45-meter away house of one Josita
Bongabong where the victim's body was found, he inquired and learned that the victim was shot. Policemen subsequently went to his
house and advised him to take a paraffin test. He obliged and was tested at the PNP Crime Laboratory and was found negative for
gunpowder residue/nitrates.
The trial court, passing on the demeanor of prosecution witness-the victim's eight-year old daughter Mirasol, observed:
. . . She talks straightforward, coherent and clear, very intelligent, with child mannerism[s]. While testifying she was crisscrossing her hands, touching anything within her reach, innocent and simple, pressing of[f] and on her stomach but she talks
with correct grammar. No doubt, this Court was convinced of her testimony which was corroborated by her brother Arnel
Ronquillo.
On the nature and weight of the dying declaration of the victim, the trial court observed:
A dying declaration may be xxx oral or in writing. As a general rule, a dying declaration to be admissible must be made by
the declarant while he is conscious of his impending death. However, even if a declarant did not make a statement that he
was on the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the wound and the fact that death supervened shortly afterwards
may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full realization that he was in a
dying condition; People vs. Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353.
Even assuming that the declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae
since it was made shortly after the startling occurrence and under the influence thereof, hence, under the circumstances,
the victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive. (Underscoring supplied)
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 30, 2006, affirmed with modification the trial court's decision. It found that the trial court
erred in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance. And it reduced the award of moral damages to P50,000, and deleted
the award of exemplary damages.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE IDENTIT[IES] OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AS THE ALLEGED ASSAILANT HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY
ESTABLISHED AS PER EVIDENCE ON RECORD?
The petition is impressed with merit.
The trial court relied on the dying declaration of the victim as recounted by his daughter Mirasol and corroborated by his son Arnel.
A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: (a) it concerns the cause and the
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying
declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death.
There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his children related to the identities of his assailants. As for the victim's
consciousness of impending death, it is not necessary to prove that he stated that he was at the brink of death; it suffices that,
judging from the nature and extent of his injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to him that it may safely be
inferred that such ante mortem declaration was made under consciousness of an impending death. The location of the victim's two
gunshot wounds, his gasping for breath, and his eventual death before arriving at the hospital meet this requirement.
It has not been established, however, that the victim would have been competent to testify had he survived the attack. There is no
showing that he had the opportunity to see his assailant. Among other things, there is no indication whether he was shot in front, the
post-mortem examination report having merely stated that the points of entry of the wounds were at the "right lumbar area" and the
"right iliac area." "
At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it must identify the assailant with certainty;
otherwise it loses its significance.
Contrary, however, to the immediately-quoted ruling of the appellate court, it is the prosecution, not petitioners, which had the
burden of proving that petitioners were, at the material time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such nicknames or aliases. This,
the prosecution failed to discharge.
When there is doubt on the identity of the malefactors, motive is essential for their conviction. 33 The Court notes that in their
affidavits supporting the criminal complaint, the victim's wife and children Mirasol and Arnel proffered not knowing any possible
motive for petitioners to shoot the victim. 34 At the trial, no evidence of any motive was presented by the prosecution. Petitioners'
defense of denial and alibi thus assumes importance.
G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Facts of the Case:
In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz was charged before the Regional Trial Court, 3rd Judicial
Region, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of robbery with homicide.
At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dated 16 May 1986 convicting De
Joya of the crime charged.
The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia
Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan.
Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at Barrio Tiaong, Baliuag, Bulacan whereas Herminia Valencia teaches in an
intermediate school at Baliuag, Bulacan..
In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse was then [sitting] at
their sofa watching the television set.
Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he
proceeded home.
At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together
with a friend, went out of the former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria Capulong looked back to the direction of the
Valencia's house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's.
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He
immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?".
. . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed
away.
Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola because she was drenched with her own blood. His Nana Edeng told
him to immediately see his mother Herminia Salac-Valencia to inform her of what happened.
Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a tricycle and went home. Alvin followed, riding his bicycle. When she
reached their house, she found her mother lying prostrate in her own blood at their sala in front of the television. Her mother's hands
were stretched open and her feet were wide apart.
Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that
said Eulalia Diamse had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia Valencia why her mother's ears were
punctured, no reply was given by said doctor. Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and
instead immediately left.
Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right earring of her mother was likewise
missing. All of these were valued [at] P300.00
That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet (aparador) were
taken out. Its secret compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed.
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the side of the cabinet near the door of their room
downstairs, more or less one meter from where the victim was lying prostrate.
Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband
Arnedo but which she gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of 1977 when she saw the old and
wornout pair of slippers of the latter.
Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second day of the four-day wake, Herminia saw herein appellant
Pioquinto de Joya enter the kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the (Valencia's) house.
In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the factors which led to the judgment of conviction against appellant.
The elements taken into account by the court in convicting appellant De Joya of robbery with homicide may be listed as follows:
1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin Valencia a 10-year old boy: "Si Paqui";
2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the deceased victim, took place two weeks before the robbery and
homicide, between the appellant and the deceased over the use of a bicycle which appellant allegedly took from the Valencia's house
without the consent of the victim;
3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which according to Herminia, she found near a cabinet in their house
one (1) meter away from the body of the victim, and which Herminia identified as one of the pair that she had given to the wife of the
accused the previous Christmas Season;
4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 in the yard of the Valencias,
standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing;
5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the four-day wake.
Issue:
WON evidences presented were to enough to convict accused.
It must be noted at once, however, that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words
could have been intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they had been intended to
designate the subject, we must note that no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of
a verb, we must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase " Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the
question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, whathappened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the
declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given
fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The doctrine of
completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work:
The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered must not be merely apart of the whole as it
was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is
related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or
by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect
from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a
portion of what he might have been able to tell. (Emphasis supplied)
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the
declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been
qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the
presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received.
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut
off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin.
The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature. When these circumstances are examined
one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the
deceased Eulalia Diamse. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two weeks before Eulalia's
death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a person to slay another in such a violent and
gory manner.
The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in the living room where Eulalia
Diamse was slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive evidence that such slipper was indeed one of the very same pair of slippers
that she had given to appellant's wife, who was also the sister of Herminia's husband. Rubber or beach, walk slippers are made in
such quantities by multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds of slippers of the same color, shape and
size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellant's wife.
The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of the
Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show that
appellant had perpetrated the slaying or the robbery.
Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate family during the four-day wake, does not
give rise to any inference that appellant was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained that he had been busily at work,
sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had dropped in the Valencias' house in the afternoon Eulalia
Diamse was killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with several other persons. His reluctance or inability
to participate in the formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt.
G.R. No. 173476
February 22, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.

An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of
Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.
Facts of the Case:
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found
guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Past midnight on July 31, 1993, Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing
Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help;
that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it
was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical
attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in
the complex at the time.
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued.
He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:
The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2) stabbing blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon
with his left arm encircled around Bolanons neck stabbing the latter with the use of his right hand at the right sub costal area which
caused Bolanons death. Not only because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo Estao, the victims
uncle who brought Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon and even on their way to the
hospital while the latter was suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who
stabbed him.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC, citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to
Salafranca as his assailant, and Salafrancas positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza.
The appeal lacks merit.
Discrediting Mendoza and Estao as witnesses against Salafranca would be unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly concluded
that Mendoza and Estao were credible and reliable. The Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to contradict the findings of
the RTC and the CA, which were entitled to great weight and respect.
Salafrancas denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The
lower courts properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill
motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon the truth.
The Court further notes Estaos testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant right
after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:
Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?
A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
Q What time was that?
A 12:50 a.m.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."
Q What did you do?
A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod Salafranca.
Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How long have you known him?
A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you look around and point him to us?
A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)
It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek help right after being
stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that
on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had
been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise
him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired
and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the
res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the
hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the
hearsay rule.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when
the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that
the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person
who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in
the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital
emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. Bolanon would have been
competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the
assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the
taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His
utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The
statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and
which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations
that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test
of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and
also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
G.R. No. 185005
December 10, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.DANTE DEJILLO and GERV ACIO "Dongkoy" HOYLE, JR., AccusedAppellants.
Facts of the Case:
Aurelio is a 22-year-old Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Kagawad of Barangay Bugang, San Miguel, Bohol. On or about 3:00 a.m. of July
29, 1996, in Barangay Bugang, Aurelio was stabbed below his left rib. Aurelio was pronounced dead on arrival at the infirmary in San
Miguel. Aurelio was stabbed by one Romeo Puracan (Romeo), 30 years old and a resident of Ong Farm, Ubay, Bohol. Romeo was
identified by accused-appellant Gervacio, who executed a Sworn Statement dated July 29, 1996 before the PNP of San Miguel. The
police picked up Romeo by 6:00 a.m. of July 29, 1996. Thereafter, Romeo was charged with the crime of homicide.
In two letters dated September 3, 1996, Germana Basalo (Germana), Aurelios mother, requested the PNP Chief of San Miguel to
initiate the filing of a criminal complaint for murder against herein accused-appellants, plus one Jonathan Sodio (Jonathan) and
Petronilo Dejillo, Sr. (Petronilo, Sr.), the father of accused-appellant Dante. In support of her request, Germana submitted the affidavits
executed by several witnesses, including Germana herself and Romeo, mostly executed on August 31, 1996, with one executed on
September 3, 1996. Germana and her family believed that Romeo was not the culprit and they had already referred the matter to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Acting favorably on the complaint for murder against accused-appellants, the Provincial Prosecution Office of Bohol eventually filed an
Information charging accused-appellants.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses presented the following version of events:
In the evening of July 28, 1996, Aurelio and accused-appellants were engaged in a drinking spree at Germanas house in Barangay
Bugang. About 40-50 meters away in the same Barangay, Celso Nuera (Celso) was celebrating his birthday at his house where Saul
and his nephew Romeo were in attendance as guests. By midnight, Romeo fell asleep on a bamboo bed outside Celsos house. At
around 3:30 a.m. of July 29, 1996, Romeo was awakened by the crowing of a rooster. While still lying down, Romeo saw clearly Aurelio
and accused-appellants on the barangay road, just four meters away. Accused-appellant Gervacio, alias Dongkoy, had his left arm on
Aurelios right shoulder and with his right hand, held and raised Aurelios left hand to shoulder level. Accused-appellant Dante then
stabbed Aurelio with a knife at the left side of the latters body. Accused-appellants ran away leaving Aurelio behind. Aurelio was still
standing but already staggering. Romeo was about to help Aurelio but he was chased away by three men, one armed with a knife.
Romeo went home to Ong Farm at Sitio Caong, San Francisco, Ubay, Bohol, where he was arrested later that morning.
In the meantime, Florenda, Aurelios sister, was asleep at her residence when she was awakened at around 3:30 a.m. of July 29, 1996
by the sound of running feet. Remembering accused-appellant Dantes threat against Aurelios life six days earlier, Florenda started
looking for Aurelio. She met accused-appellant Gervacio along the way, who pretended to help in searching for Aurelio. Florenda
subsequently heard Aurelio shouting for help. Florenda found her brother at a road canal, leaning against the canal wall. Thinking that
her brother was only drunk, Florenda asked accused-appellant Gervacio to help her carry Aurelio home but accused-appellant
Gervacio pulled up Aurelios T-shirt and said, "So, he was hit because he was stabbed by Ramie Puracan." Yet, as Florenda was
embracing Aurelio, Aurelio was able to whisper in Florendas left ear that, "I was stabbed by Dante while Dongkoy held me." By this
time, Saul, Petronilo, Sr., and Amelita (Florendas niece) had arrived at the scene. As Florenda ran home to get her husband, Amelita
heard Saul asking her uncle Aurelio who stabbed him and Aurelio answering that it was accused-appellants Dante and Dongkoy.
Petronilo, Sr., father of accused-appellant Dante, went near Aurelio and covered Aurelios mouth.
Florenda and her husband took Aurelio to the San Miguel Infirmary where Aurelio was pronounced dead on arrival.
Accused-appellant Dante had already been threatening to kill Aurelio days prior to the stabbing. Accused-appellants brother,
Petronilo Dejillo, Jr. (Petronilo, Jr.) committed robbery against Gemima, Florendas mother-in- law. Aurelio was the star witness in the
robbery case against Petronilo, Jr. Petronilo, Jr. had since been in hiding and was unable to come home even for his grandmothers
death and wake.
Taken together, the defense witnesses testimonies give the following account of events of July 28-29, 1996:
On July 28, 1996, accused-appellants, with Jonathan and several other companions, were hopping from one barangay to another to
play basketball, to visit accused-appellant Gervacios girlfriend, and to eat supper at the house of accused-appellant Gervacios uncle.
Their group finally got back to Barangay Bugang past 11:30 p.m. and had a drinking spree at Aurelios house. They were later joined
by Saul and Romeo.
During the drinking spree, Saul pulled Aurelios hair and Aurelio retaliated by boxing Saul. Accused-appellant Gervacio separated Saul
from the group and brought Saul to the Bugang public market, about 25 meters away. While accused-appellant Gervacio and Saul
were at the market, Romeo was boxed by Aurelio and hit by Dante with a belt. Romeo ran away, past accused-appellant Gervacio and
Saul at the public market. Accused-appellant Gervacio eventually returned to his group at Aurelios house.
Thereafter, Celso invited the group to his house. Only Aurelio and accused-appellant Dante entered Celsos house, while the rest of
the group remained outside to sleep on the bamboo bed outside said house. That was the last time accused-appellants saw each
other.
Finding Saul also inside Celsos house, Aurelio confronted Saul about the hair-pulling incident. The two were pacified by Petronilo, Sr.,
who then advised his own son, accused-appellant Dante, to just go home. Following his fathers advice, accused-appellant Dante left
for home at around 2:00 a.m. of July 29, 1996. Accused-appellant went to sleep and woke up at around 6:00 a.m., whereupon he
learned from his mother Letecia that Aurelio had been stabbed.
It was around 3:00 a.m. of July 29, 1996 when Aurelio woke up accused-appellant Gervacio, who was sleeping on the bamboo bed
outside Celsos house. Aurelio and accused-appellant Gervacio began walking towards Aurelios house only 25 meters away. But then,
they heard a commotion and Romeo appeared from the left side of the road, carrying a hunting knife. Romeo stabbed Aurelio on the
latters left side. Aurelio and accused-appellant Gervacio both ran away with Romeo chasing after them. Accused-appellant Gervacio
first hid himself before going home, where he got a scythe for protection. He then went back to check on Aurelio.
Along the way, accused-appellant Gervacio met Florenda who asked about the persons running. Accused-appellant Gervacio told
Florenda that Romeo was chasing him and that Aurelio was stabbed. He helped in looking for Aurelio who was found lying face up at
the right side of the road, breathing with difficulty, and unable to talk. When Florenda and her husband brought Aurelio to the
hospital, accused-appellant Gervacio accompanied them.
On September 20, 2000, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, with the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on February 22, 2008 dismissing accused-appellants appeal and affirming the RTC
judgment with the modification of increasing the award of temperate damages.
Issue:
WON there was no dying declaration made by Aurelio and that the same was a mere afterthought of the prosecution witnesses which
must not be given any evidentiary weight.
The Court finds the appeal devoid of merit.
The RTC admitted Aurelios dying declaration to prove the identity of his assailants and the circumstances that led to his death
because it qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule with the concurrence of all four essential requisites, to wit:
One of the most reliable pieces of evidence for convicting a person is the dying declaration of the victim. Courts accord credibility of
the highest order to such declarations on the truism that no man conscious of his impending death will still resort to falsehood.
The requisites for admitting such declaration as evidence an exception to the hearsay rule are four, which must concur, to wit: a.)
the dying declaration must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; b.) at the time it was
made the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; c.) the declarant was competent as a witness; and d.) the
declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the decedent was the victim. (People v. Sacario,
14 SCRA 468; People v. Almeda, 124 SCRA 487)
The four requisites are undoubtedly present in this case.
About thirty minutes or so before his death, the slain victim in this case, Aurelio "Boy" Basalo, uttered a statement identifying the two
accused, Dante Dejillo and Gervacio "Dongkoy" Hoyle, as his assailants. The statement was testified to by three prosecution
witnesses.
Florenda Dolera clearly, positively, and convincingly testified that she was the first person to arrive at the spot where her wounded
brother lay on the ground, after she heard his faint cries for help; that when she realized he was not just drunk but was wounded
because Hoyle, Jr. then pulled up her brothers shirt, telling her he was stabbed by Ramy Puracan, she embraced her brother, who,
with his lips near her ear, whispered, "I was stabbed by Dante while Dongkoy held me."
Amelita Basalo, arriving at the scene when Saul Curiba and Petronilo Dejillo, Sr. were also there heard the victim say "Dante and
Dongkoy" in answer to Saul Curibas question on who stabbed him.
Saul Curiba, rebuttal witness, confirmed that he was present soon after the victim was found on the ground, wounded; that in answer
to his third question, "who stabbed you?" the victim said in a low voice that could still be heard one meter away, "Dante Dejillo."
The dying statement of Aurelio Basalo is a statement of the surrounding circumstances of his death as the same refers to the identity
of his assailants; thus, the first requisite is present.
The second requisite is also present. Aurelio Basalo gave such declaration under the consciousness of an impending death as shown
by the serious nature of his wound which in fact resulted in his death thirty minutes or so after he was found with a stab wound on his
left chest.
Further, the fact that Aurelio Basalo at the time he gave the dying declaration was competent as a witness is too obvious to require
further discussion.
Finally, Basalos dying declaration is offered as evidence in a criminal prosecution for murder in which he was himself, the victim.
It was not only the dying declaration of Aurelio Basalo that positively identified his assailants. The prosecution also offered Romeo
"Ramy" Puracans testimony as an eyewitness account of the incident.
The RTC even noted that through the testimony of prosecution witness Elias, it was established that revenge was the motive behind
the crime, even though motive was no longer essential for a conviction as the identity of the culprits have already been established.
Between the account of Romeo Puracan and the conflicting testimony of Gervacio Hoyle, Jr., both claimed to be eyewitness accounts,
the Court finds [Romeo]s narration to be the more credible one because it jibes with the testimony of Dr. [Hamilcar] as well as with
the post mortem findings in the exhumation report of the NBI doctor.
Alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the
accused could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission. ( People v.
Lacao, Sr., 201 SCRA 317) This circumstance is not obtaining in the instant case. As testified to by [accused-appellant Dante]s father
their house is only 200 meters from Celso Nueras house and Celso Nueras house is evidently only a few meters distant from the
scene of the crime as indicated in the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses. Moreover, an alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused made by a credible witness, besides the fact that the defense of alibi is
inherently weak as it can easily be fabricated or contrived.
Well-settled is the rule that delay in reporting the crime, the assailants identity or even the victims ante mortem or dying declaration
does not render the prosecutions testimony doubtful nor impair the credibility of the witnesses.
G.R. No. 28871
September 19, 1928
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLEMENTE BABIERA, JUSTO BABIERA and DOMINGA
BORES, defendants-appellants.
Facts of the Case:
This is an appeal taken by Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo finding them guilty of the crime of murder, the first as principal, and the last two as accomplices.
Justo Babiera was the owner of two parcels of land situated in the municipality of Oton, Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands. On
October 19, 1922 Justo Babiera executed a contract of sale with the right of repurchase in favor of Basilio Copreros whereby he sold
the two parcels of land to the latter for the sum of P124 with the condition that if the vendor did not repurchase them on or before
August 1, 1923, the sale would become absolute and irrevocable. The period for repurchase having expired, Basilio Copreros took
possession of said two parcels of land, and on March 24, 1927, made application to the registrar of deeds for the Province of Iloilo for
the registration of the consolidation of his title to said parcels. On the 26th of the said month, Basilio Copreros leased said parcels to
Severino Haro, municipal president of Oton. In view of this, on March 31, 1927, Justo Babiera filed a complaint against Basilio
Copreros in the justice of the peace court of Oton for the recovery of the possession of said two parcels of land. The complaint having
been dismissed on April 19, 1927 on the ground that it did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, Justo Babiera
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Later on, said Justo Babiera asked for the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful
detainer and filed another one for the recovery of property.
Fermin Bruces was Severino Haro's copartner on shares in said lands. About the month of May, 1927, Justo Babiera accompanied by
his copartner on shares, Rosendo Paycol, went to where Fermin Bruces was plowing and asked the latter: "Who told you to plow
here?" Fermin Bruces replied: "Severino Haro." Then Justo Babiera asked him: "If this Severino tells you to kill yourself, will you do it?"
"Of course not," answered Fermin Bruces. After this interchange of words Justo Babiera told Fermin Bruces to stop plowing and to tell
his master, Severino Haro, to come and plow himself. Fermin Bruces informed Severino Haro of the incident, and in answer the latter
only told him not to mind it, but to go on plowing.
On another occasion while Fermin Bruces was transplanting rice on the same lands, Clemente Babiera and Rosendo Paycol arrived
and told him that if he continued working they would pull out someone's intestines. Fermin Bruces also informed Severino Haro of
these threats, who as before, told him not to mind them, but to go on sowing.
On July 23, 1927, Jose Haro, brother of Severino Haro, visited his land in the barrio of Bita, which was under the care of Victoriano
Randoquile. He was told by the latter that he lacked palay seeds. At that time, Rosendo Paycol was in his field, Jose Haro and
Victoriano Randoquile approached him and asked him to give them some seeds. Rosendo Paycol answered that he could not do so
because he needed what he had for his own farms. Haro and Randoquile then asked him: "Which fields do you mean?" "The fields
over which Copreros and Babiera are in litigation," answered Rosendo Paycol. Surprised at this answer, Jose Haro told Rosendo Paycol
that what he said could not be because the lot in dispute was leased to his brother Severino Haro. Rosendo Paycol replied that
attorney Buenaventura Cordova had told Clemente Babiera and Justo Babiera that Severino Haro would never be able to reap or
enjoy the fruits of the land, because if they did not win the suit by fair means they would win it by foul.
On August 21, 1927, Severino Haro, as usual, went to visit his land in the barrio of Bita, accompanied by Gregorio Torrija, Benito
Carreon and Pedro Tauro. On arriving there Fermin Bruces, his copartner on shares, told him that the day before he had found
Clemente Babiera's cow grazing on that land. It happened at that moment Clemente Babiera and Dominga Bores were passing by.
Severino Haro then informed Clemente Babiera of what his cow had done on the former's land and told him to take better care of his
cow in future and not to let it run loose. He then ordered Fermin Bruces to take the animal to where the Babiera family lived. Severino
Haro was not able to return to town until almost 7 o'clock in the evening. As it was already dark, he and his companions had to make
use of a torch made out of split bamboo to light them on their way. Severino Haro went ahead, followed by Pedro Tauro, who carried
the torch, some 8 brazas behind, with Gregorio Torrija and Benito Carreon following. On Coming to a place in the road near Rosendo
Paycol's house, Clemente Babiera suddenly sprang from the cogon grass, went after Severino Haro and struck him with his bolo in the
back. On turning his head to see who had attacked him Severino Haro received another bolo blow in the forehead near the right
eyebrow. In trying to defend himself with his hand he was wounded between the index finger and the thumb. He then tried to grasp
his assailant but did not succeed and he fell to the ground. Then Justo Babiera appeared and placing himself upon Severino Haro's
stomach, held the latter's hands. Later, Dominga Bores appeared on the scene and held both knees of the wounded man. When Justo
Babiera arrived, a voice was heard saying: "Hold him, papa," and at the same time, Severino Haro's voice was heard saying: "Help!
help!" Pedro Tauro wished to come near in order to help Severino Haro, but Clemente Babiera raised his bolo in the air and kept on
brandishing it to warn everybody off. After the torch had been extinguished they heard a voice which they recognized as Severino
Haro's saying: "Uncle Justo, have patience with me, for I have done no wrong." Then they heard another voice, that of Dominga Bores,
which said: "Here is the revolver; let us return." Before the assailants left two or three revolver shots were heard. When Severino
Haro's companions saw that their assailants had already departed, they drew near to where Severino lay stretched out to see what
had happened to him. Severino Haro told them not to fear for he did not feel as if he were going to die, and calling his copartner on
shares, Fermin Bruces, directed him to bring a cot and take him to town. Pedro Tauro and Gregorio Torrija did as Severino Haro
wished, and on arriving at the barrio of Santa Monica, they by chance came upon a truck in which were some policemen. They place
the wounded man in the same truck and took him to Saint Paul's Hospital in the City of Iloilo. When Severino Haro was taken to the
town he did not have his revolver and the cartridge belt, without the holster, was found by Gregorio Torrija near where the incident
took place.
On the same morning, August 22, 1927, and in the same hospital, Severino Haro made a sworn statement before the deputy fiscal,
Edmundo S. Piccio (Exhibit I), relating the occurrence and mentioning the persons who were present. This sworn statement was
ratified by him before the same deputy fiscal on the 27th of the said month and year when he had given up all hope of recovery.
In his ante-mortem declaration made on the 27th of August, 1927 before the same deputy fiscal, Severino Haro, among other things,
said the following:
"They repeatedly passed their fingers over my upper lip and at the same time see if I still breathed; they felt and opened my eyelids
and then inserted a finger in my pupil, because they believed that if I was insensible, I was already dead. They knelt on my stomach
and one knelt on my lower limbs, and made a pass with something, which seems to me was bamboo or a bolo, over the anterior
surface of my calf, and Dominga then took the revolver from me. I got up because I was afraid Dominga would shoot me and when I
attempted to escape Clemente Babiera pursued me and gave me another cut on the left side of the waist, and I think the blow struck
the ammunition belt, and if it had not been for the belt it would have severed my waist."
There is no question that Severino Haro had leased from Basilio Copreros two parcels of land the ownership of which had passed to
him due to Justo Babiera's failure to repurchase them within the stipulated period. Nor is there any question that the latter tried to
recover them, first, by an accion publiciana (action for unlawful detainer), and then by an action for the recovery of possession. There
is likewise no question that Severino Haro paid the expenses of the defendant Basilio Copreros for the reason that he was already in
possession of said lands as lessee. There is also no question that Clemente Babiera's cow damaged the plantings of Fermin Bruce, for
which reason the letter caught said cow, tied it, and notified his master of the matter when the latter went to visit the lands leased by
him. Neither is there any question that there was an agreement between Clemente Babiera and Severino Haro whereby the latter
ordered his copartner on shares Fermin Bruces, to take the cow near Clemente Babiera's house and tie it up there. In like manner
there is no question that at about 7 o'clock in the evening of August 21, 1927, when Severino Haro and his companions were
returning to the town of Oton, and upon their coming near Rosendo Paycol's house, in which were Clemente Babiera, his father Justo
Babiera, and his mistress Dominga Bores, said Severino Haro had an encounter with Clemente Babiera in which Severino Haro
received several wounds in consequence of which he died a week later in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo.
Issue:
Whether, as the prosecution contends, Severino Haro was suddenly and treacherously attacked by Clemente Babiera, aided by his
father and his mistress Dominga Bores.
The first question of this nature refers to the character of the document Exhibit I, which is a statement made by Severino Haro in
Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo on the morning after the crime was committed.
Although said statement in itself is inadmissible as an ante-mortem declaration, inasmuch as there is nothing to show that at the time
he made it Severino Haro knew or firmly believed that he was at the point of death, nevertheless, having ratified its contents a week
later when he was near death as a result of his wounds, said declaration is admissible as a part of that which he made antemortem "A statement made under circumstances which would not render it admissible as a dying declaration becomes admissible as
such, it is held, if approved or repeated by the declarant after he had abandoned all hope of recovery." (30 Corpus Juris, 257.)
We have seen that Justo Babiera sold two parcels of land to Basilio Copreros with the right of repurchase, and that, having failed to
repurchase them within the period stipulated, the title thereto was consolidated, in the purchaser, who leased them to Severino Haro,
the latter taking possession of them. Justo Babiera restored to every lawful means to regain possession of said parcels of land, first by
an accion publiciana, which failed, and then by an action for the recovery of possession. Severino Haro paid the expenses of Basilio
Copreros in order to carry on the suits. Such interested intervention on Severino Haro's part without doubt must have vexed Justo
Babiera, for in the month of May 1927, he went with his copartner on shares, Rosendo Paycol, to where Fermin Bruces, Severino
Haro's copartner, was plowing, and asked him who had ordered him there, and when Fermin Bruces answered that it was Severino
Haro, Justo asked him whether he would commit suicide if told to do so by said Severino Haro, and then told him to tell his master to
go and plow himself. Later on, Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera's son, accompanied by his copartner Rosendo Paycol, seeing that
Fermin Bruces went on working the land, told him that if he continued plowing, Clemente would pull out someone's intestines. If all
these threats are true, as we believe they are, then Justo Babiera and Clemente Babiera must have borne Severino Haro deep
resentment, doubtless believing that it was due to him that they could not recover their two parcels of land, and this was sufficient
and adequate to move them, upon the failure of lawful means, to resort to violence.
10
Examined in the light of the ordinary conduct of men, Severino Haro's alleged attitude, in having tried to take Clemente Babiera's cow
after having agreed to accept P2 for the damages, and having ordered that the animal be returned to its owner, is highly illogical, and
not a scintilla of evidence has been presented to explain this change of determination, as unexpected as it is unreasonable.
The facts related above have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and constitute the crime of murder defined in article 403 of the
Penal Code, there being present at the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstance of treachery, consisting in the accused
Clemente Babiera having attacked Severino Haro suddenly while the latter had his back turned, inflicting various wounds on his body
as a result of which he died a week later, said Clemente Babiera being criminally liable as principal by direct participation.
Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores are also liable but as accomplices, because, while they did not take a direct part in the infliction of
the wounds that caused Severino Haro's death, or cooperated by acts without which they could not have been inflicted, or induced
Clemente Babiera to inflict them, yet they took part in the commission of the crime by simultaneous acts consisting in the former
having mounted Severino Haro's body and held down his hands, while the latter sat on his knees while he lay stretched out on the
ground in order to allow Clemente Babiera to search the body for his revolver.
GERALDO AND ARIATE VS PEOPLE repeated case

DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST (RULE 130, SECTION 38)
G.R. No. L-38833 March 12, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.AIROL ALING Y MAJURI, accused whose death sentence is under review.
Facts of the Case:
This is a parricide case. Norija T. Mohamad, 30, was stabbed in the chest and diaphragm on January 28, 1972 at Calarian, Zamboanga
City. She died at the Brent Hospital two days later.
Girlie Aling a relative of Airol Aling stated in her affidavit of February 21, 1972 that she and Darla Aling (Norija's daughter) brought the
victim to the hospital. They learned from the police that Norija was stabbed by her husband.
On March 24, 1972 Airol Aling 35, was investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was
translated into English) that he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites because he was informed in prison by his
relatives that his wife was living with another man and fooling around with other men. He recounted the killing in this manner:
At or about one o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 1972, I was at the seashore of Calarian relaxing since I have just arrived from
Jolo, Sulu that particular day.
At that time, I was already running away from the authorities because I am an escapee from San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm.
Later on, I proceeded to my father's house which is just near the seashore, Upon reaching the house, I saw Nori Mohamad but I had
no time to talk to her because immediately after seeing me, Nori ran away, going to the direction of the street.
Armed with the bolo which I had been carrying with me, I chased after Nori and I catch up with her at the street where I started
stabbing her with the bolo, hitting her on the different parts of the body.
When I saw Nori fell down on the street badly wounded, I hurriedly left the place and ran towards the far end of Calarian.
Two policemen in their affidavit of March 24, 1972, affirmed that Airol admitted to Sergeant Antonio Macrohon in their presence that
he stabbed his wife because she had been going with many men.
The case was first called for arraignment on March 15, 1974. The accused signified his willingness to plead guilty although he had no
lawyer. A counsel de oficio was appointed for him. The trial court granted counsel's motion to transfer the arraignment to March 18.
The information was translated into the Tausug dialect which is spoken by the accused. With the assistance of his counsel, he pleaded
guilty.
Then, the accused was placed on the witness stand and examined by his counsel. He admitted that he killed his wife. He declared
that after he was informed by his counsel that the penalty for parricide is death or life imprisonment, he, nevertheless, admitted the
killing of his wife because that was the truth.
In answer to the question of the fiscal, the accused said that he understood that by pleading guilty he could be sentenced to death or
reclusion perpetua because he was an escaped convict.
He described the confrontation with his wife. When he arrived at his home, his wife ran and he pursued her. He overtook her, stabbed
her but she was able to parry the blow, and when -she fell on the ground, he repeatedly stabbed her in the abdomen.
He said that he was not coerced nor cajoled into entering a plea of guilty. He admitted that he was a prisoner in the penal colony. He
was a Muslim belonging to the Samal tribe of Siasi Sulu. He killed his wife because while he was in prison, she did not visit him and
she neglected their four children.
He agreed that his father-in-law could have the custody of his children. He was able to leave the penal colony because he was a
"living-out-prisoner". When he went to his house on January 28, 1972, his purpose was to be reconciled with his wife but when she
saw him, instead of waiting for him, she ran away. He had information that his wife was guilty of infidelity or had a "kabit". That was a
grievous offense under Muslim customs.
11
He Identified his signature in his confession which was sworn to before the clerk of court.
Issue:
WON the accused did not fully understand the nature and effect of his plea of guilt.
That contention cannot be sustained. The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against
his penal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage".
He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that the deceased was his lawful
wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity. Her failure to visit him in prison and her neglect of their children are other
circumstances confirmatory of their marital status.
The contention that the accused did not understand fully the nature and effect of his plea of guilty is belied by the record. The trial
judge, a Muslim, took pains to follow the rule that in case a plea of guilty is entered in a capital case, evidence should be received in
order to leave no room for reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and that he had full knowledge of the
meaning and consequences of his plea of guilty.
In this case, the arraignment was postponed three times in order to enable his counsel to confer with him and explain to him the
consequences of his plea of guilty. The accused testified. His confession and the affidavit of the policemen who investigated him were
presented in evidence.
G.R. No. L-28655
August 6, 1928
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.EUGENIO TOLEDO and SISENANDO HOLGADO, defendants.
EUGENIO TOLEDO, appellant.
Facts of the Case:
This is an appeal taken by Eugenio Toledo from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, finding him guilty of the crime of
homicide.
Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land situated in the municipality of
Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed,
and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost instantly.
Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there Sisenando Holgado was
taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that only he
and Filomeno Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight.
The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo
intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina
Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was
partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in
another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who
was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado,
the son of Sisenando Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the
municipal president of Pinamalayan.
Exhibit 1 above-mentioned in assignment of error No. 1, made originally in Tagalog, in translation reads as follows:
AFFIDAVIT
I. Sisenando Holgado, married, of legal age, and resident of this municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro, P. I., after being
sworn in accordance with law, state the following:
My additional homestead situated in Calingag was cleaned by me and is at present planted with palay (rice), on which I also plant
hemp, but the hemp planted by my workers is frequently uprooted by Filomeno Morales who claims that said land is his, whereas
when I was cleaning said land nobody objected to it, but now that it is already cleaned, Filomeno Morales says that one-half of the
land occupied by me is his; for this reason I decided to see Filomeno Morales about this matter and when I talked to him this morning
(Wednesday) at about nine o'clock, at the hemp plantation of Victorio Saudan situated in Calingag, he told me that if I should plant
there anything he would cut my neck, and to this I answered that if he was going to cut my neck we would fight and thereupon he
stabbed me with a penknife and then I slashed at him; after this we separated, and went to Dalmacio Manlisic's house. When we
fought, there was nobody present.
Question by president: When you went to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic, did you not meet anybody before reaching said house?
Answer: I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic.
Question by president: How do you know that the hemp you planted on your land above-mentioned was frequently uprooted by
Filomeno Morales?
Answer: Because he said as to my worker named Eulogio Supleo.
Question by president: Do you have anything more to say about the incident?
Answer: No more.
12
Issues:
I. The lower court erred in not admitting in evidence Exhibit 1.
II. The lower court erred in not finding that accused-appellant Eugenio Toledo did not take part in the fight between accused
Sisenando Holgado and deceased Filomeno Morales, resulting in the death of the latter.
III. The lower court erred in not giving accused-appellant Eugenio Toledo the benefit of a reasonable doubt."
I
The Chief and Mr. Justice Villamor would disregard entirely the first assignment of error and would, therefore, refrain from all
discussion relative to the admissibility of Exhibit 1. Confining themselves exclusively to an analysis of the evidence other than Exhibit
1, they find that Eugenio Toledo has not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
II
The second view is that for which Messrs. Justices Romualdez and Villa-Real are responsible, and is that Exhibit 1 should have been
admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae, and that giving it effect, in relation with the other evidence, the accused has not been
proved guilty. What has heretofore been said with reference to the state of the record need not here be repeated. It only remains to
be stated that Exhibit 1 was made by Sisenando Holgado on the same morning that the fight occurred and without the interval of
sufficient time for reflection. The declaration of Sisenando Holgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the party and not the
party talking about the facts. There was such a correlation between the statement and the fact of which it forms part as strongly
tends to negative the suggestion of fabrication or a suspicion of afterthought. The nature and circumstances of the statement do not
disclose intrinsic evidence of premeditation as revealed in a long, coherent, closely connected story. The modern tendency is toward
the extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice when other evidence of the same fact
cannot be procured.
III
The third opinion in court is that held by Messrs. Justices Street, Malcolm, and Ostrand, who would resolve the first assignment of
error by holding that the court erred in not admitting Exhibit 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest. Had Exhibit 1 been
received, it is believed that its influence would have been felt by the trial court.
Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is excluded by courts in the United
States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One universally recognized exception concerns the admission of dying
declarations. Another exception permits the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to
their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the declarations of a person other than accused
confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
Professor Wigmore, one of the greatest living authorities on the law of evidence, has attempted to demonstrate the false premises on
which the arbitrary limitation to the hearsay rule rests. He shows that the limitation is inconsistent with the language originally
employed in stating the principle and is unjustified on grounds of policy. Professor Wigmore in turn has been answered by no less a
body than the Supreme Court of Mississippi in the case of Brown vs. State of Mississippi. The editor of the Mississippi case in L. R. A.,
however, comes to the support of Professor Wigmore saying the unanimity of the decisions "is as complete as the shock which they
give the general sense of justice." The question has likewise in recent years gained attention by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Donnelly vs. United States ([1913], 228 U. S., 243). There it was held that the court below properly excluded
hearsay evidence relating to the confession of a third party, then deceased, of guilt of the crime with which defendant was charged.
Mr. Justice Pitney, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "In this country there is a great and practically unanimous weight of
authority in the estate courts against admitting evidence of confessions of third parties, made out of court, and tending to exonerate
the accused."
In the Philippine jurisdiction, we have never felt bound to follow blindly the principles of the common law. A reexamination of some of
those principles discloses anomalies.
A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, as the Supreme Court of Mississippi states, "to reach those man slayers who
perpetrate their crimes when there are no other eyewitnesses." But the person accused of a crime, under the same principle of
necessity, is not permitted to free himself by offering in evidence the admission of another under oath that this other committed the
crime. Again admissions are receivable against either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but not against a penal interest. We fail to
see why it can be believed that a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the one instance but will not be presumed to tell the truth
in the other instance. Again the exhibit would have been admitted against its maker at his trial, if he had not died. But the document
is held inadmissible to exonerate another. Yet the truth of the exhibit is not different in the first case that in the second.
A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are not here controlling. Most of them do not concern the
confessions of declarants shown to be deceased. Practically all of them give as the principal reason for denying the admission of a
confession of a third person that he committed the crime with which the accused is charged, that it was not made under oath. Here
the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth. When
Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a
wounded man would be expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who
accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should
have been received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the
other proven facts.
We cannot bring this decision to a conclusion without quoting the well considered language of Professor Wigmore on the subject, the
pertinent part of a decision coming from a court which has gained respect particularly in criminal cases, and an editorial note.
Professor Wigmore has said:
PAR. 1476. History of the Exception; Statement of Fact against Penal Interest, excluded; Confessions of Crime by a Third Person . It
is today commonly said, and has been expressly laid down by many judges, that the interest prejudiced by the facts stated must be
either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, and not a penal interest. What ground in authority there is for this limitation may be
found by examining the history of the execution at large.
13
The exception appears to have taken its rise chiefly in two separate rivulets of rulings, starting independently as a matter of practice,
but afterwards united as parts of a general principle. . . .
These lines of precedent proceeded independently till about the beginning of the 1800s, when a unity of principle for some of them
came gradually to be perceived and argued for. This unity lay in the circumstance that all such statements, in that they concerned
matters prejudicial to the declarant's self-interest, were fairly trustworthy and might therefore (if he were deceased) be treated as
forming an exception to the hearsay rule.
But in 1884, in a case in the House of Lords, not strongly argued and not considered by the judges in the light of the precedents, a
backward step was taken and an arbitrary limit put upon the rule. It was held to exclude the statement of a fact subjecting the
declarant to a criminal liability, and to be confined to statements of facts against either pecuniary or proprietary interest.
Thenceforward this rule was accepted in England; although it was plainly a novelty at the time of its inception; for in several rulings
up to that time such statement had been received.
The same attitude has been taken by most American courts, excluding confessions of a crime, or other statements of facts against
penal interest, made by third persons; although there is not wanting authority in favor of admitting such statements.
PAR. 1477. Same: Policy of this Limitation. It is plain enough that this limitation, besides being a fairly modern novelty, is
inconsistent with the broad language originally employed in stating the reason and principle of the present exception (ante, pars.
1457, 1476) as well as with the settled principle upon which confessions are received (ante, par. 1475).
But, furthermore, it cannot be justified on grounds of policy. The only plausible reason of policy that has ever been advanced for such
a limitation is the possibility of procuring fabricated testimony to such a admission if oral. This is the ancient rusty weapon that has
always been drawn to oppose any reform in the rules of evidence, viz., the argument of danger of abuse. This would be a good
argument against admitting any witnesses at all, for it is notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it is difficult to avoid being
deceived by their lies. The truth is that any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also
hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent.
The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation are shocking to the sense of justice; for, in its commonest application,
it requires, in a criminal trial, the rejection of a confession, however well authenticated, of a person deceased or insane or fled from
the jurisdiction (and therefore quite unavailable) who has avowed himself to be true culprit. The absurdity and wrong of rejecting
indiscriminately all such evidence is patent.
The rulings already in our books cannot be thought to involve a settled and universal acceptance of this limitation. In the first place,
in almost all of the rulings the declarant was not shown to be deceased or otherwise unavailable as a witness, and therefore the
declaration would have been inadmissible in any view of the present exception. Secondly, in some of the rulings (for example, in
North Carolina) the independent doctrine (ante, pars. 139-141) was applicable that, in order to prove the accused's non-commission
of the offense by showing commission by another person, not merely one casual piece of evidence suffices but a "prima facie" case
resting on several concurring pieces of evidence must be made out. Finally, most of the early rulings had in view, not the present
exception to the hearsay rule, but the doctrine of admissions (ante, pars. 1076, 1079) that the admissions of one who is not a coconspirator cannot affect others jointly charged.
It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard this barbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocent accused
vindicate himself even by producing to the tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the very gallows, by the
rule culprit now beyond the reach of justice.
JUDGMENT
For three somewhat divergent reasons, we are all of the opinion that the defendant-appellant Eugenio Toledo should be given the
benefit of the reasonable doubt which prevails in our minds. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from will be reversed and the
defendant and appellant acquitted.
3. ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No.
111692 February 9, 1996
FACTS:
Still professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder
At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling,
was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the
shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair." 2 Suddenly petitioner stabbed
Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled.
Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim
was killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear
would "kill all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from San Isidro he sought
refuge in his brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a
boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were many persons milling around the house "Jonie"
jumped out and escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a
store in the barangay.
RTC finds the petitioner guilty of murder
CA affirms the judgment of the lower court
ISSUE:
14
RULING:
Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and
therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of
petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he
was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation"; that he even showed him the knife
he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the
deceased. The following day however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and that petitioner had been arrested for a
crime he did not commit. 9
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded
on necessity and trustworthiness. 11
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available
to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable
that a motive to falsify existed.
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of
another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the
inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence.
Judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
4. PEOPLE VS BERNAL; 274 SCRA 197 ( JUNE 19 1997)
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were
charged with the crime of kidnapping in davao city.
A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses. 2
On the other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for his defense.
August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited
Bernal, who was passing by, to join them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to fetch his child. Thereafter, two men
arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat." 3 When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a
handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him "not to run because they were policemen" and because he had an "atraso" or a
score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the
latter's mother of the abduction.
The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an
illicit affair with Bernal's wife Naty and this was the motive behind the former's kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.
On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police on August 5, 1991, and hence, was
never kidnapped.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The prosecution has proffered sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal, together with his two companions, abducted Openda,
Jr. on August 5, 1991. A certain Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw Bernal at the
billiard hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his two companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to "Tarsing's Store" to check if a
certain person was still there. This person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that after the latter's presence was confirmed,
the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with Bernal's companions.
LibLex
Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao City who knew both Bernal and the victim, the
former being his neighbor and compadre. He narrated that he and the victim were drinking at "Tarsing's Store" on that fateful day
when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came to the
store and asked for "Payat." When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed "Payat," he was handcuffed and taken away by the
unidentified men.
Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to
him that he and Bernal's wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a
motel room. He advised Naty "not to do it again because she (was) a married woman. 9 Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity was ample
reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial
evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support
a conviction. 10 Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence,
pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
"Sec. 38.Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
15
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successorsin-interest and against third persons."
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision, it is safe to assume that "declaration against
interest" has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal. 11
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant
was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such
declaration to be true. 12
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a
declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence 13 because no sane
person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
No reason to reverse judgment
5. PAREL v. PRUDENCIO; 487 SCRA ( 19 April, 2006)
FACTS:
On Feb. 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Danilo Parel with the
RTC Baguio.
Prudencio is claiming that he is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National
Reservation near Department of Public Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City
He also claims that the house was constructed in 1972-1975 from his own funds and declared in his name in a tax
declaration and that he has been paying the taxes on it ever since
In 1973, when the 2nd floor of the house was already habitable, he allowed Parels parents to live there and supervise the
construction below. When the house was finished, the Parel family was allowed to live there since they have no house of their
own.
Parels dad, Florentino, now deceased, was Prudencios wifes younger brother.
In November 1985, Prudencio wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former was due for
retirement and he needed the place.
Danilos parents heeded this when they migrated to US in 1986, however, Danilo and his family unlawfully entered and took
possession of the ground floor of the house; and refused to leave despite many demands
So Prudencio filed an action for recovery of possession, and also asked from Parel for a monthly rental (3k) from April 1988
until he leaves the premises, plus moral and exemplary damages and costs.
Parel filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that his parents are co-owners of the house (ground floor to Parel, 2 nd floor
to Prudencio), and that his parents spent their own resources in improving the house and that the construction workers were
hired by Florentino, and that Florentino was an awardee of the land on which the house stands.
He also claims that Prudencio had filed ejectment case as well as criminal cases against them involving the subject house,
which were all dismissed.
Parel asked for the dismissal of the complaint and prayed for damages and attorneys fees.
RTC declared that the house is co-owned by Parel and Prudencio, so Prudencio cannot evict Parel. Parel was also ordered to
pay moral and actual damages, atty.s fees, and costs.
RTC concluded that the land was allocated to Florentino as part of a program of the former mayor of Baguio (Lardizabal) to
allow lowly-paid govt workers to construct their own houses on the reservation; that Prudencio failed to show proof of any
contract, written or oral, express or implied, that the late Florentino and his family stayed on the house not as co-owners but as
mere lessees, nor any other proof that would clearly establish his sole ownership of the house; and, that the late Florentino was
the one who gathered the laborers for the construction of the house and paid their salaries. Thus, the RTC ruled that coownership existed between respondent and petitioners father, Florentino.
From this, RTC concluded that Florentino and Prudencio had an agreement that Florentino would contribute money for the
construction and once the house is completed, hati sila.
RTC also questioned that Prudencio only claimed sole-ownership after 15 years.
RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as the several documents showing the City Assessors assessment of
the property all in respondents name since tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership.
It rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino declaring the house as owned by respondent saying that the
affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine the purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of
an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning the propertys tax assessment
and Florentino, thought then that it should be the respondent who should pay the taxes; and that the affidavit
cannot be accepted for being hearsay.
From this decision, Prudencio appealed, decision reversed by CA, declaring him the sole owner.
The CA found as meritorious respondents contention that since petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence any
documentary evidence, there is nothing to refute the evidence offered by respondent.
It ruled that the TCs statement that defendants occupancy of the house is due to a SPA executed by his parents is wanting
of any concrete evidence on record; that said power of attorney was never offered, hence, could not be referred to as petitioners
evidence to support his claim; that except for the bare testimonies of Candelario Regua, the carpenter-foreman, that it was
Florentino who constructed the house and Corazon Garcia, the former barangay captain, who testified that the lot was allocated
to petitioners father, there was no supporting document which would sufficiently establish factual bases for the trial courts
conclusion; and that the rule on offer of evidence is mandatory.
The CA found the affidavit dated Sep. 24, 1973 of Florentino, petitioners father, stating that he is not the
owner of the subject house but respondent, as conclusive proof of respondents sole ownership of the subject
house as it is a declaration made by Florentino against his interest.
It also gave weight to Prudencios tax declarations as sufficient to establish his case which constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property.
Parel filed an MFR, denied.

ISSUES:
1. WON Parel was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his father was a co-owner of the house. NO.
2. WON it was necessary to formally offer Parels documentary evidence. YES.
3. WON Florentinos affidavit should be given weight as conclusive proof of Prudencios sole ownership. YES.
RULING:
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
16
against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity
of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts
which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.9
A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. 11 Notably, during
Florentinos lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death, there is no showing that he had
revoked such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him (Florentino)
and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that
petitioner entered the house against the latters will and held that the remedy of respondent was to file an action for ejectment; 12 and
even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed
on the ground that respondents action should be an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
In this case, the records show that although petitioners counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his documentary evidence in
writing, he, however, did not file the same. 20 Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary evidence presented by petitioner.
Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties to the suit. 21 It is a settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked
as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. 22
Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were not formally offered, the same were marked during the presentation
of the testimonial evidence, thus it can properly be taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.23
Petitioner himself testified that it was his father who saw the progress of the construction and purchased the materials to be used; 31
and as a young boy he would follow-up some deliveries upon order of his father 32 and never saw respondent in the construction site.
The fact that not one of the witnesses saw respondent during the construction of the said house does not establish that petitioners
father and respondent co-owned the house.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2000 and its Resolution dated
November 28, 2000 are AFFIRMED.
PEDIGREE (RULE 130, SECTION 39)
GRAVADOR V MAMIGO
G.R. No. L-24989 CASTRO; July 21, 1967 (owen)
FACTS- The controversy arose because of conflicting records of Gravadors date of birth which is the basis of computation of
retirement annuities and the number of years of service of a retiree.- Pedro Gravador, principal of Sta. Catalina Elementary School in
Negros Oriental, was advised by Superintendent of Schools Salazar of his separation from the service because he had reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 as according to (1) pre-war records as a teacher in the public schools and (2) his Insular Teacher's
Cards and Employee's Record Card, which has just been found in connection with the verification of his service that he was born on
November 26, 1897 (TF he is 66 years, 8 months, and 22 days old) unless he can show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth
certificate that he was below 65 year old. Mamigo was designated teacher-in-charge of the said elementary school.- Gravador wrote
the Director of Public Schools and the Division Superintendent of Schools protesting his forced retirement because the date of his
birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Attached to his letter was (1) the affidavit of Bandoquillo and Sienes, both of
Amlan, Negros Oriental, that they knew him to be born on December 11, 1901, in Amlan, formerly known as New Ayuquitan, Negros
Oriental because they were the neighbors of Gravadors parents and they were present when Gravador was born and that they were
also invited in Gravadors baptismal party; (2) post-war records, consisting of an Elementary Teacher's Report Card, an Employee's
Record Card and an Employee's Record of Qualifications which state that Gravadors birth date is December 11, 1901.- problem is
aggravated by two uncontroverted facts, namely, that the records of the church where Gravador was baptized were destroyed by fire,
and that the
municipal civil register contains no record of the Gravadors birth.- Gravador filed a suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in
CFI Negros Oriental as he asked the court to adjudge him entitled to the office of principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School and
to order payment of not only his back salaries but also damages in the total amount of P52,400.
- TC: (1) concluded that the post-war records were intended to replace the pre-war records and therefore the correct date of birth is
December 11, 1901; (2) took into account the verified answer in a cadastral proceeding in CFI Negros Oriental, dated March 15, 1924,
filed by the Gravadors brother where it was stated that he was one of the co-owners of a piece of land and at the time he was 23
years old. TC granted his petition
- Respondents Claim: (1) TC erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records because these records were made only because it
was thought that the pre- war records had been lost or destroyed, but as some pre-war records had since been located, the date
contained in the pre-war records should be regarded as controlling; and (2) the finding of the Superintendent of Schools that
Gravador was born on November 26, 1897 is an administrative finding that should not be disturbed by the court.
ISSUE
WON TC erred in giving full reliance on post war records and verified answer by Gravadors brother in a cadastral proceeding
(PEDIGREE)
HELD
NO- The findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by substantial evidence is a settled rule of
administrative law. But where there is substantial evidence supporting the finding of the Superintendent of Schools is precisely the
issue in this case.- Cogent Reasons why TC did not err in its findings
(1) although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from
his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Even in his application for back pay
which he filed with the Department of Finance, through the Office of the Superintendent of Schools, on October 7, 1948, Gravador
stated that the date of his birth is December 11, 1901. He repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked
17
GSIS and the CSC to correct the date of his birth to December 11, 1901.
(2) the import of the declaration of Gravadors brother, contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the
effect that Gravador was then 23 years old, cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at
once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of Gravador only by evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration
ante litem motam of a deceased relative.
(3) Gravador has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay.
Gravador could not have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as the pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is
admittedly older than he.
Disposition Judgment Affirmed
PEOPLE VS ALEGADO 201 SCRA 37 (1991)

Facts:
The accused-appellant stands charged and convicted of two counts of rape by the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City. The accused
was allegedly raped CRISTINA DEANG y VILLAROSA, a girl below twelve (12) years of age, against her will and without her consent.
The accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual age at the time of the alleged incidents of rape was not establisher
with certainty; hence, it was error on the part of the trial court to convict the accused-appellant of statutory rape.
Issue:
Whether the offended party was actually below 12 years old at the time of the incidents
Hearsay evidence- exception on pedigree
Held:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the
fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the accused-appellant but
rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. Under Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part, that:
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regading pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives.
In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised Rules on Evidence to prove the victim's age is beyond
question. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is controversy in respect to the
pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed
previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person
must be a member of the family of said person. All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of
birth of the rape victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to
school upon reaching the age of seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said
tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of civil indemnity
which the accused shall pay to the offended party in each of the two rape cases is hereby increased to P50,000.00.
TISON VS CA 267 SCRA 582 (1997)
Facts:
This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and
an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The
nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the property disputed property presenting documentary
evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay
since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination.
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for
reconveyance. 7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners,
such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish
filiation. Hence, this appeal.
We find for petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.
Held:
The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be admitted by reason of private
respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an
objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former
is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay
rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry;
(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject
matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very
declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when men It must be supported by evidence aliunde. The general
18
rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the
declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant's estate, the relationship of the proved by the declaration
itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the
declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and
not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
The present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right
to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon
is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other
preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such declarant is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such
evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that
declaration made by the decedent. Where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship to another person. it
seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to
establish. The preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
While the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however
of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection
thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a
privilege which the party may waived. The proper time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer
thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred. Thus, a failure to except to
the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to
a witness must be made at the time the question is asked. An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency,
taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where
the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto.
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners
and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourth (3/4) share
therein, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
MENDOZA VS CA 201 SCRA 675
Facts:
The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it
to his dying day. The trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate court reversed
the judgment of the trial court.
- The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on
August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana
Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the rights and
privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
- Casimiro, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and
attorney's fees.- Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She
lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she married Valentin Tufiacao,
Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave
the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and
later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a
co-depositor at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
- Lolito corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his grandfather because Teopista said so.- Two other witnesses
testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro. Gaudencio said he was a cousin of
Casimiro. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which
eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at
Teopista's baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida.
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother,
Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give him
various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain
properties to Teopista.
- Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring took the stand to resist Teopista's claim. The last
statement was shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano, Casimiro's niece, who also affirmed that Vicente Toring used to
work as a cook in Casimiro's boat. She flatly declared she had never met Teopista but she knew her husband, who was a mechanic. 6
- the trial court judge rejected plaintiff' s claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by
the direct acts of the latter or of his family.
- On appeal, however, the respondent court reversed.- Casimiro died on May 1986. Counsel, now acting for Vicente Toring, then asked
this Court to substitute the latter for the deceased Casimiro Mendoza in the present petition.
ISSUES
1. WON the substitution of Casimiro Mendoza pro haec vice and nunc pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears to be the former's
illegitimate son is allowed.2. WON Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro
Mendoza.
3. WON Teopista has nevertheless established the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro by another method.
HELD
1. In Masecampo vs. Masecampo, it was held that The subsequent death of the father is not a bar to the action commenced during
his lifetime by one who pretended to be his natural son. It may survive against the executor, administrator, or any other legal
representative of the testate or intestate succession. We hereby allow the substitution of Casimiro Mendoza pro haec vice and nunc
pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears to be the former's illegitimate son. This disposes of the private respondent's contention that
the lawyer-client relationship terminated with
19
Casimiro's death and that Vicente has no personality now to substitute him.2. NORatio To establish "the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous"
does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues. The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others,
spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
affection and care.
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the status of a
recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
Reasoning The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both residents of Omapad, Mandaue
City. It is not unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the
couple is childless, as in this case. Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of one's
status. The regularity of defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been
sufficiently established.
3. YESRatio What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to
establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by
evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.- The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio
Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of
Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 39 Act or declarations about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred,
and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
- To set the record straight, it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father.
His testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own
mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.
- Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because "it is the best the nature of the
case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its admission. Nevertheless,
precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there are certain safeguards against its abuse.
- Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or
declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.2. The pedigree must be in issue.3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose
pedigree is in issue.4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.5. The relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.- All the above requisites are present in
the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida
Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of
Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The
declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally,
the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.
- If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent and her witnesses (the truck, house, joint
account) we can reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuacao to be the illegitimate child of
the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status.
SOLINAP VS LOCSIN JR. 371 SCRA (10 DECEMBER 2001)

SOLINAP V LOCSIN
G.R. No. 146737 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ: December 10, 2001 (da)
FACTS:
-Eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed a "Petition
for Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He allegedthat he is
an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin and that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
-January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful
heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not a
child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
-January 5, 1993 , another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta,
sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural
child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations.
-The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings,
joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla
(another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased.
20
-To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as
Exhibit "D") of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar
of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the
facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine
copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and identified in court the bound
volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included. Respondent also offered in
evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C") showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead
body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members of the deceased.
-Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8", indicating that the birth of respondent
was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They
observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957,
however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other hand,
Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's birth. This scenario dearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was
falsified. Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin
and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are forgeries. He
thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth records of the
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
ISSUE:
WON Juan E. Locsin Jr is an interested party and is qualified to be granted letters of administration (Which of the two documents is
genuine)
HELD:
Juan E. Locsin, Jr is not an interested person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the
issuance of letters of administration since he failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. (Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious)
Reasoning:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus:
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
XXXUpon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person, thus:
Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x"An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his
petition for issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased,
implying that he is an interested person in the estate and is considered as next of kin. But has respondent established that he is an
acknowledged natural son of the deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in
a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential
in order to establish the child's acknowledgment." (Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased, presented to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "D") and a photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of the deceased.
Exhibit D spurious:
-Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the records of births from all cities and municipalities in the
Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the
records of births cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry General
requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly
unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the
Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City. With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in
proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court should have been
presented by respondent. -Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised
form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "x x x during that
time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us
the 1958 Revised Form."
-Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102,
revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used
21
several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
-The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound
volume, not sewn like the other entries.
-The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a
sore thumb because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents
of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation,
address and business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there
is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate were
not filled up.
-There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume.The
records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have
been given more faith and credence by the courts below.
-The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of registrable certificates and documents presented
to them for entry to the Civil Registrar General.A copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General
should be identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to
the Civil Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such
circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to
declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan
C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo
Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear.-In Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father
of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of
any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or
record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child,
when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child." (Emphasis ours)
-The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeal where this Court said that "a
birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity." -A birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of
recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence.18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.
In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D"
was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and
substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In
this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness
of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.
-Respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,
lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
JISON VS CA 286 SCRA 495 (FEB 24 1998)

FACTS
In her complaint filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison
since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed
as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since
childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family.
MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree,
became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly
recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.
In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in
the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he
never recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO contended
that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He
thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses, namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena,
Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar.
These witnesses explained individual circumstances, which induced them to believe that MONINA was Franciscos daughter.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she was 40 years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She
affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar and baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D), she
was born on 6 August 1946 in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar (who passed away on 20 April 1965) and
FRANCISCO. MONINA first studied at Sagrado where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952 until 1955 (up to Grade 4),
her father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and other school expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from
Mr. Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give money to her mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied
in different schools, but FRANCISCO continuously answered for her schooling. For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the
University of Iloilo, but she later dropped due to an accident which required a week's hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for
part of the hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most of them. In 1963, she enrolled at the University of San Agustin,
where she stayed with Mrs. Franco who
22
paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for books, school supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO.
At the start of each semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask her to canvass prices, then
give her the money she needed. After finishing two semesters at University of San Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of records
she transferred to De Paul College, just in front of Mrs. Francos house, and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at
Western Institute of Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelors degree in Commerce in April 1967. During her senior year,
she stayed with Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She passed the CPA board exams in 1974, and
took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA), wherein FRANCISCO was likewise listed as
Guardian
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
48. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz
and Dolores Argenal.
FRANCISCO declared that Pansays employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that while employed by him, Pansay would sleep
with the other female helpers on the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the second floor. At
that time, his household staff was composed of three (3) female workers and two (2) male workers. After Pansay left in October 1944,
she never communicated with him again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied having had sexual
relations with Pansay and disavowed any knowledge about MONINAs birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for MONINAs
tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could
not believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He likewise
categorically denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA
was his daughter. The trial court ruled against Monina but the Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that Moninas filiation was sufficiently established.
HELD NO. RATIO
Under Article 1751 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the same
evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established, thus:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she
has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a high standard of proof is required. Specifically, to prove open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they
reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of time.
The foregoing STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH ONES FILIATION IS FOUNDED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT AN ORDER FOR
RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT MAY CREATE AN UNWHOLESOME ATMOSPHERE OR MAY BE AN IRRITANT IN THE FAMILY OR LIVES OF THE
PARTIES, SO THAT IT MUST BE ISSUED ONLY IF PATERNITY OR FILIATION IS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil cases,
i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative
of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of
trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to
controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of
evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it;
at bottom, it means probability of truth.
REASONING (FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE RATIO)
With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy.
FRANCISCOs arguments that he could not have had sex with MONINAs mother deserve scant consideration. While it has been
observed that unlawful intercourse will not be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence, this does not favor
FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act
themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victims
or mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs mother could no longer
testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution of the complaint for
recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her
parentage may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is
23
whether MONINAs evidence is coherent, logical and natural.

The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay by about the end of 1945. We agree with MONINA that this
was broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual
relations between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother. In any event, since it was established that her mother was still in the employ of
FRANCISCO at the time MONINA was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between FRANCISCO and
MONINAs mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO
fathered MONINA, has recognized her as his daughter and that MONINA has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the
status as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter.
FAMILY TRADITION (RULE 130, SECTION 40)

FERRER VS DE YNCHAUSTI
COMMON REPUTATION (RULE 130, SECTION 41)
FERRER VS DE ICHAUSTI
IN RE MALLARI
RES GESTAE (RULE 130, SECTION 42)
DBP POOL VS RMN
TALIDANO VS FALCON MARITIME
PEOPLE VS ESOY
ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF THE BUSINESS (RULE 130, SECTION 42)

LAO VS STANDARD INSURANCE
CANAQUIE VS CA
WALLEN MARITIME VS NLRC
[G.R. No. 155550. January 31, 2008.]
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. STEVEN P. CHIONG, respondent.
On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized Philippine agent of
TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOcean's vessel M/V Elbiaat the San Diego,
California Port. Under the service crew agreement, Chiong was guaranteed compensation at a monthly salary of US$440.00 and a
monthly overtime pay of US$220.00, or a total of US$7,920.00 for one year.
Subsequently, on March 27, 1989, Philimare dispatched a Letter of Guarantee to CL Hutchins & Co., Inc., TransOcean's agent at the
San Diego Port, confirming Chiong's arrival thereat in time to board the M/V Elbia which was set to sail on April 1, 1989 (California,
United States time). For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane ticket for San Diego, California with a
departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila. Ten (10) days before his scheduled departure, Chiong fetched his entire family from
Samar and brought them to Manila to see him off at the airport.
Chiong arrived at the Manila International Airport 4 (MIA), at about 6:30 a.m., three (3) hours before the scheduled time of departure.
Marilyn Calvo, Philimare's Liaison Officer, met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG) Counter to present Chiong's seaman service record book for clearance. Thereafter, Chiong's passport was duly stamped, after
complying with government requirements for departing seafarers.
Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest check-in counter. When it was Chiong's turn,
the Northwest personnel 5 informed him that his name did not appear in the computer's list of confirmed departing passengers.
Chiong was then directed to speak to a "man in barong" standing outside Northwest's counters from whom Chiong could allegedly
obtain a boarding pass. Posthaste, Chiong approached the "man in barong" who demanded US$100.00 in exchange therefor. Without
the said amount, and anxious to board the plane, Chiong queued a number of times at Northwest's Check-in Counter and presented
his ticket. However, the Northwest personnel at the counter told him to simply wait and that he was being a pest.
Calvo, who already saw that something was amiss, insisted that Chiong's plane ticket was confirmed and as such, he could check-in
smoothly and board the plane without shelling out US$100.00 for a boarding pass. Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board
Northwest Flight No. 24 bound for San Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at the M/V Elbia by April 1, 1989
(California, U.S.A. time).
It appears that Chiong's name was crossed out and substituted with "W. Costine" in Northwest's Air Passenger Manifest.
In a letter dated April 3, 1989, Chiong's counsel demanded as recompense: (1) the amount equivalent to Chiong's salary under the
latter's Crew Agreement 7 with TransOcean; (2) P15,000.00 for Chiong's expenses in fetching and bringing his family from Samar to
Manila; (3) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) P500,000.00 as legal fees. 8
Northwest demurred. Thus, on May 24, 1989, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract of carriage before the RTC. Northwest
filed a Motion to Dismiss 9 the complaint citing the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but the trial
court denied the same.
Issues were limited to the following:
24
(a)Whether [Chiong] was bumped-off by [Northwest] from Flight NW 24 or whether [Chiong] "no-showed" for said
flight.
(b)If defendant is found guilty of having breached its contract of carriage with plaintiff, what damages are
awardable to plaintiff and how much.
In the course of proceedings, Northwest, on September 14, 1990, filed a separate criminal complaint for False
Testimony14 against Chiong based on the latter's testimony that he did not leave the Philippines after April 1, 1989 contrary
to the notations in his seaman service record book that he had left the country on April 17, 1989, and returned on October 5
of the same year. Chiong did not participate in the preliminary investigation; thus, on December 14, 1990, the City
Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information against Chiong with the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding preponderance of evidence in favor of Chiong, and holding Northwest liable for breach
of contract of carriage. The RTC ruled that the evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion that Chiong was deliberately
prevented from checking-in and his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to accommodate an American passenger by the name of W.
Costine.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.
The petition must fail.
We are in complete accord with the common ruling of the lower courts that Northwest breached the contract of carriage with Chiong,
and as such, he is entitled to compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
The records reveal that Chiong, as plaintiff in the trial court, satisfied the burden of proof required in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of
evidence. Section 1 of Rule 133 provides:
SECTION 1.Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior
weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case,
the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which
they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear
upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though preponderance is not necessarily
with the greater number.
In this regard, the Court notes that, in addition to his testimony, Chiong's evidence consisted of a Northwest ticket for the April 1,
1989 Flight No. 24, Chiong's passport and seaman service record book duly stamped at the PCG counter, and the testimonies of
Calvo, Florencio Gomez, 19 and Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA) personnel who all identified the
signature and stamp of the PCG on Chiong's passport.
We have scoured the records, and found no reason to depart from the well-settled rule that factual findings of the lower courts
deserve the utmost respect and are not to be disturbed on appeal. 20 Indeed, Chiong's Northwest ticket for Flight No. 24 on April 1,
1989, coupled with the PCG stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct evidence that he was present at MIA on said
date as he intended to fly to the United States on board that flight. As testified to by POEA personnel and officers, the PCG stamp
indicates that a departing seaman has passed through the PCG counter at the airport, surrendered the exit pass, and complied with
government requirements for departing seafarers. Calvo, Philimare's liaison officer tasked to assist Chiong at the airport, corroborated
Chiong's testimony on the latter's presence at the MIA and his check-in at the PCG counter without a hitch. Calvo further testified that
she purposely stayed at the PCG counter to confirm that Chiong was able to board the plane, as it was part of her duties as
Philimare's liaison officer, to confirm with their principal, TransOcean in this case, that the seafarer had left the country and
commenced travel to the designated port where the vessel is docked. 21 Thus, she had observed that Chiong was unable to check-in
and board Northwest Flight No. 24, and was actually being given the run-around by Northwest personnel.
It is of no moment that Chiong's witnesses who all corroborated his testimony on his presence at the airport on, and flight details
for, April 1, 1989, and that he was subsequently bumped-off are, likewise, employees of Philimare which may have an interest in
the outcome of this case. We intoned in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 22 thus:
(T)his Court has repeatedly held that a witness' relationship to the victim does not automatically
affect the veracity of his or her testimony. While this principle is often applied in criminal cases, we deem
that the same principle may apply in this case, albeit civil in nature. If a witness' relationship with a party
does not ipso facto render him a biased witness in criminal cases where the quantum of evidence
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why the same principle should not
apply in civil cases where the quantum of evidence is only preponderance of evidence.
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together, amply establish the fact that Chiong was present at MIA on
April 1, 1989, passed through the PCG counter without delay, proceeded to the Northwest check-in counter, but when he presented
his confirmed ticket thereat, he was not issued a boarding pass, and ultimately barred from boarding Northwest Flight No. 24 on that
day.
It is true that Chiong's passport and seaman service record book indicate that he had left the country on April 17, 1989 and come
back on October 5 of the same year. However, this evidence fails to debunk the facts established to have transpired on April 1, 1989,
more particularly, Chiong's presence at the airport and his subsequent bumping-off by Northwest despite a confirmed ticket. Although
initially, the burden of proof was with Chiong to prove that there was a breach of contract of carriage, the burden of evidence shifted
to Northwest when Chiong adduced sufficient evidence to prove the facts he had alleged. At that point, Northwest had the burden of
going forward 23 to controvert Chiong's prima facie case. As the party asserting that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger, Northwest
then had the burden of evidence to establish its claim. Regrettably, Northwest failed to do so.
Furthermore, it has not escaped our attention that Northwest, despite the declaration in its Pre-Trial Brief, did not present as
a witness their check-in agent on that contentious date. 24 This omission was detrimental to Northwest's case considering
its claim that Chiong did not check-in at their counters on said date. It simply insisted that Chiong was a "no-show"
25
passenger and totally relied on the Flight Manifest, which, curiously, showed a horizontal line drawn across Chiong's name,
and the name W. Costine written above it. The reason for the insertion, or for Chiong's allegedly being a "no-show"
passenger, is not even recorded on the remarks column of the Flight Manifest beside the Passenger Name column. Clearly,
the categorical declaration of Chiong and his other witnesses, coupled with the PCG stamp on his passport and seaman
service record book, prevails over Northwest's evidence, particularly the Flight Manifest. Thus, we are perplexed why,
despite the evidence presented by Chiong, and the RTC's specific order to Northwest's counsel to present the person(s) who
prepared the Flight Manifest and Passenger Name Record for a proper identification of, and to testify on, those documents,
Northwest still insisted on presenting Gonofredo Mendoza and Amelia Meris who were, admittedly, not competent to testify
thereon.
Moreover, Northwest paints a scenario that ostensibly transpired on a different date. Even if Chiong left the Philippines on April 17,
1989, it would not necessarily prove that Chiong was a "no-show" on April 1, 1989. Neither does it negate the already established fact
that Chiong had a confirmed ticket for April 1, 1989, and first passed through the PCG counter without delay, then reached and was at
the Northwest check-in counters on time for the scheduled flight.
Essentially, Northwest argues that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger on two (2) separate occasions, March 28 and April 1, 1989
because he was actually scheduled to depart for the US on April 17, 1989 as ostensibly evidenced by his passport and seaman record
book. Had this new matter alleged been proven by Northwest, it would prevent or bar recovery by Chiong. Unfortunately, Northwest
was unsuccessful in proving not only the "no-show" claim, but that Chiong, likewise, worked under the original crew agreement.
Northwest likewise insists now that there is a pending criminal case for False Testimony against Chiong that a falsified part of
Chiong's testimony would indicate the falsity of his entire testimony, consistent with the "falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus" 26 doctrine. Following Northwest's flawed logic, this would invariably lead to the conclusion that the corroborating
testimonies of Chiong's witnesses are also false.
The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is not a positive rule of law and is not strictly applied in this
jurisdiction. Before this maxim can be applied, the witness must be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more material
points. The principle presupposes the existence of a positive testimony on a material point contrary to subsequent declarations in the
testimony. However, the records show that Chiong's testimony did not contain inconsistencies on what occurred on April 1, 1989. Yet,
Northwest never even attempted to explain or impugn the evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG counter on April 1, 1989,
and that his passport was accordingly stamped, obviously for purposes of his departure on that day.
As to the criminal case, it is well to note that there is no final determination, as yet, of Chiong's guilt by the courts. But even if Chiong
is adjudged guilty, it will have little effect on the outcome of this case. As we held in Leyson v. Lawa: 27
The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in
deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said
parts. In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect
examinations must be calibrated and considered.
It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer to one question may be supplied or explained as
qualified by his answer to other question. The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this
jurisdiction. The doctrine deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and the same is not an
inflexible one of universal application.
From the foregoing disquisition, the ineluctable conclusion is that Northwest breached its contract of carriage with Chiong.
Finally, the issue of the exclusion of Northwest's Exhibits "2" and "3" need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that the RTC and CA
correctly excluded these documents as hearsay evidence. We quote with favor the CA's holding thereon, thus:
As a rule, "entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facieevidence,
if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty". [Rule 130, Section 43, Revised Rules of Court]
Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the course of business, it is necessary that: (a) the
person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify; (b) the entries were made at or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer; (c) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (d)
the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (e) the entries were made
in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest and passenger name record to be mere hearsay evidence.
While there is no necessity to bring into court all the employees who individually made the entries, it is sufficient
that the person who supervised them while they were making the entries testify that the account was prepared
under his supervision and that the entries were regularly entered in the ordinary course of business. In the case
at bench, while MENDOZA was the supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal
knowledge of the entries in the manifest since he did not supervise the preparation thereof. More
importantly, no evidence was presented to prove that the employee who made the entries was dead
nor did the defendant-appellant set forth the circumstances that would show the employee's
inability to testify. 38
[G.R. No. 164457. April 11, 2012.]

ANNA LERIMA PATULA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Petitioner was charged with estafa under an information filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City that averred:
26
That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of
Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a
saleswoman of Footlucker's Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total sum of
P131,286.97 from several customers of said company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of
the sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from complying with her obligation and after a
reasonable period of time despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the said company, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the said collection to the said company but
instead, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the
proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company in the
aforesaid amount of P131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. 1
Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of facts was had, and petitioner
did not avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecution's first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the branch manager of Footlucker's Chain of
Stores, Inc. (Footlucker's) in Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994; that petitioner was an employee of Footlucker's, starting
as a saleslady in 1996 until she became a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was authorized to take
orders from wholesale customers coming from different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and
Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect payments from them; that she could issue and sign official receipts
of Footlucker's for the payments, which she would then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the payments for
tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading him to confront her;
that she responded that business was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk
discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen
Guivencan; that he learned from a customer of petitioner's that the customer's outstanding balance had already been fully
paid although that balance appeared unpaid in Footlucker's records; and that one night later on, petitioner and her parents
went to his house to deny having misappropriated any money of Footlucker's and to plead for him not to push through with a
case against her, promising to settle her account on a monthly basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped
reporting to work
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan. She declared that Go had requested her to audit petitioner after
some customers had told him that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstanding balances
for them. She discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of
around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that
upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written report denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA
PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997" marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report,
petitioner had misappropriated the total amount of P13l,286.92.
During Guivencan's stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioner's various customers allegedly with
discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first column that contained the dates of
the entries, a second that identified the invoices by the number, a third that stated the debit, a fourth that noted the credit (or the
amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the balances (debit minus credit). Only 49 of the ledgers were formally offered and admitted
by the RTC because the 50th ledger could no longer be found. EHTIDA
In the course of Guivencan's direct-examination, petitioner's counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figures
entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not
themselves presented in court. 4 With that, petitioner's counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her
testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.
On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted "not to present evidence for her defense" the
Prosecution's evidence remained "unrefuted and uncontroverted," 7 rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty ofestafa.
Issues
1.Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the falsification of the duplicate receipts issued
by petitioner to her customers violated petitioner's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation;
2.Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of the falsification of the duplicate receipts despite
the information not alleging the falsification;
3.Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as
evidence of petitioner's guilt for estafa as charged despite their not being duly authenticated; and
4.Whether or not Guivencan's testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive) to prove petitioner's misappropriation or conversion was inadmissible for being hearsay.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Failure
of
information
did
not
violate
petitioner's
of the nature and cause of the accusation
to
right
allege
to
be
falsification
informed
The Bill of Rights guarantees some rights to every person accused of a crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when the information was filed in the RTC,
contained the following provisions on the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the information.
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the information should never be taken for
granted by the State. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To
27
convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative of the Constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. 11 Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven,
unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and
later falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such duplicates to her employer to show that the customers had paid less
than the amounts actually reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed the falsification in order to conceal her
misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the falsification was not an offense separate and distinct from the estafa charged
against her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of falsification as its means of establishing her misappropriation or
conversion as an essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her was not infringed or denied to her.
We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein completely pleaded the estafa defined and penalized under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code within the context of the substantive law and the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for
the information to allege the acts of falsification by petitioner because falsification was not an element of the estafa charged.
RTC correctly dealt in its decision with petitioner's concern thuswise:
In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that [the] prosecution's evidence utterly fails to prove
the crime charged. According to the defense, the essence of Karen Guivencan's testimony is that the accused
falsified the receipts issued to the customers served by her by changing or altering the amounts in the duplicates
of the receipts and therefore, her testimony is immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is misappropriation under
Art. 315, paragraph (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation whatsoever of any falsification or
alteration of amounts in the [i]nformation under which the accused was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY.
Accused, thus, maintains that the testimony of Karen Guivencan should therefore not be considered at all as it
tended to prove an offense not charged or included in the [i]nformation and would violate [the] accused's
constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. The Court
is not in accord with such posture of the accused.
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the crime charged in the [i]nformation is
merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could not prove
falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since the information charges accused only of
misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of the Revised [P]enal Code, the Court holds that
there is no necessity of alleging the falsification in the Information as it is not an element of the
crime charged. DTcASE
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will constitute as one complex
crime and when they are considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime of Estafa Through
Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money
or goods from another person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa.
However, if the falsification is committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and
falsification are committed. In the instant case, when accused collected payments from the customers, said
collection which was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or erroneous entries which she made
on the duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal some amount of her collection which she did
not remit to the company
II
Testimonial
and
documentary
did not prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt
evidence,
being
hearsay,
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution's duty is to prove each and every element of the crime
charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included
therein.14 The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. 15 In doing
all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of
the evidence of the accused.
To establish the elements of estafa earlier mentioned, the Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various
documents consisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers
listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments,
and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. 18 The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as
Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as Footlucker's sales representative. On her
part, Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customers or
remitted by petitioner to Footlucker's. This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives,
inclusive, and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the
ledgers held by Footlucker's corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to
validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioner's misappropriation or conversion through crossexamination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and
thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. AICHaS
To elucidate why the Prosecution's hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference
is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of
her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The
personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her
testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
28
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from
whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined.
The weight of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the
information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness
and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve
any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches
herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. 19 Thus, the rule
against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 20 The
testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same. 21
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the
credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on
the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to
prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in
a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is
admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. 22 This
kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. 23 The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the
statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the
hearsay rule applies. 24
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be
excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine
the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. 25 If hearsay is allowed, the right stands
to be denied because the declarant is not in court. 26 It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party's
witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a
party's right to cross-examine her adversary's witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require
that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court formalizes this solution, viz.: EAcHCI
Section 1.Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a)
The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court ensures this solution thusly:
Section 6.Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct examination, the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2),
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . enjoy the right . . .
to meet the witnesses face to face . . .," the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to noncriminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of
hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination
by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon
whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends. 27
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan's testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be
entirely rejected as proof of petitioner's misappropriation or conversion.
III
Lack of their proper authentication rendered
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite
their being private documents that were not duly authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public document and a private document for the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, viz.:
Section 19.Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a)The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b)Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and CSIcHA
(c)Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
29
All other writings are private.

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public
document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a
notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing
authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In
contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a
notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the
manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a
private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of
Section 21, 28 Rule 132 of theRules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; 29 (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been
admitted; 30or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine. 31
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because private individuals executed or
generated them for private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four
exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their
authentication in the manner provided in Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 20.Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a)By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b)By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
As the excerpts indicate, Go's attempt at authentication of the signature of petitioner on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No.
20441 (a document that was marked as Exhibit A, while the purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1)
immediately fizzled out after the Prosecution admitted that the document was a mere machine copy, not the original. Thereafter, as if
to soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a later date the originals of the receipt with serial
number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that promise was not even true, because almost in the same breath the
Prosecution offered to authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receipts through a different witness (though then still
unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate both the machine copy of the receipt with serial
number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the machine copy was inexplicably
forgotten and was no longer even included in the Prosecution's Offer of Documentary Evidence.
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 was subsequently presented as Exhibit B through
Guivencan. However, the Prosecution did not establish that the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go had
earlier sought to identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact
that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the marking nomenclature for the machine copy of the receipt bearing serial number
FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and purposes of this case, and used the same nomenclature to refer instead to an entirely different
document entitled "List of Customers covered by ANA LERIMA PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-20,
1997."
In her case, Guivencan's identification of petitioner's signature on two receipts based alone on the fact that the signatures
contained the legible family name of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the documentary
evidence against petitioner. Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioner's signature on the receipts either
because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the
receipts.
The mystery shrouding the RTC's soft treatment of the Prosecution's flawed presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to
the instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as with Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which contains instructions on
how to prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows:
Section 22.How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, orhas
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given
by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by
the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
(Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or signing of the documents, the
Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence,
Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence.
That the Prosecution's evidence was left uncontested because petitioner decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and
did not tender her contrary evidence was inconsequential. Although the trial court had overruled the seasonable objections to
Guivencan's testimony by petitioner's counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied that hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, had no probative value. 39 Verily, the flaws of the Prosecution's evidence were fundamental and substantive, not
merely technical and procedural, and were defects that the adverse party's waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebut could
not set right or cure. Nor did the trial court's overruling of petitioner's objections imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and
value.
Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application of the hearsay rule by also tersely stating that the ledgers
"were prepared in the regular course of business." Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
30
Section 43.Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may
be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
This was another grave error of the RTC. The terse yet sweeping manner of justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable
due to the need to show the concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the
hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows:
(a)The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
(b)The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
(c)The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
(d)The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual,
moral, or religious;
(e)The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. 41
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in
the trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the State's evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to
the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence. The failure of the
judge to do so herein nullified the guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to prove her
innocence. Her acquittal should follow.
ENTRIES IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS (RULE 130, SECTION 44)

[G.R. No. L-12986. March 31, 1966.]
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG,petitionersappellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.) INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondentsappellees.
The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code. It appears that in the afternoon of March 18, 1948 a fire
broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being
hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their
owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondentsCaltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the
station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the
fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due
care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.
The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and Fire
Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Portions of the first two reports are as follows:
1.Police Department Report:
"Investigation disclosed that at about 4:00 P.M. March 18, 1948, while Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline
from a tank truck, plate No. T-5292 into underground tank of the Caltex Gasoline Station located at the corner of
Rizal Avenue and Antipolo Street, this City, an unknown Filipino lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match
stick near the main valve of the said underground tank. Due to the gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed. Quick
action of Leandro Flores in pulling of the gasoline hose connecting the truck with the underground tank prevented
a terrific explosion. However, the flames scattered due to the hose from which the gasoline was spouting. It
burned the truck and the following accessories and residences."
2.The Fire Department Report:
In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic) subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and
cigarette stand, the complainants furnished this Office a copy of a photograph taken during the fire and which is
submitted herewith. It appears in this picture that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack which
according to information gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes and matches, installed between the
gasoline pumps and the underground tanks."
The report of Captain Tinio reproduced information given by a certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the gasoline station and
what the chief of the fire department had told him on the same subject.
The foregoing reports were ruled out as "double hearsay" by the Court of Appeals and hence inadmissible. This ruling is now
assigned as error. It is contended: first, that said reports were admitted by the trial court without objection on the part of
respondents; secondly, that with respect to the police report (Exhibit V-Africa) which appears signed by a Detective Zapanta
allegedly "for Salvador Capacillo," the latter was presented as witness but respondents waived their right to cross-examine
him although they had the opportunity to do so; and thirdly, that in any event the said reports are admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule under section 35 of Rule 123, now Rule 130
31
The first contention is not borne out by the record. The transcript of the hearing of September 17, 1953 (pp. 167-170) shows that the
reports in question, when offered as evidence, were objected to by counsel for each of respondents on the ground that they were
hearsay and that they were "irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent." Indeed, in the court's resolution only Exhibits J, K, K-5 and X-6
were admitted without objection; the admission of the others, including the disputed ones, carried no such explanation.
On the second point, although Detective Capacillo did take the witness stand, he was not examined and he did not testify as to the
facts mentioned in his alleged report (signed by Detective Zapanta.) All he said was that he was one of those who investigated "the
location of the fire and, if possible, gather witnesses as to the occurrence." and that he brought the report with him. There was
nothing, therefore on which he need be cross-examined; and the contents of the report, as to which he did not testify, did not thereby
become competent evidence. And even if he had testified, his testimony would still have been objectionable as far as information
gathered by him from third persons was concerned.
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by
such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 383.)
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the reports as to the
cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. Was
knowledge of such facts, however, acquired by them through official information? As to some facts the sources thereof are not even
identified. Others are attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an employee at the gas station where the fire occurred; to Leandro
Flores, driver of the tank truck from which gasoline was being transferred at the time to the underground tank of the station; and to
respondent Mateo Boquiren, who could not, according to Exhibit V-Africa, give any reason as to the origin of the fire. To qualify their
statements as "official information acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only
must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record.1
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule: the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting
officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.
This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself) which states: where the
thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendants want of care. The gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the
neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but
they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of
care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception because the burden of proof
is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused the injury
complained of.
[G.R. No. L-48727. September 30, 1982.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSEPH LEONES y DUCUSIN alias JESSIE,defendantappellant.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, convicting the accused-appellant,
Joseph Leones y Ducusin, of the crime of rape charged in the following information, to wit:
"The undersigned offended party after having been duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law hereby accuses
JOSEPH LEONES y DUCUSIN alias Jessie of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1973, in the Municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused Joseph Leones y Ducusin alias Jessie,
by means of violence and use of force compelled the offended party to swallow tablets and consequently
thereafter while she fell into semi-consciousness the said accused wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the complainant Irene Dulay against her will in the house of the accused.
"CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence.
The accused-appellant denied the charge imputed to him, claiming that at the time of the alleged rape between 2:00 o'clock and 3:00
o'clock p.m. on April 22, 1973, he was at the beach resort with the other members of the family, namely his sister Elizabeth, his
stepmother Natividad Leones, his younger brothers and sisters named Marivic, Theresa, Carol, Pinky and Bongbong together with
other companions, for a picnic and had lunch thereat, swimming and picture-taking.
As indicated earlier, the trial court, holding that "viewed from all legal aspects of this case, in the light of the recorded evidence, . . .
is fully convinced that the crime of rape charged in the criminal complaint was committed by the accused. The evidence presented by
the prosecution is not only clear and convincing but has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."
32
We note a number of significant facts from the recorded evidence of the prosecution which materially and substantially debunks and
derails the theory of the Government and correspondingly impresses considerable merit to the defense.
1.The clinical case record of Irene Dulay's admission and confinement at the Provincial Hospital of La Union, marked Exhibit
"2", contain entries which totally and completely belie the claim of the complainant that she was raped by the accused in the
afternoon of April 22, 1973.
The entry written in the clinical record when Irene Dulay was admitted under the item "Complaints" reads: Vaginal Bleeding, and
below this entry appears the Diagnosis Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen. Assuming that the victim was
raped between 2 and 3 o'clock p.m., April 22, 1973 (the same day she was admitted in the hospital), then the lacerations of the
hymen at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock would not have been described and indicated to be Healing in the clinical case record. It would be
described as "laceration fresh" or by similar words like "bloody or new lacerations." There is no instant formula, technique or process
known to medical science or by human experience to hasten the healing of a lacerated hymen within three (3) hours or so after
defloration.
Citing from the book, Legal Medicine by Pedro P. Solis, M.D., Ll B., Medico Legal Officer, National Bureau of Investigation, Department
(now Ministry) of Justice, We have the following comment on: LibLex
"Healing time of laceration of the hymen:
Superficial laceration of the hymen may heal in two or three days.
More extensive tear may require longer time, usually seven to ten days.
Complicated types and those with intervening infection may cause delay in the healing depending upon the
extent of the involvement of the surrounding tissue and the degree of infection. Complicated laceration may even
require surgical intervention." (p. 302, italics supplied.)
Since there was found laceration, wide, at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock of the hymen which was then already healing on April 22, 1973, it
follows reasonably that the defloration occurred several days before, which may have happened when Irene Dulay took a week-long
vacation to her hometown in Pugo, La Union (tsn, p. 10, June 27, 1975) and there is evidence that she had a suitor named Ferdinand
Sarmiento who is from nearby Agoo, La Union. And when she returned to the house of her employer in San Fernando, La Union, she
had already chest and stomach pains and a headache.
The written entries in the clinical case record, Exh. "2", showing the date of her admission in the hospital on April 22, 1973, her
complaint of vaginal bleeding and the diagnosis of "Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated, the said entries having been made in official records by a public officer of the Philippines in the
performance of his duty especially enjoined by law, which is that of a physician in a government hospital. (Rule 130, Sec. 38, Rules of
Court). In the case at bar, Dr. Antonino Estioco was the admitting physician but unfortunately, he was not presented as a witness for
the government.
From the same clinical case record, Exhibit "2", it appears clearly that the alleged victim, Irene Dulay, was having her menstrual
period when she was supposedly raped for the Complaint indicated that she had vaginal bleeding. She herself admitted in her
testimony that on April 22, 1973, she was having her menstruation. (tsn, p. 9, June 27, 1975).
It is quite abnormal and unnatural, almost unheard of in human experience and behavior that a man would have sexual
intercourse with a woman then having her menstrual period, as was the admitted condition of the complainant when she
was allegedly abused by the accused. And because of this universal abhorrence, taboo and distaste to have sexual contact
with a menstruating female and this is so however passionate and lustful the man way be unless he is depraved or
demented. We cannot believe that the accused-appellant, a young fourth year college student of civil engineering studying
in Baguio City, would break or violate such a taboo by drugging the complainant girl with the help of her sister and
afterwards have sex relations with her in her menstrual condition
When the complainant was investigated by the police, she declared in her affidavit, Exhibit "5", the following answers to these
questions:
"5.QWhy are you in this office?
AI came here with the purpose of giving my voluntary statement in connection with the incident that happened to
me in the house of my employer and I want to file a formal complaint against the persons who offended
me, sir.
6.QWho are those persons who offended you, if you know?
AThey are Joseph alias Jessie and Elizabeth both surnamed Leones, the son and daughter of Mr. PepitoLeones, my
employer.
7.QWhen did that incident happened?
AAt about between the hours of 2:00 & 3:00 in the afternoon of April 22, 1973, sir.
8.QWhat did these Joseph and Elizabeth Leones do against you?
ABecause I was suffering headache at that time because it was the first day of my menstrual period, they were
inviting me to go with them to Wallace and I told them that I have a headache then later they forced me
to take in aspirin tablets, three (3) tablets then after a few seconds, I begun to feel dizzy and
halfconscious.
33
9.QDo you know if what you have forcely taken and given by the two, Joseph and Elizabeth were really aspirin
tablets?
AI do not know, but they were white in color similar to aspirin tablets but after I have taken them I felt dizzy then
unconscious.
10.QIn what manner did Joseph Leones and Elizabeth Leones force you to take in the tablets?
AAt about that time and date I mentioned above, I was then lying on my bed in my room at their residence, then
Jessie and Elizabeth came in. Joseph alias Jessie took hold of my throat with one hand and pressed it
hard that I was almost choked up, his other hand held my both cheeks his thumb and forefinger pressed
hard to forcely open my mouth while Elizabeth held a spoon containing the three (3) tablets then I was
told by them to swallow the pills. I could not resist so I swallowed the pills then later I felt dizzy as if the
world was turning around."
Thus, it would appear from the above recorded evidence that the accused Joseph Leones and his sister Elizabeth, helped and
conspired with each other in the commission of the crime of rape against the offended party, an assumption that is hardly believable
for it would lead to the absurd conclusions that Elizabeth was a principal by cooperation and that both Joseph and Elizabeth had
planned the rape for they conveniently provided themselves beforehand with the necessary drug.
It further appears in the record that the Philippine Constabulary in La Union did not believe the existence of rape when
Felicidad Boado reported the incident (tsn, p. 25, June 18, 1974), which disbelief may reasonably be attributed to the
unnatural and unusual version of the complainant that another of her own sex had conspired and confabulated in the
commission of the alleged defilement.
The complainant, Irene Dulay, had declared in her affidavit, Exhibit "5", in answer to question No. 9 that after she had taken the
tablets that were white in color similar to aspirin tablets, she felt dizzy, then unconscious. In her testimony at the trial, however, she
testified that after she had taken the tablets, she felt dizzy and felt the removal of her panty and that when he went on top of her, he
inserted his private parts into her private parts (tsn, pp. 6-7, June 27, 1975), but on cross-examination, she said that she became
unconscious when Joseph Leones was already on top of her (tsn, p. 22, June 27, 1975). If she became unconscious when Leones was
on top of her and yet she felt pain when he placed his private parts into hers, then this is incredible for how could she have known
what was done to her and how she felt when she was already unconscious as admitted by her.
The record is replete with testimonies of the very witnesses of the prosecution itself revealing the irrational, if not immoral
behavior and conduct of the complainant which cuts deep into the morality, character and credibility of the complaining
witness. To cite a few of her immoral acts, when the police came to visit her, Irene Dulay took hold of the penis, of the
policeman (Testimony of Felicidad Boado, tsn, p. 20, June 18, 1974). Whenever she sees a man, she goes after him and takes
hold of his hand and places it in her private part (Testimony of Leonida Dulay, p. 5, tsn, Sept. 20, 1974). Sometimes she is
seated, sometimes she is standing and there are moments that she goes around and whenever she sees a man, she calls for
him and says "darling Jessie" (Cross-examination of Leonida Dulay, tsn, p. 14, Sept. 20, 1974). She even said "have sexual
intercourse with me," making particular mention of the person who wanted to do that to her as Joseph Leones (Crossexamination of Leonida Dulay, tsn, pp. 27-28, Sept. 20, 1974). There are times when she gets a pillow and imitates the
sexual act (tsn, p. 29, Sept. 20, 1974). There are moments when she takes hold of a pillow, embraces it, and makes
movements imitating the sexual act
The circumstances of persons, time and place attendant in the commission of the crime do not build up the case for
the People. On the contrary, We find facts and circumstances which contradict and contravene the theory of the prosecution,
rendering it highly improbable and questionable. Thus, the room of the complainant where the alleged rape was committed
was at the ground floor of the house where her employer lives with his family and maintains a canteen at the premises, the
room being very near the washing place and had a door with only wooden jalousies. There were several persons present in
the house at the time of the alleged rape and they were Evelyn Estigoy, the secretary of Natividad Leones, the cook
Inocencia Gangad and her daughter, Marites. With the presence of these persons at the premises and the complainant's
room was not secluded nor completely closed, the opportunity to commit the rape is hardly present. More than that the
alleged time being between 2:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and with the supposed attendance of the
perpetrator's elder sister, Elizabeth the element of secrecy had been totally ignored or disregarded which is quite
unbelievable and incredible in such a crime as rape.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the evidence presented by the prosecution in the light of the legal principles above outlined
and now well-established in Our jurisprudence and guided by a little insight into human nature, We are persuaded and convinced that
the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. That moral certainty or degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind (Rule 133, Section 2, Rules of Court) has not been established by the prosecution. The
constitutional mandate that the accused is presumed innocent must prevail and, therefore, the accused-appellant, Joseph Leones, is
entitled to an acquittal.
[G.R. No. 107735. February 1, 1996.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARDO SAN GABRIEL Y ORTIZ,defendant-appellant.
The evidence shows that at around seven o'clock in the evening of 26 November 1989, within the vicinity of Pier 14 at North Harbor
along Marcos Road, Manila, a fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog on one hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel together with
"Ramon Doe" on the other. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified the protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon then
hastened towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with bladed weapons. They approached Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded
him and simultaneously stabbed him in the stomach and at the back, after which the assailants ran towards the highway leaving
Tonog behind on the ground. He was then brought to Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. RHLY
Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, Medico-Legal Officer of the Western Police District, autopsied the cadaver of the victim and reported that it
sustained two (2) penetrating stab wounds each caused by a single-bladed instrument. He opined that both wounds were fatal. 3
The accused has a different version. He testified that he saw Tonog drunk; Tonog even attempted to box him but he parried his blow;
Tonog continued walking but when he chanced upon Ramon he suddenly and without provocation boxed and kicked Ramon; Ramon
fought back but was subdued by his bigger assailant so the former ran towards the highway; when Tonog met a certain "Mando" he
boxed the latter who however fought back despite his (accused) warning not to; at this moment he saw Ramon return with a bolo on
hand; he warned Ramon not to fight but his advice went unheeded; instead, with bolo on hand Ramon struck Tonog on the belly;
34
when "Mando" saw what happened he ("Mando") pulled out his knife and also stabbed Tonog at the back; Ramon and "Mando" then
fled towards the highway.
The accused further claimed that he even stayed with the victim and called out the latter's companions to bring him to the hospital;
that prosecution witness Brenda Gonzales only arrived at the crime scene after Tonog was already taken to the hospital; that Brenda
even inquired from him what happened and then prodded him to testify; that his refusal coupled with the fact that he owed Gonzales
some money earned him the ire of the latter and that was why he was charged for the death of Tonog.
The trial court convicted the accused as charged and sentenced him "to life imprisonment and to pay the heirs of Jaime
Tonog.
Issue: WON the accused is guilty of murder
Held: We sustain the conviction of the accused for murder. It is settled that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded greatest
respect by the appellate court absent any abuse of discretion, 5 and none is perceivable in the case at bench; hence we affirm the
factual findings of the trial court.
The accused contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are incredible and conflicting. We however find otherwise.
Gonzales and Ochobillo, as observed by the trial court, testified in a direct and candid manner. No evil motive is attributed to them as
to testify falsely against the accused. That Gonzales harbored a grudge against the accused because he owed her some money, and
even enticed her customers into patronizing another carinderia, can hardly be believed. We are not convinced that Brenda Gonzales
would testify against accused-appellant for a crime so grave simply because he owed her a measly sum of P300.00. That he enticed
the customers of Gonzales into patronizing another carinderia is belied by the fact that on the night of the incident he was, as he
claimed, eating at the carinderiaof Gonzales. If there be any testimony that should be considered incredible and illogical it must be
that of the accused. His assertion that "Mando" stabbed the victim should not receive any evidentiary value when weighed against
the positive assertion of the prosecution witnesses that the accused was the assailant of Jaime Tonog.
Quite interestingly, the accused did not offer any information regarding the person and circumstances of "Mando." Up to this date
"Mando" remains a myth. Not a single witness was presented by the defense to prove who "Mando" was, nor even a hint of his
personal circumstances. During the entire proceedings in the court below "Mando" was never mentioned by the prosecution
witnesses. Nobody ever implicated him except the accused. In fact, there should have been no difficulty procuring witnesses to testify
on the part of the accused as the incident was viewed openly by a multitude of bystanders. His failure to present any witness pointing
to "Mando" as the perpetrator of the crime convinces us that "Mando" in fact existed only as a figment of the mind.
The accused leans heavily on the Advance Information Sheet 6 prepared by Pat. Steve Casimiro which did not mention him at all and
named only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect. Unfortunately this cannot defeat the positive and candid testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are onlyprima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. They are not conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and
inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness
may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and
for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during the trial would be more
lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the police blotter. 7 Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was never formally
offered by the defense during the proceedings in the court below. Hence any reliance by the accused on the document must fail
since the court cannot consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. 8
Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by the police officer only after interviewing Camba, an alleged
eyewitness. The accused then could have compelled the attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the slightest effort to
present Camba on the part of the accused should militate against his cause.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 9 But to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must
concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the
public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and, (c)
The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information. 10
The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. The public officer who
prepared the document had no sufficient and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was
acquired from Camba which therefore could not be categorized as official information because in order to be classified as such the
persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such
statements for the record. 11 In the case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to give such statements. Llibris
As previously stated, the discrepancies do not militate against the fact firmly established by the prosecution that Tonog was
stabbed at the back by the accused and by "Ramon Doe" in the abdomen. Any discordance noted is so minor and
insignificant that no further consideration is essential. The most honest witnesses make mistakes sometimes, but such
innocent lapses do not necessarily impair their credibility. The testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in
its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.
The presence of the accused in the vicinity even after the commission of the crime does not in any way extricate him from his
dilemma. Certainly, it is no proof of his innocence.
[G.R. No. 157064. August 7, 2006.]
BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES, INC. (now known
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
as
UBP
Securities,
Inc.), petitioner, vs.
Petitioner Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known as UBP Securities, Inc.) is a corporation engaged in the trading of
securities. On 14 April 1988, petitioner filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1987. After an audit investigation
conducted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for
deficiency income tax in the amount of P826,698.31 arising from the disallowance of the item on salaries, bonuses and
35
allowances in the amount of P1,219,093.93 as part of the deductible business expense since petitioner failed to subject the
salaries, bonuses and allowances to withholding taxes. This assessment was covered by Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-8791-000649 dated 1 February 1991, which, respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner through registered mail on 6 February 1991.
However, petitioner denies receiving the formal assessment notice. 3
On 17 March 1992, petitioner was served with a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy to enforce collection of the deficiency
income tax for the year 1987. Petitioner filed a formal protest, dated 25 March 1992, against the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy,
requesting for its cancellation. On 3 July 1998, petitioner received a letter dated 30 April 1998 from the respondent denying the
protest with finality. 4
On 31 July 1998, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA. After due notice and hearing, the CTA rendered a decision
in favor of petitioner. The CTA ruled on the primary issue of prescription and found it unnecessary to decide the issues on the
validity and propriety of the assessment. It maintained that while a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the
course of mail, this is merely a disputable presumption. It reasoned that the direct denial of the petitioner shifts the burden
of proof to the respondent that the mailed letter was actually received by the petitioner. The CTA found the BIR records
submitted by the respondent immaterial, self-serving, and therefore insufficient to prove that the assessment notice was
mailed and duly received by the petitioner.
Thereafter, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals on 31 August 2001. In reversing the CTA decision, the Court of
Appeals found the evidence presented by the respondent to be sufficient proof that the tax assessment notice was mailed to
the petitioner, therefore the legal presumption that it was received should apply.
The core issue in this case is whether or not respondent's right to assess petitioner's alleged deficiency income tax is
barred by prescription, the resolution of which depends on reviewing the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the CTA.
While the general rule is that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court, there are, however,
recognized exceptions 11 thereto, such as when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court or, in this case, the CTA.
this Court recognizes that the Court of Tax Appeals, which by the very nature of its function is dedicated exclusively to
the consideration of tax problems, has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, and its conclusions will not be
overturned unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority. Such findings can only be disturbed on appeal if
they are not supported by substantial evidence or there is a showing of gross error or abuse on the part of the Tax Court. 15 In
the absence of any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, this Court must presume that the CTA rendered a decision which is
valid in every respect.
Under Section 203 16 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), respondent had three (3) years from the last day
for the filing of the return to send an assessment notice to petitioner. In the case of Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Bautista, 17 this Court held that an assessment is made within the prescriptive period if notice to this effect is released, mailed
or sent by the CIR to the taxpayer within said period. Receipt thereof by the taxpayer within the prescriptive period is not
necessary. At this point, it should be clarified that the rule does not dispense with the requirement that the taxpayer should
actually receive, even beyond the prescriptive period, the assessment notice which was timely released, mailed and sent.
In the present case, records show that petitioner filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1987 on 14 April
1988. 18 The last day for filing by petitioner of its return was on 15 April 1988, 19 thus, giving respondent until 15 April 1991
within which to send an assessment notice. While respondent avers that it sent the assessment notice dated 1 February 1991 on
6 February 1991, within the three (3)-year period prescribed by law, petitioner denies having received an assessment notice from
respondent. Petitioner alleges that it came to know of the deficiency tax assessment only on 17 March 1992 when it was served
with the Warrant of Distraint and Levy. 20
In Protector's Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 21 this Court ruled that when a mail matter is sent by registered mail,
there exists a presumption, set forth under Section 3(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 22 that it was received in the regular
course of mail. The facts to be proved in order to raise this presumption are: (a) that the letter was properly addressed with
postage prepaid; and (b) that it was mailed. While a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary course of
mail, this is still merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the
burden upon the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee. 23
In the present case, petitioner denies receiving the assessment notice, and the respondent was unable to present
substantial evidence that such notice was, indeed, mailed or sent by the respondent before the BIR's right to assess had
prescribed and that said notice was received by the petitioner. The respondent presented the BIR record book where the name of
the taxpayer, the kind of tax assessed, the registry receipt number and the date of mailing were noted. The BIR records
custodian, Ingrid Versola, also testified that she made the entries therein. Respondent offered the entry in the BIR record book
and the testimony of its record custodian as entries in official records in accordance with Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, 24 which states that:
Section 44.Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. ITaCEc
The foregoing rule on evidence, however, must be read in accordance with this Court's pronouncement inAfrica v. Caltex
(Phil.), Inc., 25 where it has been held that an entrant must have personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts
were acquired by him from reports made by persons under a legal duty to submit the same.
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public
officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c)
that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information . . . .
In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were not based on her personal knowledge as she did not attest to the
fact that she personally prepared and mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it stated in the transcript of stenographic
notes 26 how and from whom she obtained the pertinent information. Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she acquired
36
the reports from persons under a legal duty to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no application in the present
case. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does not qualify as an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.
Furthermore, independent evidence, such as the registry receipt of the assessment notice, or a certification from the
Bureau of Posts, could have easily been obtained. Yet respondent failed to present such evidence.
In the case of Nava v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 this Court stressed on the importance of proving the
release, mailing or sending of the notice.
While we have held that an assessment is made when sent within the prescribed period, even if received by the
taxpayer after its expiration (Coll. of Int. Rev. vs. Bautista, L-12250 and L-12259, May 27, 1959), this ruling makes
it the more imperative that the release, mailing, or sending of the notice be clearly and satisfactorily proved.
Mere notations made without the taxpayer's intervention, notice, or control, without adequate supporting
evidence, cannot suffice; otherwise, the taxpayer would be at the mercy of the revenue offices, without adequate
protection or defense.
In the present case, the evidence offered by the respondent fails to convince this Court that Formal Assessment Notice
No. FAN-1-87-91-000649 was released, mailed, or sent before 15 April 1991, or before the lapse of the period of limitation upon
assessment and collection prescribed by Section 203 of the NIRC. Such evidence, therefore, is insufficient to give rise to the
presumption that the assessment notice was received in the regular course of mail. Consequently, the right of the government to
assess and collect the alleged deficiency tax is barred by prescription.
[G.R. No. 172031. July 14, 2008.]
JUANITO TALIDANO, petitioner, vs. FALCON MARITIME & ALLIED SERVICES, INC., SPECIAL EIGHTH
DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND LABOR ARBITER ERMITA C. CUYUGA,respondents.
Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. (private respondent) and was
assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu) which is based in Korea. His one (1)-year
contract of employment commenced on 15 October 1996 and stipulated the monthly wage at $900.00 with a fixed overtime pay of
$270.00 and leave pay of $75.00. 6
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always discriminated against and maltreated the vessel's Filipino crew. This
prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation (ITF) in London, a
measure that allegedly was resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed on 21 January 1997. He
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily disembarked the vessel after having been warned several times
of dismissal from service for his incompetence, insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his superiors. It
cited an incident involving petitioner's incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route at the Osaka Port in Japan
due to the absence of petitioner who was then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it presented a copy of a fax message,
sent to it on the date of incident, reporting the vessel's deviation from its course due to petitioner's neglect of duty at the
bridge, 8 as well as a copy of the report of crew discharge issued by the master ofM/V Phoenix Seven two days after the
incident.
On 5 November 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint, holding that he was validly
dismissed for gross neglect of duties. The Labor Arbiter relied on the fax messages presented by private respondent to prove
petitioner's neglect of his duties.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and declared the dismissal as illegal. The NLRC held that the fax
messages in support of the alleged misbehavior and neglect of duty by petitioner have no probative value and are selfserving. It added that the ship's logbook should have been submitted in evidence as it is the repository of all the activities on
board the vessel, especially those affecting the performance or attitude of the officers and crew members, and, more
importantly, the procedures preparatory to the discharge of a crew member. The NLRC also noted that private respondent
failed to comply with due process in terminating petitioner's employment
It appears that respondent received a copy of the NLRC Resolution 17 on 24 September 2002 and that said resolution became final
and executory on 7 October 2002. 18
Private respondent brought the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari 19 on 8 October 2002. The petition,
docketed as CA-G.R. Sp. No. 73521, was dismissed on technicality.
Despite ruling that prescription had not set in, the appellate court nonetheless declared petitioner's dismissal from employment as
valid and reinstated the Labor Arbiter's decision. aTEScI
The appellate court relied on the fax messages issued by the ship master shortly after petitioner had committed a serious
neglect of his duties. It noted that the said fax messages constitute the res gestae. In defending the non-presentation of the
logbook, it stated that three years had already passed since the incident and Hansu was no longer the principal of private
respondent
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in relying merely on fax messages to support the validity of his dismissal from
employment. He maintains that the first fax message containing the information that the vessel encroached on a different route was
a mere personal observation of the ship master and should have thus been corroborated by evidence, and that these fax messages
cannot be considered as res gestae because the statement of the ship master embodied therein is just a report. He also contends
that he has not caused any immediate danger to the vessel and that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the incident would have been
recorded in the logbook. Thus, he posits that the failure to produce the logbook reinforces the theory that the fax messages have
been concocted to justify his unceremonious dismissal from employment. Hence, he believes that his dismissal from employment
stemmed from his filing of the complaint with the ITF which his superiors resented. 34
Private respondent insists that the appellate court is correct in considering the fax messages as res gestae statements. It
likewise emphasizes that non-presentment of the logbook is justified as the same could no longer be retrieved because
Hansu has already ceased to be its principal. Furthermore, it refutes the allegation of petitioner that he was dismissed
37
because he filed a complaint with the ITF in behalf of his fellow crew members. It claims that petitioner's allegation is a hoax
because there is no showing that the alleged complaint has been received by the ITF and that no action thereon was ever
taken by the ITF.
The validity of an employee's dismissal hinges on the satisfaction of two substantive requirements, to wit: (1) the dismissal
must be for any of the causes provided for in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee was accorded due process,
basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner's absence during his watch duty when an emergency call was received from the Japanese port
authority that M/V Phoenix Seven was "invading other route" constituted neglect of duty, a just cause for terminating an employee.
Records reveal that this information was related to private respondent via two fax messages sent by the captain of M/V Phoenix
Seven. The first fax message dated 18 January 1997 is reproduced below:
JUST RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM MASTER N C/OFFICER THAT THEY DECIDED TO DISCHARGE 2/OFFICER AT
OSAKA PORT. ESIcaC
DUE TO MIS-BEHAVIOUR N RESEST [SIC] TO OFFICIAL ORDER.
CAPT. HAD RECEIVED EMERGENCY WARNING CALL FROM JAPAN BISAN SETO NAIKAI RADIO AUTHORITY THAT SHIP
IS INVADING OTHER ROUTE.
SO, HE WAS SURPRISED N CAME TO BRIDGE N FOUND 2/O NOT CARRY OUT HIS WATCH DUTY.
MASTER SCOLD HIM ABOUT THIS N CORRECT HIS ERROR BUT HE RESIST [SIC] THAT HE IS RIGHT AND THEN SAID
THAT HE WILL COME BACK HOME.
FURTHER MORE HE ASKED MASTER TO PAY HIM I.T.F. WAGE SCALE.
MASTER N/CIO STRONGLY ASKED US HIS REPATRIATION WITH I.E.U. ACTESI
PLS. CONFIRM YOUR OPINION ON THIS HAPPENING. 39
The second fax message dated 20 January 1997 pertained to a report of crew discharge essentially containing the same
information as the first fax message. The Court of Appeals treated these fax messages as part of the res gestae proving neglect
of duty on the part of petitioner.
Section 42 of Rule 130 40 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous
statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res
gestae are the statements accompanying the equivocal act. 41 We find that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res
gestae.
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. 42
Assuming that petitioner's negligence which allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its course is the startling occurrence,
there is no showing that the statements contained in the fax messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In addition,
no dates have been mentioned to determine if these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the
critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the first kind. TAECSD
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its admissibility are: (1) the principal act to be characterized must
be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4) the
statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act. 43
Petitioner's alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at least proved to be one. Assuming arguendo that such
absence was the equivocal act, it is nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements adverted to as
parts of the res gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with
the purported equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The matter of route encroachment or invasion is questionable.
The ship master, who is the author of the fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only from the
Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as double hearsay. IcAaSD
In any event, under Article 282 of the Labor Code, 44 an employer may terminate an employee for gross and habitual neglect of
duties. Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the
performance of one's duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending upon
the circumstances. A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee. 45
Petitioner's supposed absence from watch duty in a single isolated instance is neither gross nor habitual negligence. Without
question, the alleged lapse did not result in any untoward incident. If there was any serious aftermath, the incident should have been
recorded in the ship's logbook and presented by private respondent to substantiate its claim. Instead, private respondent belittled the
probative value of the logbook and dismissed it as self-serving. Quite the contrary, the ship's logbook is the repository of all activities
and transactions on board a vessel. Had the route invasion been so serious as to merit petitioner's dismissal, then it would have been
recorded in the logbook. Private respondent would have then had all the more reason to preserve it considering that vital pieces of
information are contained therein.AIDSTE
In termination cases, the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer. 52Private
respondent miserably failed to discharge this burden. Consequently, the petitioner's dismissal is illegal.
38
We also note that private respondent failed to comply with the procedural due process requirement for terminating an
employee. Such requirement is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious
concern since it constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to man's innate sense of justice.
Private respondent's sole reliance on the fax messages in dismissing petitioner is clearly insufficient as these messages were
addressed only to itself. No notice was ever given to petitioner apprising him in writing of the particular acts showing neglect of duty.
Neither was he informed of his dismissal from employment. Petitioner was never given an opportunity to present his side. The failure
to comply with the two-notice rule only aggravated respondent's liability on top of dismissing petitioner without a valid cause.
[G.R. No. 194320. February 1, 2012.]
MALAYAN INSURANCE
REYES, respondents.
CO.,
INC., petitioner, vs.
RODELIO
ALBERTO
and
ENRICO
ALBERTO
The Facts
At around 5 o'clock in the morning of December 17, 1995, an accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City,
involving four (4) vehicles, to wit: (1) a Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit with plate number NYS 381; (2) an Isuzu Tanker with
plate number PLR 684; (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck with plate number PDL 297; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant with plate number TLM 732. 4
Based on the Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator, Senior Police Officer 1 Alfredo M. Dungga (SPO1 Dungga), the Isuzu
Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side shortly before the vehicular incident. All three (3)
vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of
the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved forward
and the front left portion of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion of the Isuzu Tanker. 5
Previously, particularly on December 15, 1994, Malayan Insurance issued Car Insurance Policy No. PV-025-00220 in favor of First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (the assured), insuring the aforementioned Mitsubishi Galant against third party liability,
own damage and theft, among others. Having insured the vehicle against such risks, Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint
dated October 18, 1999 that it paid the damages sustained by the assured amounting to PhP700,000. 6
Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights and interests of the assured by operation of law upon its payment to
the latter, Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto (Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes
(Reyes), the registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring them to pay the amount it had
paid to the assured. When respondents refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance was constrained to file a complaint
for damages for gross negligence against respondents.
In its Decision dated February 2, 2009, the trial court, in Civil Case No. 99-95885, ruled in favor of Malayan Insurance and
declared respondents liable for damages
CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the trial court and ruled in favor of respondents
The CA held that the evidence on record has failed to establish not only negligence on the part of respondents, but also compliance
with the other requisites and the consequent right of Malayan Insurance to subrogation. 11 It noted that the police report, which has
been made part of the records of the trial court, was not properly identified by the police officer who conducted the on-the-spot
investigation of the subject collision. It, thus, held that an appellate court, as a reviewing body, cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the
genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document, much less accord it evidentiary value. 12
Subsequently, Malayan Insurance filed its Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that a police report is a prima facieevidence of
the facts stated in it. And inasmuch as they never questioned the presentation of the report in evidence, respondents are
deemed to have waived their right to question its authenticity and due execution.
Essentially, the issue boil down to the following: (1) the admissibility of the police report
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Admissibility of the Police Report
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of the police investigator who prepared the police report, said report
is still admissible in evidence, especially since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its presentation in
evidence. 16 Respondents counter that since the police report was never confirmed by the investigating police officer, it cannot be
considered as part of the evidence on record. 17
Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness knows of his or her personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness' own perception. 18 Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters
which he or she merely learned from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters. 19 Such testimony
is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay
rule. 20
As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, 21 "Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements."
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court, among which are entries in official records. 22Section 44,
Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
39
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, 23 this Court reiterated the requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay
rule of entries in official records, thus: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law
to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties, or by such other person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her
stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through official information.
Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator
who prepared it was not presented in court, as long as the above requisites could be adequately proved. 24
Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-spot investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in the performance of his
duty. However, what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report. Thus,
the third requisite is lacking.
Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police report's presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to have waived
their right to do so. 25 As a result, the police report is still admissible in evidence.
Sufficiency of Evidence
Malayan Insurance contends that since Reyes, the driver of the Fuzo Cargo truck, bumped the rear of the Mitsubishi Galant, he is
presumed to be negligent unless proved otherwise. It further contends that respondents failed to present any evidence to overturn
the presumption of negligence. 26 Contrarily, respondents claim that since Malayan Insurance did not present any witness who shall
affirm any negligent act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo truck before and after the incident, there is no evidence which would show
negligence on the part of respondents. 27 AEDCHc
We agree with Malayan Insurance. Even if We consider the inadmissibility of the police report in evidence, still, respondents
cannot evade liability by virtue of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
In the case at bar, aside from the statement in the police report, none of the parties disputes the fact that the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit
the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it. Respondents, however, point to the
reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver as the proximate cause of the collision, which allegation is totally unsupported by any
evidence on record. And assuming that this allegation is, indeed, true, it is astonishing that respondents never even bothered to file a
cross-claim against the owner or driver of the Nissan Bus.
What is at once evident from the instant case, however, is the presence of all the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur. To reiterate, res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity which applies where evidence is absent or not readily available. As
explained in D.M. Consunji, Inc., it is partly based upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes
the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and, therefore, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence.
As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following: (1) the accident was of a kind
which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured. 29
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is negligent.
Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by putting the blame
on the Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally, no contributory negligence was
attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur are present, thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of respondents.
It is worth mentioning that just like any other disputable presumptions or inferences, the presumption of negligence may be rebutted
or overcome by other evidence to the contrary. It is unfortunate, however, that respondents failed to present any evidence before the
trial court. Thus, the presumption of negligence remains. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the complaint for Malayan
Insurance's adverted failure to prove negligence on the part of respondents.
COMMERCIAL LISTS (RULE 130, SECTION 45)

G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998
PNOC
SHIPPING
AND
TRANSPORT
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION, respondents.
CORPORATION, petitioner,
FACTS:
September 21, 1977 early morning: M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation on its way to
Navotas, Metro Manila collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC)
Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro found Petroparcel to be at fault
Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award of P692,680.00 representing
the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV with interest at the legal rate plus 25% as
attorneys fees and later on amended to add the lost value of the hull less the P200K insurance and unrealized profits and lost
business opportunities
40
During the pendency of the case, PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it
acquired Petroparcel
Lower Court: against PNOC ordering it to pay P6,438,048 value of the fishing boat with interest plus P50K attorney's fees and
cost of suit
In arriving at the above disposition, the lower court cited the evidence presented by private respondent consisting of the
testimony of its general manager and sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario. Private respondent's witness testified that M/V
Maria Efigenia XV was owned by private respondent per Exhibit A, a certificate of ownership issued by the Philippine Coast
Guard showing that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was a wooden motor boat constructed in 1965 with 128.23 gross tonnage.
According to him, at the time the vessel sank, it was then carrying 1,060 tubs (baeras) of assorted fish the value of which
was never recovered. Also lost with the vessel were two cummins engines (250 horsepower), radar, pathometer and
compass. He further added that with the loss of his flagship vessel in his fishing fleet of fourteen (14) vessels, he was
constrained to hire the services of counsel whom he paid P10,000 to handle the case at the Board of Marine Inquiry and
P50,000.00 for commencing suit for damages in the lower court.
As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages, the lower court took into account the following pieces of documentary
evidence that private respondent proffered during trial:
(a) Exhibit A certified xerox copy of the certificate of ownership of M/V Maria Efigenia XV;
(b) Exhibit B a document titled "Marine Protest" executed by Delfin Villarosa, Jr. on September 22, 1977 stating that as a
result of the collision, the M/V Maria Efigenia XVsustained a hole at its left side that caused it to sink with its cargo of
1,050 baerasvalued at P170,000.00;
(c) Exhibit C a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer trawler issued by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A. Magalong
Engineering and Construction on January 26, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that construction of such trawler would cost
P2,250,000.00;
(d) Exhibit D pro forma invoice No. PSPI-05/87-NAV issued by E.D. Daclan of Power Systems, Incorporated on January 20,
1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2) units of CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm. would cost
P1,160,000.00;
(e) Exhibit E quotation of prices issued by Scan Marine Inc. on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that a unit of
Furuno Compact Daylight Radar, Model FR-604D, would cost P100,000.00 while a unit of Furuno Color Video Sounder, Model
FCV-501 would cost P45,000.00 so that the two units would cost P145,000.00;
(f) Exhibit F quotation of prices issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. on January 21, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2) rolls
of nylon rope (5" cir. X 300fl.) would cost P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon rope (3" cir. X 240fl.), P42,750.00; one (1)
binocular (7 x 50), P1,400.00, one (1) compass (6"), P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of floats, P9,000.00 or a total of P197,150.00;
(g) Exhibit G retainer agreement between Del Rosario and F. Sumulong Associates Law Offices stipulating an acceptance
fee of P5,000.00, per appearance fee of P400.00, monthly retainer of P500.00, contingent fee of 20% of the total amount
recovered and that attorney's fee to be awarded by the court should be given to Del Rosario; and
(h) Exhibit H price quotation issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. dated April 10, 1987 to Del Rosario showing the cost of poly
nettings as: 50 rolls of 400/18 3kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 5kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P81,500.00;
50 rolls of 400/18 8kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P116,000.00, and 50 rolls of 400/18 10kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P146,500
and baera (tub) at P65.00 per piece or a total of P414,065.00.
The lower court held that the prevailing replacement value of P6,438,048.00 of the fishing boat and all its equipment would
regularly increase at 30% every year from the date the quotations were given.
On the other hand, the lower court noted that petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior estimator at PNOC Dockyard
& Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and it did not bother at all to offer any documentary evidence to support its
position. Lazaro testified that the price quotations submitted by private respondent were "excessive" and that as an expert
witness, he used the quotations of his suppliers in making his estimates. However, he failed to present such quotations of
prices from his suppliers, saying that he could not produce a breakdown of the costs of his estimates as it was "a sort of
secret scheme." For this reason, the lower court concluded:
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the plaintiff relative to the replacement value of the fishing boat and its
equipments in the tune of P6,438,048.00 which were lost due to the recklessness and imprudence of the herein defendants
were not rebutted by the latter with sufficient evidence. The defendants through their sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro relied
heavily on said witness' bare claim that the amount afore-said is excessive or bloated, but they did not bother at all to
present any documentary evidence to substantiate such claim. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of the credible witness, but it must be credible in itself.
Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed
the same in toto on October 14, 1992. 21 On petitioner's assertion that the award of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly
proved by competent and admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as
an expert witness because as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify and
determine the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel. Considering the documentary evidence presented
as in the nature of market reports or quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists, the Court of Appeals held,
thus:
41
Consequently, until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility of this
class of evidence, the reception of these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court. In fact, where the lower court is confronted with evidence which appears to be of
doubtful admissibility, the judge should declare in favor of admissibility rather than of non-admissibility
Trial courts are enjoined to observe the strict enforcement of the rules of evidence which crystallized through
constant use and practice and are very useful and effective aids in the search for truth and for the effective
administration of justice. But in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or
incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical
grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court. If they are thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding or ignoring them
Stressing that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily rebutted by appellant's own sole witness in the
person of Lorenzo Lazaro, the appellate court found that petitioner ironically situated itself in an "inconsistent posture by the fact that
its own witness, admittedly an expert one, heavily relies on the very same pieces of evidence (price quotations) appellant has so
vigorously objected to as inadmissible evidence." Hence, it concluded:
. . . The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly established at the trial on the basis of appellee's documentary exhibits
(price quotations) which stood uncontroverted, and which already included the amount by way of adjustment as
prayed for in the amended complaint. There was therefore no need for appellee to amend the second amended
complaint in so far as to the claim for damages is concerned to conform with the evidence presented at the trial.
The amount of P6,438,048.00 awarded is clearly within the relief prayed for in appellee's second amended
complaint.
In assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioner posits the view that the award of P6,438,048 as actual damages should
have been in light of these considerations, namely: (1) the trial court did not base such award on the actual value of the
vessel and its equipment at the time of loss in 1977; (2) there was no evidence on extraordinary inflation that would warrant
an adjustment of the replacement cost of the lost vessel, equipment and cargo; (3) the value of the lost cargo and the prices
quoted in respondent's documentary evidence only amount to P4,336,215.00; (4) private respondent's failure to adduce
evidence to support its claim for unrealized profit and business opportunities; and (5) private respondent's failure to prove
the extent and actual value of damages sustained as a result of the 1977 collision of the vessels.
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual
amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. 28 The burden
of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. He must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. 29 In
other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. 30
In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondent's general manager and certain pieces of
documentary evidence. Except for Exhibit B where the value of the 1,050 baeras of fish were pegged at their September 1977 value
when the collision happened, the pieces of documentary evidence proffered by private respondent with respect to items and
equipment lost show similar items and equipment with corresponding prices in early 1987 or approximately ten (10) years after the
collision. Noticeably, petitioner did not object to the exhibits in terms of the time index for valuation of the lost goods and equipment.
In objecting to the same pieces of evidence, petitioner commented that these were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del
Rosario) did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects
thereof. 31 Clearly ignoring petitioner's objections to the exhibits, the lower court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave them
due weight to arrive at the award of P6,438,048.00 as actual damages.
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del Rosario's testimony. Private respondent did not present any other
witnesses especially those whose signatures appear in the price quotations that became the bases of the award. We hold, however,
that the price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered along with
the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though
he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted
with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence. Moreover,
because he was the owner of private respondent corporation 32 whatever testimony he would give with regard to the value of the lost
vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given credence 33 considering his
familiarity thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel itself
should be accepted as gospel truth. 34 We must, therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del Rosario's
claim as regards the amount of losses.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the persons who issued them
were not presented as witnesses. 35 Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule. 36On this point, we believe that the exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37
to 47 of Rule 130. 37
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to "commercial lists and the like" under Section 45, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court of Appeals considered private respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." It
added, however, that these exhibits should be admitted in evidence "until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence" because "the reception of these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as
evidence rests on the sound discretion of the trial court." 38 Reference to Section 45, Rule 130, however, would show that the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals on the matter was arbitrarily arrived at. This rule states:
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation
contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of
42
any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them there.
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said
compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in
the same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H 39 are not "commercial lists" for
these do not belong to the category of "other published compilations" under Section 45 aforequoted. Under the principle
of ejusdem generis, "(w)here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or
things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned." 40The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued
personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the
two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter.
Neither are these "market reports or quotations" within the purview of "commercial lists" as these are not "standard
handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation." 41 These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario.
To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence but these are, however, subject to the general principles of evidence and
to various rules relating to documentary evidence. 42 Hence, in one case, it was held that a letter from an automobile dealer offering
an allowance for an automobile upon purchase of a new automobile after repairs had been completed, was not a "price current" or
"commercial list" within the statute which made such items presumptive evidence of the value of the article specified therein. The
letter was not admissible in evidence as a "commercial list" even though the clerk of the dealer testified that he had written the letter
in due course of business upon instructions of the dealer. 43
But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the admissibility of those letters or communications when it held
that unless "plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent," evidence should better be admitted rather than rejected on "doubtful or
technical grounds," 44 the same pieces of evidence, however, should not have been given probative weight. This is a distinction we
wish to point out. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at
all. 45 On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. 46 Thus, a letter
may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence.
Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to
question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its
contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. Thus:
The courts differ as to the weight to be given to hearsay evidence admitted without objection. Some hold that when
hearsay has been admitted without objection, the same may be considered as any other properly admitted
testimony. Others maintain that it is entitled to no more consideration than if it had been excluded.
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is the latter one. Our Supreme Court held that although the question of
admissibility of evidence can not be raised for the first time on appeal, yet if the evidence is hearsay it has no
probative value and should be disregarded whether objected to or not. "If no objection is made" quoting Jones on
Evidence "it (hearsay) becomes evidence by reason of the want of such objection even though its admission does
not confer upon it any new attribute in point of weight. Its nature and quality remain the same, so far as its intrinsic
weakness and incompetency to satisfy the mind are concerned, and as opposed to direct primary evidence, the
latter always prevails.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or
evidence that violates the rules of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not
give such evidence any probative value. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value. 47
Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.
48
Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally deprives private respondent of any redress for the
loss of its vessel. This is because in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 49 the Court said:
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent is "entitled to nominal
damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered."
LEARNED TREATIES (RULE 130, SECTION 46)

PRIOR TESTIMONY (RULE 130, SECTION 47)
TAN VS CA
MANLICLIC VS CALAUNAN
ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST (RULE 130, SECTION 26)
ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO
April 13, 2001
FACTS
Estrada, forrmer President of the Republic of the Philippines, was held to have resigned from office. His resignation was based on the
Angara Diary where several statements of Estrada were noted.
Estrada objected to the using of the Angara Diary as evidence against him contending that it violates the rule against the admission
of hearsay evidence.
43
ISSUE
Whether or not the Angara Diary is admissible in evidence against Estrada and binding against him.
2.WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE:
HEARSAY, BEST EVIDENCE, AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;
3.WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HEARSAY RULE;
RULING
The Angara Diary is admissible.
The Angara Diary is not an out of court statement but part of the pleadings. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. Said Diary was
frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings. Estrada had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but
unfortunately failed to do so.
The Angara Diary is considered as admission by a party, hence, not covered by the hearsay evidence rule. Section 26 of Rule 130
provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." These
admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. The Angara Diary contains direct statements of Estrada which can be categorized
as admissions of a party.
The argument that the Diary is not Estrada's and hence, not binding on him fails to conside the theory of adoptive admission. An
adoptive admssion is a party's reaction to a statement or action by anotehr person when it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction
as an admission of something or implied by the other person. The basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising
from the ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made. In the Angara diary, it was
revealed that Executive Secretary Angara advised Estrada to consider a dignified exit or resignation. Estrada did noy object to the
suggested option but simply said that he could never leave the country. Estrada's silence on this can be taken admission by him.
Hence, the Angara Diary is binding on Estrada.
We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent Arroyo. We used the Angara
Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a
person's subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases
involving last will and testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other similar cases. As will be discussed below, the
use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the
Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.
We did not stop with the contemporaneous events but proceeded to examine some events posterior to the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all important press release of the petitioner containing his final statement which was issued after
the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. After analyzing its content, we ruled that petitioner's issuance of the press release
and his abandonment of Malacaang Palace confirmed his resignation. 1 These are overt acts which leave no doubt to the Court that
the petitioner has resigned.
It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to
contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. 6
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. 7 There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of
cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. 8 Not all hearsay evidence, however, is
inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance,
trustworthiness and necessity. 9 The emergence of these exceptions and their wide spread acceptance is well-explained by
Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of other persons' accounts of
what happened, and verdicts are usually sustained and affirmed even if they are based on hearsay
erroneously admitted, or admitted because no objection was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452,
454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict). Although volumes have been
written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule, no one advocates a rule that would bar all hearsay
evidence. Indeed, the decided historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly probative
statements from the definition of hearsay (sections 2 and 3, infra), and to develop more class exceptions
to the hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra). Furthermore, many states have added to their rules the residual,
or catch-all, exceptions first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize the admission of hearsay that
does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is adequately trustworthy and probative (section 12, infra).
Moreover, some commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished altogether instead of
being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1786,
1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes omitted):
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that '[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.' Under this
structure, exclusion is justified by fears of how the jury will be influenced by the evidence.
However, it is not traditional to think of hearsay as merely a subdivision of this structure, and
the Federal Rules do not conceive of hearsay in that manner. Prejudice refers to the jury's use
of evidence for inferences other than those for which the evidence is legally relevant; by
contrast, the rule against hearsay questions the jury's ability to evaluate the strength of a
legitimate inference to be drawn from the evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude
testimony because a witness was particularly smooth or convincing, there would be no doubt
as to the usurpation of the jury's function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized by the evidence
rules, such as those stemming from racial or religious biases or from the introduction of
photographs of a victim's final state, the exclusion of hearsay on the basis of misperception
strikes at the root of the jury's function by usurping its power to process quite ordinary
evidence, the type of information routinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives.
xxx xxx xxx
Since virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are either
incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate, the only alternative to a general rule of admission
44
would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is surely inferior. More important, the
assumptions necessary to justify a rule against hearsay . . . seem insupportable and, in any
event, are inconsistent with accepted notions of the function of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay
rules should be abolished.
Some support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now available which is,
however, derived from simulations that suggests that admitting hearsay has little effect on trial
outcomes because jurors discount the value of hearsay evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Researching the
Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene,
Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992);
Kovera, Park & Penrod, Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992);
Landsman & Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay
Evidence in American Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev. 65 (1991).
Others, even if they concede that restrictions on hearsay have some utility, question whether the benefits
outweigh the cost:
The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to justice. It also
includes the time spent on litigating the rule. And of course this is not just a cost voluntarily
borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of the court salaries,
administrative costs, and capital costs are borne by the public. As expensive as litigation is
for the parties, it is supported by an enormous public subsidy. Each time a hearsay question is
litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes other costs as well. Enormous time is spent
teaching and writing about the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises. In some law
schools, students spend over half their time in evidence classes learning the intricacies of the
hearsay rule, and . . . enormous academic resources are expended on the rule.
Allen, Commentary on Professor Friendman's Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797,
800 [1992] (but would abolish rule only in civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game Theoretic Analysis of
Hearsay, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 723 (1992)." 10
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from
the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a
party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." 11 It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if
they are hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities who explain why admissions are
not covered by the hearsay rule: 12
"Wigmore, after pointing out that the party's declaration has generally the probative value of any other
person's assertion, argued that it had a special value when offered against the party. In that circumstance,
the admission discredits the party's statement with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony,
much like a witness impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, he continued, admissions pass the
gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions be excluded if there was no
opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine because it is the opponent's own declaration, and 'he does
not need to cross-examine himself.' Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rules is satisfied since the party
now as opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his former assertion.
(Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154, McCormick)
According to Morgan: 'The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests not upon any
notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon
the adversary theory of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine
himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath.'
A man's acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to
presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583)."
Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant
independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue,
and (2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes the following: 21
a.Statements of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge, belief,
intention, ill will and other emotions;
b.Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and the like;
c.Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is,
the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;
d.Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and
e.Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.
Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant statements are not covered by the prohibition against hearsay evidence:
22
"1088.Mental State or Condition Proof of Knowledge. There are a number of common issues, forming
a general class, in proof of which hearsay is so obviously necessary that it is not customary to refer to its
admissibility as by virtue of any exception to the general exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such cases, is
as of course. For example, where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as motive, malice,
knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as
conclusive of his state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of others to the acts or
statements of such person. Where his acts or statements are against his interest, they are plainly
admissible within the rules hereinabove announced as to admissions against interest. And even where not
against interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or transaction in issue as to constitute
once of the very facts in controversy, they become admissible of necessity."
45
As aforediscussed, the Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial
evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioner's
intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long been a quiet area of our law on
evidence and petitioner's attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.
HEARSAY EXCEPTION IN CHILD ABUSE CASE (SECTION 28, RULES IN THE EXAMINATION OF CHILD WITNESS)
HEARSAY RULE IN WRIT OF AMPARO
GEN. AVELINO RAZON VS TAGITIS
C. EFFECT IF HEARSAY EVIDENCE IS NOT OBJECTED TO

MALLARI VS PEOPLE
46

Hearsay Evidence Rule and Its Exception Compilation

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12.

HE SAID, SHE SAID

testimonial knowledge (rule 130, section 36)

DYING DECLARATION (RULE 130, SECTION 37)

November 20, 2008

February 22, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.

December 10, 2012

G.R. No. 28871

September 19, 1928

GERALDO AND ARIATE VS PEOPLE repeated case

Parel filed an MFR, denied.

against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

PEOPLE VS ALEGADO 201 SCRA 37 (1991)

SOLINAP VS LOCSIN JR. 371 SCRA (10 DECEMBER 2001)

JISON VS CA 286 SCRA 495 (FEB 24 1998)

whether MONINAs evidence is coherent, logical and natural.

FAMILY TRADITION (RULE 130, SECTION 40)

ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF THE BUSINESS (RULE 130, SECTION 42)

[G.R. No. 164457. April 11, 2012.]

All other writings are private.

ENTRIES IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS (RULE 130, SECTION 44)

Inc.), petitioner, vs.

INC., petitioner, vs.

COMMERCIAL LISTS (RULE 130, SECTION 45)

LEARNED TREATIES (RULE 130, SECTION 46)

C. EFFECT IF HEARSAY EVIDENCE IS NOT OBJECTED TO

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