Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SOLIDBANK CORP VS CA
Gateway obtained 4 foreign currency denominated loans from petitioner Solid Bank as capital for its manufacturing operations. The
loans were secured by Promissory notes and by assignment to Solid Bank of all the proceeds of Gateway's Back-end Services
Agreement with Alliance Semiconductors.
2.
However, Gateway failed to pay its obligations despite repeated demands from the petitioner. This prompted petitioner to file a
complaint for collection of sum of money.
3.
During the trial, Petitioner filed a motion for the production and inspection of documents after learning that Gateway already
received proceeds of its Back-end agreement with Alliance. The motion called for the inspecion of all books of accounts, financial
statements, receipts, checks, vouchers, and other accounting records. The court granted the motion.
4.
Subsequently, after a couple of postponements, Gateway was only able to produce the billings and not all the other documents.
The Court chastised it for not exerting due diligence in procuring the required documents and it ordered that those not produced
shall be deemed established in accordance with Solid Bank's claim.
5.
Gateway filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to nullify the 2 orders of the lower court. CA granted the petition and ruled
that the motion to produce and inspect failed to comply with Sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Ruled of Court. Hence this petition.
Issue: W/N the motion for production and inspection complied with Sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court
HELD: NO (Petition denied).
1.
Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits "fishing" for evidence, the only limitation being that the documents, papers, etc.,
sought to be produced are not privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce them and that they are
material to any matter involved in the action. A fishing expedition no longer precludes a party from prying into the facts underlying
his opponent's case. However, fishing for evidence has its limitations.
2.
Solidbank's motion was fatally defective and violates Sec. 1 Rule 27 due to its failure to specify with particularity the documents it
required Gateway to produce. Simply, the motion called for a blanket inspection, too broad and too generalized in scope. Its request
that "all documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement" ask for a
promiscuous mass of documents.
3.
A motion for production and inspection of documents should not demand a roving inspection of a promiscuous mass of
documents. The inspection should be limited to those documents designated with sufficient particularity in the motion, such that
the adverse party can easily identify the documents he is required to produce.
4.
Since it is Solid Bank who asserted that Gateway already received payment from its Back-end Agreement with Alliance, then the
burden of proof is on its side. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Throughout the trial, the burden of proof remains with the party
upon whom it is imposed, until he shall have discharged the same.
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier.
Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
*Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
purpose
5. OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v Court of Appeals Case Digest
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v CA
FACTS:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the
petitioner, against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation
owned and controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines.
The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the respondent to deliver 43,000 metric
tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and despite petitioners several demands. The
petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their
contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral award. To
enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying
that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but foreign court
refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private
respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused
to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the
aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have
jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The
petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari,
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16
of the contract.
RULING:
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the
courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is
relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay
the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our
rules provide otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's
dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED,
6.
HABALUYAS
ENTERPRISES,
INC.
and
PEDRO
HABALUYAS, petitioners,
VS.
JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36; SHUGO NODA & CO., LTD., and SHUYA
NODA, respondents.
FACTS: Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Second Division of the Court promulgated on
August 5, 1985 which granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition and set aside the order of respondent Judge granting
private respondents' motion for new trial.
ISSUE
Whether the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or
ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended.
HELD: YES
SINCE, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
The Court resolved that the interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in the original decision IN THE CASE OF
GIBS VS CFI (refer below) were applied prospectively from the time herein stated. The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive
parties of their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure which was not expressly prohibited or
allowed by the law or the Rules. On the other hand, a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an appeal, a
petition for review or a petition for review on certiorari, and since the purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite
the final disposition of cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in order. Hence, for the guidance of Bench and
Bar, the Court restates and clarifies the rules on this point, as follows:
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution(May 30, 1986), the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may
be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion
either grant or deny the extension requested.
2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal may be filed within the reglementary
period of thirty (30) days. If the court denies the motion for extension, the appeal must be taken within the original period,
inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for appeal .The trial court may grant said motion after the
expiration of the period for appeal provided it was filed within the original period.
All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the merits.
(In the case of Gibbs vs. Court, of First Instance (80 Phil. 160), the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and
ruled that the failure of defendant's attorney to file the petition to set aside the judgment within the reglementary period
was due to excusable neglect, and, consequently, the record on appeal was allowed. The Court did not rule that the
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration could not be granted.)
7. PHIL RABBIT VS ARCIAGA
148 SCRA 438 Civil Law Preliminary Title Application of Laws Finality of Judgment
On August 24, 1960, Taurino Singson as paying passenger on board a bus belonging to the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines sustained
multiple serious physical injuries when the said bus crashed against an acacia tree somewhere in Balaoan, La Union. Thereafter, he
brought a complaint for contractual tort. In their answer, Philippine Rabbit interposed the defense that the collision was due to
fortuitous event. The case was set for trial but the case was dismissed for non appearance of the plaintiff (Singson). He then filed a
motion for relief on the grounds of equity. He averred that the jeepney he was riding on the way to court for trial had engine trouble
hence he was too late in court (when he arrived, the case was already dismissed.) Judge Ludivico Arciaga, the hearing judge,
granted the motion. Philippine Rabbit questioned the grant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case filed by Taurino Singson should be dismissed.
HELD: Yes. Normally, a petition for relief may be granted by the courts but in this case, there is no reason to grant such. It appears
that in this case, Singson and his lawyer let 61 days lapse before filing their petition/motion for relief. Under the rules, a petition for
relief must be filed within 60 days from the order of dismissal otherwise, the judgment shall become final and executory. It is
already too late for Singson when he filed his petition on the 61st day. Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their
rights.
8. El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure
of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of
legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made
effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not
strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by
agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted
for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino.
Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The
mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by
publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which is in
Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of
the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards
sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court.
However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the
estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and
to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the
court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over
the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its
competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is
acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein,
under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the
property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of
the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the
action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term
potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of
land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to
be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the
world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is
expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The
expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty
wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action
quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having
for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other
form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action becomes as to
him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to
appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution is valid and binding between the corporation and planters.
Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. There can be no doubt that the directors of the appellee company had authority
to modify the proposed terms of the Amended Milling Contract for the purpose of making its terms more acceptable to the other
contracting parties. The rule is that
It is a question, therefore, in each case of the logical relation of the act to the corporate purpose expressed in the charter. If that act
is one which is lawful in itself, and not otherwise prohibited, is done for the purpose of serving corporate ends, and is reasonably
tributary to the promotion of those ends, in a substantial, and not in a remote and fanciful sense, it may fairly be considered within
charter powers. The test to be applied is whether the act in question is in direct and immediate furtherance of the corporation's
business, fairly incident to the express powers and reasonably necessary to their exercise. If so, the corporation has the power to
do it; otherwise, not.
As the resolution in question was passed in good faith by the board of directors, it is valid and binding, and whether or not it will
cause losses or decrease the profits of the central, the court has no authority to review them.
It is a well-known rule of law that questions of policy or of management are left solely to the honest decision of officers and
directors of a corporation, and the court is without authority to substitute its judgment of the board of directors; the board is the
business manager of the corporation, and so long as it acts in good faith its orders are not reviewable by the courts. Hence, the
appellee Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company is, under the terms of its Resolution, duty bound to grant similar increases to plaintiffsappellants herein.