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reference, both analytical and political, for those who reject the current
neoliberal global order. In this paper the validity of this approach is examined
theoretically and historically. After a preliminary description of the developmental state, the paper investigates in turn the four terms contained in the
titleneoliberalism, globality, the state and developmentfrom a historical
materialist standpoint. It is then argued that any approach that aims to provide
an eective roadmap for a progressive alternative to neoliberalism needs to
centre its analysis on the Marxian concept of class.
This paper explores the current usefulness of the concept of the developmental state in the present framework of global capitalism, which many
people have characterised as shaped by the ideology of neoliberalism.1 The
approach taken is primarily an examination of the ontological, epistemological and theoretical foundations of the developmental state (hereafter DS)
concept.
Given the marginalisation of dependency theory and of Marxism more
broadly in the past twenty years, the DS became by about 1990 the major
ideological rallying point for those who wish to contest the appropriateness
of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus as a framework for eective
governance and economic development in the global South. In so far as the
DS concept can be stripped down to the idea that the state can play a central
role in economic development, it has a very long pedigree, stretching back to
the mercantilist period at the dawn of capitalism, via the 19th-century
critiques of free trade (Hamilton, List), to the period of late development
(that is, after Britain) as analysed by Gerschenkron.2 While important
aspects of these earlier debates are still very much present, the locus classicus
of the modern DS concept was undoubtedly East Asia, and in particular the
work of Amsden on South Korea and Wade on Taiwan.3 Their insistence
that the East Asian miracles were the result of eective and many-sided
policies of state intervention in markets, rather than the opening-up
advocated by the World Bank, won widespread support in the 1990s. Much
Hugo Radice is in the School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK.
Email: h.k.radice@leeds.ac.uk.
ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/08/06115322 2008 Third World Quarterly
DOI: 10.1080/01436590802201121
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building and policy practice. This elision of subject and critique occurs in
tools of economic policy analysis such as the Phillips curve,15 as much as in
institutions of governance such as those created at Bretton Woods.
Third, if we turn from economics to what bourgeois social theory denes
as the politics of liberalism, we can observe the same kind of phenomena in
relation to the nature of power and the adequacy, or rather inadequacy, of
critiques rooted in concepts of democracy. The ideology of liberalism
promoted a reconstitution of the state as a public realm separate from the
private realm of civil society; the state is legitimated within this public realm
by its internal relation to individualised citizenship. As Rupert puts it, In a
fully developed bourgeois republic, explicit class relations are banished from
the public sphere, as all citizens are recognised for political purposes to be
formally equal individuals.16
Abstracted as bourgeois political thought thus necessarily is from the
structures of production and the material interests rooted in them, in the 20th
century these interests with equal necessity asserted themselves in the realm
of actual everyday politics. For a century, roughly 1870 to 1970, across most
of the core capitalist states at least, this realm was dominated by competition
for power between political parties; furthermore, class, broadly as dened by
Marx, was arguably the most inuential basis for party politics.17
Political sociology struggled against Marxism for decades, seeking to deal
with the problem of reconciling theory and reality by nding ways in which
the politics of class could be rendered compatible with the basic tenets of
liberalism. This process of recuperation has passed through several phases. In
the 1960s theoretical constructs such as modernisation, civic culture,
pluralism and the end of ideology challenged Marxism by oering alternative
discourses linked closely to the practical politics of postwar Keynesian
welfare-state reformism and postcolonial development.18 Economic and
political developments in the late 1960s and 1970sthe end of the postwar
boom, the US defeat in Vietnam, EastWest detente, the rise of OPEC and
demands for a new international economic orderfuelled a progressive
agenda which appeared to bridge the divide between Marxism and the
mainstream, for example the concepts of corporatism and dependency.19
However, a refoundation of political analysis on methodological individualism and economic reductionism was also under way, for example in
Buchanans public choice critique of the activist state.20 In the late 1970s
and 1980s mainstream political sociology sought to displace class analysis in
favour of bringing the state back in and of reviving forms of
institutionalism,21 allocating to classes as organised economic interests a
secondary and contingent role in politics.
In the 1990s the refusal of class to disappear from the lives and
consciousness of citizens led to a further reformulation of liberal ideology,
by now widely labelled neoliberal, in which concepts such as governance and
civil society were deployed in ways that deected the citizen from class
identication in favour of a contractual relationship with the state.22 In
practice this relationship has increasingly become one of individual
consumption of services organised through the state, but provided by
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This allows us to see the period of deeper globalisation since the 1980s as a
new phase in the spread of capitalism across the globe, characterised by
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The problem lies, however, in understanding how the shape of these new
spaces and their interrelations are transformed through the historical
development of capitalism. In particular, the concept of the relative
autonomy of the statethe idea most rmly associated with Poulantzas
own workis in practice impossible to distinguish from the essential
autonomy that he disavows. What is needed is an explanatory framework
that instantiates the limits placed by capitalist relations of production on the
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variation in the scope of state action. Reviewing the classical positions of the
early 20th century, on the one hand dogmatic MarxismLeninism adopted an
economictechnological reductionism in which the forces of production
compelled changes in the relations of production, which the all-seeing
revolutionary party of the working class could foresee and perhaps hasten.
On the other hand, revisionist socialdemocratic Marxism took as reality the
appearance of state autonomy, and thought that the political forms of
bourgeois society could be given a radical class content through the
electoral success of workers parties. The historical failure of both these
political ideologies in the 20th century should be attributed, at least in part,
to their failure to break denitively from the bourgeois conception of
economics and politics as separate spheres.
Put more practically, perhaps the real diculty for critics of capitalism is
that the predominantly liberal political hegemony that shapes the form and
functions of the state entails a congruence of ideas, interests and institutions
that form a self-referential totality. The historical constitution of the liberal
democratic state creates a common sense that steers critical opposition
towards compromise, through promises of accommodation as much as
through threats of repression. Thus attempts in the 1970s to push the state
beyond the limits of the post-1945 settlementfrom embedded liberalism to
embedded social democracy, if you likerequired a risky and ambitious
strategy of being in and against the state at the same time.42 Understanding
the subtle ways in which the state-in-society sought to head o the challenge
of an increasingly demanding working class had to start with a return to
basics: the critique of political economy.43 From this standpoint the defence
of the egalitarian gains of the postwar Keynesian welfare state, while being
preferable to mere acquiescence in its demise, runs the risk of drawing a veil
over its historical inadequacies in transforming capitalism.44
Returning to the understanding of economics and the state in contemporary comparative political economy, we nd that the advocates of SMC adopt
a fundamentally Keynesian framework, as if this of itself constituted an
epistemological break with (neo)liberalism. However, as argued above, this
means accepting the limits that Keynes himself placed upon his critique. As
an old-fashioned political liberal Keynes found the forced egalitarianism and
sociopolitical repression of Soviet-style state socialism deeply unpalatable;
more important is his insistence that, with appropriate instruments of
economic intervention to hand that could correct the deciencies of market
self-regulation, capitalism could be preserved in a form that provided not the
best, but the best feasible, combination of economic eciency and political
freedom.45 Keynes rhetorical ourish about the euthanasia of the rentier,
and thus the practical need for a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of
investment,46 should be attributed to the degree of pessimism engendered in
Keynes by the long series of debacles in international decision making from
Versailles through to the 1930s.
The contemporary critics of NLC, true to their Keynesian inclinations, view
the state as intrinsically politically neutral, if potentially subject to capture by
special interests such as high nance or radical trade unions, and they view
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He went on to argue that both the capitalist and the socialist models of
development place the state at the centre of the process, and within a context
of imperialism and international inequality,
the essential problem of development can be posed as follows: how is it possible
to install and maintain in state power a regime with the will and the possibility
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to transform the social structure in a way that would make possible a dramatic
rise in productivity and investment . . . how to maintain it in power over a long
period of time, perhaps thirty to fty years, during which time sucient capital
accumulation could take place, a national economy could be erected, and
national (as opposed to sub-national) classes could be suciently organised so
that the state machinery is structurally resistant to outside intervention, internal
secession and palace coups detat.58
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did in the North around the provision of growth, welfare and security: but in
the capitalist world the state rst and foremost represented and promoted the
rule of capital.73
In this context a critical alternative to the DS perspective starts from the
proposition that globalisation has not entailed fundamental changes in how
the ideas, interests and institutions that constitute the capitalist political
economy are congured. I remain cautious about endorsing the concept of a
transnational capitalist class (TCC), in the sense of either the Amsterdam
School of international political economy or the radical development
sociology of Sklair or Robinson;74 while there is abundant evidence that
elite interests in the global South are now substantively the same as those of
the North, the concept of the progressive national bourgeoisie has always
been more rhetoric than reality.75 In particular, political developments in
diverse parts of the world point to the recognition that neoliberal capitalism
oers in general a more eective framework for reproducing exploitation and
class rule, both nationally and transnationally, than political forms based on
direct appropriation and force. At the same time, contrary to the widespread
view that the working class has ceased to exist in advanced capitalism, and
was politically stillborn in the postcolonial South, the world is immensely
more proletarian than ever before in historyin the sense of being bereft of
direct access to means of production and relying of necessity on the
performance of wage-labour. The social forces that engender awareness of
common interests and thence class consciousness operate as they always have
done under capitalismthat is, in the teeth of ideological hostility and state
repressionwith the important, but nonetheless ontologically secondary,
distinction that these forces increasingly operate at a global level.
In this context, the DS, like SMC in the North, rests on the historical terrain
of reformism. As a political strategy for citizens who believe that capitalism
can and should be terminated, reformism rests now as always on twin beliefs
in the existence of 1) a politically neutral core of institutions and practices
that can be redeployed to undermine the existing order from within; and 2) a
substantial part of the ruling classes that can be won over to the cause. The
reformist credentials of the DS thesis are not always easy to see, but we can
accept that its cause has indeed been the improvement of living conditions
and life chances for the masses of ordinary citizens in the global South, and
as already noted at the outset, this cause was indeed advanced at least in the
classic East Asian cases. The actual politics of the DS and their unfolding
through time, however, are another matter. With the benet of hindsight, and
from the standpoint of those masses, the developmental trajectory of the East
Asian archetypes up to the early 1990s repudiates any suggestion that the DS
ever contained the seeds of anything other than the consolidation of
capitalism. The dismantling of core mechanisms of state direction, even if
liberalisation and democratisation have remained incomplete since then, has
in general conrmed this judgement. Above all the state even in Korea and
Taiwan during the apogee of the DS remained a capitalist state: since then it
has continued, in the time-honoured manner of such states, to absorb or
rebu challenges from below.76
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14 In K Marx, Capital, Vol 1, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1954.
15 The economist AW Phillips identied an apparent trade-o between ination and unemployment in
the long-term historical record of the UK. Phillips, The relation between unemployment and the rate
of change of money wage rates in the United Kingdom, 18611957, Economica, new series, 25 (100),
1958, pp 283299. In monetarist hands this was transformed into the modern theory that
unemployment is caused by labour-market rigidities. For a critical account, see D Baker, The
NAIRU: is it a real constraint?, in D Baker, G Epstein & R Pollin (eds), Globalization and Progressive
Economic Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp 369387.
16 M Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p 24.
17 It is no coincidence that this is also the period of the age of the nation-state, as the next section makes
clear.
18 On modernisation, see WW Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960; and S Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968. On civic culture, see GA Almond & S Verba,
The Civic Culture, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963. On pluralism, see RA Dahl, Who
Governs?, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961. On the end of ideology, see D Bell, The End of
Ideology, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960.
19 On corporatism, see PC Schmitter & G Lehmbruck (eds), Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation,
London: Sage, 1979; and JH Goldthorpe (ed), Order and Conict in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1984. On dependency, see AG Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in
Latin America, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967; FH Cardoso & E Faletto, Dependency and
Development in Latin America, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979; and PB Evans,
Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.
20 JM Buchanan & RD Tollison, The Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, Ann
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1972.
21 See PB Evans, D Rueschemeyer & T Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985; and JG March & JP Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, Glencoe, IL: Free Press,
1989.
22 See, for example, World Bank, Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance,
Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000; and F Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order
in the Twenty-First Century, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
23 See B Gills, J Rocamora & R Wilson (eds), Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World
Order, London: Pluto Press, 1993; and P Cammack, Globalization and the death of liberal
democracy, European Review, 6 (2), 1998, pp 249263.
24 A Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper & Row, 1957.
25 Representative overviews of the vast literature on globalisation include D Held & A McGrew,
Globalization/Anti-Globalization, London: Polity Press, 2002; MB Steger, Globalisation: A Very Short
Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; JA Scholte, Globalisation: A Critical Introduction,
London: Palgrave, 2005; and N Bisley, Rethinking Globalization, London: Palgrave, 2007. See also the
readings collected in D Held & A McGrew (eds), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction
to the Globalization Debate, London: Polity Press, 2003. For a survey of theoretical perspectives in the
eld of global political economy more widely, see R Palan (ed), Global Political Economy:
Contemporary Theories, London: Routledge, 2000.
26 The forms of advanced industrial capitalism are discussed further in the following section. For an
examination of the methodology of the comparative political economy literature, see H Radice,
Comparing national capitalisms, in J Perraton & B Clift (eds), Where are National Capitalisms Now?,
London: Palgrave, 2004, pp 183194.
27 See notably the essays in M Rupert & H Smith, (eds), Historical Materialism and Globalization,
London: Routledge, 2002.
28 See especially G Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times,
London: Verso, 1994.
29 For example, WI Robinson, A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class and State in a
Transnational World, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.
30 See J Niederveen Pieterse, Oriental globalization, Theory, Culture & Society, 23 (23), 2006, pp 411
413.
31 N Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, London: Merlin Press, 1972 (originally published in
1918).
32 R Hilferding, Finance Capital, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981 (originally published in 1910).
33 S Bromley, Marxism and globalisation, in A Gamble, D Marsh & A Tant (eds), Marxism and Social
Science, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp 285286. See also C von Braunmuhl, On the analysis of the
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35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
bourgeois state within the world market context, in J Holloway & S Picciotto (eds), State and Capital:
A Marxist Debate, London: Edward Arnold, 1978, pp 16077; H Lacher, The International Relations of
Modernity: Capitalism, Territoriality and Globalization, London: Routledge, 2003; and B Teschke, The
Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations, London: Verso,
2003.
J Rosenberg, The Follies of Globalisation Theory, London: Verso, 2000, ch 1.
R Murray, The internationalization of capital and the nation state, New Left Review, 67, 1971, pp 84
109.
See H Radice, Keynes and the policy of practical protectionism, in JV Hillard (ed), JM Keynes in
Retrospect, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1988, pp 153171.
For a critique of this approach within the 1990s globalisation debates, see H Radice, Responses to
globalisation: a critique of progressive nationalism, New Political Economy, 5 (1), 2000, pp 519.
This has been the main focus in recent years of the eld of comparative political economy. See, for
example, JR Hollingsworth, P Schmitter & W Streeck (eds), Governing Capitalist Economies:
Performance and Control of Economic Sectors, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; S Berger & R
Dore (eds), National Diversity and Global Capitalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996; C
Crouch & W Streeck (eds), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and
Diversity, London: Sage, 1997; and PA Hall & D Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism: The
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Although
there are many variations in taxonomy and nomenclature, the bimodal approach presented here is the
norm.
See, for example, R Miliband, Poulantzas and the capitalist state, New Left Review, 82, 1973, pp 83
92; Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1979; N Poulantzas,
Political Power and Social Classes, London: Verso, 1973; and Poulantzas, The capitalist state: a reply
to Miliband and Laclau, New Left Review, 95, 1976, pp 6383.
S Clarke, Marxism, sociology and Poulantzas theory of the state, Capital and Class, 2, 1979, pp 131.
N Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, London: New Left Books, 1978, p 18 (authors emphasis).
LondonEdinburgh Weekend Return Group, In and Against the State, London: Pluto Press, 1980.
See Clarke, Keynesianism, Monetarism and the Crisis of the State.
Apple argues that even the supposed Keynesian commitment to full employment through scal
activism was only actually honoured for a few years in the 1950s. N Apple, The rise and fall of full
employment capitalism, Studies in Political Economy, 4, 1980, pp 539. As the global economic
turmoil of January 2008 attests, however, the idea of scal activism is still wheeled out when monetary
policy falters in the face of a threat of recession.
JM Keynes, National self-suciency, The Yale Review, XXII (4), 1933.
Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, ch 24.
Incomes policies entail the setting by the state of permissible rates of increase in wages or earnings.
They were the pre-eminent tool for controlling ination, especially in the Anglo-Saxon economies, in
the 1960s and 1970s. See, for example, F Hirsch & JH Goldthorpe, The Political Economy of Ination,
London: Martin Robertson, 1978.
See, for example, M Hampton, Hegemony, class struggle and the radical historiography of global
monetary standards, Capital and Class, 89, 2006, pp 131164.
See Clarke, Keynesianism, Monetarism and the Crisis of the State, pp 311316.
See S Wilks, Class compromise and the international economy: the rise and fall of Swedish social
democracy, Capital and Class, 58, 1996, pp 89111; and G Ramia, The downturn of the Swedish
model: inevitable?, Journal of Australian Political Economy, 38, 1996, pp 6397.
On US Japanolatry, see P Burkett & M Hart-Landsberg, The use and abuse of Japan as a progressive
model, Socialist Register 1996: Are There Alternatives?, London: Merlin Press, 1996, pp 6292. On
UK admiration for Germany, see W Hutton, The State Were In, London: Cape, 1995.
See the references in note 38 above.
Both lines of defence are developed in detail across a wide range of policy areas in the essays in L Weiss
(ed), States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Leys argues that the pragmatic orientation of early development theory can be attributed to three
factors: the scale and urgency of the problems revealed by decolonisation, the political constraints
placed on social science by the Cold War, and the scope and eectiveness of state action apparently
permitted by the Bretton Woods institutions. C Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory,
Oxford: James Currey, 1996, ch 1.
See notably PT Bauer, Dissent on Development, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1971. Fascinating
insights into the early period of development theory and practice can be found in the essays by 10
pioneers of development economics in GM Meier & D Seers (eds), Pioneers in Development,
Washington, DC: World Bank, 1984.
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56 See references in note 19.
57 I Wallerstein, The state and social transformation, Politics and Society, 1, 1971, pp 359364. The
quotation is from a reprint in H Bernstein (ed), Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World
Today, London: Penguin Education, pp 277278.
58 Ibid, p 280.
59 As in Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
60 See, for example, J Malloy (ed), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, Pittsburgh, PA:
Pittsburgh University Press, 1977.
61 R Saull, Locating the global South in the theorisation of the Cold War: capitalist development, social
revolution and geopolitical conict, Third World Quarterly, 26 (2), 2005, pp 253280.
62 R Desai, From national bourgeoisie to rogues, failures and bullies: 21st century imperialism and the
unravelling of the Third World, Third World Quarterly, 25 (1), 2004, pp 169185. However, Lenin only
oered communist support to the more revolutionary elements in the bourgeois-democratic
movements for national liberation, and in 1920 explicitly reasserted this view in proposing to support
only national-revolutionary movements. It was the Comintern that elided this distinction during
Stalins rule. See J Smith, Lenin and the national bourgeoisie, private communication available from
the author.
63 For a wide-ranging review of the consequences of the end of the Cold War for the Third World, see the
essays in L Fawcett & Y Sayigh (eds), The Third World Beyond the Cold War, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999.
64 See references in note 3.
65 World Bank, Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance.
66 Chang & Evans, The role of institutions in economic change.
67 See H-J Kwon, Transforming the developmental welfare state in East Asia, Development and Change,
26 (3), 2005, pp 477497.
68 L Clie & R Luckham, Complex political emergencies and the state: failure and the fate of the state,
Third World Quarterly, 20 (1), 1999, pp 2750; and J Milliken & K Krause, State failure, state collapse
and state reconstruction: concepts, lessons and strategies, Development and Change, 33 (5), 2002, pp
753774.
69 See R Wade, What strategies are viable for developing countries today? The World Trade Organization
and the shrinking of development space, Review of International Political Economy, 10 (4), 2003, pp
621644; JE Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, New York: Norton, 2002; and Stiglitz, Making
Globalization Work: The Next Steps to Global Justice, New York: Norton, 2006.
70 Evans et al, Bringing the State Back In.
71 P Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957.
72 See, for example, O Sunkel, Transnational capitalism and national disintegration in Latin America,
Social and Economic Studies, 22 (1), 1973, pp 132176.
73 It is at least arguable, in the light of events from 1989 onwards, that the same ultimately was true of the
so-called communist alternative. See H Radice, Gramsci, Marx and the emancipation of labour,
paper presented at the Nottingham workshop on Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour,
October 2007.
74 K van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations, London: Routledge, 1998; L Sklair,
The Transnational Capitalist Class, Oxford: Blackwell, 2001; and Robinson, A Theory of Global
Capitalism.
75 Desai, From national bourgeoisie to rogues, failures and bullies.
76 For the case of South Korea, see K Gray, Challenges to the theory and practice of polyarchy: the rise
of the political left in Korea, Globalizations, forthcoming.
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