New York Civil Rights Lawyer Eric Sanders Files A $200 Million Dollar Claim Against The DOJ

CLAIM FOR DAMAGE, ---
INJURY, OR DEATH
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read carefull -- nstructions on the

reverse side and supply information requeF
sides of this
form. Use additional sheet(s) if necessary. see reverse
both side for
additional instructions.
FORM APPROVED
OMB NO. 1105-0008
1. Submit to Appropriate Federal Agency:
2. Name, address of claimant, and claimant's personal representative if any.

(See instructions on reverse). Number, Street, City, State and Zip code.
United States Department of Justice
Eric Sanders, Esq.

THE SANDERS FIRM, P.C. 230 Park Avenue, Suite 1000
New York, NY 10169
3. TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT
r-i
MILITARY
4. DATE OF BIRTH
CIVILIAN
5. MARITAL STATUS
6. DATE AND DAY OF ACCIDENT
7. TIME (A.M. OR P.m.)
Married
8. BASIS OF CLAIM (State in detail the known facts and circumstances attending the damage, injury, or death, identifying persons and property involved, the place of occurrence and
the cause thereof. Use additional pages if necessary).
Andrew M. Thaler, Esq., Chapter 7 Trustee, Tracey S. Bernstein, Esq., Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., along with Former
Bankruptcy Judge Dorothy T. Eisenberg (EDNY) conspired with one another to violate Claimant's equal protection rights by
causing him to be illegally picked up by the US Marshals Service, detained in the Metropolitan Detention Center where violent
inmates are housed. They illegally used the Bankruptcy Code and related legal processes to enforce a legally VOID judgment
against him
9
PROPERTY DAMAGE
NAME AND ADDRESS OF OWNER, IF OTHER THAN CLAIMANT (Number, Street, City, State, and Zip Code).
q
BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE PROPERTY, NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE AND THE LOCATION OF WHERE THE PROPERTY MAYBE INSPECTED.
(See instructions on reverse side).
I
i.,
'
\1
1-1.
PERSONAL INJURY/WRONGFUL DEATH
10.
STATE THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF EACH INJURY OR CAUSE OF DEATH, WHICH FORMS THE BASIS OF THE CLAIM. IF OTHER THAN CLAIMANT, STATE THE NAME
OF THE INJURED PERSON OR DECEDENT.
WITNESSES
11
ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, and Zip Code)
NAME
AMOUNT OF CLAIM (in dollars)
12. (See instructions on reverse).

12a. PROPERTY DAMAGE
12b. PERSONAL INJURY
12c. WRONGFUL DEATH
12d. TOTAL (Failure to specify may cause

forfeiture of your rights).
50,000,000.00
150,000,000.00
0.00
200,000,000.00
I CERTIFY THAT THE AMOUNT OF CLAIM COVERS ONLY DAMAGES AND INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INCIDENT ABOVE AND AGREE TO ACCEPT SAID AMOUNT IN
FULL SATISFACTION AND FINAL SETTLEMENT 0: THIS CLAIM.
13b. PHONE NUMBER OF PERSON SIGNING FORM 14. DATE OF SIGNATURE
NATURE OF CLAIMANT (See instructions or reverse side).
13a.
V)
CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR PRESENTING FRAUDULENT

CLAIM OR MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS
CIVIL PENALTY FOR PRESENTING

FRAUDULENT CLAIM
The claimant is liable to the United States Governmen for a civil penalty of not less than
65,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages sustained
)y the Government. (See 31 U.S.C. 3729).
kuthorized for Local Reproduction
'revious Edition is not Usable
5-109
10/15/2015
212-808-6515
ki
Fine, imprisonment, or both. (See 18 U.S.C. 287, 1001.)
NSN 7540-00-634-4046
STANDARD FORM 95 (REV. 2/2007)

PRESCRIBED BY DEPT. OF JUSTICE
28 CFR 14.2
CLAIM FOR DAMAGE, '

INJURY, OR DEATH
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read carefully "instructions on the
FORM APPROVED
reverse side and supply information request,. both sides of this

form. Use additional sheet(s) if necessary. See reverse side for
OMB NO. 1105-0008

Eric Sanders, Esq.

New York, NY 10169
MILITARY
4. DATE OF
CIVILIAN
5. MARITAL STATUS
7. TIME (A.M. OR P.M.)
Married
the cause thereof. Use additional pages if necessa y).
as a former employee of Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. When picked up the Claimant was armed, this almost caused an accidental
shooting and scared the neighbors as one of the approximately twelve (12) United States Marshals said "He's a retired cop."
The United States Marshals were unsure what to do with Claimant since he committed NO CRIME. Eventually, the United
States Marshals stored Claimant's firearm in his safe allowed him to carry his legal papers regarding the VOID issue.
9.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE PROPERTY, NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE AND THE LOCATION OF WHERE THE PROPERTY MAY BE INSPECTED.
10.
WITNESSES
11
NAME

12c. WRONGFUL DEATH

50,000,000.00
150,000,000.00
0.00
200,000,000.00
SAID AMOUNT IN
I CERTIFY THAT THE AMOUNT OF CLAIM COVERS ONLY DAMAGES AND INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INCIDENT ABOVE AND AGREE TO ACCEPT
FULL SATISFACTION AND FINAL SETTLEMENT O' THIS CLAIM.
13a. SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT (See instructions or reverse side).
10/15/2015
212-808-6515


FRAUDULENT CLAIM
$5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages sustained
by the Government. (See 31 U.S.C. 3729).
Authorized for Local Reproduction
Previous Edition is not Usable
35-109

.................
,anna
n,
,1171 I
71,
111/171
NSN 7540-00-634-4046
28 CFR 14.2
CLAIM FOR DAMAGE,
INJURY, OR DEATH
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read carefully - - instructions on the

reverse side and supply information request
, both sides of this
FORM APPROVED
OMB NO. 1105-0008


Eric Sanders, Esq.

New York, NY 10169
1 MILITARY
4. DATE OF BIRTH
CIVILIAN
5. MARITAL STATUS
Married
8. BASIS OF CLAIM (State in detail the known facts and

circumstances attending the damage, injury, or death, identifying persons and property involved, the place of occurrence and
the cause thereof. Use additional pages if necessa -y).
Once Claimant arrived at the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York - Central Islip, the United States
Marshal informed him that Former Bankruptcy Judge Eisenberg REFUSED to him and ORDEREd them to remove him to the
Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn. In the meantime, statements were given to DNAInfo and other media outlets
claiming the Claimant is essentially a DEADBEAT when in fact, he had NO DEBT other than the VOID judgment
9.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
10.
WITNESSES
11.
NAME

12c. WRONGFUL DEATH

50,000,000.00
150,000,000.00
0.00
200,000,000.00
SAID AMOUNT IN
I CERTIFY THAT THE AMOUNT OF CLAIM COVERS ONLY DAMAGES AND INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INCIDENT ABOVE AND AGREE TO ACCEPT
FULL SATISFACTION AND FINAL SETTLEMENT 0= THIS CLAIM.
10/15/2015
212-808-6515


FRAUDULENT C -AIM
)5-109
NSN 7540-00-634-4046
(REV. 2/2L
STANDARD
28 CFR 14.2
CLAIM FOR DAMAGE,

INJURY, OR DEATH
INSTRUCTIONS:
FORM APPROVED
OMB NO. 1105-0008
Please read carefully t'',Istructions on the

reverse side and supply information requestt
both sides of this


Eric Sanders, Esq.

New York, NY 10169
I
I MILITARY
5. MARITAL STATUS
CIVILIAN
Married
8. BASIS OF CLAIM (State in detail the known facts end circumstances attending the damage, injury, or death, identifying persons and property involved, the place of occurrence and
This was done to smear Claiman't stellar reputation with the Court, legal community and community at large causing
IRREPARABLE damage to his reputation and THE SANDERS FIRM, P.C. Once Claimant arrived at the Metropolitan Detention
Center, the staff was clueless how to handle him since he wasn't there accused or sentenced for committing any CRIME, he
was there as the officers coined "You are here because the Judge is having a hissy fit." The Claimant was thrown into the SHU
9.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
10.
WITNESSES
11.
NAME

12c. WRONGFUL DEATH

50,000,000.00
150,000,000.00
0.00
200,000,000.00
FULL SATISFACTION AND FINAL SETTLEMENT O THIS CLAIM.
13a. SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT (See instructions on reverse side).
10/15/2015
212-808-6515


FRAUDULENT C _AIM
95-109
NSN 7540-00-634-4046
(REV.
STANDARD
28 CFR 14.2
CLAIM FOR DAMAGE,
INJURY, OR DEATH
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read carefully P--Thstructions on the

reverse side and supply information requestr.
both sides of this
FORM APPROVED
OMB NO. 1105-0008


Eric Sanders, Esq.

New York, NY 10169
I MILITARY
4. DATE OF BIRTH
CIVILIAN
5. MARITAL STATUS
Married
8. BASIS OF CLAIM (State in detail the known facts land

or the Special Housing Unit as an inmate and confined as if he violated the Rules or was a violent inmate. The SHU is for
punishing inmates. The Claimant was housed and stip-searched several times over the course of his confinement from
October 15, 2013 through October 21, 2013. On more than one (1) occassion, prison officials wrote reports claiming Claimant
violated the Rules to justify the SHU confinement. Claimant was only trying to survive among violent inmates.
9.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
10.
WITNESSES
it
NAME

12c. WRONGFUL DEATH

50,000,000.00
150,000,000.00
0.00
200,000,000.00
FULL SATISFACTION AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THIS CLAIM.
13a. SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT (See instructions on reverse side).
10/15/2015
212-808-6515


FRAUDULENT CLAIM
The claimant is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than
95-109
NSN 7540-00-634-4046
_ _ . _ ._ _
.
STANDARD
28 CFR 14.2
CLAIM FOR DAMAGE -INJURY, OR DEATH
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read carefully*`-- instructions on the

reverse side and supply information reques,
I both sides of this
FORM APPROVED
OMB NO. 1105-0008


Eric Sanders, Esq.

New York, NY 10169
MILITARY
5. MARITAL STATUS
CIVILIAN
Married
Eventually, Claimant was brought before Former Bankruptcy Judge Eisenberg's court and he raised the VOID issue but, she
ignored it although the law is very clepr VOIDNESS must be immediately resolved. Under the threat of further Court action,
Claimant reluctantly turned over more than $200k in personal funds earmaked for his personal and business taxes. To this day,
Claimant doesn't know the status of the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition that was only filed to protect his client because
9.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
10.
WITNESSES
NAME

12c. WRONGFUL DEATH

50,000,000.00
150,000,000.00
0.00
200,000,000.00
13a. SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT (See instructions or reverse side)
10/15/2015
212-808-6515


FRAUDULENT C _AIM
The claimant is liable to the United States Govemmen fora civil penalty of not less than
4uthorized for Local Reproduction
15-109
NSN 7540-00-634-4046
STANDARD FORM 95 (REV. 2/2007)

28 CFR 14.2
CLAIM FOR DAMAGE,

INJURY, OR DEATH
INSTRUCTIONS:
Please read carefully '

reverse side and supply information request
FORM APPROVED
OMB NO. 1105-0008
instructions on the
i both sides of this


Eric Sanders, Esq.

New York, NY 10169
I
I MILITARY
5. MARITAL STATUS
CIVILIAN
7. TIME (A.M. OR P fv.)
Married
he is so rattled by this total violation f his civil rights, he hasn't opened any related mail since being released from the
Metropolitan Detention Center. Former Bankruptcy Judge Eisenberg retired shortly after Claimant sent a Premotion Letter to
the Court and interested parties and a response to the Committee on Grievances of the Eastern District of New York to explain
why he shouldn't be DISBARRED. Claimant was CLEAREd by the Committee on March 20, 2015
9.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
10.
WITNESSES
11.
NAME

12c. WRONGFUL DEATH

50,000,000.00
150,000,Q00.00
0.00
200,000,000.00
13a. SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT (See instructions or) reverse side).
10/15/2015
212-808-6515


FRAUDULENT C _AIM
)5-109
NSN 7540-00-634-4046
STANDARD FORM 95 (REV.
- --

28 CFR 14.2
CLAIM FOR DAMAGE,

INJURY, OR DEATH
INSTRUCTIONS:
Please read carefully ttreverse side and supply information request
FORM APPROVED
OMB NO. 1105-0008
'nstructions on the
both sides of this


Eric Sanders, Esq.

New York, NY 10169
fl MILITARY
4. DATE OF BIRTH
1 CIVILIAN
5. MARITAL STATUS
Married
8. BASIS OF CLAIM (State in detail the known facts and

but the other releated investigation by the First Department is still pending. Claimant FULLY intends to file his Motion to Vacate
and related legal actions against the aforementioned and other related parties in Early 2016. Claimant contends he was treated
in such a mean-spirited and disrespectful manner because of his race. Claimant contends if he was a Caucasian attorney, he
would've never been handled in this manner, the judgment would've been VOIDED and certainly not sent to a federal prison.
9.
PROPERTY DAMAGE
10.
WITNESSES
11.
NAME

12c. WRONGFUL DEATH

50,000,000.00
150,000,000.00
0.00
200,000,000.00
10/15/2015
212-808-6515


FRAUDULENT C.AIM
$5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the artiount of damages sustained
95-109
NSN 7540-00-634-4046
(REV. 2/2C
STANDARD
28 CFR 14.2
INSURANCE COVERAGE
In order that subrogation claims may be adjudicated, t is essential that the claimant provide the following information regatuing the insurance coverage of the vehicle or property
15. Do you carry accident Insurance?
Yes
I yes, give name and address of insurance company (Number, Street, City, State, and Zip Code) and policy number.
16. Have you filed a claim with your insurance carrier in this instance, and if so, is it full coverage or deductible?
18. If a claim has been filed with your carrier, what ac
i Yes
n No
Lxj No
17.If deductible, state amount.
ion has your insurer taken or proposed to take with reference to your claim? (It is necessary that you ascertain these fact,
19. Do you carry public liability and property damage nsurance?
Yes
If yes, give name and address of insurance carrier (Number, Street, City, State, and Zip Code).
X No
INSTRUCTIONS
Claims presented under the Federal Tort Claims Act should be submitted directly to the "appropriate Federal agency" whose
employee(s) was involved in the incident. If the incident involves more than one claimant, each claimant should submit a separate
claim form.
Complete all items - Insert the word NONE where applicable.
A CLAIM SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN PREE ENTED WHEN A FEDERAL
DAMAGES IN A SUM CERTAIN FOR INJURY TO OR LOSS OF PROPERTY, PERSONAL
AGENCY RECEIVES FROM A CLAIMANT, HIS DULY AUTHORIZED AGENT, OR LEGAL INJURY, OR DEATH ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED BY REASON OF THE INCIDENT.
REPRESENTATIVE, AN EXECUTED STANDARD FORM 95 OR OTHER WRITTEN
THE CLAIM MUST BE PRESENTED TO THE APPROPRIATE FEDERAL AGENCY WITHIN
NOTIFICATION OF AN INCIDENT, ACCOMPANIED BY A CLAIM FOR MONEY
TWO YEARS AFTER THE CLAIM ACCRUES.
Failure to completely execute this form or to supply the requested material within
two years from the date the claim accrued may render your claim invalid. A claim
is deemed presented when it is received by the appropriate agency, not when it is
mailed.
If instruction is needed in completing this form, the agency listed in item #1 on the reverse
side may be contacted. Complete regulations pertain ng to claims asserted under the
Federal Tort Claims Act can be found in Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 14.
Many agencies have published supplementing regulations. If more than one agency is
involved, please state each agency.
The claim may be filled by a duly authorized agent or other legal representative, provided
evidence satisfactory to the Government is submitted with the claim establishing express
authority to act for the claimant. A claim presented by an agent or legal representative
must be presented in the name of the claimant. If the claim is signed by the agent or
legal representative, it must show the title or legal capacity of the person signing and be
accompanied by evidence of his/her authority to press nt a claim on behalf of the claimant
as agent, executor, administrator, parent, guardian or other representative.
If claimant intends to file for both personal injury and property damage, the amount for
each must be shown in item number 12 of this form.
The amount claimed should be substantiated by competent evidence as follows:

(a) In support of the claim for personal injury or death, the claimant should submit a
written report by the attending physician, showing the nature and extent of the injury. the
nature and extent of treatment, the degree of permanent disability, if any, the prognosis,
and the period of hospitalization, or incapacitation, attaching itemized bills for medical,
hospital, or burial expenses actually incurred.
(b) In support of claims for damage to property, which has been or can be economically
repaired, the claimant should submit at least two itemized signed statements or estimates
by reliable, disinterested concerns, or, if payment has been made, the itemized signed
receipts evidencing payment.
(c) In support of claims for damage to property which is not economically repairable, or if
the property is lost or destroyed, the claimant should submit statements as to the original
cost of the property, the date of purchase, and the value of the property, both before and
after the accident. Such statements should be by disinterested competent persons,
preferably reputable dealers or officials familiar with the type of property damaged, or by
two or more competitive bidders, and should be certified as being just and correct.
(d) Failure to specify a sum certain will render your claim invalid and may result in
forfeiture of your rights.
PRIVACY ACT NOTICE

This Notice is provided in accordance with the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3), and
concerns the information requested in the letter to which this Notice is attached.
A. Authority: The requested information is solicited pursuant to one or more of the
following: 5 U.S.C. 301, 28 U.S.C. 501 et seq , 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., 28 C.F.R.
Part 14.
B. Principal Purpose: The information requested is to be used in evaluating claims

C. Routine Use: See the Notices of Systems of Records for the agency to whom you are
submitting this form for this information.
D. Effect of Failure to Respond: Disclosure is voluntary. However, failure to supply the
requested information or to execute the form may render your claim "invalid."
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT NOTICE

This notice is solely for the purpose of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501. Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 6 hours per
response, including the time for reviewing instructions searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to the Director, Tons
Branch, Attention: Paperwork Reduction Staff, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530 or to the Office of Management and Budget. Do not mail completed
form(s) to these addresses.
STANDARD FORM 95 REV. (2/2007) BACK
EXHIBIT 1
RANDALL T. ENG
PRESIDING JUSTICE
Appellate Biuiston
creme Total of fir state of New jurk
ecottb Judicial Department
45 Monroe Part
Brooklyn, N.V. 11Z111
(710) 075-1300
MEL E. HARRIS
KAREN HOCHBERG TOMMER
DEPUTY CLERKS
MARIA T. FASULO
DARRELL M. JOSEPH
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY CLERKS
APRILANNE AGOSTINO
CLERK OF THE COURT
February 5, 2013
Re: M/O Goldberg v New York State Division of Human Rights

Appellate Division Docket No.: 2012-08079
Sanders Firm, P.C.
1140 Avenue of Americas
9th Floor
New York, NY 10036
Dear Counsel:
This office has been advised by counsel for the respondent Mary Rocco that appellant Eric
Sanders filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of New York on November 29, 2012. As a result of that filing, all proceedings
in this Court - including the respondent's time to serve and file her brief - are stayed until this Court
is authorized to proceed consistent with Title 11 of the United States Code and any mandates of the
Bankruptcy Court. At that time, this Court will issue an order scheduling a date for the service and
filing of the respondent's brief.
Kindly advise this office immediately of all pertinent developments in the Bankruptcy Court.
s truly,
0144 444 .
LL M. JOSE
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY CLERK
cc:
Himmel & Bernstein, LLP
EXHIBIT 2
10/15/2015
US Marshals Arrest Lawyer for DC Crash Mom - Bed-Stuy - DNAinfo.com New York
US Marshals Arrest Lawyer for DC Crash Mom

By Murray Weiss I October 15, 2013 io:3 6am I Updated an Oetober15, 2013 12:09pm
@weiss_murray
Eric Sanders (R) stands with the family of Miriam Carey while they address media outsici_
View Full Caption
Michael Graae/Getty Images
NEW YORK U.S. Marshals armed with a warrant have arrested

the prominent New York lawyer who represents the family of Miriam
Carey, the Connecticut woman shot and killed in. Washington, D.C.
after she tried to crash her car through a White House gate, DNAinfo
New York has learned.
Eric Sanders, a civil rights attorney best known for suing the NYPD,
was arrested outside his house in Melville, L.I., Tuesday morning
after Federal Bankruptcy Judge Dorothy Eisenberg issued a warrant
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last week. Eisenberg was iiirious that Sanders had floute, her
authority for months dragging his feet in court, failing to show up
for hearings and ignoring her requests for documents, according to
court documents.
Sanders surrendered without incident, sources said.
The final straw was when Sanders failed to pay $181,666 to several
people who recently won settlements against him, including a lawyer
in his firm who was fired because she got pregnant, according to
court documents.
Sanders was processed at the federal courthouse in Central Islip
before being transferred to the Metropolitan Detention Center in
Sunset Park, where he will remain until Judge Eisenberg chooses to
see him or he clears up his debts, sources said.
"He will sit there until she wants to talk to him or he pays his debt," a
source said.
Sanders' office did not immediately return a call for comment.
The arrest came shortly after Sanders appeared with Carey's family
at her wake in Brooklyn on Monday night, where he once again
criticized cops and federal officers in Washington, D.C. for killing the
troubled 34-year-old Stamford, Conn. woman.
U.S. Marshals considered arresting Sanders at the wake on Monday,
but "wanted to prevent having a spectacle" and did not want to
disrespect the family, sources said.
Sanders and. Carey's family have argued that the dental hygienist
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10/15/2015
suffered from postpartmu depression and was unarmed ,vnen she

led cops on a wild chase with her young daughter in her car.
"They blew it," Sanders said of the D.C. police and federal officers
involved in Carey's death.
Judge Eisenberg, who works in Long Island's Eastern District
bankruptcy court, ordered Sanders' arrest Oct. 7, saying she was
"holding [Sanders] in civil contempt for his willful failure to comply
with this Court's Turnover order."
She added that she wanted Sanders "incarcerated in a federal facility
until such time as [Sanders] has purged said contempt by paying."
Sanders will be locked up until he not only satisfies the debt, but also
forks over legal fees, expenses and interest. In addition, he'll have to
pay $1,000 for each day he spends in jail, the judge wrote.
Sources said the arrest order was almost unprecedented.
"It is almost unheard of for a judge in bankruptcy court to order
someone's arrest," a source said. "The judge obviously has had it
with him, and decided enough was enough."
Sanders made a career along with his former law partner Jeffrey
Goldberg suing city agencies, particularly the NYPD. Most of his
cases involved officers claiming they were victims of sexual
harassment, discrimination or verbal abuse by police brass or fellow
officers.
The lawyers were known for alerting pet reporters to their court
filings against the city along with demands for exorbitant
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US Marshals Arrest Lawyer for DC Crash Mom - Bed-Stuy - DNAmfo com New York
damages. Most cases, ho v,ever, ended out of public glare ,vith

nuisance settlements which the city felt was less expensive than
litigation.
Ironically, Sanders and Goldberg split a few years ago after their firm
lost the discrimination case to a female attorney who claimed she
was fired because she had gotten pregnant.
Sanders, who is married with a child, and is also a retired NYPD
officer, stood with the Carey family, including Valarie Carey, a
retired NYPD sergeant, at a Brooklyn funeral home on Monday.
Last Friday, Sanders was on his usual rounds inside NYPD
headquarters attending to legal matters involving a city officer,
sources said.
Sources said Sanders' arrest will likely lead to a disciplinary hearing,
which could jeopardize his license to practice.
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EXHIBIT 3
NEW YORK STATE
DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LEGAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT UNIT

ONE FORDRAM PLAZA, 4TH FLOOR
BRONX, NEW YORK 50458
(71 8) 741-8422
Fax: (718) 741-3217

www.dhr.ny.gov
ANDREW M. CUOMO
GOVERNOR
November 7, 2013
HELEN DIANE FOSTER

ACTING COMMISSIONER
Eric Sanders, Esq.

The Sanders Firm, P.C.
1140 Avenue of the Americas, 9th Floor
New York, NY 10036
VIA FACSIMILE: 212-537-9081
Re:
Mary Rocco v. Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Eric Sanders

Case No. 10112394
Dear Mr. Sanders:

The Division is in receipt of your Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL") request which was received
by the Division on October 31, 2013.
Please be advised that the cost for a copy of the Hearing File and Litigation File you requested is
S287.50. Due to a substantial increase in the number of requests received, a copy will be forwarded to you
within thirty (30) business days, upon receipt of a check or money order for that amount, payable to the NYS
Division of Human Rights. Send payment to:
NYS Division of Human Rights
Attn: Richard Jay Brill, FOIL Officer
One Fordham Plaza, 4th Floor
Bronx, New York 10458
Please write the case number, 10112394, on your check.
However, the Division is unable to provide you with a copy of the Hearing Transcripts, to obtain a
copy of the Hearing Transcripts please contact:
Precise Court Reporting
(516) 747-9393 or (212) 581-2570
Very truly yours,
Richard Jay Brill

FOIL Officer
EXHIBIT 4
DEF
tOY L. REARDON, ESQ.
:HAIRMAN
OLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
HRISTOPHER E. CHANG. ESQ.
RNEST J. COLLAZO, Eso.
ALIBURTON PALES. 2D., EGO.
HARLOTTE MOSES FISCHMAN, ESQ.
ARTIN R. GOLD, ESQ.
DBERT L. HAIG, ESQ.
YRON KIRSCHBAUM, ESQ.
_AN LEVINE, ESQ.
ON. EUGENE L NARDEL.0
ERCEDES A. NESFIELD
ON. JOSEPH P. SULLIVAN
TEPHEN L. WEINER, ESQ.
OMMITTEE MEMBERS
kTHERINE M. ABATE, ESQ.
,MES M. ALTMAN. ESQ.
kVID ARROYO, ESQ.
NA BEATTIE. ESQ.
ITER A. BELLACOSA, ESQ.
7.ORGE BERGER, ESQ.
AEILA S. BOSTON. ESQ.
BUKSBAUM
)HN M. CALLAGY, EGO.
*IN F. CAMBRIA. ESQ.
CHOLAS M. CANNELLA, ESQ.
ORGIO CAPUTO
)HN H. CARLEY, ESQ.
JRORA CASSIRER, ESQ.
kTHERINE A. CHRISTIAN. ESQ.
kLPH C. DAWSON, ESQ.
:ONARD F. DELUCA
iELDON ELSEN, ESQ.
ILLIAM P. FRANK, EGO.
JTH W. FRIENDLY
A-TTHEVV GAZER, ESQ.
kVID R. GELFAND, ESQ.
DBERT J. GIUFFRA, ESQ.
)BERT E. GODOSKY, ESO.
INN D. GORDAN, III. ESQ.
CHOLAS A. GRAVANTE, JR., ESQ.
CHARD M. GREENBERG, ESO.
AURA BARRY GRINALDS, ESQ.
.MES W. HARBISON, JR., ESQ.
ERARD E. HARPER, ESQ.
>TER C. HARVEY, ESQ.
SAN C. MCK. HENDERSON
ZYMOUR W. JAMES, JR., ESO.
IMELA JARVIS, ESQ.
)11N J. JEROME. ESQ.
_FREIDA B. KENNY. ESQ.
kNCY B. LUDMERER, ESQ.
2THUR MARTIN LUXENBERG, ESQ.
ILLIAM A. MAHER, ESO.
DGER JUAN MALDONADO, Esc:,
+I ILY F. MANDELSTAM
DBERT P. MCGREEVY, ESQ.
ARIA D. MELENDEZ, ESQ.
COB PULTMAN, ESQ.
)LAND G. RIOPELLE, ESQ.
DBIN STRATTON RIVERA
\ RBARA K. ROTHSCHILD
kVID M. RUBIN, ESQ.
ILLIAM T. RUSSELL. JR., ESQ.
kRBARA A. RYAN, EGO.
\RLA G. SANCHEZ. ESO.
kTHLEEN M. SCANLON, ESQ.
IREN PATTON SEYMOUR, ESO.
(GENE P. SOUTHER, ESC/.
,WRENCE S. SPIEGEL, ESQ.
kRLA A. KERR STEARNS, ESQ.
ILLIAM ST. LOUIS. ESQ.
)NALD J. SYLVESTRI, JR.
TICA VON ALTHANN
HN L. WARDEN, ESQ.
ISAN WELSHER
LTON L. WILLIAMS, JR., ESQ.
ANK H. WOHL. ESQ.
:HARD R. ZAYAS, ESQ.
)NZALO S. ZEBALLOS, EGO..
RAH E. ZGUNIEC, ESO.
TMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMM* 'EE
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION

FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
61 BROADWAY
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10006
(212) 401-0800
FAX: (212) 287-1045 (NOT FOR SERVICE OF PAPERS)
JORGE DOPICO
CHIEF COUNSEL
SPECIAL TRIAL COUNSEL
JEREMY S. GARBER
DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL
ANGELA CHRISTMAS
NAOMI F. GOLDSTEIN
VITALY LIPKANSKY
RAYMOND VALLEJO
November 18, 2013

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
The Sanders Firm, PC
Eric Sanders, Esq.
1140 Avenue of the Americas
9' Floor
New York, NY 10036
Re:
STAFF COUNSEL
KEVIN P. CULLEY
KEVIN M. DOYLE
PAUL L. FRIMAN
ROBERTA N. KOLAR
JUN H. LEE
NORMA I. LOPEZ
NORMA I. MELENDEZ
ELISABETH A. PALLADINO
KATHY W. PARRINO
ORLANDO REYES
EILEEN J. SHIELDS
KAYUN L. WHITTINGHAM
Sua Sponte Investigation

Docket No: 2013.2293
Dear Mr. Sanders:

On the basis of the New York Law Journal article dated October 18, 2013, a
copy of which is enclosed, the Committee opened a sua Sponte investigation into the
circumstances that led to your being held in civil contempt by Eastern District
Bankruptcy Judge Dorothy Eisenberg and being incarcerated for failing to purge the
contempt. The contempt appears to have arisen as a result of your failure to satisfy a
$175,000 judgment. At the very least, your conduct appears to adversely reflect on your
fitness as a lawyer, in violation of rule 8.4(h), of the New York Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter, please submit a written
response. Be sure to include the details of what led to the judgment, why you wilfully
failed to pay the judgement and whether you have now purged the contempt.
Very truly yours,

,d(9-ed
Naomi F. Goldstein
NFG:tmn
Enc.
DEF
rOY L. REARDON, ESQ.
:NAIRMAN
OLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
HRISTOPHER E. CHANG, ESO.
NEST J. COLLAZO, ESQ.
ALIBURTON FALES, 2D.. ESQ.
HARLOTTE MOSES FISCHMAN, ESQ.
ARTIN R. GOLD. ESQ.
OBERT L. HAIG, ESQ.
YRON KIRSCHBAUM, ESQ.
_AN LEVINE, ESQ.
ON. EUGENE L. NARDELLI
ERCEDES A. NESFIELD
ON. JOSEPH P. SULLIVAN
rEPHEN L. WEINER, ESQ.
OMMITTEE MEMBERS
ATHERINE M. ABATE, ESQ.
\MES M. ALTMAN. ESQ.
AVID ARROYO. ESQ.
INA BEATTIE. ESQ.
TER A. BELLACOSA, ESQ.
FORGE BERGER. ESQ.
-IEILA S. BOSTON, ESQ.
AVID BUKSBAUM
3HN M. CALLAGY, ESQ.
31.1N F. CAMBRIA, ESQ.
ICHOLAS.M. CANNELLA, ESQ.
IORGIO CAPUTO
)HN H. CARLEY, ESQ.
JRORA CASSIRER, ESQ.
ATHERINE A. CHRISTIAN. ESQ.
ALPH C. DAWSON. ESQ.
EONARD F. DELUCA
-(ELDON ELSEN. ESQ.
'ILLIAM P. FRANK, ESQ.
JTH W. FRIENDLY
ATTHEW GAZER, ESQ.
AVID R. GELFAND, ESC?.
DBERT J. GIUFFRA. ESQ.
DBERT E. GODOSICY. ESC).
)HN D. GORDAN. III, 550.
'CHOLAS A. GRAVANTE, JR.. ESC).
CHARD M. GREENBERG, ESC).
AURA BARRY GRINALDS. ESQ.
mES W. HARBISON, JR., ESO.
ERARD E. HARPER, ESQ.
TER C. HARVEY. ESQ.
RAN C. MCK. HENDERSON
nwouR W. JAMES, JR., ESQ.
AMELA JARVIS, ESQ.
31.4N J. JEROME. ESC).
_FREIDA B. KENNY, ESQ.
ANCY B. LUDMERER. ESQ.
ATHUR MARTIN LUXENBERG, ESO.
'ILLIAM A. MAHER, ESQ.
OGER JUAN MALDONADO, ESQ.
MILT F. MANDELSTAM
OBERT P. MCGREEVY, ESQ.
ARIA D. MELENDEZ. 550.
COB PULTMAN. 550.
OLAND G. RIOPELLE.ESQ.
OBIN STRATTON RIVERA
ARBARA K. ROTHSCHILD
AVID M. RUBIN, ESO.
'ILLIAM T. RUSSELL. JR.. ESQ.
ARBARA A. RYAN. ESQ.
ARIA G. SANCHEZ, ESQ.
4THLEEN M. SCANLON, ESC).
AREN PATTON SEYMOUR. ESQ.
JGENE P. SOUTHER, ESO.
kWRENCE S. SPIEGEL. ESQ.
ARLA A. KERR STEARNS. ESO.
ILLIAM ST. LOUIS. ESQ.
DNALD J. SYLVESTRI, JR.
ATICA VON ALTHANN
)HN L WARDEN, ESQ.
/SAN WELSHER
LION L. WILLIAMS, JR., ESQ.
LANK H. WOHL, Esc,.
SHARD R. ZAYAS. 550.
)NZALO S. ZEBALLOS, 550.
,RAH E. ZGLINIEC, ESO.
TMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMM 'EE

FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
61 BROADWAY
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10006
(212) 401-0800
FAX: (212) 287-1045 (NOT FOR SERVICE OF PAPERS)
JORGE DOPICO
CHIEF COUNSEL
SPECIAL TRIAL COUNSEL
JEREMY S. GARBER
DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL
November 26, 2013
STAFF COUNSEL
KEVIN P. CULLEY
KEVIN M. DOYLE
PAUL L. FRIMAN
ROBERTA N. KOLAR
JUN H. LEE
NORMA I. LOPEZ
NORMA I. MELENDEZ
ELISABETH A. PALLADINO
KATHY W. PARRINO
ORLANDO REYES
EILEEN J. SHIELDS
KAYLIN L WHITTINGHAM
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

The Sanders Firm, PC
Eric Sanders, Esq.
1140 Avenue of the Americas
9th Floor
New York, NY 10036
Re:
ANGELA CHRISTMAS
NAOMI F. GOLDSTEIN
VrrALY LIPKANSKY
RAYMOND VALLEJO
Sua Sponte Investigation

Docket No: 2013.2293
Dear Mr. Sanders:

On the basis of the New York Law Journal article dated October 18, 2013, a
copy of which is enclosed, the Committee opened a sua sponte investigation into the
circumstances that led to your being held in civil contempt by Eastern District
Bankruptcy Judge Dorothy Eisenberg and being incarcerated for failing to purge the
contempt. The contempt appears to have arisen as a result of your failure to satisfy a
$175,000 judgment. At the very least, your conduct appears to adversely reflect on your
fitness as a lawyer, in violation of rule 8.4(h), of the New York Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter, please submit a written
response. Be sure to include the details of what led to the judgment, why you wilfully
failed to pay the judgement and whether you have now purged the contempt.
Very truly yours,
Rkae-r-AA, ,Aged5Ve-u'uf
Naomi F. Goldstein
NFG:tmn
Enc.
Cc:
rage-f Or I
40 to
tti illau
ALM Properties, Inc.

Page printed from: New York Law Journal
Back to Article
Attorney Is Jailed Over Failure to Pay Debts

Andrew Keshner
New York Law Journal
2013-10-18 00:00:00.0
A civil rights attorney has been incarcerated for his "willful failure" to follow a bankruptcy judge's order to pay almost
$190,000 in debts, including a judgment arising from an employee's discrimination action based on her pregnancy.
Eric Sanders of The Sanders Firm in Manhattan was taken into custody on Tuesday after Eastern District Bankruptcy
Judge Dorothy Eisenberg, sitting in Central Islip, entered a civil contempt order against him. The Oct. 7 order, which
slapped the attomey with $1,000 daily fines for failure to purge the contempt, arises from his failure to comply with an
Aug. 16 turnover order in Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings, which Sanders initiated.
According to the federal Bureau of Prisons website, as of Thursday afternoon, Sanders was still being held at the
Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn. Sanders, a graduate of the St. John's University School of Law who was
admitted in 2004, represented himself in the bankruptcy proceedings and his firm could not be reached on Thursday.
One of Sanders' creditors is attorney Mary Rocco, who once worked with him at the law firm of Jeffrey L. Goldberg P.C.
In March 2009, an administrative law judge with the State Division of Human Rights said Sanders and Goldberg were
responsible for Rocco's back pay and mental anguish after she was terminated soon after returning from maternity
leave. The ruling was upheld on appeal.
But Rocco, now working as a solo practitioner, still has not been paid any of the $175,000 plus interest she is owed,
said her attorney, Tracey Bernstein of Himmel & Bernstein. Bernstein said though Sanders "built his reputation" on
fighting civil rights violations, he "refused to honor" a judgment based on his own actions, "despite having been found
after a hearing to have violated my client's rights."
Copyright 2013. ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved.
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleFriendlyNYjsp?id=1202624068178
11/18/2013
213 NOV 25 cp 3: 25
'L RSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
C EgeRlp.a41:6
u COMMaTEE
PS>.
FIRSTCLASS

FIRST DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
61 BROADWAY
New York, New York 10Q06:: CV/ E-D
4r eific,:ffig,==ismommor
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NamegaMB,PITNEY BOWES
00.46
$
021A
NOV18 2013
0004333602
MAILED FROM ZIP CODE 10006
EXHIBIT 5
Eric Sanders
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
ectbounces@nyed.uscourts.gov
Monday, November 18, 2013 9:11 AM
nobody@nyed.uscourts.gov
Activity in Case 1:13-mc-00885-BMC In Re: Eric Sanders, Esq. Letter
This is an automatic e-mail message generated by the CM/ECF system. Please DO NOT RESPOND to
this e-mail because the mail box is unattended.
***NOTE TO PUBLIC ACCESS USERS*** Judicial Conference of the United States policy permits
attorneys of record and parties in a case (including pro se litigants) to receive one free electronic copy of
all documents filed electronically, if receipt is required by law or directed by the filer. PACER access fees
apply to all other users. To avoid later charges, download a copy of each document during this first
viewing. However, if the referenced document is a transcript, the free copy and 30 page limit do not
apply.
U.S. District Court
Eastern District of New York
Notice of Electronic Filing
The following transaction was entered by Sanders, Eric on 11/18/2013 at 9:11 AM EST and filed on 11/18/2013
In Re: Eric Sanders, Esq.
Case Name:
1 :13-mc-00885-BMC
Case Number:
Eric Sanders
Filer:
Document Number: 3
Docket Text:
Letter in Response to Grievance Committee of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York by Eric Sanders (Sanders, Eric)
1:13-mc-00885-BMC Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Eric Sanders
1: 13-mc-00885-BMC Notice will not be electronically mailed to:
The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:
Document description:Main Document
Original filename:n/a
Electronic document Stamp:
[STAMP NYEDStamp_ID=875559751 [Date=11 /18/2013] [FileNumber=8279504-0]
[02bf255c7b6354f0Offa84972ddb593b615f42bc9d559effb5ca245de9b001288a26
54bf7fc161683dec1868637b6e519c92011466988f3f12e5eabf5c09effc]]
orirse 1:13-mc-00885-oivIC Document 3 Filed 11/18/13

A SANDERS FIRM, pc
L-,AveLP,I&E-tglag,ID 17 ' 6
9th Roor, New York, NY 10036
Phone: (800) 371-4835
Fax: (212) 537-9081
Facebook: thesamkobfinnoc
November 18, 2013
Grievance Committee for the United States District

For the Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza
Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201
Re:
In re: Eric Sanders, an attorney
admitted to practice before this Court, 13
MC-885 (BMC)
Dear Committee Members:
First, I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to hopefully clarify this
matter. It deeply saddens me to write this letter as I never envisioned that I would be placed in
such a difficult position and treated with such disrespect as an African-American legal
professional and family man since becoming a member of the New York State Bar and the
Eastern District Bar.
Since Late 2004, I have practiced in this Court. Ever since becoming a member of the
Eastern District Bar, I have appeared before just about every Judge in this Court and served this
Bar honorably, representing the interests of my clients and the Bar at large. I have never been
disciplined for any misconduct. I have never had any personal conflicts with anyone in the Bar,
the Court or opposing counsel, the only conflicts that have occurred were in the spirit of
litigation. I am the consummate professional and certainly not disrespectful to anyone. That is
not my general nature.
Despite my very public profile as an up and coming African-American legal professional,
I lead a very private law abiding life. I take care of my family. They are primarily professional
military personnel, law enforcement personnel, attorneys, university professors and the like.
They lead law abiding lives as well. My friends are the same way. Actually, I have some of the
same friends for well over twenty-five (25) years since I graduated from the New York City
Police Academy. I have never ever been arrested in my entire life and being picked up the
United States Marshal Service, which completely scared my neighbors, then detained in the
Metropolitan Detention Center a federal prison after Bankruptcy Judge Dorothy Eisenberg
refused to see me for close to one week, was not only traumatic, jeopardized my personal safety,
it has impacted my squeaky clean image as an African-American legal professional. The federal
detention has had a profound effect on me as a United States Citizen but, has also affected my
family, friends and clients. I am still at complete loss as to why that was necessary when I was
not being disrespectful to the Court or anyone else I am simply overwhelmed by this endless
Case 1:13-mc-0088t, ;AMC Document 3 Filed 11/18/13 F ..je 2 of 8 PagelD #: 7
legal nightmare for close to now ten (10) years ever since I decided to work for Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C.
As an "employee" of Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., I have lost
literally millions of dollars in unpaid wages and legal fees that I will probably never recover
since Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., has decided to file for Bankruptcy. Prior to Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
P.C., and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., filing for Bankruptcy, I won several fee disputes in the
Eastern District before Sr. Judge Arthur D. Spatt and Magistrate Judge Viktor V. Pohorelsky
awarding me 1/3 of legal fees on several cases I brought to the firm after Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
Esq., claimed that no such agreement existed. There are probably close to 130 or so federal civil
rights and police disciplinary cases that I will never recover any monies earned since I brought
this book of business to the firm. There are an untold number of 911 claims, I believe in the
upper hundreds part of the $675 million Captive Fund in Sr. Judge Alvin Hellerstein's Court I
will never recover any monies earned since I along with Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., brought this
book of business to the firm.
Based upon not receiving any relief from the Court for the Rocco Matter which I will
address below, I made the biggest legal mistake by filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection
out of pure frustration and protecting my client Retired Hempstead Police Assistant Chief Willie
R. Dixon from being relentlessly harassed by Tracey S. Bernstein, Esq., of Himmel & Bernstein,
LLP on behalf of former Associate Mary Bridget Rocco, Esq. Mr. Bernstein is seeking to
enforce a judgment from the New York State Division of Human Rights against me as an
"employee." This judgment that I believe is legally VOID is the main source of the legal
dispute. Retired Assistant Chief Dixon was threatened with arrest including receiving papers
from someone indicating such but, when he called-Supreme Court of the State of New York,
County of New York Judge Geoffrey D.S. Wright, his law clerk told him that no such order was
issued by him. By filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection, I completely ruined my pristine
Tier 1 Credit Status, scores over 800 where I had access to well over $100, 000.00 in unsecured
credit lines and close to $2 million in mortgage credit. I had zero debt. Now I am stuck in an
endless trap. I need the Court's assistance to end this legal nightmare. I have already suffered
enough.
With respect to the Rocco Matter, I am in the process of obtaining all legal papers that
were filed and docketed at the New York State Division of Human Rights, as well as the legal
papers that were filed and docketed at the Supreme Court of the State of New York Appellate
Division Second Department. I do not think that it is appropriate to re-litigate this matter but, I
have to say a few things about the Rocco Matter that was not fleshed out during the investigation
and litigation due to a legal conflict between me as an "employee" and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C.,
and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., as "employers." My individual Constitutional rights were never
protected by prior legal counsel Susan Penny Bernstein, former Associate of Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
P.C., and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., nor New York State Division of Human Rights
Administrative Law Judge Robert M. Vespoli. They never raised the fact that I was an
"employee" not an "employer" within the meaning of the New York State Human Rights law
without any ownership interest as defined by the New York State Court of Appeals or the
threshold of the "Economic Reality Test" as defined by the Appellate Division Second
Department, therefore, not subject to any individual liability and dismissed me from the Rocco
2
Case 1:13-mc-0088t)-6MC Document 3 Filed 11/18/13
..je 3 of 8 PagelD #: 8
Matter. At the time of the Rocco filing, I just became a member of the New York State Bar as
well as the Eastern District Bar and had not known her but only a few short months and I had
little if any contact with her at all.
From the outset of my employment with Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., and Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, Esq., I had a very difficult time with the other employees' who were Caucasian. I was
the only person of color that worked at the firm which never diversified until sometime later after
I was promoted to Managing Attorney. In the Rocco Matter, Mary Bridget Rocco, Esq., with the
assistance of former Associate Chester P. Lukas7ewski, Esq., and former Paralegal Jennifer
Riehl was quite successful in "gaming" the court into believing that she was discriminated
against due to her pregnancy. Nothing can be further from the truth. These employees' engaged
in a concerted very disingenuous form of payback. These employees were very upset because I
the quote "Black Militant" had the audacity to drastically cut back on their waste of firm
resources. Quite frankly, as told to me by Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., Mary Bridget Rocco, Esq.,
only brought the New York State Division of Human Rights complaint against me because "She
did not like you because you are Black." Mary Bridget Rocco, Esq., did not make any "good
faith" allegations against me. According to Mary Bridget Rocco, Esq., Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
Esq., called me a "Black Militant." There is so much more. That is a mere snapshot of the
outright disrespect towards me as an African-American legal professional that began on July 17,
2004, with my employment as an Associate, then as the Managing Attorney of Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C. Until now, I have kept quiet since July 17, 2004, out of respect for Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, Esq., because he gave me my start in the practice of law.
Other than the New York State Division of Human Rights proceeding on December 3`d
and 4th, 2008, I did not participate in any subsequent legal proceedings. The only thing I did was
demand based upon the request from Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C.,
that Mary Bridget Rocco, Esq., actually work a full time schedule as the rest of the employees,
upon her return from Maternity Leave, nothing more, nothing less.
On October 7, 2010, I severed all ties with Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., and Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C., and have not had any contact with them.
During spring 2011, I sought consultation and the advice of an attorney that formerly
prosecuted cases for the Disciplinary Committee and shortly thereafter retained him to assist me
with several issues related to Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., and Cronin
and Byzcek, LLP regarding the Mary Bridget Rocco, Esq., matter; unpaid wages; failure to
protect my equitable interest in literally hundreds of pending matters, as well as other allegations
of attorney misconduct related to the New York State Division of Human Rights proceeding.
Unfortunately, after very little negotiations, I was told that the Disciplinary Committee probably
would not entertain a "pissing match" between attorneys. I thought with time that these matters
would resolve themselves once everyone cooled down. I was so wrong.
Sometime in December 2011, Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C.,
filed for bankruptcy protection. Shortly, thereafter, Tracey S. Bernstein, Esq., filed an Order to
Show Cause in Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Nassau to have me
"arrested." Up to that point, I had no idea the Rocco Matter was still unresolved.
3
Case 1:13-mc-0088-13MC Document 3 Filed 11/18/13 r _.ge 4 of 8 PagelD #: 9
On May 24, 2012, I filed a Notice of Cross-Motion in the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, County of Nassau seeking an Order pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a)(4) and (a)(5) and/or
5015 and other ground in the "Interests of Justice" vacating the Notice and Final Order of the
New York State Division of Human Rights in the Rocco Matter. My legal arguments centered
on the Judgment being legally VOID against me because the New York State Division of Human
Rights only has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over "employers" and not "employees"
consistent with Patrowich v. v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 542, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473
N.E.2d 11 (1984) and corporate employees cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting Trovato
v. Air Express Intl., 238 AD2d 333. I also raised the conflict of interest issue with Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, Esq., and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., during the New York State Division of Human
Rights and the fact that there was an "alleged" appeal filed on my behalf that I did not authorize
or even have a discussion with any attorney hired by Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., and Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C.
On July 17, 2012, the Honorable Thomas A. Adams of the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, County of Nassau denied my motion ruling that I "affirmatively waived the defense
of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction by not interposing it in the Answer or during the New York
State Division of Human Rights as well under CPLR 3211(e) and also "limited by [my] brief on
appeal limited to damages." The Court completely sidestepped the Constitutional fact that I
could never "appear" within the meaning of the New York State Human Rights law or be held
personally liable because I was an "employee" without any ownership interest or power to do
more than carry out the responsibilities as determined by Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., and Jeffrey 1.
Goldberg, P.C., consistent with Patrowich or Trovato. The Court never even addressed the fact
that Mr. Bernstein argued that I "aided and abetted" Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., and Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C., violating Mary Bridget Rocco' Esq.'s rights that is totally inconsistent with
Patrowich or Trovato. That argument makes no legal sense since both Patrowich or Trovato are
against that legal argument. Nor did the Court address the conflict of interest issue.
On July 26, 2012, I filed a Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, Second Judicial Department.
Sometime in November 2012, I filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection for the
indicated reasons above.
On January 28, 2013, after filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection, I filed the appeal
to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Judicial
Department. I also served Tracey Bernstein, Esq., of Himmel & Bernstein, LLP on behalf of
Mary Bridget Rocco, Esq.,
On February 5, 2013, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New
York, Second Judicial Department notified me that my appeal is stayed.
After filing the appeal, I hoped that the Chapter 7 filing would be administratively
dismissed in a similar fashion as Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for Failure to
Prosecute. That was a legal mistake.
4
Case 1:13-mc-00885-0MC Document 3 Filed 11/18/13
5 of 8 PagelD #: 10
On October 15, 2013, I was picked up by the United States Marshal Service and detained
at the Metropolitan Detention Center based upon the Order of Bankruptcy Judge Dorothy
Eisenberg under the mistaken belief that I was being disruptive to the judicial process. That is
simply inaccurate.
On October 21, 2013, I appeared before Bankruptcy Judge Dorothy Eisenberg and
released subject to the conditions of a subsequently filed order. Now, my excess business funds
are totally depleted, I cannot even pay my taxes, support my family or support myself. I am
afraid of being detained again. I am afraid to legally challenge the order or make any motion
such as a Rule 60 Motion as applied to Bankruptcy Rule 9024 to Vacate the Judgment or motion
the Court to Withdraw the Chapter 7 bankruptcy to assert claims of Malpractice etc., against the
appropriate parties.
This entire legal nightmare has left me totally apprehensive about doing anything to
assert my Constitutional rights. I am even apprehensive when I see law enforcement around.
Nor do I even feel at ease in my own apartment. And to make even matters worse, I now have to
explain myself in order to keep my membership in the Eastern District Bar. Thank goodness I
have very supportive colleagues in the legal profession, family, friends and clients that
understand the scope of the legal nightmare I am in otherwise I really do not know how I would
continue to function in this legal profession. I would probably quit.
In closing, I have given the Grievance Committee of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York a mere snapshot into the legal nightmare I find myself in. I
have always served honorably in the Eastern District Bar and I hope to continue to do so. But,
what I need now is the Court's assistance to end this legal nightmare. I have already suffered
enough.
Thank you for reading my response.
Sincerely,
Eric Sanders
ES/es
Case 1:13-mc-00885-6MC Document 3 Filed 11/18/13 1--,..e, 6 of 8 PagelD #: 11
EXHIBIT 1
Case 1:13-mc-0088 dMC Document 3 Filed 11

/18/13 l ...je 7 of 8 PagelD #: 12
A-69
EXHIBIT 4 TO SANDERS AFFIRMATION EXCERPT FROM NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE, SECOND EDITION,
REGARDING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF EMPLOYEES [A-69 - A-70]
st. In vtdvai liability of employees, is N.Y- Jur_ 2d Civil Rights st
1.8 N.Y. Jar. 2 (2vH Rights 51

New York lurispnidence, Second Edition
Database updated May 2012
Civil Rights
Russell J. Davis, ID., MA, Tracy Bateman Ferrell, I. D., Michael N. Giuliano, ID, Robin
C. Lamer, 1.D.. Andrew Lee. ID, Tom Muskus, J.D,Karl Oakes, ID_ Jeanne Philbin,
III. Employment or Employment-Related Discrimination
A. In General
3. Employment Relationship
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
51. Individual liabthty of employees
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Civil Rights tw.-1103, 1113
A.L.R. Library
Individual Liability of Supervisors, Managers, Officers or Co-eruployees for Discrhninatory Actions Under State Civil
Rights Au, 83 A.L.R.Sth 1
Trial Strategy
lncilvIdital Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 Am. Jur. Trials 489
Generally, even if an employer can be held liable for employment discrimination under the Slate Haman Rights Law, individual
liability for such discrimination cannot be imposed upon as employee of the employer if he or she is not shown to have any
ownership interest in the employer or power m do more than catty ompersonnel decisions made by others. 3 Such is true ever
in the case of corporate employee having the title of an officer, manager, or supervisor of a corporate tEnti.sion- 2 The "economic
reality" mat for determining who may be sped as an 'employer under the Human Rights Law requires plaintiff to put forth
evidence that shows corporate employee sited, i.e, the punitive employer, had ownership interest in the company or power to
do more than carry out personnel decisions made by otheis,3 In determining whether an individual has power to do more than
carry out the personnel decisions made by others, courts should consider whether the individual: 4
had the power to hire end fire the employee
supervised and controlled the employee's work sr-Wide or employment conditions
determined the rate and method of payment
maintained employment records
An employee's conclusory allegations that the office manager had the power to hire. fat, and promote people was insufficient
to demon:stem that manager bad power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others, as required to support
individual liability for crtscriminarlon under the Human Rights Act 5
Corydon;
In contrast to the State Run= Rights Law, which, in defining those who may be held liable for unlawful discriminatory
practio.c, speaks of an "employer" without mention of employees or agents, the New York City Haman Rights Law expressly
..
..
:.Next
.
OC.N.7171,' .
Case 1:13-mc-00885-MC Document 3
11/141/13 1- _.de 8 of 8 PagelD 13
A-70 j
fi 51. Inefivkival liability of employees, 18 N.Y. Jur. 2d Civil RIghtt 51
provides that it is unlawful for an employer or 'an employee or agent thereof to engage in discriminatory employment
praetices.6 thereby making such employees or agents individually liable for such plactices.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Under the Now Yotk State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), an individual employee may be liable as en 'employer,' only when
the has en ownership interest or any power to do more than carryout personnel decisions made by others. McKinley's Executive
Law , 296. Miloacia v. B.R. Guest Holdings LIZ, 928 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sop 201)).
FEND OF SUPPLEME2F11
Footnotes
Malta v. Alliance Mortg. Banking Corp.. 650 F. Supp. 2d 249 (E.D. N.Y. 2009); DiTitztio v. 7-Eleven, Inc.. 662 F. Sulap. 243 333
1
(SD. N.Y. 20091; Stunts v. New York State Dept of Edw.-, 26 A-13.3d 67, 805 N.Y.S.2d 704. 204 Ed. Law Rep. 696 13d Dept
20n1): Int:row/la v. Chemical Bank. 63 N.Y2d 541, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659.473 N.F-2d 11 (1984); Novak v. Royal Life Ins. Co. Of
New Yerk Inc_ 284 A_112d 892, 726 N.Y.S.2d 734 (341
2001); Murphy v. ERA United Realty. 251 A.D.2d 469.674 N.Y.S1d
415 Cm Dept 1998): Young v. Geoghegan, 250 A. D.2d 423.673 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1st Dept 1998k Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co.. 214
A.D2d 1005, 626 N.Y.S.2d 9()8 (4th Dept 1695); 84.6141.- v. ROMMI1Cativslic Diocese of Brooklyn, 194 Misc.. 2d 561.754 N.Y.S.2d
164,173 Ed. Law Rep. 946 (Sun 2003).
A male city employee could not be held liable to a female cocosployee wider the State Human Rights Law, based on his am of naked
sexual exhibitionism before her and shortly thereafter. when fully clothed. his attempt to hug her, Inasmuch as the statute Wks
only to empioyets. Tunoninello v. City of New W4,212 A.D.2d 434.
N.Y.S.2d 714 (1st Dept 1995).
Individual employees were not subject to liabEity for age discrimination in violation of the New York Human Rights Law where
they were not shown to have any ownership interest or power to do more than entry out personnel decisions made by others, and the
plaintifb Weds* identify specific discriminatory employment decisions made by any particular defendant with respect to peotietalar
plaiotiffs other than emminsory allegations of a generalized "conspiracy* involving all defendants moreover, the term "person," as
u
defined in Exec. Law 292(1), should be hnerpreted to =bade individuals who are :meanly in a common employment relationship.
Faroaton v. POniesaa12, 891 F. Stipp. 986(S.D. N.Y. 1995).
DiFiEsso v. 7-Eleven. Inc. 662 F. Stqap. 24 333 (SA N.Y. 2009); No-mid v. Chemical Bank. 63 N. Y.241 541, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659.
2
473 1,1.112d 11 (1984) (holding that a complaint alleging age and sex aszrixtdoaticm to anplOymern under the Human Rights law
was property dismissed as to an surtvidual defendant who was one of appriazimiorly 800 vicreproiderns of the corporate Cefendant
and was not shown to have any ownership interest or power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others).
Kaiser v. Ranalts Restaurant Corp_ 72 A_13.34:1539.899 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dept 2010).
3
Maher v. Alliance Moog. Banking Corp., 650 F. Stipp. 2d 249 (E.D. N.Y. 2009).
4
5
Novak v. Royal Life Ins. Co. Of New York tnc., 284 A.D.2c1892, 726 N.Y.S.2d 784 (3d Dept M01).
6
NYC Code 8-1074
Murphy v. ERA United Realty. 251 A.15.24 4459. 674 N.Y.S.241 415 (2d Dept 1998).
7
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EXHIBIT 6
V1
SANDERS FIRM, pc
1140 Avenue of the Americas,

9th Floor, New York, NY 10036
Phone: (800) 371-4835
Fax: (212) 537-9081
Facebook: thesanderstirmpc
January 12, 2014
Judge Dorothy T. Eisenberg

United States Bankruptcy Court
Alfonse M. D'Amatd Federal Courthouse
290 Federal Plaza
Central Islip, New York 11722
Re:
Eric Sanders-Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Case No.: 8-12-76905-478
Dear Judge Eisenberg:
First, I would like to thank the Court for the opportunity to hopefully clarify and resolve
this matter so I can finally move on with my life. Although I am the Debtor in this matter, I am a
federal practitioner by trade, having practiced civil rights and related causes of actions in the
Eastern, Northern and Southern District Bars. Since I have not found an attorney that will
follow-through, assert and protect my legal interests, I am forced to stop taking any further civil
rights cases and focus entirely on this personal matter.
From the outset, my legal position has been and will continue to be that the Rocco Matter
entered against me is legally VOID. It is well settled that the defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction can be waived, however, "a judgment is [VOID] if the court that rendered it lacked
jurisdiction ... of the parties. "R" Best Produce, Inc. v. DiSapio, 540 F.3d 115, 122 (2d Cir.
2008)(quoting In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1099 (2d Cir. 1979)). Voidness can be
collaterally attacked at any time. Crosby v. The Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir.
1963)(30 year old judgment vacated a void on First Amendment grounds). Therefore, since the
underlying judgment is legally VOID, upon stipulation of the parties or upon formal motion, the
Adversary Action as well as the underlying Voluntary Debtor Bankruptcy Petition must be
vacated and dismissed and all monies held in trust immediately returned to me. Thus far, the
Court has not heard from me, therefore, in order to understand the scope of the legal dispute,
later I will provide the Court with some background information.
Unfortunately, since October 21, 2013, my legal position in this matter has not been
formally brought to the Court's attention. I am hopeful but, not overly optimistic that the parties
can amicably resolve this matter without the need for me to formally file motions under
Bankruptcy Rule 90241, as applied by Rule 60 (b)(4), (b)(6), (d)(1) and (d)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. That is the precise reason I am sending the Court and all parties this
pre-motion letter. Therefore, if I run askew of the formalities in Bankruptcy Court, I apologize
to the Court and the parties in advance I am only trying to finally resolve this complete
miscarriage of justice against me.
Debtor Background
Since Late 20)4, I have practiced in various New York courts. Ever since becoming a
member of the New York State Bar as well as the Eastern, Northern and Southern District Bars, I
have appeared before many jurists and served honorably, representing the interests of my clients
and the Bar at large. I have never had any personal conflicts with anyone in the Bar, the Court or
opposing counsel, the only conflicts that have occurred were in the spirit of litigation. I am the
consummate professional and certainly not disrespectful to anyone. That is not my general
nature.
same friends for well over twenty-five (25) years since I graduated from the New York City
Police Academy. I have never ever been arrested in my entire life and being picked up by the
Metropolitan Detention Center a federal prison after the Court refused to see me for close to one
week, was not only traumatic, jeopardized my personal safety, it has impacted my squeaky clean
image as an African-American legal professional. The federal detention has had a profound
effect on me as a United States Citizen but, has also affected my family, friends and clients.
Now, if they do not hear from me for a period of time, they fear I have been detained once again.
I am still at complete loss as to why that was necessary when I was not being disrespectful to the
Court or anyone else I am simply overwhelmed by this endless legal nightmare for close to now
ten (10) years ever since I decided to work for Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
Esq.
Employment Background
As an individual corporate "employee" of Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., and Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, Esq., I have lost literally millions of dollars in unpaid wages and legal fees that I will
probably never recover since Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., is an unscrupulous businessman who
decided to file for Bankruptcy protection. Even after leaving the employ of Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., Mr. Goldberg has done everything in his power to try and
damage my legal reputation and business including lying to former clients. On several
occasions, Mr. Goldberg has told clients outlandish claims of me stealing their monies from
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., when in fact he spent their monies. I did not steal as a police officer
and I certainly will not steal as an attorney. I would NEVER sell my integrity to anyone for any
amount of monies. Mr. Goldberg made the same outlandish claims about client matters because
he DID NOT want to follow my recommendations for case handling once I transitioned from
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., to open The Sanders Firm, P.C., then had no clue what the client
matters were about damaging their ability to aggressively pursue their respective claims. This
led to avoidable malpractice and attorney misconduct claims filed against me. Prior to leaving
2
the employ of Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., Mr. Goldberg claims that
I was not making a yearly salary of $286,000, a quick review of the payroll records of ADP Total
Source and Paychex Will support that I was in fact compensated $286,000.00 a year. The payroll
records will also suprrt that I was not paid all of the outstanding wages owed to me over the
years. Mr. Goldberg claims he and I did not have a verbal agreement to pay me 1/3 of every case
I brought to the firm.' However, if you check Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C.'S internal QuickBooks
accounting system or even the accounting records of James Wasenius, C.P.A., P.C., beginning
Late 2004 or Early 2005 with the Ricardo Richards case, you will see that is in fact true as well.
After that case, I was never paid my 1/3 of every case brought to the firm. If you review every
Retainer Agreement as well as the legal documents written for cases other than pension and
social security, they are ALL written and signed by me. Prior to Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., and
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., filing for Bankruptcy protection, I won several fee disputes in the
Eastern District before Sr. Judge Arthur D. Spatt (Alana Smith v. County of Nassau and Alvin
Palmer v. County of Nassau) and Magistrate Judge Viktor V. Pohorelsky (Aretha Williams v.
City of New York), they both awarded me 1/3 of legal fees on the aforementioned cases I
brought to the firm after Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., claimed that no
such verbal agreement existed. Since Late 2004, there are probably close to 130 or so federal
civil rights, police disciplinary cases and personal injury cases that I will never recover any
monies since I brought these books of business to the firm. There are an untold number of 911
claims, I believe in the upper hundreds part of the $675 million Captive Insurance Fund in Sr.
Judge Alvin Hellerstein's Court I will never recover any monies earned since I along with
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., brought this book of business to the firm. There is so much more.
The Rocco Matter
Based upon not receiving any relief from the New York State Division of Human Rights
and the Supreme Court of the State of New York in the Rocco Matter which I will address
below, I made the biggest legal mistake by filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection out of pure
frustration and protecting my client Retired Hempstead Police Assistant Chief Willie R. Dixon
from being relentlessly harassed by Tracey S. Bernstein, Esq., of Himmel & Bernstein, LLP on
behalf of former Associate Mary Bridget Rocco, Esq. Mr. Bernstein is seeking to enforce a
judgment from the New York State Division of Human Rights against me as an individual
corporate "employee." This judgment I believe is legally VOID is the main source of the legal
dispute that resulted in me being held in Civil Contempt. Retired Assistant Chief Dixon was
threatened with arrest including receiving papers from someone indicating such but, when he
called Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York Judge Geoffrey D.S.
Wright, his law clerk told him that no such order was issued by him. Retired Assistant Chief
Dixon has the document, which I never saw but, he is willing to confirm this to the Court. By
filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection, I completely ruined my pristine Tier 1 Credit Status,
scores over 800 where I had access to well over $100, 000.00 in unsecured credit lines and close
to $2 million in mortgage credit. At the time of the Bankruptcy filing, I had zero consumer or
business debt. Now I am stuck in an endless legal trap. I need the Court's assistance to end this
legal nightmare today. 'I have already suffered more than enough.
Due to the near total depletion of my available personal and business funds, it is very
difficult for me to do anything to protect my legal interests. Once my personal and business
3
funds are stabilized, with respect to the Rocco Matter, I am going to obtain all legal papers that
Division Second De ment. I have tried to obtain those documents from former employer
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, .C. as well as former appeals counsel for Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, sq., and of course they never responded to my request. I have tried to
obtain the transcripts from the transcription service but, they never returned my phone call. The
court file is available from the New York State Division of Human Rights. But, I have been
unable to secure it yep pending the stabilization of my personal and business finances.
Hopefully, once I receive all of the documents related to the Rocco Matter, I will turn
them over to the appropriate authorities consistent with my complaints.
While I do not think that it is appropriate to completely re-litigate this Rocco Matter, it is
interesting to note, I had very little if any contact with Mrs. Rocco. Quite frankly, even Mrs.
Rocco ADMITS in her own testimony most of her interactions were with Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
Esq. I only carried out my duties and responsibilities as determined by Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C.
and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq. I have a few more things to say about certain facts that were not
fleshed out during the investigation and litigation due to an inherent legal conflict between me as
an individual corporate "employee" and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.,
as "employers." My individual Constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were
never protected by prior legal counsel Susan Penny Bernstein, former Associate of Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C., and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., or Administrative Law Judge Robert M. Vespoli.
It is quite clear but, completely disregarded, that I was an individual corporate "employee" not
an "employer" within the meaning of the New York State Human Rights law without any
ownership interest as defined by the New York State Court of Appeals or the threshold of the
"Economic Reality Test" as interpreted by the Appellate Division Second Department following
Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, therefore, not subject to any individual liability. If my individual
Constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were protected, the Rocco Matter should
have been dismissed against me in my individual capacity and I would not been intertwined with
this legal mess.
At the time of the Rocco filing, I just became a member of the New York State Bar as
well as the Eastern and Southern District Bars and had not known her but only a few short
months and I had very little if any contact with her at all. Nor did I ever have any ownership
interest in Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., was the sole owner and holder of
all corporate stock issued by Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. Nor did I have any partnership agreement
with Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. or Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.
Goldberg, Esq., I had a very difficult time with the other employees' who were Caucasian. I was
the only person of color that worked at the firm which never diversified until sometime later after
I was promoted to Managing Attorney. In the Rocco Matter, Mrs. Rocco, with the assistance of
former Associate Chester P. Lukaszewski, Esq., and former Paralegal Jennifer Riehl was quite
successful in "gaming" the Court into believing she was discriminated against due to her
pregnancy. Nothing can be further from the truth. If anything, Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and
4
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, sq., treated Mrs. Rocco much more favorably than any other employee
including paying her jwell in excess of standard timeframe normally granted for maternity leave,
paying her a full time salary although she worked far less than a full work week only about 12 or
so hours in the office and paying the medical expenses of her family members who were not
"employees." Mrs. Rocco, Mr. Lukaszewski and Ms. Riehl engaged in a concerted very
disingenuous form of payback. These "employees" were very upset with Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., because he let the "Black Militant" have too much power and
convince Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., to drastically cut back on their
complete waste of firtn resources. Quite frankly, as told to me by Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.,
Mrs. Rocco only brought the New York State Division of Human Rights complaint against me
because "She did not like you because you are Black." Mrs. Rocco did not make any "good
faith" allegations against me. She knew at the time of filing the complaint with the New York
State Division of Human Rights that I was an individual corporate "employee" not her
"employer." According to Mrs. Rocco, Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., called me a "Black Militant."
There is so much more. That is a mere snapshot of the outright disrespect towards me as an
African-American legal professional that began on July 17, 2004, with my employment as an
Associate, then as the Managing Attorney of Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. Until now, I have kept
quiet since July 17, 2004, out of respect for Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., because he gave me my
start in the practice of law. However, being quiet has done nothing but, get me more intertwined
into their legal mess. Now, I am going to stop at nothing to get out the real truth about the Rocco
Matter and the fact and circumstances surrounding my employment with Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.
Other than the New York State Division of Human Rights proceeding on December 3rd
and 4th, 2008, I did not participate in any subsequent legal proceedings. The only thing I did was
demand based upon the request from Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.,
that Mrs. Rocco actually work a full time schedule as the rest of the "employees," upon her
return from Maternity Leave, nothing more, nothing less. This conversation occurred on her last
day at Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. in front of Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., as she never considered or
even acknowledged me as her "Boss." Those are Mrs. Rocco's words. She said "Jeff is my
`Boss.'"
On October 7, 2010, I severed all ties with Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, Esq., and have not had any contact with them.
prosecuted cases for the Disciplinary Committee and shortly thereafter retained him to assist me
with several issues related to Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., and Cronin
and Byzcek, LLP regarding the Rocco Matter; unpaid wages; failure to protect my equitable
interest in literally hundreds of pending matters, as well as other allegations of attorney
misconduct related to tlie New York State Division of Human Rights proceeding. Unfortunately,
after very little negotiations, I was told that the Disciplinary Committee probably would not
entertain a "pissing maich" between attorneys. I thought with time that these matters would
resolve themselves once everyone cooled down. I was so wrong.
Sometime in December 2011, Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.,
5
filed for Bankruptcy protection. Shortly, thereafter, Mr. Bernstein filed an Order to Show Cause
in Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Nassau to have me "arrested." Up to that
point, I had no idea the Rocco Matter was still unresolved.
New York, County ottNassau seeking an Order pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a)(4) and (a)(5) and/or
5015 and other ground in the "Interests of Justice" vacating the Notice and Final Order of the
New York State Division of Human Rights in the Rocco Matter. My legal arguments centered
on the Judgment being legally VOID against me because the New York State Division of Human
Rights only has personal and subject matter jurisdiction over "employers" and not individual
corporate "employees" consistent with Patrowich v. v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 542, 483
N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11 (1984) and individual corporate "employees" cannot be held liable
for "aiding and abetting" Trovato v. Air Express Intl., 238 AD2d 333. I also raised the conflict
of interest issue with Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., during the New
York State Division of Human Rights hearing and the fact there was an "alleged" appeal filed on
my behalf that I did not authorize or even have a discussion with any attorney hired by Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.
On July 17, 2012, the Honorable Thomas A. Adams of the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, County of Nassau denied my motion ruling that I "affirmatively waived the defense
of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction by not interposing it in the Answer or during the New York
State Division of Human Rights as well under CPLR 3211(e) and also "limited by [my] brief on
appeal limited to damages." The Court completely sidestepped the Constitutional fact that I
could never "appear" within the meaning of the New York State Human Rights law or be held
personally liable because I was an individual corporate "employee" without any ownership
interest or power to do more than carry out the responsibilities as determined by Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey 1. Goldberg, Esq., consistent with Patrowich; Trovato, Monsanto v.
Electronic Data Systems Corporation, 141 A.D.2d 514, 529 N.Y.S.2d 512 (conspiracy claim
cannot be permitted to stand on the theory that it links the individual defendant to the
employment discrimination claims asserted against the corporate defendant under the Human
Rights Law, Executive Law 297); see also Foley v. Mobil Chemical Company., 170 Misc.2d1,
647 N.Y.S.2d 374 (excellent statutory analysis discussing "no individual liability" under Human
Rights Law absent "ownership interest"). The Court also never even addressed the fact Mr.
Bernstein consistently and disingenuously argued that I "aided and abetted" Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., violating Mrs. Rocco's rights. Not only is the argument
legally inconsistent with Patrowich; Trovato; Monsanto and Foley it makes no legal sense since
not only are the aforementioned cases against such an argument but, I was never charged with
"aiding and abetting." The Court also never addressed the conflict of interest issue.
On July 26, 2012, I filed a Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, Second Judicial Department.
Voluntary Bankruptcy Petition
Sometime in November 2012, I filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection for the
indicated reasons above.
6
On January 28, 2013, after filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection, I filed an appeal to
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Judicial
Department. I also served Mr. Bernstein on behalf of Mrs. Rocco.
York, Second Judicial Department notified me that my appeal is stayed.
dismissed in a similar fashion as Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for Failure to
Prosecute. That was legal mistake.
On October 15, 2013, I was picked up by the United States Marshal Service and detained
at the Metropolitan Detention Center based upon the Court's Order under the mistaken belief that
I was being disruptive to the judicial process. That is simply inaccurate.
On October 21, 2013, I appeared before the Court and released subject to the conditions
of a subsequently filed order. Throughout the short hearing, I kept listening to references by the
Trustee's attorney how I am a "High-Profile" attorney and handling the DC Shooting case.
Meanwhile, I was treated as nothing other than a common "deadbeat" and a "criminal."
Meanwhile, a review of the Bankruptcy petition clearly indicates I owe no consumer or business
debt the only other things listed is the Rocco judgment and other pending legal matters. The
Rocco Matter is the only judgment, the other legal actions: Jouan Olivares and Roy Van Allen
(presumably resolved by Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C.'S malpractice carrier, the actions are the
result of me leaving Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and the clients' not being informed thereby
disadvantaging their legal claims) and Daniel Davin, a defamation case filed against me while
representing a plaintiff in a race discrimination case against him. I plan on moving the Court to
dismiss the Davin Matter for failure to state a claim as defamation is not legally cognizable
against an attorney representing a client in a legal action under Section 74 of the New York Civil
Rights Law.
I still remember, while standing in the Bankruptcy Court shaking my head in prison
clothing, I just could not understand how I am being held individually liable, when I was only an
individual corporate "employee." I was then released. I retained counsel. The Court's actions
against me completely de-stabilized The Sanders Firm, P.C.'S momentum in the marketplace.
Essentially, all business operations were totally disrupted including mail service etc. It is only
through perseverance and respect for my reputation as being a law abiding, hard-working legal
professional, most clients' remained with the firm. The clients' are astute; they understand what
is going on with this legal mess. Now, after several months, The Sanders Firm, P.C.'S
operations have been stabilized.
Thus far, there has been essentially no movement, other than during my next court
appearance sometime in November 2013, the Trustee's attorney and the Court agreed they would
not like to see me lose my license to practice but, yet there was no discussion about how these
actions completely violated my Fourteenth Amendment Rights.
Around this time, Mr. Bernstein representing Mrs. Rocco admitted to outgoing Debtor
Counsel Raymond Sussman, Esq., that I was not an "employer" only an "employee" but, I am
`misreading' the Court's ruling because I was found 'liable' for 'aiding and abetting.' Nothing
can be further from the truth. As indicated above, that means Mr. Bernstein agrees the Court
completely misapplied the law to me as an individual corporate "employee." Please kindly read
the entire New York tate Division of Human Rights Decision and Order, particularly Pages 8
and 10. Please notice, the only claims resolved are New York State Executive Law 296.1(a)
and 297.6. There is no claim resolved related to New York State Executive Law 296.6. Mr.
Bernstein is disingenuously trying to exploit this complete misapplication of the New York State
Human Rights Law as it relates to me as an individual with the same Constitutional rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment as every other United States Citizen. Mr. Bernstein well knows,
New York State Executive Law 296.6 was not even claimed by Mrs. Rocco as evidenced by
the New York State Division of Human Rights Decision and Order. Mr. Bernstein also knows
the Honorable Thomas A. Adams of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of
Nassau never even mentioned "aiding and abetting" in his decision, he only discussed "Lack of
Jurisdiction" as a defense. Mr. Bernstein also knows the New York State Court of Appeals and
the Second Department have already ruled against such incognizable legal arguments. This
information was not brought to the Bankruptcy Court's attention. Nor were any stipulations or
motions filed by outgoing Debtor Counsel Raymond Sussman, Esq., to vacate all actions against
me.
About a month later, on December 23, 2013, Jeffrey 1. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, Esq., while under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection then intentionally stopped
payment on a corporate check in the amount of $12,755.05, of monies owed to me from the
former Profit Sharing Program and never replaced it.
On January 10, 2014, I received notice via first class mail from Andrew M. Thaler
Chapter 7 Trustee of 341 meeting scheduled for January 13, 2014. The letter is dated
December 31, 2013 and addressed to outgoing Debtor Counsel Raymond Sussman, Esq. Mr.
Sussman has not contacted me about this meeting. Without saying anything further, effective
immediately, Mr. Sussman will no longer represent me in this matter.
Now, since October 21, 2013, I was "forced" to turn over well over $218,000, of my hard
earned monies, my personal and business finances are in a mess. To this day, instead of having
well over $200,000 in reserve funds available in The Sanders Firm, P.C.'s business account, I
have gone down to as low as $140. In addition, because The Sanders Firm, P.C.'S business
reserve funds are totally depleted, I cannot even pay my income and corporate taxes, support my
family or even support myself. I am afraid of being detained again. I am afraid to legally
challenge the order. This entire legal nightmare has left me totally apprehensive about doing
anything to assert my Constitutional rights. I am even apprehensive whenever I see law
enforcement around believing they have a warrant for my arrest. Nor do I even feel at ease in
my own apartment. Now, I rarely stay there choosing to stay elsewhere. And to make matters
even worse, I now have to seek redress from the same Court that ordered my detention. My
Constitutional rights have been totally violated and I want the opportunity to assert any and all
actions against such entities and individuals. Despite my past experience with the Court, I am
hopeful that I am heard and my legal rights protected.
8
Thank goodn ss I have very supportive colleagues in the legal profession, family, friends
and clients who total understand the scope of the legal nightmare I am in otherwise I would
probably quit.
In closing, I ve given the Court a mere snapshot into the legal nightmare I find myself
in. I am hopeful the arties will review the underlying Rocco Matter judgment and the
applicable law and v luntarily file a stipulation as indicated above or the Court on its own with
or without the need of a formally filed Rule 9024 motion, vacate and dismiss all matters against
me and order the immediate return of all monies in trust to me forthwith. I have already suffered
enough.
Thank you for reading my pre-motion letter.
Eric Sanders
ES/es
Andrew M. Thaler Chapter 7 Trustee
Scott Mandelup, Esq.
Christine Black, Esq.
Tracey S. Bernstein, EN. (Counsel for Mary Bridget Rocco)
EXHIBIT 7
-THE
FIRM,
140 Avenue of the Americas,

- 9th Floor, New York, NY 10036
Phone: (800) 371-4835
Fax: (212) 537-9081
January 12, 2014
Departmental Disciplinary Committee

Supreme Court, Appelllate Division
First Judicial Departmpnt
61 Broadway
New York, N.Y. 10006
Re: In re: Sua Sponte Investigation
2013.2293
Dear Committee Members:
First, I would like to thank the Disciplinary Committee for the opportunity to hopefully
clarify this matter. It deeply saddens me to write this letter as I never envisioned I would be
placed in such a difficult position and treated with such outright disrespect as an AfricanAmerican legal professional and family man since becoming a member of the New York State
Bar as well as the Eastern, Northern and Southern District Bars.
Since Late 2004, I have practiced in various New York courts. Ever since becoming a
member of the New York State Bar as well as the Eastern, Northern and Southern District Bars, I
have appeared before many jurists and served honorably, representing the interests of my clients
and the Bar at large. I have never had any personal conflicts with anyone in the Bar, the Court or
opposing counsel, the only conflicts that have occurred were in the spirit of litigation. I am the
consummate professional and certainly not disrespectful to anyone. That is not my general
nature.
same friends for well pver twenty-five (25) years since I graduated from the New York City
Police Academy. I have never ever been arrested in my entire life and being picked up by the
Metropolitan Detention Center a federal prison after Bankruptcy Judge Dorothy Eisenberg
refused to see me for close to one week, was not only traumatic, jeopardized my personal safety,
it has impacted my squeaky clean image as an African-American legal professional. The federal
detention has had a p ofound effect on me as a United States Citizen but, has also affected my
family, friends and cl ents. Now, if they do not hear from me for a period of time, they fear I
have been detained o ce again. I am still at complete loss as to why that was necessary when I
was not being disrespectful to the Court or anyone else I am simply overwhelmed by this endless
legal nightmare for close to now ten (10) years ever since I decided to work for Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.
As an individual corporate "employee" of Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., and Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, Esq., I hav4 lost literally millions of dollars in unpaid wages and legal fees that I will
probably never recovdr since Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., is an unscrupulous businessman who
decided to file for Bankruptcy protection. Even after leaving the employ of Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., Mr. Goldberg has done everything in his power to try and
damage my legal reputation and business including lying to former clients. On several
occasions, Mr. Goldberg has told clients outlandish claims of me stealing their monies from
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., when in fact he spent their monies. I did not steal as a police officer
and I certainly will not steal as an attorney. I would NEVER sell my integrity to anyone for any
amount of monies. Mr. Goldberg made the same outlandish claims about client matters because
he DID NOT want to follow my recommendations for case handling once I transitioned from
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, C., to open The Sanders Firm, P.C., then had no clue what the client
matters were about dOnaging their ability to aggressively pursue their respective claims. This
led to avoidable malpitactice and attorney misconduct claims filed against me. Prior to leaving
the employ of Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., Mr. Goldberg claims that
I was not making a yearly salary of $286,000, a quick review of the payroll records of ADP Total
Source and Paychex will support that I was in fact compensated $286,000.00 a year. The payroll
records will also supp c rt that I was not paid all of the outstanding wages owed to me over the
years. Mr. Goldberg laims he and I did not have a verbal agreement to pay me 1/3 of every case
I brought to the firm. owever, if you check Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C.'S internal QuickBooks
accounting system or even the accounting records of James Wasenius, C.P.A., P.C., beginning
Late 2004 or Early 2005 with the Ricardo Richards case, you will see that is in fact true as well.
After that case, I was never paid my 1/3 of every case brought to the firm. If you review every
Retainer Agreement as well as the legal documents written for cases other than pension and
social security, they are ALL written and signed by me. Prior to Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., and
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., filing for Bankruptcy protection, I won several fee disputes in the
Eastern District before Sr. Judge Arthur D. Spatt (Alana Smith v. County of Nassau and Alvin
Palmer v. County of Nassau) and Magistrate Judge Viktor V. Pohorelsky (Aretha Williams v.
City of New York), they both awarded me 1/3 of legal fees on the aforementioned cases I
brought to the firm after Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., claimed that no
such verbal agreement existed. Since Late 2004, there are probably close to 130 or so federal
civil rights, police disciplinary cases and personal injury cases that I will never recover any
monies since I brought these books of business to the firm. There are an untold number of 911
claims, I believe in the upper hundreds part of the $675 million Captive Insurance Fund in Sr.
Judge Alvin Hellerstein's Court I will never recover any monies earned since I along with
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., brought this book of business to the firm. There is so much more.
Based upon not receiving any relief from the New York State Division of Human Rights
and the Supreme Court of the State of New York in the Rocco Matter which I will address
below, I made the biggest legal mistake by filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection out of pure
frustration and protecting my client Retired Hempstead Police Assistant Chief Willie R. Dixon
from being relentlessly harassed by Tracey S. Bernstein, Esq., of Himmel & Bernstein, LLP on
2
behalf of former Associate Mary Bridget Rocco, Esq. Mr. Bernstein is seeking to enforce a
judgment from the New York State Division of Human Rights against me as an individual
corporate "employee.' This judgment I believe is legally VOID is the main source of the legal
dispute that resulted i me being held in Civil Contempt. Retired Assistant Chief Dixon was
threatened with arrest ncluding receiving papers from someone indicating such but, when he
called Supreme Court f the State of New York, County of New York Judge Geoffrey D.S.
Wright, his law clerk ld him that no such order was issued by him. Retired Assistant Chief
Dixon has the docum t, which I never saw but, he is willing to confirm this to the Disciplinary
Committee. By filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection, I completely ruined my pristine Tier
1 Credit Status, score over 800 where I had access to well over $100, 000.00 in unsecured credit
lines and close to $2 Million in mortgage credit. At the time of the Bankruptcy filing, I had zero
consumer or business debt. Now I am stuck in an endless legal trap. I need the Court's
assistance to end this legal nightmare. I have already suffered more than enough.
Due to the neat total depletion of my available personal and business funds, it is very
difficult for me to do anything to protect my legal interests. Once my personal and business
funds are stabilized, With respect to the Rocco Matter, I am going to obtain all legal papers that
Division Second Department. I have tried to obtain those documents from former employer
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. as well as former appeals counsel for Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., and of course they never responded to my request. I have tried to
obtain the transcript frIpm the transcription service but, they never returned my phone call. The
court file is available from the New York State Division of Human Rights. But, I have been
unable to secure it yet pending the stabilization of my personal and business finances.
Hopefully, once I receive all of the documents related to the Rocco Matter, I will provide
a prior taped interview and some prior hearing testimony given by former Paralegal Jennifer
Riehl to bring to the Disciplinary Committee's attention that essentially accuses Mrs. Rocco of
perpetuating this fraud of alleged "pregnancy discrimination" upon the Court, under-reporting
rental income and other related forms of misconduct. Mrs. Rocco essentially "coerced" Jeffrey
L. Goldberg, Esq., into paying her a full-time salary to be a stay at home mom because of a prior
incident she knew about with a female employee years before I ever started working for Jeffrey
L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq. Mrs. Rocco essentially stayed home with the
children while Mr. Frank Pullano, her spouse worked outside of the home, although he claimed
to the New York City Police Pension Board and the Social Security Administration he is
"disabled." Prior to leaving the employ of Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., based upon my
conversation with Mr. Goldberg, I am pretty sure Mr. Pullano's Accidental Disability Retirement
Pension and Social Security Disability Applications were handled by Mrs. Rocco with Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., Additionally, I have a particular affidavit to bring
to the Disciplinary Committee's attention filed by an independent third-party on behalf of Jeffrey
L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., accusing Mr. Pullano of essentially pension and
social security fraud. r. Pullano and I were assigned to the same company in the New York
City Police Academy. It is my understanding that Mr. Pullano essentially claims he is disabled
from performing duti and responsibilities related to police work. Well, if that is true, why did
Ms. Constance Cannone file a sworn affidavit claiming she observed Mr. Pullano working off
3
the books as an arme security guard near one of the Jewish Synagogues in Nassau County
during the pendency f the Rocco Matter? Mr. Pullano also submitted an affidavit on behalf of
Mrs. Rocco.
The aforemen Toned information was not evaluated or addressed by Administrative Law
Judge Robert M. Vesjsoli in the New York State Division of Human Rights Decision and Order
(Exhibit 1). Nor do I suspect were these serious allegations of misconduct and fraud ever
referred to the Discip inary Committee, the New York City Police Pension Fund or the Social
Security Administrati n for investigation. These allegations if sustained, not only go to the
veracity of Mrs. Rocc 's alleged claims of pregnancy discrimination, they also impact the
taxpayers as pension ixid social security fraud are crimes against the public trust. Based upon
public reports, there re currently as many as 1000 cases of social security fraud being evaluated.
The accused defendar ts' include lawyers, consultants, NYPD personnel and other civil servants.
While I do note think that it is appropriate to completely re-litigate this Rocco Matter, it is
interesting to note, I had very little if any contact with Mrs. Rocco. Quite frankly, even Mrs.
Rocco ADMITS in her own testimony most of her interactions were with Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
Esq. I only carried out my duties and responsibilities as determined by Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C.
and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq. I have a few more things to say about certain facts that were not
fleshed out during the investigation and litigation due to an inherent legal conflict between me as
an individual corporate "employee" and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.,
as "employers." My individual Constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were
never protected by prior legal counsel Susan Penny Bernstein, former Associate of Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C., and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., or Administrative Law Judge Robert M. Vespoli.
It is quite clear but, completely disregarded, that I was an individual corporate "employee" not
an "employer" within the meaning of the New York State Human Rights law without any
ownership interest as defined by the New York State Court of Appeals or the threshold of the
"Economic Reality Test" as interpreted by the Appellate Division Second Department following
Patrowich v. Chemical]. Bank (Exhibit 2), therefore, not subject to any individual liability. If my
individual Constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were protected, the Rocco
Matter should have been dismissed against me in my individual capacity and I would not been
intertwined with this legal mess.
At the time of the Rocco filing, I just became a member of the New York State Bar as
well as the Eastern and Southern District Bars and had not known her but only a few short
months and I had very little if any contact with her at all. Nor did I ever have any ownership
interest in Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., was the sole owner and holder of
all corporate stock issued by Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. Nor did I have any partnership agreement
with Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. or Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.
Goldberg, Esq., I had very difficult time with the other employees' who were Caucasian. I was
the only person of col r that worked at the firm which never diversified until sometime later after
I was promoted to M aging Attorney. In the Rocco Matter, Mrs. Rocco, with the assistance of
former Associate Che ter P. Lukaszewski, Esq., and former Paralegal Jennifer Riehl was quite
successful in "gaming ' the Court into believing she was discriminated against due to her
4
pregnancy. Nothing S. n be further from the truth. If anything, Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and
Jeffrey L. Goldberg, sq., treated Mrs. Rocco much more favorably than any other employee
including paying her ell in excess of standard timeframe normally granted for maternity leave,
paying her a full time alary although she worked far less than a full work week only about 12 or
so hours in the office d paying the medical expenses of her family members who were not
"employees." Mrs. R cco, Mr. Lukaszewski and Ms. Riehl engaged in a concerted very
disingenuous form of ayback. These "employees" were very upset with Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
P.C. and Jeffrey L. G ldberg, Esq., because he let I the quote "Black Militant" have too much
power and convince J ffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., to drastically cut
back on their complet waste of firm resources. Quite frankly, as told to me by Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, Esq., Mrs. occo only brought the New York State Division of Human Rights
complaint against me ecause "She did not like you because you are Black." Mrs. Rocco did not
make any "good faith' allegations against me. According to Mrs. Rocco, Jeffrey L. Goldberg,
Esq., called me a "Bl k Militant." There is so much more. That is a mere snapshot of the
outright disrespect to ards me as an African-American legal professional that began on July 17,
2004, with my emplo ent as an Associate, then as the Managing Attorney of Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C. Until ow, I have kept quiet since July 17, 2004, out of respect for Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, Esq., becau .e he gave me my start in the practice of law. However, being quiet has
done nothing but, get e more intertwined into their legal mess. Now, I am going to stop at
nothing to get the real truth about the Rocco Matter and the fact and circumstances surrounding
my employment with effrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.
Other than the New York State Division of Human Rights proceeding on December 3f1
and 4th, 2008, I did no participate in any subsequent legal proceedings. The only thing I did was
demand based upon the request from Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.,
that Mrs. Rocco actua ly work a full time schedule as the rest of the "employees," upon her
return from Maternity Leave, nothing more, nothing less. This conversation occurred on her last
day at Jeffrey L. Gold erg, P.C. in front of Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., as she never considered or
as her "Boss." Those are Mrs. Rocco's words. She said "Jeff is my
even acknowledged
`Boss.'"
On October 7, 2010, I severed all ties with Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, Esq., and h ve not had any contact with them.
prosecuted cases for ti e Disciplinary Committee and shortly thereafter retained him to assist me
with several issues related to Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C., Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., and Cronin
and Byzcek, LLP regarding the Rocco Matter; unpaid wages; failure to protect my equitable
interest in literally hundreds of pending matters, as well as other allegations of attorney
misconduct related to he New York State Division of Human Rights proceeding. Unfortunately,
after very little negoti tions, I was told that the Disciplinary Committee probably would not
entertain a "pissing m tch" between attorneys. I thought with time that these matters would
resolve themselves on e everyone cooled down. I was so wrong.
Sometime in ecember 2011, Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.,
filed for Bankruptcy p otection. Shortly, thereafter, Mr. Bernstein filed an Order to Show Cause
5
in Supreme Court of e State of New York, County of Nassau to have me "arrested." Up to that
point, I had no idea th Rocco Matter was still unresolved.
New York, County of assau seeking an Order pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a)(4) and (a)(5) and/or
5015 and other groun in the "Interests of Justice" vacating the Notice and Final Order of the
New York State Divis on of Human Rights in the Rocco Matter. My legal arguments centered
on the Judgment bein legally VOID against me because the New York State Division of Human
Rights only has perso al and subject matter jurisdiction over "employers" and not individual
corporate "employees consistent with Patrowich v. v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 542, 483
N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N. .2d 11 (1984) and individual corporate "employees" cannot be held liable
for "aiding and abetti g" Trovato v. Air Express Intl., 238 AD2d 333 (Exhibit 3). I also raised
the conflict of interest issue with Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., during
the New York State D vision of Human Rights hearing and the fact there was an "alleged"
appeal filed on my be alf that I did not authorize or even have a discussion with any attorney
hired by Jeffrey L. Go dberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq.
On July 17, 20 2, the Honorable Thomas A. Adams of the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, County of assau denied my motion ruling that I "affirmatively waived the defense
of Lack of Personal J isdiction by not interposing it in the Answer or during the New York
State Division of H
Rights as well under CPLR 3211(e) and also "limited by [my] brief on
appeal limited to dam ges." The Court completely sidestepped the Constitutional fact that I
could never "appear" ithin the meaning of the New York State Human Rights law or be held
personally liable because I was an individual corporate "employee" without any ownership
interest or power to do more than carry out the responsibilities as determined by Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey 1. Goldberg, Esq., consistent with Patrowich; Trovato; Monsanto v.
Electronic Data Systems Corporation, 141 A.D.2d 514, 529 N.Y.S.2d 512 (conspiracy claim
cannot be permitted to stand on the theory that it links the individual defendant to the
employment discrimi lion claims asserted against the corporate defendant under the Human
Rights Law, Executiv Law 297)(Exhibit 4); see also Foley v. Mobil Chemical Company, 170
Misc.2d1, 647 N.Y.S. d 374 (excellent statutory analysis discussing "no individual liability"
under Human Rights aw absent "ownership interest")(Exhibit 5). The Court also never even
addressed the fact Mr. Bernstein consistently and disingenuously argued that I "aided and
abetted" Jeffrey L. Go dberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L. Goldberg, Esq., violating Mrs. Rocco's rights.
Not only is the argum nt legally inconsistent with Patrowich; Trovato; Monsanto and Foley it
makes no legal sense s nce not only are the aforementioned cases against such an argument but, I
was never charged witti "aiding and abetting." The Court also never addressed the conflict of
interest issue.
On July 26, 20 t 2, I filed a Notice of Appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of the State of w York, Second Judicial Department.
Sometime in N vember 2012, I filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection for the
indicated reasons abo
On January 28,1 2013, after filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection, I filed an appeal to
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Judicial
Department. I also se ed Mr. Bernstein on behalf of Mrs. Rocco.
York, Second Judicial II epartment notified me that my appeal is stayed.
dismissed in a similar ashion as Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for Failure to
Prosecute. That was a legal mistake.
On October 15 2013, I was picked up by the United States Marshal Service and detained
at the Metropolitan D ention Center based upon the Order of Bankruptcy Judge Dorothy
Eisenberg under the staken belief that I was being disruptive to the judicial process. That is
simply inaccurate.
On October 21 2013, I appeared before Bankruptcy Judge Dorothy Eisenberg and
released subject to the conditions of a subsequently filed order. Throughout the short hearing, I
kept listening to refer nces by the Trustee's attorney how I am a "High-Profile" attorney and
handling the DC Sho ing case. Meanwhile, I was treated as nothing other than a common
"deadbeat" and a "cri final." Meanwhile, a review of the Bankruptcy petition clearly indicates I
owe no consumer or siness debt the only other things listed is the Rocco judgment and other
pending legal matters. The Rocco Matter is the only judgment, the other legal actions: Jouan
Olivares and Roy V. Allen (presumably resolved by Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C.'S malpractice
carrier, the actions ar the result of me leaving Jeffrey L. Goldberg, P.C. and the clients' not
being informed there disadvantaging their legal claims) and Daniel Davin, a defamation case
filed against me whil representing a plaintiff in a race discrimination case against him. I plan
on moving the Court dismiss the Davin Matter for failure to state a claim as defamation is not
legally cognizable ag. inst an attorney representing a client in a legal action under Section 74 of
the New York Civil ' i'ghts Law.
While standin there in the Bankruptcy Court shaking my head in prison clothing, I still
informed the Court I annot understand how I am being held individually liable, when I was only
an "employee." I wa then released. I retained counsel. The Court's actions against me
completely de-stabili ed The Sanders Firm, P.C.'S momentum in the marketplace. Essentially,
all business operatio were totally disrupted including mail service etc. It is only through
perseverance and res ect for my reputation as being a law abiding, hard-working legal
professional, most cli nts' remained with the firm. The clients' are astute; they understand what
is going on with this gal mess. Now, after several months, The Sanders Firm, P.C.'S
operations have been tabilized.
Thus far, ther has been essentially no movement, other than during my next court
appearance sometim in November 2013, the Trustee's attorney and the Court agreed they would
not like to see me los my license to practice but, yet there was no discussion about how these
actions completely vi lated my Fourteenth Amendment Rights.
Around this t e, Mr. Bernstein representing Mrs. Rocco admitted to my attorney
7
Raymond Sussman, sq., that I was not an "employer" only an "employee" but, I am
`misreading' the Cou 's ruling because I was found 'liable' for 'aiding and abetting.' Nothing
can be further from t truth. As indicated above, that means Mr. Bernstein agrees the Court
completely misapplie the law to me as an individual corporate "employee." Please kindly read
the entire New York tate Division of Human Rights Decision and Order, particularly Pages 8
and 10. Please notice the only claims resolved are New York State Executive Law 296.1(a)
and 297.6. There is n claim resolved related to New York State Executive Law 296.6. Mr.
Bernstein is disingen ously trying to exploit this complete misapplication of the New York State
Human Rights Law a it relates to me as an individual with the same Constitutional rights under
the Fourteenth Amen ment as every other United States Citizen. Mr. Bernstein well knows,
New York State Exec tive Law 296.6 was not even claimed by Mrs. Rocco as evidenced by
the New York State p vision of Human Rights Decision and Order. Mr. Bernstein also knows
the Honorable Thom A. Adams of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of
Nassau never even m ntioned "aiding and abetting" in his decision, he only discussed "Lack of
Jurisdiction" as a def se. Mr. Bernstein also knows the New York State Court of Appeals and
the Second Departme t have already ruled against such incognizable legal arguments. This
information was not b ought to the Bankruptcy Court's attention. Nor were any motions filed to
vacate all actions agai st me.
About a mont later, on December 23, 2013, Jeffrey 1. Goldberg, P.C. and Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, Esq., while under Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection then intentionally stopped
payment on a corpora check in the amount of $12,755.05, of monies owed to me from the
former Profit Sharing 'rogram and never replaced it.
Now, since 0 ober 21, 2013, I was "forced" to turn over well over $218,000, of my hard
earned monies, my pe sonal and business finances are in a mess. To this day, instead of having
well over $200,000 in reserve funds available in The Sanders Firm, P.C.'s business account, I
have gone down to as ow as $140. In addition, because The Sanders Firm, P.C.'S business
reserve funds are total y depleted, I cannot even pay my income and corporate taxes, support my
family or even suppo myself. I am afraid of being detained again. I am afraid to legally
challenge the order or ake any motion such as a Rule 60 Motion as applied to Bankruptcy Rule
9024 to Vacate the Ju gment or motion the Court to Withdraw the Chapter 7 bankruptcy to
assert claims of Malpr ctice etc., against the appropriate parties, although I know my
Constitutional rights ve been totally violated. This entire legal nightmare has left me totally
apprehensive about d I ng anything to assert my Constitutional rights. I am even apprehensive
whenever I see law en orcement around believing they have a warrant for my arrest. Nor do I
even feel at ease in m own apartment. Now, I rarely stay there choosing to stay elsewhere.
And to make matters en worse, I now have to explain myself to various Disciplinary
Committees in order t keep my license to practice law. Thank goodness I have very supportive
colleagues in the legal profession, family, friends and clients who totally understand the scope of
in otherwise I would probably quit.
the legal nightmare I
In closing, I h
the legal nightmare I
York State Bar and I
nightmare. I have alr
e given the Departmental Disciplinary Committee a mere snapshot into

nd myself in. I have always served honorably as a member of the New
pe to continue to do so. But, what I need now is support to end this legal
dy suffered enough.
8
Thank you for reading my response.

Sincerely,
Eric Sanders
ES/es
Exhibit 1
DAVID A. PATERSON
GOVERNOR
NEW YORK STATE

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
on the Complaint of
MARY ROCCO,
Complainant,
v.
NOTICE AND
FINAL ORDER
Case No. 10112394
JEFFREY L. GOLDBERG, ERIC SANDERS,

JEFFREY L. GOLDBERG, P.C.,
Respondents.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the attached is a true copy of the Recommended
Findings of Fact, Opinion and Decision, and Order ("Recommended Order"), issued on March
18, 2009, by Robert M. Vespoli, an Administrative Law Judge of the New York State Division
of Human Rights ("Division"). An opportunity was given to all parties to object to the
Recommended Order, and all Objections received have been reviewed.
PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT, UPON REVIEW, THE RECOMMENDED
ORDER IS HEREBY ADOPTED AND ISSUED BY THE HONORABLE GALEN D.
ICIRKLAND, COMMISSIONER, AS THE FINAL ORDER OF THE NEW YORK STATE
DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ("ORDER"), WITH THE FOLLOWING
AMENDMENT:
A complaina t's decision to start her own business "from which [s]he might reasonably
expect to de ye some financial benefit [is] consonant with [her] obligation to mitigate
damages." aornell v. T. V. Dev. Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 69, 75 (1966). In the instant matter,
the credible vidence demonstrates that in January 2006, Complainant started her own
law practice. (Tr. 341, 343, 412-13) Respondent has not proven that Complainant failed
to make dili nt efforts to mitigate her damages during this period. See State Div. of
Human Righ s v. North Oueensview Homes, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 819 (2d Dept. 1980) (citing
Cornell v. T . Corp., 17 N.Y.2d at 74 and Walter Motor Truck Co. v. New York State
Div. of Hum n Rights v. Wackenhut Corp., 248 A.D.2d 926 (4th Dept. 1998)).
Accordingly, in addition to the damages directed in the Recommended Order,
Complainant is entitled to compensation for lost wages during the period of January 2006
through the d to of the hearing in this matter. In 2006, Complainant earned $15,189 and
in 2007, Co plainant earned $15,545. (Complainant's Exhibits 23, 24, 25).
Complainant would have earned $150,000. (Tr. 13) It is noted that Complainant filed
Objections t the Recommended Order on April 7, 2009, in which she argued for
compensation during this period. However, no evidence was included regarding any
2008 income Thus, an award for that period would be speculative. Accordingly,
Complainant is entitled to $119,266, plus nine percent interest to accrue from January 1,
2007, a reaso able inteunediate date, until the date payment is made.
In accordance with the Division's Rules of Practice, a copy of this Order has been filed in
the offices maintain =d by the Division at One Fordham Plaza, 4th Floor, Bronx, New York
10458. The Order i ay be inspected by any member of the public during the regular office hours
of the Division.
-2-
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that any party to this proceeding may appeal this
Order to the Supreme Court in the County wherein the unlawful discriminatory practice that is
the subject of the Order occurred, or wherein any person required in the Order to cease and desist
from an unlawful discriminatory practice, or to take other affirmative action, resides or transacts
business, by filing with such Supreme Court of the State a Petition and Notice of Petition, within
sixty (60) days after service of this Order. A copy of the Petition and Notice of Petition must
also be served on all parties, including the General Counsel, New York State Division of Human
Rights, One Fordham Plaza, 4th Floor, Bronx, New York 10458. Please do not file the original
Notice or Petition with the Division.
ADOPTED, ISSUED, AND ORDERED.
DATED: iJAN 2 5 2010
Bronx, New York
COMMISSIONER
-3-
NEW YORK STATE

NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS
on the Complaint of
MARY ROCCO,
Complainant,
RECOMMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT, OPINION AND DECISION,
AND ORDER
v.
Case No. 10112394
JEFFREY L. GOLDBERG; ERIC SANDERS;
JEFFREY L. GOLDBERG, P.C.
Respondents.
SUMMARY
Complains t alleged that Respondents terminated her employment on June 6, 2005,
because of her pre ancy and in retaliation for complaining about unlawful discriminatory
practices. Althoug Respondents denied these allegations, the instant complaint must be
sustained. Accordi gly, Complainant is entitled to relief in the form of lost wages in the amount
of $35,624.00 and ompensatory damages for mental anguish in the amount of $20,000.00.
ct
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE
On June 1, 006, Complainant filed a verified complaint with the New York State
Division of Hum
Rights ("Division"), charging Respondents with unlawful discriminatory
practices relating t employment in violation of N.Y. Exec. Law, art. 15 ("Human Rights Law").
After inves igation, the Division found that it had jurisdiction over the complaint and that
probable cause exi ted to believe that Respondents had engaged in unlawful discriminatory
practices. The Div sion thereupon referred the case to public hearing.
After due n tice, the case came on for hearing before Robert M. Vespoli, an
Administrative La Judge ("ALJ") of the Division. Public hearing sessions were held on
December 3 and 4, 008.
Complaina and Respondents appeared at the hearing. Complainant was represented by
Tracey S. Bemstei Esq. Respondents were represented by Susan P. Bernstein, Esq.
At the publi hearing, the presiding ALJ amended the caption to add Jeffery L. Goldberg,
P.C. as a Responde i t. (Tr. 4-5)
Respondent.' verified answer and verified amended answer were received into evidence
nunc pro tunc as A J's Exhibit 8. (Tr. 7-8, 766-67; ALJ's Exh. 8) Complainant submitted an
affidavit from Fra Pullano dated December 9, 2008, that was received into evidence as
Complainant's Exh bit 30. (Tr. 759-60; Complainant's Exh. 30) Respondents submitted an
affidavit from Con
ce Cannone dated December 8, 2008, that was received into evidence as
Respondents' Exhi it 4. (Tr. 759-60; Respondents' Exh. 4)
FINDINGS OF FACT
I.
Complain t alleged that Respondents terminated her employment on June 6, 2005,
because of her pre ancy and in retaliation for complaining about unlawful discriminatory
practices. (ALJ's Exh. 1)
2. Responde is denied these allegations. Respondents also asserted counterclaims
alleging that Comp ainant was liable for conduct involving assault, harassment, blackmail,
extortion, fraud, I eny, violation of attorney-client privilege and violation of the privacy rights
of Respondents' cl ents. (ALJ's Exh. 8)
-2-
3.
Complain t is a thirty-three year old female and the mother of three young children
who were born duf g the term of her employment with Respondent law firm Jeffrey L.
Goldberg, P.C. ("Fi
"). (ALJ's Exh. 1) At the time of her separation from employment,
Complainant held t e position of associate attorney at the Firm, a position for which she was
qualified. (Tr. 11) Complainant had worked for the Firm since 1997. (Tr. 10) As a law student,
Complainant work d part-time as a legal intern. (Tr. 10) On March 31, 2000, Complainant
began working full time and received a starting salary of $865.38 per week. (Tr. 11)
4.
The Firm' practice areas are pension law, disability law, and employment
discrimination law. (Tr. 552)

5. Goldberg as supportive when Complainant's first child was born on August 29, 2002.
(Tr. 12, 31-33) He 'd not complain about Complainant's flexible work schedule when she
returned from mate nity leave in November 2002. Complainant continued to receive her full
salary and there wa no change in her assignments or responsibilities. (Tr. 12, 33-34)
6.
On Saturd y, February 14, 2004, during Complainant's second pregnancy, Complainant
was hospitalized fo two days due to pregnancy-related complications. (Tr. 36) Complainant
called Goldberg fro n the hospital to inform him. (Tr. 36) The next day, Goldberg called
Complainant at the hospital and told her that he had hired Chester Lukaszewski because "he
couldn't have babie s." (Tr. 36-37)
7.
Around th s time, Goldberg made Complainant feel uncomfortable about her second
pregnancy and her mpending maternity leave. (Tr. 35-36; ALJ's Exh. 1)
8.
Complain t returned to work on February 16, 2004, and worked until April 15, 2004,
when she went out n her second maternity leave. (Tr. 41-42, 421; Complainant's Exh. 5)
Complainant's sec nd child was born on April 29, 2004. (Tr. 12)
-3-
9.
During th spring of 2004, while Complainant was out on her second maternity leave,
Goldberg began di cussions with Eric Sanders regarding his prospective employment with the
Firm. (Tr. 658, 71 ) At that time, Goldberg and Sanders discussed Complainant, her maternity
leave, and the diffi ulty Goldberg was having with her absence. (Tr. 658) Sanders began
working for the Fi on July 19, 2004. (Tr. 13-14, 713) On or about December 18, 2004,
Goldberg promote. Sanders to the position of managing attorney. (Tr. 559-61, 677-78)
10. On July 1 , 2004, when Complainant returned to the office from her second maternity
leave, Complainan noticed a distinct change in the way Goldberg treated her. (Tr. 12, 42-43,
45-47, 49, 70-75; Somplainant's Exh. 4; ALJ's Exh. 1) Between July 19, 2004 and March 9,
2005, Complainan was routinely given undesirable assignments and clerical tasks, and her direct
contacts with clien s and Goldberg were reduced. (Tr. 49-51, 56-59, 76, 224, 231-33;
Complainant's Ex 4; ALJ's Exh. 1)
11. In Novem r 2004, Goldberg, Sanders and Lukaszewski noticed that Complainant was
pregnant for a thir time and thought she was "hiding it with big clothing." (Tr. 440, 466-67) In
conversations with Lukaszewski, Goldberg and Sanders commented about the timing of
Complainant's pre nancies and stated that Complainant was having "Irish twins." (Tr. 440-41,
443, 450)
12. Goldberg end Sanders felt that Complainant was taking advantage of the Firm by
getting pregnant. (Tr. 440-41, 443, 449, 482-83, 488-90, 644)
13. On Dece ber 27, 2004, Complainant announced to Goldberg that she was pregnant.
Goldberg replied, ' [n]ot again. I need to speak to Mr. Sanders." (Tr. 105)
14. On Febru ry 17, 2005, Goldberg and Sanders met with Complainant, and they revoked
her company car,
11 phone and credit card. (Tr. 112-15, 127-29, 651-52, 684; Complainant's
-4
Exh. 6) Other em oyees at the Firm kept these benefits until August 5, 2005. (Tr. 130-31, 43244, 511-12, 651-52 687; Complainant's Exh. 27)
15. At the Fe' ruary 17 meeting, Complainant pointed out that she had been working fulltime hours. Neith
Goldberg nor Sanders refuted this assertion. (Tr. 112-15, 127-29, 754;
Complainant's E
6)
16. Goldberg
d Sanders provided conflicting, implausible testimony about when they
became aware of mplainant's third pregnancy. Sanders testified that he was completely
unaware of this pr ;. nancy until February 17, 2005, less than one month before Complainant
gave birth to her t rd child on March 15. (Tr. 14, 721-24) However, Sanders discussed with
Lukaszewski and
oldberg his suspicion that Complainant was pregnant in November 2004.
(Tr. 440, 443, 450, 466-67)

15. Goldberg nitially contended that he was unaware of Complainant's third pregnancy
until February 200 , two weeks prior to her maternity leave. (Complainant's Exh. 16) However,
Goldberg admitted during cross-examination that he knew about Complainant's pregnancy in
late December 200 . (Tr. 611-12, 640-41)
16. On Marc 2, 2005, Complainant met with Goldberg and complained to him that she was
being penalized an 1 retaliated against for getting pregnant again. Notably, Goldberg did not
deny Complainant s allegation. He apologized for revoking Complainant's car, cell phone and
credit card, he ass red her that there was no problem with her work and he said he would have to
discuss her situati with Sanders. (Tr. 135-36; Complainant's Exh. 6)
17. On Marc 9, 2005, the day before Complainant's third maternity leave began,
Complainant met
ith Goldberg. Goldberg did not address Complainant's complaints and told
her that she shoul "go have babies." (Tr. 139; Complainant's Exh. 4; ALJ's Exh. 1)
-5-
20. On May 5 2005, when Complainant called Goldberg and asked him what he intended
to do about her co plaints of discrimination, Goldberg was evasive and refused to address her
concerns. (Compl inant's Exh. 6)
21. Responde ts terminated Complainant's employment when she returned from maternity
leave on June 6, 2 I 5. (Tr. 162-67)
22. Goldberg verred that he did not have prior knowledge of Complainant's intention to
return to work on J
e 6, 2005. (Tr. 571-72, 619) However, this claim is not credible.
23. On June 1 2005, Complainant left a telephone message for Goldberg with Jennifer
Riehl, a paralegal
ith the Firm, stating, "I've tried numerous times to contact you. Dr. says OK
for Monday [June
2005]." (Complainant's Exh. 29) After taking this message, Riehl put it in
Goldberg's messa
box, which is standard procedure for conveying telephone messages at the
Firm. (Tr. 509) A er his initial denial, Goldberg admitted during cross-examination that he
probably received
is message. (Tr. 571-72, 618-19, 697-98)
24. On May 1 , 2005, Goldberg signed a disability form related to Complainant's maternity
leave which stated hat Complainant was a full-time employee and that Complainant's physician
authorized her to rE turn to work on June 6, 2005. (Tr. 704; Complainant's Exh. 15)
25. Goldberg old Lukaszewski and Sanders that Complainant would be returning to work
on June 6, 2005. ( r. 452)
26. Responde ts asserted that Complainant's employment was not terminated on June 6,
2005. (Tr. 572, 61 , 632, 712) However, this assertion is contradicted in the record.
27. On June
2005, Complainant returned to work from her maternity leave and found that
a new attorney wa occupying her office, that all of her personal belongings had been packed
-6-
into shopping bags and boxes, and that she could no longer log into her computer. (Tr. 163-65,
453, 511-13)
28. That day, omplainant met with Goldberg and Sanders, and Sanders informed
Complainant that h r employment was terminated. (Tr. 166)
29. Lukaszewski corroborated Complainant's testimony that Respondents terminated her
employment at the une 6 meeting. Goldberg discussed the termination of Complainant's
employment with ukaszewski shortly after the meeting. (Tr. 455-56) Goldberg told
Lukaszewski that lomplainant was "let go" and that Complainant asked a lot of questions and
took a lot of notes t the meeting. (Tr. 455)
30. At the tim- of her discharge, Complainant's weekly salary was $1,442.31. (Tr. 13)
31. Complain nt collected unemployment benefits in 2005 and 2006 totaling $10,530.00.
(Complainant's Ex ibits 22-23)32. Complain nt made efforts to find employment by attending unemployment seminars,
posting her resume on a career website, and checking job listings in the New York Times and the
New York Law Journal. (Tr. 337-41, 375-76)
31 In Janua 2006, Complainant started her own law practice, which continued through
the date of the he ng. (Tr. 341, 343-44, 412-13)
34. The recor is devoid of evidence showing that Complainant looked for comparable
employment betw n January 2006 and late June 2008. (Tr. 376-77)
35. Complai t felt humiliated, embarrassed and distraught over the loss of her job. (Tr.
216, 326) This ex erience adversely affected her marriage and interfered with her relationship
with her newborn Child. (Tr. 215-17)
OPINION AND DECISION

The record establishes that Respondents unlawfully discriminated against Complainant
because of her pregnancy by terminating her employment on June 6, 2005.
It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of sex.
N.Y. Exec. Law, art. 15 ("Human Rights Law") 296.1(a). Complainant has the burden of
establishing a prima facie case by showing that she is a member of a protected group, that she
was qualified for the position she held, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that
Respondents' actions occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to Respondents to rebut
the presumption of unlawful discrimination by clearly articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for their employment decision. The ultimate burden rests with Complainant to show that
Respondents' proffered explanations are a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See Ferrante v.
American Lung Ass 'n, 90 N.Y.2d 623, 629-30, 665 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29 (1997).
In the instar t case, Complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination. As
a pregnant female, omplainant is a member of a protected class. See Mittl v. New York State
Div. of Human Rig i ts, 100 N.Y.2d 326, 330, 763 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (2003). Complainant
informed Respond nts about her pregnancy on December 27, 2004, and Complainant was
qualified for the po ition she held when Respondents terminated her employment on June 6,
2005.
The circum stances surrounding the termination of Complainant's employment give rise
to an inference of iscrimination. The record establishes that Goldberg and Sanders harbored
discriminatory anir us toward Complainant because of her pregnancy. They felt that
Complainant was t king advantage of the Firm by getting pregnant and commented that
-8-
Complainant was having "Irish twins." When Complainant formally announced her pregnancy
to Goldberg, he w. disappointed that Complainant was pregnant again and told her he would
have to discuss thi issue with Sanders. Less than two months later, Goldberg and Sanders
rescinded Complai ant's company car, cell phone and credit card while other employees at the
Firm kept these be efits until August 5, 2005. Finally, just before Complainant went out on
maternity leave, sh complained to Goldberg that she was being penalized and retaliated against
because of her pre ancy. Goldberg, an experienced attorney practicing in the area of
employment discri nation law, did not deny these pointed allegations and did nothing to
address them. Rat er, he told Complainant to "go have babies."
The burden of production then shifts to Respondents to show that Complainant's
discharge was moti ated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Respondents have failed to
meet this burden.
Although spondents averred that they did not terminate Complainant's employment,
the record supports a contrary conclusion. Goldberg and Sanders rescinded Complainant's
company car, cell hone and credit card roughly three weeks before she went out on maternity
leave. Upon Corn lainant's return from maternity leave on June 6, 2005, a new attorney was
occupying Compl nant's office, Complainant's personal effects had been packed and she was
no longer able to I g into her computer. Furthermore, Lukaszewski corroborated Complainant's
allegation that Respondents terminated her employment at the June 6 meeting.
Respondents initially took the incredulous position that they did not know Complainant
was pregnant until ebruary 2005, less than one month before Complainant gave birth.
However, the reco d firmly establishes that Complainant formally announced her pregnancy to
Goldberg in Dece ber 2004. Moreover, Goldberg, Sanders and Lukaszewski noticed that
-9-
Complainant was p egnant in November 2004.

Respondent also contended that they did not know when Complainant was returning
from her maternity eave. However, Complainant maintained telephone contact with Goldberg
during her leave.
that she would retu
n June 1, 2005, Complainant left a telephone message for Goldberg stating

to work on June 6, 2005. Although Goldberg initially denied this, he later
admitted that he pri bably received this message. Furthermore, on May 19, 2005, Goldberg
signed a disability
is rm
authorizing Complainant to return to work on June 6, 2005. Finally,
Goldberg told Luk. szewski and Sanders that Complainant would be returning to work on June 6,
2005.
Responden
proffered explanations for Complainant's discharge are not credible. It is
well settled that "a complainant's] prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find
that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the
employer unlawful] discriminated." Id. at 331, 763 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (citations and internal
quotation marks o itted). In the case at bar, the Division finds that Respondents unlawfully
discriminated agai st Complainant because of her pregnancy by terminating her employment on
June 6, 2005.
The record so establishes that Respondents retaliated against Complainant because she
complained about regnancy discrimination. The Human Rights Law prohibits an employer
from retaliating ag "nst an employee for having filed a complaint or opposed discriminatory
practices. Human
Complain
that she engaged
'ghts Law 296.7.

bears the burden of establishing a prima facie retaliation claim by showing
protected activity, Respondents were aware that she participated in this
activity, she suffer d an adverse employment action, and there is a causal relationship between
-10-
the protected activi and the adverse action. Once Complainant has met this burden,
Respondents have t e burden of coming forward with legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons in
support of their act ons. Complainant then must show that the reasons presented are a pretext for
unlawful retaliatio . See Pace v. Ogden Servs. Corp., 257 A.D.2d 101, 104, 692 N.Y.S.2d 220,
223-24 (3d Dept. 1 99).
Complaina t has established a prima facie case of retaliation. The record shows that in
March 2005, just b fore she went out on maternity leave, Complainant complained to Goldberg
about pregnancy discrimination in the workplace. Goldberg did not deny Complainant's
allegations, and he ook no remedial action. On May 5, 2005, Complainant called Goldberg and
asked him what he ntended to do about her complaints of discrimination. Respondents
terminated Compl nant's employment one month later when she returned to work on June 6,
2005. The tempor proximity between these events gives rise to an inference of causation. See
Gorman-Bakos v. ornell Coop. Extension, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001) (reviewing cases
that found tempor proximity to indicate a causal connection for time periods ranging from
twelve days to ei
months).
The burden of production then shifts to Respondents to show that their actions were
motivated by legiti ate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Respondents have failed to meet their
burden. In light of Complainant's prima facie case and Respondents' inconsistent and
incredulous explan tions for Complainant's discharge, the Division finds that Respondents
unlawfully retaliat against Complainant by terminating her employment. See Mittl at 331, 763
N.Y.S.2d at 521.
Responden s asserted counterclaims alleging that Complainant was liable for conduct
involving assault, arassment, blackmail, extortion, fraud, larceny, violation of attorney-client
-11-
privilege and violat on of the privacy rights of Respondents' clients. Respondents'

counterclaims are
t actionable in these proceedings and are summarily dismissed.
The Divisio is granted broad discretionary powers to redress an injury by way of an

award of reasonabl compensatory damages. Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal
Bd., 52 N.Y.2d 72, 9, 436 N.Y.S.2d 231, 235 (1980). However, the award must bear a
reasonable relation hip to the wrongdoing, be supported by substantial evidence and be
comparable to awa IS s for similar injuries. State of New York v. New York State Div. of Human
Rights, 284 A.D.2d 882, 884, 727 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (3d Dept. 2001).
In the inst t case, Complainant is entitled to compensation for back pay. Respondents
paid Complainant salary of $1,442.31 per week when her employment was terminated on June
6, 2005. Complain nt made reasonable efforts to seek comparable employment after her
discharge. Howev r, Complainant abandoned her job search when she started her own practice
in January 2006. S e Palmisano v. New Venture Gear, Inc., DHR Case No. 5752007 (June 28,
2006). Accordingl , Complainant's back pay award should be calculated from the time she was
wrongfully dischar ed on June 6, 2005, until January 2006, a period of approximately 32 weeks.
Complain. t would have earned approximately $46,154.00 during this 32 week period.
Complainant's unemployment benefits ($10,530.00) are offset against the amount Complainant
would have earned from Respondents during this time period. Therefore, Complainant is
entitled to $35,624.00 in damages for back pay.
Complain. t is also entitled to recover compensatory damages for mental anguish caused
by Respondents'
lawful conduct. In considering an award of compensatory damages for
mental anguish, the Division must be especially careful to ensure that the award is reasonably
related to the wron doing, supported in the record and comparable to awards for similar injuries.
- 12 -
State Div. of Huma Rights v. Muia, 176 A.D.2d 1142, 1144, 575 N.Y.S.2d 957, 960 (3d Dept.
1991). Because of e "strong antidiscrimination policy" of the Human Rights Law, a
complainant seekin an award for pain and suffering "need not produce the quantum and quality
of evidence to prov compensatory damages he would have had to produce under an analogous
provision." Batavi Lodge No. 196 v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143,
147, 359 N.Y.S.2d 5, 28 (1974). Indeed, Indental injury may be proved by the complainant's
own testimony, co oborated by reference to the circumstances of the alleged misconduct." New
York City Transit
th. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 78 N.Y.2d 207, 216, 573 N.Y.S.2d 49, 54
(1991).
In the case t bar, Complainant credibly testified that, as a result of Respondents'
unlawful discrimin tory conduct, she felt humiliated, embarrassed and distraught. At a time
when she should h e been experiencing great joy, Complainant was experiencing emotional
trauma that advers y affected her familial relationships, particularly with her spouse and her
newborn child. Ac ordingly, the Division finds that an award of $20,000.00 for mental anguish
is consistent with s milar cases and will effectuate the remedial purposes of the Human Rights
Law. See State of Jew York v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 284 A.D.2d 882, 727
ept. 2001); Georgeson & Co., Inc. v. Stewart, 267 A.D.2d 126, 700 N.Y.S.2d
N.Y.S.2d 499 (3d
9 (1st Dept. 1999); ew York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. New York State Div. of Human
Rights, 236 A.D.2 310, 654 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1st Dept. 1997); State Div, of Human Rights v. Demi
Lass Ltd., 232 A.D 2d 335, 648 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1st Dept. 1996).
- 13 -
ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Opinion and Decision, and pursuant to the
provisions of the H
an Rights Law and the Division's Rules of Practice, it is hereby
ORDERED hat Respondents, and their agents, representatives, employees, successors,

and assigns, shall c ase and desist from discriminatory practices in employment; and it is further
ORDERED
at Respondents shall take the following action to effectuate the purposes of
the Human Rights aw, and the findings and conclusions of this Order:
I. Within si ty (60) days of the date of the Commissioner's Order, Respondents shall
pay to Complainant the sum of $35,624.00 as damages for back pay. Interest shall accrue on the
award at the rate of me percent per annum from September 26, 2005, a reasonable intermediate
date, until the date ayment is actually made by Respondents.
2. Within si ty (60) days of the date of the Commissioner's Order, Respondents shall
pay to Complainant the sum of $20,000.00 without any withholdings or deductions, as
compensatory dams ges for the mental anguish and humiliation suffered by Complainant as a
result of Responder ts' unlawful discrimination against her. Interest shall accrue on the award at
the rate of nine perc ent per annum from the date of the Commissioner's Order until payment is
actually made by R spondents.
3. The aforesaid payments shall be made by Respondents in the form of two certified
checks made payable to the order of Complainant, Mary Rocco, and delivered by certified mail,
return receipt reque ted, to her attorney, Tracey S. Bernstein, Esq., 928 Broadway, Suite 1000,
New York, New Y rk 10010. Respondents shall furnish written proof to the New York State
Division of Human Rights, Office of General Counsel, One Fordham Plaza, 4th Floor, Bronx,
New York 10458, f their compliance with the directives contained within this Order.
-14-
4. Within s xty (60) days of the date of the Commissioner's Order, Respondents shall
promulgate policie and procedures for the prevention of unlawful discrimination in accordance
with the Human Ri hts Law. These policies and procedures shall include the establishment and
formalization of a r porting mechanism for employees in the event of discriminatory behavior or
treatment, and shat contain the development and implementation of a training program in the
prevention of unla
1 discrimination in accordance with the Human Rights Law. Training shall
be provided to all e ployees. A copy of these policies and procedures shall be provided,
simultaneously, to le New York State Division of Human Rights, Office of General Counsel,
One Fordham Plaz 4th Floor, Bronx, New York 10458.
5. Respond nts shall cooperate with the representatives of the Division during any
investigation into c mpliance with the directives contained within this Order.
DA thD: March 18 2009

Hempstea , New York
Robert M. Vespoli
Administrative Law Judge
-15-
Exhibit 2
rk QV()
ILO (DO-P&
Vi6Ni
Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 63 (.2c1 541 (1984)

473 NIE.2C111,483 N.Y.S.2d
9, 59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1801
tt-S -E*
WO
184 Cases that cite this headnote

63 N.Y. d 541
Court of Appe s of New York.
II]
Civil Rights
Margaret H. PATR WICH, Appellant,

CHEMICAL B
Vicarious Liability; Respondeat Superior

Civil Rights
Particular Cases
K, Defendant,
Civil Rights
T.-- Employment Practices
Harold D. Corn y, Respondent.

Nov.
, 1984.
Plaintiff brought age and sex discrimination action against

corporation and corporate
fleet. The Supreme Court,
Special Term, New York ounty, Louis Grossman, J.,
denied defendants' motion fo partial summary judgment.
The Supreme Court, Appell e Division, 98 A.D.2d 318,
470 N.Y.S.2d 599, modified by dismissing complaint as
against corporate officer, and aintiff appealed. The Court of
Appeals held that corporate o icer who had not been shown
to have any ownership intere t or power to do more than
carry out personnel decisions made by others could not be
held liable, under either state r federal law, in age and sex
discrimination action.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes (2)
Corporate officer who was one of approximately

800 vice presidents of corporation and had not
been shown to have any ownership interest or
power to do more than carry out personnel
decisions made by others could not be held
liable, under either state or federal law, in
age and sex discrimination suit brought against
corporation; declining to follow Obradovich
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 569 F.Supp. 785;
Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 554 F.Supp.
285; Barkley v. Carraux, 533 F.Supp. 242;
and Compston v. Borden, 424 F.Supp. 157.
McKinney's Executive Law 290 et seq., 292,
subd.5, 296, subd. 3b; McKinney's Labor Law
190 et seq., 190, subd.3, 194, 198a; Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 3(d), 6(d), as
amended, 29 U.S.C.A. 203(d), 206(d); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 2
et seq., 4, 11(b), 15(c), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A.
621 et seq., 623, 630(b), 633a(c).
Civil Rights
Employment Pr tices
Civil Rights
Employment Pr tices
Corporate employee though he has title as
officer and is manage or supervisor of corporate
division, is not indivi ually subject to age or sex
discrimination suit, if e is not shown to have any
ownership interest or ny power to do more than
carry out personnel ecisions made by others.
McKinney's Executiv Law 290 et seq., 292,
McKinney's Labor Law
subd.5, 296, subd. 3
subd.3,
194, 198a; Fair
190 et seq., 190,
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 3(d), 6(d), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. . 203(d), 206(d); Age
Discrimination in Em loyment Act of 1967, 2
et seq., 4, 11(b), 15(c , as amended, 29 U.S.C.A.
621 et seq., 623, 6 0(b), 633a(c).
Attorneys and Law Firms

*542 ***660 **12 Robin J. Arzt, New York City, for
appellant.
Kenneth J. Ke]ly and John B. Wynne, New York City, for
respondent.
Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.
--
20
On R thitc,?r 2. No oYairl
uric' ai U.S. `Gc.),,, ,,'i.... nt Works.
541 (1984)
Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 3
473 N.E.2d 11, 483 N.Y.S.2d 6.9, 59 FalrEmpl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1801
(1( A corporate employee, t ough he has a title as an officer
and is the manager or supervi or of a corporate division, is
not individually subject to suit *th respect to discrimination
based on age or sex under Ne York's Human Rights Law
(Executive Law, art. 15) or its abor Law ( 194) or under the
Federal Age Discrimination in mployment Act (29 U.S.C.
623) or Equal Pay Act (29 U. .C. 206, subd. [d] ) if he is
not shown to have any owners ip interest or any power to do
more than carry out personnel ecisions made by others. The
order of the Appellate Division 98 A.D.2d 318, 470N.Y.S.2d
599 insofar as it dismisses th complaint against defendant
Convey i should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.
(21 *543 The Human Rig is Law definition of employer
(Executive Law, 292, subd. ) relates only to the number
of persons employed and p ovides no clue to whether
individual employees of a co orate employer may be sued
under its provisions. The co trary is, however, suggested
by subdivision 3-b of sect .n 296, which makes it a
discriminatory practice for ny real estate broker, real
estate salesman or employee or agent thereof " to make
certain representations, for it ndicates that the Legislature
differentiated that provision orn the general definition of
"employer." Plaintiff cites Ha v. Sullivan, 84 A.D.2d 865,
445 N.Y.S.2d 40, affd ** 661 55 N.Y.2d 1011, 449
N.Y.S.2d 481, 434 N.E.2d 717, and McBride v. General
Ry. Signal Co., 96 A.D.2d 145, 467 N.Y.S.2d 457, but
those cases concern only the employer's responsibility for
discriminatory acts of its empl yee **13 and, therefore, are
not authority to the contrary.
Plaintiff fares no better unde article 6 of the Labor Law.
Although the definition in su division 3 of section 190 of
"employer" provides no clu we have recently held that
the provisions of section 198 subjecting corporate officers
to criminal sanctions for viol tion of the article indicates a
legislative intent that they n t be subject to civil liability
(Stoganovic v. Dinolfo, 61 N .2d 812, 473 N.Y.S.2d 972,
462 N.E.2d 149, affg 92 A.D. d 729, 461 N.Y.S.2d 121).
The question is a closer one der the Federal statutes. The
Equal Pay Act defines "emp yer" to include "any person
acting directly or indirectly the interest of an employer
in relation to an employee" IF 9 U.S.C. 203, subd. [d] ),
and the Age Discrimination ct defines the word to mean
"a person engaged in an ind try affecting commerce who
has twenty or more employe [during a specified period] *
* * The term also means (1) ny agent of such person." (29
U.S.C. 630, subd. [b].) We assume without deciding that
an Age Discrimination action can be maintained in a State

court (see 29 U.S.C. 633a, subd. [c] ["Any person aggrieved
may bring a civil action in any Federal district court"]; cf.
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 479, 101
S.Ct. 2870, 2875, 69 L.Ed.2d 784). We conclude, however,
that the weight of Federal authority is that "economic reality"
governs who may be sued under both statutes and that a
com
h as defendant Conley, who, plaintiff
p lages,mplogee
concedes, is one of approximately 800 vice-presidents of
Chemical Bank and has not been shown to have any
ownership *544 interest or power to do more than carry
out personnel decisions made- by others is not individually
subject to suit under either statute. Cases supporting that
conclusion are Carter v. Thitchess Community Coll., 735
F.2d 8, 14 ["whether the alleged employer could hire and
fire the worker, control work schedules and conditions of
employment, determine the rate and method of payment,
and maintain employment records"]; Donovan v. Agnew,
712 F.2d 1509, 1514 ["corporate officers with a significant
ownership interest who had operational control of significant
aspects of the corporation's day to day functions, including
compensation of employees"]; Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation
Co., 695 F.2d 190, 195, cert. den. sub. nom. Alberding
v. Donovan, 463 U.S. 1207, 103 S.Ct. 3537, 77 L.Ed.2d
1387, reh. den. 463 U.S. 1249, 104 S.Ct. 37, 77 L.Ed.2d
1456 ["pervasive control over the business and financial
affairs"]; York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Assn., 684 F.2d
360, 362 ["supervisory or managerial employee to whom
employment decisions have been delegated"]; Marshall v.
Arlene Knitwear, 454 F.Supp. 715, 721, affd in part and
rev'd in part 608 F.2d 1369 ["substantial ownership interest
in and acted as an agent of the employer"]; see Coffin v.
South Carolina Dept. of Social Servs., 562 F.Supp. 579;
Martin v. Easton Pub. Co., 478 F.Supp. 796. 2 Although there
are District Court decisions holding supervisory employees
individually liable (Obradovich v. Federal Reserve Bank,
569 F.Supp. 785, 788-789 ["supervisory employees and
employees who 'participated in the decision making process
that forms the basis of the alleged discrimination' "];
Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 554 F.Supp. 285, 290
["immediate supervisor * * * (who) reviewed her work
and made recommendations concerning such personnel
related decisions as salary and promotion"]; Barkley v.
Carraux, 533 F.Supp. 242, 245 ["department managers of that
corporation"]; Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 157,
158 ["supervisor of the maintenance ***662 department"] ),
we decline to follow them in light of the controlling higher
Federal authority cited above.
,W,z;21taviNext 2013 Ttion son Reuters. No ciaim w orkiinai U.S. G >%
Works.
Patrowich v. Chemical Bank 6 ..Y.2d 541 (1984)

473 N.E.2d 11, 483 N.Y.S.2d 59, 59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1801
*545 COOKE, C.J., and J SEN, JONES, WACHTLER,
MEYER, SIMONS and KA , JJ., concur in Per Curiam
opinion.
Order affirmed, with costs.
Parallel Citations
63 N.Y.2d 541, 473 N.E.2d 11, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 59 Fair
Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1801
Footnotes
Plaintiffs appeal as agai st defendant Chemical Bank was dismissed for nonfinality (62 N.Y.2d 801).
1
Some of the above deci ons were made under the Civil Rights Act definition (42 U.S.C. 2000e, subd. [b] ) but are applicable
2
to the present decision b cause, except as to number of employees, that definition is the same as that of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (29 U. .C. 630, subd. [b] ).
End of Document
q.;') 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
-..--.--_-
-.
re;) 2013 Tho, sciii Reuters. No claim to: original U.S. Government Works.
Exhibit 3
AT - -\nt,t)
Trovato v. Air Express Intern.,
A.D.2d 333 (1997)
655 N.Y.S.2d 656
kt) 4\ tbikr5.-rJ\ncrTNG
.
W3au
to make personnel decisions. McKinney's

Executive Law 296, subd. 6.
238 A.D. d 333

Supreme Court, A ellate Division,
Second Departm nt, New York.
R(f.
William TROVATO et al., Appellants,

v.
AIR EXPRESS I
ERNATIONAL,
et al., Resp ndents.

AP 1 1997.
In action to recover damages f
to New York State Human Ri
order of the Supreme Court,
dismissing complaint insofar
coemployees.Er
ie Supreme C
that: (1) coemployees were
discrimination suit under the
evidence that they had own
defendant or had authority t
and (2) coemployees could no
abettors.
sex discrimination pursuant

hts Law, plaintiffs appealed
assau County, Winick, J.,
s asserted against plaintiffs'
rt, Appellate Division, held
ot subject to employment
Human Rights Law absent
rship interest in corporate
make personnel decisions,
be held liable as aiders and
Affirmed.
West Headnotes (2)
ill
Civil Rights
Individuals as "E ployers"
Corporate employee is ot individually subject to
employment discrimin tion suit under New York
State Human Rights aw unless he or she has
ownership interest in orporate employer or has
authority to do more than carry out personnel
decisions made by oth rs. McKinney's Executive
Law 296.
31 Cases that cite this eadnote
121
Civil Rights
Employment Pra tices
Corporate employees
for employment dis
abettors pursuant to
Rights Law, absent
employee-owners or
could not be held liable

imination as alders and
ew York State Human
vidence that they were
had specified authority

**656 Harry Weinberg, Garden City, (Cary Scott
Goldinger, of counsel), for appellants.
Capriano Lichtman & Flach, LLP, New York City,
(Christopher H. Cloud, of counsel), for respondents.
Before BRACKEN, J.P., and O'BRIEN, KRAUSMAN and
GOLDSTEIN, JJ.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
*333 In an action, inter alia, to recover damages
for discrimination based on sex pursuant to the New York
State Human Rights **657 Law (Executive Law article 15),
the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court,
Nassau County (Winick, J.), entered February 10, 1997,
which granted the defendants' motion for partial summary
judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against
the defendants Loretta Feldman, Betty Barriga, and Denise
Martucciello. The plaintiffs' notice of appeal from a decision
dated April 1, 1996, is deemed a premature notice of appeal
from the order entered February 10, 1997 (see, CPLR 5520[c]
).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' cause of
action alleging sex discrimination in violation of the New
York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law 296)
insofar as asserted *334 against the individual defendants,
the plaintiffs' co-employees. A corporate employee is not
individually subject to an employment discrimination suit
under the Human Rights Law unless he or she has an
ownership interest in the corporate employer or has the
authority "to do more than carry out personnel decisions
made by others" (Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y 2d
541, 542, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11; see also,
Monsanto v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 141 A.D.2d 514,
515, 529 N.Y.S.2d 512). There is no evidence in this case
2013 rho rT
...?.uters. Ni.
Trovato v. Air Express Intern., 2, A1.D.2d 333 (1997)

655 N.Y.S.2d 656
be sued for employment discrimination (see, Tomka v. Seiler
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295; Steadman v. Sinclair. 223 A.D.2d 392,
636 N.Y.S.2d 325; Peck v. Sony Music Corp., 221 A.D.2d
157, 632 N.Y.S.2d 963).
that the individual defendants bad any ownership interest in

the corporate defendant or any authority to make personnel
decisions.
[21 We reject the plaintiffs' contention that the individual
defendants could be held liable 4s aiders andabsts
to
to Executive Law 296(6). Th$ Legislature and the Court of
A eals have determined that only employers and em loyeeowners or those with speci d authority are subjec
t
to
employment discrimination suits under the Human Rights
Law (see, Executive Law 296 l ] [a]; Patrowich v. Chemical
Bank, supra; compare, Executive Law 296[3b] ). To find
co=emplcutee liable as an ai4er and abettor would ignore
the statutory and legal authorit4 limiting the parties who may
End of Document
(F,S)
The court also properly granted summary judgment

dismissing the plaintiffs' cause of action to recover damages
for intentional infliction of emotional distress insofar as
asserted against the individual defendants (see, Chime v.
Sicuranza, 221 A.D.2d 401, 403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 536).
Parallel Citations
238 A.D.2d 333, 655 N.Y.S.2d 656
Cc.: 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
2073 Thorr4on Reuters, No claim to original U.S. Government V,,lo
List of 20 Citing References for Tr
v Air Express Intl
- .--.-
Citing References (20)
Title
Treatment
Examined by
Date
1. Memorand m of Law in Support of

Defendants' M tion for Partial Dismissal of
Type
Depth Headnote(s)
Dec. 07, 1998 Motion
Plaintiffs' Com laints

ot 15la"
Pascale FELIX, Plaintiff, v. Sharon BALKIN, Saks
Fifth Avenue, a d Parfums Givenchy, Defendants;
Iris Nunez, Plai tiff, v. Sharon Balkin, Saks Fifth A...
1998 WL 3514 47, *35142547+ , S.D.N.Y. (Trial
Motion, Memor ndum and Affidavit)
Examined by
2. Plaintiff's
morandum of Law in Opposition Jun. 05, 2012 Motion
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Strike
Pleadings e'ul
Rita HAHN, Pla ntiff, v. CONGREGATION
MECHINA MIK ASH MELECH, INC., Talmud
Torah Mekor C aim and Chaim Buxbaum, in his
individual and
cial capacit...
2012 WL 8666183, *1+ , N.Y.Sup. (Trial Motion,
Memorandum d Affidavit)
Distinguished
by
LNEGATiVE
Jul. 12 2001 Case
3. Garone United Parcel Service, Inc.

2001 WL 98491 , "4+ , E.D.N.Y.
ENE-
:N.Y.S.2d
Plaintiff Linda arone brings this employment

discrimination tion pursuant to those provisions of
Title VII of the ivil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2(a)(1),.
Distinguished
by
NEor wr I
4. Murphy . ERA United Realty

674 N.Y.S.2d 4 5, 417+ , N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.
'Jun. 15, 1998
-rCase
2
'N.Y.S.2d
LABOR AND E PLOYMENT - Discrimination.

Former real est te broker stated cause of action
against former employees for aiding and abetting
owner-employe 's alleged discriminatory...
Discussed by
5. Memorand m Decision 9A.9.!??...

Torres v. Vittori Corp.
2008 WL 2937 80, *2937180+ , N.Y.Sup. (Trial
Order)
[This opinion is
official publicati
1 to_ were rea
NUMBERED N
Discussed by
Discussed by
Jul. 21, 2008 Case
2
N.Y.S.2d
ncorrected and not selected for

n.] The following papers, numbered
on this motion to/for_ C2PAPERS
tice of Motion!...
6. Brief for PI intiffs-Appellants ctd- IP"

Wendy GOLDI and Kenneth Deutsch, PlaintiffsAppellants, v. =NGINEERS COUNTRY CLUB,
Jonathan Gold, Sheldon Ratner, Leslie Giffords,
Milton Grunwal , L...
2007 WL 5613 8, *5613948+ , N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.
(Appellate Brie
Oct. 10, 2007 Brief
7. Brief of De ndants-Respondents University

Physicians of = rooklyn, Inc. and Daniel Zabel
Mar. 10, 2003 Brief
ZEN
N.Y.S.2d
ZEE
Joshua A. BE ER, M.D. Ginette Becker,

University 'ma ing Associates, P.C., Judith Kaley,
Francine Kaley and Rasheeda Pasha, PlaintiffsAppellants, v...
2003 WL 2333 696, *23335696+ , N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.
(Appellate Brie )
-------- ....
....-,........---...................,.y..,...-....-
No claim to original US. Governmeni Irks.
1 2
N.Y.S.2d
Out Of Plan
20-i 3 Thomso,
List of 20 Citing References for Tr yaw v Air Express intl.
Title
Treatment
Date
Type
Depth
Discussed by 8. Defendants Brief In Support of Their Motion May 10, 1999 Motion
Headnote(s)
MErii7 :
(-1" PlAn
for Summary J dgment
Fay BRERETO , Plaintiff, v. ALLEGHENY
AIRLINES, INC d/b/a Usairways Express, Nicole
Miller a/k/a Nic e Sewell, and Michelle Graybill.,
Defendants.
1999 WL 3480 01, *34805801+, E.D.N.Y. (Trial
Discussed by
Discussed by
9. Memorand
of Law in Support of Defendant Dec. 11, 2006 ; Motion
Ronald Tesler' Motion to Dismiss or for a More
Definite State ent
Rosemary RIE
WISE OPTIC
b/a Wise Optic
2006 WL 4047
Motion, Memor
10. Memoran
ECKER, Plaintiff, v. ABB OPTICAL,

, LLC Opticare Acquisition Corp. d/ ,
, and Ronald Tesler, Defendants.
8, *4047978+ , S.D.N.Y. (Trial
ndum and Affidavit)
m of Law in Support of
Dec. 11, 2006 ' Motion
Defendant Ro Id Tesler's Motion to Dismiss or
for a More Defi ite Statement 9u! ?5 .....

Rosemary RIE ECKER, Plaintiff, v. ABB OPTICAL
WISE OPTIC , LLC Opticare Acquisition Corp. d/
b/a Wise Opti I, and Ronald Tesler, Defendants.
2006 WL 4047 9, *4047979+ , S.D.N.Y. (Trial
Discussed by
11. Memorand m of Law in Support of
Feb. 13, 2013 Motion
II
Defendants' M tion to Dismiss

Kristopher KEN INGTON, Liridona Kastrat,
Thomas Ahear , and David Ortiz, Plaintiffs, v. 226
REALTY LLC d b/a HOTEL EDISON, 228 Hotel
Corp. d/b/a Hot
2013 WL 5966 19, *1+ , N.Y.Sup. (Trial Motion,
Memorandum d Affidavit)
Discussed by 12. Defendan ' Memorandum of Law in
Support of Mo ion to Dismiss and Strike
Declined to
Follow by
' May 10, 2012 i Motion
Prejudicial Ple dings ))

Rita HAHN, Pla ntiff, v. CONGREGATION
MECHINA MIK ASH MELECH, INC., Talmud
Torah Mekor C aim and Chaim Buxbaum, in his
individual and icial capacit...
2012 WL 8666167, *1+ , N.Y.Sup. (Trial Motion,
Memorandum .nd Affidavit)
.
13. Stanley v. uardian Sec. Services, Inc. 33

800 F.Supp.2d .50, 556+ , S.D.N.Y.
MEN
1 - 2
N.Y.S.2d
Jul. 14, 2011
Case
'N.Y.S.2d
NIMA.TY,F

District court la ked jurisdiction over pro se litigant's
unexhausted Ti le VII claim of discriminatory
termination.
Declined to
Follow by
I NE.GATiVE 1
. .1 . 1 ,, ......
Dec. 29, 2009 Case
14. Dantuono . Davis Vision, Inc.

2009 WL 5196 51, *12+ , E.D.N.Y.
Employee rebu ed the employer's nondiscriminatory r asoning for terminating her as
intemet-usage eports were impossible to tell for
what...
1 1..
-.... -,.-.
Next (.;:i 201. Thomson Rou -,rs. No clz.lim to original
Govern rnera
11.1
1,1", .
...- 11.,..
..
List of 20 Citing References for Tr v,. _ v Air Express Intl.
Title
Treatment
Declined to
Follow by
15. Doe v. Ci
Date
Type
Depth
Headnote(s)
Feb. 06, 2008 Case
of New York /$
583 F.Supp.2d 44, 450 , S.D.N.Y.
N.Y.S.2d
NEGATIVE I
LABOR AND E PLOYMENT - Discrimination. Law
enforcement o cer stated hostile work environment

claims against rrorism consultant.
Declined to
Follow by
I NEGATIve
Apr. 25, 2007 Case

16. Costab le v. County of Westchester, New ';
York
485 F.Supp.2d 24, 438 , S.D.N.Y.

;
GOVERNMEN - Counties. County employee's
failure to file no ce of claim before suing co-workers
did not require ismissa I.
Declined to
Follow by
I NEGATWE I
GM
N.Y.S.2d
Jun. 21, 2006 Case
" 17. Patane Clark

435 F.Supp.2d 06, 313 , S.D.N.Y.
N.Y.S.2d
EDUCATION - bor and Employment. A university

employee faile to state a sexually hostile work
environment cl im under Title VII.
Declined to
Follow by
INEGATIVE
18. King v. own of Wallkill

302 F.Supp.2d 79, 295+ , S.D.N.Y.
! Feb. 13,2604.aase
N.Y.S.2d

Individuals actu lly participating in discriminatory
conduct were p tentially liable under NYHRL.
Declined to
Follow by
INECiArM2
Sep. 26, 2002 Case
N.Y.S.2d

Individuals coul be liable under NYHRL for aiding
and abetting e ployer's alleged unlawful conduct. z
Declined to
Follow by
NEGArive I
19. Bennett v. Progressive Corp.

225 F.Supp.2d 90, 214 , N.D.N.Y.
20. Duviell v. Counseling Service of Eastern Nov 20, 2001 Case

Dist. of New Y rk
2001 WL 1776 58, *17 , E.D.N.Y.
Plaintiff Carole uviella ("Duviella") is a former

employee of de endant Counseling Service of the
Eastern District f New York ("CSEDNY"). Following
her termination Duviella...
20'l 3 Thomson Reu -;rs. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
N.Y.S.2d
Exhibit 4
LcV\t\NS-U
tU
)1/4)
Monsanto v. Electronic Data ys......ns Corp., 141 A.D.2d 514 (1988)
3 k L -I)
WO C.."(
acic,1
529 N.Y.S.2d 512
141 A.D. d 514

Supreme Court, A pellate Division,
Second Dep
ent, New York.
121
Conspiraey
i Nature and Elements in General
Claim of conspiracy does not constitute
substantive tort, and may be alleged only to
connect defendant to otherwise actionable tort.
Remile MONSANTO, spondentAppellant,

ELECTRONIC) TA SYSTEMS
CORPORATION, et al., A pellantsRespondents.

June , 1988.
Employee brought action aga nst individual and corporate
defendants, alleging breach of provision contained in
manager's guide, breach f contract and wrongful
termination, conspiracy, an defamation. The Supreme
Court, Nassau County, Brucia J., dismissed various causes
of action. On cross appeals, t Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, held that: (I) conspi acy claim was not actionable,
as New York did not recogni e common-law tort theory of
liability based upon wrongful scharge of at-will employee
and discrimination claim and r Human Rights Law could
not give rise to tort liability, and conspiracy claim could
be alleged only to connect def ndant to otherwise actionable
tort; (2) cause of action for br ach of contract and wrongful
termination could not succeed here governing employment
contract contained provision hat employment relationship
and agreement could be termin ted by either party at any time;
and (3) to extent claim for int tional infliction of emotional
distress was alleged, the claim was insufficient, as there was
no allegation of special damag s and prima facie tort cause of
action could not be allowed in ircumvention of unavailability
of tort claim for wrongful dis harge or rule against liability
for discharge of at-will emplo ee.
131
Insofar as conspiracy claim alleged conspiracy

to terminate employment of plaintiff employee,
the conspiracy claim was not actionable, as New
York does not recognize common-law tort theory
of liability based upon wrongful discharge of atwill employee.
[41
West Headnotes (14)
Appeal and Error

4-- Appealability o i original judgment or order
Appeal from order enying motion to dismiss
one cause of action ould be dismissed, where
that order had been superseded by later order
made upon reargu ent that adhered to the
original determinatio
Conspiracy
4,- Conspiracy to injure in property or
business
Conspiracy claim alleging that defendants
conspired to terminate employment of plaintiff
employee could not be permitted to stand
on theory that it linked individual defendant
to employment discrimination claims asserted
against corporate defendant under Human
Rights Law; discrimination claim under Human
Rights Law was action created by statute, which
did not exist at common law, and therefore, could
not give rise to tort liability, so as to support
conspiracy claim. McKinney's Executive Law
297.
Affirmed in part; reversed in art.
III
Conspiracy
Conspiracy to injure in property or
business

( 151
Conspiracy
k-.., Conspiracy to injure in property or
business
Conspiracy claim alleging that individual
defendant and corporate defendant conspired
to terminate employment of plaintiff employee
could not be permitted to stand on theory
that claim linked individual defendant to
SI kVINEd: 2013 Tho, son Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
..ns Corp., 141 A.D.2d 514 (1988)
Monsanto v. Electronic Data
employment discri nation claims asserted

against corporate d fendant under Human
Rights Law, as co orate employee was not
individually subject to discrimination suits under
the Human Rights L w if he were not shown to
have any ownership i terest or any power to do
more than carry out p sonnel decisions made by
others. McKinney's E ecutive Law 297.
allegation that defendants breached provision

contained in manager's guide that provided that
initiator of termination should be convinced
of employee's violation; employment agreement
provided it could not be modified absent
written agreement executed by both employer
and employee, so guide provision constituted
nothing more than general guideline which could
not be imposed upon contract.
16)
Labor and Employ ent

Particular cases
There was no liabili for breach of contract
and wrongful term ina ion of plaintiff employee,
where governing emp oyment contract signed by
employee revealed th t parties did not agree to
fixed term of emplo ent, but rather, agreed that
employment relation ip and agreement could
be terminated by eith r party at any time; where
term of employment as not fixed by contract,
employee was deem to be at-will employee,
and employer could to mate employment of atwill employee at any ime and for any reason or
for no reason.
171
191
Manager's guide provision, that allegedly

provided that initiator of termination should
be convinced of employee's violation, did not
constitute sufficiently express limitation on
employer's right of discharge to give rise to
action for breach of employment contract on part
of employee.
[10] Labor and Employment

Discharge or layoff
Law does not imply covenant of good faith or fair
dealing in every employment contract that limits
right of employer to discharge employee without
good cause.
Contracts
Agreements rela ing to actions and other
proceedings in gener
Express choice of la provision embodied in
employment contrac would not be avoided
on theory Texas de sional law was violative
of undefined public policy of New York, in
employee's action alle ing breach of contract and
wrongful termination rule of contract regarding
at-will employee un er Texas law was in fact
indistinguishable fro New York rule.
Labor and Employment

Particular cases
1111
Pretrial Procedure
C. Libel and slander
Defamation claim that did not comply with
special pleading requirement contained in
statute, that complaint set forth the particular
words complained of, had to be dismissed.
McKinney's CPLR 3016(a).
181
Labor and Employ ent

Modification or escission of contract
Express contractual
relationship could be
at any time would n
for purposes of em
of contract and wro
rovision that employment

terminated by either party
t be considered modified,
loyee's action for breach
ful termination, based on
[12] Libel and Slander

Publication
Defamation claim that failed to state particular
person to whom allegedly defamatory comments
were made was defective.
VV,esttaANext 2013 Tho: son Req.; r6, No claim to original U.S. -Government kNorks.
Monsanto v. Electronic Data ya. arts Corp., 141 A.D.2d 514 (1988)
529 N.Y.S.2d 512
11 Cases that cite this ieadnote
April 8, 1987, as granted that branch of the defendants' motion

which was to dismiss the first, second, and sixth causes of
action asserted in the complaint.
1131 Damages
Mental suffering nd emotional distress
To extent claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress co Id be construed to allege
prima facie tort, the claim was insufficient
to state cause of ac on, where there was no
allegation of special d ages.
1141 Damages
Other particular ases
Prima facie tort caus of action for intentional
infliction of emotio al distress could not be
allowed in circumve tion of unavailability of
tort claim for wron 1 discharge or contract
rule against liability for discharge of at-will
employee.

**513 Breed, Abbott & Mo gan, New York City (Eric M.
Nelson and Jean R. Weinber of counsel), for appellantsrespondents.
**514 Leed & Morelli, Ca le Place (Steven Morelli, of
counsel), for respondent-appe lant.
Before THOMPSON, J.P., a d WEINSTEIN, ETBER and
HARWOOD, JJ.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM BY THE OURT.
In an action to recover dama es for slander, the defendants
order of the Supreme Court,
appeal from (1) so much of
Nassau County (Brucia, J.), ated April 8, 1987, as denied
that branch of their motion hich was to dismiss the fifth
cause of action asserted in t e complaint, and (2) so much
of an order of the same court dated September 25, 1987, as,
upon reargument, adhered to he original determination, and
the plaintiff cross-appeals fr m so much of the order dated
111 ORDERED that the defendants' appeal from so much

of the order dated April 8, 1987, as denied their motion to
dismiss the fifth cause of action is dismissed, as that part of
the order was superseded by the order dated September 25,
1987, made upon reargument; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated April 8, 1987, is affirmed
insofar as cross-appealed from, on the law; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated September 25, 1987 is
reversed insofar as appealed from, the defendants' motion to
dismiss the fifth cause of action is granted and the provision
of the order dated April 8, 1987, denying that branch of the
motion is vacated; and it is further,
*515 ORDERED that the defendants are awarded one bill
of costs.
PI
131 141
15] The court erred in declining to dismiss
the plaintiffs fifth cause of action sounding in conspiracy.
A claim of conspiracy does not constitute a substantive
tort and may be alleged only to connect a defendant to an
otherwise actionable tort (see, Alexander & Alexander v.
Fritzen, 68 N.Y.2d 968, 969, 510 N.Y.S.2d 546, 503 N.E.2d
102; Noble v. Creative Tech. Servs., 126 A.D.2d 611, 613,
51 N.Y.S.2d 51). Insofar as the complaint alleges that the
defendants conspired to terminate the employment of the
plaintiff, the conspiracy claim is not actionable since New
York does not recognize a common-law tort theory of liability
based upon wrongful discharge of an "at will" employee
(see, Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d
293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86; Noble v. Creative
Tech. Servs., supra ). Xor can the conspiracy claim be
permitted to stand on the theory that it links the individual
defendant to the employment discrimination claims asserted
against the corporate defendant under the Human Rights
Law (Executive Law 297). A discrimination claim under
the Human Rights Law is an action created by statute,
which did not exist at common law, and therefore cannot give
rise to tort liability (see, Murphy v. American Home Prods.
Corp., supra, at 297, 307, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86).
The conspiracy claim must be dismissed for the additional
O
- rthat a corporate employee is not individual17701ect
teas
to discrimination suits under the Human Rights Law "if he
is not shown to have any ownership interest or any power
son Reuters, No cfairn to original U.S.
--.-,. ,,,", ,, 1n..

INcirxs.
Monsanto v. Electronic Data Sy:,-ms Corp., 141 A.D.2d 514 (1988)

5299N.Y.S.2d 512
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 457 N.Y.S.2d
193, 443 N.E.2d 441).
to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by

others" (Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 542,
483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11).
16i The second cause of action for breach of contract and
wrongful termination was properly dismissed. Reference to
the governing employment contract signed by the plaintiff
reveals that the parties did not agree to a fixed term of
employment, but rather that "the employment relationship
and this agreement may be terminated by either party at any
time". It is well settled that w here the term of employment
is not fixed by a contract, the employee is deemed to be "at
will" and the employer may terminate the employment of the
"at will" employee "at any time and for any reason or for
no reason" (see, Buffolino v. Ling Is. Say. Bank 126 A.D.2d
508, 509, 510 N.Y.S.2d 628; we also, O'Connor v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 65 N.Y.2d 724, 49g N.Y.S.2d 9, 481 N.E.2d 549;
**515 Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., supra ).
171 We find untenable the plaintiffs contention that the
express choice-of-law provision embodied in the employment
contract should not be given effect since Texas decisional
law is allegedly violative of an undefined public policy of
this State. In fact, the rule of contract regarding an "at-will"
employee *516 under Texas law is indistinguishable from
the New York rule (see, Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644
S.W.2d 536, 538-539 [Tex.] )
[101 The plaintiffs alternative argument that the law implies

a covenant of good faith or fair dealing in every employment
contract limiting the right of an employer to discharge an
employee without good cause has previously been rejected by
the Court of Appeals in Murphy v. American Home Prods.
Corp., (supra, 58 N.Y.2d at 304-305, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448
N.E.2d 86; see also, Sabetay v. Sterling Drug. 69 N.Y.2d 329,
514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 506 N.E.2d 919).
Ill 1
[121 The plaintiffs claim of defamation fails to
comply with the special pleading requirement contained in
CPLR 3016(a) that the complaint set forth the "the particular
words complained of', thereby mandating dismissal (see,
Gardner v. Alexander Rent-A-Car, 28 A.D.2d 667, 280
N.Y.S.2d 595; Kahn v. Friedlander, 90 A.D.2d 868, 869, 456
N.Y.S.2d 482). The claim is further defective in that it fails to
state the particular person to whom the allegedly defamatory
comments were made (see, Buffolino v. Long Is. Say. Bank,
supra, 126 A.D.2d at 510, 510 N.Y.S.2d 628).
[131
1141 When viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, the sixth cause of action does not sufficiently
allege facts constituting intentional infliction of emotional
distress (see, Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 402
N.Y.S.2d 991, 373 N.E.2d 1215; Buffolino v. Long Is, Say.
Bank supra, 126 A.D.2d at 510, 510 N.Y.S.2d 628). Insofar
(8j 191 In his second cause of action the plaintiff attempts to
as this cause of action may be construed to allege a prima
circumvent an express contraotual provision contained in the
facie tort, it is nonetheless insufficient as there is no allegation
employment contract by alleging that the defendants breached
of
special damages (see, Freihofer *517 v. Hearst Corp.,
a provision contained in the "EDS Manager's Guide" which,
65 N.Y.2d 135, 142-143, 490 N.Y.S.2d 735, 480 N.E.2d
according to the complaint, provides that "the initiator of the
349). Moreover, this court has held that "[a] prima facie
termination should be convinced of the employee's violation".
tort cause of action 'cannot be allowed in circumvention
In view of the fact that the employment agreement provides
of the unavailability of a tort claim for wrongful discharge
that it may not be modified absent a written agreement
or the contract rule against liability for discharge of an atexecuted by both the employer and the employee, the "Guide"
will employee' " (O'Donnell v. Westchester Community Serv.
provision constitutes nothing more than a general guideline
Council, 96 A.D.2d 885, 466 N.Y.S.2d 41, quoting from
which cannot be imposed upon the contract (see, Reynolds
Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., supra, 58 N.Y.2d
Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, supra, at 539). Moreover, the foregoing
at 304, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86).
provision does not constitute a sufficiently express limitation
on the employer's right of discharge to give rise to an action
for breach of contract (see, Btiffolino v. Long Is. Say. Bank,
Parallel Citations
supra, 126 A.D.2d at 509, 5 0 N.Y.S.2d 628; O'Connor v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 108 A.D 2d 843, 485 N.Y.S.2d 345, affd.
141 A.D.2d 514, 529 N.Y.S.2d 512
65 N.Y.2d 724, 492 N.Y.S.2ci 9, 481 N.E.2d 549, supra; cf,
End of Document
4f,) 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
2013 Thomson .euters, No claim to original U.S. Government Works,
List of 21 Negative Treatment fo Nk...,santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.
Negative Treatment
Negative Direct History
The KeyCited document h been negatively impacted in the following ways by events or decisions in the same
litigation or proceedings:
There is no negative direct istory.
Negative Citing Referent s (21)
The KeyCited document h s been negatively referenced by the following events or decisions in other litigation or
proceedings:
Treatment
Declined to
Extend by
Title
Date
1. Rome Am ulatory Surgical Center, LLC v. Rome

Memorial Hos ., Inc. 1,10ST NEGATIVE.
Dec. 22 ,
=2004
Type
Case
Depth
Headnote(s)
giii7M 11
S.Ct.
349 F.Supp.2 389 , N.D.N.Y.

ANTITRUST - Monopolies. Ambulatory surgical
facility failed t establish monopolization claim against
hospital.
Distinguished
by
Aug. 06 ,
1985
2. Burlingt n Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v.
. Case
13
S.Ct.
Esprit De Con
769 F.2d 919 2nd Cir.(N.Y.)
Off-price retail r brought action against full-price retailer
and clothing anufacturer for violation of federal
antitrust law. efendants moved for summary judgment.
The...
Distinguished
by
3. Garment st., Inc. v. Belk Stores Services, Inc.
31) ;Aug. 26 ,
1986
!Case
amiln
io
11
S.Ct.
799 F.2d 905 4th Cir.(N.C.)
Discount retai brought antitrust action against
sportswear m. nufacturer and competing retailer.
Defendants moved for directed verdict. The District
Court, 617 F. upp. 944,...
Distinguished
by
4. Arnold ontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Budd Baer, Inc.
Aug. 24 ,
1987
Case
10
S.Ct.
826 F.2d 133 , 3rd Cir.(Pa.)

Automobile d alership brought action against four
other dealers ips alleging violations of the antitrust and
monopolizatio provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. The Unit
Distinguished
by
5. H.L. Ha den Co. of New York, Inc. v. Siemens

Medical Syste s, Inc.
Oct. 09 ,
1987
Case
Oct. 27 ,
, 1987
Case
MB
10 11 13
672 F.Supp. 4 , S.D.N.Y.

Former distrib tor of dental x-ray equipment and
mail order co pany which acquired equipment
from distribut r filed suit against manufacturer and
manufacturer' two largest...
Distinguished
by
6. Power Co version, Inc. v. Saft America, Inc.

672 F.Supp. 4 , D.Md.
Battery manu :cturer brought action against
competitors a d former officers of competitors alleging
violations of f: deral antitrust laws. Competitors and
former officer oved to...
(f) 201:3 -illorns)ri R.e ,ters. Nii ciaim to ortginal
Gov:::. meni Works.
S.Ct.
List of 21 Negative Treatment for o. Onto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.
Title
Treatment
Distinguished
by
7. Sorisio v. Lenox, Inc.
Date
May 26 ,
1988
Type
'Case
Depth
ME
Headnote(s)
10 11 13
S.Ct.
701 F.Supp. 950 , D.Conn.

Luggage dealer brought action against manufacturer for
alleged violatio s of federal and state antitrust laws, the
Connecticut Fr- chise Act, and the Connecticut Unfair
Trade...
Distinguished
by
8. Winn v. Edn Hibel Corp. 13
'Oct. 28 ,
1988
Case
13
S.Ct.
858 F.2d 1517 , 11th Cir.(Fla.)

Artwork dealer ought money damages for Sherman
Act conspiracy Ilegedly resulting in dealer's
termination. T e United States District Court for the
Southern Distri of Florida,...
Distinguished
by
9. Bi-Rite Oil C
Inc. v. Indiana Farm Bureau Co-op. Jul. 26 , 1990 Case
Ass'n, Inc.
908 F.2d 200 , th Cir.(Ind.)
Retailer brough antitrust action against refinery and
member coope fives after refinery terminated sales of
blended gasolin to retailer for nonpayment of debt.
The United...
Distinguished
by
10. Eskofot
S v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.
Jan. 06
:1995
12
S.Ct.
872 F.Supp. 81 S.D.N.Y.

Danish manufa urer of printing equipment brought suit
corporation and its British subsidiary,
against Ameri
alleging that de ndants had monopolized the domestic
and...
Distinguished
by
11. Datagate, I c. v Hewlett-Packard Co.

60 F.3d 1421 ,
Independent se
and repair for a
brought antitrus
United States...
Distinguished
by
Jul. 27 , 1995 Case
Bin
S.Ct.
th Cir.(Cal.)
ice organization that provided service
anufacturer's computer hardware
action against the manufacturer. The
12. Toys "" "" Us, Inc. v. F.T.C.
Aug. 01 ,
2000
Case
s.ct.
221 F.3d 928 , th Cir.

ANTITRUST - orizontal Restraints. Toy retailer's
agreements a unted to horizontal restraint.
Distinguished
by
13. PepsiC , Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.
;Sep. 19 ,
.2000
:Case
S.Ct.
114 F.Supp.2d '43 , S.D.N.Y.

ANTITRUST - onopolies. Coke was not liable to Pepsi
for monopolizat on of distribution channel.
Distinguished
by
14. Coca-C la Co. v. Omni Pacific Co., Inc.

2000 WL 3319
On August 11,
plaintiffs' motio
counterclaims.
counsel and th
Distinguished
by
^
2011 Thon-son Rew
Sep. 27 ,
:2000
;Case
S.Ct.
867 , N.D.Cal.
000, this Court heard argument on
for summary judgment on defendant's
aving considered the arguments of
papers...
15. Alexan er v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co.
13
Jul. 03 , 2001 Case
s. No c.i?im to original U.S. Governmeni work$.
Olin
11
List of 21 Negative Treatment fo
,santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.
Title
Treatment
Date
Type
Depth
149 F.Supp.2 989 , N.D.III.

ANTITRUST - Monopolies. Fact issues existed as to
whether tax b ers engaged in antitrust conspiracy.
Distinguished
by
Headnote(s)
S.Ct.
16. North Ja son Pharmacy, Inc. v. Express Scripts

Inc.
Oct. 13 ,
2004
Case
11
S.Ct.
345 F.Supp.2 1279 , N.D.AIa.

ANTITRUST Pricing. Independent pharmacies' 1
complaint wo Id not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim.
Distinguished
by
17. George iller Brick Co., Inc. v. Stark Ceramics, Inc. May 18 ,
2005
))
Case
S.Ct.
9 Misc.3d 151 , N.Y.Sup.

ANTITRUST Conspiracy. Distributor sufficiently
alleged conce ed action constituting actionable wrong
under Donnell Act.
Distinguished
by
18. Toled Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack
Jun. 17 ,
, 2008
*NM
iota 10
Case
530 F.3d 204 3rd Cir.(Pa.)

COMMERCIA LAW - Trade Secrets. "Gist of the
action" doctri did not apply to misappropriation of
trade secrets laim.
Distinguished
by
13
S.Ct.
Trucks, Inc.
Distinguished
by
12
19. TYR Spo , Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear, Inc.
f
Mar. 16 ,
.2010
709 F.Supp.2 802 , C.D.Cal.

ANTITRUST - Monopolies. Defendants did not evince
conspiratorial estraint of trade in violation of Sherman
Act.
,..
20. Cloverlea Enterprises, Inc. v. Maryland
:Aug. 06 ,
2010
Thoroughbred Horsemen's Association, Inc.
, Case
,
al
, 10
13
S.Ct.
:
, Case
- 8 11 12
S.Ct.
730 F.Supp.2 451 , D.Md.

ANTITRUST - Group Boycotts. Racetrack owner
sufficiently st ed Sherman Act claims based on group
boycott of sim (cast signals.
...
Distinguished
21. In re Sulf ric Acid Antitrust Litigation
by
Sep. 24 ,
'2010
743 F.Supp.2 827 , N.D.III.

ANTITRUST - Conspiracy. Summary judgment was
precluded on onsumers' antitrust conspiracy claims
against all but one sulfuric acid producer.
20-13 Tilorziscd1
less. iNc) cauo to GrigifK-ii U.S. Governillenl.
Case
Via....
., 11
s.ct.
12
13
Exhibit 5
aktV
Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co. tiv Oilisc.2d 1 (1996)
647 N.Y.S.2d 374
41
*1
TWWS
170 M sc.2d 1
Supreme Court, Mon oe County, New York.
131
Ramona L. F LEY, Plaintiff,
May 1, 1996.
Employee sued coworkers fo sexual harassment in violation
of Human Rights Law. Co orkers moved for summary
judgment. The Supreme C rt, Fisher, J., held that: (1)
individual who worked in employer's human relations
department, but had no owner hip interest in employer or any
power to do more than pro ces and record personnel decisions
made by other employees, w s not "employer" for purposes
of Human Rights Law, and (2) individual who exercised
day-to-day control over empi yee's work schedule, evaluated
employee's performance on y rly basis, and made hiring and
firing proposals for approval y others was not "employer/
Civil Rights
Individuals as "employers"
Civil Rights
Employment practices
Aiders and abettors provision of Human Rights
Law applied only to parties outside employment
relationship who assisted in discrimination, and
thus could not be used to hold supervisor liable
for discrimination. McKinney's Executive Law
296, subd. 6.
Summary judgment granted.
West Headnotes (8)
Civil Rights
Individuals as " mployers"
"Economic reality"
which, in corpora
individual employee
"employer" under H
test is not articul
above which indivi
Executive Law 2
[51
test is threshold, below

scheme of hierarchy,
may not be held liable as
an Rights Law; however,
on of precise standard
ual is liable. McKinney's
subd. 5, 296, subd 1(a).

[61
Civil Rights
4..--- Individuals as " mployers"
Individual who wo
relations departmen
interest in employer
than process and r
made by other empi
for purposes of Hum
Executive Law 2
ed in employer's human
but had no ownership
or any power to do more
cord personnel decisions
yees, was not "employer"
Rights Law. McKinney's
subd. 5, 2%, subd. 1(a).
Statutes
Superfluousness
Meaning and effect should be given to all of
statute's language, if possible, and words are
not to be rejected as superfluous when it is
practicable to give each a distinct and separate
meaning.

c.--[21
Civil Rights
Individuals as "employers"
Individual who exercised day-to-day control
over employee's work schedule, evaluated
employee's performance on yearly basis, and
made hiring and firing proposals for approval
by others was not "employer" for purposes of
Human Rights Law. McKinney's Executive Law
292, subd. 5, 296, subd. 1(a).
MOBIL CHEMICAL CO PANY, et al., Defendants.
[11
\ij Lk)
Civil Rights
Judicial review and enforcement of
administrative decisions
Human Right Law "shall be construed liberally
for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof"
on such issues as whether Department of
Human Rights Commissioner's determination is
supported by substantial evidence, and whether
remedy chosen by Commissioner is consistent
WEst taviNexr 201 Thor, ,son Reuters, No claim to original U.S. Govern!ent
Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co., 1 ..iisc.2d 1 (1996)

647 N.Y.S.2d 374
with statutory schem . McKinney's Executive
Law 300.
171
Civil Rights
Purpose and con truction in general
It is leap beyond pr per role of courts to use
liberal construction ovision alone in manner
which finds no other textual source in Human
Right Law; liberal c nstruction does not mean
one that flies in fa of structure of statute.
McKinney's Executiv Law 300.
181
Civil Rights
Purpose and co truction in general
Employment discri ination statutes' broad
d liberal construction
remedial purposes
afforded them cann trump narrow, focused
conclusion drawn fr m structure and logic of
statutes. McKinney's xecutive Law 300.

"375 *2 Steven E. Mabone, Victor, for Jose Calle,
defendant.
Michael J. Kieffer, Rochester, for Steve Barnett, defendant.
Osborn, Reed, Burke & Tobi Rochester (Thomas C. Burke,
of counsel), for Paul Miller, d fendant.
Patterson, Belknap, Webb & yler, New York City (Ellen
M. Martin, of counsel), fo Mobil Chemical Company,
defendant.
Merkel & Merkel, Rochester avid A. Merkel, of counsel),
for plaintiff.
Opinion
KENNETH R. FISHER, Justi e.
Defendants Calle and Barnett ove for summary judgment on
plaintiff's State Human Right ' Law (SHRL) claim for sexual
harassment. They contend th , as employees of defendant
Mobil Chemical Company, t y are not "employers" within
in 292(5). Defendant Calle was plaintiffs immediate

supervisor and is the primary object of her sexual harassment
claim. Defendant Barnett was employed in the Employee
Relations Department of Mobil's Label Materials Division,
and is not a direct object of her claims of harassment. Plaintiff
claims that Barnett became aware of Calle's harassment and
did nothing to remedy it.
After reading the applicable statute, which provides that
. 4employerfsi" are the proper subject of SHRL claims of
discrimination in employment under N.Y. Executive Law
296(1)(a) ("unlawful discriminatory practice ... [f]or
an_ pmp/axer2! *3 to engage in the enumerated acts of
discrimination) (emphasis supplied), and that "[t]he term
`employer' does not include anyopployerith-fewer_than
292 5),
fourersons in his employ," N.Y. Executive
the answer to this question would seem naturally to flow
from a plain reading. Neither Calle nor Barnett employed
four persons; accordingly, they may not be held liable as
"employers" under the statute _%ca ce the Legislature failed
expressly to provide for individual employee/supervisor
Jiability, such failure "may be construed as an indication that
its exclusion was intended." McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y.,
Book 1, Statutes 74; Estate of Cowart **376 v. Nicklos
Drilling Company, 505 U.S. 469, 475, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2594,
120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992) ("In a statutory construction case,
the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and
when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry
into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary
circumstance, is finished."); Matter of Board of Higher
Education of the City of New York v. Carter, 14 N.Y.2d 138,
147, 250 N.Y.S.2d 33, 199 N.E.2d 141 (1964) (applying the
ordinary dictionary definition of the term "employer" under
the SHRL).
[2J But the Court of Appeals opined in Patrowich
flj
v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473
N.E.2d 11 (1984) that the statutory definition of an employer
"provides no clue to whether individual employees of a
corporate employer may be sued under its provisions," id. 63
N.Y.2d at 543, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11, and held
"that 'economic reality' governs who may be sued." Id 63
N.Y.2d at 543, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11. The court
elaborated this "economic reality" test only by reference to
(A) whether the individual employee in question is "shown
to have any ownership interest or power to do more than
carry out personnel decisions made by others," id. 63 N.Y.2d
at 542, 543-44, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11, and by
reference (B) to the holdings of a number of federal cases
the meaning of N.Y. Executi e Law 296(1)(a), as defined
Ne=l 20 '3 ThorT son Reuters. No claim to orinina! U.S. Government Workii.
Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co. fi .41sc.2d 1 (1996)

647 N.Y.S.2d 374
that it approved or disapprov d. Id 63 N.Y.2d at 544, 483
N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11 collecting cases).
No subsequent explication of this economic reality standard
has been attempted by the Co of Appeals, and the available
cases do not provide a relia le measure of the ownership/
power criterion or the "pow r to do more than carry out
personnel decisions made b others" test. For example, it
was not revealed in Patrowi It whether the vice president
sought to be held liable held i y stock in Chemical Bank, or
whether stock ownership at a identified level might satisfy
the generic "economic intere t" test or the more particular
ownership/power test. Simil rly, the court did not give
guidance on what "more" po er or authority in the corporate
scheme was required to satin the control/power test than the
*4 simple power to carry o personnel decisions made by
others that the court found i ufficient to trigger individual
liability. Nor did the court id tify how the control or power
aspect of its analysis was a m re particularized version of the
"economic reality" test.
Patrowich thus may properly e read as providing examples
of a threshold below which in the corporate scheme or
hierarchy, an individual em oyee may not be held liable
articulation of the precise
under the SHRL, but not
standard above which Special erm must find that a question
of fact exists that the individ 1 defendant is liable under the
State Human Rights Law. T is distinction is not important
for Bamett's motion, because for the reasons stated below,
Patrowich clearly compels a rant of summary judgment in
his favor. But it is important f r Calle's motion, because Calle
may well have had the powe to do something more in the
out someone else's personnel
corporate hierarchy than ca
decisions. I
**377 [31 Concerning Calle's motion, defendants

established without contradiction in their motion papers that
personnel decisions at Mobil were actually made by two
layers of line management personnel before they are carried
out by Calle. Interpreting the evidence in plaintiffs favor, as
is required on motions for summary judgement, it is fair to
conclude that, in Mobil's scheme, Calle made hiring and firing
proposals for approval by others, and that he exercised day-today control of plaintiffs work schedule and job functions as
her supervisor. Calle conceded in his deposition that he hired
and trained most of *5 the people in Mobil's Label Materials
Group, albeit with approval from his in line supervisor, Jim
Lambert, and the Employee Relations Department. Indeed,
he hired plaintiff, presumably with those two approvals, and
evaluated her performance on a yearly basis. According to
Calle, she reported to him. According to plaintiff, Calle "ran
the whole marketing operation[,] ... [and] often bragged that
he could do what he wanted to do and that he had the power
to do so because he had the Employee Relations Department
in his back pocket."
But plaintiffs effort to avoid summary judgment with such
allegations is unavailing, because Patrowich disapproved
of the holding in Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 554
F.Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y.1983), in which virtually identical
allegations by the plaintiff in that case, that her supervisor's
recommendations "were usually 'rubber stamped,' " were
held sufficient to raise an issue of fact precluding
summary judgement on the individual liability issue. Id.
554 F.Supp. at 290. Indeed, Calle's alleged power to
recommend personnel actions and his day-to-day control
over plaintiff as her supervisor mirror the pleadings in
Patrowich itself. Accordingly, Calle appears to be entitled to
summary judgment notwithstanding plaintiffs averments of
his supposed autonomy. 2
Turning to the facts, defendan Bamett's motion for summary

judgment, presented by leave f the Appellate Division after
Barnett's deposition, Foley v. obil Chemical Company, 214
A.D.2d 1005, 1006, 626 N. .S.2d 908 (4th Dept.1995), is
resolved readily under the P trowich test. Plaintiff alleges
only that Barnett was in the E ployee Relations Department,
that he "was part of the proce " of Mobil's hiring, firing, and
evaluation of employees, and hat he signed personnel action
forms recording personnel ctions originating elsewhere.
judgment because he had no
Barnett is entitled to summ
ownership of Mobil or powe to do more than process and
record Mobil's personnel deci ions made by other employees.
This conclusion is consistent with an analysis of the generic

"economic reality" test embraced by Patrowich, which was
drawn largely from a line of Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
cases. In Carter v. Dutchess Community College, 735 F.2d 8
(2d Cir.1984), cited with approval in Patrowich, 63 N.Y.2d
at 544, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11, the court held
that "[t]he 'economic reality' test ... has been refined and ...
is understood to include inquiries *6 into: 'whether the
alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the
employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work
schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the
rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment
records.' " Carter, 735 F.2d at 12 (quoting Bonnette v.
.-_-_. .
2013 Thai: ;son Reuters. No claim to originai U.S. Govemmen Works.
Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co. 17%, .fisc.2d 1 (1996)
California Health and Weller,

(9th Cir.1983)). The multi-fa
Rights v. GTE Corporation, 1
234 (4th Dept.1985) appears t
not in terms identical. See
Rochester Strong Mein. Hos
N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup.Ct. Mo
grounds and otherwise affd,
281 (4th Dept.1988).
Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470

or test of State Div. of Hutnan
9 A.D.2d 1082, 487 N.Y.S.2d
be a similar approach, though
lso, Samper v. University of
, 139 Misc.2d 580, 583, 528
oe Co.1987), mod. on other
44 A.D.2d 940, 535 N.Y.S.2d
In Danneskjold v. Hausratl 82 F.3d 37 (2d Cir.1996),

however, which like Carter nvolved a claim by a prison
inmate seeking unpaid mini urn wages under the FLSA,
the court substantially revise its approach to the economic
reality test, and rejected the a plicability of the four part test
of Carter **378 and Bonn tte to contexts in which it is
not apt. Instead, the court e ployed "an economic reality
test at a higher level of gener lity" than the multi-factor test,
taking into account the poli ies underlying the FLSA and
whether denying coverage "t ded to undermine compliance
with the FLSA." Id. 82 F.3 at 42. Finding that the four
factor test of Carter and Bon to is not helpful in the prison
labor context, because it "is u eful largely in cases involving
claims of joint employment, id. 82 F.3d at 43, the court
nevertheless adhered to an onomic reality approach, by
considering whether the plai tiff was "an employee in any
conventional sense." Id. 82 F. d at 42. In doing so, the court
determined that, in the circu stances of prison labor and in
light of the statutory schem "[t]he relationship [wa]s not
one of employment," id. 82 .3d at 42, and it "discard[ed]
the four-factor Bonnette test s a surrogate for an economic
reality test." Id. 82 F.3d at 4 See also, Vanskike v. Peters,
974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 992) ("The Bonnette factors,
with their emphasis on contr 1 over the terms and structure
of the employment relations p, are particularly appropriate
where (as in Bonnette itself) it is clear that some entity is
an 'employer' and the questi is which one"), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 928, 113 S.Ct. 13 3, 122 L.Ed.2d 692 (1993).
This is persuasive authority scouraging the use of the four
factor test of GTE Corporatio and Samper except in contexts
in which it "capture[s] the e nature of the relationship,"
Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d t 809, and encouraging the use
of the *7 "economic reality' test in light of the underlying
SHRL scheme, by exploring whether a denial of coverage
would tend to undermine co
iance with the SHRL. 3
Concluding that the four fact r test of GTE Corporation and

Samper is inapt to this case 1 yes for consideration whether
a question of fact exists and the generic "economic reality"
test. A review of the other cases approved in Patrowich,

and an examination whether the SHRL would be undermined
by denying coverage, shows that plaintiff has failed to
raise such an issue of fact with respect to Calle. Beginning
with the cases, in Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509 (1st
Cir.1983), the two individual defendants sought to be held
liable were the sole officers and directors of the corporation
which wholly owned plaintiff's nominal employer. Observing
that its holding was "narrow," the court found individual
liability under the economic reality test of "corporate officers
with a significant ownership interest who had operational
control over significant aspects of the corporation's day-today functions, including compensation of employees, and
who personally made decisions to continue operations despite
financial adversity during the period of non-payment." Id.
712 F.2d at 1514. Similarly, in Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation
Company, Inc., 695 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1207, 103 S.Ct. 3537, 77 L.Ed.2d 1387 (1983), the
individual sought to be held liable under the economic reality
test "exercised *8 pervasive control over the business and
financial affairs" of the entity employer. **379 Id. 695 F.2d
at 195 (personal exercise of " 'financial gymnastics directly
affected Sabine's employees by making it possible for Sabine
to meet its payroll and keep its employees supplied with the
equipment and materials necessary to perform their jobs' ")
(quoting the district court's opinion). "Ultimate control was
vested in ... [the individual, and] [t]he corporation's very
survival depended upon ... [his] largesse, with his decision to
terminate all financial aid precipitating its near demise...." and
plaintiffs FLSA claim. Id 695 F.2d at 195. Neither of these
cases even remotely applies to Calle's relationship to Mobil.
The approach of these federal cases to the economic reality
test bears some resemblance to the reasoning recently
employed by the Fourth Department to support its vicarious
entity liability finding against a high level corporate employee
who was " 'more than an agent, ... or employee vested
with some supervisory or decision making responsibility.'
" Matter of Father Belle Community Center v. SDHR, 221
A.D.2d 44, 642 N.Y.S.2d 739 (4th Dept.1996) (quoting
Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank. 67 N.Y.2d 369, 380, 502
N.Y.S.2d 965, 494 N.E.2d 70 (1986)). The import of the
FLSA cases approved in Patrowich, when considered with
the helpful discussion in Father Belle Community Center,
is that the supervisor may be held individually liable if the
economic reality of the relationship between the supervisor
sought to be charged under the SHRL, and the entity
employer, is such that it may fairly be said that the supervisor
was for all intents and purposes the actual employer.
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Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co. is.. ..,lisc.2d 1 (1996)

647
374
This conclusion that there

the respective determinatio
liability finds support in the re
rejecting individual liability i
context. Tomka v. Seiler Corp
(2d Cir.1995); Williams v. Ba
some relationship between

of individual and vicarious
ent and overwhelming caselaw
the Title VII, ADA and ADEA
ration. 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-17
ing, 72 F.3d 552, 554 n. 2 (7th
Cir.1995) (collecting cases). 4 There are dissenting views, see

e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318 24 (Parker, J., dissenting), but
the basis of these dissents is itle VII's inclusion of "agents"
of covered entity "employer " in the statutory definition.
There is no such statutory in rpretation problem under the
SHRL, because N.Y. Exec ve Law 292(5) does not
include agents or employee *9 in the definition of an
"employer," a fact which and ubtedly motivated the court in
Matter of Father Belle Com unity Center v. SDHR, supra,
to carefully eschew a co
on law agency rationale for
vicarious liability under the S RL.
A holding that Calle is an "em toyer" within the statute would
create the anomaly that a co orate vice-president in charge
of plaintiffs division escapes liability under the statute (the
situation in Patrowich ), but a elatively low level supervisor,
who apparently exercises con derable control over plaintiffs
workplace and conditions f employment in this large
corporation, but who has co siderably less significance in
the overall corporate structur in any economically realistic
sense, may be held individ ly liable. Compounding the
anomaly is the fact that, in the latter case, the company
itself may remain immune om liability under vicarious
liability principles because it c uld not, or did not, have actual
or constructive knowledge o the allegedly discriminatory
conduct. Although Mobil has not itself brought a motion for
summary judgment and the r ord is otherwise undeveloped
on the point, this is mor than just a possibility in
a corporation as large as obil. Even those few who
would support individual lia ility in the Title VII context
acknowledge "that Title V liability on the part of the
employer's agent must be p emised upon a prior finding
that the complained of condu t may properly be imputed to
66 F.3d at 1323 (Parker, J.,
the employer as well." Tom
at
1315 (majority opn.).
dissenting). Accord id. 66 F.3
Accordingly, a close exami tion of the statutory scheme
Legislature did not intend,
of the SHRL shows that
"
except in the "economic real' of an individual defendant
who should indeed be deeme the actual employer, that the
individual be held liable wh n the entity itself may not be
held liable under vicarious li bility principles. The "parade
"
**380 of horribles" persuading federal circuit courts that

Congress relieved individuals of liability under Title VII
even when vicarious liability of the entity is available to
the plaintiff, and thus making joint and several liability
available to the defendant to ameliorate the individual's
exposure, e.g., Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315-16, becomes a
most compelling rationale for concluding that the Legislature
intended to relieve individuals of liability under SHRL when
the possibility exists that such liability might be "shared"
alone. Such possibility always exists when the economic
reality of the individual's relationship *10 to the entity
employer is insufficient to consider him, in any functional
sense, the employer. 5
Other aspects of the SHRL statutory scheme suggest that
the Legislature did not intend individual liability in the
absence of the economic reality that the individual is the
true employer. Taking a cue from the Title VII cases, the
Legislature's decision to protect small employers (fewer than
four employees under the SHRL) from the costs of defending
such suits strongly suggests that the Legislature did not
intend to allow civil liability to run against employees who
are not in any economic realistic sense "employers" under
the Patrowich analysis who presumably would be able to
pay. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314 ("it was 'inconceivable' that a
Congress concerned with protecting small employers would
simultaneously allow civil liability to run against individual
employees"). Although the Title VII cases employ this
rationale to relieve all employees from liability, Patrowich
makes clear that this reasoning would only apply to individual
employees who, under the economic reality test, may not
fairly be viewed as the "employer." Part of the function of
the economic reality test is to weed out and protect those
employees of an employer who, in good conscience, should
not be forced to bear the brunt of a damages award alone.
This construction of the statute would not undermine
compliance with the SHRL because the full panoply
of remedies that the statute allows remain available for
imposition against the employer, which is in the best position
to eradicate the discriminatory practice. Martin v. Easton
Publishing Company, 478 F.Supp. 796, 799 (E.D.Pa.1979),
cited with approval in Patrowich, 63 N.Y.2d at 544, 483
N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11. As aptly stated in EEOC v. AIC
Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir.1995),
the contrary view that "individual liability is essential to
dissuade supervisors and other individuals from violating the
law.... and that *11 through the loophole of no individual
liability will pour a flood of unpunished and undeterrable
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Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co. ti ,ilisc.2d 1 (1996)

647 N.Y.S.2d 374
discrimination," is a "Chi en Little-esque argument,"
adequately refuted by the fac that "[tjhe employing entity is
still liable, and that entity an' its managers have the proper
incentives to adequately disc pline wayward employees, as
well as to instruct and train e ployees to avoid actions that
might impose liability." id. 5' F.3d at 1282. See also, Matter
of New York City Transit Au hority v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 78 N.Y.2d 207, 217, 5 3 N.Y.S.2d 49, 577 N.E.2d 40
(1991) ("the relief imposed b the Commissioner need only
be reasonably related to the d criminatory conduct.")
ALDERS AND AB TTORS THEORY

141 In holding that plaintif fails to raise a question of fact
under the economic reality st embraced in Patrowich, it
becomes necessary to consi er plaintiff's invitation to the
court to embrace the additio al holding of Tomka v. Seiler
Corporation, 66 F.3d at 13 7, that employee supervisors
may be held liable under Y. Executive Law 296(6)
as aiders and abettors of th discrimination. Although the
First Department has embra d such a theory, it has done
so without discussion of th New York statutory scheme
"381 and whether the egislature ever intended the
aiders and abettors provisio to make those primarily and
directly perpetrating the hara sment within the employment
relationship liable as individ als. Steadman v. Sinclair, 223
A.D.2d 392, 636 N.Y.S.2d 32 , 326 (1st Dept.1996); Peckv.
Sony Music Corporation, 221 .D.2d. 157, 632 N.Y.S.2d 963
(1st Dept.1995). A case in t Second Department recently
rejected Tomka's and the irst Department's approach.
Trovato v. Air Express Intern 'tional, unpublished, N.Y.L.J.,
vol. 215, no. 74, p. 30, col. 4 Sup.Ct. Nassau Co., April 17,
1996). In co-defendant Bame s case, the Fourth Department
la without discussion of the
recalled the Patrowich fo
issue. Foley v. Mobil Chet ical, 214 A.D.2d 1005, 626
N.Y.S.2d 908. The one treat ent of 296(6) in the Court of
Appeals sheds no light on thi question. Jews for Jesus, Inc.
Council of New York, Inc.,
v. Jewish Community Relati
79 N.Y.2d 227, 232-33, 581 .Y.S.2d 643, 590 N.E.2d 228
(1992).
151 Interpreting 296(6) in the manner suggested by
plaintiff would render the atrowich "economic reality"
inquiry essentially meaning! s in most cases. As one court
has held, applying 296(6 to a person in a "common
employment relationship" wi the plaintiff would render the
Patrowich "economic reality' approach, which as interpreted
here has a textual source i the SHRL's use of the term
Falbaum v. Pomerantz, 891
"employer," unnecessary. *
F.Supp. 986, 992 (S.D.N.Y.1' 95). It is a fundamental tenet of
the law of statutory construction, recognized in Falbaum, 891

F.Supp. at 992, that "meaning and effect should be given to
all its language, if possible, and words are not to be rejected
as superfluous when it is practicable to give to each a distinct
and separate meaning." McKinney's Consolidated Laws of
New York Annotated, Book 1, Statutes 231 (1971). See
Matter of Bliss v. Bliss, 66 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 497 N.Y.S.2d
344, 488 N.E.2d 90 (1985). The holding of Tomka and the
Federal District Court cases cited in support of its holding
essentially ignore, by rendering meaningless in most cases,
the legislative choice of the word "employer" in 296(1)
(a), and the substance of the "economic reality" test giving
meaning to that word embraced in Patrowich. Application
of that test would be unnecessary if individual employees
in any event would be held liable as aiders and abettors.
From a careful analysis of the statutory scheme, however,
it is clear that the Legislature intended application of the
aiders and abettors provision only to "parties outside the
employment relationship who may assist in employment
discrimination." Joel E. Cohen, Individual Corporate Officer
Liability, N.Y.L.J., vol. 214, no. 25 (August 7, 1995) (Special
Pullout Section, p. 1, col. 1, text at n. 44 & n. 44).
Worse yet, these decisions ignore the common law definition
of an "aider and abettor" as one who without being present
aids or assists the principal wrongdoer to commit the
allegedly unlawful act. Except in the Penal Law Context,
in which the distinction between a principal wrongdoer
and an aider and abettor was swept away by statute to
remove many procedural barriers to criminal conviction of
accessories to crime, People v. Bliven, 112 N.Y. 79, 82-83,
19 N.E. 638 (1889); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., Criminal
Law, 6.6(d)-(e) at 572-75 (2d ed. 1986), see also, People
v. Guidice, 83 N.Y.2d 630, 637, 612 N.Y.S.2d 350, 634
N.E.2d 951 (1994) ("for charging purposes, the distinction
between principal and accomplice is academic") (emphasis
supplied), the concept of an aider and abettor written into
the SHRL must retain its common law characteristics in the
absence of statutory definition or other clear expression of
contrary legislative intent contained in the "language used in
the statute." Arbegast v. Board of Education of South New
Berlin Central School, 65 N.Y.2d 161, 169, 490 N.Y.S.2d
751, 480 N.E.2d 365 (1985). This rule applies particularly
when the asserted change "affects ... rules of liability."
Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn Corp.. 54 N.Y.2d 580, 592,
446 N.Y.S.2d 917, 431 N.E.2d 278 (1981) (adding: "Public
policy determined by the Legislature is not to be extended
by a court by reason of its [i.e., the court's] notion of
what the public policy ought to be.") See also, McKinney's
'1^
.....
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Th
Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co
647 N.Y.S.2d 374
ifilisc.2d 1 (1996)
in another context: "We do not doubt that the employment

discrimination statutes have broad remedial purposes and
should be interpreted liberally, but that cannot trump the
*13
It
is
true
that
the
SHRL
narrow,
focused conclusion we draw from the structure and
**382 [61 17] [8]
logic of the statutes. A liberal construction does not mean one
"shall be construed liberally or the accomplishment of the
that
flies in the face of the structure of the statute." EEOC v.
purposes thereof," N.Y. Ex cutive Law300, on such
AIC
Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1282.
issues as whether the SDHR Commissioner's determination
Consolidated Laws of New
301 (1971).
ork, Book 1, Statutes 153,
is supported by substantial e .dence, 300 Grarnatan Avenue

Associates v. SDHR, 45 N.Y d 176, 183-84, 408 N.Y.S.2d
54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 (1978); City of Schenectady v. SDHR,
37 N.Y.2d 421, 428,373 N.Y. .2d 59, 335 N.E.2d 290 (1975)
("duty of courts to make s
that the Human Rights Law
works and that the intent of th Legislature is not thwarted by
a combination of strict const ction of the statute and a battle
with semantics"); Matter of B and of Higher Education of the
City of New York v. Carter, 14 .Y.2d 138, 153, 250 N.Y.S.2d
33, 199 N.E.2d 141 (1964), d whether the remedy chosen
by the Commissioner is consi tent with the statutory scheme.
New York Institute of Techno ogy v. SDHR, 40 N.Y.2d 316,
324-25, 386 N.Y.S.2d 685, 3 3 N.E.2d 598 (1976). But it is
a leap beyond the proper rol of the courts to use the liberal
construction provision alone n a manner producing a result
which finds no other textua source in the SHRL, and to
ignore language carefully ch sen by the Legislature. If the
Legislature wished to reach e conduct of individuals in a
common employment relatio hip with the plaintiff, it easily
could have so defined the to aiders and abettors as it did
under the Penal Law 20.00. Because nothing in the statute
other than the liberal const tion provision itself supports
plaintiffs interpretation of 96(6), the court finds that the
common law meaning of th term controls. As well stated
Accordingly, and because this court is bound to follow the

"economic reality" test Patrowich establishes for inquiries
such as these, which is the test the Appellate Division
prescribed for application in co-defendant Barnett's case,
Foley v. Mobil Chemical Company, 214 A.D.2d at 1006, 626
N.Y.S.2d 908, it is necessary to consider the question under
296(6) in light of the legislative history and purpose of the
SHRL statutory scheme. For the reasons stated above, the
court concludes that the aiders and abettors provision is not
available to hold Calle liable.
*14 CONCLUSION
The motions of defendant Barnett and Calle for summary
judgment on the SHRL claims are granted.
[Portions of opinion omitted for purposes of publication.]

Parallel Citations
170 Misc.2d 1, 647 N.Y.S.2d 374
Footnotes
The vice president in Pat owich presumably had the power to do a lot more than carry out someone else's personnel decisions. He was,
after all, "the manager o supervisor of a corporate division," id. 63 N.Y.2d at 542, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11, and plaintiffs
supervisor. Id 98 A.D.2 318, 325, 470 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1st Dept.1984), aff'd, supra, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11.
To be distinguished are ituations in which the employer actually delegates the power to exercise employment decisions to the
2
supervisor. York v. Tenn see Crushed Stone Association, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir.1982), cited with approval in Patrowich. There
is in this case no eviden of a delegation remotely like those considered in York to trigger individual liability. Id. 684 F.2d at 362
(collecting examples in e cited cases). In any event, the court was careful to point out that such employees could be sued only in
their "official capacity." d The Sixth Circuit recently confirmed the observation in Winston v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc., 903
F.Supp. 1151 (W.D.Ky. 95) that York did not decide the individual liability issue on other than an official capacity basis, and that
the issue remains open that jurisdiction under Title VII. Wilson v. Nutt, 69 F.3d 538 n. 3 (6th Cir. Oct 30, 1995) (unpublished
disposition; text availabl on WESTLAW 1995 WL 638298). Other cases accepting official capacity suits against individuals, but not
personal capacity suits, i dude Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C.Cir.1995) cert. denied sub nom. Gary v. Washington Metro.
Area Tr. Auth.. 516 U.S. 011. 116 S.Ct. 569, 133 L.Ed.2d 493 (1995); Grant v. Lone Star Company, 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir.1994),
cert. denied. 513 U.S. 1 15, 115 S.Ct. 574, 130 L.Ed.2d 491 (1994); Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28 (5th Cir.1990).
The Carter and Bonnett four factor test which focuses on control is functionally indistinguishable except in minor particulars from
3
the multi-factor test in S HR v. GTE Corporation and Samper. These tests "harke[n] back to the common law distinction between
an employer and an ind endent contractor" and "thus primarily shed light on just one boundary" of the employment relationship.
-'^
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Of iginal
.. .... .-.
1S, Government 'IN r KS
Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co. 11... dlisc.2d 1 (1996)

647 N.Y.S.2d 374
4
5
Vanskike v. Peters, 974 .2d at 810. See also, 52 N.Y.Jur.2d, Employment Relations, 42 at 59-61 (1986) (the predecessor of
which was quoted in S e Div. of Human Rights v. GTE Corporation, 109 A.D.2d at 1083, 487 N.Y.S.2d 234); Matter of Villa
Maria Institute of Music v. Ross, 54 N.Y.2d 691, 692-93, 442 N.Y.S.2d 972, 426 N.E.2d 466 (1981) (employers or "independent
contractors") (cited in S nper, 139 Misc.2d at 583, 528 N.Y.S.2d 958); Pelow v. Sork Enterprises, Ltd. 39 A.D.2d 494, 496, 337
N.Y.S.2d 218 (3rd Dept. 972), affd, 33 N.Y.2d 944, 353 N.Y.S.2d 729, 309 N.E.2d 130 (1974). These tests have little relevance to
the determination wheth ran employee of an entity, the latter of which is unquestionably an employer, is also an "employer" within
the meaning of a statute hich defines the term. In Samper, defendants asked the court to declare that the education context was not
covered by the statute
its concept of an "employer." The question of Dr. Gabel's status as an "employer" under the Patrowich
test does not appear to h ve been a contested issue on appeal in Samper. because the defendants did not file a cross-appeal. In GTE
Corporation, the other c se using the four factor test, the issue was whether GTE Corporation, or a temporary employment agency,
was the employer. Acco ngly, there is no precedent commanding application of the four-factor test to circumstances such as these.
Coffin v. South Carolina epartment of Social Services, 562 F.Supp. 579, 589-90 (D.S.C.1983), cited with approval in Patrowich.
would appear to need re amination in light of these cases.
Plaintiff contends, and s e of the older cases suggest, that the test of individual liability should be limited to whether the supervisor
participated in the empl
ent decisions which led to plaintiffs lawsuit. This argument cannot succeed, because a review of the
record on appeal in Patr ich reveals that the corporate vice-president sought to be held individually liable allegedly committed the
discriminatory actions. A cepting such an argument would only sanction another way of invoicing the agency rationale for determining
an employee's liability a an "employer" under 296(1)(a) that the statute does not embrace (unlike Title VII), see Executive Law
292(5), and Matter of Fa her Belle Community Center has squarely rejected in the vicarious liability context.
End of Document
<t:)2013 Thomson Routers. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

`ty'estiawNext- t 2013 Thor. sort Reuters. No claim to original Li.S. Government Works.
Exhibit 6
A-69
EXHIBIT 4 TO SANDERS AFFIRMATION EXCERPT FRO11
NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE, SECOND EDITION,
REGARDING IN 3IVIDUAL LIABILITY OF EMPLOYEES [A-69 - A-70]
51. Iricifvidisal liability of asnployees, 18 N.Y_ Jur 2d C1u4I Rights 51
is N.Y. Jur. 2d civil Rights

New York Jurisprudence, Second Edition
Database updated May 20/2
Civil Rights
Russell J. Davis, J.D., MA, Tracy Bateman Farrell, J. D., Michael N. Giuliano, J.D., Robin
Karl Oakes, 7.D., -Jeanne Philter. J.D.
C. Lamer, J.D., Andrew Lee, J.D., Tom Muskus,
!IL Employment or Employment-Rented Discrimination
A. In General
3. Employment Relationship
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
51. Individual liability of employees
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, civil Rights 40,41017, 1113
A-1.11. Library
Individual Liability of Supervisors, Managers, Officers or Co-employees for Discriminatory Actions Under State Civil
Rights Act. 83 A.L.R-Sth I
Trial Strategy
Individual Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 Am. Jur. Trials 489
Generally, even if an employer can be held liable for employment discrimination under the State Human Rights Law, individual
liability for such discrimination cannot be imposed upon an employee of the employer if he or she is not shown to have any
ownership interest in the employer or power ro do more then carry out persomiel decisions made by others_ ' Such is true even
in the case of corporate employee having the title of an officer, manager, or supervisor of a corporate dr.fision. 2 The "economic
reality" test for determining who may be sued as an "employer under the Human Rights Law requires plaintiff to put forth
evidence that shows corporate employee sued, i.e., the putative employer, had ownership interest in the company or power to
do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others. 3 In determining whether an indvidual has power to do more than
ions made by others, courts should consider whether the individual: 4
carry out the personnel
and fire the employee
had the power to
supervised and
lied the employee's work schedule or employment conditions
determined the rani and method of payment
maintained employment records
An employee's conclusory allegations that the office manager had the power to hire, fire, and promote people was insufficient
to demonstrate that manager had power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others, as required to support
individual liability for CESeditifIlati011 under the Human Rights Am. 5
Caution:
In contrast to the State li,mnan Rights Law, which, in defining those who may be held liable for unlawitil discriminatory
of an "e, toyer" without mention of employees or agents, the New York City Human Rights Law expressly
practices, speaks
,Next 7
IF
---- . -_-
No ole
orc5st:,"
--._ --
Osvilre. .1. .A,onts
A-70
51. individual liability of employees, 18 N.Y. Jur. 2d Civil Rights 51
provides that it is unlawful for an employer or "an employee or agent thereof" to engage in discriminatory employment
practices, 6 thereby making such employees or agents individually liable for such practices.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSBRL), an individual employee may be liable es an "employer,* only when
she has an ownership interest or any power to do more than carryout personnel decisions =delay others. McKinney's Executive
Law 296. Miloscia v. B.R. Guest Holdings LLC, 928 N.Y S.2d 905 (Sop 2011).
FEND OF SUPPLEMENT]
Footnotes
Maher v. Alliance Mortg. Banking Corp., 650 F. Supp. 2d 249 (ED. N.Y. 2009); Mato v. 7-Eleven, Inc.. 662 F. Sum. 24 333
(S.D. N.Y. 2009); Strauss v. New York State Dept. of Ethic., 26 A.D.3d 67, 805 N.Y.S.2d 704. 204 Ed. Law Rep. 696 (3d Dept
2005): Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y2d 541, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659.473 N.E2d 11 (!984); Novak v. Royal Life Ins. Co. Of
New York Inc., 264 A.D2d 892, 726 N.Y.S2d 784 (3d Dept 2001); Murphy v. ERA United Realty. 251 A.D.2d 469.674 N.Y.S.24
415 rai Dept 1998); Young v. Geoghegan, 250 A.Did 423, 673 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1st Dept 1998k Foley v. Mobil Chemical Co.. 214
A.D2d 1005, 626 N.Y.S.2d 908 (41h Dept 1995); Samide v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 194 Misc. 2e1 561, 754 N.Y.S.2d
164, 173 Ed. Law Rep. 946 (Sup 2003).
A male city employ= could not be held liable to a female coemployce under dm State Human Rights Law, based on his act of raked
sexual exhibitionism before her and, shortly thereafter-. when fully clothed his attempt to hug her. inasmuch as the statute applies
only to employers. Tuniminello v. City of New York, 212 A.D.2d 434, 622 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1st Dept 1995).
Individual employees were not subject to liability for age diaeriminatiaa in violation of the New York Human Rights Law where
they wen not shown to have my ownership interest or power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others, and the
plaintiffs Weds identify specific &aim ataxy employment decisions made by any particular defendant with respect to particular
plaintiffs other than conchfcry allegations of a generalized "conspiracy" involving all defendant; moreover, the term "person,' as
defined in Exec. Law 292(1). should be interpreted to exclude individuals who are merely in a common employment relationdip.
Fail:gam v. Pomerantz, 1391 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. N.Y. 1995).
DiPilato v. 7-Eleven. Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 333 (S.D. N.Y. 2009); Parrowich v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y.24 541, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659,
2
473 NLE2ti 11 (1984) (holding that a complaint alleging age and sex crtaimininion in employment under the Heenan Rights Law
was properly dismissed as to an individual defendant who was one of approximately 800 vice-presidents of the corporate defendant
and was not shown to have any ownership interest or power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others).
Kaiser v. Raoul's Restaurant Corp., 72 A.D.3d 539.899 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dept 2010).
3
4
5
Maher v. Alliance tvlortg. Banking Corp., 650 F. Sapp. 2d 249 (E.D. N.Y. 2009).
NYC Code 8-107(a).

Murphy v. ERA United Realty. 251 A.D.2d 469.674 N.Y.S.2.4 415 (2d Dept 1998).
Novak v. Royal Life lns. Co. Of New York Inc., 284 A.D.2.4 892, 726 N.Y.S.2d 784 (3c1 Dept 2001).
Eipet of DIK1PrOcre
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EXHIBIT 8
Eric Sanders
From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:
Friday, March 20, 2015 4:14 PM

nobody@nyed.uscourts.gov
Activity in Case 1:13-mc-00885-BMC In Re: Eric Sanders, Esq. Letter
This is an automatic e-mail essage generated by the CM/ECF system. Please DO NOT RESPOND to
this e-mail because the mail ox is unattended.
***NOTE TO PUBLIC AC ESS USERS*** Judicial Conference of the United States policy permits
attorneys of record and parti s in a case (including pro se litigants) to receive one free electronic copy of
all documents filed electroni Ily, if receipt is required by law or directed by the filer. PACER access fees
apply to all other users. To a oid later charges, download a copy of each document during this first
viewing. However, if the refe enced document is a transcript, the free copy and 30 page limit do not
apply.
U.S. District Court
Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was ntered on 3/20/2015 at 4:14 PM EDT and filed on 3/20/2015
In Re: Eri Sanders, Esq.
Case Name:
1:13-mc-1 0885-BMC
Case Number:
Filer:
Document Number: 4
Docket Text:
Letter dated 3/20/15 from PaulaMarie Susi, Case Manager, Attorney Disciplinary Clerk that
having reviewed the relevait documents has determined that no action is warranted. (Guzzi,
Roseann)
1:13-mc-00885-BMC Notice h s been electronically mailed to:

Eric Sanders
1:13-mc-00885-BMC Notice w 11 not be electronically mailed to:
The following document(s) are sociated with this transaction:
Document description:Main D icument
Original filename:n/a
Electronic document Stamp:
[STAMP NYEDStamp_1D=875 59751 [Date=3/20/2015] [FileNumber=9577727-0]
[8727cc6e5cd73dcc5a25bcc761 641caal8b123e64acdf696b508686e5b516957cfb 1
5b513e99da65bb4fcc75cebadla b9325eee031396c0fd43f6c9e164464
1
Case 1:13-mc-00
C HAMMERS OF
3MC Document 4 Filed 03/ 20/15
tge 1 of 1 PagelD #: 14
,itatts pistrict Court

"aattrzi Pistrid of irfo ark
BRIAN 14. COGAN
225 Gomm Vista Xast
JUDGE
Proof*, $411 York 11201
March 20, 2015
Eric Sanders
The Sanders Firm, P. .
1140 Avenue of the ericas, 9th floor
New York, NY 10036
Mr. Sanders:
The Conunitt on Grievances of the Eastern District of New York, having reviewed the
relevant documents 13-MC-885, has determined that no action is warranted.
c-1)
arie Susi, Case Manager!
a
Attorney Disciplinary Clerk
cc:
file 13mc885
snADERS FMK
9
k 888-892-8952
t.
PC
1140 Avenue of the Americas, 9th Floor, New York, NY 10036
4 844-205-7214
thesandersfirmpc
SandersFirmPC
July 31, 2015
Raymond S. Sussman, i_.

'sq.
The Law Offices of Rakmond S. Sussman
4523 Avenue H
Brooklyn, N.Y. 11234
Re:
Chapter 7 Filing of Eric Sanders
Dear Mr. Sussman:

On October 22, 2013, you were given two (2) checks for $5,000.00, to represent me in a
bankruptcy proceeding where you were instructed to file several motions vacating all actions
against me including a judgment from the New York State Division of Human Rights. You never
sent me a Retainer Agreement or performed any of the legal services consistent with my
instructions.
Since December 2013, I haven't heard anything from you.
In January 2014, I demanded via email, text and phone that you return the monies
remitted to you, you fai ed to respond. Several months later, I even went to your friend Victoria
L. Brown-Douglas, Esq., who referred you to me in hopes of avoiding pursuing this any further.
Unfortunately, again you failed to respond.
Therefore, I have no other choice than to immediately demand the return of the monies
remitted to you, $10,00C.00 plus interest of nine (9) percent from October 22, 2013, within seven
letter, otherwise I will be forced to report you to the Disciplinary
(7) days of receipt of t
Committee and pursue legal action against you.
Eric Sanders
ES/es
EXHIBIT 10
SUPREME. COURT OF THE STATL JF NEW YORK

NEW YORK COUNTY
PRESENT:
PART
Justice
-(-)C-c-(/
INDEX NO.
-v-
MOTION DATE
xvt's t , 4t,
The following papers, numbned 1 to
MOTION SEQ. NKC)
, were read on this motion to/for
Notice of Motion/OfT
de-iltd Show Cause Affidavits-L- hiiiit'S
I No(s).
Answering Affidavits Exhibits
I No(s).
Replying Affidavits
I No(s).
Upon the foregoing papersA it is ordered that this-metiorris cytyo
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Dated:
2. CHECK AS APPROPRIATE:
3. CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:
ri NON-FINAL DISPOSITIC
Z CASE DISPOSED
1. CHECK ONE:
MOTION IS:
GRANTED
DENIED
II GRANTED IN PART
r SUBMIT ORDER
SETTLE ORDER
7 DO NOT POST
ET OTHE
LiFIDUCIARY
APPOINTMENT
___i REFEREN
-,Z4,,VPii71*
WILLIE R. DIXON
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New York Civil Rights Lawyer Eric Sanders Files A $200 Million Dollar Claim Against The DOJ

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New York Civil Rights Lawyer Eric Sanders Files A $200 Million Dollar Claim Against The DOJ

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CLAIM FOR DAMAGE, ---

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read carefull -- nstructions on the

1. Submit to Appropriate Federal Agency:

2. Name, address of claimant, and claimant's personal representative if any.

United States Department of Justice

Eric Sanders, Esq.

6. DATE AND DAY OF ACCIDENT

7. TIME (A.M. OR P.m.)

PERSONAL INJURY/WRONGFUL DEATH

ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, and Zip Code)

AMOUNT OF CLAIM (in dollars)

12. (See instructions on reverse).

12b. PERSONAL INJURY

12c. WRONGFUL DEATH

12d. TOTAL (Failure to specify may cause

NATURE OF CLAIMANT (See instructions or reverse side).

CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR PRESENTING FRAUDULENT

CIVIL PENALTY FOR PRESENTING

Fine, imprisonment, or both. (See 18 U.S.C. 287, 1001.)

STANDARD FORM 95 (REV. 2/2007)

CLAIM FOR DAMAGE, '

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read carefully "instructions on the

reverse side and supply information request,. both sides of this

OMB NO. 1105-0008

1. Submit to Appropriate Federal Agency:

2. Name, address of claimant, and claimant's personal representative if any.

United States Department of Justice

Eric Sanders, Esq.

6. DATE AND DAY OF ACCIDENT

7. TIME (A.M. OR P.M.)

PERSONAL INJURY/WRONGFUL DEATH

ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, and Zip Code)

AMOUNT OF CLAIM (in dollars)

12. (See instructions on reverse).

12b. PERSONAL INJURY

12c. WRONGFUL DEATH

12d. TOTAL (Failure to specify may cause

13a. SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT (See instructions or reverse side).

CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR PRESENTING FRAUDULENT

CIVIL PENALTY FOR PRESENTING

Fine, imprisonment, or both. (See 18 U.S.C. 287, 1001.)

CLAIM FOR DAMAGE,

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read carefully - - instructions on the

form. Use additional sheet(s) if necessary. See reverse side for

1. Submit to Appropriate Federal Agency:

2. Name, address of claimant, and claimant's personal representative if any.

United States Department of Justice

Eric Sanders, Esq.

6. DATE AND DAY OF ACCIDENT

7. TIME (A.M. OR P.M.)

8. BASIS OF CLAIM (State in detail the known facts and

PERSONAL INJURY/WRONGFUL DEATH

ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, and Zip Code)

AMOUNT OF CLAIM (in dollars)

12. (See instructions on reverse).

12b. PERSONAL INJURY

12c. WRONGFUL DEATH

12d. TOTAL (Failure to specify may cause

13a. SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT (See instructions or reverse side).

CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR PRESENTING FRAUDULENT

CIVIL PENALTY FOR PRESENTING

Fine, imprisonment, or both. (See 18 U.S.C. 287, 1001.)

CLAIM FOR DAMAGE,