Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22734
720.77
80.00
40.00
P2,707.44
==========
P14.50
===========
P207.50
===========
P1,779.69
88.98
the year 1947 but held that the right to assess and collect the
taxes for 1945 and 1946 has not prescribed. For 1945 and 1946
the returns were filed on August 24, 1953; assessments for both
taxable years were made within five years therefrom or on
October 19, 1953; and the action to collect the tax was filed
within five years from the latter date, on August 7, 1957. For
taxable year 1947, however, the return was filed on March 1,
1948; the assessment was made on October 19, 1953, more than
five years from the date the return was filed; hence, the right to
assess income tax for 1947 had prescribed. Accordingly, We
remanded the case to the Tax Court for further appropriate
proceedings.1
In the Tax Court, the parties submitted the case for decision
without additional evidence.
Pineda is liable for the assessment as an heir and as a holdertransferee of property belonging to the estate/taxpayer. As an
heir he is individually answerable for the part of the tax
proportionate to the share he received from the inheritance.3 His
liability, however, cannot exceed the amount of his share.4
P135.83
436.95
P187.50
TAXATION
Facts:
Atanasio Pineda died, survived by his wife, Felicisima Bagtas, and 15
children, the eldest of whom is Manuel B. Pineda, a lawyer. The estate
was divided among the heirs and Manuel B. Pineda's share
TAXATION
All told, the Government has two ways of collecting the tax in question.
One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them
the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received.
Another remedy, is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in
the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of the tax due, the
estate. This second remedy is the very avenue the Government took
in this case to collect the tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue should
be given, in instances like the case at bar, the necessary discretion to
avail itself of the most expeditious way to collect the tax as may be
envisioned in the particular provision of the Tax Code above quoted,
because taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and
certain availability is an imperious need. And as afore-stated in this
case the suit seeks to achieve only one objective: payment of the tax.
The adjustment of the respective shares due to the heirs from the
inheritance, as lessened by the tax, is left to await the suit for
contribution by the heir from whom the Government recovered said
tax.
Issue:
Can BIR collect the full amount of estate taxes from an heir's
inheritance
Ruling:
Yes. The Government can require Atty. Pineda to pay the full amount
of the taxes assessed. Pineda is liable for the assessment as an heir
and as a holder-transferee of property belonging to the
estate/taxpayer. As an heir he is individually answerable for the part of
the tax proportionate to the share he received from the inheritance.
His liability, however, cannot exceed the amount of his share. As a
holder of property belonging to the estate, Pineda is liable for he tax
up to the amount of the property in his possession. The reason is that
the Government has a lien on the P2,500.00 received by him from the
estate as his share in the inheritance, for unpaid income taxes a for
which said estate is liable.
TAXATION
FIRST DIVISION
DE CASTRO, J.:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the claim for taxes by
the government against the estate of Luis D. Tongoy was filed
beyond the period provided in Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the claim for taxes of the
government was already barred under Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.
which raise the sole issue of whether or not the statute of nonclaims Section 5, Rule 86 of the New Rule of Court, bars claim
of the government for unpaid taxes, still within the period of
limitation prescribed in Section 331 and 332 of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
TAXATION
The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes
against a decedent's estate in the form of exception from the
application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. Taxes
are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain
availability are imperious need. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue vs. Pineda, G. R. No. L-22734, September 15, 1967, 21
SCRA 105). Upon taxation depends the Government ability to
serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected. To
safeguard such interest, neglect or omission of government
officials entrusted with the collection of taxes should not be
allowed to bring harm or detriment to the people, in the same
manner as private persons may be made to suffer individually on
account of his own negligence, the presumption being that they
take good care of their personal affairs. This should not hold true
to government officials with respect to matters not of their own
personal concern. This is the philosophy behind the
government's exception, as a general rule, from the operation of
the principle of estoppel. (Republic vs. Caballero, L-27437,
September 30, 1977, 79 SCRA 177; Manila Lodge No. 761,
Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, L-41001, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 162; Sy vs.
Central Bank of the Philippines, L-41480, April 30,1976, 70
SCRA 571; Balmaceda vs. Corominas & Co., Inc., 66 SCRA
553; Auyong Hian vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 59 SCRA 110;
Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 66 SCRA 553;
Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, L18841, January 27, 1969, 26 SCRA 620; Zamora vs. Court of
Tax Appeals, L-23272, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 77; E.
Rodriguez, Inc. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, L- 23041,
July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 119.) As already shown, taxes may be
TAXATION
notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the
time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be
more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date
of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before
an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor
who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited
the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are
equitable, allow such claim to be flied within a time not
exceeding one (1) month. (Emphasis supplied)
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
TAXATION
VERA v. FERNANDEZ
GR No. L-31364 March 30, 1979
89 SCRA 199
FACTS: The BIR filed on July 29, 1969 a motion for allowance
of claim and for payment of taxes representing the estate's tax
deficiencies in 1963 to 1964 in the intestate proceedings of Luis
Tongoy. The administrator opposed arguing that the claim was
TAXATION
10
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
ALGUE, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be
collected without unnecessary hindrance On the other hand, such
collection should be made in accordance with law as any
arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. It
is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting
interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so that the real
purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the common
good, may be achieved.
11
The proven fact is that four days after the private respondent
received the petitioner's notice of assessment, it filed its letter of
protest. This was apparently not taken into account before the
warrant of distraint and levy was issued; indeed, such protest
could not be located in the office of the petitioner. It was only
after Atty. Guevara gave the BIR a copy of the protest that it
was, if at all, considered by the tax authorities. During the
intervening period, the warrant was premature and could
therefore not be served.
TAXATION
12
(a) Expenses:
(1) In general.--All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered; ... 22
TAXATION
13
are not paid wholly for services rendered, but the excessive
payments are a distribution of earnings upon the stock. . . .
(Promulgated Feb. 11, 1931, 30 O.G. No. 18, 325.)
It is worth noting at this point that most of the payees were not
in the regular employ of Algue nor were they its controlling
stockholders. 23
TAXATION
14
158 SCRA 9
158 SCRA 9
Facts:
The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company (PSEDC).
Appointed Algue Inc. as its agent. Algue received a commission of
125,000.00 and it was from their commission that it paid organizers
of VOICP 75,000.00 in proportional fees. He received an assessment
from the CIR. He filed a letter of protest or reconsideration. The CIR
contends that the claimed deduction was properly disallowed because
it was not an ordinary, reasonable or necessary expense.
Ruling:
No. taxes are the lifeblood of the government and should be collected
without unnecessary hindrance. Every person who is able to pay must
contribute his share in the running of the government. The government
for its part is expected to respond in the form of tangible and
intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people and
enhance their moral and material values. This symbiotic relationship is
the rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that is
an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power.
TAXATION
15
It appears that the action for eminent domain was filed on May
20, 1986, docketed as Civil Case No. 13699. Attached to
petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account
(Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been opened with the
PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the
sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the provisions of Pres.
Decree No. 42. After due hearing where the parties presented
their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of the
property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision on June 4,
1987, fixing the appraised value of the property at
P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus
the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier
released to private respondent.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Judge RTC of Makati,
Branch CXLII ADMIRAL FINANCE CREDITORS
CONSORTIUM, INC., and SHERIFF SILVINO R.
PASTRANA,respondents.
TAXATION
16
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17
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18
In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June 4,
1987 is not disputed by petitioner. No appeal was taken
therefrom. For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed
possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its
inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just
compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the
property since the same has been the site of Makati West High
School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not
condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation
arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. It
cannot be over-emphasized that, within the context of the State's
inherent power of eminent domain,
. . . [j]ust compensation means not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land
but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss
[Cosculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393, 400. See also
Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, G.R.
TAXATION
19
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20
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21
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Facts
An expropriation proceeding was filed by the Municipality of
Makati, herein petitioner, against the private property of Arceli
Jo. In compliance to PD 42, the petitioner opened an account
under its name at PNB depositing an amount of P417,510.00.
The court fixed the appraised value of the expropriated property
at P5,291,666.00 and an advanced payment was made in the
amount of P338,160 leaving a balance of P4,953,506. After the
decision becomes final and executory, the private respondent
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. A notice of
garnishment was thereafter issued by the court to the PNB
account. A manifestation was filed by the petitioner informing
the court that the private respondent was no longer the true
owner of the expropriated property. The court consolidated the
ownership of the property to PSB as a mortgagee/purchaser. The
private respondent and PSB agreed to divide the compensation
due from the expropriation proceeding. The judge ordered PNB
to immediately release to them the sum of P4,953.506
corresponding to the balance of the appraised value of the
expropriated property. The PNB bank manager refused as he is
waiting for the approval of their head office. The Municipality of
Makati contends that its fund with DBP could neither be be
22
Issue
Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the
expropriation proceeding ?
Held
The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two
existing accounts with PNB. Account A was the one intended for
the expropriation proceeding and account B is primarily
intended for financing governmental functions and activities.
Because account A has a fund that is insufficient to meet the
remaining amount of its balance for the expropriation
proceeding, it is unlawful to get the remaining balance from
Account B without an ordinance appropriating said funds for
expropriation purpose. Thus the court ruled that account A
maybe levied but not account B. The respondents are without
recourse however should the petitioner refuse to pay its
remaining obligation. Where a municipality refuses without
justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money judgment
TAXATION
23
EN BANC
This Court finds such a plea more than justified. The petition
must be dismissed.
1. It is manifest that the field of state activity has assumed a
much wider scope, The reason was so clearly set forth by retired
Chief Justice Makalintal thus: "The areas which used to be left
to private enterprise and initiative and which the government
was called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was
better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any
24
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25
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26
classification,
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against
petitioner.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerero, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin,
Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Plana, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The petitioner has no cause of action for
prohibition.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
This is a frivolous suit. While the tax rates for compensation
income are lower than those for net income such circumtance
does not necessarily result in lower tax payments for these
receiving compensation income. In fact, the reverse will most
likely be the case; those who file returns on the basis of net
income will pay less taxes because they claim all sort of
deduction justified or not I vote for dismissal.
TAXATION
Sison vs Ancheta
GR No. L-59431, 25 July 1984
27
TAXATION
28
Issue:
Whether or not Section 1 of BP Blg 135 violates the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, while also
violating the rule that taxes must be uniform and equitable
Ruling:
1. No. Assuming that said amount represents a portion of the
75% of his war damage claim which was not paid, the same
would not be deductible as a loss in 1951 because, according to
petitioner, the last installment he received from the War Damage
Commission, together with the notice that no further payment
would be made on his claim, was in 1950. In the circumstance,
said amount would at most be a proper deduction from his 1950
gross income. In the second place, said amount cannot be
considered as a "business asset" which can be deducted as a loss
in contemplation of law because its collection is not enforceable
as a matter of right, but is dependent merely upon the generosity
and magnanimity of the U. S. government. As of the end of
1945, there was absolutely no law under which petitioner could
claim compensation for the destruction of his properties during
the battle for the liberation of the Philippines. And under the
Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the payments of claims by
the War Damage Commission merely depended upon its
discretion to be exercised in the manner it may see lit, but the
non-payment of which cannot give rise to any enforceable right.
TAXATION
2. Yes. It is well known that our internal revenue laws are not
political in nature and as such were continued in force during the
period of enemy occupation and in effect were actually enforced
by the occupation government. As a matter of fact, income tax
returns were filed during that period and income tax payment
29
were effected and considered valid and legal. Such tax laws are
deemed to be the laws of the occupied territory and not of the
occupying enemy.
30
TAXATION
31
found that certain parcels of land were below street level and
were affected by the tides (Rollo, pp. 24-25).
TAXATION
32
In the same vein, the due process clause may be invoked where a
taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the
Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to
amount to confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse
of power (Sison v. Ancheta, supra).
TAXATION
33
by its Rental Freezing Laws (then R.A. No. 6359 and P.D. 20)
under the principle of social justice should not now be penalized
by the same government by the imposition of excessive taxes
petitioners can ill afford and eventually result in the forfeiture of
their properties.
TAXATION
comparable.
Taxes are lifeblood of government, however, such collection
should be made in accordance with the law and therefore
necessary to reconcile conflicting interests of the authorities so
that the real purpose of taxation, promotion of the welfare of
common good can be achieved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not income approach is the method to be used in the
tax assessment and not the comparable sales approach.
RULING:
By no stretch of the imagination can the market value of
properties covered by PD 20 be equated with the market value of
properties not so covered. In the case at bar, not even factors
determinant of the assessed value of subject properties under the
comparable sales approach were presented by respondent
namely:
REYES v. ALMANZOR
GR Nos. L-49839-46, April 26, 1991
196 SCRA 322
TAXATION
35
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36
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37
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38
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39
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3. The tax of one (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.)
of volume capacity on all softdrinks, produced or manufactured,
or an equivalent of 1- centavos per case, 23 cannot be
considered unjust and unfair. 24 an increase in the tax alone
would not support the claim that the tax is oppressive, unjust and
confiscatory. Municipal corporations are allowed much
discretion in determining the reates of imposable taxes. 25 This
is in line with the constutional policy of according the widest
possible autonomy to local governments in matters of local
taxation, an aspect that is given expression in the Local Tax
Code (PD No. 231, July 1, 1973). 26 Unless the amount is so
excessive as to be prohibitive, courts will go slow in writing off
an ordinance as unreasonable. 27 Reluctance should not deter
compliance with an ordinance such as Ordinance No. 27 if the
purpose of the law to further strengthen local autonomy were to
be realized. 28
Finally, the municipal license tax of P1,000.00 per corking
machine with five but not more than ten crowners or P2,000.00
with ten but not more than twenty crowners imposed on
40
41
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43
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44
CONCEPCION, J.:
TAXATION
45
petitioner had "no legal capacity to sue", and that the petition did
"not state a cause of action". In support to this motion,
respondent Zulueta alleged that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal,
not its provincial governor, should represent the Province of
Rizal, pursuant to section 1683 of the Revised Administrative
Code; that said respondent is " not aware of any law which
makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the
improvements of . . . private property"; and that, the
constitutional provision invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to
the donation in question, the same being a pure act of liberality,
not a contract. The other respondents, in turn, maintained that
petitioner could not assail the appropriation in question because
"there is no actual bona fide case . . . in which the validity of
Republic Act No. 920 is necessarily involved" and petitioner
"has not shown that he has a personal and substantial interest" in
said Act "and that its enforcement has caused or will cause him a
direct injury."
TAXATION
46
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47
xxx
xxx
48
Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other statutory
enactments, is subject to exceptions. For instance, the creditors
of a party to an illegal contract may, under the conditions set
forth in Article 1177 of said Code, exercise the rights and actions
of the latter, except only those which are inherent in his person,
including therefore, his right to the annulment of said contract,
even though such creditors are not affected by the same, except
indirectly, in the manner indicated in said legal provision.
Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be
contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, 5upon the theory that "the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
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49
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50
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51
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-7859. December 22, 1955.]
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52
DECISION
TAXATION
53
such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid
and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in
plaintiffs opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be
constitutionally levied. The action having been dismissed by the
Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs appealed the case directly
to this Court (Judiciary Act, section 17).
TAXATION
54
Even from the standpoint that the Act is a pure tax measure, it
cannot be said that the devotion of tax money to experimental
stations to seek increase of efficiency in sugar production,
utilization of by- products and solution of allied problems, as
well as to the improvement of living and working conditions in
sugar mills or plantations, without any part of such money being
channeled directly to private persons, constitutes expenditure of
tax money for private purposes, (compare Everson v. Board of
Education, 91 L. Ed. 472, 168 ALR 1392, 1400).
TAXATION
55
limitation.
56
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57
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58
59
TAXATION
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed
primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
60
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive
which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor
one industry over another.
TAXATION
61
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62
The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not
brought about the "demise" of the video industry. On the
contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in
many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
TAXATION
63
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive
which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor
one industry over another.
TAXATION
64
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30232 July 29, 1988
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitionerappellant,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the HONORABLE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondentsappellees.
H. San Luis & V.L. Simbulan for petitioner-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the October 21, 1968 Decision *
of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 1484, "Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation v. Hon. Ramon Oben, Commissioner,
Bureau of Internal Revenue", denying the various claims for tax
refund; and the February 20, 1969 Resolution of the same court
denying the motion for reconsideration.
Herein petitioner-appellant, in 1961 and 1962, for the repair and
maintenance of its tugboats, imported various engine parts and
other equipment for which it paid, under protest, the assessed
compensating tax. Unable to secure a tax refund from the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on January 2, 1964, it filed a
Petition for Review (Rollo, pp. 14-18) with the Court of Tax
Appeals, docketed therein as CTA Case No. 1484, praying
among others, that it be granted the refund of the amount of
TAXATION
65
II
The lower court erred in not holding that the business in which
petitioner-appellant is engaged, is part and parcel of the shipping
industry.
III
TAXATION
66
On the other hand, respondents-appellees counter that petitionerappellant's "tugboats" are not "Cargo vessel" because they are
neither designed nor used for carrying and/or transporting
persons or goods by themselves but are mainly employed for
towing and pulling purposes. As such, it cannot be claimed that
the tugboats in question are used in carrying and transporting
passengers or cargoes as a common carrier by water, either
coastwise or oceangoing and, therefore, not within the purview
of Section 190 of the Tax Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 3176 (Brief for Respondents-Appellees, pp. 45).
This Court has laid down the rule that "as the power of taxation
is a high prerogative of sovereignty, the relinquishment is never
presumed and any reduction or dimunition thereof with respect
to its mode or its rate, must be strictly construed, and the same
must be coached in clear and unmistakable terms in order that it
may be applied." (84 C.J.S. pp. 659-800), More specifically
stated, the general rule is that any claim for exemption from the
tax statute should be strictly construed against the taxpayer
(Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Co. et al.,
69 SCRA 469 [1977] and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
P.J. Kiener Co. Ltd., et al., 65 SCRA 142 [1975]).
TAXATION
67
Luzon Stevedoring Corp v Court of Tax Appeals GR No L30232, July 29, 1988
FACTS:
Luzon Stevedoring Corp imported various engine parts and other
equipment for tugboat repair and maintenance in 1961 and 1962.
It paid the assessed compensation tax under protest. Unable to
secure a tax refund from the Commissioner for the amount of
P33,442.13, it filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax
Appeals. The CTA denied the petition as well as the motion for
reconsideration filed thereafter. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the Corporation exempt from compensation tax?
TAXATION
RULING:
No. As the power of taxation is a high prerogative of
sovereignty, the relinquishment of such is never presumed and
any reduction or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or
68
TAXATION
69
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71
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72
from paying PPA any fee or charge because: 1. The wharf and its
facilities are built and installed on its own land; 2. Repairs and
maintenance are solely paid by it; 3. Maintenance and dredging of the
channel are done by the Company personnel;4. At not time has the
government paid any centavo for such activities.
HELD:
ISSUE:
WON the Victorias Milling Co. claim of exception for PPA fees is
meritorious.
No, the petitioners claim that there is no basis for the PPA to assess
and impose the dues and charge is devoid of merit. As correctly stated
by the Solicitor General, the fees and charges PPA collects are not for
the use of the wharf that petitioner owns but for the privilege of
navigating in public waters, of entering and leaving public harbours
and berthing on public streams or waters. As to the requirement to
remit 10% of the handling charges,Section 6B-(ix) of the Presidential
Decree No. 857 authorized the PPA "To levy dues, rates, or charges
for the use of the premises, works, appliances, facilities, or for
services provided by or belonging to the Authority, or any organization
concerned with port operations." This 10% government shareof
earnings of arrastre and stevedoring operators is in the nature of
contractual compensation to which a person desiring to operate
arrastre service must agree as a condition to the grant of the permit to
operate.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., concur in the result.
VICTORIAS MILLING CO. V PPA 153 SCRA 317; August 27, 1987
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of theJuly 27, 1984 Decision
of the Office of the Presidential Assistant For Legal Affairs dismissing
the appeal from the adverse ruling of the Philippine Ports Authority on
the sole ground that the same was filed beyond the reglementary
period.On April 28, 1981, the Iloilo Port Manager of respondent
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA for short) wrote petitioner Victorias
Milling Co., requiring it to have its tug boats and barges undergo
harbor formalities and pay entrance/clearance fees as well as
berthing fees effective May 1, 1981. PPA,likewise, requiring petitioner
to secure a permit for cargo handling operations at its Da-an Banua
wharf and remit 10%of its gross income for said operations as the
government's share. Victorias Milling Co. maintained that it is except
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