G.R. No.

L-30272 February 28, 1985

RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
CONSUELO C. VILLAREAL, ISABEL C.
VILLAREAL, FLAVIANO C. VILLAREAL,
ALFREDO V. GOMEZ, AURORA V.
GOMEZ and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Cuevas, J.
FACTS: Respondents are applicants for
the registration of two agricultural
lands located in Rizal. They presented
testimonial and documentary evidence
appearing that the property applied
for, designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of
Plan Psu-147662, have a total area of
26,015 sq. m.; that these lots
originally belong to one Maria Certeza;
that upon her death, the property was
involved in a litigation between her
grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza,
and that the lots were given by the
latter to Justice de Joya as the latters
attorneys fees; that the lots were then
sold by de Joya to Filomeno Sta.
Ana,who in turn sold the same to
spouses Victoriano Cervo and Ignacia
Guillermo in 1939; that sometime in
November 1955, the said spouses sold
the lots to herein applicants as shown
by a duly notarized deed of sale. The
spouses Cervo declared the property
for taxation purposes in the name of
the wife, Ignacia Guillermo, and paid
for the realty taxes thereon; that prior
to the sale, the spouses Cervo had the
two lots surveyed first in 1950 and
then in 1955. On the other hand,
oppositor (Rizal Cement Company)
claims to be the owner of the subject
lots, having bought the same from
Maria Certeza, and to have been in
continuous and adverse possession of
the property since 1911. To
substantiate this claim, petitioner
submitted documentary evidence, one
of which is a tax declaration of the
said lots. The Court of First Instance
denied the application for registration
of respondents and ordered the
issuance of a decree of registration in
the name of Rizal Cement Co., after
finality of said decision. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the CFI. The CA
denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration. Hence, this petition

was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents
had been in actual possession of the
land in question.
HELD: Yes. The CA gave credence to
the testimony of the witnesses for
respondents namely: 1. Santiago Picadizo
(one of the tenants of the land); 2. Isaac
Reyes (worked on of the 2 parcels of land
since 1934 to the present); 3. Mr. Valentin
Marqueza (rebuttal witness who averred
that h ebegan to live in Rizal since 1910
after buying a portion of the property from
Maria Certeza and avers that Rizal Cement
intended to make a factory by building a
small house which was later on removed,
and that Rizal Cement did not take
possession of the land and that it was Maria
As a general rule, it is provided in the
Civil Code that possession is acquired
by the material occupation of a thing
or the exercise of a right or by the fact
that it is subject to the action of our
will, or by the proper acts or legal
formalities established for acquiring
such right. Petitioners evidence,
consisting of tax receipts, tax
declaration and survey plan are not
conclusive and indisputable basis of
ones ownership of the property in
question. Assessment alone is of little
value as proof of title. Mere tax
declaration does not vest ownership of
the property upon defendant.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. DE LOS
ANGELES
35 SCRA 102
FACTS:
On November 2, 1960, UP and
ALUMCO entered into a logging
agreement whereby the latter was
granted exclusive authority to cut,
collect and remove timber from the
Land Grant for a period starting from
the date of
agreement to December 31, 1965,
extendible for a period of 5 years by
mutual agreement.
On December 8, 1964, ALUMCO
incurred an
unpaid account of P219,362.94.
Despite repeated demands, ALUMCO

still failed to pay, so UP sent a notice

to rescind the logging agreement. On
the other hand, ALUMCO executed an
instrument entitled
Acknowledgment of Debt and
Proposed Manner of Payments. It was
approved by the president of UP,
which stipulated the following:
3. In the event that the payments
called for are not sufficient to liquidate
the foregoing indebtedness, the
balance outstanding after the said
payments have been applied shall be
paid by the debtor in full no later than
June 30, 1965.
5. In the event that the debtor fails to
comply with any of its promises, the
Debtor agrees without reservation that
Creditor shall have the right to
consider the Logging Agreement
rescinded, without the necessity of
any judicial suit ALUMCO continued
its logging operations, but again
incurred an unpaid account. On July
19,1965, UP informed ALUMCO that it
had, as of that date, considered
rescinded and of no further legal effect
the logging agreement, and that UP
had already taken steps to have
another concessionaire take over the
logging operation. ALUMCO filed a
petition to enjoin UP from conducting
the bidding. The lower court ruled in

favor of ALUMCO, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Can petitioner UP treat its contract
with ALUMCO rescinded, and may
disregard the same before any judicial
pronouncement to that effect?
RULING:
Yes. In the first place, UP and ALUMCO
had
expressly stipulated that upon default
by the debtor, UP has the right and
the power to consider the Logging
Agreement of December 2, 1960 as
rescinded without the necessity of any
judicial suit. As to such special
stipulation
and in connection with Article 1191 of
the Civil Code, the Supreme Court,
stated in Froilan vs. Pan Oriental
Shipping Co:
There is nothing in the law that
prohibits the
parties from entering into agreement
that violation of the terms of the
contract would cause cancellation
thereof, even without court
intervention. In other words, it is not
always
necessary for the injured party to
resort to court for rescission of the
contract.